122 People vs.

Andre Marti [GR bottom and on top of the Thereupon, the NBI agents tried rights against unreasonable
81561, 18 January 1991] packages, and sealed with to locate Marti but to no avail, search and seizure, the Court
masking tape. Before delivery of inasmuch as the latter's stated sees no cogent reason why the
Facts: On 14 August 1987, Andre
Marti's box to the Bureau of address was the Manila Central same should not be admitted
Marti and his common-law wife,
Customs and/or Bureau of Post Office. Thereafter, an against him in the prosecution
Shirley Reyes, went to the booth
Posts, Mr. Job Reyes Information was filed against of the offense charged. The
of the Manila Packing and
(proprietor) and husband of Marti for violation of RA 6425, mere presence of the NBI agents
Export Forwarders in the Pistang
Anita (Reyes), following otherwise known as the did not convert the reasonable
Pilipino Complex, Ermita,
standard operating procedure, Dangerous Drugs Act. After trial, search effected by Reyes into a
Manila, carrying with them 4
opened the boxes for final the Special Criminal Court of warrantless search and seizure
gift-wrapped packages. Anita
inspection, where a peculiar Manila (Regional Trial Court, proscribed by the Constitution.
Reyes (the proprietress and no
odor emitted therefrom. Job Branch XLIX) rendered the Merely to observe and look at
relation to Shirley Reyes)
pulled out a cellophane wrapper decision, convicting Marti of that which is in plain sight is not
attended to them. Marti
protruding from the opening of violation of Section 21 (b), a search. Having observed that
informed Anita Reyes that he
one of the gloves, and took Article IV in relation to Section 4, which is open, where no
was sending the packages to a
several grams of the contents Article 11 and Section 2 (e)(i), trespass has been committed in
friend in Zurich, Switzerland.
thereof. Job Reyes forthwith Article 1 of Republic Act 6425, as aid thereof, is not search.
Marti filled up the contract
prepared a letter reporting the amended, otherwise known as Where the contraband articles
necessary for the transaction,
shipment to the NBI and the Dangerous Drugs Act. Marti are identified without a trespass
writing therein his name,
requesting a laboratory appealed. on the part of the arresting
passport number, the date of
examination of the samples he officer, there is not the search
shipment and the name and Issue: Whether an act of a
extracted from the cellophane that is prohibited by the
address of the consignee, private individual, allegedly in
wrapper. At the Narcotics constitution. The constitutional
namely, "WALTER FIERZ, violation of the accused's
Section of the National Bureau proscription against unlawful
Mattacketr II, 8052 Zurich, constitutional rights, be
of Investigation (NBI), the box searches and seizures therefore
Switzerland." Anita Reyes did invoked against the State.
containing Marti's packages was applies as a restraint directed
not inspect the packages as
opened, yielding dried Held: In the absence of only against the government
Marti refused, who assured the
marijuana leaves, or cake-like governmental interference, the and its agencies tasked with the
former that the packages simply
(bricks) dried marijuana leaves. liberties guaranteed by the enforcement of the law. Thus, it
contained books, cigars, and
The NBI agents made an Constitution cannot be invoked could only be invoked against
gloves and were gifts to his
inventory and took charge of against the State. The the State to whom the restraint
friend in Zurich. In view of
the box and of the contents contraband herein, having come against arbitrary and
Marti's representation, the 4
thereof, after signing a into possession of the unreasonable exercise of power
packages were then placed
"Receipt" acknowledging Government without the latter is imposed. If the search is made
inside a brown corrugated box,
custody of the said effects. transgressing the accused's upon the request of law
with styro-foam placed at the
enforcers, a warrant must
generally be first secured if it is
to pass the test of
constitutionality. However, if
the search is made at the behest
or initiative of the proprietor of
a private establishment for its
own and private purposes, as in
the case at bar, and without the
intervention of police
authorities, the right against
unreasonable search and
seizure cannot be invoked for
only the act of private
individual, not the law
enforcers, is involved. In sum,
the protection against
unreasonable searches and
seizures cannot be extended to
acts committed by private
individuals so as to bring it
within the ambit of alleged
unlawful intrusion by the
government.
123 Bache & Co. (Phil.) Inc. vs.
Ruiz [GR L-32409, 27 February
1971] En Banc, Villamor (J): 7
concur, 1 filed a separate
concurring opinion to which 1
concurs, 1 concurs in result
Facts: On 24 February 1970,
Misael P. Vera, Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, wrote a letter
addressed to Judge Vivencio M.
Ruiz requesting the issuance of a
search warrant against Bache &
Co. (Phil.), Inc. and Frederick E.
Seggerman for violation of
Section 46(a) of the National
Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), in
relation to all other pertinent
provisions thereof, particularly
Sections 53, 72, 73, 208 and 209,
and authorizing Constitutional
Law II, 2005 ( 2 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) Revenue
Examiner Rodolfo de Leon to
make and file the application for
search warrant which was
attached to the letter. In the
afternoon of the following day,
De Leon and his witness, Arturo
Logronio, went to the Court of
First Instance (CFI) of Rizal. They
brought with them the following
papers: Vera's letter-request; an
application for search warrant
already filled up but still
unsigned by De Leon; an affidavit
of Logronio subscribed before
De Leon; a deposition in printed
form of Logronio already
accomplished and signed by him
but not yet subscribed; and a
search warrant already
accomplished but still unsigned
by Judge. At that time the Judge
was hearing a certain case; so,
by means of a note, he
instructed his Deputy Clerk of
Court to take the depositions of
De Leon and Logronio. After the
session had adjourned, the
Judge was informed that the
depositions had already been
taken. The stenographer, upon
request of the Judge, read to him
her stenographic notes; and
thereafter, the Judge asked
Logronio to take the oath and
warned him that if his deposition
was found to be false and
without legal basis, he could be
charged for perjury. The Judge
signed de Leon's application for
search warrant and Logronio's
deposition. Search Warrant 2-M-
70 was then signed by Judge and
accordingly issued. 3 days later
(a Saturday), the BIR agents
served the search warrant to the
corporation and Seggerman at
the offices of the corporation on
Ayala Avenue, Makati, Rizal. The
corporation's lawyers protested
the search on the ground that no
formal complaint or transcript of
testimony was attached to the
warrant. The agents
nevertheless proceeded with
their search which yielded 6
boxes of documents. On 3
March 1970, the corporation
and Seggerman filed a petition
with the Court of First Instance
(CFI) of Rizal praying that the
search warrant be quashed,
dissolved or recalled, that
preliminary prohibitory and
mandatory writs of injunction be
issued, that the search warrant
be declared null and void, and
that Vera, Logronio, de Leon, et.
al., be ordered to pay the
corporation and Seggerman,
jointly and severally, damages
and attorney's fees. After
hearing and on 29 July 1970, the
court issued an order dismissing
the petition for dissolution of the
search warrant. In the
meantime, or on 16 April 1970,
the Bureau of Internal Revenue
made tax assessments on the
corporation in the total sum of
P2,594,729.97, partly, if not
entirely, based on the
documents thus seized. The
corporation and Seggerman filed
an action for certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus.
Issue: Whether the corporation
has the right to contest the
legality of the seizure of
documents from its office.
Held: The legality of a seizure can
be contested only by the party
whose rights have been
impaired thereby, and that the
objection to an unlawful search
and seizure is purely personal
and cannot be availed of by third
parties. In Stonehill, et al. vs.
Diokno, et al. (GR L-19550, 19
June 1967; 20 SCRA 383) the
Supreme Court impliedly
recognized the right of a
corporation to object against
unreasonable searches and
seizures; holding that the
corporations have their
respective personalities,
separate and distinct from the
personality of the corporate
officers, regardless of the
amount of shares of stock or the
interest of each of them in said
corporations, whatever, the
offices they hold therein may be;
and that the corporate officers
therefore may not validly object
to the use in evidence against
them of the documents, papers
and things seized from the
offices and premises of the
corporations, since the right to
object to the admission of said
papers in evidence belongs
exclusively to the corporations,
to whom the seized effects
belong, and may not be invoked
by the corporate officers in
proceedings against them in
their individual capacity. The
distinction between the
Stonehill case and the present
case is that: in the former case,
only the officers of the various
corporations in whose offices
documents, papers and effects
were searched and seized were
the petitioners; while in the
latter, the corporation to whom
the seized documents belong,
and whose rights have thereby
been impaired, is itself a
petitioner. On that score, the
corporation herein stands on a
different footing from the
corporations in Stonehill.
Moreover, herein, the search
warrant was void inasmuch as
First, there was no personal
examination conducted by the
Judge of the complainant (De
Leon) and his witness (Logronio).
The Judge did not ask either of
the two any question the answer
to which could possibly be the
basis for determining whether or
not there was probable cause
against Bache & Co. and
Seggerman. The participation of
the Judge in the proceedings
which led to the issuance of
Search Warrant 2-M-70 was thus
limited to listening to the
stenographer's readings of her
notes, to a few words of warning
against the commission of
perjury, and to administering the
oath to the complainant and his
witness. This cannot be consider
a personal examination. Second,
the search warrant was issued
for more than one specific
offense. The search warrant was
issued for at least 4 distinct
offenses under the Tax Code.
The first is the violation of
Section 46(a), Section 72 and
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 3 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
Section 73 (the filing of income
tax returns), which are
interrelated. The second is the
violation of Section 53
(withholding of income taxes at
source). The third is the violation
of Section 208 (unlawful pursuit
of business or occupation); and
the fourth is the violation of
Section 209 (failure to make a
return of receipts, sales,
business or gross value of output
actually removed or to pay the
tax due thereon). Even in their
classification the 6 provisions are
embraced in 2 different titles:
Sections 46(a), 53, 72 and 73 are
under Title II (Income Tax); while
Sections 208 and 209 are under
Title V (Privilege Tax on Business
and Occupation). Lastly, the
search warrant does not
particularly describe the things
to be seized. Search Warrant No.
2-M-70 tends to defeat the
major objective of the Bill of
Rights, i.e., the elimination of
general warrants, for the
language used therein is so all-
embracing as to include all
conceivable records of the
corporation, which, if seized,
could possibly render its
business inoperative. Thus,
Search Warrant 2-M-70 is null
and void.
124 Stonehill vs. Diokno [GR L-
19550, 19 June 1967] En Banc,
Concepcion (CJ): 6 concur
Facts: Upon application of the
officers of the government,
Special Prosecutors Pedro D.
Cenzon, Efren I. Plana and
Manuel Villareal Jr. and Assistant
Fiscal Manases G. Reyes; Judge
Amado Roan (Municipal Court of
Manila), Judge Roman Cansino
(Municipal Court of Manila),
Judge Hermogenes Caluag
(Court of First Instance of Rizal-
Quezon City Branch), and Judge
Damian Jimenez (Municipal
Court of Quezon City) issued, on
different dates, a total of 42
search warrants against Harry S.
Stonehill, Robert P. Brooks,
HJohn J. Brooks, and Karl Beck,
and/or the corporations of
which they were officers,
directed to any peace officer, to
search the said persons and/or
the premises of their offices,
warehouses and/or residences,
and to seize and take possession
of the following personal
property to wit: "Books of
accounts, financial records,
vouchers, correspondence,
receipts, ledgers, journals,
portfolios, credit journals,
typewriters, and other
documents and/or papers
showing all business
transactions including
disbursements receipts, balance
sheets and profit and loss
statements and Bobbins
(cigarette wrappers)" as "the
subject of the offense; stolen or
embezzled and proceeds or
fruits of the offense," or "used or
intended to be used as the
means of committing the
offense," which is described in
the applications adverted to
above as "violation of Central
Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs
Laws, Internal Revenue (Code)
and the Revised Penal Code."
Alleging that the search
warrants are null and void, as
contravening the Constitution
and the Rules of Court, Stonehill,
et. al. filed with the Supreme
Court the original action for
certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus and injunction. On
22 March 1962, the Supreme
Court issued the writ of
preliminary injunction prayed
for in the petition. However, by
resolution dated 29 June 1962,
the writ was partially lifted or
dissolved, insofar as the papers,
documents and things seized
from the offices of the
corporations are concerned;
but, the injunction was
maintained as regards the
papers, documents and things
found and seized in the
residences of Stonehill, et. al.
Issue: Whether Stonehill, et. al.
can assail the legality of the
contested warrants that allowed
seizure of documents, papers
and other effects in the
corporate offices, and other
places besides their residences.
Held: Stonehill, et. al.
maintained that the search
warrants are in the nature of
general warrants and that,
accordingly, the seizures
effected upon the authority
thereof are null and void. No
warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause, to be
determined by the judge in the
manner set forth in said
provision; and the warrant shall
particularly describe the things
to be seized. None of these
requirements has been
complied with in the contested
warrants. The grave violation of
the Constitution made in the
application for the contested
search warrants was
compounded by the description
therein made of the effects to be
searched for and seized. The
warrants authorized the search
for and seizure of records
pertaining to all business
transactions of Stonehill, et. al.,
regardless of whether the
transactions were legal or illegal.
The warrants sanctioned the
seizure of all records of the
corporate officers and the
corporations, whatever their
nature, thus openly
contravening the explicit
command of our Bill of Rights —
that the things to be seized be
particularly described — as well
as tending to defeat its major
objective: the elimination of
general warrants. However, the
documents, papers, and things
seized under the alleged
authority of the warrants in
question may be split into (2)
major groups, namely: (a) those
found and seized in the offices of
the corporations and (b) those
found seized in the
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 4 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
residences of Stonehill, et. al. As
regards the first group, Stonehill,
et. al. have no cause of action to
assail the legality of the
contested warrants and of the
seizures made in pursuance
thereof, for the simple reason
that said corporations have their
respective personalities,
separate and distinct from the
personality of Stonehill, et. al.,
regardless of the amount of
shares of stock or of the interest
of each of them in said
corporations, and whatever the
offices they hold therein may be.
Indeed, it is well settled that the
legality of a seizure can be
contested only by the party
whose rights have been
impaired thereby, and that the
objection to an unlawful search
and seizure is purely personal
and cannot be availed of by third
parties. Consequently, Stonehill,
et. al. may not validly object to
the use in evidence against them
of the documents, papers and
things seized from the offices
and premises of the
corporations adverted to above,
since the right to object to the
admission of said papers in
evidence belongs exclusively to
the corporations, to whom the
seized effects belong, and may
not be invoked by the corporate
officers in proceedings against
them in their individual capacity.
With respect to the documents,
papers and things seized in the
residences of Stonehill, et. al.,
the 29 June 1962 Resolution of
the Supreme Court, denying the
lifting of the writ of preliminary
injunction previously issued by
the Court on the documents,
papers and things seized in the
residences, in effect, restrained
the prosecutors from using them
in evidence against Stonehill, et.
al. Thus, the Court held that the
warrants for the search of 3
residences are null and void;
that the searches and seizures
therein made are illegal; that the
writ of preliminary injunction
heretofore issued, in connection
with the documents, papers and
other effects thus seized in said
residences is made permanent,
that the writs prayed for are
granted, insofar as the
documents, papers and other
effects so seized in the
residences are concerned; and
that the petition herein is
dismissed and the writs prayed
for denied, as regards the
documents, papers and other
effects seized in the 29 places,
offices and other premises.
127 Burgos v. Chief of Staff, AFP
[GR 64261, 26 December 1984]
En Banc, Escolin (J): 10 concur, 1
took no part
Facts: On 7 December 1982,
Judge Ernani Cruz-Paño,
Executive Judge of the then CFI
Rizal [Quezon City], issued 2
search warrants where the
premises at 19, Road 3, Project
6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C
& D, RMS Building, Quezon
Avenue, Quezon City, business
addresses of the "Metropolitan
Mail" and "We Forum"
newspapers, respectively, were
searched, and office and printing
machines, equipment,
paraphernalia, motor vehicles
and other articles used in the
printing, publication and
distribution of the said
newspapers, as well as
numerous papers, documents,
books and other written
literature alleged to be in the
possession and control of Jose
Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of
the "We Forum" newspaper,
were seized. A petition for
certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with preliminary
mandatory and prohibitory
injunction was filed after 6
months following the raid to
question the validity of said
search warrants, and to enjoin
the Judge Advocate General of
the AFP, the city fiscal of Quezon
City, et.al. from using the articles
seized as evidence in Criminal
Case Q022782 of the RTC
Quezon City (People v. Burgos).
Issue: Whether allegations of
possession and printing of
subversive materials may be the
basis of the issuance of search
warrants.
Held: Section 3 provides that no
search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be
determined by the judge, or
such other responsible officer as
may be authorized by law, after
examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly
describing the place to be
searched and the persons or
things to be seized. Probable
cause for a search is defined as
such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been
committed and that the objects
sought in connection with the
offense are in the place sought
to be searched. In mandating
that "no warrant shall issue
except upon probable cause to
be determined by the judge,
after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may
produce”; the Constitution
requires no less than personal
knowledge by the complainant
or his witnesses of the facts
upon which the issuance of a
search warrant may be justified.
Herein, a statement in the effect
that Burgos "is in possession or I. Facts: a. In a rape case filed by
has in his control printing Petitioner against Private
equipment and other Respondent Arzadon,
paraphernalia, news Respondent Judge Carbonell
publications and other dismissed the said case for the
documents which were used and failure of Petitioner to take the
are all continuously being used witness stand on 4 consecutive
as a means of committing the orders.
offense of subversion b. The Order was for the purpose
punishable under PD 885, as of determining probable cause
amended" is a mere conclusion on the issuance of a warrant of
of law and does not satisfy the arrest against Arzadon.
requirements of probable cause. c. Due to the failure of Petitioner
Bereft of such particulars as in taking the witness stand,
would justify a finding of the respondent Judge Carbonell
existence of probable cause, said dismissed the criminal case for
allegation cannot serve as basis lack of probable cause.
for the issuance of a search d. Judge Carbonell claims that
warrant. Further, when the under Section 2, Article III of the
search warrant applied for is 1987 Constitution, no warrant of
directed against a newspaper arrest shall issue except upon
publisher or editor in connection probable cause to be
with the publication of determined personally by the
subversive materials, the judge after examination under
application and/or its supporting oath or affirmation of the
affidavits must contain a complainant and the witnesses
specification, stating with he may produce.
particularity the alleged
subversive material he has II. Issue:
published or is intending to Whether or not Judge Carbonell
publish. Mere generalization will committed grave abuse of
not suffice. discretion in dismissing the case.
AAA v Carbonell
III. Held: Yes. Judge Carbonell
committed grave abuse of
discretion. The Supreme Court
explained that this constitutional
provision does not mandatorily
require the judge to personally
examine the complainant and
her witnesses. Instead, he may
opt to personally evaluate the
report and supporting
documents submitted by the
prosecutor or he may disregard
the prosecutor’s report and
require the submission of
supporting affidavits of
witnesses.
What the law requires as
personal determination on the
part of the judge is that he
should not rely solely on the
report of the investigating
prosecutor. If the report, taken
together with the supporting
evidence, is sufficient to sustain
a finding of probable cause, it is
not compulsory that a personal
examination of the complainant
and his witnesses be conducted.
In a rape case, private
complainant failed to appear 4
consecutive orders to take the
witness stand in order to satisfy
the judge for the existence of
probable cause for the issuance
of a warrant of arrest.
Judge Carbonell dismissed
Criminal Case No. 6983 for lack of
probable cause on the ground
that the complainant and her
witnesses failed to take the
witness stand. He claims that
under Section 2, Article III of the
1987 Constitution, no warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause “to be
determined personally by the
judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses
he may produce.”
Is Judge Carbonell correct?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. Judge Carbonell committed
grave abuse of discretion. The
Supreme Court explained that
this constitutional provision
does not mandatorily require
the judge to personally examine
the complainant and her
witnesses. Instead, he may opt
to personally evaluate the report
and supporting documents
submitted by the prosecutor or
he may disregard the
prosecutor’s report and require
the submission of supporting
affidavits of witnesses.
“We reiterated the above ruling
in the case of Webb v. De Leon,
where we held that before
issuing warrants of arrest, judges
merely determine the
probability, not the certainty, of
guilt of an accused. In doing so,
judges do not conduct a de novo
hearing to determine the
existence of probable cause.
They just personally review the
initial determination of the
prosecutor finding a probable
cause to see if it is supported by
substantial evidence.”
fellester.blogspot.com It is well
to remember that there is a
distinction between the
preliminary inquiry which
determines probable cause for
the issuance of a warrant of
arrest and the preliminary
investigation proper which
ascertains whether the offender
should be held for trial or be
released. The determination of
probable cause for purposes of
issuing the warrant of arrest is
made by the judge. The
preliminary investigation proper
– whether or not there is
reasonable ground to believe
that the accused is guilty of the
offense charged – is the function
of the investigating prosecutor.
True, there are cases where the
circumstances may call for the
judge’s personal examination of
the complainant and his
witnesses. But it must be
emphasized that such personal
examination is not mandatory
and indispensable in the
determination of probable cause
for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest. The necessity arises only
when there is an utter failure of
the evidence to show the
existence of probable cause.
Otherwise, the judge may rely
on the report of the investigating
prosecutor, provided that he
likewise evaluates the
documentary evidence in
support thereof.
Indeed, what the law requires as
personal determination on the
part of the judge is that he
should not rely solely on the
report of the investigating
prosecutor. In Okabe v.
Gutierrez, we stressed that the
judge should consider not only
the report of the investigating
prosecutor but also the affidavit
and the documentary evidence
of the parties, the counter-
affidavit of the accused and his
witnesses, as well as the
transcript of stenographic notes
taken during the preliminary
investigation, if any, submitted
to the court by the investigating
prosecutor upon the filing of the
Information. If the report, taken
together with the supporting
evidence, is sufficient to sustain
a finding of probable cause, it is
not compulsory that a personal
examination of the complainant
and his witnesses be conducted.
(AAA vs. Carbonell, G.R. No.
171465, June 8, 2007)
People vs Pastrana and Abad
On 26 March 2001, NBI
Investigator Albert Froilan
Gaerlan filed an application of
search warrant of Amador
Pastrana and Rufina Abad,
alleging respondents were
engaged in a scheme to defraud
foreign investors. Their
employees would call clients and
convince them to invest by
purchasing shares of stocks, the
same being non-existent.
Gaerlan averred that the scheme
not only constituted estafa but
also a violation of Republic Act
No. 8799 or the Securities
Regulation Code (SRC).
Gaerlan attached the affidavit of
Rashed H. Alghurairi, one of the
complainants from Saudi Arabia.
Search warrant was released on
the same day by Judge Tranquil
Salvador and the search was
conducted.
On 27 March 2001, NBI agents
and representatives from the
Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) proceeded to
respondents' office to search the
same. The search was witnessed
by Isagani Paulino and Gerardo
Derma, Chief Security Officer
and Building Administrator of 88
Corporate Center. The agents
were able to seize 89 boxes
containing business documents
(e.g. telephone bills, official
receipts, sales agreement, etc.)
Respondent Abad moved to
quash Search Warrant because it
was issued in connection with
two offenses, one for violation of
the SRC and the other
for estafa under the RPC, which
circumstance contravened the
basic tenet of the rules of
criminal procedure that search
warrants are to be issued only
upon a finding of probable cause
in connection with one specific
offense. Further, Search
Warrant failed to describe with
specificity the objects to be
seized. Judge Salvador, Jr.
voluntarily inhibited himself
from the case, thus the case was
re-raffled.
The RTC ruled that the search
warrant was null and void
because it violated the
requirement that a search
warrant must be issued in
connection with one specific
offense only
Upon appeal, the CA affirmed
the ruling of the RTC. It declared
that Search Warrant clearly
violated Section 4, Rule 126 of
the Rules of Court which
prohibits the issuance of a
search warrant for more than
one specific offense, because
the application failed to specify
what provision of the SRC was
violated or even what type
of estafa was committed by
respondents.
Petitioner argues that violation
of Section 28.1 of the SRC
and estafa are so intertwined
that the punishable acts defined
in one of them can be
considered as including or are
necessarily included in the
other; that it punishes act of
misrepresentation, an element
common to both offenses; thus,
the issuance of a single search
warrant did not violate the "one
specific offense rule."
Issue: Whether or not the search
warrant is void on the ground
that it lacks probable cause.
Article III, Section 2 of the
Constitution guarantees every
individual the right to personal
liberty and security of homes
against unreasonable searches
and seizure. The purpose of the
constitutional provision against
unlawful searches and seizures is
to prevent violations of private
security in person and property,
and unlawful invasion of the
sanctity of the home, by officers
of the law acting under
legislative or judicial sanction,
and to give remedy against such
usurpations when attempted.
Additionally, Rule 126, Sections
4 and 5 of the 2000 Rules on
Criminal Procedure provide for
the requisites for the issuance of
a search warrant, to wit:
SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing
search warrant. A search
warrant shall not issue except
upon probable cause in
connection with one specific
offense to be determined
personally by the judge after
examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant
and the witness he may
produce, and particularly
describing the place to be
searched and the things to be
seized which may be anywhere
in the Philippines.
SEC. 5. Examination of
complainant; record. The judge
must, before issuing the
warrant, personally examine in
the form of searching questions
and answers, in writing and
under oath, the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce
on facts personally known to
them and attach to the record
their sworn statements,
together with the affidavits
submitted.
One of the constitutional
requirements for the validity of a
search warrant is that it must be
issued based on probable cause
which, under the Rules, must be
in connection with one specific
offense to prevent the issuance
of a scatter-shot warrant. In
search warrant proceedings,
probable cause is defined as
such facts and circumstances
that would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been
committed and that the objects
sought in connection with the
offense are in the place sought
to be searched.
In this case, the core of the
problem is that the subject
warrant did not state one
specific offense. It included
violation of the SRC which covers
several penal provisions
and estafa, which could be
committed in a number of ways.
No specific offense had been
alleged in said applications. The
averments thereof with respect
to the offense committed
were abstract. As a topic: whether or not the
consequence, it
was impossible for the judges
who issued the warrants to have
found the existence of probable
cause, for the same presupposes
the introduction of competent
proof that the party against
whom it is sought has
performed particular acts, or
committed specific omissions,
violating a given provision of our
criminal laws.
Hence, Search Warrant is null
and void for having been issued
for more than one specific
offense.
Petition is denied. CA decision is
affirmed.
Soliven vs Judge Makasiar
Facts: - there are three
principal issues raised in this
case: 1st whether or not
petitioners were denied due
process when information for
libel were filed against them
although the finding of the
existence of a prima facie case
was still under review by the
Secretary of Justice and the
President; 2nd is related to our
constitutional rights of Beltran
were violated when respondent
RTC judge issued a warrant for
his arrest without personally
examining the complainant and
the witnesses to determine
probable cause; and 3rd whether
or not the President of the
Philippines may initiate criminal
proceedings against the
petitioners through the filing of
a complaint-affidavit.
Issue: whether or not the
constitutional rights of Beltran
were violated when respondent
RTC judge issued a warrant for his
arrest without personally
examining the complainant and
the witnesses to determine
probable cause
Ruling: - The second issue, raised
by petitioner Beltran is that the
addition of the word
"personally" after the word
"determined" and the deletion
of the grant of authority by the
1973 Constitution to issue
warrants to "other responsible
officers as may be authorized by
law," has convinced petitioner
Beltran that the Constitution
requires the judge to personally
examine the complainant and
his witnesses in his
determination of probable cause
for the issuance of warrants of
arrest.
- The interpretation of
Beltran is inaccurate. In
determining the probable cause
for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest, the judge is not required
to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses.
- Instead, the judge shall:
(1) personally evaluate the
report and the supporting
documents submitted by the
fiscal regarding the existence of
probable cause and, on the basis
thereof, issue a warrant of
arrest; or (2) if he finds no
probable cause, he may
disregard the fiscal's report and
require the submission of
supporting affidavits of
witnesses to aid him in arriving
at a conclusion as to the
existence of probable cause.
- In 1987, the Supreme
Court adopted Circular No. 12,
setting down guidelines for the
issuance of warrants of arrest.
- Respondent judge has
not been deviated from the
prescribed procedure. Thus,
with regard to the issuance of
the warrants of arrest, a finding
of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction cannot be sustained.
The petition was dismissed.
PITA VS. COURT OF APPEALS
[178 SCRA 362; G.R. NO.80806; 5
OCT 1989]
Facts: On December 1 and 3,
1983, pursuing an Anti-Smut
Campaign initiated by the Mayor
of the City of Manila, Ramon D.
Bagatsing, elements of the
Special Anti-Narcotics Group,
Auxilliary Services Bureau,
Western Police District, INP of
the Metropolitan Police Force of
Manila, seized and confiscated
from dealers, distributors,
newsstand owners and peddlers
along Manila sidewalks,
magazines, publications and
other reading materials believed
to be obscene, pornographic
and indecent and later burned
the seized materials in public at
the University belt along C.M.
Recto Avenue, Manila, in the
presence of Mayor Bagatsing
and several officers and
members of various student
organizations.
Among the publications seized,
and later burned, was "Pinoy
Playboy" magazines published
and co-edited by plaintiff Leo
Pita.
Plaintiff filed a case
for injunction with prayer for
issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction against
Mayor Bagatsing and Narcisco
Cabrera, as superintendent of
Western Police District of the
City of Manila, seeking to enjoin
said defendants and their agents
from confiscating plaintiff’s
magazines or from preventing
the sale or circulation thereof
claiming that the magazine is a
decent, artistic and educational
magazine which is not per se
obscene, and that the
publication is protected by the
Constitutionalguarantees of fre
edom of speech and of the
press. Plaintiff also filed an
Urgent Motion for issuance of a
temporary restraining order
against indiscriminate
seizure, confiscation and
burning of plaintiff's "Pinoy
Playboy" Magazines, pending
hearing on the petition for
preliminaryinjunction. The Court
granted the temporary
restraining order. The case was
set for trial upon the lapse of the
TRO. RTC ruled that the seizure
was valid. This was affirmed by
the CA.
Issue: Whether or Not the
seizure violative of the freedom
of expression of the petitioner.
Held: Freedom of the press is
not without restraint as the state
has the right to protect society
from pornographic literature
that is offensive to public morals,
as indeed we have laws
punishing the author, publishers
and sellers of obscene
publications. However, It is
easier said than done to say, that
if the pictures here in question
were used not exactly for art's
sake but rather for commercial
purposes, the pictures are not
entitled to any constitutional
protection. Using the Kottinger
rule: the test of obscenity is
"whether the tendency of the
matter charged as obscene, is to
deprave or corrupt those whose
minds are open to such
immoralinfluences and into and pose a clear and present
whose hands a publication or danger of an evil substantive
other article charged as being enough to warrant State
obscene may fall." Another is interference and action;
whether it shocks the ordinary 2. The judge must determine
and common sense of men as an whether or not the same are
indecency. Ultimately "whether indeed obscene. The question is
a picture is obscene to be resolved on a case-to-case
or indecent must depend upon basis and on the judge’s sound
the circumstances of the case discretion;
and that the question is to be
PASION VDA de Gracia vs Locsin
decided by the "judgment of
the aggregatesense of the
Facts: Mariano G. Almeda, an
community reached by it." The
agent of the Anti-Usuary Board,
government authorities in the
obtained from the justice of the
instant case have not shown the
peace of Tarlac, a search warrant
required proof to justify a ban
commanding any officer of the
and to warrant confiscation of
law to search the person, house
the literature First of all, they
or store of the petitioner at
were not possessed of a
Victoria, Tarlac, for “certain
lawful court order: (1) finding
books, lists, chits, receipts,
the said materials to be
documents and other papers
pornography, and (2)
relating to her activities as
authorizing them to carry out a
usurer.” The search warrant was
search and seizure, by way of a
issued upon an affidavit given by
search warrant. The court
the said Almeda.
provides that the authorities
must apply for the issuance of a
On the same date, the said
search warrant from a judge, if in
Mariano G. Almeda,
their opinion an obscenity
accompanied by a captain of the
seizure is in order and that;
Philippine Constabulary, went to
the office of the petitioner in
1. The authorities must convince
Victoria, Tarlac and, after
the court that the materials
showing the search warrant to
sought to be seized are obscene
the petitioner’s bookkeeper,
Alfredo Salas, and, without the
presence of the petitioner who
was ill and confined at the time,
proceeded with the execution
thereof
The papers and documents
seized were kept for a
considerable length of time by
the Anti-Usury Board and
thereafter were turned over by it
to the respondent fiscal who
subsequently filed six separate
criminal cases against the herein
petitioner for violation of the
Anti-Usury Law.
The legality of the search
warrant was challenged by
counsel for the petitioner in the
six criminal cases and the
devolution of the documents
demanded. The respondent
Judge denied the petitioner’s
motion for the reason that
though the search warrant was
illegal, there was a waiver on the
part of the petitioner.
HELD: Freedom from
unreasonable searches and
seizures is declared a popular
right and for a search warrant to
be valid, (1) it must be issued
upon probable cause; (2) the
probable cause must be
determined by the judge himself
and not by the applicant or any
other person; (3) in the
determination of probable
cause, the judge must examine,
under oath or affirmation, the
complainant and such witnesses
as the latter may produce; and
(4) the warrant issued must
particularly describe the place to
be searched and persons or
things to be seized.
In the instant case the existence
of probable cause was
determined not by the judge
himself but by the applicant. All
that the judge did was to accept
as true the affidavit made by
agent Almeda. He did not decide
for himself. It does not appear
that he examined the applicant
and his witnesses, if any. Even
accepting the description of the
properties to be seized to be
sufficient and on the assumption
that the receipt issued is
sufficiently detailed within the
meaning of the law, the
properties seized were not
delivered to the court which
issued the warrant, as required
by law.
Instead, they were turned over
to the resp. provincial fiscal &
used by him in building up cases
against petitioner. Considering
that at the time the warrant was
issued, there was no case
pending against the petitioner,
the averment that the warrant
was issued primarily for
exploration purposes is not
without basis.
139 Pasion Vda. de Garcia vs.
Locsin [GR 45950, 20 June 1938]
Facts: On 10 November 1934,
Mariano G. Almeda, an agent of
the Anti-Usury Board, obtained
from the justice of the peace of
Tarlac, Tarlac, a search warrant
commanding any officer of the
law to search the person, house
or store of Leona Pasion Vda. de
Garcia at Victoria, Tarlac, for
"certain books, lists, chits,
receipts, documents and other
papers relating to her activities
as usurer." The search warrant
was issued upon an affidavit
given by the said Almeda "that
he has and there is just and
probable cause to believe and he
does believe that Leona Pasion
de Garcia keeps and conceals in
her house and store at Victoria,
Tarlac, certain books, lists, chits,
receipts, documents, and other
papers relating to her activities
as usurer, all of which is contrary
to the statute in such cases
made and provided." On the
same date, Almeda,
accompanied by a captain of the
Philippine Constabulary, went to
the office of Pasion de Garcia in
Victoria, Tarlac and, after
showing the search warrant to
the latter's bookkeeper, Alfredo
Salas, and, without Pasion de
Garcia's presence who was ill
and confined at the time,
proceeded with the execution
thereof. Two packages of
records and a locked filing
cabinet containing several
papers and documents were
seized by Almeda and a receipt
therefor issued by him to Salas.
The papers and documents
seized were kept for a
considerable length of time by
the Anti-Usury Board and
thereafter were turned over by it
to the provincial fiscal Felix
Imperial, who subsequently
filed, in the Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Tarlac, 6
separate criminal cases against
Pasion de Garcia for violation of
the Anti-Usury Law. On several
occasions, after seizure, Pasion
de Garcia, through counsel,
demanded from the Anti-Usury
Board the return of the
documents seized. On January 7,
and, by motion, on 4 June 1937,
the legality of the search warrant
was challenged by Pasion de
Garcia's counsel in the 6 criminal
cases and the devolution of the
documents demanded. By
resolution of 5 October 1937,
Judge Diego Locsin (CFI) denied
Pasion de garcia's motion of
June 4 for the reason that
though the search warrant was
illegal, there was a waiver on the
latter's part. A motion for
reconsideration was presented
but was denied by order of 3
January 1938. Pasion de Garcia
registered her exception.
Issue: Whether the lack of
personal examination of
witnesses renders the warrant
void
Held: Freedom from
unreasonable searches and
seizures is declared a popular
right and for a search warrant to
be valid, (1) it must be issued
upon probable cause; (2) the
probable cause must be
determined by the judge himself
and not by the applicant or any
other person; (3) in the
determination of probable
cause, the judge must examine,
under oath or affirmation, the
complainant and such witnesses
as the latter may produce; and
(4) the warrant issued must
particularly describe the place to
be searched and persons or
things to be seized. These
requirements are
complemented by the Code of
Criminal Procedure, particularly
with reference to the duration of
the validity of the search warrant
and the obligation of the officer
seizing the property to deliver
the same to the corresponding
court. Herein, the existence of
probable cause was determined
not by the judge himself but by
the applicant. All that the judge
did was to accept as true the
affidavit made by agent Almeda.
He did not decide for himself. It
does not appear that he
examined the applicant and his
witnesses, if any. Even accepting
the description of the properties
to be seized to be sufficient and
on the assumption that the
receipt issued is sufficiently
detailed within the meaning of
the law, the properties seized
were not delivered to the court
which issued the warrant, as
required by law. Instead, they
were turned over to the
provincial fiscal and used by him
in building up cases against
Pasion de Garcia. Considering
that at the time the warrant was
issued there was no case
pending against Pasion de
Garcia, the averment that the
warrant was issued
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 22 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
primarily for exploration
purposes is not without basis.
The search warrant was illegally
issued by the justice of the peace
of Tarlac, Tarlac. In any event,
the failure on the part of Pasion
de Garcia and her bookkeeper to
resist or object to the execution
of the warrant does not
constitute an implied waiver of
constitutional right. It is, as
Judge Cooley observes, but a
submission to the authority of
the law. As the constitutional
guaranty is not dependent upon
any affirmative act of the citizen,
the courts do not place the
citizen in the position of either
contesting an officer's authority
by force, or waiving his
constitutional rights; but instead
they hold that a peaceful
submission to a search or seizure
is not a consent or an invitation
thereto, but is merely a
demonstration of regard for the
supremacy of the law.
142 Mata vs. Bayona [GR 50720,
26 March 1984]
Facts: Soriano Mata was accused
under Presidential Decree (PD)
810, as amended by PD 1306,
the information against him
alleging that Soriano Mata
offered, took and arranged bets
on the Jai Alai game by "selling
illegal tickets known as 'Masiao
tickets' without any authority
from the Philippine Jai Alai &
Amusement Corporation or
from the government
authorities concerned." Mata
claimed that during the hearing
of the case, he discovered that
nowhere from the records of the
said case could be found the
search warrant and other
pertinent papers connected to
the issuance of the same, so that
he had to inquire from the City
Fiscal its whereabouts, and to
which inquiry Judge Josephine K.
Bayona, presiding Jufe of the
City Court of Ormoc replied, "it is
with the court". The Judge then
handed the records to the Fiscal
who attached them to the
records. This led Mata to file a
motion to quash and annul the
search warrant and for the
return of the articles seized,
citing and invoking, among
others, Section 4 of Rule 126 of
the Revised Rules of Court. The
motion was denied by the Judge
on 1 March 1979, stating that
the court has made a thorough
investigation and examination
under oath of Bernardo U. Goles
and Reynaldo T. Mayote,
members of the Intelligence
Section of 352nd PC Co./Police
District II INP; that in fact the
court made a certification to
that effect; and that the fact that
documents relating to the
search warrant were not
attached immediately to the
record of the criminal case is of
no moment, considering that
the rule does not specify when
these documents are to be
attached to the records. Mata's
motion for reconsideration of
the aforesaid order having been
denied, he came to the Supreme
Court, with the petition for
certiorari, praying, among
others, that the Court declare
the search warrant to be invalid
for its alleged failure to comply
with the requisites of the
Constitution and the Rules of
Court, and that all the articles
confiscated under such warrant
as inadmissible as evidence in
the case, or in any proceedings
on the matter.
Issue: Whether the judge must
before issuing the warrant
personally examine on oath or
affirmation the complainant and
any witnesses he may produce
and take their depositions in
writing, and attach them to the
record, in addition to any
affidavits presented to him
Held: Under the Constitution "no
search warrant shall issue but
upon probable cause to be
determined by the Judge or such
other responsible officer as may
be authorized by law after
examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may
produce". More emphatic and
detailed is the implementing
rule of the constitutional
injunction, The Rules provide
that the judge must before
issuing the warrant personally
examine on oath or affirmation
the complainant and any
witnesses he may produce and
take their depositions in writing,
and attach them to the record, in
addition to any affidavits
presented to him. Mere
affidavits of the complainant and
his witnesses are thus not
sufficient. The examining Judge
has to take depositions in writing
of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce and
to attach them to the record.
Such written deposition is
necessary in order that the
Judge may be able to properly
determine the existence or
nonexistence of the probable
cause, to hold liable for perjury
the person giving it if it will be
found later that his declarations
are false. We, therefore, hold
that the search warrant is
tainted with illegality by the
failure of the Judge to conform
with the essential requisites of
taking the depositions in writing
and attaching them to the
record, rendering the search
warrant invalid.
Del Castillo vs People
G.R. No. 185128
Petitioner: Ruben Del Castillo @
Boy Castillo
Respondent: People of the
Philippines
Facts: Police Officers headed by
SPO3 Bienvenido Masnayon
went to serve a search warrant
from the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) to Petitioner Ruben Del
Castillo in search of illegal drugs.
Upon arrival, somebody shouted
“raid” which prompted the
police officers to immediately
disembark from the jeep they
were riding and go directly to Del
Castillo’s house and cordoned it
off. Police men found nothing
incriminating in Del Castillo’s
residence, but one of the
barangay tanods was able to
confiscate from the hut several
articles including four (4) plastic
packs of methamphetamine
hydrochloride, or shabu.
An Information was filed before
RTC against Del Castillo, charging
him with violation of Section 16,
Article III of R.A. 6425 (The
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972).
During the arraignment, Del
Castillo pleaded not guilty. The
RTC found Del Castillo guilty
beyond reasonable of the charge
against him in the information.
The Court of Appeals (CA)
affirmed the decision.
Del Castillo appealed his case to
the CA, insisting that there was a
violation of his constitutional
guaranty against unreasonable
searches and seizure. On the
contrary, the Office of the
Solicitor General argued that the
constitutional guaranty against
unreasonable searches and
seizure is applicable only against
government authorities. Hence,
assuming that the items seized
were found in another place not
designated in the search
warrant, the same items should
still be admissible as evidence
because the one who discovered
them was a barangay tanod who
is a private individual.
Issue: Whether or not there was
a violation of Del Castillo’s right
against unreasonable searches
and seizure.
Ruling: Petition GRANTED. It
must be remembered that the
warrant issued must particularly
describe the place to be
searched and persons or things
to be seized in order for it to be
valid. A designation or
description that points out the
place to be searched to the
exclusion of all others, and on
inquiry unerringly leads the
peace officers to it, satisfies the
constitutional requirement of
definiteness.
In the present case, the search
warrant specifically designates
or describes the residence of the
petitioner as the place to be
searched. Incidentally, the items
were seized by a barangay tanod
in a nipa hut, 20 meters away
from the residence of the Del
Castillo. The confiscated items,
having been found in a place
other than the one described in
the search warrant, can be
considered as fruits of an invalid
warrantless search, the
presentation of which as an
evidence is a violation of Del
Castillo’s constitutional guaranty
against unreasonable searches
and seizure.
The OSG argued that, assuming
that the items seized were found
in another place not designated
in the search warrant, the same
items should still be admissible
as evidence because the one
who discovered them was a
barangay tanod who is a private
individual, the constitutional
guaranty against unreasonable
searches and seizure being
applicable only against
government authorities. The
contention is devoid of merit. It
was testified to during trial by
the police officers who effected
the search warrant that they
asked the assistance of the
barangay tanods. Having been
established that the assistance
of the barangay tanods was
sought by the police authorities
who effected the search
warrant, the same barangay
tanods therefore acted as agents
of persons in authority. Article
152 of the Revised Penal Code
defines persons in authority and
agents of persons in authority as
“any person directly vested with
jurisdiction, whether as an
individual or as a member of
some court or governmental
corporation, board or
commission, shall be deemed a
person in authority. A barangay
captain and a barangay
chairman shall also be deemed a
person in authority. A person
who, by direct provision of law
or by election or by appointment
by competent authority, is
charged with the maintenance
of public order and the
protection and security of life
and property, such as barrio
councilman, barrio policeman
and barangay leader, and any
person who comes to the aid of
persons in authority, shall be
deemed an agent of a person in
authority.”
The Local Government Code also
contains a provision which
describes the function of a
barangay tanod as an agent of
persons in authority. Section 388
of the Local Government Code
reads: “For purposes of the
Revised Penal Code, the punong
barangay, sangguniang barangay
members, and members of the
lupong tagapamayapa in each
barangay shall be deemed as
persons in authority in their
jurisdictions, while other
barangay officials and members
who may be designated by law
or ordinance and charged with
the maintenance of public order,
protection and security of life
and property, or the
maintenance of a desirable and
balanced environment, and any
barangay member who comes to
the aid of persons in authority,
shall be deemed agents of
persons in authority.
By virtue of the above
provisions, the police officers, as
well as the barangay tanods
were acting as agents of a
person in authority during the
conduct of the search. Thus, the
search conducted was
unreasonable and the
confiscated items are
inadmissible in evidence.
132 People vs. Salanguit [GR
133254-55, 19 April 2001]
Facts:
On 26 December 1995, Sr. Insp.
Aguilar applied for a warrant in
the Regional Trial Court, Branch
90, Dasmariñias, Cavite, to
search the residence of Robert
Salanguit y Ko on Binhagan St.,
Novaliches, Quezon City. He
presented as his witness SPO1
Edmund Badua, who testified
that as a poseur-buyer, he was
able to purchase 2.12 grams of
shabu from Salanguit. The sale
took place in Salunguit's room,
and Badua saw that the shabu
was taken by Salunguit from a
cabinet inside his room. The
application was granted, and a
search warrant was later issued
by Presiding Judge Dolores L.
Español. At about 10:30 p.m. of
said day, a group of about 10
policemen, along with one
civilian informer, went to the
residence of Salunguit to serve
the warrant. The police
operatives knocked on
Salanguit’s door, but nobody
opened it. They heard people
inside the house, apparently
panicking. The police operatives
then forced the door open and
entered the house. After
showing the search warrant to
the occupants of the house, Lt.
Cortes and his group started
searching the house. They found
12 small heat-sealed
transparent plastic bags
containing a white crystalline
substance, a paper clip box also
containing a white crystalline
substance, and two bricks of
dried leaves which appeared to
be marijuana wrapped in
newsprint having a total weight
of approximately 1,255 grams. A
receipt of the items seized was
prepared, but Salanguit refused
to sign it. After the search, the
police operatives took Salanguit
with them to Station 10, EDSA,
Kamuning, Quezon City, along
with the items they had seized.
PO3 Duazo requested a
laboratory examination of the
confiscated evidence. The white
crystalline substance with a total
weight of 2.77 grams and those
contained in a small box with a
total weight of 8.37 grams were
found to be positive for
methamphetamine
hydrochloride. On the other
hand, the two bricks of dried
leaves, one weighing 425 grams
and the other 850 grams, were
found to be marijuana. Charges
against Roberto Salanguit y Ko
for violations of Republic Act
(RA) 6425, i.e. for possession of
shabu and marijuana, (Criminal
Cases Q-95-64357 and Q95-
64358, respectively) were filed
on 28 December 1995. After
hearing, the trial court rendered
its decision, convicting Salanguit
in Criminal Cases Q-95-64357
and Q-95-64358 for violation of
Section 16 and 8, respectively,
RA 6425, and sentencing him to
suffer an indeterminate
sentence with a minimum of 6
months of arresto mayor and a
maximum of 4 years and 2
months of prision correccional,
and reclusion perpetua and to
pay a fine of P700,000.00,
respectively. Salanguit appealed;
contesting his conviction on the
grounds that (1) the admissibility
of the shabu allegedly recovered
from his residence as evidence
against him on the ground that
the warrant used in obtaining it
was invalid; (2) the admissibility
in evidence of the marijuana
allegedly seized from Salanguit
to the "plain view" doctrine; and
(3) the employment of
unnecessary force by the police
in the execution of the warrant.
Issue: Whether the warrant was
invalid for failure of providing
evidence to support the seizure
of “drug paraphernalia”, and
whether the marijuana may be
included as evidence in light of
the “plain view doctrine.”
Held: The warrant authorized
the seizure of "undetermined
quantity of shabu and drug
paraphernalia." Evidence was
presented showing probable
cause of the existence of
methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu. The fact
that there was no probable
cause to support the application
for the seizure of drug
paraphernalia does not warrant
the conclusion that the search
warrant is void. This fact would
be material only if drug
paraphernalia was in fact seized
by the police. The fact is that
none was taken by virtue of the
search warrant issued. If at all,
therefore, the search warrant is
void only insofar as it authorized
the seizure of drug
paraphernalia, but it is valid as to
the seizure of
methamphetamine
hydrochloride as to which
evidence was presented
showing probable cause as to its
existence. In sum, with respect
to the seizure of shabu from
Salanguit's residence, Search
Warrant 160 was properly
issued, such warrant being
founded on probable cause
personally determined by the
judge under oath or affirmation
of the deposing witness and
particularly describing the place
to be searched and the things to
be seized. With respect to, and
in light of the "plain view
doctrine," the police failed to
allege the time when the
marijuana was found, i.e.,
whether prior to, or
contemporaneous with, the
shabu subject of the warrant, or
whether it was recovered on
Salanguit's person or in an area
within his immediate control. Its
recovery, therefore, presumably
during the search conducted
after the shabu had been
recovered from the cabinet, as
attested to by SPO1 Badua in his
deposition, was invalid. Thus,
the Court affirmed the decision
as to Criminal Case Q-95-64357
only.
198 People vs. Sucro [GR 93239, instance that Pat. Fulgencio
18 March 1991] radioed P/Lt. Seraspi and
reported the activity going on
Facts: On 21 March 1989, Pat.
P/Lt. Seraspi instructed Pat.
Roy Fulgencio, a member of the
Fulgencio to continue
INP, Kalibo, Aklan, was
monitoring developments. At
instructed by P/Lt. Vicente
about 6:30 P.M., Pat. Fulgencio
Seraspi, Jr. (Station Commander
again called up Seraspi to report
of the INP Kalibo, Aklan) to
that a third buyer later identified
monitor the activities of Edison
as Ronnie Macabante, was
Sucro, because of information
transacting with Sucro. At that
gathered by Seraspi that Sucro
point, the team of P/Lt Seraspi
was selling marijuana. As
proceeded to the area and while
planned, at about 5:00 P.M. on
the police officers were at the
said date, Pat. Fulgencio
Youth Hostel at Maagma St., Pat.
positioned himself under the
Fulgencio told P/Lt. Seraspi to
house of a certain Arlie Regalado
intercept Macabante and Sucro.
at C. Quimpo Street. Adjacent to
P/ Lt. Seraspi and his team
the house of Regalado, about 2
caught up with Macabante at
meters away, was a chapel.
the crossing of Mabini and
Thereafter, Pat. Fulgencio saw
Maagma Sts. in front of the
Sucro enter the chapel, taking
Aklan Medical Center. Upon
something which turned out
seeing the police, Macabante
later to be marijuana from the
threw something to the ground
compartment of a cart found
which turned out to be a tea bag
inside the chapel, and then
of marijuana. When confronted,
return to the street where he
Macabante readily admitted
handed the same to a buyer,
that he bought the same from
Aldie Borromeo. After a while
Sucro in front of the chapel. The
Sucro went back to the chapel
police team was able to overtake
and again came out with
and arrest Sucro at the corner of
marijuana which he gave to a
C. Quimpo and Veterans Sts. The
group of persons. It was at this
police recovered 19 sticks and 4
teabags of marijuana from the
cart inside the chapel and
another teabag from
Macabante. The teabags of
marijuana were sent to the PC-
INP Crime Laboratory Service, at
Camp Delgado, Iloilo City for
analysis. The specimens were all
found positive of marijuana.
Sucro was charged with violation
of Section 4, Article II of the
Dangerous Drugs Act. Upon
arraignment, Sucro, assisted by
counsel, entered a plea of "not
guilty" to the offense charged.
Trial ensued and a judgment of
conviction was rendered, finding
Sucro guilty of the sale of
prohibited drug and sentencing
him to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment, and pay a fine of
P20,000, and costs. Sucro
appealed.
Issue: Whether the arrest
without warrant of the accused
is lawful and consequently,
whether the evidence resulting
from such arrest is admissible.
Held: Section 5, Rule 113 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure
provides for the instances where
arrest without warrant is
considered lawful. The rule
states that "A peace officer or
private person may, without
warrant, arrest a person: (a)
When in his presence, the
person to be arrested has
committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense; (b) When an
offense has in fact just been
committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested
has committed it;" An offense is
committed in the presence or
within the view of an officer,
within the meaning of the rule
authorizing an arrest without a
warrant, when the officer sees
the offense, although at a
distance, or hears the
disturbances created thereby
and proceeds at once to the
scene thereof. The failure of the
police officers to secure a
warrant stems from the fact that
their knowledge acquired from
the surveillance was insufficient
to fulfill the requirements for the
issuance of a search warrant.
What is paramount is that
probable cause existed. Still, that
searches and seizures must be
supported by a valid warrant is
not an absolute rule. Among the
200 People vs. Go [GR 116001, 14
exceptions granted by law is a
March 2001]; also Go vs. Court of
search incidental to a lawful
Appeals [GR 123943]
arrest under Sec. 12, Rule 126 of
the Rules on Criminal Procedure,
which provides that a person
Facts: On 22 October 1992, at
lawfully arrested may be
around 10:00 p.m., SPO1 Mauro
searched for dangerous
Piamonte and SPO3 Candido
weapons or anything which may
Liquido, members of the
be used as proof of the
Intelligence and Follow-up Unit
commission of an offense,
of the Calamba Police, went to
without a search warrant.
the police outpost at Crossing,
Herein, police officers have
Calamba, Laguna, to follow up
personal knowledge of the
an intelligence report that
actual commission of the crime
methamphetamine
when it had earlier conducted
hydrochloride, or shabu, a
surveillance activities of the
regulated drug, was being
accused. Under the
supplied there. Police civilian
circumstances (monitoring of
agent Ronnie Panuringan arrived
transactions) there existed
and reported to them that he
probable cause for the arresting
saw Luisito Go, also known as
officers, to arrest Sucro who was
"King Louie", enter the Flamingo
in fact selling marijuana and to
Disco House with two women.
seize the contraband. Thus, as
Panuringan said that he spotted
there is nothing unlawful about
a gun tucked in Go's waist.
the arrest considering its
Together, the three policemen
compliance with the
proceeded to the Flamingo,
requirements of a warrantless
which was located about a
arrest; ergo, the fruits obtained
hundred meters away from the
from such lawful arrest are
outpost. When they arrived at
admissible in evidence.
the Flamingo, the police officers
informed the owner that they
were conducting an "Operation
Bakal," whereby they search for
illegally possessed firearms. The
owner allowed them in and told
a waiter to accompany them.
They went up to the second floor
of the disco. The waiter turned
on the lights, and the police
officers saw Go and his lady
companions seated at a table.
They identified themselves and
asked Go to stand up. When the
later did so, the policemen saw
the gun tucked in his waist. SPO1
Piamonte asked for the license
of the gun, but Go was unable to
produce any. Instead, Go
brought out the driver's license
of a certain Tan Antonio Lerios.
SPO1 Piamonte confiscated the
gun, which was later identified
as a 9mm Walther P88,
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 94 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
Serial Number 006784, with a
magazine containing 10 rounds
of live ammunition. Go was
invited to the police precinct for
questioning. On the way out of
the disco, Go asked permission
to bring his car, which was
parked outside. The police
officers accompanied Go to his
car, a Honda Civic with license
plate number TCM-789.
Through the windshield, SPO3
Liquido noticed a Philippine
National Police identification
card hanging from the rearview
mirror. He asked Go if he was a
member of the PNP, and he said
no. The police officers asked Go
for his driver's license and the
registration papers of the
vehicle, but he was unable to
produce them. When Go opened
the door, SPO3 Liquido took the
ID card and found that the same
belonged to SPO4 Zenaida
Bagadiong. The police officers
saw pieces of glass tooters and
tin foils on the backseat and
floor of the car. They asked Go
why he had these items, but he
did not say anything. Instead, Go
suggested that they talk the
matter over, and intimated that
he had money. SPO3 Liquido
replied that they should talk at
the police headquarters. Go
took out an attaché case from
the car and opened it. There
were two black clutch bags
inside. Go opened the first bag,
which contained shiny white
substance wrapped in
cellophane. The second bag
contained P120,000.00 in cash.
The police officers brought Go to
the police station. When they
arrived at the precinct, they
turned over the attaché case
together with the two black
clutch bags to the investigator.
The investigator found eight
cellophane bags containing
granules suspected to be shabu
in one of the clutch bags. When
the attaché case was opened,
the police officers found that it
also contained three glass
tooters, tin foils, an improvised
burner, magazines and
newspapers. Consequently, two
Informations were filed against
Go before the Regional Trial
Court of Calamba, Laguna,
Branch 34 (Criminal Case 3308-
92-C, for violation of Article III of
RA 6452 or the Dangerous Drugs
Act; and Criminal Case 3309-92-
C, for violation of PD 1866) After
a joint trial, the lower court
rendered judgment convicting
Go in the two criminal cases, and
sentencing him in Criminal Case
3308-92-C to a penalty of
imprisonment of 6 years and 1
day to 12 years and a fine of
P12,000.00; and in Criminal Case
3309-92-C to suffer an
imprisonment of reclusion
perpetua. Go appealed his
conviction in Criminal Case
3309-92-C directly to the
Supreme Court (GR 116001). On
the other hand, Go brought his
appeal of the judgment in
Criminal Case 3308-92-C before
the Court of Appeals. In an
Amended Decision dated 21
February 1996, the Court of
Appeals affirmed Go's conviction
but modified the penalty
imposed by the trial court by
sentencing him, in addition to
imprisonment of 6 years and 1
day to 12 years, to pay a fine of
P6,000.00, citing Section 8 of RA
6425, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of
insolvency. Go filed the petition
for review (GR 123943). The two
cases were subsequently
consolidated.
Issue: Whether Go was legally
arrested without warrant for
illegal possession of firearms and
illegal drugs.
Held: The constitutional
proscription, that no person
shall be arrested without any
warrant of arrest having been
issued prior thereto, is not a
hard-and-fast rule. The Rules of
Court and jurisprudence
recognize exceptional cases
where an arrest may be effected
without a warrant. Among these
are when, in the presence of a
peace officer, the person to be
arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an
offense; or when an offense has
in fact just been committed, and
the arresting officer has
personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it.
Herein, the police saw the gun
tucked in Go's waist when he
stood up. The gun was plainly
visible. No search was
conducted as none was
necessary. Go could not show
any license for the firearm,
whether at the time of his arrest
or thereafter. Thus, he was in
effect committing a crime in the
presence of the police officers.
No warrant of arrest was
necessary in such a situation, it
being one of the recognized
exceptions under the Rules. As a
consequence of Go's valid
warrantless arrest, he may be
lawfully searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may
be used as proof of the
commission of an offense,
without a search warrant, as
provided in Rule 126, Section 12.
This is a valid search incidental to
the lawful arrest. The
subsequent discovery in his car
of drug paraphernalia and the
crystalline substance, which was
later identified as shabu, though
in a distant place from where the
illegal possession of firearm was
committed, cannot be said to
have been made during an illegal
search. As such, the seized items
do not fall within the
exclusionary clause, which states
that any evidence obtained in
violation of the right against
warrantless arrest cannot be
used for any purposes in any
proceeding. Hence, not being
fruits of the poisonous tree, so
to speak, the objects found at
the scene of the crime, such as
the firearm, the shabu and the
drug paraphernalia, can be used
as evidence against appellant.
Besides, it has been held that
drugs discovered as a result of a
consented search is admissible
in evidence.
Leniza Reyes vs People
Facts: - Reyes was charged with
Illegal Possession of Dangerous
Drugs.
-She possesses and have
in her custody and control 0.04
gram of white crystalline
substance contained in one
transparent plastic sachet which
was found to be positive of
Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride, which is a
dangerous drug.
-around eight o'clock in
the evening, a group of police
officers including PO1 Jefferson
Monteras was patrolling the
diversion road of Barangay Looc
when two teenagers
approached and informed them
that a woman with long hair and
a dragon tattoo on her left arm
had just bought shabu in
Barangay Mambog.
-Then Reyes, who
matched the said description
and smelled like liquor, passed
by the police officers.
- The police latter asked
if she bought shabu and ordered
her to bring it out. Reyes
answered, "Di ba bawal kayong
magkapkap ng babae?" and
turned her back, pulled
something out from her breast
area and held a small plastic
sachet.
- PO1 Monteras
immediately confiscated the
sachet and brought it to the
police station.
- it was confirmed that
the substance inside the sachet
was tested positive for 0.04
gram of methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu.
- Reyes denied the
charges, according to Reyes, a
man approached and asked if
she knew a certain person. After
answering in the negative, she
rode the jeepney until it was
blocked by two civilian men in
motorcycles whom she
identified to be one PO1
Dimacali.
 -Dimacali ordered her to
bring out the shabu which she
denied having. She was then
brought to the police station
where the police officers
extracted from her the amount
of P35,000.00 in exchange for
her freedom. But since she failed
to give the money, the police
officers took her to Taytay for
inquest proceedings.
-RTC found Reyes guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of
illegal possession of 0.11 gram
of shabu. RTC ruled that the
prosecution was able to prove
that Reyes was validly arrested
and found to be in possession
of shabu, which she voluntarily
surrendered to the police
officers upon her arrest. It was
also observed that the chain of
custody of the seized item was
sufficiently established through
the testimony of PO1 Monteras,
which was not ill-motivated.
-CA affirmed Reyes's
conviction for the crime
charged. It held that the search
made on Reyes's person yielding
the sachet of shabu was valid
because she was caught in
flagrante delicto in its
possession and was legally
arrested. However, it corrected
the quantity of shabu to 0.04
gram.
Issue: whether or not there was
a valid warrantless arrest
Ruling: None. In this case, there
is no valid warrantless arrest
that took place as Reyes did not
do anything as to provoke
suspicion in the minds of the
arresting officers that she had
just committed, was
committing, or was about to
commit a crime when she was
just passing by. Under the law,
there are three instances when
warrantless arrests may be
lawfully effected: (a) an arrest of
a suspect in flagrante delicto;
(b) an arrest of a suspect where,
based on personal knowledge of
the arresting officer, there is
probable cause that said suspect
was the perpetrator of a crime
which had just been committed;
and (c) an arrest of a prisoner
who has escaped from custody
serving final judgment or
temporarily confined during the
pendency of his case or has
escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to
another. The validity of
warrantless arrest requires
compliance with the overt act
test, showing that the accused
exhibit an overt act within the
view of the police officers
suggesting that she was in
possession of illegal drugs at the
time she was
apprehended. Absent any overt
act showing the commission of a
crime, the warrantless arrest is
rendered invalid. PO1 Monteras
himself admitted that Reyes
passed by them without acting
suspiciously or doing anything
wrong, except that she smelled
of liquor. Therefore, the Court
finds that no lawful arrest was
made on Reyes.
197 In RE: Umil, Umil vs. Ramos
[GR 81567, 9 July 1990]; also
Roque vs. de Villa [GR 84581-82],
Facts: [GR 81567] On 1 February
1988, the Regional Intelligence
Operations Unit of the Capital
Command (RIOU-CAPCOM)
received confidential
information about a member of
the NPA Sparrow Unit
(liquidation squad) being treated
for a gunshot wound at the St.
Agnes Hospital in Roosevelt
Avenue, Quezon City. Upon
verification, it was found that
the wounded person, who was
listed in the hospital records as
Ronnie Javelon, is actually
Rolando Dural, a member of the
NPA liquidation squad,
responsible for the killing of 2
CAPCOM soldiers the day
before, or on 31 January 1988, in
Macanining Street, Bagong
Barrio, Caloocan City. In view of
this verification, Dural was
transferred to the Regional
Medical Services of the
CAPCOM, for security reasons.
While confined thereat, or on 4
February 1988, Dural was
positively identified by
eyewitnesses as the gunman
who went on top of the hood of
the CAPCOM mobile patrol car,
and fired at the 2 CAPCOM
soldiers seated inside the car
identified as T/Sgt. Carlos Pabon
and CIC Renato Manligot. As a
consequence of this positive
identification, Dural was
referred to the Caloocan City
Fiscal who conducted an inquest
and thereafter filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Caloocan
City an information charging
Rolando Dural alias Ronnie
Javelon with the crime of
"Double Murder with Assault
Upon Agents of Persons in
Authority." (Criminal Case C-
30112; no bail recommended).
On 15 February 1988, the
information was amended to
include, as defendant, Bernardo
Itucal, Jr. who, at the filing of the
original information, was still
unidentified. Meanwhile, on 6
February 1988, a petition for
habeas corpus was filed with the
Supreme Court on behalf of
Roberto Umil, Rolando Dural,
and Renato Villanueva. The
Court issued the writ of habeas
corpus on 9 February 1988 and
Fidel V. Ramos, Maj. Gen.
Renato de Villa, Brig. Gen.
Ramon Montano, and Brig. Gen.
Alexander Aguirre filed a Return
of the Writ on 12 February 1988.
Thereafter, the parties were
heard on 15 February 1988. On
26 February 1988, however,
Umil and Villanueva posted bail
before the Regional Trial Court
of Pasay City where charges for
violation of the Anti-Subversion
Act had been filed against them,
and they were accordingly
released.
Issue: Whether Dural can be
validly arrested without any
warrant of arrest for the crime of
rebellion.
Held: Dural, it clearly appears
that he was not arrested while in
the act of shooting the 2
CAPCOM soldiers nor was he
arrested just after the
commission of the said offense
for his arrest came a day after
the said shooting incident.
Seemingly, his arrest without
warrant is unjustified. However,
Dural was arrested for being a
member of the New Peoples
Army (NPA), an outlawed
subversive organization.
Subversion being a continuing
offense, the arrest of Rolando
Dural without warrant is justified
as it can be said that he was
committing an offense when
arrested. The crimes of
rebellion, subversion, conspiracy
or proposal to commit such
crimes, and crimes or offenses
committed in furtherance
thereof or in connection
therewith constitute direct
assaults against the State and
are in the nature of continuing
crimes. The arrest of persons
involved in the rebellion
whether as its fighting armed
elements, or for committing
non-violent acts but in
furtherance of the rebellion, is
more an act of capturing them in
the course of an armed conflict,
to quell the rebellion, than for
the purpose of immediately
prosecuting them in court for a
statutory offense. The arrest,
therefore, need not follow the
usual procedure in the
prosecution of offenses which
requires the determination by a
judge of the existence of
probable cause before the
issuance of a judicial warrant of
arrest and the granting of bail if
the offense is bailable.
Obviously, the absence of a
judicial warrant is no legal
impediment to arresting or
capturing persons committing
overt acts of violence against
government forces, or any other
milder acts but equally in
pursuance of the rebellious
movement. The arrest or
capture is thus impelled by the
exigencies of the situation that
involves the very survival of
society and its government and
duly constituted authorities.
G.R. No. 197788, February 29,
2012
RODEL LUZ y ONG, Petitioner,
vs
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Facts:
PO3 Emmanuel L. Alteza
testified that he saw the accused
driving a motorcycle without a
helmet and so he flagged him
down. He invited the accused to
come inside their sub-station
since the place where he flagged
down the accused is almost in
front of the sub-station to where
he is assigned as a traffic
enforcer. The accused violated a
municipal ordinance which
requires all motorcycle drivers to
wear helmet while driving said
motor vehicle. While the officers
were issuing a citation ticket for
violation of municipal ordinance,
PO3 Alteza noticed that the
accused was uneasy and kept on
reaching something from his
jacket. He was alerted and told
the accused to take out the
contents of his jacket’s pocket as
the latter may have a weapon
inside it. The accused obliged,
slowly put out the contents of
his jacket’s pocket which
included two plastic sachets of
suspected shabu.
The RTC convicted petitioner of
illegal possession of dangerous
drugs as the substances are
positive of methampethamine
hydrochloride. Upon appeal, the
CA affirmed the RTCs Decision.
Upon a petition for reiew on
certiorari, petitioner claims that
there was no lawful search and
seizure, because there was no
lawful arrest. He claims that the
finding that there was a lawful
arrest was erroneous, since he
was not even issued a citation
ticket or charged with violation
of the city ordinance. Even
assuming there was a valid
arrest, he claims that he had
never consented to the search
conducted upon him.
Issue:
Whether or not the arrest,
searches and seizure were
invalid.
Held: Subsequently, the Office
Yes, there was no valid arrest. of the Provincial
When he was flagged down for Prosecutor issued
committing a traffic violation, he separate Resolutions
was not, ipso facto and solely for amending the
this reason, arrested. There Informations in both
being no valid arrest, the cases.
warrantless search that resulted  In the Amended
from it was likewise illegal. MART IN VILLAMOR y TAYSON, Information, the phrase
Under R.A. 4136, or the Land and VICTOR BONAOBRA y "acting as a collector"
Transportation and Traffic Code, GIANAN, Petitioners was included to charge
the general procedure for vs Villamor as a collector in
dealing with a traffic violation is PEOPLE OF THE PIDLIPPINES, an illegal numbers game.
not the arrest of the offender, Respondents On the other hand,
but the confiscation of the Bonaobra was charged
drivers license of the latter. At March 22, 2017 as a “manager or
the time that he was waiting for operator” in the
PO3 Alteza to write his citation FACTS: Amended Information.
ticket, petitioner could not be  When separately
said to have been under arrest.  Villamor and Bonaoobra arraigned, Villamor and
rior to the issuance of the ticket, were charged with Bonaobra, both pleaded
the period during which violation of Section 3(c) not guilty to the
petitioner was at the police of RA 9287 for collecting respective charges filed
station may be characterized and soliciting bets for an against them.
merely as waiting time. illegal numbers game
The subject items seized during locally known VERSION OF THE PROSECUTION
the illegal arrest are as "lotteng' and
inadmissible. The drugs are the possessing a list of  Upon receiving a call
very corpus delicti of the crime various numbers, a from an informant
of illegal possession of calculator, a cellphone, regarding ongoing illegal
dangerous drugs. Thus, their and cash. numbers game
inadmissibility precludes  Petitioners filed Motions at Barangay Francia,
conviction and calls for the for Reinvestigation, Virac, Catanduanes,
acquittal of the accused. which were both granted specifically at the
by the RTC.
residence of Bonaobra,
 they immediately When Bonaobra was at Whether the petitioners' Without the said
proceeded to the said the door, a man later conviction for violation of RA warrant, a search or
residence to confirm the identified as PD Peñaflor 9287 as collector or agent under seizure becomes
report. kicked the fence of Section 3(c) for Villamor, and as unreasonable within the
 According to the police Bonaobra's house, coordinator, controller, or context of the
officers, they saw grabbed Bonaobra's supervisor m1der Section 3(d) Constitution and any
petitioners in the act of right arm, and for Bonaobra, should be upheld. evidence obtained on
counting money bets. said, "Caught in the the occasion of such
SC RULING:
 When they entered the act ka!" Florencio went unreasonable search and
gate of the compound, outside and asked PD NO. The Court finds that the seizure shall be
they introduced Peñaflor if he had a right of the petitioners against inadmissible in evidence
themselves as police search warrant but the unreasonable searches and for any purpose in any
officers and confiscated Police officer answered seizures was violated by the proceeding.
the items found on the “Di na kelangan yan.” arresting officers when they
 Under Section 5 of Rule
table consisting of cash Petitioners were then barged into Bonaobra's
113 of the Rules of Court,
amounting to ₱l,500.00 made to board the compound without a valid
a lawful arrest may be
in different service vehicle and warrant of arrest or a search effected even without a
denominations, brought in for warrant. Consequently, the warrant of arrest in the
the "papelitos," a investigation at the evidence obtained by the police following instances:
calculator, a cellular police headquarters. officers is inadmissible against
phone, and a pen. the petitioners, the same having Sec. 5. Arrest without
RTC RULING: RTC gave credence
been obtained in violation of the warrant; when lawful. - A
VERSION OF THE DEFENSE to the testimonies of the peace officer or a private
said right.
arresting officers and held that person may, without a
 Villamor went to petitioners were caught in  Section 2, Article Ill of the warrant, arrest a person:
Bonaobra's house to pay flagrante delicto and found the 1987 Constitution
a debt he owed to the petitioners guilty beyond requires a judicial (a) When, in his
latter’s wife, Jonah. reasonable doubt. presence, the
warrant based on the
Villamor gave Bonaobra person to be
existence of probable
₱2,000.00 which the CA RULING: affirmed the RTC's arrested has
cause before a search
latter placed on top of Decision. committed, is
and an arrest may be
the table. Bonaobra then actually
ISSUE: effected by law
went outside the house committing, or is
enforcement agents.
to answer his cellphone. attempting to
commit an one confinement presence of the arresting a crime had just been
offense; to another. officers. Based on the committed, was actually
testimonies of PO1 being committed, or was
(b) When an  In warrantless arrests Saraspi and PD Peñaflor, about to be committed
offense has in made pursuant to they were positioned in their presence.
fact just been Section 5(a), Rule 113, some 15 to 20 meters  The Court finds it
committed, and two elements must away from petitioners doubtful that the police
he has probable concur, namely "(a) the and it is doubtful that the officers witnessed any
cause to believe
person to be arrested police officers were able overt act before entering
based on
must execute an overt to determine that a the private home of
personal
act indicating that he has criminal activity was Bonaobra immediately
knowledge of
facts or just committed, is ongoing to allow them to preceding the arrest.
circumstances actually committing, or is validly effect an in PO1 Saraspi even
that the person to attempting to commit a flagrante admitted that from his
be arrested has crime; and (b) such overt delicto warrantless position outside the
committed it; and act is done in the arrest and a search compound, he could not
presence or within the incidental to a read the contents of the
(c) When the view of the arresting warrantless arrest so-called "papelitos;"
person to be officer." thereafter. The police yet, upon seeing the
arrested is a  After a judicious review officers even admitted calculator, phone,
prisoner who has
of the records of the that the compound was papers and money on
escaped from a
case, the Court finds that surrounded by a bamboo the table, he readily
penal
establishment or there was no valid fence 5'7" to 5'9" in concluded the same to
place where he is warrantless arrest on height, which made it be gambling
serving final petitioners.1âwphi1 It harder to see what was paraphernalias.
judgment or was not properly happening inside the  The Court is aware that
temporarily established that compound. It appears any question regarding
confined while his petitioners had just that the police officers the legality of a
case is pending, committed, or were acted based solely on the warrantless arrest must
or has escaped actually committing, or information received be raised before
while being attempting to commit a from PD Peñaflor's arraignment. Failure to
transferred from crime and that said act or informant and not on do so constitutes a
acts were done in the personal knowledge that waiver of the right to
 question the legality of
the arrest especially
when the accused
actively participated
during trial as in this
case. However, we have
clarified that such waiver
is only confined to the
defects of the arrest and
not on the inadmissibility
of the evidence seized
during an illegal arrest.
 The evidence seized
from the Bonaobra
compound is
inadmissible in evidence
since it was obtained in
violation of Section 3(2),
Article III of the 1987
Constitution. Since the
alleged illegal gambling
paraphernalia is the
very corpus delicti of the
crime charged, the Court
acquits petitioners.
DP: WHEREFORE, the Decision of
the CA which affirmed the
Judgment of the Regional Trial
Court of Virac, Catanduanes,
hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Petitioners Martin
Villamor y Tayson and Victor
Bonaobra y Gianan are
ACQUITTED and are ordered to
be immediately RELEASED from
detention, unless they are
confined for any other lawful
cause.
202 People vs. Gerente [GR
95847-48, 10 March 1993]
Facts: At about 7:00 a.m. of 30
April 1990, Gabriel Gerente,
together with Fredo Echigoren
and Totoy Echigoren, allegedly
started drinking liquor and
smoking marijuana in Gerente's
house which is about 6 meters
away from the house of Edna
Edwina Reyes who was in her
house on that day. She
overheard the three men talking
about their intention to kill
Clarito Blace. She testified that
she heard Fredo Echigoren
saying, "Gabriel, papatayin natin
si Clarito Blace." Fredo and Totoy
Echigoren and Gerente carried
out their plan to kill Clarito Blace
at about 2:00 p.m. of the same
day. Reyes allegedly witnessed
the killing. Fredo Echigoren
struck the first blow against
Clarito Blace, followed by Totoy
Echigoren and Gabriel Gerente
who hit him twice with a piece of
wood in the head and when he
fell, Totoy Echigoren dropped a
hollow block on the victim's
head. Thereafter, the three men
dragged Blace to a place behind
the house of Gerente. At about
4:00 p.m. of the same day,
Patrolman Jaime Urrutia of the
Valenzuela Police Station
received a report from the Palo
Police Detachment about a
mauling incident. He went to the
Valenzuela District Hospital
where the victim was brought.
He was informed by the hospital
officials that the victim died on
arrival. The cause of death was
massive fracture of the skull
caused by a hard and heavy
object. Right away, Patrolman
Urrutia, together with Police
Corporal Romeo Lima and
Patrolman Alex Umali,
proceeded to Paseo de Blas
where the mauling incident took
place. There they found a piece
of wood with blood stains, a
hollow block and two roaches of
marijuana. They were informed
by Reyes that she saw the killing
and she pointed to Gabriel
Gerente as one of the three men
who killed Clarito. The
policemen proceeded to the
house of Gerente, who was then
sleeping. They told him to come
out of the house and they
introduced themselves as
policemen.
Patrolman Urrutia frisked
Gerente and found a coin purse
in his pocket which contained
dried leaves wrapped in
cigarette foil. The dried leaves
were sent to the National
Bureau of Investigation for
examination. The Forensic
Chemist found them to be
marijuana. Only Gerente was
apprehended by the police. The
other suspects, Fredo and Totoy
Echigoren, are still at large. On 2
May 1990, two separate
informations were filed by
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
Benjamin Caraig against him for
Violation of Section 8, Art. II, of
RA 6425, and for Murder. When
arraigned on 16 May 1990,
Gerente pleaded not guilty to
both charges. A joint trial of the
two cases was held. On 24
September 1990, the Regional
Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, Branch 172, found
Gerente guilty of Violation of
Section 8 of Republic Act 6425
and sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment for a
term of 12 years and 1 day, as
minimum, to 20 years, as
maximum; and also found him
guilty of Murder for which crime
he was sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. .
Gerente appealed.
Issue: Whether the police
officers have the personal
knowledge of the killing of Blace
to allow them to arrest, and the
subsequent searchly Gerente’s
person, without the necessary
warrant.
Held: The search of Gerente's
person and the seizure of the
marijuana leaves in his
possession were valid because
they were incident to a lawful
warrantless arrest. Paragraphs
(a) and (b), Section 5, Rule 113 of
the Revised Rules of Court
provide that "A peace officer or
a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person: (a)
When, in his presence, the
person to be arrested has
committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense; (b) When an
offense has in fact just been
committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested
has committed it;" The
policemen arrested Gerente
only some 3 hours after Gerente
and his companions had killed
Blace. They saw Blace dead in
the hospital and when they
inspected the scene of the
crime, they found the
instruments of death: a piece of
wood and a concrete hollow
block which the killers had used
to bludgeon him to death. The
eye-witness, Edna Edwina Reyes,
reported the happening to the
policemen and pinpointed her
neighbor, Gerente, as one of the
killers. Under those
circumstances, since the
policemen had personal
knowledge of the violent death
of Blace and of facts indicating
that Gerente and two others had
killed him, they could lawfully
arrest Gerente without a
warrant. If they had postponed
his arrest until they could obtain
a warrant, he would have fled
the law as his two companions
did. The search conducted on
Gerente's person was likewise
lawful because it was made as an
incident to a valid arrest. This is
in accordance with Section 12,
Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of
Court which provides that "A
person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may
be used as proof of the
commission of an offense,
without a search warrant." The
frisk and search of Gerente's
person upon his arrest was a
permissible precautionary
measure of arresting officers to
protect themselves, for the
person who is about to be
arrested may be armed and
might attack them unless he is
first disarmed.
205 People vs. Cubcubin [GR
136267, 10 July 2001]
Facts: At about 3:30 a.m. of 26
August 1997, Sgt. Rogel, desk
officer of the Cavite City police
station, received a telephone
call that a person had been shot
near the cemetery along Julian
Felipe Boulevard in San Antonio,
Cavite City. For this reason, a
police team, composed of SPO1
Malinao, Jr., PO3 Rosal, PO3
Estoy, Jr., PO3 Manicio, and
SPO3 Manalo, responded to the
call and found Henry P.
Piamonte slumped dead on his
tricycle which was then parked
on the road. Police
photographer Fred Agana took
pictures of the crime scene
showing the victim slumped on
the handle of the tricycle. PO3
Rosal testified that a tricycle
driver, who refused to divulge
his name, told him that Fidel
Abrenica Cubcubin Jr. and the
victim were last seen together
coming out of the Sting Cafe,
located in San Antonio near the
gate of Sangley Point, Cavite
City, about a kilometer and a half
away from the crime scene.
Forthwith, PO3 Rosal and SPO1
Malinao, Jr. went to the cafe and
talked to Danet Garcellano, a
food server/waitress in Sting
Cafe. Garcellano described
Cubcubin as a lean, dark-
complexioned, and mustachioed
man who had on a white t-shirt
and brown short pants.
Armando Plata, another tricycle
driver, told PO3 Rosal and SPO1
Malinao, Jr. that Garcellano's
description fitted a person
known as alias "Jun Dulce."
Armando Plata, who knew
where Cubcubin lived, led PO3
Rosal, SPO1 Malinao, Jr., and
Prosecutor Lu to Cubucubin's
house in Garcia Extension,
Cavite City. The policemen
knocked on the door for about 3
minutes before it was opened by
a man who answered the
description given by Danet
Garcellano and who turned out
to be Cubcubin. The police
operatives identified themselves
and informed him that he was
being sought in connection with
the shooting near the cemetery.
Cubcubin denied involvement in
the incident. PO3 Rosal and
SPO1 Malinao, Jr. then asked
permission to enter and look
around the house. SPO1
Malinao, Jr. said that upon
entering the house, he noticed a
white t-shirt, bearing the brand
name "Hanes" and the name
"Dhenvher" written in the inner
portion of the shirt's hemline,
placed over a divider near the
kitchen. Upon close
examination, he said that he
found it to be "bloodied." When
he picked up the t-shirt, two
spent .38 caliber shells fell from
it. PO3 Rosal stayed with
Cubcubin while he conducted a
search. They then took the t-
shirt and the two bullet shells.
SPO1 Malinao, Jr. then asked
Cubcubin to go with them to
Sting Cafe for purposes of
identification. There, Cubcubin
was positively identified by
Danet Garcellano as the victim's
companion. The police
investigators asked Cubcubin
where the fatal gun was. SPO1
Malinao, Jr. said Cubcubin
refused to tell him where he hid
the gun so he sought the latter's
permission to go back to his
house to conduct a further
search. Thereupon, SPO1
Malinao, Jr., accompanied by
Prosecutor Lu, PO3 Estoy, Jr.,
PO3 Manicio, SPO3 Manalo, and
PO3 Rosal, proceeded thereto.
Inside the house, they saw
Cubcubin's 11-year old son
Jhumar. PO3 Estoy, Jr. found on
top of a plastic water container
(drum) outside the bathroom a
homemade Smith and Wesson
caliber .38 revolver (six shooter),
without a serial number. He
found the gun loaded with five
live bullets. PO3 Estoy, Jr. said
that he inscribed his initials
"RDE" (for Raymundo D. Estoy)
on the cylinder of the gun with
the use of a sharp object. While
PO3 Estoy, Jr. was conducting
the search, SPO1 Malinao, Jr.
and PO3 Rosal stayed with
Cubcubin in the sala. The .38
caliber gun, the white "Hanes" t-
shirt, and the two spent .38
caliber shells were all
photographed. Cubcubin was
then taken to the police station,
where he was photographed
along with the things seized
from him. Cubcubin was charged
for the crime of murder. On 5
October 1998, the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 88, Cavite City,
found Cubcubin guilty of murder
and sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of death. Hence, the
automatic review.
Issue: Whether there was
"probable cause" for PO3 Rosal
and SPO1 Malinao, Jr., the
arresting officers, to believe that
Cubcubin committed the crime,
to allow them to conduct the
latter's warrantless arrest.
Held: Rule 113, §5 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure, as
amended, provides that "A
peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a
person: (a) When, in his
presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an
offense; (b) When an offense has
in fact just been committed, and
he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person
to be arrested has committed it;
(c) When the person to be
arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he
is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from
one confinement to another."
Under §5(b), two conditions
must concur for a warrantless
arrest to be valid: first, the
offender has just committed an
offense and, second, the
arresting peace officer or private
person has personal knowledge
of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has
committed it. It has been held
that "personal knowledge of
facts' in arrests without a
warrant must be based upon
probable cause, which means an
actual belief or reasonable
grounds of suspicion." Herein,
the arrest of Cubcubin was
effected shortly after the victim
was killed. There was no
"probable cause, however, for
PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr.,
the arresting officers, to believe
that Cubcubin committed the
crime. The two did not have
"personal knowledge of facts"
indicating that Cubcubin had
committed the crime. Their
knowledge of the circumstances
from which they allegedly
inferred that Cubcubin was
probably guilty was based
entirely on what they had been
told by others, to wit: by
someone who called the PNP
station in San Antonio, Cavite
City at about 3:30 a.m. of 26
August 1997 and reported that a
man had been killed along Julian
Felipe Boulevard of the said city;
by an alleged witness who saw
Cubcubin and the victim coming
out of the Sting Cafe; by Danet
Garcellano, waitress at the Sting
Cafe, who said that the man last
seen with the victim was lean,
mustachioed, dark-
complexioned and was wearing
a white t-shirt and a pair of
brown short pants; by a tricycle
driver named Armando Plata
who told them that the physical
description given by Garcellano
fitted Cubcubin, alias "Jun
Dulce" and who said he knew
where Cubcubin lived and
accompanied them to
Cubcubin's house. Thus, PO3
Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr.
merely relied on information
given to them by others. Be that
as it may, Cubcubin cannot now
question the validity of his arrest
without a warrant. The records
show that he pleaded not guilty
to the charge when arraigned on
11 November 1997. Cubcubin
did not object to the
arraignment, and thus has
waived the right to object to the
legality of his arrest. On the
other hand, the search of
Cubcubin's house was illegal
and, consequently, the things
obtained as a result of the illegal
search, i.e., the white "Hanes" t-
shirt, two spent shells, and the
.38 caliber gun, are inadmissible
in evidence against him. It
cannot be said that the .38
caliber gun was discovered
through inadvertence. After
bringing Cubcubin to the Sting
Cafe where he was positively
identified by a waitress named
Danet Garcellano as the victim's
companion, the arresting
officers allegedly asked
Cubcubin where he hid the gun
used in killing the victim.
According to SPO1 Malinao, Jr.,
when Cubcubin refused to
answer, he sought Cubcubin's
permission to go back to his
house and there found the .38
caliber revolver on top of a
plastic water container outside
the bathroom. Thus, the gun was
purposely sought by the police
officers and they did not merely
stumble upon it. Nor were the
police officers justified in seizing
the white "Hanes" t-shirt placed
on top of the divider "in plain
view" as such is not contraband
nor is it incriminating in nature
which would lead SPO1 Malinao,
Jr. to conclude that it would
constitute evidence of a crime.
Contrary to what SPO1 Malinao,
Jr. said, the t-shirt was not
"bloodied" which could have
directed his attention to take a
closer look at it. From the
photograph of the t-shirt, it is
not visible that there were
bloodstains. The actual t-shirt
merely had some small specks of
blood at its lower portion.
Furthermore, there is no
evidence to link Cubcubin
directly to the crime.
206 People vs. Rodrigueza [GR
95902, 4 February 1992]
Facts: [Prosecution] At around
5:00 p.m. of 1 July 1987, CIC
Ciriaco Taduran was in their
headquarters at the Office of the
Narcotics Regional Unit at Camp
Bagong Ibalon, Legaspi City,
together with S/Sgt. Elpidio
Molinawe, CIC Leonardo B.
Galutan and their commanding
officer, Major Crisostomo M.
Zeidem, when a confidential
informer arrived and told them
that there was an ongoing illegal
traffic of prohibited drugs in
Tagas, Daraga, Albay. Major
Zeidem formed a team to
conduct a buybust operation,
which team was given P200.00
in different denominations to
buy marijuana. These bills were
treated with ultraviolet powder
at the Philippine Constabulary
Crime Laboratory (PCCL). Sgt.
Molinawe gave the money to
Taduran who acted as the
poseur buyer.
He was told to look for a certain
Don, the alleged seller of
prohibited drugs. Taduran went
to Tagas alone and, while along
the road, he met Samuel
Segovia. He asked Segovia where
he could find Don and where he
could buy marijuana. Segovia
left for a while and when he
returned, he was accompanied
by a man who was later on
introduced to him as Don conducted a raid in the house of the crime laboratory for
Rodrigueza. After agreeing on Jovencio Rodrigueza, Don's examination. From that time on,
the price of P200.00 for 100 father. Taduran did not go with he was not allowed to go home
grams of marijuana, Don halted them. During the raid, they were and was detained inside the
a passing tricycle driven by able to confiscate dried camp. He was also tortured in
Antonio Lonceras. He boarded it marijuana leaves and a plastic order to make him admit his
and left Taduran and Segovia. syringe, among others. complicity in the alleged sale of
When he came back, Don gave marijuana.
The search, however, was not
Taduran "a certain object
authorized by any search On 10 July 1987, Don
wrapped in a plastic" which was
warrant. The next day, Jovencio Rodrigueza, Samuel Segovia and
later identified as marijuana, and
Rodrigueza was released from Antonio Lonceras, for
received payment therefor.
detention but Don Rodrigueza possession of 100 grams of
Thereafter, Taduran returned to
was detained. [Defense] Don marijuana leaves and for selling,
the headquarters and made a
Rodrigueza, on the other hand, in a buy-bust operation, said 100
report regarding his said
claimed that on said date he was grams of dried marijuana leaves
purchase of marijuana. Based on
in the house of his aunt in San for a consideration of P200.00.
that information, Major Zeidem
Roque, Legaspi City. He stayed During the arraignment, all the
ordered a team to conduct an
there overnight and did not accused pleaded not guilty to
operation to apprehend the
leave the place until the next day the charge against them. The
suspects. In the evening of the
when his brother arrived and Regional Trial Court of Legaspi
same date, CIC Galutan and
told him that their father was City, Branch 10, found Don
S/Sgt. Molinawe proceeded to
taken by some military men the Rodrigueza guilty beyond
Regidor Street, Daraga, Albay
preceding night. Rodrigueza reasonable doubt of violating
and arrested Rodrigueza,
went to Camp Bagong Ibalon Section 4, Article II of the
Antonio Lonceras and Samuel
and arrived there at around 8:00 Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972
Segovia. The constables were
a.m. of 2 July 1987. When he (Republic Act 6425, as amended)
not, however, armed with a
arrived, he was asked if he knew and sentenced him to suffer the
warrant of arrest when they
anything about the marijuana penalty of life imprisonment and
apprehended the three accused.
incident, to which question he to pay a fine of P20,000.00 and
The arrests were brought to the
answered in the negative. Like costs. The court, however,
headquarters for investigation.
Segovia, he was made to hold a acquitted Segovia and Lonceres.
Thereafter, agents of the
P10.00 bill and was brought to Rodrigueza appealed.
Narcotics Command (NARCOM)
Issue: Whether the time of Don
Rodrigueza’s arrest is material in
determining his culpability in the
crime charged.
Held: As provided in the present
Constitution, a search, to be
valid, must generally be
authorized by a search warrant
duly issued by the proper
government authority. True, in
some instances, the Court has
allowed government authorities
to conduct searches and
seizures even without a search
warrant. Thus, when the owner
of the premises waives his right
against such incursion; when the
search is incidental to a lawful
arrest; when it is made on
vessels and aircraft for violation
of customs laws; when it is made
on automobiles for the purpose
of preventing violations of
smuggling or immigration laws;
when it involves prohibited
articles in plain view; or in cases
of inspection of buildings and
other premises for the
enforcement of fire, sanitary and
building regulations, a search
may be validly made even
without a search warrant.
Herein, however, the raid
conducted by the NARCOM
agents in the house of Jovencio
Rodrigueza was not authorized
by any search warrant. It does
not appear, either, that the
situation falls under any of the
aforementioned cases. Hence,
Rodrigueza's right against
unreasonable search and seizure
was clearly violated. The
NARCOM agents could not have
justified their act by invoking the
urgency and necessity of the
situation because the
testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses reveal that the place
had already been put under
surveillance for quite some time.
Had it been their intention to
conduct the raid, then they
should, because they easily
could, have first secured a
search warrant during that time.
Further, the inconsistencies
made by prosecution witnesses
give more credibility to the
testimony of Don Rodrigueza.
While it is true that Rodrigueza's
defense amounts to an alibi, and
as such is the weakest defense in
a criminal prosecution, there
are, nonetheless, some
evidentiary aspects pointing to
the truth in his testimony. Firstly,
the Joint Affidavit of Arrest
corroborates his testimony that
he was not among those who
were arrested on the night of 1
July 1987. His co-accused
Segovia also testified that
Rodrigueza was not with them
when they were apprehended
by the NARCOM agents. Hence,
Rodrigueza is acquitted of the
crime charged, due to the failure
of the prosecution to establish
its cause.
207 Go vs. Court of Appeals [GR
101837, 11 February 1992]
Facts: On 2 July 1991, Eldon
Maguan was driving his car along
Wilson St., San Juan, Metro
Manila, heading towards P.
Guevarra St. Rolito Go y
Tambunting entered Wilson St.,
where it is a one-way street and
started traveling in the opposite
or "wrong" direction. At the
corner of Wilson and J. Abad
Santos Sts., Go's and Maguan's
cars nearly bumped each other.
Go alighted from his car, walked
over and shot Maguan inside his
car. Go then boarded his car and
left the scene. A security guard
at a nearby restaurant was able
to take down Go's car plate
number.
The police arrived shortly
thereafter at the scene of the
shooting and there retrieved an
empty shell and one round of
live ammunition for a 9mm
caliber pistol. Verification at the
Land Transportation Office
showed that the car was
registered to one Elsa Ang Go.
The following day, the police
returned to the scene of the
shooting to find out where the
suspect had come from; they
were informed that Go had
dined at Cravings Bake Shop
shortly before the shooting. The
police obtained a facsimile or
impression of the credit card
used by Go from the cashier of
the bake shop. The security
guard of the bake shop was
shown a picture of Go and he
positively identified him as the
same person who had shot
Maguan. Having established that
the assailant was probably Go,
the police launched a manhunt
for Go. On 8 July 1991, Go
presented himself before the
San Juan Police Station to verify
news reports that he was being
hunted by the police; he was
accompanied by two (2) lawyers.
The police forthwith detained
him. An eyewitness to the
shooting, who was at the police
station at that time, positively
identified Go as the gunman.
That same day, the police
promptly filed a complaint for
frustrated homicide against Go
with the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Rizal. First
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
Dennis Villa Ignacio
("Prosecutor") informed Go, in
the Presence of his lawyers. that
he could avail himself of his right
to preliminary investigation but
that he must first sign a waiver of
the provisions of Article 125 of
the Revised Penal Code. Go
refused to execute any such
waiver. On 9 July 1991, while the
complaint was still with the
Prosecutor, and before an
information could be filed in
court, the victim, Eldon Maguan,
died of his gunshot wound(s).
Accordingly, on 11 July 1991, the
Prosecutor, instead of filing an
information for frustrated
homicide, filed an information
for murder before the Regional
Trial Court. No bail was
recommended. At the bottom of
the information, the Prosecutor
certified that no preliminary
investigation had been
conducted because the accused
did not execute and sign a
waiver of the provisions of
Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code.
In the afternoon of 11 July 1991,
Go's counsel filed with the
prosecutor an omnibus motion
for immediate release and
proper preliminary
investigation, alleging that the
warrantless arrest of Go was
unlawful and that no preliminary
investigation had been
conducted before the
information was filed. On 12 July
1991, Go filed an urgent ex-
parte motion for special raffle in
order to expedite action on the
Prosecutor's bail
recommendation.
The case was raffled to the sala
of Judge Benjamin V. Pelayo
(Branch 168, RTC of Pasig City),
who, on the same date,
approved the cash bond posted
by Go and ordered his release.
Go was in fact released that
same day. On 16 July 1991, the
Prosecutor filed with the
Regional Trial Court a motion for
leave to conduct preliminary
investigation and prayed that in
the meantime all proceedings in
the court be suspended. On the
said date, the trial court issued
an Order 9 granting leave to
conduct preliminary
investigation and cancelling the
arraignment set for 15 August
1991 until after the prosecution
shall have concluded its
preliminary investigation.
On 17 July 1991, however, the
Judge motu proprio issued an
Order, (1) recalling the 12 July
1991 Order which granted bail:
petitioner was given 48 hours
from receipt of the Order to
surrender himself: (2) recalling
and cancelling the 16 July 1991
Order which granted leave to
the Prosecutor to conduct
preliminary investigation: (3)
treating Go's omnibus motion
for immediate release and
preliminary investigation dated
11 July 1991 as a petition for bail
and set for hearing on 23 July
1991. On 19 July 1991, Go filed a
petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus
before the Supreme Court
assailing the 17 July 1991 Order.
Go also moved for suspension
of all proceedings in the case
pending resolution by the
Supreme Court of his petition:
this motion was, however,
denied by Judge Pelayo. On 23
July 1991, Go surrendered to the
police. By a Resolution dated 24
July 1991, the Supreme Court
remanded the petition for
certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus to the Court of
Appeals. On 16 August 1991,
Judge Pelayo issued an order in
open court setting Go's
arraignment on 23 August 1991.
On 19 August 1991, Go filed with
the Court of Appeals a motion to
restrain his arraignment. On 23
August 1991, Judge Pelayo
issued a Commitment Order
directing the Provincial Warden
of Rizal to admit Go into his
custody at the Rizal Provincial
Jail.
On the same date, Go was
arraigned. In view, however, of
his refusal to enter a plea, the
trial court entered for him a plea
of not guilty. The trial court then
set the criminal case for
continuous hearings on 19, 24
and 26 September; on 2, 3, 11
and 17 October; and on 7, 8, 14,
15, 21 and 22 November 1991.
On 27 August 1991. Go filed a
petition for habeas corpus in the
Court of Appeals. On 30 August
1991, the Court of Appeals
issued the writ of habeas corpus.
The petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus, on
the one hand, and the petition
for habeas corpus, upon the
other, were subsequently
consolidated in the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals,
on 2 September 1991, issued a
resolution denying Go's motion
to restrain his arraignment on
the ground that motion had
become moot and academic. On
19 September 1991, trial of the
criminal case commenced. On
23 September 1991, the Court of
Appeals rendered a consolidated
decision dismissing the 2
petitions on the grounds that
Go's warrantless arrest was valid
and Go's act of posting bail
constituted waiver of any
irregularity attending his arrest,
among others. On 3 October
1991, the prosecution presented
three (3) more witnesses at the
trial. Go's Counsel also filed a
"Withdrawal of Appearance"
with the trial court, with Go's
conformity.
On 4 October 1991, Go filed the
present petition for Review on
Certiorari. On 14 October 1991,
the Court issued a Resolution
directing Judge Pelayo to held in
abeyance the hearing of the
criminal case below until further
orders from the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether Go was arrested
legally without warrant for the
killing of Maguan, and is thus not
entitled to be released pending
the conduct of a preliminary
investigation.
Held: Go's warrantless "arrest"
or detention does not fall within
the terms of Section 5 of Rule
113 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure which
provides that "A peace officer or
a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person: (a)
When, in his presence, the
person to be created has
committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense; (b) When an
offense has in fact just been
committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and (c) When
the person to be arrested is a
prisoner who has escaped from
a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final
judgment or temporarily
confined while his case is
pending or has escaped while
being transferred from one
confinement to another. In cases
falling under paragraphs (a) and
(b) hereof, the person arrested
without a warrant shall be
forthwith delivered to the
nearest police station or jail, and
he shall be proceeded against in
accordance with Rule 112,
Section 7." Go's "arrest" took
place 6 days after the shooting
of Maguan. The "arresting"
officers obviously were not
present, within the meaning of
Section 5(a), at the time Go had
allegedly shot Maguan. Neither
could the "arrest" effected 6
days after the shooting be
reasonably regarded as effected
"when [the shooting had] in fact
just been committed" within the
meaning of Section 5 (b).
Moreover, none of the
"arresting" officers had any
"personal knowledge" of facts
indicating that Go was the
gunman who had shot Maguan.
The information upon which the
police acted had been derived
from statements made by
alleged eyewitnesses to the
shooting -- one stated that Go
was the gunman another was
able to take down the alleged
gunman's car's plate number
which turned out to be
registered in Go's wife's name.
That information did not,
however, constitute "personal
knowledge." It is thus clear to
the Court that there was no
lawful warrantless arrest of Go
within the meaning of Section 5
of Rule 113. It is clear too that
Section 7 of Rule 112 is also not
applicable. Indeed, Go was not
arrested at all. When he walked
into the San Juan Police Station,
accompanied by two (2) lawyers,
he in fact placed himself at the
disposal of the police
authorities. He did not state that
he was "surrendering" himself,
in all probability to avoid the
implication he was admitting
that he had slain Eldon Maguan
or that he was otherwise guilty
of a crime. When the police filed
a complaint for frustrated
homicide with the Prosecutor,
the latter should have
immediately scheduled a travelling in the "wrong"
preliminary investigation to
determine whether there was
probable cause for charging Go
in court for the killing of Eldon
Maguan. Instead, as noted
earlier, the Prosecutor
proceeded under the erroneous
supposition that Section 7 of
Rule 112 was applicable and
required Go to waive the
provisions of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code as a
condition for carrying out a
preliminary investigation. This
was substantive error, for Go
was entitled to a preliminary
investigation and that right
should have been accorded him
without any conditions.
Moreover, since Go had not
been arrested; with or without a
warrant, he was also entitled to
be released forthwith subject
only to his appearing at the
preliminary investigation.
Go vs CA
Facts: -Eldon Maguan was
driving his car along Wilson St.,
San Juan, heading towards P.
Guevarra St. Petitioner entered
a one-way street and started
direction. At the corner of the
Sts., petitioner's and Maguan's
cars nearly bumped each other.
Petitioner got out from his car,
walked over and shot Maguan
inside his car. Petitioner then
boarded his car and left the
scene.
-A security guard at a nearby
restaurant was able to take
down petitioner's car plate
number. The police arrived
shortly at the scene of the
shooting and retrieved an empty
shell and one round of live
ammunition for a 9 mm caliber
pistol. Verification at the Land
Transportation Office showed
that the car was registered to
one Elsa Ang Go.
-the police launched a manhunt
for petitioner.
-petitioner presented himself
before the San Juan Police
Station to verify news reports
that he was being hunted by the
police. He was accompanied by
two lawyers.
-An eyewitness to the shooting,
positively identified petitioner as
the gunman. That same day, the
police promptly filed a complaint
for frustrated homicide against
petitioner.
-Prosecutor informed petitioner,
in the presence of his lawyers,
that he could avail himself of his
right to preliminary investigation
but that he must first sign a
waiver of the provisions.
However, petitioner refused to
execute such waivers.
-while the complaint was still
with the Prosecutor, and before
an information could be filed in
court, the victim, Eldon Maguan,
died of his gunshot wounds.
-the Prosecutor, instead of filing
an information for frustrated
homicide, filed an information
for murder .
-the Prosecutor certified that no
preliminary investigation had
been conducted because the
accused did not execute and sign
a waiver of the provisions of
Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code.
-counsel for petitioner filed an
omnibus motion for immediate
release and proper preliminary
investigation, alleging that the
warrantless arrest of petitioner
was unlawful and that no
preliminary investigation had
been conducted before the
information was filed.
- The Solicitor General argues
that petitioner had been validly
arrested without warrant. Since
petitioner's identity as the
gunman who had shot Maguan
had been sufficiently established
by police work, petitioner was
validly arrested six days later at
the San Juan Police Station.
-petitioner argues that he was
not lawfully arrested without
warrant because he went to the
police station six days after the
shooting which he had allegedly
perpetrated. petitioner argues
that the crime had not been "just
committed" at the time that he
was arrested and none of the
police officers who arrested him
had been an eyewitness to the
shooting of Maguan and
accordingly none had the
"personal knowledge" required
for the lawfulness of a Also, the provisions are
warrantees arrest.
Issue: whether or not a lawful
warrantless arrest had been
effected by the San Juan Police in
respect of petitioner Go
Ruling: No. It is clear to the Court
that there was no lawful
warrantless arrest of petitioner.
Under the law, A peace officer or
a private person may, without
warrant, arrest a person: (a)
When, in his presence, the
person to be arrested has
committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense; (b) When an
offense has in fact just been
committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and (c) When
the person to be arrested is a
prisoner who has escaped from
a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final
judgment or temporarily
confined while his case is
pending or has escaped while
being transferred from one
confinement to another.
not applicable. Indeed,
petitioner was not arrested at
all. When he walked into San
Juan Police Station,
accompanied by two (2) lawyers,
he in fact placed himself at the
disposal of the police
authorities. He did not state that
he was "surrendering" himself,
to avoid the implication he was
admitting that he was guilty of a
crime.
When the police filed a
complaint for frustrated
homicide with the Prosecutor,
the latter should have
immediately scheduled a Polines, a police informer, who
preliminary investigation to
determine whether there was
probable cause for charging
petitioner in court for the killing
of Eldon Maguan. However, the
Prosecutor proceed under the
erroneous belief. This was
substantive error, for petitioner
was entitled to a preliminary
investigation and that right
should have been accorded him
without any conditions.
Petitioner is entitled to be
released immediately subject
only to his appearing at the
preliminary investigation.
209 People vs. Enrile [GR 74189,
26 May 1993]
Facts: At about 6:30 p.m. of 25
October 1985, a buy-bust team
composed of Pat. Jaime Flores
and Pat. Wilson Rances of the
Quezon City Police Anti-
Narcotics Unit was dispatched to
entrap Rogelio Abugatal at
Roosevelt Avenue in San
Francisco del Monte, Quezon
City.
The plan was made on the
strength of a tip given by Renato
was himself to pose as the
buyer. On that occasion the
policemen saw Polines hand
over to Abugatal the marked
money representing payment
for the mock transaction.
Abugatal left with the money
and returned 10 minutes later
with a wrapped object which he
gave Polines. The two policemen
then approached Abugatal and
placed him under arrest, at the
same time confiscating the
wrapped object. Subsequent
laboratory examination revealed
this to be marijuana with
flowering tops weighing 22
grams. Upon prodding, Abugatal
led the policemen to a house at
20 De Vera Street, also in San
Francisco del Monte, Quezon
City, where he called out for
Antonio Enrile. Enrile came out
and met them at the gate.
Abugatal pointed to Enrile as
the source of the marijuana,
whereupon the policemen
immediately arrested and
frisked him. They found in the
right front pocket of his trousers
the marked money earlier
delivered to Abugatal. At the
police headquarters, Abugatal
signed a sworn confession.
Enrile refused to make any
statement pending consultation
with a lawyer. Antonio Enrile y
Villaroman and Rogelio Abugatal
y Marquez were charged for
violation of the Dangerous Drug
Act by the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City.
The RTC, after trial and on 14
February 1986, found Enrile and
Abugatal guilty beyond
reasonable doubt and
sentenced them to life
imprisonment and a fine of
P30,000.00. Both appealed.
Abugatal, however, was killed in
an attempted jailbreak and thus
the appeal is dismissed as to
him.
Issue: Whether the mark money
found in Enrile’s possession,
pursuant to a warrantless arrest,
search and seizure, provide for
his criminal culpability.
Held: It was Abugatal who was
allegedly caught red-handed by
the policemen as he sold the
marijuana to Polines. Enrile was
not even at the scene of the
entrapment at that time.
Abugatal said he did lead the
policemen to Enrile's house
where he pointed to Enrile as
the source of the marijuana.
Even assuming this to be true,
that circumstance alone did not
justify Enrile's warrantless arrest
and search. Under Rule 113,
Section 5, of the Rules of Court,
a peace officer or a private
person may make a warrantless
arrest only under any of the
following circumstances: (a)
When, in his presence, the
person to be arrested has
committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense; (b) When an
offense has in fact just been
committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and (c) When
the person to be arrested is a
prisoner who has escaped from
a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final
judgment or temporarily
confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one
confinement to another.
Paragraphs (a) and (b) are clearly
inapplicable.
Paragraph (b) is also not in point
because the policemen who
later arrested Enrile at his house
had no personal knowledge that
he was the source of the
marijuana. According to the
policemen themselves, what
happened was that they asked
Abugatal who gave him the
marijuana and were told it was
Enrile. It was for this reason that
they proceeded to Enrile's house
and immediately arrested him.
What the policemen should
have done was secure a search
warrant on the basis of the
information supplied by
Abugatal and then, with such
authority, proceeded to search
and, if the search was fruitful,
arrest Enrile. They had no right
to simply force themselves into
his house on the bare (and
subsequently disallowed)
allegations of Abugatal and
bundle Enrile off to the police
station as if he had been caught
in flagrante delicto. The
discovery of the marked money
on him did not mean he was
caught in the act of selling
marijuana. The marked money
was not prohibited per se. Even
if it were, that fact alone would
not retroactively validate the
warrantless search and seizure.
210 People vs. Pasudag [GR
128822, 4 May 2001]
Facts: On 26 September 1995, at
around 1:30 p.m., SPO2 Pepito
Calip of the PNP Sison,
Pangasinan, went to Brgy.
Artacho to conduct anti-jueteng
operations. He urinated at a
bushy bamboo fence behind the
public school. About 5 meters
away, he saw a garden of about
70 square meters. There were
marijuana plants in between
corn plants and camote tops. He
inquired from a storekeeper
nearby as to who owned the
house with the garden. The
storeowner told him that
Alberto Pasudag y Bokang
owned it. SPO2 Calip went to the
Police Station and reported to
Chief of Police Romeo C. Astrero.
The latter dispatched a team
(composed of SPO2 Calip, SPO3
Fajarito, SPO3 Alcantara and
PO3 Rasca) to conduct an
investigation. At around 2:30
p.m., the team arrived at Brgy.
Artacho and went straight to the
house of Pasudag. SPO3 Fajarito
looked for Pasudag and asked
him to bring the team to his
backyard garden which was
about 5 meters away. Upon
seeing the marijuana plants, the
policemen called for a Issue: Whether time was of the
photographer, who took
pictures of Pasudag standing
beside one of the marijuana
plants. They uprooted 7
marijuana plants. The team
brought Pasudag and the
marijuana plants to the police
station. On 17 December 1996,
4th Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor of Pangasinan
Emiliano M. Matro filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Pangasinan,
Urdaneta an Information
charging Pasudag with violation
of RA 6425, Sec. 9. On 10
February 1997, the trial court
arraigned the accused. He
pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued.
The Regional Trial Court,
Pangasinan, Branch 46,
Urdaneta found Pasudag guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of
illegal cultivation of marijuana
and sentenced him to reclusion
perpetua and to pay a fine of
P500,000.00, without subsidiary
penalty and other accessories of
the law. Pasudag appealed.
no sufficient reason to believe information was amended to
essence to uproot and confiscate that they would be uprooted on include Farida Ali y Hassen, who
the marijuana plants. that same day. With the illegal had also been arrested with him
seizure of the marijuana plants, that same evening and likewise
Held: As a general rule, the
the seized plants are investigated. Both were
procurement of a search
inadmissible in evidence against arraigned and pleaded not
warrant is required before a law
Pasudag. guilty. Subsequently, the fiscal
enforcer may validly search or
filed a motion to dismiss the
seize the person, house, papers
charge against Ali on the basis of
or effects of any individual. The
211 People vs. Aminnudin [GR L- a sworn statement of the
Constitution provides that "the
74860, 6 July 1988] arresting officers absolving her
right of the people to be secure
after a "thorough investigation."
in their persons, houses, papers
The motion was granted, and
and effects against
Facts: Idel Aminnudin y Ahni was trial proceeded only against
unreasonable searches and
arrested on 25 June 1984, Aminnudin, who was eventually
seizures of whatever nature and
shortly after disembarking from convicted, and sentenced to life
for any purpose shall be
the M/V Wilcon 9 at about 8:30 imprisonment plus a fine of
inviolable." Any evidence
p.m., in Iloilo City. The PC P20,000.00.
obtained in violation of this
officers who were in fact waiting
provision is inadmissible. Herein,
for him simply accosted him,
the police authorities had ample
inspected his bag and finding Issue: Whether there was ample
opportunity to secure from the
what looked liked marijuana opportunity to obtain a warrant
court a search warrant. SPO2
leaves took him to their of arrest against Aminnudin, for
Pepito Calip inquired as to who
headquarters for investigation. alleged possession and transport
owned the house. He was
The two bundles of suspect of illegal drugs.
acquainted with marijuana
articles were confiscated from
plants and immediately
him and later taken to the NBI
recognized that some plants in
laboratory for examination. Held: It is not disputed, and in
the backyard of the house were
When they were verified as fact it is admitted by the PC
marijuana plants. Time was not
marijuana leaves, an officers who testified for the
of the essence to uproot and
information for violation of the prosecution, that they had no
confiscate the plants. They were
Dangerous Drugs Act was filed warrant when they arrested
three months old and there was
against him. Later, the Aminnudin and seized the bag
he was carrying. Their only
justification was the tip they had
earlier received from a reliable
and regular informer who
reported to them that
Aminnudin was arriving in Iloilo
by boat with marijuana. Their
testimony varies as to the time
they received the tip, one saying
it was two days before the arrest
(this was the declaration of the
chief of the arresting team, Lt.
Cipriano Querol, Jr.), another
two weeks and a third "weeks
before June 25." There was no
warrant of arrest or search
warrant issued by a judge after
personal determination by him
of the existence of probable
cause. Contrary to the
averments of the government,
Aminnudin was not caught in
flagrante nor was a crime about
to be committed or had just
been committed to justify the
warrantless arrest allowed
under Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court. Even expediency could
not be invoked to dispense with
the obtention of the warrant.
The present case presented no
urgency. From the conflicting
declarations of the PC witnesses,
it is clear that they had at least
two days within which they
could have obtained a warrant
to arrest and search Aminnudin
who was coming Iloilo on the
M/V Wilcon 9. His name was
known. The vehicle was
identified. The date of its arrival
was certain. And from the
information they had received,
they could have persuaded a
judge that there was probable
cause, indeed, to justify the
issuance of a warrant. Yet they
did nothing. No effort was made
to comply with the law. The Bill
of Rights was ignored altogether
because the PC lieutenant who
was the head of the arresting
team, had determined on his
own authority that "search
warrant was not necessary."
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
IDEL AMINNUDIN y like and that his business
AHNI, defendant-appellant.
G.R.No. 74869 July 6, 1988
FACTS:
VERSION OF THE PROSECUTION information for violation
of the Dangerous Drugs
 According to the
Act was filed against him.
prosecution, the PC
officers had earlier AMMINUDIN’s Defense:
received a tip from one
 Amminudin disclaimed
of their informers that
the marijuana, averring
the Amminudin was on
all he had in his bag was
board a vessel bound for
his clothing. He alleged
Iloilo City and was
that he was arbitrarily
carrying
arrested and
marijuana. Acting on
immediately handcuffed.
this tip, they waited for
His bag was confiscated
him in the evening of
without a search
June 25, 1984, and
warrant. At the PC
approached him as he
headquarters, he was
descended from the
manhandled to force him
vessel after the informer
to admit he was carrying
had pointed to him. They
the marijuana, the
detained him and
investigator hitting him
inspected the bag he was
with a piece of wood in
carrying. It was found to
the chest and arms even
contain three kilos of
as he parried the blows
what were later analyzed
while he was still
as marijuana leaves by an
handcuffed. He insisted
NBI forensic examiner,
he did not even know
who testified that she
what marijuana looked
conducted microscopic,
chemical and
was selling watches and
chromatographic tests
sometimes
on them.
cigarettes. He also
 When they were verified
argued that the
as marijuana leaves, an
marijuana he was alleged
 to have been carrying YES, the constitutional right
was not properly against unreasonable search and
Identified and could have seizure is violated.
been any of several
bundles kept in the stock  It is not disputed, and in
room of the PC fact it is admitted by the
headquarters. PC officers who testified
for the prosecution, that
RTC Ruling: they had no warrant
when they arrested
 Found Amminudin
Aminnudin and seized
Guilty. The trial court
the bag he was carrying.
was unconvinced, noting Their only justification
from its own was the tip they had
examination of the earlier received from a
accused that he claimed reliable and regular
to have come to Iloilo informer who reported
City to sell watches but to them that Aminnudin
carried only two watches was arriving in Iloilo by
at the time, traveling boat with marijuana.
from Jolo for that Their testimony varies as
purpose and spending to the time they received
the tip, one saying it was
P107.00 for fare, not to
two days before the
mention his other
arrest, 20 another two
expenses. 21
weeks and a third
"weeks before June 25.
ISSUE:
 In the case at bar, there
Whether or not accused was no warrant of arrest
constitutional right against or search warrant issued
unreasonable search and seizure by a judge after personal
is violated. determination by him of
the existence of
SC RULING:
probable cause in
violation of ART III Sec 2 was Identified. The date
of the Constitution. of its arrival was certain.
Contrary to the And from the
averments of the information they had
government, the received, they could
accused-appellant was have persuaded a judge
not caught in that there was probable
flagrante nor was a cause, indeed, to justify
crime about to be the issuance of a
committed or had just warrant. Yet they did
been committed to nothing. No effort was
justify the warrantless made to comply with the
arrest allowed under law. The Bill of Rights was
Rule 113 of the Rules of ignored altogether
Court. Even expediency because the PC
could not be invoked to lieutenant who was the
dispense with the head of the arresting
obtention of the team, had determined
warrant. on his own authority that
 The present case a "search warrant was
presented no such not necessary."
urgency. From the  In the case at bar, the
conflicting declarations accused-appellant was
of the PC witnesses, it is not, at the moment of his
clear that they had at arrest, committing a
least two days within crime nor was it shown
which they could have that he was about to do
obtained a warrant to so or that he had just
arrest and search done so. What he was
Aminnudin who was doing was descending
coming to Iloilo on the the gangplank of the
M/V Wilcon 9. His name M/V Wilcon 9 and there
was known. The vehicle was no outward
 indication that called for
his arrest. To all
appearances, he was like
any of the other
passengers innocently
disembarking from the
vessel. It was only when
the informer pointed to
him as the carrier of the
marijuana that he
suddenly became
suspect and so subject to
apprehension. It was the
furtive finger that
triggered his arrest. The
Identification by the
informer was the
probable cause as
determined by the
officers (and not a judge)
that authorized them to
pounce upon Aminnudin
and immediately arrest
him.
 While this is not to say
that the accused-
appellant is innocent, for
indeed his very own
words suggest that he is
lying, that fact alone
DP: ACCORDINGLY, the decision
does not justify a finding
that he is guilty. The of the trial court is REVERSED
constitutional
presumption is that he is and the accused-appellant is
innocent, and he will be ACQUITTED. It is so ordered.
so declared even if his
defense is weak as long
as the prosecution is not
strong enough to convict
him.
 Without the evidence of
the marijuana allegedly
seized from Aminnudin,
the case of the
prosecution must fall.
That evidence cannot be
admitted, and should
never have been
considered by the trial
court for the simple fact
is that the marijuana was
seized illegally.
 The court finds that with
the exclusion of the
illegally seized marijuana
as evidence against the
accused-appellant, his
guilt has not been
proved beyond
reasonable doubt and he
must therefore be
discharged on the
presumption that he is
innocent.