1. Albetz Investment, Inc. v. CA and sps.
Calma
(G.R. No. L-32570, February 28, 1977)
SUMMARY:
 This is an action for damages caused to the plaintiffs’ properties due to the
alleged indiscriminate, negligent, and wanton demolition of the house of the
plaintiffs when the sheriff served the writ of execution issued by the
Municipal Court.
FACTS:
 The Calma spouses (Ricardo and Vicenta) were lessees of the lot described
as Lot No. 27 pt., Block No. BP-52 of a subdivision plan and located at No.
816 Prudencio St., Sampaloc, Manila.
 Albetz Investments, Inc., the lessor needing the premises in order to
construct a new building, demanded delivery of the lot to it.
 Upon refusal of the Calma Spouses, Albetz Investments, Inc. brought an
action of unlawful detainer against Vicente Calma
 Judgment by default was by the MTC ordering Vicenta and all persons
claiming under her to vacate the premises and to pay the corresponding
rentals.
 Judgment became final and Atty. Meneses, director and lawyer of Albetz,
filed a motion for execution.
 MTC granted the motion. MTC issued writ of execution commanding the
Sheriff to remove the defendants in the premises and to collect the
damages.
 Sheriff submitted his return informing the Court that defendant has not yet
demolished her house and improvements or vacated the lot.
 Vicenta filed for certiorari with preliminary injuction in CFI of Manila. Upon
filing of this petition, counsel for Vicenta filed a motion in the unlawful
detainer case praying that all proceedings be suspended until termination of
the petition for certiorari with prohibition. Municipal Judge granted the
petition and suspended all the proceedings in the unlawful detainer case.
 CFI denied the petition for certiorari.
 Atty. Meneses filed a motion for demolition -> opposed by Vicenta ->
Municipal Judge granting the motion ordered Vicenta to vacate and remove
her house on the premises within 30 days upon receipt, otherwise a
demolition order would issue -> Vicenta failed to comply -> the Court issued
an order on June 21, 1965 authorizing and ordering the Sheriff to destroy,
demolish or remove the house of Vicenta.
 The SC dismissed the appeal of the Calmas in the certiorari case.
 Spouses Calma filed an action for specific performance with injunction
against Albetz praying that the latter be ordered to sell the lot to the Calmas
at a reasonable price. SC dismissed the petition on Feb. 15, 1966.
 Four (4) days thereafter, February 19, 1966, the Sheriff demolished the
house of the Calmas WITHOUT any new writ or order for demolition
following only the order of June 21, 1965.
 Spouses Calma filed for damages in the CFI of Manila. CFI rendered
judgment in favor of the spouses. CA affirmed CFI’s decision.
ISSUE:
 Whether or not the demolition executed by the Sheriff at the instance of
Albetz Investments, Inc. and Atty. Meneses constitutes a malicious,
indiscriminate, and wanton character.
HELD:
 Yes. According to the Supreme Court although Albetz Investment had the
legal rights to the surrender to them of the parcel of land leased by the
Calma spouses, which could only be achieved thru the demolition of the
house standing thereon, nevertheless, such right should not have been
exercised in such a manner as to unduly prejudice its owners. As found by
the trial court and the CA, “In the course of the demolition, which was,
according to the evidence for the plaintiffs, indiscriminate, the personal
properties were just carelessly placed between the house and the fence, and
then were left in the house and they were damaged by falling debris. As here
was no one to take care of them, many of the properties are lost.
 Under Art. 19 of the New Civil Code, “Every person must, in the exercise of
his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. Certainly, the
demolition complained of in the case at bar was not carried out in a manner
consistent with justice and good faith. At the instance of petitioner, it was
done in a swift, unconscionable manner, giving the occupants of the house
no time at all to remove their belongings therefrom. No damage worth
mentioning would have been sustained by petitioner Albetz Investments, Inc.
if their men, led by the Sheriff, had been instructed to allow said occupants
to remove their personal properties, considering that this would not have
taken a considerable length of time.
2. CASE TITLE: VELAYO, in his capacity as assignee of the insolvent
COMMERCIAL AIR LINES, INC. (CALI) vs SHELL COMPANY
[G.R. No. L-7817 Date October 31, 1956]
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: Civil Law: Basic Concepts in Human Relations Acting with
Justice
FACTS:
• Commercial Air Lines, Inc. (CALI) is engaged in air transportation business.
Since the start of its operation, defendant Shell Company supplies its fuel
needs. Mr. Fitzgerald, its credit manager who extended credit to CALI, was in
charge of the collection thereof.
 CALI owed P170k to Shell and offered its C-54 plane, at the time was
located in California as payment to Shell but declined as it thought that CALI
had sufficient money to pay its debt.
 CALI called upon an informal meeting among its creditors:
o It was insolvent and had to stop operations
o Memorandum agreement executed by CALI to Philippine Airlines
regarding the proposed sale to the latter of the aviation equipments
o Presented balance sheets showing their assets including the C54
plane involved in the suit wherein there was a general
understanding and desirability to consummate the sale
 o Agreed to appoint representatives to a working committee to
determine the order of preference to how each creditor should be
paid and agreed not to file suit against CALI
o In return, CALI did reserve that it will file insolvency proceedings
should its assets be not enough to pay them up.
 The working committee convened to discuss how CALI’s assets would be
divided amongst the creditors but while such was pending, Fitzgerald sent a
message to Shell USA advising the latter that Shell Philippines is assigning
its $79k credit to Shell USA
o Thereby effectively collecting almost all of CALI’s indebtedness to
Shell Philippines
o Shell USA found out that CALI has a C-54 plane in California and
petitioned before a Californian court to have the plane by the
subject of a writ of attachment which was granted
 Meanwhile, CALI stockholders were unaware of the credit assignment made
by Shell Philippines to Shell USA and went on to approve the sale of CALI’s
asset to Philippine Airlines. In September 1948, the other creditors learned
about the assignment made by Shell
o This prompted other creditors to file their own complaint of
attachment against CALI’s assets
o CALI then filed for insolvency proceedings to protect its assets in
the Philippines from being attached.
 Alfredo Pelayo’s unanimously elected by the creditors as CALI’s assignee
was confirmed by the Court in lieu of the insolvency proceeding
 In order for Velayo to recover the plane, he filed for a write of injunction
against Shell Philippines in order for the latter to restrain Shell USA from
proceeding with the attachment and in the alternative that judgement be
awarded in favour of CALI for damages double the amount of the C-54
plane.
 The plane was not recovered
o Shell Company argued that it is not liable for damages because
there is nothing in the law which prohibits a company from
assigning its credit since it was also common practice
ISSUE(S): Whether or not Shell is liable for damages considering that it did not
violate any law
HELD: Yes, the basis of such liability, in the absent of law, Art. 21 Civil Code.
“Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.”
• Thus the defendant should be liable for indemnity for acts it committed in
bad faith and with betrayal of confidence.
• It cannot be alleged that in the case at bar, the defendant had any vested or
acquired right to betray the confidence of the insolvent CALI or its
creditors-said new provisions, like those on Human Relations, can be
given retroactive effect.
• Art. 2254. “no vested or acquired right can arise from acts or omissions
which are against the law or which infringe upon the rights of others”
• A moral wrong or injury, even if it does not constitute violation of a statute law,
should be compensated by damages wherein, moral damages may be
recovered
• There is no clear proof in the record about the real value of CALI’s plane C-54
at the time when defendant’s credit was assigned to its sister corporation
in the US
Felipe v. Leuterio
FACTS:
 In a benefit inter-collegiate oratorical contest in Naga, Camarines Sur, the
judges of the said competition decided to give Nestor Nosce the first honor
and to Emma Imperial, the second honor.
 After four days, Emma addressed a letter to the board of judges questioning
the decision, alleging that there was a mathematical mistake which led to her
getting second place only, instead of the first.
 The Board refused change their award.
 Emma then filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance.
o It appeared that Nestor Nosce and Emma Imperial tied for the first
place, and the chairman, with the consent of the board, broke the
tie and awarded the first honors to Nosce and the second to
Imperial.
 However, it was discovered by Imperial that one of the judges, Delfin
Rodriguez, gave a score 1 point higher than what was recorded, as he made
an error in adding up Imperial’s scores.
 This being the case, Imperial asserts that there should have been no tie at
all.
 However, the paper where Delfin Rodriguez placed his scores did not
specify which criteria he was scoring, and this was the reason for the refusal
of the board to reverse its decision.
ISSUE:
May the issue be brought to the Court to reverse the decision of the board of judges?
HELD:
 No. The CFI erred in assuming jurisdiction over the matter with the
reasoning that there was a wrong that must be remedied by the Courts.
 This mistake in reasoning lies in the assumption that Imperial suffered a
wrong at the hands of the judges. However, there was none. At the most,
only an error was committed.
 With no wrong committed, there was no deprivation of rights.
 Incidentally, a contestant has no right to the prize until he or she is declared
the winner.
 If fraud or malice was present and proven, Imperial’s action would then be
directed against the individual judge or judges who fraudulently or
maliciously injured her and not against the whole.
3. Fonancier vs. Court of Appeals
 - This case was instituted in the CFI of Manila by the Iglesia Filipina
Indpendiente, represented by Supreme Bishop Gerardo M. Bayaca, against
Santiago A. Fonancier, seeking to require the latter to render .n accounting
of his administration of all the temporal properties in his possession
belonging to said church, and to recover the same on the ground that he is
no longer the supreme bishop of the said religious organization.
FACTS
 On September 2, 1945, the Consejo Supremo de Obispos (Supreme Council
of Bishops) of the Iglesia Filipina Independiente (IFI) convened and
approved the designation of bishops to their respective bishoprics. Here
began the conflict which culminated in the division.
 Alejandro Remollino was assigned as bishop of the diocese of Cavite. Upon
learning that the latter notified the priests of his bishopric regarding his
assignment, Monsignor Fonacier wrote him a letter dated September 18,
1945 enjoining him from assuming the duties of his office and from taking
possession of the diocese of Cavite until he (Fonacier) had approved the
appointment made by the Supreme Council.
 On December 1, Bishop Manuel Aguilar filed charges against Monsignor
Fonacier as Supreme Bishop which were submitted to a meeting of the
Supreme Council of Bishops held on January 21 of the following year and
same charges were submitted to the Asemblea Magna or Asemblea General
of the church held the following day. This body approved the forced
resignation of petitioner and elected Bishop Bacaya as Supreme Bishop to
succeed Fonacier. Fonacier, when informed of his removal, refused to turn
over all the funds, documents and other properties of the church to his
successor.
 On September 1, 1946, the Asemblea convened and elected Monsignor
Isabelo de los Reyes Jr., as Supreme Bishop. Meanwhile, on the same date,
Monsignor Fonacier and some of his followers met at the Manila Hotel and
elected Monsignor Juan Jamias as their Supreme Bishop.
ISSUE : Whether or not the civil courts have jurisdiction in ecclesiastical matters
RULING
Where a decision of an ecclesiastical court plainly violates the law it professes to
administer, or is in conflict with the laws of the land, it will not be followed by the civil
courts. In some instances, not only have the civil courts assumed the right to inquire
into the jurisdiction of religious tribunals and the regularity of their procedure, but they
have subjected their decisions to the test of fairness or to the test furnished by the
constitution and laws of the church. Thus, it has been held that expulsion of a
member without notice or an opportunity to be heard is not conclusive upon the civil
courts when a property right is involved.
Where there is a schism that leads to a separation into distinct and conflicting bodies,
the rights of such bodies to the use of the property must be determined by ordinary
principles, which govern voluntary associations. If the principle of government in such
cases is that the majority rules, then the numerical majority of members must control
the right to the use of the property. If there be within the congregation officers in
whom are vested the powers of such control, then those who adhere in the
acknowledged organism by which the body is governed are entitled to the use of the
property. The minority in choosing to separate themselves into a distinct body, and
refusing to recognize the authority of the government body, can claim no rights in the
property from the fact that they had once been members of the church or
congregation. Herein, the properties of the IFI are held by a religious congregation,
and that the numerical majority is on the side of the faction of Mons. de los Reyes, et.
al. where the number of its bishops and priests, as of 22 January 1948, were 293 as
against 64 of Mons. Fonacier's group.
The amendments of the constitution, restatement of articles of religion and
abandonment of faith or abjuration alleged by Mons. Fonacier, having to do with faith,
practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church
and having reference to the power of excluding from the church those allegedly
unworthy of membership, are unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside
the province of the civil courts.
5. Baksh vs CA
 In August 1986, while working as a waitress in Dagupan City, Pangasinan,
Marilou Gonzales, then 21 years old, met Gashem Shookat Baksh, a 29
year old exchange student from Iran who was studying medicine in
Dagupan. The two got really close and intimate.
 On Marilou’s account, she said that Gashem later offered to marry her at the
end of the semester.
 Marilou then introduced Gashem to her parents where they expressed their
intention to get married.
 Marilou’s parents then started inviting sponsors and relatives to the wedding.
They even started looking for animals to slaughter for the occasion.
 Meanwhile, Marilou started living with Gashem in his apartment where they
had sexual intercourse.
 But in no time, their relationship went sour as Gashem began maltreating
Marilou. Gashem eventually revoked his promise of marrying Marilou and he
told her that he is already married to someone in Bacolod City. So Marilou
went home and later sued Gashem for damages.
 The trial court ruled in favor of Marilou and awarded her P20k in moral
damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
 On appeal, Gashem averred that he never proposed marriage to Marilou
and that he cannot be adjudged to have violated Filipino customs and
traditions since he, being an Iranian, was not familiar with Filipino customs
and traditions.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct.
HELD:
 Yes. Gashem is liable to pay for damages in favor of Marilou not really
because of his breach of promise to marry her but based on Article 21 of the
Civil Code which provides:
o Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy
shall compensate the latter for the damage.
 Breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong per se. In this case, it
is the deceit and fraud employed by Gashem that constitutes a violation of
Article 21 of the Civil Code.
 His promise of marrying Marilou was a deceitful scheme to lure her into
sexual congress.
 As found by the trial court, Marilou was not a woman of loose morals. She
was a virgin before she met Gashem.
 She would not have surrendered herself to Gashem had Gashem not
promised to marry her.
 Gashem’s blatant disregard of Filipino traditions on marriage and on the
reputation of Filipinas is contrary to morals, good customs, and public policy.
 As a foreigner who is enjoying the hospitality of our country and even taking
advantage of the opportunity to study here he is expected to respect our
traditions. Any act contrary will render him liable under Article 21 of the Civil
Code.
 The Supreme Court also elucidated that Article 21 was meant to expand the
concepts of torts and quasi delict.
 It is meant to cover situations such as this case where the breach
complained of is not strictly covered by existing laws.
 It was meant as a legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which
is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the
statute books – such as the absence of a law penalizing a the breach of
promise to marry.
 The Supreme Court however agreed with legal luminaries that if the promise
to marry was made and there was carnal knowledge because of it, then
moral damages may be recovered (presence of moral or criminal seduction),
Except if there was mutual lust; or if expenses were made because of the
promise (expenses for the wedding), then actual damages may be
recovered.
6. Domalagan v. Bolifer
FACTS:
 In 1909, Domalagan and Bolifer entered into an agreement in which
Domalagan will pay Bolifer P500 upon the marriage of their children.
 Domalagan delivered the P500 to Bolifer with the additional P16 as a token
of the future marriage.
 Notwithstanding the agreement, Bolifer’s daughter married another person
(Laureano Sisi) in 1910.
 Domalagan demanded the return of the P516 with the interest and damages
therefrom
 Domalagan alleged that he suffered damages because he had to sell certain
real property in Bohol to fulfill his obligation.
 Bolifer denied the existence of the contract. He also alleged that, through the
facts, Domalagan did not have a cause of action to institute the suit.
 The CFI ruled in favor of Domalagan, it stated that Domalagan delivered
P516 to Bolifer in consideration of the agreement. Domalagan sought the
return of the money, but Bolifer would not deliver it. Also, there is no proof
that Domalagan had suffered any additional damages.
 The CFI ordered Bolifer to return the P516 with an interest of 6 percent.
ISSUE:
 W/N Domalagan delivered P516 to Bolifer that would give rise to the suit
 W/N a verbal contract entered into by the parties is valid and effective
*(Note: The contract is the delivery of the money by reason of a prospective
marriage)*
HELD:
First Issue: A Question of Fact
 The lower court found that a large preponderance of evidence showed that
Domalagan had delivered to Bolifer the sum of P516 in the same manner as
alleged in the complaint.
 It is a well-settled rule that the findings of fact of the trial court are to be held
in great regard, for it is the trial court who saw and heard the witnesses
themselves, and are in a proper position to judge the genuineness of the
witnesses.
 Also, there is an abundance of uncontradicted evidence that support the
findings of the lower court. Thus, this court is not inclined to disturb its
findings and judgment.
Second Issue: Validity of a verbal contract
 Appellant contends that by virtue of paragraph 3 of section 335 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, Domalagan could not recover because the agreement
was merely verbal and not reduced into writing.
 Appelant argued that for the contract to be valid, it must be reduced into
writing.
The court is unimpressed
 Said law does not render oral contracts invalid, but merely unenforceable.
 Said law provides that the contract shall not be enforced by an action unless
the same is evidenced by some note or memorandum.
 The foregoing law only provides the method by which contracts may be
proved. It does not declare that verbal contracts are invalid.
 A contract may be perfectly valid even though it is not clothed with the
necessary form.
  In this case, if the contract was not made in conformity with the said law,
then it cannot be proved, if the proper objection was made.
 Also, failure to object to the evidence presented in order to prove the
contract, is a waiver of the provisions of law.
 During the trial of the case, Bolifer made no objection to the admissibility of
oral evidence to support the disputed contract, and ultimately permitted the
contract to be proved by evidence other than a writing.
 Such a contract that was not objected would be just as binding upon the
parties as if it had been reduced to writing.
Judgment is affirmed
7. PASEO REALTY vs. COURT OF APPEALS, COURT OF TAX APPEALS, G.R. No.
119286, October 13, 2004
Taxation is a destructive power which interferes with the personal and property
rights of the people and takes from them a portion of their property for the
support of the government. And since taxes are what we pay for civilized society, or
are the lifeblood of the nation, the law frowns against exemptions from taxation and
statutes granting tax exemptions are thus construed strictissimi juris against the
taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority. A claim of refund or exemption
from tax payments must be clearly shown and be based on language in the law too
plain to be mistaken. Taxation is the rule; exemption therefrom is the exception.
I. FACTS:
In 1990, petitioner filed its Income Tax Return for the calendar year 1989 declaring a
credit balance of P172,477.00.
In 1991, petitioner filed a claim for the refund of excess creditable withholding and
income taxes for the years 1989 and 1990. According to petitioner:
Respondent Court dismissed the petition, stating that “petitioner’s 1989 Corporate
Income Tax Return indicated that the amount of P54,104.00 has already been
automatically applied by the petitioner as tax credit for the succeeding taxable year
1990”.
“Petitioner did not specify in its return the amount to be refunded and the amount to
be applied as tax credit to the succeeding taxable year, but merely marked an ‘x’ to
the box indicating ‘to be applied as tax credit to the succeeding taxable year’.
xxx Thus, there is really nothing left to be refunded to petitioner for the year 1989. To
grant petitioner’s claim for refund is tantamount to granting twice the refund herein
sought to be refunded, to the prejudice of the Government.”
Petitioner filed a Petition for Review insisting that the issue in this case is not whether
the amount of P54,104.00 was included as tax credit to be applied against its 1990
income tax liability; but whether the same amount was actually applied as tax credit
for 1990. Petitioner claims that there is no need to show that the amount of
P54,104.00 had not been automatically applied against its 1990 income tax liability
because the appellate court’s decision in C.A.-G.R. Sp. No. 32890 clearly held that
petitioner charged its 1990 income tax liability against its tax credit for 1988 and not
1989.
II. ISSUE:
1) Whether petitioner is entitled to a refund of P54,104.00.
2) Whether petitioner applied such creditable taxes withheld to its 1990 income
tax liability.
III. RULING
1) No.
Other than its own bare allegations, petitioner offers no proof that its creditable
tax of P172,477.00 was applied as claimed above.
Nowhere in the case referred to by petitioner did the Court of Appeals make a
categorical determination that petitioner’s tax liability for 1990 was applied against its
1988 tax credit.
The confusion as to petitioner’s entitlement to a refund could have been avoided had
it presented its tax return for 1990. As it is, we only have petitioner’s allegation that its
tax due for 1990 was P33,240.00 and that this was applied against its remaining tax
credits using its own “first in, first out” method of computation.
The grant of a refund is founded on the assumption that the tax return is
valid, i.e., that the facts stated therein are true and correct. Without the tax return, it is
error to grant a refund since it would be virtually impossible to determine whether the
proper taxes have been assessed and paid.
A claimant has the burden of proof to establish the factual basis of his or her claim for
tax credit or refund. Tax refunds, like tax exemptions, are construed strictly against
“P172,477.00 Amount indicated in petitioner’s 1989 tax return to be
applied as tax credit for the succeeding taxable year
– 25,623.00 Claim for refund in CTA
P146,854.00 Balance as of April 16, 1990
– 59,510.00 Claim for refund in CTA (granted) (C.A.-G.R. Sp. No.
32890)
P87,344.00 Balance as of January 2, 1991
– 33,240.00 Income tax liability for calendar year 1990
P54,104.00 Balance as of April 15, 1991 now subject of the instant
claim for refund
the taxpayer.
2) Yes.
Section 76 of Republic Act No. 8424 emphasizes that it is imperative to indicate in the
tax return or the final adjustment return whether a tax credit or refund is sought by
(through ticking of the box) making the taxpayer’s choice irrevocable.
Contrary to petitioner’s assertion, the taxpayer’s election, signified by the
ticking of boxes in Item 10 of BIR Form No. 1702, is not a mere technical exercise. It
aids in the proper management of claims for refund or tax credit by leading tax
authorities to the direction they should take in addressing the claim.
Parenthetically, while a taxpayer is given the choice whether to claim for refund or
have its excess taxes applied as tax credit for the succeeding taxable year, such
election is not final. Prior verification and approval by the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue is required. The availment of the remedy of tax credit is not absolute and
mandatory. It does not confer an absolute right on the taxpayer to avail of the tax
credit scheme if it so chooses. Neither does it impose a duty on the part of the
government to sit back and allow an important facet of tax collection to be at the sole
control and discretion of the taxpayer.
8. JOSE J. FERRER, JR. v. CITY MAYOR HERBERT BAUTISTA, CITY COUNCIL
OF QC, CITY TREASUERER OF QC, AND CITY ASSESSOR OF QC
GR 210551 JUNE 30, 2015
Petition for certiorari under rule 65 of Rules of Court (ROC) with prayer for issuance
of a temporary restraining order (TRO) seeking to declare unconstitutional and illegal
Ordinance Nos. SP-2095, S-2011 and SP-2235, S-2013 on the Socialized Housing
Tax and Garbage Free imposed by the respondents
FACTS:
oOct. 17, 2011 – respondent City Council enacted Ordinance No. SP-2095, S-
2011 or the Socialized Housing Tax (SHT) of Quezon City
 Section 3. IMPOSITION - where a special assessment
equivalent to ½ percent (0.5%) on the assessed value of the land in
excess of P100,000.00 shall be collected by the city treasurer
which shall accrue to the Socialized Housing Programs in QC
 Section 7. TAX CREDIT – taxpayers dutifully paying the special
assessment tax as imposed by this ordinance shall enjoy a tax
credit which may be availed of:
1. only after 5 years of continued payment
2. the taxpayer must be in good standing as certified by
the city treasurer and city assessor
3. only by the registered owner
The tax credit shall be equivalent to the total amount of the special
assessment paid by the property owner
oThe SHT shall be effective for 5 years for the following projects:
1. land purchase/ land banking
2. improvement of current or existing socialized housing facilities
3. land development
4. construction of core houses, sanitary cores, medium-rise buildings &
other similar structures
5. financing of public-private partnership agreement of QC and National
Housing Authority (NHA) with the private sector
oDec. 16, 2013 – Ordinance No. SP-2235, S-2013 was enacted and took
effect 10 days after its approval. The garbage fees on residential properties
shall be deposited solely and exclusively in an earmarked special account
under the general fund to be utilized for garbage collections
 The collection of the garbage fees shall accrue on the first day of
January and shall be paid simultaneously with the payment of the
real property tax
 In case the owner refuses to pay, a penalty of 25% of garbage
fee due, plus 2% interest per month shall be charged
oPetitioner alleges that he is a registered co-owner of a residential property in
QC and that on Jan. 7, 2014, he paid his realty tax which already included the
garbage fee
oInstant petition was filed on Jan. 17, 2014 and a TRO was issued on Feb. 5,
2014, which enjoined the enforcement of said ordinances
oRespondents filed their comment with urgent motion to dissolve the TRO
ISSUES: WON Ordinance Nos. SP-2095, S-2011 and SP-2235, S-2013 are
constitutional
HELD: Ordinance No. SP-2095, S-2011 or the SHT of QC is constitutional while
Ordinance No. SP-2235, S-2013 or the garbage fee collection is unconstitutional and
illegal
RATIO:
PROCEDURAL MATTERS
A. PROPRIETY OF A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
o Respondents are not tribunals, boards, or officers exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions
o The enactment of City Council of QC of the assailed ordinances
was done in the exercise of its legislative, not judicial or quasi-
judicial function
o The respondents are performing ministerial functions  one that
an officer or tribunal performs in the context of a given set of facts
in a prescribed manner and without regard for the exercise of his or
its own judgment, upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done
B. LOCUS STANDI OF THE PETITIONER
o A party challenging the constitutionality of a law, act, or statute
must show not only that the law is invalid but also that he has
sustained or is in immediate or imminent danger of sustaining some
direct injury as a result of its enforcement
o Petitioner clearly has legal standing  he is a real party-in-
interest to assail the constitutionality and legality of the ordinances
 as he is a co-owner of a residential property in QC and a
taxpayer
C. LITIS PENDENTIA
o Alliance of Quezon City Homeowners, et al. v. Hon. Herbert
Bautista, et al. has been pending in the QC RTC since Feb. 2012
(legality of SP-2095)
o Litis Pendentia refers to a situation where 2 actions are pending
between the same parties for the same cause of action, so that one
of them becomes unnecessary and vexatious
o Requisites: (1) identity of the parties, (2) identity of rights asserted
and relief prayed for, relief being founded on the same facts, (3)
identity of the 2 cases such that judgment in one, regardless of
which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other
 2nd and 3rd requisites are absent in this case
o Even if founded on the same set of facts, the rights asserted and
reliefs prayed for could be different and there is no basis to rule that
the 2 cases are intimately related to one another
D. FAILURE TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
o There is no need for the petitioners to exhaust administrative
remedies before resorting to the courts, considering that there was
only a pure question of law
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
A. Validity of ordinances
oRespondents correctly argued that an ordinance, as in every law, is
presumed valid and question of reasonableness is open to judicial
inquiry
oRequirements for an ordinance to be valid:
(1) not contrary to the Constitution or any statute
(2) not unfair or oppressive
(3) not partial or discriminatory
(4) not prohibit but may regulate
(5) general and consistent with public policy
(6) not unreasonable
oOrdinances are inferior in status and subordinate to the laws of the
State
B. Delegation of Power
oLGUs merely form part of the whole; that the policy of ensuring the
autonomy of local governments was never intended by the drafters to
create an imperium in imperio and install an intra-sovereign political
subdivision independent of a single sovereign
oLGUs are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of
legislative power from the national legislature
C. Power of Taxation - LGUs
oPower to tax is no longer vested exclusively on the Congress 
LGUs are now given direct authority to levy taxes, fess and other
charges pursuant to Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution, subject to
such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide
oThis delegation of power is to safeguard the viability and self-
sufficiency of LGUs by directly granting them general and broad
tax powers
oLGC establishes these guidelines in taxation (sec. 130, 133, 151, and
186)
D. On SHT (Constitutional)
oAn ordinance based on reasonable classification does not violate the
constitutional guaranty of the equal protection of the law
oThe reasonableness of SHT cannot be disputed as it is not
confiscatory or oppressive since the tax being imposed is what the
Urban Development and Housing Act (UDHA) actually allows
oThe provisions of the subject ordinance are fair and just, where on
certain conditions, the ordinance grants a tax credit equivalent to the
total amount of the special assessment paid
E. On Garbage Fee (illegal and unconstitutional)
o LGUs are statutorily sanctioned to impose and collect such
reasonable fees and charges for services rendered
o The fee imposed for garbage collections under Ordinance No. SP-
2235 is a charge fixed for the regulation of the activity
o Although a special charge, tax, or assessment may be imposed by
a municipal corporation, it must be reasonably commensurate to
the cost of providing the garbage service
o It violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution and the
provisions of LGC that an ordinance must be equitable and based
as far as practicable on the taxpayer’s ability to pay, and not unjust,
excessive, oppressive, and confiscatory
o The rates being charged by the ordinance are unjust and
inequitable (e.g. a resident of 200 sq. m. unit in a condominium has
to pay twice the amount than that of a resident of a lot similar in
size)
o The classifications under Ordinance No. SP-2235 are not germane
to its declared purpose
F. Publication
oUpon the enactment of Ordinance No. SP-2095, it was stated that it
would take effect after its publication in a newspaper of general
circulation
oOrdinance No. SP-2235 was passed by the City Council on Dec. 16,
2013 and it was provided that it would be effective upon its approval 
it was approved by the City Mayor on December 26, 2013
oLGC states that:
o Unless otherwise stated in the ordinance or the resolution
approving the local development plan and public investment
program, the same shall take effect after 10 days from the
date a copy thereof is posted in the bulletin board
o In addition to being posted, be published once in a
newspaper o general circulation within the city: provided,
that in the absence thereof, the ordinance or resolution shall
be published in any newspaper of general circulation
 9. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner,
Vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and COMMONWEALTH MANAGEMENT AND SERVICES
CORPORATION, respondents
FACTS:
1. Case on certiorari assailing the decision of the CA, reversing the
decision of the CTA that COMASERCO is liable for VAT for its
transactions with its clients for the year 1988.
2. COMASERCO is a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws
of the Philippines. It is an affiliate of Philippine American Life Insurance Co.
(Philamlife), organized by the letter to perform collection, consultative and
other technical services, including functioning as an internal auditor, of
Philamlife and its other affiliates.
3. On January 24, 1992, the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) issued an
assessment to private respondent COMASERCO for deficiency value-
added tax (VAT) amounting to P351, 851.01, for taxable year 1988. (See full
case for the breakdown of the 351,851.01)
4. COMASERCO's annual corporate income tax return ending December 31,
1988 indicated a net loss in its operations in the amount of P6,077.00
5. On February 10, 1992, COMASERCO filed with the BIR, a letter-protest
objecting to the latter's finding of deficiency VAT. On August 20, 1992, the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue sent a collection letter to COMASERCO
demanding payment of the deficiency VAT.
6. On September 29,1992, COMASERCO filed with the Court of Tax Appeals
a petition for review contesting the Commissioner's assessment.
COMASERCO asserted that the services it rendered to Philamlife and its
affiliates, relating to collections, consultative and other technical assistance,
including functioning as an internal auditor, were on a "no-profit,
reimbursement-of-cost-only" basis. It averred that it was not engaged id the
business of providing services to Philamlife and its affiliates.
7. COMASERCO was established to ensure operational orderliness and
administrative efficiency of Philamlife and its affiliates, and not in the sale of
services. COMASERCO stressed that it was not profit-motivated, thus not
engaged in business. In fact, it did not generate profit but suffered a net loss
in taxable year 1988. COMASERCO averred that since it was not engaged
in business, it was not liable to pay VAT.
8. Decisions: CTA decided in favor of CIR, CA reversed.
ISSUE:
W/N COMASERCO is liable for VAT
RULING:
YES. Decision of the CTA is reinstated.
1.) Section 99 of NIRC of 1986, Persons liable. - Any person who, in the
course of trade or business, sells, barters or exchanges goods, renders
services, or engages in similar transactions and any person who imports
goods shall be subject to the value-added tax (VAT) imposed in Sections
100 to 102 of this Code.
2.) COMAMASERCO Argues that the phrase “In the course of trade or
business” means that the company or business is carried on with a
view to profit or livelihood. That one must be profit oriented.
3.) Moreover, COMASERCO argues that that determining the nature of the
company is material in the determination of who to tax.
4.) SEC. 99 OF NIRC OF 1986 was amended with R.A. 7716, EXPANDED
VAT LAW which provides:
SEC. 105. Persons Liable. - Any person who, in the course
of trade or business, sells, barters, exchanges, leases goods or
properties, renders services, and any person who imports goods
shall be subject to the value-added tax (VAT) imposed in Sections
106 and 108 of this Code.
5.) The value-added tax is an indirect tax and the amount of tax may be shifted
or passed on to the buyer, transferee or lessee of the goods, properties or
services. This rule shall likewise apply to existing sale or lease of goods,
properties or services at the time of the effectivity of Republic Act No.7716
6.) Court ruled that: "The phrase "in the course of trade or business" means the
regular conduct or pursuit of a commercial or an economic activity, including
transactions incidental thereto, by any person regardless of whether or not
the person engaged therein is a nonstock, nonprofit organization
(irrespective of the disposition of its net income and whether or not it sells
exclusively to members of their guests), or government entity.
7.) It is immaterial whether the primary purpose of a corporation indicates that it
receives payments for services rendered to its affiliates on a
reimbursement-on-cost basis only, without realizing profit, for purposes of
determining liability for VAT on services rendered. As long as the entity
provides service for a fee, remuneration or consideration, then the service
rendered is subject to VAT.
10. SALDANA v. CITY OF ILOILO
[GR L-10470, 26 June 1958]
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Sereafin Saldaña
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE: City of Iloilo
Appeal on the decision of CFI – Iloilo on complaint for refund of taxes paid
by Saldaña under protest, upholding the legality of Ordinance No. 28, as
amended by Ordinance No. 30.
FACTS:
 - May 25, 1946: City of Iloilo promulgated Ordinance No. 28, which strictly
prohibits the transport of food supply and labor animals outside Iloilo without
first obtaining the necessary license permit from the mayor.
- June 4, 1946: Ordinance No. 28 was amended by Ordinance No. 30
- Sept. 16 to Dec. 6, 1946: Serafin Saldana had been paying, under protest,
so-called fees on fish bought in Iloilo and sent to Manila, amounting to Php
1,359.80.
- Sept. 17, 1951: Saldana commenced the present proceedings by complaint
for the reimbursement to him of the said amount with interest, on the ground
that the ordinances in question were illegal, null and void, having been
enacted beyond the powers of the Municipal Board of the City.
- Defendant contended that the imposition and collection of the municipal
licenses were within the power and duties of the Municipal Board in the
exercise of its police power.
- Trial Court rendered in favor of the defendant and held that:
o Ordinance No. 28 as amended was valid
o Its purpose regulates the exit of food supply and labor animals from
the city, as well as their sale beyond city limits, and falls squarely
within par. (aa), sec. 21 of the Charter of the City, namely,
Commonwealth Act No. 158
o It does not restrict trade but only regulates the business of
purchase of foodstuffs for the purpose of taking them outside, with
the purpose of averting the scarcity of foodstuffs
o Imposition and collection of the license fees provided was included
within the police power
o Fees were reasonable amounts that is necessary to cover the
expenses in the issuance of the licenses and the cost of the
necessary inspection or police surveillance.
ISSUE: Whether the “license fee” was validly imposed.
Held: NO, the appealed decision is hereby reversed and the City of Iloilo is hereby
ordered to reimburse plaintiff the amount of P1,359.80, with legal interest and costs.
- Differences between the license and the property tax are well established.
o License represents the permission conceded to do an act. It is not
supposed to be imposed for revenue. It is in the main for police
purposes
o Property tax is assessed according to the value of property.
- Judging from the amount of fees fixed in the ordinance, the so-called fees
were in reality taxes for city revenue.
o The fees cannot possibly be considered as mere expense incurred
for, or the cost of the inspection of each animal and the issuance of
the corresponding permit. There would be no doubt that the fees
collected would amount to a sizable sum and augment greatly the
revenues of the municipal corporation
- As such, they are unauthorized by the law or the City Charter, and are also
in contravention of Sections 2287 and 2629 of the Revised Administrative
Code.
o A municipal corporation, unlike a sovereign state, is clothed with no
inherent power of taxation. Its charter must plainly show an intent to
confer that power or the corporation cannot assume it. And the
power when granted is to be construed strictissimi juris. Any doubt
or
Ordinance Ordinance
No. 28 No. 30
Chicken .50 .20
Eggs (per hundred) 2 1
Fish (per kilo) .20 .10
Bananas (per hundred 2 1
bunches)
ambiguity arising out of the term used must be resolved against the
corporation.
o It shall not be in the power of the municipal council to impose a tax
in any form whatever upon goods and merchandise into the
municipality, or out of the same, and any attempt to impose an
import or export tax upon such goods in the guise of an
unreasonable charge for wharfage, use of bridges or otherwise,
shall be void.
- The prohibition against taking animals and articles outside Iloilo without
mayor’s permit is in restraint of trade and a curtailment of the rights of the
owners of said animals and articles to freely sell; and of prospective
purchasers to buy and dispose of them without the city limits in the ordinary
course of commerce and trade.
- The ordinance is ultra vires and, thus, is null and void.
11. Lorenzo vs Posadas
64 Phil 353 (1937)
FACTS:
Lorenzo, in his capacity as trustee of the estate of a certain Thomas Hanley,
deceased, brought an action against respondent Posadas, Collector of Internal
Revenue. Petitioner alleges the respondent to have exceeded in its tax collection,
which, as assessed by the former, should only be in the amount of PhP1,434.24
instead of PhP2,052.74. Disregarding the allegation, respondent filed a motion in the
CFI of Zamboanga praying that the trustee be made to pay such tax. The motion was
granted. Petitioner paid the amount in protest, however notified the respondent that
until a refund is prompted, suit would be bought for its recovery. Respondent
overruled the protest. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON the provisions of Act No. 3606 (Tax Law) which is favorable to the
taxpayer be given retroactive effect –NO.
HELD:
Respondent levied and assessed the inheritance tax collected from the petitioner
under the provisions of section 1544 of the Revised Administrative Code as amended
by Act No. 3606. However, the latter only enacted in 1930 – not the law in force when
the Thomas Henley died in 1922. Laws cannot be applied retroactively. The Court
states that it is a well-settled principle that inheritance taxation is governed by the
statue in force at the time of the death of the decendent. The Court also
emphasized that “a statute should be considered as prospective in its operation,
unless the language of the statute clearly demands or expresses that it shall have
retroactive effect…” Act No. 3606 does not contain any provisions indicating a
legislative intent to give it a retroactive effect. Thus, the provisions of Act No. 3606
cannot be applied.
12. Spouses Alfonso and Maria Angeles Cusi vs Lilia A. Domingo
Ramona De Vera vs Lilia Domingo and Spouses Radella and Alfred Sy
Facts:
 Lilia Domingo in July 1999, learned the construction activities were being
undertaken o her property without her consent. The series of said
anomalous transactions are as follows:
o On July 18, 1997, Radelia Sy petitioned the RTC for issuance of a
new owner’s copy of TCT No. N-165606 appending to her petition a
deed of absolute sale dated July 14, 1997 purportedly executed by
Lilia Domingo
o Sy claimed that the bag containing her owner’s copy of said TCT
was snatched on July 13, 1997
o RTC granted the petition and issued a new owner’s duplicate copy
of said TCT which was later cancelled by virtue of a deed of
absolute sale and in its stead the Registry of Deeds in SY’s name
o Sy subdivided said property and sold each half by way of contract
to sell to Spouses Edgardo and Ramona Liza De Vera and spouses
Alfonso and Maria Angeles Cusi
 Domingo commenced action against SY and her spouse, the De Veras and
Cusis in the RTC
 RTC declared sale between Lilia Domingo and Radella Sy void and held
Radella Sy liable for damages
o Also declared that spouses De Vera and Cusi to be purchasers in
good faith
 RTC however rendered a new decision ruling the spouses De Vera and Cusi
not purchasers in good faith
 Instant appeal to the CA was denied and the appellate court affirmed RTC
decision and reinstated the spouses De Vera and Cusi not in good faith an
that the undervaluation of the purchase price from 7Million/half to only
1M/half to enable Sy to pay a lesser capital gains tax
 CA denied motions for reconsideration
Issue:
 WON the CA erred in finding that the TCT No. 186142 registered in the
name of Radelia Sy is a reconstituted title
 WON the petitioners are buyers in good faith and for value
 WON the petitioners are entitled to reimbursement of all the payments made
by the petitioners to their co-defendants spouses Alfred and Radelia Sy in
addition to damages
Held:
 The Court affirms in toto the decision of the Court of Appeals
Ratio:
 The unanimity in findings of both the RTC and the CA is no conclusive on
the Court as fully supported by preponderant evidence
 Petitioners were shown to have been deficient in their vigilance as buyers of
the property even after knowing that what was handed to them was
reconstituted title and yet both still did not investigate on the said land
o CA and RTC pointed out the “simultaneous transactions,
particularly the date of the alleged loss of the TCT No. 165606 and
the Deed of Sale, sufficed to arouse suspicion on any person ealing
with the subject property”
 Petitioners aru=gue that the actual consideration of the sale was nearly &M
for each half of the property, the Court rejects their aguments as devoid of
factual basis for they did not adduce evidence of the actual payment of that
amount to Sy. Accordingly, the recitals of the deeds of sale were controlling
on the consideration of the sales
ON TORRENS SYSTEM OF LAND REGISTRATION:
 The State is required to maintain a register of landholdings that guarantees
indefeasible title to those included in the register to combat problems of
uncertainty, complexity, and cost associated with old title systems
 Dispenses with the need of proving ownership by long complicated
documents
 Torrens system is to obviate possible conflicts of title by giving the public the
right to rely upon the face of the Torrens certificate without needing to
inquire further
13. PROFESSIONAL SERVICES, INC. VS. NATIVIDAD AND ENRIQUE AGANA
G.R. No. 126297 January 31, 2007
FACTS:
 April 4, 1984 – Natividad agana was rushed to the Medical City General Hospital
because of difficulty and bloody anal discharge. After a series of medical
 examinations, she was diagnosed by Dr. Miguel Ampil to be suffering from
cancer of the sigmoid
 April 11, 1984 – Dr. Ampil performed surgery on Natividad, who found that her
cancer has spread throughout her left ovary. Because of this, Dr. Ampil sought
for the consent of the Aganas to have Dr. Juan Fuentes perform a hysterectomy
on her. Thus, Dr. Fuentes took over and completed the operation.
o When Dr. Fuentes was done, Dr. Ampil tool over once again to close the
incision.
 However, the operation appeared to be flawed – in the records of the nurses
after the operation, there appeared to be 2 sponges that were missing.
 After a couple of days, Natividad complained of excruciating pain from her anal
region, which led her to consult both Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes, who, in return,
told her that such pain is the natural consequence of the surgery.
 May 9, 1984 – The Aganas went to the United States to seek further treatment.
After four (4) months of consultations and lab examinations, Natividad was told
to be free from cancer and that she could return to the Philippines.
 August 31, 1984 – The Aganas flew back to the Philippines. Two weeks later,
the daughter of Natividad agana found a piece of gauze protruding from her
vagina. Upon being informed, Dr. Ampil proceeded to the residence of the
Aganas to extract the gauze. After which, Dr. Ampil assured Natividad that the
pain would soon go away.
 Such assurance did not come true as the pain that Natividad was experiencing
grew more intense. Because of this, they went to the Polymedic General
Hospital, where Dr. Ramon Gutierrez found another foreign object inside
Natividad’s vagina. Another surgery was needed in order to remove the foreign
object.
o What was found was another piece of gauze, which caused a bad
infection in Natividad’s vagina.
 November 12, 1984 – The Aganas filed with the RTC a complaint for damages
against the Professional Services, Inc. (PSI) as owner and operator of The
Medical City, Dr. Miguel Ampil, and Dr. Juan Fuentes for negligence and
malpractice.
o Enrique Agana, husband of Natividad, also filed with the Professional
Regulation Commission (PRC) an administrative complaint for gross
negligence and malpractice Against Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes
 PRC only proceeded to head the case with that of Dr. Fuentes as
Dr. Ampil was in the United States.
 February 16, 1986 – Natividad died
 March 17, 1993 – RTC decided in favor of the Aganas and found PSI, Dr. Ampil,
and Dr. Fuentes to be liable for negligence and malpractice.
o PSI, Dr. Ampil, Dr. Fuentes – all liable for damages (Php 2,000,000.00)
o Dr. Ampil & Dr. Fuentes – both liable for exemplary damages (Php
300,000.00)
 PSI, Dr. Ampil, and Dr. Fuentes filed an appeal with the CA
 April 3, 1993 – The Aganas filed with the RTC a motion for partial execution of
its decision, which was granted. Certain properties of Dr. Ampil was then levied
and sold. The amount (Php 451, 275.00) was then delivered to the Aganas
 After an agreement with PSI and Dr. Fuentes to indefinitely suspend any further
execution of the RTC decision, the Aganas again filed for a motion for an alias
writ (Alias writ is an additional writ or second writ that is issued after an
earlier writ of that kind has been issued but has not been effective) of execution
against the properties of PSI and Dr. Fuentes.
o This was grated by the RTC.
o Dr. Fuentes filed with the CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition, with
a prayer for preliminary injunction
 This was granted by the CA.
 January 25, 1995 – PRC board of Medicine rendered its decision regarding the
administrative case filed by Enrique Agana, dismissing the case against Dr.
Fuentes.
o It could not be proved that Dr. Fuentes was liable for leaving the pieces
of gauze inside the vagina of Natividad, and that he concealed such fact.
FACTS OF G.R. No. 126297: consolidated cases
 G.R. No. 126297 – PSI alleged that the CA erred in its decision in holding that
 PSI is estopped from raising the defense that Dr. Ampil is not its
employee
 It is solidarily liable with Dr. Ampil
 PSI is not entitled to counterclaim against the Aganas
o PSI contends that Dr. Ampil is not an employee of PSI, but a mere
consultant or independent contractor. As such, he alone should answer
for his negligence
 G.R. No. 126467 – Aganas claim that CA erred in its decision finding Dr.
Fuentes not guilty for neither negligence nor malpractice, invoking the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur (the principle that the occurrence of an accident implies
negligence // later on defined by the SC as “the thing speaks for itself”)
o The Aganas contend that the pieces of gauze are prima facie proof of the
negligence of both Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes
 G.R. No. 127590 – Dr. Ampil claims that the decision of the CA is erred in
finding him liable for negligence and malpractice. He claims that:
o It was Dr. Fuentes who used the gauzes in performing the hysterectomy
o The nurses failed to properly count the used sponges/gauzes in the
surgery
o The medical intervention of the foreign doctors who examined Natividad
in the United States
ISSUES:
 Whether or not the CA erred in holding Dr. Ampil liable for negligence and
malpractice (GR 126297)
 Whether or not the CA erred in absolving Dr. Fuentes of any liability (GR
126467)
 Whether or not PSI may be held solidarily liable for the negligence of Dr. Ampil
(GR 127590)
HELD:
G.R. No 127590
 The Court finds the arguments of Dr. Ampil in G.R. No. 127590 to be purely
hypothetical and without basis.
o Dr. Ampil did not show any evidence that the foreign doctors were the
ones who left the pieces of gauze inside the vagina of Natividad
o Court found that after Dr. Fuentes performed a hysterectomy on
Natividad, Dr. Ampil examined the work of Dr. Fuentes and found it in
order.
 Court held that an operation requiring the placing of sponges in the incision is
not complete until the sponges are properly removed, and it is settled that the
leaving of sponges or other foreign substances in the wound after the incision
has been closed is prima facie evidence of negligence by the operating surgeon
(Dr. Ampil)
 Dr. Ampil, as the lead surgeon, had the duty to remove all foreign objects, such
as gauzes, from Natividad’s body before closing the incision. After which, it is his
duty to inform Natividad about any necessary objects left inside for healing. Dr.
Ampil breached both duties. Such breach caused injury to Natividad. The
negligence of Dr. Ampil is the proximate cause
(Elements of medical malpractice or medical negligence: duty, breach, injury,
and proximate cause)
G.R. No. 126467
 The Aganas claim that the CA erred by dismissing the case against Dr. Fuentes
with regard to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. According to them, the presence
of the gauze that was left inside Natividad’s body is prima facie evidence of
negligence
o The Court is not convinced
 The Court held that “where the thing which caused the injury, without the fault of
the injured, is under the exclusive control of the defendant and injury is such that
it should not have occurred if he, having such control used proper care, it affords
reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation that the injury arose from
the defendants want of care, and the burden of proof is shifted to them to
establish that he has observed due care and diligence.
 Requisites for the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (in case sir
asks)
o The occurrence of an injury
o The thing which caused the injury was under the control and
management of the defendant
o The occurrence was such that in the ordinary court of things, would not
have happened if those who had control or management used proper
care
o The absence of explanation by the defendant
 It is established that Dr. Amil was the lead surgeon of the operation and that
he only sought for the services of Dr. Fuentes to perform the hysterectomy.
After performing such, Dr. Fuentes showed his work to Dr. Ampil, who then
examined it and found that everything was in order, and later on allowed Dr.
Fuentes to leave the operating room. Dr. Ampil then proceeded to operate on
Natividad. As he was about to finish the procedure, the nurses informed him
that two (2) pieces of gauze were missing. Thus, Dr. Ampil conducted a
diligent search, but to no avail. Dr. Ampil then directed the incision to be
closed. During this time, Dr. Fuentes was no longer in the operating room,
and, in fact, had left the hospital.
 As lead surgeon, Dr. Ampil was the “captain of the ship”. His act of ordering for
the closure of the incision regardless of the missing gauzes caused injury to
the body of Natividad.
G.R. No. 126297
 Art. 2176, NCC – Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such
fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter.
 Art. 2180, NCC – The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not
only for ones own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom
one is responsible
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise
responsible for damages cause by their employees in the service of the
branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions
Employers shall be liable for the damages cause by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks even though
the former are not engaged in any business od industry
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent damage.
 The Court held that professionals are considered personally liable for the fault
or negligence they commit in the discharge of their duties, and their employer
cannot be held liable for such fault or negligence. Thus, a hospital cannot be
held liable for the fault or negligence of a physician or surgeon in the treatment
or operation of patients
 However, in today’s application, Courts came to realize that modern hospitals
are increasingly taking an active role in supplying and regulating medical care to
patients. Rather, they regularly employ, on a salaried basis, a large staff of
physicians, interns, nurses, administrative and manual workers. They charge
patients for medical care and treatment, even collecting for such services
through legal action, if necessary. Thus, the Court concluded that there is no
reason to exempt hospitals from the universal rule of respondent superior -- A
legal doctrine, most commonly used in tort, that holds an employer or principal
legally responsible for the wrongful acts of an employee or agent, if such acts
occur within the scope of the employment or agency.
 Apparent authority, or what is sometimes referred to as the holding out theory,
or doctrine of ostensible agency or agency by estoppel, has its origin from the
law of agency, has its original from the law of agency. It imposes liability, not as
the result of the reality of a contractual relationship, but rather because of the
actions of a principal or an employer in somehow misleading the public into
believing that the relationship or the authority exists
 In the present case, it was duly established that PSI operated the Medical City
Hospital for the purpose and under the concept of providing comprehensive
medical services to the public. Accordingly, it has the duty to exercise
reasonable care to protect from harm all patients admitted into its facility for
medical treatment. Unfortunately, PSI failed to perform such duty.
o PSI’s liability is traceable to its failure to conduct an investigation of the
matter reported in the nota bene of the count nurse. Such failure
established PSI’s part in the dark conspiracy of silence and concealment
about the gauzes.
 Anent the corollary issue of whether PSI is solidarily liable with Dr. Ampil for
damages, let it be emphasized that PSI, apart from a general denial of its
responsibility, failed to adduce evidence showing that it exercised the diligence
of a good father of a family in the accreditation and supervision of the latter. In
neglecting to offer such proof, PSI failed to discharge its burden under the last
paragraph of Article 2180 cited earlier, and, therefore, must be adjudged
solidarily liable with Dr. Ampil. Moreover, as we have discussed, PSI is also
directly liable to the Aganas.
14. Davao Saw Mill co. vs. Castillo, Aproniano G. and Davao light & power co. Inc.
Facts:
>The Davao Saw mill is a holder of a lumber concession from the
government of the Philippines. It has operated a saw mill in the sitio of Maa, Barrio of
Tigatu, Davao.
>Davao Saw mill erected a building on a land that belonged to another
person. Davao Saw Mill co. housed different machineries used by the company in the
said building. The Machines were placed and mounted on concrete cement.
>In the contract of lease by the owner and Davao Saw Mill co., Davo
Sawmill agreed to turn over free of charge all improvements and buildings erected by
it on the premises with the exception of machineries, which shall remain with the
Davao Sawmill.
>In an action brought by the Davao Light and Power Co., judgment was
rendered against Davao Sawmill. A writ of execution was issued and the machineries
placed on the saw mill were levied upon as personalty by the sheriff. Davao Light and
Power Co., proceeded to purchase the machinery and other properties auctioned by
the sheriff.
Issue: Whether or not the Machineries are real or personal properties
Held:
>The Machineries are considered personal properties, the lessee placed the
machinery in the building erected on land belonging to another, with the
understanding that the machinery was not included in the improvements which would
pass to the lessor on the expiration of the lease agreement. The lessee also treated
the machinery as personal property in executing chattel mortgages in favor of
third persons. The machinery was levied upon by the sheriff as personally pursuant
to a writ of execution obtained without any protest being registered.
>Machinery only becomes immobilized when placed in a plant by the owner
of the property or plant, but not when so placed by a tenant, usufructuary , or any
person having temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the
owner.
15. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, vs. NEXT MOBILE, INC.
G.R. No. 212825
FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to
reverse and set aside the Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc affirming the
earlier decision of its First Division in CTA Case No. 7965, On April 15, 2002,
respondent filed with the Bureau of Internal Revenue its Annual Income Tax Return
for taxable year ending December 31, 2001 and also filed its Monthly Remittance
Returns of Final Income Taxes Withheld, its Monthly aemittance Returns of Expanded
Withholding Tax and its Monthly Remittance Return of Income Taxes Withheld on
Compensation for year ending December 31, 2001.
On September 25, 2003, respondent received a copy of the Letter of
Authority dated September 8, 2003 signed by Regional Director Valeroso authorizing
Revenue Officer Crespo of Revenue District Office 43 to examine respondent's books
of accounts and other accounting records for income and withholding taxes for the
period covering January l, 2001 to December 31, 2001. Sarmiento, respondent's
Director of Finance, subsequently executed several waivers of the statute of
limitations to extend the prescriptive period of assessment for taxes due.
On September 26, 2005, respondent received from the BIR a Preliminary
Assessment Notice dated September 16, 2005 to which it filed a Reply then received
a Formal Letter of Demand demanding payment of deficiency income tax, final
withholding tax, expanded withholding tax, increments for late remittance of taxes
withheld, and compromise penalty for failure to file returns/late filing/late remittance of
taxes withheld, in the total amount of P313,339,610.42. Respondent filed its protest
against the FLO and requested the reinvestigation of the assessments. BIR denied its
protest. Thus, on respondent filed a Petition for Review before the CTA. It rejected
petitioner's claim that it is within the 3 year prescriptive period this case falls under the
exception as to the three-year prescriptive period for assessment and that the 10-year
prescriptive period should apply on the ground of filing a false or fraudulent return.
CTA also said that the waivers did not validly extended the prescriptive period.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CIR's right to assess respondent's deficiency taxes had
already prescribed?
RULING:
The petition has merit. An assessment notice issued after the three-year
prescriptive period is not valid and effective. Exceptions to this rule are provided
under Section 2224 of the NIRC. Section 222(b) of the NIRC provides that the period
to assess and collect taxes may only be extended upon a written agreement between
the CIR and the taxpayer executed before the expiration of the three-year period. The
Court has consistently held that a waiver of the statute of limitations must faithfully
comply with the provisions of RMO No. 20-90 and RDAO 05-01 in order to be valid
and binding.
The deficiencies of the Waivers in this case are the same as the defects of the waiver
in Kudos. In the instant case, the CT A found the Waivers because of the following
flaws: (1) they were executed without a notarized board authority; (2) the dates of
acceptance by the BIR were not indicated therein; and (3) the fact of receipt by
respondent of its copy of the Second Waiver was not indicated on the face of the
original Second Waiver. To be sure, both parties in this case are at fault.
This case, the taxpayer, on the one hand, after voluntarily executing waivers,
insisted on their invalidity by raising the very same defects it caused. On the other
hand, the BIR miserably failed to exact from respondent compliance with its rules.
The BIR's negligence in the performance of its duties was so gross that it amounted
to malice and bad faith. Moreover, the BIR was so lax such that it seemed that it
consented to the mistakes in the Waivers. Such a situation is dangerous and open to
abuse by unscrupulous taxpayers who intend to escape their responsibility to pay
taxes by mere expedient of hiding behind technicalities. CIR was indeed careless
in complying with the requirements of RMO No. 20-90 and RDAO 01-05.
Nevertheless, petitioner's negligence may be addressed by enforcing the provisions
imposing administrative liabilities upon the officers responsible for these errors.
There is no reason to disturb the tax court's findings that records failed to
establish, even by prima facic evidence, that respondent Next Mobile filed false and
fraudulent returns on the ground of substantial underdeclaration of income in
respondent Next Mobile's Annual ITR.
PETITION GRANTED
16. TOSHIBA INFORMATION EQUIPMENT (PHILS.), INC. v. COMMISSIONER ON
INTERNAL REVENUE
G.R. No. 157594 • March 9, 2010 • J. Leonardo-de Castro
FACTS:
1. Petition for Review on Certiorari
2. Toshiba seeks the reversal of:
a. A Decision of the CA on Aug 29, 2002 which found that Toshiba
was not entitled to the credit/refund of its unutilized input VAT
attributable to its export sales, because it was a tax-exempt entity
and its export sales were VAT-exempt transactions; and
b. A Resolution of the CA, which denied the Motion for
Reconsideration of Toshiba.
3. Toshiba is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing
and exporting of electric machinery, equipment systems, etc.
4. Toshiba is registered with the Philippine Economic Zone Authority
(PEZA) as an Economic Zone (ECOZONE) export enterprise in Laguna
Technopark.
5. Toshiba is registered with RDO 57 of the BIR, with TIN 004-739-137.
6. In its VAT returns for Q1 and Q2 1997 (filed on Apr 14, 1997 and July 21,
1997 respectively) Toshiba declared input VAT on its domestic purchases of
taxable goods and services in the aggregate sum of Php 3,875,139.65, with
no zero-rated sales.
7. Jul 23, 1997: Toshiba submitted amended VAT returns for the same period,
reporting the same amount of input vat but this time, they indicated zero-
rated sales totaling Php7,494,677,000.00.
8. Mar 30, 1999: Toshiba filed with DOF One-Stop Shop (One-Stop Shop Inter-
Agency Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center of the DOF) two separate
applications for tax credit/refund of its unutilized input VAT for the first
half of 1997 in the total amount of Php 3,685,446.73
9. Mar 31, 1999: Toshiba filed a Petition for Review to toll the running of the
two-year prescriptive period under the Tax Code of 1997, as amended.
Prayer: tax refund/credit representing unutilized input taxes
10. CIR opposed the claim for tax refund/credit of Toshiba, submitting that:
a. Toshiba’s claim for tax refund/credit is subject to administrative
investigation by the CIR Bureau;
b. Toshiba failed to show that the taxes were irregularly collected;
c. Taxes paid and collected are presumed to have been made in
accordance with law (and hence, not refundable);
d. The burden of proof was on Toshiba to show that it had complied
with provisions of the Tax Code; and
e. Claims for tax refund/credit are construed strictly (in strictissimi
juris) against the taxpayer, as it takes the nature of exemption from
tax.
11. Summary of the CIR arguments:
a. Toshiba was a VAT-exempt entity;
b. Toshiba’s export sales were VAT-exempt transactions.
12. Oct 16, 2000: The CTA rendered a Decision favoring Toshiba, holding that
the CIR himself admitted, in a Joint Stipulation, that the export sales of
Toshiba were subject to 0% VAT based on the Tax Code of 1977, as
amended. It could claim tax credit/refund of input VAT 1 directly
attributable to zero-rated sales, in accordance with Revenue Regulation
No. 7-95. The CTA ruled that Toshiba should be refunded/credited Php
1,385,292.02 (instead of the requested refund of 3.7M).
13. Both parties filed an MR.
a. Toshiba submitted that the Php 1,887,545.65 (leftover) that the
CTA reduced/disallowed was properly substantiated.
b. The CIR on the other hand argued that Toshiba was not entitled
to the credit/refund of its input VAT payments because as a
PEZA-registered ECOZONE export enterprise, Toshiba was
NOT subject to VAT.
i. As an ECOZONE, they were to remit to the government
5% of gross income earned within the zone, in lieu of all
taxes, including VAT.
ii. Toshiba, therefore, was exempted from VAT; and,
therefore, its sale of goods was not subject to output
1Input vs. Output VAT: In very simple terms (because I don’t get tax just yet, sorry!), input VAT is VAT on
purchases; output VAT is VAT on sales.
 VAT and was not allowed any tax credit on the input
VAT it had previously paid.
14. The CTA didn’t consider the argument that Toshiba was not entitled to a tax
refund/credit because it was only raised by the CIR for the first time in the
MR. Moreover, the CTA pointed out that Toshiba availed itself of the
income tax holiday under the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987, so
Toshiba was exempt ONLY from income tax, but NOT other taxes such
as the VAT. Conflicting views on RA 7916 (Special Economic Zone Act):
a. CIR: What applied was Section 24 of RA 7916, on Exemption of
Taxes under the NIRC. This stated that ECOZONEs are to remit
5% of gross income in lieu of all taxes
b. CTA: What applied was Section 23 of RA 7916, on Fiscal
Incentives. This stated that Toshiba, as a “business establishment
operating within the ECONOZONES”, can avail of fiscal incentives,
one of which was the Income Tax Holiday, provided for under the
Omnibus Investments Code of 1987.
15. The CA reversed the decision of the CTA and ruled in favor of CIR, on the
basis that Toshiba was a tax-exempt entity under Sec. 24 of RA 7916
[see above].
ISSUE: Whether or not Toshiba could claim refund of its input VAT payments on its
domestic purchases of goods and services, which is contingent on whether or not
Toshiba was a tax-exempt entity
RULING: YES, Toshiba could claim refund of its input VAT payments. Toshiba was
NOT a tax-exempt entity.
RATIO: This case was decided mostly on the basis that the CIR actually judicially
admitted that Toshiba was VAT-registered, and that its export sales were subject to
VAT at 0% rate, which he stated in his Joint Stipulation. The judicial admission of the
CIR had a binding effect, which the CIR was bound by, and could not argue that the
admissions were “made through palpable mistake”.
Doctrine: VAT treatment of PEZA-registered enterprises.
1. There is a basic distinction between the VAT-exemption of a person, and
the VAT-exemption of a transaction.
a. VAT-exempt person/party: A person or entity granted VAT
exemption under the Tax Code, a special law or an international
agreement to which the Philippines is a signatory, and by virtue of
which its taxable transactions become exempt from VAT
b. VAT-exempt transaction: Involves goods or services which, by their
nature, are specifically listed in and expressly exempted from the
VAT under the Tax Code, without regard to the tax status – VAT-
exempt or not – of the party to the transaction.
2. It is now a settled rule that based on the Cross Border Doctrine, PEZA-
registered enterprises, such as Toshiba, are VAT-exempt and no VAT can
be passed on to them.
a. Cross-Border Doctrine: No VAT shall be imposed to form part of the
cost of goods destined for consumption outside of the
territorial border of the taxing authority. Hence, actual export of
goods and services from the Philippines to a foreign country
must be free of VAT; while, those destined for use or
consumption within the Philippines shall be imposed with ten
percent (10%) VAT. (Walang tax dapat ang palabas ng Pilipinas
[“taxing authority”])
3. Prior to Oct 15, 1999 (Issuance of the BIR of RMC No. 74-99): Whether a
PEZA-registered enterprise was exempt or subject to VAT depended on the
type of fiscal incentives availed of by the said enterprise. Choice between
either of these two incentives
a. 5% preferential tax on gross income (Sec. 24; see facts); or
b. Income tax holiday (Sec. 23; see facts).
4. New Rule, after Oct 15, 1999: Any sale by a supplier from the Customs
Territory to a PEZA-registered enterprise as export sale should not be
burdened by output VAT.
5. THEREFORE, the CIR cannot insist that ALL PEZA-registered
enterprises are VAT-exempt in every instance.
17. CIR vs. Sarangani Resources Corporation
CTA Case No. 8105 April 28, 2015
Ponente: Cotangco-Manalastas, J.:
Petition for Review seeking the nullification of the Decision and subsequent resolution
of the Special First Division of the Court
FACTS
 Petitioner Sarangani Resources Corporation (now respondent) is a domestic
corporation organized for the purpose of and engaged in the acquisition of:
o real property, subdivision and business;
o ownership, development, construction and operation of resorts, golf
courses, hotels and other structure for tourism purposes on
acquired real estate
 Respondent (now petitioner) is the duly appointed Commissioner of BIR,
authorized to review protests on deficiency tax assessment.
 May 2007 – Petitioner was furnished a copy of Letter of Authority,
authorizing Revenue Officer Malilin to conduct an examination of petitioner’s
books of accounts and other accounting records for verification of its tax
liabilities for the calendar year ending December 31, 2005; during the audit
period, P submitted to R relevant documents pursuant to the various letter
requests of the letter.
 July 15, 2008 – P received a Notice for Initial Conference with a schedule of
tax deficiency and its details of discrepancies.
 November 12, 2008 – P received a copy of Preliminary Assessment Notice
(PAN), stating that after investigation it was found that P has deficiency
income and VAT for calendar year 2005 P2, 831, 888.64 as income tax
payable and P217, 226.67 VAT payable.
 November 26, 2008 – Carlos Baldosamon (President of Saranggani)
submitted two letters to Mamapok Diro (assistant Regional Director of R),
requesting a reconsideration and extension of time within which to file in
 writing its explanation and to submit all relevant documents supporting its
protest; Petitioner’s request was denied.
 December 22, 2008 – P received a Formal Letter of Demand (FLD) and
Assessment Notice (FAN), with Details of Discrepancies issued by the
Regional Director assessing P with a total collectible amount of P1,402,000,
corresponding to compromise penalties for calendar year 2005:
o P1,664,546.43 tax deficiencies, broken down as follows:
 Liable for P3,066,546.43 including compromise penalties
(P protested the assessment)
o Petitioner submitted documents in support of protest and was
partially granted by Regional Director Atty. Omila-Yap together with
a Recomputation of Tax Liabilities showing a reduction tax due to
P1,465,113.20 detailed as follows:
 P filed a letter addressed to the Respondent
Commissioner, requesting reconsideration of the decision
by Atty. Omila-Yap, pursuant to section 3.1.5 of Revenue
Regulations No. 12-99, which provides the procedure in
elevating taxpayers’ protest to the BIR Commissioner
within thirty days from date of receipt of the final decision.
 P submitted documents but because of R’s inaction, P
filed the instant Petition for Review praying that the
assessment of deficiency income, VAT and compromise
penalties in the amount of P1,465,113.20 covering taxable
year 2005, be CANCELLED AND WITHDRAWN.
o Special First Division: Petition for Review Partially Granted.
Assessments for deficiency income tax affirmed with modifications.
Petitioner is ordered to pay respondent modifified amount of
P403,468.34 inclusive of 25% surcharge imposed under Section
248(A)(3) of NIRC of 1997, as amended. Petitioner is also ordered
to pay deficiency interest of 20% per annum on the basic income
tax of P235,021.09 and VAT of P87,753,58. Compromised penalty
of P92,000 is CANCELLED as there is no compromise agreement
between the parties.
 Upon the decision, both Petitioner CIR and respondent SRC filed Motions for
Partial Reconsideration but were denied.
 Petitioner CIR tiled the instant Petition for Review before the CTA En Banc
on December 26, 2013; Respondent SRC filed a Manifestation that it has
fully paid its tax liabilities for taxable year 2005 in accordance with the
Decision dated June 28, 2013.
 CTA En Banc resolved to give due course to the petition and ordered the
parties to submit their memoranda within thirty days.
ISSUE/RULING
 Whether the Honorable Court is correct in partially granting respondent’s
claimed deductions (NO)
 Whether respondent is liable for deficiency VAT assessment on its interest
income
RATIO
 The other issues raised will no longer be discussed for being moot.
 Petition for Review – Granted
 Decision and Resolution of the Special First Division – Reversed and Set
Aside
 Petition for Review filed by Respondent SRC – Dismissed for having been
filed out of time
Settled is the rule that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period
laid down by law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional. The failure to perfect an
appeal as required by the rules has the effect of defeating the right to appeal of a
party and precluding the appellate court from acquiring jurisdiction over the case.9
The right to appeal is not part of due process but a mere statutory privilege that has to
be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law.
While the timeliness of the appeal is not raised as an issue in the instant petition nor
in the Division below, the Court En Banc is not precluded from reviewing the same.
Thus, the Supreme Court has clarified that "where prescription, lack of jurisdiction or
failure to state a cause of action clearly appear from the complaint filed with the trial
court, the action may be dismissed motu proprio by the Court of Appeals, even if the
case has been elevated for review on different grounds. Verily, the dis
 The timeliness of respondent Sarangani Resources' appeal before the CTA
Division must be reviewed in light of Section 228 of the National Internal
Revenue Code (NIRC) of 1997
 Commissioner of CIR has 180 days from the date of the submission of the
supporting documents to decide the protest filed by a taxpayer. If the CIR
representative failed to act on the disputed assessment within the said period
from the date of submission of documents, the taxpayer can either:
o File a petition for review with the CTA within 30 days after the
expiration of the 180-day period
o Await for the final decision of the Commissioner on the disputed
assessments and appeal the final decision to the CTA within 30
days after receipt of copy of decision
 In the case a bar, respondent Sarangani Resources received a copy of the
Formal Letter of Demand on December 22, 2008. Filed a protest letter to the FLD
on January 21, 2009. Regional Director Yap rendered a decision partially
granting the protest, which was received by respondent on July 29, 2009.
Respondent elevated its protest to the CIR on August 28, 2009 but when
respondent elevated it, CIR had only 18 days remaining within which to decide
the protest. However, respondent did not appeal to CTA upon the lapse of the
180-day period on September 15, 2009, nor within the 30-day period.
 Instead, respondent submitted additional documents on October 15, 2009 and
counted another 180-day period from October 15, 2009 for the CIR to decide its
appeal. Within thirty (30) days from the lapse of the new 180-day period on April
23, 2010, respondent Sarangani Resources filed a Petition for Review with the
CTA Division to appeal the inaction of the CIR. Specifically, respondent filed the
Petition for Review on May 13, 2010.
NOTE: It must be stressed that Section 228 of the NIRC of 1997, as amended,
provides only for one 180-day period for the CIR or her authorized representative to
decide the protest. Thus, RR No. 12-99, which implements Section 228, does not
provide for a fresh or separate 180-day period for the CIR to decide the appealed
decision of her authorized representative. Considering that the 180-day period
expired on September 15, 2009, pursuant to Section 228 of the NIRC of 1997, as
amended, respondent Sarangani Resources had thirty days, or until October 15, 2009
to appeal to the CTA. Records show that respondent filed the Petition for Review in
CTA Case No. 8105 only on May 13, 2010, or two hundred and ten (210) days
beyond the last day to file the petition for review. Since the Petition for Review with
the CTA was filed way beyond the 30-day reglementary period, the CTA Special First
Division had no jurisdiction to entertain the Petition for Review in CTA Case No. 8105,
and should thus have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.