Cpo - Calang

Republic of the Philippines
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
NATIONAL PROSECUTION SERVICE
Office of the City Prosecutor
Surigao City
ARIES CRISPO FERNANDEZ, NPS DOCKET NO. XIII-05-INV-19C-

Complainant, 00190
-versus- FOR: RAPE
JOSEPH BALCOS ALBANO, ET AL.,

Respondents.
x------------------------x
COUNTER-AFFIDAVIT
AKO, JOSEPH B. ALBANO, hingkod na ang panuigon, minyo

ug nagpuyo sa P-4, Barangay Sabang, Siyudad Surigao, human
manumpa subay sa balaod moasoy ning mosunod: (I,JOSEPH B.
ALBAN0, of legal age, married and a resident ofP-4, Barangay
Sabang, Suriga City, after being duly sworn in accordance with
law depose and say:)
1.Nga dili tinuod an kaso nga gipasaka sa ako ni Aries

Crispo Fernandez ug ako natingaya na apil man ako sa kaso;
(That the accusation of Aries Crispo Fernandez is not true and I
am surprised that I am included as respondent in the case;)
2.Nga ang tinuod nga istorya si Aries Crispo Fernandez ug

Romeo Sumaylo nga pulos mga hubog nag-away ug
nagsinumbagay ug ako igo lamang mitabang pagsagda o
pagbuyag sa ila duha nga miresulta nga nangatumba ug
aksidente nga natamakan si Aries Crispo Fernandez ug si Romeo
Sumaylo; (That the what transpired was that Aries Crispo and
Romeo Sumaylo who were both drunk had a quarrel and fistfight
and I was trying to pacify and separate them in the process Aries
Crispo Fernandez and Romeo Sumaylo fell to the ground and I
accidentally stepped on them;)
3.Nga dilli tinuod nga ako ako tagpasakitan o tagsumbag si

Aries Crispo Fernandez; (That it is not true that I physically harmed
and uspunched Aries Crispo Fernandez;)
4. Nga ang away ug pagsinumbagay ni Aries Crispo

Fernandez ug Romeo Sumaylo maoy resulta sa ilang pagpalagot
kan Romeo Sumaylo nga medyo may deperensya sa pangutok;
(That the quarrel and fistfight between Aries Crispo Fernandez
Page 2
and Romeo Sumaylo was the result of when they tried to bully
Romeo Sumaylo, who is somewhat mentally retarded;)
4. Nga dinhi akong gi-attach and joint affidavit sa akong

mga testigos nga nakasaksi sa hitabao ug gimarkahan annex
“1”; (That attached hereto is the joint affidavit of my witnesses
who witnessed the incident and marked as annex “1”)
AKO KINI PIRMAHAN ning petsa___sa Hunyo, 2019 dinhi sa

Siyudad sa Surigao. (I will affix my signature this____day of July
2019 at Surigao City, Philippines.
JOSEPH B. ALBANO
Affiant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this___day of July,

2019 at Surigao City, Philippines. I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have
personally examined the affiant and I am satisfied that he
voluntarily executed and understood his affidavit hereof.
Copy furnished:
Aries Crispo Fernandez

Purok 4, Barangay Sabang,
Surigao City
REGISTERED MAIL
REG. REC. NO.___________________
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES)
CITY OF SURIGAO )S.S.
X----------------- x
JOINT AFFIDAVIT
KAMI, FREDERICK TAMBONG, IMELOU JEAN L. BALCOS ug

JANICE T. BALCOS, hingkod na ang mga edad ug nagpuyo sa
Barangay Sabang, Siyudad sa Suriiga, human manumpa subay
sa balaod, moasoy ning mosunod: We, Frederick Tambong,,
Imelou Jean L. Balcos and Janice T. Balcos, of legal ages and
residents of Barangay Sabang, Surigao City, after being duly
sworn in accordance with law, depose and say:
1.Nga kami nakasaksi sa hitabo di-in nagsinumbagay sila

Aries Crsipo Fernandez ug Romeo Sumaylo niadtong petsa 29,
mga alas 3 sa hapon kay pista man nan Barangay Sabang; (That
we witnessed that incident wherein Aries Crispo Fernandez and
Romeo Sumaylo had a fistfight on June 29, 2019 at about 3:00 in
the afternoon, because it was the barangay fiesta of Barangay
Sabang;)
2.Nga dili tinuod nga si Joseph Balcos Albano mipasakit ug

misumbag kan Aries Crispo Fernandez, kay si Joseph Balcos
Albano igo man lang mitabang pagsagda ug pagbuyag kan
Aries Crispo Fernandez ug Romeo Sumaylo nga nagsinumbabay.
(That it is not true that Joseph Balcos Albano physically harmed or
punched Aries Crispo Fernandez, because he merely helped in
pacifying and separating Aries Crispo Fernandez and Romeo
Sumaylo who quarreled and had a fistfight;
3.Nga kami naghimo ni-ini nga deklarasyon aron pagsulti sa

tinuod ng hitabo. (We are executing this declaration to tell what
actually happened.)
AMO KINI PIRMAHAN ning petsa___sa Hulyo, 2019 dinhi sa

Siyudad sa Surigao. (We will affix our signatures this____day of July
2019 at Surigao City, Philippines.)
FREDERICK TAMBONG IMELOU JEAN L. BALCOS

Affiant Affiant
JANICE T. BALCOS
Affiant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this___day of June,

X----------------- x
AFFIDAVIT OF WITNESS
I, ROLAND S. PAGARA, Filipino of legal age, married and a

resident Cabadbaran City, Agusan del Norte, after being duly
sworn in accordance with law, depose and say:
That I am presently working as dump truck driver Integrated

Geotechnical System, Inc., the company undertaking the road
concreting in Mainit, Surigao del Norte;
That I personally know Reymundo Pabas, he being my

helper in the dump truck I am driving owned by Integrated
Geotechnical Systems, Inc.;
That the whole day of April 11, 2019, Reymundo Pabas,

worked with me as helper of the dump truck I was driving hauling
wastes as filling materials to the road construction of the
Integrated Geotechnical Systems in Mainit, Surigao del Norte;
That on that day, April 11, 2019, we were busy with our work,
that I and Reymundo Pabas only rest was during lunch break and
after five (5:00) o’clock in the afternoon;
That I am executing this affidavit to attest the truth of the

foregoing facts and to inform the authorities concerned.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand
this___day of Junes, 2019 at Surigao City, Philippines.
ROLAND S. PAGARA
Affiant


X----------------- x
AFFIDAVIT OF WITNESS
I, JESUS V. SEVILLA, JR., Filipino of legal age, married and a

resident Toledo City, Cebu Province, after being duly sworn in
accordance with law, depose and say:
That I am a civil engineer and presently the project engineer

of Integrated Geotechnical System, Inc., the company
undertaking the road concreting in Mainit, Surigao del Norte;
That I personally know Reynan Sevilla Enlacinto, he being a

dump truck driver of our company in our road concreting project
in Mainit, Surigao del Norte. I am not in anyway related to him
only that his middle name and my surname are the same;
That on April 10, 2019 and April 11, 2019, Reynan Enlacinto
reported to work and was tasked by me to haul sand and gravel,
boulders, cement for our concreting project that his only rest was
during lunch break and after five (5:00) o’clock in the afternoon.
As a matter of fact, I could still remember that on April 11, 2019, at
about three (3:00) in the afternoon, I instructed Reynan Enlacinto
to haul and deliver boulders to the area of the concreting
project;
That I personally know also Reymundo Pagas he being a
helper of one of the dump truck drivers of our company. That on
April 11, 2019 he reported to work the whole day;


this___day of Junes, 2019 at Surigao City, Philippines.
JESUS V. SEVILLA, JR.

Affiant

DANILO C. MENOR
Counsel for the Accused
PTR No. 08071851-04-19 – Surigao City
IBP O.R. No. 62147 1-04-1 – Pasig City
Roll No. 29461
MCLE Compliance No. V-0006220 6-06-16
2nd Flr., Teng Bldg., Kaimo St.,
Surigao City
Mobile No. 0999 999 9565
Copy furnished:
Menchie Ann G. Gozon

Purok Orchids, Brgy. San Jose,
Mainit, Surigao del Norte
REGISTERED MAIL
REG. REC. NO.___________________
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
10th Judicial RegionRepublic of the Philippines
OFFICE OF THE CI
BRANCH 29
Surigao City
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, CRIM. CASE NO. 13681

Plaintiff,
-versus- FOR: VIO. OF RA 9615
JOSE LUIS QUINTANA VASQUEZ,

A.K.A JOSE LUIS QUINTANA,
Accused.
X---------------------x
OMNIBUS MOTION TO QUASH SEARCH WARRANT NO. 01-

2018, TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE AND DECLARE
THE ARREST OF THE ACCUSED ILLEGAL
ACCUSED, through counsel, to this Honorable Court, most

respectfully moves to quash Search Warrant No. 01-2018, to
suppress evidence and to declare the arrest of the accused
illegal in support thereof, alleges:
1.That Search Warrant No. 01-2018 was issued by the

Regional Trial Court, Branch 29, Surigao City on March 12, 2018 to
seize and confiscate a shotgun and undetermined number of
high powered firearms.
2.That as a result of the implementation of the said search

warrant a Fragmentation Grenade was allegedly recovered (No
shotgun and high powered firearms were seized as described in
the search warrant).
Search Warrant was issued without probable cause.

3.That with all due respect, Search Warrant No. 01-2018 was
issued without the required probable cause. As a matter of fact
no shotgun or high powered firearms were seized or recovered
by the police operatives in the implementation of the warrant.
4. That the accused is not the owner, lessee or occupant of

Vascon Beauty Parlor/Salon or the building where it holds
business. He was there purposely only to have a haircut. The
building searched is owned by Mr. & Mrs. Ferdinand P. Sembrano

and leased to Ms. Rowena Cabe Conales who is the owner and
proprietor of Vascon Beauty Parlor /Salon. A copy of the contract
of lease is hereto attached as annex “A”. The beauty parlor
business is operated by Ms. Rowena Cabe Conales. A copy of
the business permit is hereto attached as annex “B”.
Under the facts obtaining, the search warrant should have

been issued against Rowena Cabe Conales, the
owner/proprietor of the beauty parlor and the lessee of the
subject building and not against the accused. In this regard, with
all due respect, it can be said that the issuance of the subject
search warrant against the accused was a mistake. Being a
mistake, it follows that the same was issued without probable
cause and the implementation of the same was unlawful.
Whatever evidence obtained by reason of the search is fruit of
the poisonous tree, so to speak, and not admissible in evidence;
5. That the fact that no firearm was recovered in the

implementation of the subject search warrant is enough
evidence to show that its issuance was without any probable
cause. It is very evident that the Honorable Presiding Judge that
issued the search warrant was fed with lies by the applicant and
his witnesses.
Evidence obtained (a grenade) is not admissible in evidence and

must be suppressed.
6. That it must be pointed out that the fragmentation

grenade allegedly recovered and seized from the place
searched is not one of those mentioned in Search Warrant No.
01-2018. The grenade was allegedly wrapped with a colored blue
plastic cellophane and recovered at the back of the wooden
cabinet. In short, the grenade was not in plain view of the police
operatives as it was behind the wooden cabinet and wrapped
with a blue plastic cellophane. The grenade, therefore is not
admissible in evidence.
In one case where search warrant directs the seizure of
shabu and drug paraphernalia but bricks of marijuana were also
recovered, the Supreme Court ruled:
“The marijuana bricks were wrapped in

newsprint. There was no apparent illegality to
justifytheir seizure. This case is similar to People. v.
Musa, in which we declared inadmissible the
marijuana recovered by NARCOM agents because
the said drugs were contained in a plastic bag which
gave no indication of its contents. We explained:
Moreover, when the NARCOM agents saw the

plastic bag hanging in one corner of the kitchen, they
had no clue as to its contents. They had to ask the
appellant what the bag contained. When the
appellant refused to respond, they opened it and
found the marijuana. Unlike Ker v. California, where
the marijuana was visible to the police officers eyes,
the NARCOM agents in this case could not have
discovered the inculpatory nature of the contents of
the bag had they not forcibly opened it. Even
assuming then, that the NARCOM agents
inadvertently came across the plastic bag because it
was within their plain view, what may be said to be
the object in their plain view was just the plastic bag
and not the marijuana. The incriminating nature of the
contents of the plastic bag was not immediately
apparent from the plain view of said object. It cannot
be claimed that the plastic bag clearly betrayed its
contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, is
transparency, or otherwise, that its contents are
obvious to an observer.
No presumption of regularity may be invoked by

an officer in aid of the process when he undertakes to
justify an encroachment of rights secured by the
Constitution. In this case, the marijuana allegedly
found in the possession of accused-appellant was in
the form of two bricks wrapped in newsprint. Not
being in a transparent container, the contents
wrapped in newsprint could not have been readily
discernible as marijuana. Nor was there mention of
the time or manner these items were discovered.
Accordingly, forfailure of the prosecution to prove
that the seizure of the marijuana without a warrant
was conducted in accordance with the plain view
doctrine, we hold
that the marijuana is inadmissible in evidence against

accused-appellant. However, the confiscation of the
drug must be upheld.”1
In another case, the Supreme Court, ruled:
“With respect to the .22 caliber revolver with Serial

No. 48673, that the police raiding team found in a
drawer at the kitchen of petitioners house, suffice it to
say that the firearm was not mentioned in the search
warrant applied for and issued for the search of
petitioners house. Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution lays down the general rule that a search
and seizure must be carried out through or on the
strength of a judicial warrant, absent which such
search and seizure becomes unreasonable within the
meaning of said constitutional provision.”2
7. That prior to implementation of the subject search

warrant police officers already entered the subject building and
its rooms under the pretext of looking for a burglar. The boarders
occupying the rooms were told go out of the rooms. This fact was
reported by the lessee of the building and proprietor of the
beauty parlor and seven (7) others of the subject rooms to the
police station. Copies of the extracts of the police blotter are
hereto attached as annexes “C”, “D”, “E”, “F’, “G”, “H”, “I” and
“J”, respectively;
8. That it is very clear that even before he search warrant

was implemented police operatives had already entered the
subject rooms without any witnesses. The witnesses referred to by
the police operatives arrived late. In short, the search was made
in the absence of the occupants who were ordered to go out of
the rooms as narrated in violation of Section 8, Rule 126 of the
Revised Rules of Court which provides: “No search of a house,
room, or any other premises shall be made except in the
presence of the lawful occupant thereof, or any member of his
family or in the absence of the latter, two witnesses of sufficient
age and discretion residing in the same locality”
1
People v. Roberto Salangit Y Ko,
G. R. No. 1335454-55, April 19, 2001
2
Vicente del Rosario Y Nicolas v. People of the Philippines,
G.R. No. 142295, May 31, 2001.
5
9. That based on the factual setting in the case at bar, that

the fragmentation grenade is a fruit of a poisonous tree, hence,
not admissible in evidence. Its suppression, therefore, has factual
and legal basis. The implementation of the subject search
warrant was characterized by serious irregularities which violated,
a constitutional right, that is, the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures.
The arrest of the accused was illegal.
As discussed in the preceding paragraphs of this omnibus

motion, the arrest of the accused was patently illegal and judicial
declaration to that effect would be in order.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully

prayed of this Honorable Court that the reliefs prayed for in
omnibus motion be granted.
Surigao City, Philippines, April 2, 2018.
DANILO C. MENOR
PTR No. 9847418 1-04-18 – Surigao City
IBP O.R. No. 966858 1-04-18 –Surigao City
Roll No. 29461
Surigao City
Mobile No. 0999 999 9565
The City Prosecutor The Clerk of Court

Surigao City RTC, BR. 30, Surigao City
GREETINGS;
Please include the foregoing omnibus motion for the approval of

the Honorable Court on April 13, 2018 at 8:30 in the morning.
DANILO C. MENOR
Copy furnished:
The City Prosecutor

Surigao City - RECEIVED BY:___________________
5. That in the issuance of a search warrant to
confiscate/seize firearms, the Supreme Court has this to say:
“The probable cause for a valid search warrant

has been defined as such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed, and that objects sought in connection
with the offense are in the place sought to be
searched. This probable cause must be shown to be
within the personal knowledge of the complainant
or the witnesses he may produce and not based on
mere hearsay. In determining its existence, the
examining magistrate must make a probing and
exhaustive, not merely routine or pro forma
examination of the applicant and the witnesses.
Probable cause must be shown by the best
evidence that could be obtained under the
circumstances. On the part of the applicant and
witnesses, the introduction of such evidence is
necessary especially where the issue is the existence
of a negative ingredient of the offense charged,
e.g., the absence of a license required by law. On
the other hand, the judge must not simply rehash the
contents of the affidavits but must make his own
extensive inquiry on the existence of such license, as
well as on whether the applicant and the witnesses
have personal knowledge thereof.
In Paper Industries Corporation of the

Philippines (PICOP) v. Asuncion, we declared as void
the search warrant issued by the trial court in
connection with the offense of illegal possession of
firearms, ammunitions and explosives, on the ground,
inter alia, of failure to prove the requisite probable
cause. The applicant and the witness presented for
the issuance of the warrant were found to be
without personal knowledge of the lack of license to
possess firearms of the management of PICOP and
its security agency. They likewise did not testify as to
the absence of license and failed to attach to the
application a no license certification from the
Firearms and Explosives Office of the Philippine
National Police. Thus -
Bacolod appeared during the hearing and was

extensively examined by the judge. But his testimony
showed that he did not have personal knowledge
that the petitioners, in violation of PD 1866, were not
licensed to possess firearms, ammunitions or
explosives
xxx xxx xxx
When questioned by the judge, Bacolod stated

merely that he believed that the PICOP security
guards had no license to possess the subject
firearms. This, however, does not meet the
requirement that a witness must testify on his
personal knowledge, not belief.”3
3
Bernard R. Nala v. Jude Jesus M Barrose, Jr.
G.R. No. 153087, Aug. 7, 2003
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
10th Judicial Region
BRANCH 29
Surigao City
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, CRIM. CASE NO. 13681

Plaintiff,
-versus- FOR: VIO. OF RA 9615
JOSE LUIS QUINTANA VASQUEZ,

A.K.A JOSE LUIS QUINTANA,
Accused.
X---------------------x
ENTRY OF APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL WITH OMNIBUS

MOTION TO EXPUNGE FROM THE RECORD THE AMENDED
INFORMATION AND TO HOLD IN ABEYANCE ISSUANCE OF
WARRANT OF ARREST
The undersigned counsel to this Honorable Court, most

respectfully enters his appearance as counsel for the accused
and moves to expunge from the court record the amended
information filed by the Office of the City Prosecutor, Surigao
Cityand to hold in abeyance issuance of warrant of arrest based
on the amended information, in support thereof, alleges:
1.That on March 15, 2018, the Office of the City Prosecutor,

Surigao filed the information in the above-captioned case
recommending a bail bond of P80,000.00 for the provisional
liberty of the accused;
2.That the accused, based on the bail bond recommended

in the information filed by the Office of the City Prosecutor,
Surigao City, put up a bail bond in the amount of P80,000.00 and
was ordered released from detention;
3. That on March 26, 2018, the Office of the City Prosecutor,

Surigao City, without filing a motion for leave of court to amend
the information filed an AMENDED INFORMATION, this time,
RECOMMENDING NO BAIL for the provisional liberty of the
accused;
4. That the AMENDED INFORMATION filed by the Office of

the City Prosecutor, Surigao City, is a nullity and produces no
legal effect whatsoever as it was filed WITHOUT LEAVE OF COURT

as required by the Rules on Criminal Procedure;
5. That Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal

Procedure, the provision of law on the matter, provides as follows:
“Sec. 14. Amendment or substitution. – A complaint

or information may be amended, in form or in
substance, without leave of court and when it can be
done without causing prejudice to the rights of the
accused.
However, any amendment before plea, which

downgrades the nature of the offense charged in or
excludes any accused from the complaint or
information, can be made only upon motion by the
prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with
leave of court. The court shall state its reasons in
resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be
furnished all parties, especially the offended party.
If it appears at anytime before judgment that a

mistake has been made in charging the proper offense,
the court shall dismiss the original complaint or
information upon the filing of a new one charging the
proper offense in accordance with section 19, Rule 119,
provided the accused shall not be placed in double
jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give
bail for their appearance at the trial.”
6. That the amended information cannot just be filed by the

Office of the City Prosecutor, Surigao City, without asking or filing
a motion for leave of court as its filing will cause prejudice to the
rights of the accused, which in this particular case his
constitutional right to bail, because the accused had already
exercised his right to bail (Accused out on bail), but the
amended information has recommended no bail for the
provisional liberty of the accused;
7. That amendment of the information cannot be done

without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused as stated
in the preceding paragraph. Stated otherwise, the filing of the
amended information has violated Section 14, Rule 110 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure as quoted above.
PRAYER

prayed of this Honorable Court that the reliefs prayed for in this
omnibus motion be granted.
Surigao City, Philippines, March 27, 2018.
DANILO C. MENOR
PTR No. 9847418 1-04-18 – Surigao City
IBP O.R. No. 966858 1-04-18 –Surigao City
Roll No. 29461
Surigao City
Mobile No. 0999 999 9565
The City Prosecutor

Surigao City
The Clerk of Court

Regional Trial Court
Branch 30
Surigao City
GREETINGS;
Please include the foregoing omnibus motion for the approval of

the Honorable Court on April 13, 2018 at 8:30 in the morning.
DANILO C. MENOR
Copy furnished:
The City Prosecutor
Surigao City
RECEIVED BY:___________________
February 20, 2018SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 163858. June 28, 2005]
UNITED LABORATORIES, INC., petitioner, vs. ERNESTO ISIP and/or SHALIMAR

PHILIPPINES and/or OCCUPANTS, Shalimar Building, No. 1571, Aragon Street, Sta.
Cruz, Manila, respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Rolando H. Besarra, Special Investigator III of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI),
filed an application, in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, for the issuance of a
search warrant concerning the first and second floors of the Shalimar Building, located at
No. 1571, Aragon Street (formerly No. 1524, Lacson Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila) occupied
and/or used by Shalimar Philippines, owned/operated by Ernesto Isip; and for the seizure of
the following for violation of Section 4(a), in relation to Section 8, of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 8203:
a. Finished or unfinished products of UNITED LABORATORIES (UNILAB), particularly

REVICON multivitamins;
b. Sundry items such as tags, labels, boxes, packages, wrappers, receptacles, advertisements
and other paraphernalia used in the offering for sale, sale and/or distribution of counterfeit
c. Sales invoices, delivery receipts, official receipts, ledgers, journals, purchase orders and
all other books of accounts and documents used in recording the manufacture and/or
importation, distribution and/or sales of counterfeit REVICON multivitamins.[1]
The application was docketed as People v. Ernesto Isip, et al., Respondents, Search Warrant
Case No. 04-4916 and raffled to Branch 24 of the court. Appended thereto were the
following: (1) a sketch[2] showing the location of the building to be searched; (2) the
affidavit[3] of Charlie Rabe of the Armadillo Protection and Security Agency hired by
United Laboratories, Inc. (UNILAB), who allegedly saw the manufacture, production and/or
distribution of fake drug products such as Revicon by Shalimar Philippines; (3) the letter-
request of UNILAB, the duly licensed and exclusive manufacturer and/or distributor of
Revicon and Disudrin, for the monitoring of the unauthorized production/manufacture of the
said drugs and, if warranted, for their seizure; (4) the letter-complaint[4] of UNILAB issued
through its Director of the Security and Safety Group; and (5) the joint affidavit[5] of NBI
Agents Roberto Divinagracia and Rolando Besarra containing the following allegations:
2. When learned that an Asset was already placed by ARMADILLO PROTECTIVE AND
SECURITY AGENCY named CHARLIE RABE, who was renting a room since November
2003, at the said premises located at No. 1571 Aragon St., Sta. Cruz, Manila. MR. RABE
averred that the owner of the premises is a certain MR. ERNESTO ISIP and that the said
premises which is known as SHALIMAR PHILIPPINES, Shalimar Building, are being used
to manufacture counterfeit UNILAB products, particularly REVICON multivitamins, which
was already patented by UNILAB since 1985;
3. Upon verification of the report, we found out that the said premises is a six-story
structure, with an additional floor as a penthouse, and colored red-brown. It has a tight
security arrangement wherein non-residents are not allowed to enter or reconnoiter in the
premises;
4. We also learned that its old address is No. 1524 Lacson Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila, and
has a new address as 1571 Aragon St., Sta. Cruz, Manila; and that the area of counterfeiting
operations are the first and second floors of Shalimar Building;
5. Since we cannot enter the premises, we instructed the Asset to take pictures of the area
especially the places wherein the clandestine manufacturing operations were being held. At
a peril to his well-being and security, the Asset was able to take photographs herein
incorporated into this Search Warrant Application.[6]
A representative from UNILAB, Michael Tome, testified during the hearing on the
application for the search warrant. After conducting the requisite searching questions, the
court granted the application and issued Search Warrant No. 04-4916 dated January 27,
2004, directing any police officer of the law to conduct a search of the first and second
floors of the Shalimar Building located at No. 1571, Aragon Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila. The
court also directed the police to seize the following items:
a. Finished or unfinished products of UNITED LABORATORIES (UNILAB), particularly

b. Sundry items such as tags, labels, boxes, packages, wrappers, receptacles, advertisements
and other paraphernalia used in the offering for sale, sale and/or distribution of counterfeit
c. Sales invoices, delivery receipts, official receipts, ledgers, journals, purchase orders and
all other books of accounts and documents used in recording the manufacture and/or
importation, distribution and/or sales of counterfeit REVICON multivitamins.[7]
The court also ordered the delivery of the seized items before it, together with a true
inventory thereof executed under oath.
The search warrant was implemented at 4:30 p.m. on January 27, 2004 by NBI agents
Besarra and Divinagracia, in coordination with UNILAB employees. No fake Revicon
multivitamins were found; instead, there were sealed boxes at the first and second floors of
the Shalimar Building which, when opened by the NBI agents in the presence of respondent
Isip, contained the following:
QUANTITY/UNIT DESCRIPTION
792 Bottles Disudrin 60 ml.

30 Boxes (100 pieces each) Inoflox 200 mg.[8]
NBI Special Investigator Divinagracia submitted an inventory of the things seized in which
he declared that the search of the first and second floors of the Shalimar Building at No.
1571, Aragon Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila, the premises described in the warrant, was done in
an orderly and peaceful manner. He also filed a Return of Search Warrant,[9] alleging that
no other articles/items other than those mentioned in the warrant and inventory sheet were
seized. The agent prayed that of the items seized, ten boxes of Disudrin 60 ml., and at least
one box of Inoflox be turned over to the custody of the Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD)
for examination.[10] The court issued an order granting the motion, on the condition that the
turn over be made before the court, in the presence of a representative from the respondents
and the court.[11]
The respondents filed an Urgent Motion to Quash the Search Warrant or to Suppress
Evidence.[12] They contended that the implementing officers of the NBI conducted their
search at the first, second, third and fourth floors of the building at No. 1524-A, Lacson
Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila, where items in open display were allegedly found. They pointed
out, however, that such premises was different from the address described in the search
warrant, the first and second floors of the Shalimar Building located at No. 1571, Aragon
Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila. The respondents, likewise, asserted that the NBI officers seized
Disudrin and Inoflox products which were not included in the list of properties to be seized
in the search warrant.
UNILAB, in collaboration with the NBI, opposed the motion, insisting that the search was
limited to the first and second floors of the Shalimar building located at the corner of
Aragon Street and Lacson Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila. They averred that, based on the sketch
appended to the search warrant application, Rabes affidavit, as well as the joint affidavit of
Besarra and Divinagracia, the building where the search was conducted was located at No.
1571, Aragon Street corner Lacson Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila. They pointed out that No.
1524 Lacson Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila was the old address, and the new address was No.
1571, Aragon Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila. They maintained that the warrant was not
implemented in any other place.[13]
In reply, the respondents insisted that the items seized were different from those listed in the
search warrant. They also claimed that the seizure took place in the building located at No.
1524-A which was not depicted in the sketch of the premises which the applicant submitted
to the trial court.[14] In accordance with the ruling of this Court in People v. Court of
Appeals,[15] the respondents served a copy of their pleading on UNILAB.[16]
On March 11, 2004, the trial court issued an Order[17] granting the motion of the
respondents, on the ground that the things seized, namely, Disudrin and Inoflox, were not
those described in the search warrant. On March 16, 2004, the trial court issued an
advisory[18] that the seized articles could no longer be admitted in evidence against the
respondents in any proceedings, as the search warrant had already been quashed.
UNILAB, through the Ureta Law Office, filed a motion, in collaboration with the NBI
agents, for the reconsideration of the order, contending that the ground used by the court in
quashing the warrant was not that invoked by the respondents, and that the seizure of the
items was justified by the plain view doctrine. The respondents objected to the appearance
of the counsel of UNILAB, contending that the latter could not appear for the People of the
Philippines. The respondents moved that the motion for reconsideration of UNILAB be
stricken off the record. Disputing the claims of UNILAB, they insisted that the items seized
were contained in boxes at the time of the seizure at No. 1524-A, Lacson Avenue corner
Aragon Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila, and were not apparently incriminating on plain view.
Moreover, the seized items were not those described and itemized in the search warrant
application, as well as the warrant issued by the court itself. The respondents emphasized
that the Shalimar Laboratories is authorized to manufacture galenical preparations of the
following products:
Products:
- Povidone Iodine
- Chamomile Oil
- Salicylic Acid 10 g.
- Hydrogen Peroxide 3% Topical Solution
- Aceite de Alcamforado
- Aceite de Manzanilla[19]
In a manifestation and opposition, the respondents assailed the appearance of the counsel of
UNILAB, and insisted that it was not authorized to appear before the court under the Rules
of Court, and to file pleadings. They averred that the BFAD was the authorized government
agency to file an application for a search warrant.
In its counter-manifestation, UNILAB averred that it had the personality to file the motion
for reconsideration because it was the one which sought the filing of the application for a
search warrant; besides, it was not proscribed by Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure from participating in the proceedings and filing pleadings. The only parties to the
case were the NBI and UNILAB and not the State or public prosecutor. UNILAB also
argued that the offended party, or the holder of a license to operate, may intervene through
counsel under Section 16 of Rule 110, in relation to Section 7(e), of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
UNILAB prayed that an ocular inspection be conducted of the place searched by the NBI
officers.[20] In their rejoinder, the respondents manifested that an ocular inspection was the
option to look forward to.[21] However, no such ocular inspection of the said premises was
conducted.
In the meantime, the BFAD submitted to the court the result of its examination of the
Disudrin and Inoflox samples which the NBI officers seized from the Shalimar Building. On
its examination of the actual component of Inoflox, the BFAD declared that the substance
failed the test.[22] The BFAD, likewise, declared that the examined Disudrin syrup failed
the test.[23] The BFAD had earlier issued the following report:
PRODUCT NAME Manufacturer L.N. E.D. FINDINGS

1.Phenylpropanolamine Unilab 21021552 3-06 -Registered, however,
(Disudrin) label/physical
12.5 mg./5mL Syrup appearance does not
conform with the
BFAD approved
label/ registered
specifications.
2.Ofloxacin (Inoflox) Unilab 99017407 3-05 -Registered, however,
200 mg. tablet. label/physical
appearance does not
conform with the
BFAD approved
label/ registered
specifications.[24]
On May 28, 2004, the trial court issued an Order[25] denying the motion for reconsideration
filed by UNILAB. The court declared that:
The Search Warrant is crystal clear: The seizing officers were only authorized to take
possession of finished or unfinished products of United Laboratories (UNILAB),
particularly REVICON Multivitamins, and documents evidencing the counterfeit nature of
said products. The Receipt/Inventory of Property Seized pursuant to the warrant does not,
however, include REVICON but other products. And whether or not these seized products
are imitations of UNILAB items is beside the point. No evidence was shown nor any was
given during the proceedings on the application for search warrant relative to the seized
products.
On this score alone, the search suffered from a fatal infirmity and, hence, cannot be
sustained.[26]
UNILAB, thus, filed the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, where the following issues are raised:
Whether or not the seized 792 bottles of Disudrin 60 ml. and 30 boxes of Inoflox 200 mg.
are INADMISSIBLE as evidence against the respondents because they constitute the fruit of
the poisonous tree or, CONVERSELY, whether or not the seizure of the same counterfeit
drugs is justified and lawful under the plain view doctrine and, hence, the same are legally
admissible as evidence against the respondents in any and all actions? [27]
The petitioner avers that it was deprived of its right to a day in court when the trial court
quashed the search warrant for a ground which was not raised by the respondents herein in
their motion to quash the warrant. As such, it argues that the trial court ignored the issue
raised by the respondents. The petitioner insists that by so doing, the RTC deprived it of its
right to due process. The petitioner asserts that the description in the search warrant of the
products to be seized finished or unfinished products of UNILAB is sufficient to include
counterfeit drugs within the premises of the respondents not covered by any license to
operate from the BFAD, and/or not authorized or licensed to manufacture, or repackage
drugs produced or manufactured by UNILAB. Citing the ruling of this Court in Padilla v.
Court of Appeals,[28] the petitioner asserts that the products seized were in plain view of the
officers; hence, may be seized by them. The petitioner posits that the respondents
themselves admitted that the seized articles were in open display; hence, the said articles
were in plain view of the implementing officers.
In their comment on the petition, the respondents aver that the petition should have been
filed before the Court of Appeals (CA) because factual questions are raised. They also assert
that the petitioner has no locus standi to file the petition involving the validity and the
implementation of the search warrant. They argue that the petitioner merely assisted the
NBI, the BFAD and the Department of Justice; hence, it should have impleaded the said
government agencies as parties-petitioners. The petition should have been filed by the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG) in behalf of the NBI and/or the BFAD, because under the
1987 Revised Administrative Code, the OSG is mandated to represent the government and
its officers charged in their official capacity in cases before the Supreme Court. The
respondents further assert that the trial court may consider issues not raised by the parties if
such consideration would aid the court in the just determination of the case.
The respondents, likewise, maintain that the raiding team slashed the sealed boxes so fast
even before respondent Isip could object. They argue that the seizure took place at No.
1524-A, Lacson Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 220778, and not at No. 1571, Aragon Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila covered by TCT No.
174412 as stated in the search warrant. They assert that the ruling of the Court in People v.
Court of Appeals[29] is applicable in this case. They conclude that the petitioner failed to
prove the factual basis for the application of the plain view doctrine.[30]
In reply, the petitioner asserts that it has standing and is, in fact, the real party-in-interest to
defend the validity of the search warrant issued by the RTC; after all, it was upon its
instance that the application for a search warrant was filed by the NBI, which the RTC
granted. It asserts that it is not proscribed under R.A. No. 8203 from filing a criminal
complaint against the respondents and requesting the NBI to file an application for a search
warrant. The petitioner points out that the Rules of Criminal Procedure does not specifically
prohibit a private complainant from defending the validity of a search warrant. Neither is the
participation of a state prosecutor provided in Rule 126 of the said Rules. After all, the
petitioner insists, the proceedings for the application and issuance of a search warrant is not
a criminal action. The petitioner asserts that the place sought to be searched was sufficiently
described in the warrant for, after all, there is only one building on the two parcels of land
described in two titles where Shalimar Philippines is located, the place searched by the NBI
officers.[31] It also asserts that the building is located at the corner of Aragon Street and
Lacson Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila.[32]
The petitioner avers that the plain view doctrine is applicable in this case because the boxes
were found outside the door of the respondents laboratory on the garage floor. The boxes
aroused the suspicion of the members of the raiding team precisely because these were
marked with the distinctive UNILAB logos. The boxes in which the items were contained
were themselves so designated to replicate true and original UNILAB boxes for the same
medicine. Thus, on the left hand corner of one side of some of the boxes[33] the letters ABR
under the words 60 ml, appeared to describe the condition/quality of the bottles inside (as it
is with genuine UNILAB box of the true medicine of the same brand). The petitioner
pointed out that ABR is the acronym for amber bottle round describing the bottles in which
the true and original Disudrin (for children) is contained.
The petitioner points out that the same boxes also had their own license plates which were
instituted as among its internal control/countermeasures. The license plates indicate that the
items within are, supposedly, Disudrin. The NBI officers had reasonable ground to believe
that all the boxes have one and the same data appearing on their supposedly distinctive
license plates. The petitioner insists that although some of the boxes marked with the
distinctive UNILAB logo were, indeed, sealed, the tape or seal was also a copy of the
original because these, too, were marked with the distinctive UNILAB logo. The petitioner
appended to its pleading pictures of the Shalimar building and the rooms searched showing
respondent Isip;[34] the boxes seized by the police officers containing Disudrin syrup;[35]
and the boxes containing Inoflox and its contents.[36]
The issues for resolution are the following: (1) whether the petitioner is the proper party to
file the petition at bench; (2) whether it was proper for the petitioner to file the present
petition in this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court; and (3) whether the search
conducted by the NBI officers of the first and second floors of the Shalimar building and the
seizure of the sealed boxes which, when opened, contained Disudrin syrup and Inoflox, were
valid.
On the first issue, we agree with the petitioners contention that a search warrant proceeding
is, in no sense, a criminal action[37] or the commencement of a prosecution.[38] The
proceeding is not one against any person, but is solely for the discovery and to get
possession of personal property. It is a special and peculiar remedy, drastic in nature, and
made necessary because of public necessity. It resembles in some respect with what is
commonly known as John Doe proceedings.[39] While an application for a search warrant is
entitled like a criminal action, it does not make it such an action.
A search warrant is a legal process which has been likened to a writ of discovery employed
by the State to procure relevant evidence of crime.[40] It is in the nature of a criminal
process, restricted to cases of public prosecutions.[41] A search warrant is a police weapon,
issued under the police power. A search warrant must issue in the name of the State, namely,
the People of the Philippines.[42]
A search warrant has no relation to a civil process. It is not a process for adjudicating civil
rights or maintaining mere private rights.[43] It concerns the public at large as distinguished
from the ordinary civil action involving the rights of private persons.[44] It may only be
applied for in the furtherance of public prosecution.[45]
However, a private individual or a private corporation complaining to the NBI or to a

government agency charged with the enforcement of special penal laws, such as the BFAD,
may appear, participate and file pleadings in the search warrant proceedings to maintain,
inter alia, the validity of the search warrant issued by the court and the admissibility of the
properties seized in anticipation of a criminal case to be filed; such private party may do so
in collaboration with the NBI or such government agency. The party may file an opposition
to a motion to quash the search warrant issued by the court, or a motion for the
reconsideration of the court order granting such motion to quash.[46]
In this case, UNILAB, in collaboration with the NBI, opposed the respondents motion to
quash the search warrant. The respondents served copies of their reply and
opposition/comment to UNILAB, through Modesto Alejandro, Jr.[47] The court a quo
allowed the appearance of UNILAB and accepted the pleadings filed by it and its counsel.
The general rule is that the proper party to file a petition in the CA or Supreme Court to
assail any adverse order of the RTC in the search warrant proceedings is the People of the
Philippines, through the OSG. However, in Columbia Pictures Entertainment, Inc. v. Court
of Appeals,[48] the Court allowed a private corporation (the complainant in the RTC) to file
a petition for certiorari, and considered the petition as one filed by the OSG. The Court in
the said case even held that the petitioners therein could argue its case in lieu of the OSG:
From the records, it is clear that, as complainants, petitioners were involved in the
proceedings which led to the issuance of Search Warrant No. 23. In People v. Nano, the
Court declared that while the general rule is that it is only the Solicitor General who is
authorized to bring or defend actions on behalf of the People or the Republic of the
Philippines once the case is brought before this Court or the Court of Appeals, if there
appears to be grave error committed by the judge or a lack of due process, the petition will
be deemed filed by the private complainants therein as if it were filed by the Solicitor
General. In line with this ruling, the Court gives this petition due course and will allow
petitioners to argue their case against the questioned order in lieu of the Solicitor
General.[49]
The general rule is that a party is mandated to follow the hierarchy of courts. However, in
exceptional cases, the Court, for compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of the
issues raised, may take cognizance of petitions filed directly before it.[50] In this case, the
Court has opted to take cognizance of the petition, considering the nature of the issues raised
by the parties.
The Court does not agree with the petitioners contention that the issue of whether the
Disudrin and Inoflox products were lawfully seized was never raised in the pleadings of the
respondents in the court a quo. Truly, the respondents failed to raise the issue in their motion
to quash the search warrant; in their reply, however, they averred that the seized items were
not included in the subject warrant and, therefore, were not lawfully seized by the raiding
team. They also averred that the said articles were not illegal per se, like explosives and
shabu, as to justify their seizure in the course of unlawful search.[51] In their
Opposition/Comment filed on March 15, 2004, the respondents even alleged the following:
The jurisdiction of this Honorable Court is limited to the determination of whether there is a
legal basis to quash the search warrant and/or to suppress the seized articles in evidence.
Since the articles allegedly seized during the implementation of the search warrant Disudrin
and Inoflux products were not included in the search warrant, they were, therefore, not
lawfully seized by the raiding team; they are not illegal per se, as it were, like an arms
cache, subversive materials or shabu as to justify their seizure in the course of a lawful
search, or being in plain view or some such. No need whatever for some public assay.
The NBI manifestation is a glaring admission that it cannot tell without proper examination
or assay that the Disudrin and Inoflox samples allegedly seized from respondents place were
counterfeit. All the relevant presumptions are in favor of legality.[52]
The Court, therefore, finds no factual basis for the contention of the petitioner that the
respondents never raised in the court a quo the issue of whether the seizure of the Disudrin
and Inoflox products was valid.
In any event, the petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration of the March 11, 2004
Order of the court a quo on the following claims:
2.01 The Honorable Court ERRED in ruling on a non-issue or the issue as to the alleged
failure to particularly describe in the search warrant the items to be seized but
upon which NO challenge was then existing and/or NO controversy is raised;
2.02 The Honorable Court ERRED in its ruling that finished or unfinished products of
UNILAB cannot stand the test of a particular description for which it then
reasons that the search is, supposedly unreasonable; and,
2.03 The Honorable Court ERRED in finding that the evidence seized is lawfully
inadmissible against respondents.[53]
The court a quo considered the motion of the petitioner and the issue raised by it before
finally resolving to deny the same. It cannot thus be gainsaid that the petitioner was denied
its right to due process.
On the validity of the seizure of the sealed boxes and its contents of Disudrin and Inoflox,
the Court, likewise, rejects the contention of the petitioner.
A search warrant, to be valid, must particularly describe the place to be searched and the
things to be seized. The officers of the law are to seize only those things particularly
described in the search warrant. A search warrant is not a sweeping authority empowering a
raiding party to undertake a fishing expedition to seize and confiscate any and all kinds of
evidence or articles relating to a crime. The search is limited in scope so as not to be general
or explanatory. Nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant.[54]
Objects, articles or papers not described in the warrant but on plain view of the executing
officer may be seized by him. However, the seizure by the officer of objects/articles/papers
not described in the warrant cannot be presumed as plain view. The State must adduce
evidence, testimonial or documentary, to prove the confluence of the essential requirements
for the doctrine to apply, namely: (a) the executing law enforcement officer has a prior
justification for an initial intrusion or otherwise properly in a position from which he can
view a particular order; (b) the officer must discover incriminating evidence inadvertently;
and (c) it must be immediately apparent to the police that the items they observe may be
evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure.[55]
The doctrine is not an exception to the warrant. It merely serves to supplement the prior
justification whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search as an incident to a
lawful arrest or some other legitimate reason for being present, unconnected with a search
directed against the accused. The doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory
search from one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges. It is a
recognition of the fact that when executing police officers comes across immediately
incriminating evidence not covered by the warrant, they should not be required to close their
eyes to it, regardless of whether it is evidence of the crime they are investigating or evidence
of some other crime. It would be needless to require the police to obtain another
warrant.[56] Under the doctrine, there is no invasion of a legitimate expectation of privacy
and there is no search within the meaning of the Constitution.
The immediate requirement means that the executing officer can, at the time of discovery of
the object or the facts therein available to him, determine probable cause of the objects
incriminating evidence.[57] In other words, to be immediate, probable cause must be the
direct result of the officers instantaneous sensory perception of the object.[58] The object is
apparent if the executing officer had probable cause to connect the object to criminal
activity. The incriminating nature of the evidence becomes apparent in the course of the
search, without the benefit of any unlawful search or seizure. It must be apparent at the
moment of seizure.[59]
The requirement of inadvertence, on the other hand, means that the officer must not have
known in advance of the location of the evidence and intend to seize it.[60] Discovery is not
anticipated.[61]
The immediately apparent test does not require an unduly high degree of certainty as to the
incriminating character of evidence. It requires merely that the seizure be presumptively
reasonable assuming that there is probable cause to associate the property with criminal
activity; that a nexus exists between a viewed object and criminal activity.[62]
Incriminating means the furnishing of evidence as proof of circumstances tending to prove

the guilt of a person.[63]
Indeed, probable cause is a flexible, common sense standard. It merely requires that the facts
available to the officer would warrant a man of reasonable caution and belief that certain
items may be contrabanded or stolen property or useful as evidence of a crime. It does not
require proof that such belief be correct or more likely than true. A practical, non-traditional
probability that incriminating evidence is involved is all that is required. The evidence thus
collected must be seen and verified as understood by those experienced in the field of law
enforcement.[64]
In this case, Disudrin and/or Inoflox were not listed in the search warrant issued by the court
a quo as among the properties to be seized by the NBI agents. The warrant specifically
authorized the officers only to seize counterfeit Revicon multivitamins, finished or
unfinished, and the documents used in recording, manufacture and/or importation,
distribution and/or sale, or the offering for sale, sale and/or distribution of the said vitamins.
The implementing officers failed to find any counterfeit Revicon multivitamins, and instead
seized sealed boxes which, when opened at the place where they were found, turned out to
contain Inoflox and Disudrin.
It was thus incumbent on the NBI agents and the petitioner to prove their claim that the
items were seized based on the plain view doctrine. It is not enough to prove that the sealed
boxes were in the plain view of the NBI agents; evidence should have been adduced to
prove the existence of all the essential requirements for the application of the doctrine
during the hearing of the respondents motion to quash, or at the very least, during the
hearing of the NBI and the petitioners motion for reconsideration on April 16, 2004. The
immediately apparent aspect, after all, is central to the plain view exception relied upon by
the petitioner and the NBI. There is no showing that the NBI and the petitioner even
attempted to adduce such evidence. In fact, the petitioner and the NBI failed to present any
of the NBI agents who executed the warrant, or any of the petitioners representative who
was present at the time of the enforcement of the warrant to prove that the enforcing officers
discovered the sealed boxes inadvertently, and that such boxes and their contents were
incriminating and immediately apparent. It must be stressed that only the NBI agent/agents
who enforced the warrant had personal knowledge whether the sealed boxes and their
contents thereof were incriminating and that they were immediately apparent.[65] There is
even no showing that the NBI agents knew the contents of the sealed boxes before they were
opened.
In sum then, the Court finds and so hold that the petitioner and the NBI failed to prove the
essential requirements for the application of the plain view doctrine.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The
assailed orders of the Regional Trial Court are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, p. 95.
[2] Id. at 108.
[3] Id. at 99.
[4] Id. at 103-104.
[5] Id. at 106-107.
[6] Rollo, p. 106.
[7] Id. at 112.
[8] Rollo, p. 114.
[9] Id. at 116.
[10] Id.
[11] Rollo, p. 115.
[12] Id. at 117-124.
[13] Rollo, pp. 125-128.
[14] Id. at 129-136.
[15] G.R. No. 126379, 26 June 1998, 291 SCRA 400.
[16] Rollo, p. 138.
[17] Id. at 153-155.
[18] Id. at 157.
[19] Rollo, p. 195.
[20] Rollo, p. 207.
[21] Id. at 214.
[22] Id. at 175.
[23] Id. at 177.
[24] Id. at 182.
[25] Rollo, pp. 18-19.
[26] Id. at 19.
[27] Id. at 46.

[28] G.R. No. 121917, 12 March 1997, 269 SCRA 402.
[29] G.R. No. 126379, 26 June 1998, 291 SCRA 400.
[30] Rollo, pp. 229-244.
[31] Annexes A and A-1, Rollo, p. 285.
[32] Annex G, Id. at 125.
[33] Annexes C-2 and C-4, Id. at 288-289.
[34] Annexes A to A-1 and B-2, Rollo, pp. 286-287.
[35] Annexes C-2 and C-4, Id. at 288-289.
[36] Annexes C-5, C-6 and C-7, Id. at 290-291.
[37] State v. Kieffer, 187 NW 164 (1922).
[38] Bevington v. United States, 35 F.2d 584 (1929).
[39] State v. Kieffer, supra.
[40] Lodyga v. State, 179 NE 542 (1932).
[41] C.J.S.,
Searches and Seizures 63, p. 825, citing State v. Derry, 85 N.E. 765; Brooks v.
Wyner, 46 So.2d 97; and Philipps v. Johns, 12 Tenn. App. 354.
[42] Section 1, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
[43] State v. Derry, 86 NE 482 (1908).
[44] Lodyga v. State, supra.
[45] State v. Derry, supra.
[46] 20th
Century Fox Film Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. L-76649-51, 19
August 1988, 164 SCRA 655.
[47] Rollo, p. 145.
[48] G.R. No. 111267, 20 September 1996, 262 SCRA 219.
[49] Id. at 224.
[50] Ark Travel Express, Inc. v. Abrogar, G.R. No. 137010, 29 August 2003, 410 SCRA 148.
[51] Rollo, pp. 131-132.
[52] Rollo, pp. 140-141.
[53] Id. at 23.
[54] People v. Go, G.R. No. 144639, 12 September 2003, 411 SCRA 81.
[55] Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 US 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022 (1971).
[56] United States v. Gray, 484 F.2d 352 (1973).
[57] United States v. Beal, 810 F.2d 574 (1987).

[58] Ibid.
[59] Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra.
[60] Texas v. Brown, 460 US 730, 103 S.Ct. 1535 (1983).
[61] Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra.
[62] United States v. Beal, supra.
[63] United States v. Truitt, Jr., 521 F.2d 1174 (1975).
[64] Texas v. Brown, supra.
[65] People v. Go, supra.

[G.R. No. 142295. May 31, 2001]
VICENTE DEL ROSARIO y NICOLAS, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

respondent.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
Petitioner Vicente del Rosario y Nicolas appeals via certiorari from a decision of the Court
of Appealsi[1] affirming with modification the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Bulacan,
Branch 20, Malolos, and finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of P. D.
No. 1866, as amended by Republic Act No. 8294 (illegal possession of firearms), sentencing
him to four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as
minimum, to six (6) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum,
and to pay a fine of P30,000.00.
On June 17, 1996, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Eufracio S. Marquez of Bulacan filed
with the Regional Trial Court, Bulacan, Malolos an Information charging petitioner Vicente
del Rosario y Nicolas with violation of P. D. No. 1866, as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of June 1996, in the municipality of Norzagaray, Province of
Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession under
his custody and control, the following, to wit:
a) One (1) pc. Pistol Cal. 45 SN:70G23792 (w/o license)
b) One (1) pc. Revolver Cal. 22 SN:48673 (w/o license)
c) Twenty Seven (27) rds live ammos. For cal. .45
d) Five (5) pcs. Magazines for cal. .45
e) Eight (8) rds live ammunitions for cal. 22
f) Five (5) pcs. Magazines short for cal. 5.56 (M16)
g) Twenty (20) rds live ammunitions for cal 5.56
without first having obtained a proper license therefor.
Contrary to law.ii[2]
On June 25, 1996, the trial court arraigned the petitioner. He pleaded not guilty.iii[3] Trial
ensued.
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
Sometime in May 1996, the police received a report that accused-appellant Vicente del
Rosario was in possession of certain firearms without the necessary licenses. Acting upon
the report, P/Sr. Insp. Jerito Adique of the PNP Criminal Investigation Group at Camp
Olivas, Pampanga inquired from the PNP Firearms and Explosive Division whether or not
the report was true. On May 10, 1996, P/Sr. Insp. Edwin C. Roque of the PNP Firearms and
Explosives Division issued a certification (Exhibit L) stating that per records in his office,
the appellant is not a licensed/registered firearm holder of any kind and caliber. Armed with
the said certification, P/Sr. Insp. Adique applied for a search warrant to enable his team to
search the house of appellant.
On June 13, 1996, a search warrant (Exhibit A) was issued by Judge Gil Fernandez, Sr. of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 217, authorizing the search of the
residence of appellant at Barangay Tigbe, Norzagaray, Bulacan.iv[4] On June 15, 1996, at
about 7:00 oclock in the morning, a team led by P/Sr. Insp. Adique went to Norzagaray to
serve the warrant. Before proceeding to the residence of the appellant, the police officers
requested Barangay Chairman Rogelio de Silva and Barangay Councilman Aurelio
Panteleon to accompany them in the implementation of the warrant. Upon arrival at the
house of appellant, the police officers introduced themselves to the wife of appellant. When
the appellant came out, P/Sr. Insp. Adique informed him that they had a search warrant and
that they were authorized to search his house. After appellant gave his permission, the police
officers conducted a search of the house. The search yielded the following items: (a) a
caliber .45 pistol with Serial No. 703792 with five magazines of caliber .45 (Exhibits B and
H) found at the masters bedroom; (b) five magazines of 5.56 M-16 rifle and two radios
(Exhibits C to C-4) found in the room of appellants daughter; and (c) a caliber .22 revolver
with Serial No. 48673 (Exhibit F) containing 8 pieces of live ammunition (Exhibit M) found
in the kitchen of the house. When asked about his license to possess the firearms, the
appellant failed to produce any. This prompted the police officers to seize the subject
firearms.
SPO2 Marion Montezon, one of the searching officers, prepared three separate inventories
of the seized items (Exhibits H, M and N). The inventories were signed by P/Sr. Insp.
Adique, the appellant and the barangay officials who witnessed the search. Thereafter SPO2
Montezon prepared a certification of orderly search (Exhibit I) which was signed by the
appellant and the barangay officials attesting to the orderly conduct of the search.
For his defense, appellant contends that he had a license for the caliber .45 pistol recovered
in his bedroom and that the other items seized during the search including the caliber .22
revolver, were merely planted by the police officers. Appellant likewise assails the manner
in which the search was carried out, claiming that the police officers just barged into his
house without asking permission. Furthermore, he claimed that the barangay officials
arrived only after the police already had finished the search.
After trial and on July 2, 1998, the trial court rendered a judgment of conviction, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused VICENTE DEL
ROSARIO y NICOLAS guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of P. D. No. 1866 as
charged under the Information dated June 17, 1996.
Conformably with the provisions of said law, as amended by Republic Act No. 8294, and
pursuant to the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court hereby sentences
the accused to suffer imprisonment of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to six
(6) years of prision correctional, as maximum, and to pay a fine of Fifteen Thousand Pesos
(P15,000.00).v[5]
On July 20, 1998, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, assailing the decision for
being contrary to facts and the law.vi[6]
On July 9, 1999, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision affirming with modification
the decision of the trial court as set out in the opening paragraph of this decision.vii[7]
On August 10, 1999, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration
and/or new trial.viii[8] He contended that the certification issued by the Chief, Firearms and
Explosives Division, Philippine National Police stating that the person named therein had
not been issued a firearm license referred to a certain Vicente Vic del Rosario of barangay
Bigte, Norzagaray, Bulacan, not to him. He comes from barangay Tigbe, Norzagaray,
Bulacan, and that he has a valid firearm license.
On February 22, 2000, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration for lack
of merit.ix[9]
Hence, this appeal.x[10]
Petitioner submits that the search conducted at his residence was illegal as the search
warrant was issued in violation of the Constitutionxi[11] and consequently, the evidence
seized was inadmissible. He also submits that he had a license for the .45 caliber firearm and
ammunition seized in his bedroom. The other firearm, a .22 caliber revolver seized in a
drawer at the kitchen of his house, a magazine for 5.56 mm. cal. Armalite rifle, and two 2-
way radios found in his daughters bedroom, were either planted by the police or illegally
seized, as they were not mentioned in the search warrant.
We find the petition impressed with merit.
We define the issues as follows:
First: whether petitioner had a license for the .45 caliber Colt pistol and ammunition seized
in his bedroom; and
Second: whether the .22 caliber revolver seized in a drawer at the kitchen of his house, a
magazine for 5.56 mm. cal. Armalite rifle and two 2-way radios found in his daughters
bedroom, were planted by the police or were illegally seized.
We shall resolve the issues in seriatim.
First: The .45 cal. Colt pistol in question was duly licensed.
Normally, we do not review the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial
courts.xii[12] However, this case comes within the exceptions.xiii[13] The findings of fact by
the Court of Appeals will not be disturbed by the Court unless these findings are not
supported by evidence.xiv[14] In this case, the findings of the lower courts even directly
contradict the evidence. Hence, we review the evidence. The trial court held that the copy of
the license presented was blurred, and that in any event, the court could rely on the
certification dated May 10, 1996, of P/Sr. Inspector Edwin C. Roque, Chief, Records
Branch, Firearms and Explosives Division, Philippine National Police stating that Vicente
Vic del Rosario of Barangay Bigte, Norzagaray, Bulacan is not a licensed/registered firearm
holder of any kind and caliber.xv[15] As against this, petitioner submitted that he was not the
person referred to in the said certification because he is Vicente del Rosario y Nicolas from
Barangay Tigbe, Norzagaray, Bulacan. The Court takes judicial notice of the existence of
both barangay Tigbe and barangay Bigte, in Norzagaray, Bulacan.xvi[16] In fact, the trial
court erred grievously in not taking judicial notice of the barangays within its territorial
jurisdiction, believing the prosecutions submission that there was only barangay Tigbe, and
that barangay Bigte in the certification was a typographical error.xvii[17] Petitioner presented
to the head of the raiding team, Police Senior Inspector Jerito A. Adique, Chief, Operations
Branch, PNP Criminal Investigation Command, a valid firearm license. The court is duty
bound to examine the evidence assiduously to determine the guilt or innocence of the
accused. It is true that the court may rely on the certification of the Chief, Firearms and
Explosives Division, PNP on the absence of a firearm license.xviii[18] However, such
certification referred to another individual and thus, cannot prevail over a valid firearm
license duly issued to petitioner. In this case, petitioner presented the printed computerized
copy of License No. RCL 1614021915 issued to him on July 13, 1993, expiring in January
1995, by the Chief, Firearms and Explosives Division, PNP under the signature of Reynaldo
V. Velasco, Sr. Supt. (GSC) PNP, Chief, FEO.xix[19] On the dorsal side of the printed
computerized license, there is stamped the words Validity of computerized license is
extended until renewed license is printed dated January 17, 1995, signed by Police Chief
Inspector Franklin S. Alfabeto, Chief, Licence Branch, FEO.xx[20] Coupled with this
indefinite extension, petitioner paid the license fees for the extension of the license for the
next two-year period.xxi[21]
Consequently, we find that petitioner was the holder of a valid firearm license for the .45
caliber Colt pistol seized in the bedroom of his house on June 15, 1996.xxii[22] As required,
petitioner presented the license to the head of the raiding team, Police Senior Inspector Jerito
A. Adique of the Criminal Investigation Division Group, PNP.xxiii[23] As a senior police
officer, Senior Inspector Adique could easily determine the genuineness and authenticity of
the computerized printed license presented. He must know the computerized license printed
form. The stamp is clearly visible. He could decipher the words and the signature of the
authorized signing official of the Firearms and Explosives Division, PNP. He belonged to
the same national police organization.
Nevertheless, Senior Insp. Adique rejected the license presented because, according to him,
it was expired. However, assuming that the license presented was expired during the period
January 1995 to January 1997, still, possession of the firearm in question, a .45 caliber Colt
pistol with serial No. 70G23792, during that period was not illegal. The firearm was kept at
home, not carried outside residence. On June 15, 1996, at the time of the seizure of the
firearm in question, possession of firearm with an expired license was not considered
unlawful, provided that the license had not been cancelled or revoked. Republic Act No.
8294, providing that possession of a firearm with an expired license was unlawful took
effect only on July 7, 1997.xxiv[24] It could not be given retroactive effect.xxv[25]
According to firearm licensing regulations, the renewal of a firearm license was

automatically applied for upon payment of the license fees for the renewal period. The
expired license was not cancelled or revoked. It served as temporary authority to possess the
firearm until the renewed license was issued. Meantime, the applicant may keep the gun at
home pending renewal of the firearm license and issuance of a printed computerized license.
He was not obliged to surrender the weapon. Printed at the dorsal side of the computerized
license is a notice reading:
IMPORTANT
1. This firearm license is valid for two (2) years. Exhibit this license whenever demanded by
proper authority.
2. Surrender your firearm/s to the nearest PNP Unit upon revocation or termination of this
license. Under any of the following instances, your license shall be revoked for which
reason your firearm/s is/are subject to confiscation and its/their forfeiture in favor of the
government.
a. Failure to notify the Chief of PNP in writing of your change of address, and/or
qualification.
b. Failure to renew this license by paying annual license, fees, within six (6)
months from your birth month. Renewal of your license can be made within
your birth month or month preceding your birth month. Late renewal shall be
penalized with 50% surcharge for the first month (from the first day to the last
day of this month) followed by an additional 25% surcharge for all of the
succeeding five (5) months compounded monthly.
c. Loss of firearm/s through negligence.
d. Carrying of firearm/s outside of residence without appropriate permit and/or

carrying firearm/s in prohibited places.
e. Conviction by competent court for a crime involving moral turpitude or for any
offense where the penalty carries an imprisonment of more than six (6) months or
fine of at least P1,000.00.
f. Dismissal for cause from the service.
g. Failure to sign license, or sign ID picture or affix right thumbmark.
3. Unauthorized loan of firearm/s to another person is punishable by permanent

disqualification and forfeiture of the firearm in favor of the government.
4. If termination is due to death, your next of kin should surrender your firearm/s to the
nearest PNP Unit. For those within Metro Manila, surrender should be made with FEO,
Camp Crame.
5. When firearms become permanently unserviceable, they should be deposited with the
nearest PNP Unit and ownership should be relinquished in writing so that firearms may be
disposed of in accordance with law.
6. Application for the purchase of ammunition should be made in case of a resident of Metro
Manila direct to the Chief, FEO and for residents of a Province to secure recommendation
letter to the nearest PNP Provincial Command who will thereafter endorse same to CHIEF,
FEO for issuance of the permit. License must be presented before an authority to purchase
ammo could be obtained.xxvi[26]
Indeed, as heretofore stated, petitioner duly paid the license fees for the automatic renewal
of the firearm license for the next two years upon expiration of the license in January 1995,
as evidenced by official receipt No. 7615186, dated January 17, 1995.xxvii[27] The license
would be renewed, as it was, because petitioner still possessed the required qualifications.
Meantime, the validity of the license was extended until the renewed computerized license
was printed. In fact, a renewed license was issued on January 17, 1997, for the succeeding
two-year period.xxviii[28]
Aside from the clearly valid and subsisting license issued to petitioner, on January 25, 1995,
the Chief, Philippine National Police issued to him a permit to carry firearm outside
residence valid until January 25, 1996, for the firearm in question.xxix[29] The Chief,
Philippine National Police would not issue a permit to carry firearm outside residence unless
petitioner had a valid and subsisting firearm license. Although the permit to carry firearm
outside residence was valid for only one year, and expired on January 25, 1996, such permit
is proof that the regular firearm license was renewed and subsisting within the two-year term
up to January 1997. A Permit to Carry Firearm Outside Residence presupposes that the party
to whom it is issued is duly licensed to possess the firearm in question.xxx[30]
Unquestionably, on January 17, 1997, the Chief, Firearms and Explosives Division, PNP
renewed petitioners license for the .45 cal. Colt pistol in question.xxxi[31]
Clearly then, petitioner had a valid firearm license during the interregnum between January
17, 1995, to the issuance of his renewed license on January 17, 1997.
Finally, there is no rhyme or reason why the Court of Appeals and the trial court did not
accept with alacrity the certification dated June 25, 1996, of P/Sr. Inspector Edwin C.
Roque,xxxii[32] Chief, Records Branch, Firearms and Explosives Division, PNP that Vicente
N. del Rosario of Barangay Tigbe, Norzagaray, Bulacan is a licensed/registered holder of
Pistol, Colt caliber .45 with serial number 70G23792, covered by computerized license
issued dated June 15, 1995, with an expiry date January 1997.xxxiii[33] Reinforcing the
aforementioned certification, petitioner submitted another certification dated August 27,
1999, stating that Vicente N. del Rosario of Barangay Tigbe, Norzagaray, Bulacan, was
issued firearm license No. RL-C1614021915, for caliber .45 Pistol with Serial Number
70G23792, for the years covering the period from July 13, 1993 to January 1995, and the
extension appearing at the back thereof for the years 1995 to 1997.xxxiv[34] Had the lower
courts given full probative value to these official issuances, petitioner would have been
correctly acquitted, thus sparing this Court of valuable time and effort.
In crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, the prosecution has the burden of proving
the elements thereof, viz.: (a) the existence of the subject firearm and (b) the fact that the
accused who owned or possessed it does not have the license or permit to possess the
same.xxxv[35] The essence of the crime of illegal possession is the possession, whether actual
or constructive, of the subject firearm, without which there can be no conviction for illegal
possession. After possession is established by the prosecution, it would only be a matter of
course to determine whether the accused has a license to possess the firearm.xxxvi[36]
Possession of any firearm becomes unlawful only if the necessary permit or license therefor
is not first obtained. The absence of license and legal authority constitutes an essential
ingredient of the offense of illegal possession of firearm and every ingredient or essential
element of an offense must be shown by the prosecution by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Stated otherwise, the negative fact of lack or absence of license constitutes an essential
ingredient of the offense which the prosecution has the duty not only to allege but also to
prove beyond reasonable doubt.xxxvii[37] To convict an accused for illegal possession of
firearms and explosives under P. D. 1866, as amended, two (2) essential elements must be
indubitably established, viz.: (a) the existence of the subject firearm or explosive which may
be proved by the presentation of the subject firearm or explosive or by the testimony of
witnesses who saw accused in possession of the same, and (b) the negative fact that the
accused had no license or permit to own or possess the firearm or explosive which fact may
be established by the testimony or certification of a representative of the PNP Firearms and
Explosives Unit that the accused has no license or permit to possess the subject firearm or
explosive. x x x We stress that the essence of the crime penalized under P. D. 1866 is
primarily the accuseds lack of license or permit to carry or possess the firearm, ammunition
or explosive as possession by itself is not prohibited by law.xxxviii[38] Illegal possession of
firearm is a crime punished by special law, a malum prohibitum, and no malice or intent to
commit a crime need be proved.xxxix[39] To support a conviction, however, there must be
possession coupled with intent to possess (animus possidendi) the firearm.xl[40]
In upholding the prosecution and giving credence to the testimony of police officer Jerito A.
Adigue, the trial court relied on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duties by the police officers.xli[41] This is a flagrant error because his testimony is directly
contradictory to the official records of the Firearms and Explosives Division, PNP, which
must prevail. Morever, the presumption of regularity can not prevail over the Constitutional
presumption of innocence.xlii[42] Right from the start, P/Sr. Insp. Jerito A. Adigue was
aware that petitioner possessed a valid license for the caliber .45 Colt pistol in question.
Despite this fact, P/Sr. Insp. Adigue proceeded to detain petitioner and charged him with
illegal possession of firearms. We quote pertinent portions of the testimony of petitioner:
Q: What else did Adigue tell you after showing to him the license of your cal. .45 pistol
and the alleged cal. .22 found in a drawer in your kitchen?
A: He told me that since my firearm is licensed, he will return my firearm, give him
ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) and for me to tell who among the people in our barangay
have unlicensed firearm, sir.
Q: How did he say about the ten thousand pesos?
A: He said palit kalabaw na lang tayo sir.
Q: And what did you answer him?
A: I told him my firearm is licensed and I do not have money, if I have, I will not give
him, sir, because he was just trying to squeeze something from me.
Q: How about the unlicensed firearms in your barangay which he asked from you?
A: I said I do not know any unlicensed firearm in our barangay, sir.
Q: About the .22 cal. pistol, what was your answer to him?
A: I told him that it was not mine, they planted it, sir.
Q: What did he say next?
A: He said that it is your word against mine, the Court will believe me because I am a
police officer, sir.
Q: What was your comment to what he said?
A: I said my firearm is licensed and we have Courts of law who do not conform with
officials like you and then he laughed and laughed, sir.xliii[43]
The trial court was obviously misguided when it held that it is a matter of judicial notice that
a caliber .45 firearm can not be licensed to a private individual.xliv[44] This ruling has no
basis either in law or in jurisprudence.xlv[45]
Second issue. The seizure of items not mentioned in the search warrant was illegal.
With respect to the .22 caliber revolver with Serial No. 48673, that the police raiding team
found in a drawer at the kitchen of petitioners house, suffice it to say that the firearm was
not mentioned in the search warrant applied for and issued for the search of petitioners
house. Section 2, Article III of the Constitution lays down the general rule that a search and
seizure must be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant, absent which
such search and seizure becomes unreasonable within the meaning of said constitutional
provision.xlvi[46] Supporting jurisprudence thus outlined the following requisites for a search
warrants validity, the absence of even one will cause its downright nullification: (1) it must
be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge
himself and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the determination of probable
cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such
witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the
place to be searched and persons or things to be seized.xlvii[47] Seizure is limited to those
items particularly described in a valid search warrant. Searching officers are without
discretion regarding what articles they shall seize.xlviii[48] Evidence seized on the occasion
of such an unreasonable search and seizure is tainted and excluded for being the proverbial
fruit of a poisonous tree. In the language of the fundamental law, it shall be inadmissible in
evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.xlix[49]
In this case, the firearm was not found inadvertently and in plain view. It was found as a
result of a meticulous search in the kitchen of petitioners house. This firearm, to emphasize,
was not mentioned in the search warrant. Hence, the seizure was illegal.l[50] The seizure
without the requisite search warrant was in plain violation of the law and the
Constitution.li[51] True that as an exception, the police may seize without warrant illegally
possessed firearm or any contraband for that matter, inadvertently found in plain view.
However, [t]he seizure of evidence in plain view applies only where the police officer is not
searching for evidence against the accused, but inadvertently comes across an incriminating
object.lii[52] Specifically, seizure of evidence in plain view is justified when there is:
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally
present in the pursuit of their official duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where
they are;
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and
(d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.liii[53]
Hence, the petitioner rightly rejected the firearm as planted and not belonging to him. The
prosecution was not able to prove that the firearm was in the effective possession or control
of the petitioner without a license. In illegal possession of firearms, the possessor must know
of the existence of the subject firearm in his possession or control. In People v. de
Gracia,liv[54] we clarified the meaning of possession for the purpose of convicting a person
under P. D. No. 1866, thus: x x x In the present case, a distinction should be made between
criminal intent and intent to possess. While mere possession without criminal intent is
sufficient to convict a person for illegal possession of a firearm, it must still be shown that
there was animus possidendi or an intent to possess on the part of the accused. x x x x
Hence, the kind of possession punishable under P. D. No. 1866 is one where the accused
possessed a firearm either physically or constructively with animus possidendi or intention
to possess the same.lv[55] That is the meaning of animus possidendi. In the absence of
animus possidendi, the possessor of a firearm incurs no criminal liability.
The same is true with respect to the 5.56 cal. magazine found in the bedroom of petitioners
daughter. The seizure was invalid and the seized items were inadmissible in evidence. As
explained in People v. Doria,lvi[56] the plain view doctrine applies when the following
requisites concur: (1) the law enforcement officer is in a position where he has a clear view
of a particular area or has prior justification for an intrusion; (2) said officer inadvertently
comes across (or sees in plain view) a piece of incriminating evidence; and (3) it is
immediately apparent to such officer that the item he sees may be evidence of a crime or a
contraband or is otherwise subject to seizure.
With particular reference to the two 2-way radios that the raiding policemen also seized in
the bedroom of petitioners daughter, there was absolutely no reason for the seizure. The
radios were not contraband per se. The National Telecommunications Commission may
license two-way radios at its discretion.lvii[57] The burden is on the prosecution to show that
the two-way radios were not licensed. The National Telecommunication Commission is the
sole agency authorized to seize unlicensed two-way radios. More importantly, admittedly,
the two-way radios were not mentioned in the search warrant. We condemn the seizure as
illegal and a plain violation of a citizens right. Worse, the petitioner was not charged with
illegal possession of the two-way radios.
Consequently, the confiscation of the two 2-way radios was clearly illegal. The possession
of such radios is not even included in the charge of illegal possession of firearms (violation
of P. D. No. 1866, as amended) alleged in the Information.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby REVERSES the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G. R. CR No. 22255, promulgated on July 09, 1999.
The Court ACQUITS petitioner Vicente del Rosario y Nicolas of the charge of violation of
P. D. No. 1866, as amended by R. A. No. 8294 (illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition), in Criminal Case No. 800-M-96, Regional Trial Court, Bulacan, Branch 20,
Malolos.
Costs de oficio.
The Chief, Firearms and Explosives Division, PNP shall return to petitioner his caliber .45
Colt pistol, with Serial Number No. 70G23792, the five (5) extra magazines and twenty
seven (27) rounds of live ammunition, and the two 2-way radios confiscated from him. The
Chief, Philippine National Police, or his duly authorized representative shall show to this
Court proof of compliance herewith within fifteen (15) days from notice. The .22 caliber
revolver with Serial No. 48673, and eight (8) live ammunition and the magazine for 5.56
mm. caliber Armalite rifle are confiscated in favor of the government.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Kapunan, J., on leave.

[G.R. No. 153087. August 7, 2003]
BERNARD R. NALA, petitioner, vs. JUDGE JESUS M. BARROSO, JR., Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, 10th Judicial Region, Malaybalay City, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
In determining the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant, the
examining magistrate must make probing and exhaustive, not merely routine or pro forma
examination of the applicant and the witnesses.4[1] Probable cause must be shown by the best
evidence that could be obtained under the circumstances. The introduction of such evidence
is necessary especially where the issue is the existence of a negative ingredient of the
offense charged, e.g., the absence of a license required by law.5[2]
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to annul the
October 18, 20016[3] and February 15, 20027[4] Orders8[5] of the Regional Trial Court of
Malaybalay City, Branch 10, which denied petitioners Omnibus Motion to Quash 9[6] Search
and Seizure Warrant No. 30-01.10[7]
On June 25, 2001, PO3 Macrino L. Alcoser applied for the issuance of a warrant to search
the person and residence of petitioner Bernard R. Nala, who was referred to in the
application as Rumolo11[8] Nala alias Long12[9] of Purok 4, Poblacion, Kitaotao,
Bukidnon.13[10] The application was filed in connection with petitioners alleged illegal
possession of one caliber .22 magnum and one 9 mm. pistol in violation of Republic Act No.
8294, which amended Presidential Decree No. 1866, or the law on Illegal Possession of
Firearms. On the same day, after examining Alcoser and his witness Ruel Nalagon,
respondent Presiding Judge of RTC of Malaybalay City, Branch 10, issued Search and
Seizure Warrant No. 30-01, against Romulo Nala alias Lolong Nala who is said to be
residing at Purok 4, Poblacion, Kitaotao, Bukidnon.
At around 6:30 in the morning of July 4, 2001, Alcoser and other police officers searched
petitioners house and allegedly seized the following articles, to wit
People v. Tee, G.R. Nos. 140546-47, 20 January 2003, citing the Constitution, Article III,
4[1]
Section 2; 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure, Rule 126, Sections 4 and 5. See also Pendon
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 84873, 16 November 1990, 191 SCRA 429, 438, citing Roan
v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 71410, 25 November 1986, 145 SCRA 687; Mata v. Bayona, G.R.
No. L-50720, 26 March 1984, 128 SCRA 388.
Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines v. Asuncion, 366 Phil. 717, 736-737
5[2]
(1999), citing People v. Estrada, 357 Phil. 377 (1998).
6[3]
Rollo, p. 91.
7[4]
Rollo, p. 130.
8[5]
Penned by Judge Jesus M. Barroso, Jr.
9[6]
Records, p. 8.
10[7]
Records, p. 6.
Spelled as Rumolo in the application for search and seizure warrant and spelled as
11[8]
Romulo in the issued search and seizure warrant.
12[9]
Records, p. 1.
13[10]
Id.
-1- one piece caliber .38 revolver (snub-nose) with Serial Number 1125609
-1- one pc. fragmentation grenade (cacao type)
-1- one pc. .22 long barrel
-5- pcs live ammunition for caliber .38 revolver
-4- four pcs. of disposable lighter and unestimated numbers of cellophane used for
packing of shabu14[11]
On July 5, 2001, Criminal Cases Nos. 10943-2001-P and 10944-2001-P for illegal
possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosives were filed against the petitioner before
the 5th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Kitaotao, Bukidnon.15[12]
On August 8, 2001, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion16[13] seeking to (1) quash Search and
Seizure Warrant No. 30-01; (2) declare inadmissible for any purpose the items allegedly
seized under the said warrant; and (3) direct the release of the air rifle seized by the police
officers.
Respondent judge denied the Omnibus Motion to Quash but ordered the return of the air
rifle to petitioner. As to the validity of the search warrant, respondent found that probable
cause was duly established from the deposition and examination of witness Ruel Nalagon
and the testimony of PO3 Macrino L. Alcoser who personally conducted a surveillance to
confirm the information given by Nalagon. The fact that the items seized were not exactly
the items listed in the warrant does not invalidate the same because the items seized bear a
direct relation to the crime of illegal possession of firearms. Respondent judge also found
that petitioner was sufficiently identified in the warrant although his first name was
erroneously stated therein as Romulo and not Bernard, considering that the warrant was
couched in terms that would make it enforceable against the person and residence of
petitioner and no other. The dispositive portion of the questioned Order reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the Omnibus Motion to be without merit, the same is hereby
DENIED. However, as to the questioned Air Rifle, the same is allowed to be withdrawn and
ordered returned to herein movant.
SO ORDERED.17[14]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied on February 15,
2002.18[15] Hence, he filed the instant petition alleging that respondent judge committed
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the questioned orders.
The issues for resolution are as follows: (1) Was petitioner sufficiently described in the
search and seizure warrant? (2) Was there probable cause for the issuance of a search and
seizure warrant against petitioner? and (3) Whether or not the firearms and explosive
allegedly found in petitioners residence are admissible in evidence against him even though
said firearms were not listed in the search and seizure warrant.
At the outset, it must be noted that the instant petition for certiorari was filed directly with
this Court in disregard of the rule on hierarchy of courts. In the interest of substantial justice
and speedy disposition of cases, however, we opt to take cognizance of this petition in order
to address the urgency and seriousness of the constitutional issues raised.19[16] In rendering
Return of Search Warrant noted at the back of Search and Seizure Warrant No. 30-01,
14[11]
Records, p. 6.
15[12]
Rollo, pp. 161-162.
16[13]
Rollo, p. 46.
17[14]
Rollo, p. 93.
18[15]
Rollo, p. 130.
Roan v. Gonzales, supra, note 1, at p. 698, citing Burgos, Sr. v. Chief of Staff, 218 Phil.
19[16]
754 (1984); Philippine Rural Electric Cooperatives Association, Inc. v. Secretary of the
decisions, courts have always been conscientiously guided by the norm that on the balance,
technicalities take a backseat against substantive rights, and not the other way around. Thus,
if the application of the Rules would tend to frustrate rather than promote justice, it is always
within our power to suspend the rules, or except a particular case from its operation.20[17]
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution guarantees every individual the right to personal
liberty and security of homes against unreasonable searches and seizures, viz:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The purpose of the constitutional provision against unlawful searches and seizures is to
prevent violations of private security in person and property, and unlawful invasion of the
sanctity of the home, by officers of the law acting under legislative or judicial sanction, and
to give remedy against such usurpations when attempted.21[18]
Corollarily, Rule 126, Sections 4 and 5 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure provide for
the requisites for the issuance of a search warrant, to wit:
SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue except upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witness he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized
which may be anywhere in the Philippines.
SEC. 5. Examination of complainant; record. The judge must, before issuing the warrant,
personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under
oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them
and attach to the record their sworn statements, together with the affidavits submitted.
More simply stated, the requisites of a valid search warrant are: (1) probable cause is
present; (2) such presence is determined personally by the judge; (3) the complainant and
the witnesses he or she may produce are personally examined by the judge, in writing and
under oath or affirmation; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on facts personally
known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the person and place to be
searched and the things to be seized.22[19]
Department of Interior and Local Government, G.R. No. 143076, 10 June 2003. See also
Fortich v. Corona, 352 Phil. 461, 480-481 (1998), citing People v. Cuaresma, G.R. No.
67787, 18 April 1989, 172 SCRA 415.
Coronel v. Desierto, G.R. No. 149022, 8 April 2003, citing People v. Flores, 336 Phil.
20[17]
58 (1997); De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 103276, 11 April 1996, 256 SCRA 171;
Manila Railroad Co. v. Atty. General, 20 Phil. 523 (1911); Viuda de Ordoveza v.
Raymundo, 63 Phil. 275 (1936); Olacao v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No.
81390, 29 August 1989, 177 SCRA 38; Legasto v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 76854-60,
25 April 1989, 172 SCRA 722; City Fair Corporation v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 313 Phil. 464 (1995); Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. L-31303-04, 31
May 1978, 83 SCRA 453; Bank of America, NT & SA v. Gerochi, Jr., G.R. No. 73210, 10
February 1994, 230 SCRA 9.
Silva v. Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Negros, Oriental, Branch XXXIII,
21[18]
G.R. No. 81756, 21 October 1991, 203 SCRA 140, 144, citing Alvero v. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637
(1946).
Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines v. Asuncion, supra, note 2 at p. 731,

22[19]
citing Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 112708-09, 29 March 1996, 255 SCRA 438.
On the first issue, the failure to correctly state in the search and seizure warrant the first
name of petitioner, which is Bernard and not Romulo or Rumolo, does not invalidate the
warrant because the additional description alias Lolong Nala who is said to be residing at
Purok 4, Poblacion, Kitaotao, Bukidnon sufficiently enabled the police officers to locate and
identify the petitioner. What is prohibited is a warrant against an unnamed party, and not one
which, as in the instant case, contains a descriptio personae that will enable the officer to
identify the accused without difficulty.23[20]
The probable cause for a valid search warrant has been defined as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed, and that objects sought in connection with the offense are in
the place sought to be searched. This probable cause must be shown to be within the
personal knowledge of the complainant or the witnesses he may produce and not based on
mere hearsay.24[21] In determining its existence, the examining magistrate must make a
probing and exhaustive, not merely routine or pro forma examination of the applicant and
the witnesses.25[22] Probable cause must be shown by the best evidence that could be
obtained under the circumstances. On the part of the applicant and witnesses, the
introduction of such evidence is necessary especially where the issue is the existence of a
negative ingredient of the offense charged, e.g., the absence of a license required by
law.26[23] On the other hand, the judge must not simply rehash the contents of the affidavits
but must make his own extensive inquiry on the existence of such license, as well as on
whether the applicant and the witnesses have personal knowledge thereof.
In Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines (PICOP) v. Asuncion,27[24] we declared

as void the search warrant issued by the trial court in connection with the offense of illegal
possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosives, on the ground, inter alia, of failure to
prove the requisite probable cause. The applicant and the witness presented for the issuance
of the warrant were found to be without personal knowledge of the lack of license to possess
firearms of the management of PICOP and its security agency. They likewise did not testify
as to the absence of license and failed to attach to the application a no license certification
from the Firearms and Explosives Office of the Philippine National Police. Thus -
Bacolod appeared during the hearing and was extensively examined by the judge. But his
testimony showed that he did not have personal knowledge that the petitioners, in violation
of PD 1866, were not licensed to possess firearms, ammunitions or explosives
xxx xxx xxx
When questioned by the judge, Bacolod stated merely that he believed that the PICOP
security guards had no license to possess the subject firearms. This, however, does not meet
the requirement that a witness must testify on his personal knowledge, not belief.
xxx xxx xxx
Moreover, Bacolod failed to affirm that none of the firearms seen inside the PICOP
compound was licensed. Bacolod merely declared that the security agency and its guards
were not licensed. He also said that some of the firearms were owned by PICOP. Yet, he
23[20]
People v. Veloso, 48 Phil. 169, 181 (1925).
Prudente v. Dayrit, G.R. No. 82870, 14 December 1989, 180 SCRA 69, 76, citing
24[21]
Quintero v. National Bureau of Investigation, G.R. No. L-35149, 23 June 1988, 162 SCRA
467; 20th Century Fox Film Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. L-76649-51, 19
August 1988, 164 SCRA 655; People v. Sy Juco, 64 Phil. 667 (1937); Alvarez v. CFI, 64
Phil. 33 (1937); United States v. Addison, 28 Phil. 566 (1914).
25[22]
People v. Tee, supra, note 1; Pendon v. Court of Appeals, supra, note 1.
26[23]
Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines v. Asuncion, supra, note 2.
27[24]
Id.
made no statement before the trial court that PICOP, aside from the security agency, had no
license to possess those firearms. Worse, the applicant and his witnesses inexplicably failed
to attach to the application a copy of the aforementioned no license certification from the
Firearms and Explosives Office (FEO) of the PNP, or to present it during the hearing. Such
certification could have been easily obtained, considering that the FEO was located in Camp
Crame where the unit of Bacolod was also based.28[25]
With respect to the .22 caliber revolver with Serial No. 48673, that the police raiding team
found in a drawer at the kitchen of petitioners house, suffice it to say that the firearm was
not mentioned in the search warrant applied for and issued for the search of petitioners
house. Section 2, Article III of the Constitution lays down the general rule that a search and
seizure must be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant, absent which
such search and seizure becomes unreasonable within the meaning of said constitutional
provisionCOURT: [To witness Ruel Nalagon]
Q I am showing you this document/sworn statement of Ruel Nala[gon] given to PO3

Rodrigo Delfin, Investigator, SCOT/PDEU Bukidnon Police Provincial Office, Camp
Ramon Onahon, Malaybalay City on or about 12:30 in the afternoon of June 25, 2001, in the
presence of PO3 Macrino Alcoser, Operative of Special Case Operation Team. Are you the
same Ruel Nalagon who has given a statement before the above-named police officer?
A Yes, Sir.
Q You have given a statement before the abovenamed police officer or Investigator that
you have personal knowledge that a certain Romulo Nala in Purok 4, Poblacion, Kitaotao,
Bukidnon has in his possession a .22 magnum pistol and 9MM pistol[?] Why and how do
you know that he has in his possession such pistols?
A Because I personally saw and witnessed him bringing or carrying said pistols.
Q Where did you see him bringing or carrying said pistols?

A I saw him personally in the public market of Kitaotao, Bukidnon. I also witnessed
him firing said pistol especially when he is drunk.
Q How often did you see him carrying and firing said pistols?
A Many times.
Q Do you know Romulo Nala? Are you friends with said person?
A Yes, sir because we are neighbors in Purok 4, Poblacion, Kitaotao, Bukidnon.
Q This Romulo Nala, is he bringing these two (2) pistols at the same time?
A No sir, he is bringing often times the .22 magnum and I saw him only twice bringing
9MM pistol.
Q Do you have something more to add or say in this investigation?

A None as of this moment.
That is all.29[27]
COURT:
Next witness [PO3 Macrino L. Alcoser]
xxx xxx xxx
Q Regarding this application filed by your office, what is your basis in arriving into a
conclusion that this certain Romulo Nala of Purok 4, Poblacion, Kitaotao, Bukidnon has in
his possession illegal firearms?
28[25]
Id., at pp. 733-736.
29[27]
Records, pp. 4-5.
A Based on the report of our reliable asset, a civilian agent who was able to personally
witness this Mr. Romulo Nala who has in his possession one (1) .22 magnum and one (1)
9MM pistols which are unlicensed.
Q What action [was] commenced by your office if any as to the report made by your
asset regarding the alleged possession of Mr. Romulo Nala of unlicensed firearms?
A Our officer through authorized personnel, conducted surveillance operation on the
spot, headed by this affiant.
Q What was the result of the surveillance conducted by your office?

A The result turned out to be positive and we have [concrete] evidence that indeed this
Romulo Nala is engaged with the above illegal act.
Q Are there more information you wish to inform this Court.

A None, as of the moment.
Q Do you affirm the truthfulness of the above statement made by you and [will you]
voluntarily sign the same?
A Yes, sir.
That is all.30[28]
It did not even occur to the examining judge to clarify how did the police officers conduct an
on the spot surveillance on June 25, 2001 on a 2-hour interval between 12:30 p.m.,31[29]
when Nalagon executed the affidavit, and 2:30 p.m.,32[30] when PO3 Macrino L. Alcoser
testified before the respondent judge that they conducted surveillance operation on the spot
right after Nalagon executed his affidavit. Even if we apply the presumption of regularity in
the performance of duty, the on the spot surveillance claimed by Alcoser contradicts his
statement in the application for the issuance of warrant that he conducted long range
surveillance of petitioner. At any rate, regardless of the nature of the surveillance and
verification of the information carried out by the police officers, the fact remains that both
the applicant, PO3 Macrino L. Alcoser, and his witness Ruel Nalagon did not have personal
knowledge of petitioners lack of license to possess firearms, ammunitions and explosive;
and did not adduce the evidence required to prove the existence of probable cause that
petitioner had no license to possess a firearm. Hence, the search and seizure warrant issued
on the basis of the evidence presented is void.
Can petitioner be charged with illegal possession of firearms and explosive allegedly seized
from his house? Petitioner contends that said articles are inadmissible as evidence against
him because they were not the same items specifically listed in the warrant. The Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor, on the other hand, claims that petitioner should be held liable
because the items seized bear a direct relation to the offense of illegal possession of
firearms. These arguments, however, become immaterial in view of the nullity of the search
warrant which made possible the seizure of the questioned articles.
The settled rule is that where entry into the premises to be searched was gained by virtue of
a void search warrant, prohibited articles seized in the course of the search are inadmissible
against the accused. In Roan v. Gonzales,33[31] the prosecution sought to charge the accused
with illegal possession of firearms on the basis of the items seized in a search through a
warrant which the Court declared as void for lack of probable cause. In ruling against the
admissibility of the items seized, the Court said
30[28]
Records, pp. 5 and 5a.
31[29]
Records, p. 2.
32[30]
Records, p. 4.
33[31]
Supra, note 1.
Prohibited articles may be seized but only as long as the search is valid. In this case, it was
not because: 1) there was no valid search warrant; and 2) absent such a warrant, the right
thereto was not validly waived by the petitioner. In short, the military officers who entered
the petitioners premises had no right to be there and therefore had no right either to seize the
pistol and bullets.34[32]
Conformably, the articles allegedly seized in the house of petitioner cannot be used as
evidence against him because access therein was gained by the police officer using a void
search and seizure warrant. It is as if they entered petitioners house without a warrant,
making their entry therein illegal, and the items seized, inadmissible.
Moreover, it does not follow that because an offense is malum prohibitum, the subject
thereof is necessarily illegal per se. Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita, but the subjects
of this kind of offense may not be summarily seized simply because they are prohibited. A
warrant is still necessary,35[33] because possession of any firearm becomes unlawful only if
the required permit or license therefor is not first obtained.36[34]
So also, admissibility of the items seized cannot be justified under the plain view doctrine. It
is true that, as an exception, the police officer may seize without warrant illegally possessed
firearm, or any contraband for that matter, inadvertently found in plain view. However, said
officer must have a prior right to be in the position to have that view of the objects to be
seized. The plain view doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law
enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in
a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in
plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he
observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The law
enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from
which he can particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came
inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open
to eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent.37[35]
No presumption of regularity may be invoked in aid of the process when the officer
undertakes to justify an encroachment of rights secured by the Constitution. In this case, the
firearms and explosive were found at the rear portion of petitioners house38[36] but the
records do not show how exactly were these items discovered. Clearly, therefore, the plain
view doctrine finds no application here not only because the police officers had no
justification to search the house of petitioner (their search warrant being void for lack of
probable cause), but also because said officers failed to discharge the burden of proving that
subject articles were inadvertently found in petitioners house.
The issue of the reasonableness of the implementation of the search and seizure warrant, i.e.,
whether the search was conducted in the presence of witnesses and whether the air rifle
which the trial court ordered to be returned to petitioner was indeed among the items seized
during the search, are matters that would be best determined in the pending administrative
case for grave misconduct and irregularity in the performance of duty against the police
officers who conducted the search.
34[32]
Id., at pp. 696-697.
35[33]
Id., at 697.
36[34]
Del Rosario v. People, supra, note 27.
People v. Doria, 361 Phil. 595, 633-634 (1999), citing Harris v. United States, 390 U.S.
37[35]
234, 19 L. Ed. 2d 1067, 1069 (1968); Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines, at 174 (1996); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564
(1971); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 75 L. Ed. 2d 502, 510 [1983]; People v. Musa, G.R.
No. 96177, 27 January 1993, 217 SCRA 597, 611 (1993); Roan v. Gonzales, supra, note 1;
Cruz, Constitutional Law, p. 151 (1996).
38[36]
Petition, Rollo, pp. 30-31.
Considering that the search and seizure warrant in this case was procured in violation of the
Constitution and the Rules of Court, all the items seized in petitioners house, being fruits of
the poisonous tree, are inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The exclusion of
these unlawfully seized evidence is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional
injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures.39[37] Hence, the complaints filed
against petitioner for illegal possession of firearms and explosive based on illegally obtained
evidence have no more leg to stand on.40[38] Pending resolution of said cases, however, the
articles seized are to remain in custodia legis.41[39]
Finally, the Court notes that among the items seized by the officers were four pcs. of
disposable lighter and unestimated numbers of cellophane used for packing of shabu. These
items are not contraband per se, nor objects in connection with the offense of illegal
possession of firearms for which the warrant was issued. Moreover, it is highly preposterous
to assume that these items were used in connection with offenses involving illegal drugs.
Even granting that they were, they would still be inadmissible against the petitioner for
being products of an illegal search. Hence, the subject articles should be returned to
petitioner.42[40]
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The October 18,
2001 and February 15, 2002 Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Malaybalay City, Branch
10, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as it denied petitioners omnibus motion to
quash the search warrant. Search and Seizure Warrant No. 30-01 dated June 25, 2001 is
declared VOID and the articles seized by virtue thereof are declared inadmissible in
evidence. Pending resolution of Criminal Case Nos. 10943-2001-P and 10944-2001-P for
illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosive against petitioner, the items
(caliber .38 revolver with Serial Number 1125609 and 5 pieces live ammunitions;
fragmentation grenade; and .22 long barrel) subject thereof, must remain in custodia legis.
The four pieces of disposable lighter and cellophane seized should be returned to petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Hon. Ombudsman for Mindanao

Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao
4th Floor, H&C Building, Alvarez St., Sta. Ana,
Davao City
Sir:
I am filing a formal criminal and administrative complaint

against the ROSANNA A. SAMALCA, Barangay Treasurer and
Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines v. Asuncion, supra, note 2 at p. 740,

39[37]
citing The Constitution, Article III, Section 2; Stonehill v. Diokno, 126 Phil. 738 (1967);
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 US 643 (1961).
40[38]
Id.
41[39]
Roan v. Gonzales, supra, note 1 at p. 698.
42[40]
Del Rosario v. People, supra, note 27, at pp. 394-395.
ALPHA M. DELOLA, the Barangay Captain of Barangay Bad-as,
Placer, Surigao del Norte, committed as follows:
1. That on September 7, 2017, the BAD-AS TABO

VENDORS ASSOCIATION, through our President
Alfred Aguilar and in my presence who is a
member of the association, paid the amount of
P300.00 for the rental of the Barangay Gym or
Multi-Purpose Building used by the Bad-as Tabo
Vendor’s Association. The payment was received
by Barangay Captain ALPHA M. DELOLA, placed
the money in his pocket and who then instructed
the Barangay Treasurer, ROSANNA A. SAMALCA;
2. That Barangay Captain Alpha M. Delola

instructed Treasurer Rosanna A. Samalca to issue
a receipt for the payment but the receipt issued is
not an Official Receipt. A copy of which is hereto
attached as annex “A” and made part of this
complaint;
3. That, likewise, on October 26, 2017, the BAD-AS

TABO VENDORS ASSOCIATION, again through our
President Alfred Aguilar and in my presence, paid
the amount of P300,00.00 for the rental of the
Barangay Gym or Multi-Purpose Building used by
the Bad-as Tabo Vendors Association. Again, the
payment was received by Barangay Captain
Alpha M. Delola, who placed the money in his
pocket and Treasurer Rosanna A. Samalca upon
instruction of the Barangay Captain, issued a
receipt which is not an Official Receipt. A copy of
which is hereto attached as annex “B” and made
part of this complaint;
4. That there were other payments by the Bad-as

Tabo Vendor’s association for the rental of the
Barangay Gym or Multi-Purpose Building to the
Page two, letter complaint . . . .
Barangay, but the receipts issued were not official

receipts, only that I could not anymore produce
the said receipts;
The actuation of Barangay Captain Alpha M. Delola and

Barangay Treasurer Rosanna A. Samalca, as narrated above is a
violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 1445, the Auditing Code of the
Philippines;
The possibility that the aforestated payments received by
the aforenamed Barangay Captain and Barangay Treasurer, did
not enter the coffers of the Barangay, is not farfetched.
It is, therefore, respectfully prayed of this Honorable Office of

the Ombudsman for Mindanao, that the corresponding
investigation be conducted and, if evidence warrants, file the
corresponding cases in court of competent jurisdiction.

this___day of February at Surigao City, Philippines.
MYRA A. BARADILLO
Purok 4, Barangay Bad-as,
Placer, Surigao del Norte
VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION
I, MYRA A. BARADILLO, Filipino, of legal age, married and a

resident of Placer, Surigao dell Norte, after having been duly
sworn to in accordance with law hereby depose and say: That I
am the complainant in the above complaint; that I have caused
the preparation of this complaint; that I have read understood all
the contents of the same and attest that all the allegations
contained therein are true and correct of my own personal
knowledge and based on authentic records; that I have not
commenced any other action or filed any claim involving the
same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to
the best of my knowledge, no such other action or claim is
pending therein; if there is such other pending action or claim I
undertake to inform this Honorable Office of the pendency
thereof within five days from notice of the same.
Page three, letter complaint . . . .
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto affixed my signature

this ____day of February, 2018 at Surigao City, Philippines.
MYRA A. BARADILLO
Affiant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this____ day of
February, 2018 at Surigao City Philippines. Affiant exhibited to me
her
bearing her signature and photograph.
Doc. No.________;
Page No.________;
Book No.________;
SERIES OF 2018.
PRISCILA G. CUBILLAN,
Complainant,
NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE
SURIGAO DEL NORTE POLICE PROVINCIAL OFFICE
Provincial Summary Hearing, DLOS
Surigao City
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE,

Complainant, ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO.
PRO 13AACNR-01-030917
-versus- FOR: GRAVE MISCONDUCT
PO2 RONIE C. CUSTODIO,

Respondent.
x-----------------x
RESPONDENT’S POSITION PAPER WITH

MOTION TO DISMISS
RESPONDENT, assisted by counsel, to this Honorable Office,

most respectfully submits this position paper with motion to
dismiss on the ground of forum shopping:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a case for grave misconduct. The Charge Sheet or

the Complaint accused the respondent of having been arrested
as a result of a buy bust-entrapment operation together with
PO1 Arnel Odog on November 4, 2016.
The respondent of course is denying the accusation.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
As contained in the counter-affidavit of the respondent, the

following is his version of the incident that gave rise to the instant
administrative case:
a) At around 1:30 o’clock in the afternoon of

November 4, 2016, I was in the Office of Tanariz
Fishermen Multi-Purpose Cooperative (TAFIMCO for
short) for the purpose of following up and
Page 2, position paper . . . .
processing with the said cooperative the buy-out of

my loan with PSSLAI.
b) While I was in TAFIMCO, I met PO1 Arnel Odog, a

member of the PNP assigned at Maritime Group
Regional Office, located at Parrucho St., Surigao
City, who also wanted to avail a loan with TAFIMCO;
c) At around 2:30 o’clock in the afternoon of the same

day, I decided to go to PNB to inquire if the money I
transferred from my CASH account with PSSLAI to
my PNB ATM had already been effected. It was at
this juncture that PO1 Odog offered me a ride on his
motorcycle to which offer I accepted. We
proceeded to PNB Branch at Rizal
St., Surigao City. Upon arrival, I entered the bank
premises and proceeded to where the ATM was
located and made a balance inquiry and found out
that my cash account with PSSLAI was not yet
transferred to my ATM. I went out of the bank but
could not leave as yet because it was raining and
so waited outside for the rain to stop. PO1 Odog
was still in the vicinity of the bank as it was raining
heavily. PO1 Odog asked me if I could accompany
him to Sueños Inn located at Burgos St., because
according to him he would collect from a person
the partial payment of the four (4) pieces of round
posts that he had delivered and was waiting at
room 301 of the inn;
d) PO1 Odog sensed that I badly needed money. At

that time I had no money to buy medicine for my
child who was ill with cough and fever. He told me
that he would give me P500.00, if he would be able
to collect the payment from the person who was
waiting at Sueños Inn.
e) After the rain subsided, we then proceeded to

Sueños Inn. Upon arrival at the said inn, PO1 Odog
immediately went upstairs while I stayed behind
standing just outside in front of the inn. Rain started
to pour so I went inside the inn. I was standing
beside the stairs on the groundfloor waiting for PO1
Odog when I heard shouts

coming from upstairs. Thinking that something
happened, I went upstairs to the third floor. When I
reached the third floor of the inn, to my surprise,
two (2) police officers suddenly held my two (2)
arms. I resisted because I just went upstairs to find
out what was taking place. But the two (2) police
officers forcibly brought me inside room 301 where I
saw PO1 Odog already arrested. PO2 Agbayani
kicked and boxed me on my abdomen and mouth
causing injury on my upper lip. The injury is
evidenced by a medical certificate;
f) A body search was conducted on my person and

they recovered no drug or contraband from me.
The evidence will show that nothing illegal was
found in my possession during the body search.
ISSUES
1. IS THERE LEGAL BASIS TO DISMISS THE INSTANT CASE

BECAUSE OF FORUM SHOPPING?
2. IS THE RESPONDENT GUILTY OF GRAVE MISCONDUCT?
DISCUSSION AND ARGUMENTS
1
(Motion to Dismiss)
The instant case should be dismissed

On the ground of Forum Shopping.
On March 30, 2017, after the respondent filed his answer in

the instant case on March 27, 2017, he received a Notice/or
Order from the National Headquarters of the Philippine National
Police, INTERNAL AFFAIRS SERVICE, Camp Crame, Quezon City,
requiring him to submit his counter-affidavit for an administrative
offense of Grave Misconduct and Conduct Unbecoming of a
Police Officer, grounded on the VERY same act which is now the
subject of the instant administrative case, that is, the respondent
was arrested in a buy-bust/entrapment operation on November
4, 2017. In short, there is another administrative case pending
before the Internal Affairs Service,
PNP, Camp Crame Quezon City. A copy of the notice is hereto

attached as annex “1”.
The notice or order is dated March 20, 2017. The
complainant in the instant case, therefore, failed to comply with
the certification of non-forum shopping as contained in the
Charge Sheet. On this ground alone, there is legal basis to dismiss
the instant case in consonance with Section 4, Rule 2 of
NAPOLCOM Memorandum Circular No. 2016-002.
Under the aforesaid NAPOLCOM Circular, the case shall be

dismissed for forum shopping upon MOTION of the respondent.
2
(Is the respondent guilty of grave misconduct?)
The respondent is not guilty of grave misconduct.
In administrative cases substantial evidence is required to

support a guilty verdict. Jurisprudence defines “Substantial
Evidence” as “more than a scintilla”. It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable person might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.
It is the respectful submission of the respondent that

substantial evidence in the case at bar, can be attained only
depending on the outcome of the criminal case filed against the
respondent for violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 for the alleged
involvement of the respondent in the sale of “shabu” which is also
the subject of this administrative case. Whether the court will
convict or acquit the respondent in the criminal case is very vital
in so far as the quantum of evidence (substantial evidence)
required in this administrative case to support a verdict of guilty of
grave misconduct.
Crucial in the case at bar, is the credibility of the

complainant’s witnesses. It is unfortunate that their credibility
could not be tested for lack of opportunity to cross-examine
them. Their credibility can only be ascertained in the criminal
case that was filed against the respondent as the latter is
afforded the right to cross-examine the witnesses against him. This
fact, adds more weight to the argument for the suspension of the
proceedings await the outcome in the criminal case.
The fact that the respondent’s drug test yielded negative results is
another piece of evidence that weakens the evidence
of the complainant. (Please see: Exhibit “5”, hereto attached.) A
suspension of the proceedings would, therefore, be in order.
The version of the poseur buyer

is not credible.
In the affidavit of poseur buyer Police Officer Andit, he

claimed that he was surprised that there was another person in
the room. He further claimed that he saw the other person
(referring to the respondent) handing two (2) sachets of
something to PO1 Odog and the sachets were given to him (par.
8 page 2 of joint affidavit. That is a big lie. Police Officer Andit
and the respondent had been assigned together at Surigao City
Police Station for more than (2) years and they know each other
very well. It is, therefore, unbelievable that Police Officer Andit
would not be able to recognize the respondent. The memos
marked as Exhibits “8”, “9” and “10”, the existence of which
documents was admitted by the complainant would prove that
it is highly impossible for Police Officer Andit not to have
recognized or identified the respondent.
Another indication that put to doubt the claim of the

poseur buyer that the respondent participated in the sale of
“shabu” is the result of the drug test conducted on the
respondent. The drug test found the respondent negative for the
use of dangerous drugs.
Further, a careful scrutiny of the The Certificate of

Coordination issued and approved by PDEA would show that
only Alyas Nonoy Odog is the target person is not the
respondent. This would only show that the police operatives who
arrested the respondent targeted PO1 Odog alone because
they did not include the name of the respondent in the
Certificate of Coordination. (Certificate of Coordination marked
as Exhibit “6” is hereto attached).
The Operational Plan (Exhibit “7” and Exhibit “E” for the
complainant) which includes the name of the respondent as
target is inconsistent with the PDEA Certificate of Coordination.
Why was the name of the respondent not in the PDEA Certificate
of Coordination but included in the Operational Plan? This is a
question that put to doubt the assertion that the
Page 6, position paper . . .
respondent had any participation in the sale of “shabu”. It

renders highly suspect the operational plan.
No “shabu” was presented and the

Forensic Chemical Officer did not
Testify.
The charge of grave misconduct is anchored on the

alleged participation of the respondent in the sale of shabu
together with PO1 Arnel Odog. Basic therefore in the prosecution
of this case that the “shabu” allegedly sold or a even a mere
photograph should have presented. Moreover, the Forensic
Chemical Officer who examined the “shabu” did not testify and
identify the Chemistry Report containing his findings that indeed
the one sold was “shabu”.
The Chemistry Report marked as exhibit by the complainant

was not identified by the Forensic Chemical Officer who
conducted the laboratory examination and who prepared it.
Thus, the same cannot be admitted in evidence as under
Section 3, Rule 2 of NAPOLCOM Circular No. 2016-002.
In the prosecution of this case, although the Rules on

Evidence of the Rules of Court are not strictly applied in
administrative case, yet, considering that the respondent here is
being accused of having sold “shabu”, it is basic that the
complainant should establish that the “shabu” is indeed
“shabu”, a dangerous drug. Likewise, it must be established that
it is the very same “shabu” allegedly sold. Further, to establish the
chain of custody of the “shabu”. The complainant failed to
establish all these things, in the process, falling short in
establishing substantial evidence to support a verdict of guilty.
The respondent is a good and

honest policeman.
It is well to repeat that respondent had been assigned at

the Surigao City Police Station for more than two (2) years and
had done a lot of accomplishments in the campaign against
illegal drugs. He is a recipient of the “Medalya ng Papuri”
(marked as Exhibit 12. The certification of Police Supt. Noel E.
Silvosa, dated September 16, 2016, then Officer-In-Charge of the
Surigao City Police Station would also show that the
respondent is a good and honest policeman. That it is well to

inform this investigation that the respondent had participated
in a seminar on selected provisions of RA 9165, for which he was
issued a certificate of participation.
CONCLUSION
All told, it is very clear that there is no substantial evidence

to support a finding of guilt. The respondent was not inside Room
301 of Suenos Inn. He went up there just to find out what was
happening when he heard shouts, but was instead arrested and
implicated in the alleged sale of “shabu”. The respondent was
just at the wrong place at the wrong time, so to speak. He did
not commit the acts complained of.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable

Office that the instant case be dismissed.
Surigao City, Philippines, April 20, 2017.
PO1 RONIE C. CUSTODIO

Respondent
ASSISTED BY:
DANILO C. MENOR
Counsel for Respondent PO2 Ronie C. Custodio
PTR NO. 8366749 - 1-06-2016
IBP O.R. NO. 966719 - 1-06-2016
Roll No. 29461
MCLE Compliance No. V-0006220 6.6.16
2nd Flr., Teng Bldg., Kaimo St., Washington,
Surigao City
VERIFICATION
I, P02 RONIE C. CUSTODIO, Filipino of legal age, after having

been duly sworn in accordance with law, depose and say: that I
am the respondent in the above-captioned case; that I have
caused the preparation of the foregoing position paper; that I
have read the allegations of this position papers; that the
allegations therein are true and correct of my own personal
knowledge and based on authentic records.

this____day of April, 2017 at Surigao City, Philippines.
P02 RONIE C. CUSTODIO
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this ___ day of

April, 2017 at Surigao City, Philippines. Affiant exhibited to me his
AFPSLAI ID No. 965214 bearing his signature and photograph.
Doc. No._____;
Page No. ____;
Book No._____;
SERIES OF 2017.
Copy furnished:
Philippine National Police

c/o SPO4 Gary S. Boniao
Nominal Complainant
Police Regional Office No. 13 (CARAGA)
Camp Rodriguez
Butuan City
BY REGISTERED MAIL
Reg.Rec. No.________________________
PROOF OF SERVICE
I, MARK JOSEPH S. SALA, am the connected with the Law

Office of Atty. Danilo C. Menor as process server; that on
April___, 2017 I have furnished SPO4 Gary S. Boniao with a copy
of this pleading by registered mail as evidenced by a registry
receipt indicated above.
MARK JOSEPH S. SALA
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this____day of

April, 2017 at Surigao City, Philippines. Affiant exhibited to me his
PAG-IBIG CARD No. 1211-5922-9281 bearing his signature and
photograph.
Doc. No._____;
Page No._____;
Book No._____;
SERIES OF 2017.
CERTIFICATION
A copy of this pleading was furnished SPO4 Gary S. Boniao

by registered mail by reason of distance between the City of
Surigao and City of Butuan.
DANILO C. MENOR
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao
4th Floor, H&C Building, Alvarez St., Sta. Ana, Davao City
Complainant,
-versus- Case No. OMB-M-A-16-0378

For: Abuse of Authority;
Failure to Process Documents
and Papers
Expeditiously
OSCAR R. TOLDO
Vice Mayor
Municipality of Del Carmen
Surigao del Norte
Respondent.
X---------------------x
RESPONDENT’S POSITION PAPER
RESPONDENT, by himself, to this Honorable Office of the

Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao, most respectfully submits this
position paper:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The respondent is being accused of abuse of authority;

Process Documents and Papers Expeditiously. The instant
complaint arose out when the voucher for communication
expenses, Travel Order and TEV claim of the complainant was
not approved by the respondent and the complainant’s claim
that the respondent ordered or instructed her not to mark him
absent for the July 11, 2016 session of the Sangguniang Bayan.
ISSUE: IS THE RESPONDENT GUILTY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE

OFFENSE CHARGED?
DISCUSSION AND ARGUMENTS

With all due respect, it is the humble submission of the
respondent that he is not guilty of the administrative offense
lodged against him by the complainant.
It must be stressed that when the respondent assumed

office as Municipal Vice Mayor of the Municipality of Del
Carmen, Surigao del Norte, being elected for the first time in that
position, he made it a policy that all disbursement papers or
documents submitted for his signature or approval shall be
personally submitted and followed up by the official or
employee concerned. The corresponding notice is
conspicuously placed at the entrance of respondent’s office.
(Please see: Photograph marked as annex “1” of the counter-
affidavit.)
The purpose of the respondent in making that policy is to

enable him to determine the propriety and legitimacy of the
claims/disbursements/documents, in the process making it sure
that he would sign and approve only proper, valid and
legitimate claims/ disbursements and documents.
In the case of the complainant, her voucher for

communications expenses, travel order, as well as the TEV claim
voucher were not submitted personally by the complainant in
violation of the policy. In both instances, the respondent
instructed her secretary to inform the complainant to follow up
her aforesaid papers personally with the respondent so that she
could answer some queries from the respondents in connection
with the paper/documents that she submitted for signature and
approval by the respondent, which the secretary did, but the
complainant refused to do so.
A cursory examination of the receipts attached and

supporting the voucher for communications expenses of the
complainant, it pertains to load and smartload in the total
amount of P3,100.00, meaning to say cell phone loads. The first
receipt in the amount of P2,600.00 is undated. The other one is
dated July 11, 2016, is for P500.00. The respondent just find it
suspicious that the first receipt for P2,600 is undated. Further, the
total amount of P3,600.00 for two (2) months cell phone load
seems to be highly questionable. While the voucher states “To
payment of Communication Expenses . . . “ and not for
“reimbursement of communication expenses”, yet, receipts are
already attached to the disbursement voucher when no
payment has as yet been made. That is precisely the reason why
the respondent wanted the complainant to follow it up
personally so that she could answer respondent’s queries about
it.
In so far as the Travel Order and TEV claim voucher are
concerned complainant did not follow it up personally despite
having been told by respondent’s secretary. The
Page 3, Position paper . . . .
papers were brought by someone but not by the complainant

herself. As the Vice Mayor, the respondent has the discretion to
approve or disapprove a request for official travel by any official
or employee under his supervision depending on its propriety
and importance.
In the grant of the request for official travel, it is incumbent

upon the respondent to determine first if there is really a need for
such an official travel and whether or not it will adversely affect
public service, if granted. Stated otherwise, the respondent has
to determine first the propriety of such official travel. The
complainant refused to see the respondent so he could ask her
questions about the travel order. For this reason the respondent
did not approve or sign the Travel Order. As a consequence, the
TEV claim voucher accompanying it was not also be approved.
Besides, the TEV voucher has not as yet been signed by the
Municipal Accountant and the Municipal Treasurer.
To go on official travel to attend a seminar or conference

and the like, is not a right, but a mere privilege granted to
officials and employees. It is not mandatory, but rather,
discretionary on the part of the approving official whether to
approve or disapprove a request for official travel.
There is no truth to the claim that the respondent instructed

the complainant not to mark him absent for the July 11, 2016
session of the Sangguniang Bayan. All the respondent did was to
inform the complainant that at that time he was the Acting
Mayor and he was attending a seminar and reminded the
complainant to find out first the reason why any member of the
Sangguniang Bayan is not in the session hall during a regular
session before marking him or her absent.
Based on the facts obtaining in the case at bar, it is very

clear that the respondent has not violated any rules on
expeditious processing of documents and papers.
Further, the respondent is not liable for abuse of authority.

Abuse of authority has been defined as a misdemeanor
committed by a public officer, who under the color of his office,
wrongfully inflicts upon any person any bodily harm,
imprisonment or other injury; it is an act characterized with
cruelty, severity, or excessive use of authority.43 The acts

complained of by the complainant cannot be classified as
abuse of authority as defined and contemplated by law.
In the instant case, it is very obvious that the actuations of

the respondent were aimed at seeing to it that only legitimate
and valid claims/disbursements/documents are approved in the
process preventing the misuse and wastage of public funds.
PRAYER

prayed of this Honorable Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Mindanao that instant case be dismissed.
Surigao City, for Davao City, Philippines, February 10, 2017.
OSCAR R. TOLDO
Respondent
VERIFICATION
I, OSCAR R. TOLDO, Filipino of legal age, after having been

duly sworn in accordance with law, depose and say: that I am
the respondent in the above-captioned case; that I have
caused the preparation of the foregoing position paper; that I
have read the allegations of this position papers; that the
allegations therein are true and correct of my own personal
knowledge and based on authentic records.

this____day of February, 2017 at Surigao City, Philippines.
OSCAR R. TOLDO
43
Rafael v. Sualog, A.M. P-07-2330, June 12, 2008, 554 SCRA 278, 287; citing Aranda , Jr. v. Alavarez, A.M.
No. P-04-1889, November 23, 2007, 538 SCRA 162 and Stillgrove v. Sabas, A.M. P-6-2257, November 29,
2006, 508 SCRA 383, 400.
February, 2017 at Surigao City, Philippines. Affiant exhibited to
me his Voter’s ID No. VIN:6724-0347A-J2687MSS10000-7 bearing
his signature and photograph.
Doc. No._____;
Page No. ____;
Book No._____;
SERIES OF 2017.
Copy furnished:
Ms. Priscilla G. Cubillan

Office of the Sanggunian Secretary
Province of Surigao del Norte
BY: REGISTERED MAIL
REG REC. NO.__________
PROOF OF SERVICE
I, OSCAR R. TOLDO, after being duly sworn in accordance

with law, depose and say: that I am the respondent in the
above-captioned case; that on February 10, 2017, I have served
a copy of this counter-affidavit to Priscilla G. Cubillan, the
complainant, by registered mail, by depositing the envelope
containing a copy of this counter-affidavit with the Post Office of
Surigao City, addressed at her Office at the Office of the
Sangguiang Secretary, Municipality of Del Carmen, Del Carmen,
Surigao del Norte, as evidenced by registry receipt
number_____________________hereto attached.

this____day of February, 2017 at Surigao City, Philippines.
OSCAR R. TOLDO
Affiant

February, 2017 at Surigao City, Philippines. Affiant exhibited to
me his Voter’s ID No. VIN:6724-0347A-J2687MSS10000-7 bearing
his signature and photograph.
Doc. No._____;
Page No. ____;
Book No._____;
SERIES OF 2017
Complainant,
-versus- Case No. OMB-M-C-16-0300

For: Violation of Sec. 3 (f) of
Republic Act No. 3019
OSCAR R. TOLDO
Vice Mayor
Surigao del Norte
Respondent.
X---------------------x
Complainant,
-versus- Case No. OMB-M-A-16-0378

For: Abuse of Authority;
Failure to Process Documents
and Papers
Expeditiously
OSCAR R. TOLDO
Vice Mayor
Surigao del Norte
Respondent.
X---------------------x
COUNTER-AFFIDAVIT
I, OSCAR RUAYA TOLDO, Filipino of legal age, widower and

a resident of the Municipality of Del Carmen, Province of Surigao
del Norte, after being duly sworn in accordance with law,
depose and say:
1.That I am the incumbent Municipal Vice-Mayor of the

Municipality of Del Carmen, Province of Surigao del Norte,
receiving a monthly compensation corresponding to Salary
Grade 25. I can be contacted at the Office of the Municipal
Vice Mayor, Municipality of Del Carmen, Province of Surigao del
Norte;
Page two, counter-affidavit . . . . .
2.That I strongly deny the accusations against me for being
without any factual and legal basis;
3. That the reasons for the disapproval of the voucher for

communications expenses, travel order and TEV are stated in the
succeeding paragraphs;
4.That when I assumed office as Municipal Vice Mayor of

the Municipality of Del Carmen, Province of Surigao del Norte on
June 30, 2016, I made it a policy that all disbursement
papers/documents for my signature shall be personally
submitted and followed up by the official or employee
concerned. The corresponding notice is conspicuously placed at
the entrance of my office. Attached hereto is a photograph
marked as annex “1”;
5.That my purpose in making that policy is to enable me to

determine the propriety and legitimacy of the
claims/disbursements/documents, knowing fully well that, in the
event that I would approve any
claims/disbursements/doocuments that would turn out to be not
proper and legitimate, I as the approving officer, may be liable
administratively, civilly and criminally;
6.That in the case of the complainant, the voucher for

communications expenses was not personally submitted to me. It
was merely brought by someone, not the complainant, for my
approval. I have instructed my secretary to inform the
complainant to follow it up personally, which my secretary did
so, in order that the complainant could answer some of my
questions about the said voucher. I waited for several days, but
the complainant failed and refused, so I disapproved it by not
signing or affixing my signature;
7.That if we examine the receipts attached and supporting

the voucher for communications expenses, of the complainant,
it pertains to load and smartload in the total amount of
P3,100.00, meaning to say cell phone loads. The first receipt in
the amount of P2,600.00 is undated. The other one is
dated July 11, 2016, is for P500.00. I just find it suspicious that the
first receipt for P2,600 is undated. Further, the total amount of
P3,600.00 for two (2) months cell phone load seems to be highly
questionable and while the voucher states “To payment of
Communication Expenses . . . “ and not for “reimbursement of
communication expenses”, yet, receipts are already attached
to the disbursement voucher when no payment has
Page three, counter-affidavit . . . .
as yet been made, which is highly irregular, that is why, I wanted

the complainant to follow it up personally or see me so that she
could answer my queries about it. The Complainant failed, as a
result, said claim was not approved or signed by me;
8. That the truth is that the complainant did not follow-up
personally the voucher for communications expenses on August
3, 2016 because at that time I have already disapproved it by
not signing or affixing my signature;
9. That with respect to the Travel Order and TEV claim

voucher, again the complainant did not follow it up personally
despite having been told by my secretary upon my instruction.
The papers were brought by someone but not by the
complainant herself. As the Vice Mayor, I have the discretion to
approve or disapprove a request for official travel by any official
or employee under my supervision depending on its propriety
and importance. In the grant of the request for official travel, it is
incumbent upon me to determine first if there is really a need for
such an official travel and whether or not it will adversely affect
public service, if granted. Stated otherwise, I have to determine
the propriety of such official travel. The complainant refused to
see me personally so I could ask her questions about the travel
order before I would act on such a request. For this reason I did
not approve or sign the Travel Order. Accordingly, the TEV claim
voucher accompanying it could not also be approved. Besides,
the TEV voucher has not as yet been signed by the Municipal
Accountant and the Municipal Treasurer;
All told, an official or employee cannot, as matter of right,

demand that his request for travel be granted or approved. If
the approving officer is of the belief that the official travel of an
official or employee is not good for public service or there is no
necessity for the requested official travel, the same has to be
denied;
10. That the disapproval of the travel order and TEV

voucher did take long. After the complainant’s failure to see me
personally so that I could I ask her questions on her supposed
travel, I had already disapproved it by not signing or affixing my
signature;
Page four, counter-affidavit . . . .
11. That in connection with the alleged incident on July 25,

2016 (re: session on July 11, 2016), there was never an instruction
from me not to mark me absent. All I did was to inform the
complainant that at that time I was the Acting Municipal Mayor
on account of the official out of town travel of the Municipal
Mayor which had lasted already for more than three (3) days
and I also attended a seminar. Further, I reminded the
complainant to find out first the reason why the Vice Mayor or
any member of the Sanggunian is not in the session hall during a
regular session before marking him or her absent and that she
was wrong in marking me absent. If ever she corrected herself, it
was her own decision, not mine, perhaps after finding out that
she was wrong;
12. That the claim that I have delayed the approval of

complainant’s claim for communication expenses, travel, etc.,
has no factual and legal basis. If ever somebody has to be
investigated, it should be the complainant for filing a highly
anomalous and irregular claim for communication expenses;
13. That I could not understand the attitude of the

complainant. I could only surmised that she could not accept
me as the Vice Mayor of our Municipality, having supported and
being loyal to the former Vice Mayor whom I defeated in the last
elections;
14. That with all the foregoing, it is the my humble opinion

that I have not committed any wrongful act that can be
classified as abuse of authority, failure to process documents and
papers expeditiously and I have not violated Section 3 (f) of
Republic Act No. 3019. Therefore, it is respectfully prayed of this
Honorable Office that the instant case be dismissed.

this____day of November, 2016 at Surigao City, Philippines.
OSCAR R. TOLDO
Respondent
Page five, counter-affidavit . . . .
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE this_____day of

November, 2016, at Surigao City, Philippines. I HEREBY CERTIFY
that I have personally examined the affiant and I am satisfied
that he voluntarily executed and understood his affidavit hereof.
Copy furnished:
Ms. Priscilla G. Cubillan
Office of the Sanggunian Secretary
Province of Surigao del Norte
BY: REGISTERED MAIL
REG REC. NO.__________
PROOF OF SERVICE
I, OSCAR R. TOLDO, after being duly sworn in accordance

with law, depose and say: that I am the respondent in the
above-captioned case; that on November 11, 2016, I have
served a copy of this counter-affidavit to Priscilla G. Cubillan, the
complainant, by registered mail, by depositing the envelope
containing a copy of this counter-affidavit with the Post Office of
Surigao City, addressed at her Office at the Office of the
Sangguiang Secretary, Municipality of Del Carmen, Del Carmen,
Surigao del Norte, as evidenced by registry receipt
number_____________________hereto attached.

this____day of January, 2005 at Surigao City, Philippines.
OSCAR R. TOLDO
Affiant

January, 2006 at Surigao City, Philippines. Affiant exhibited to me
his Voter’s ID No. VIN:6724-0347A-J2687MSS10000-7 bearing his
signature and photograph.
Doc. No._____;
Page No. ____;
Book No._____;
SERIES OF 2016
(f) Neglecting or refusing, after due demand or request, without
sufficient justification, to act within a reasonable time on any
matter pending before him for the purpose of obtaining, directly
or indirectly, from any person interested in the matter some
pecuniary or material benefit or advantage, or for the purpose of
favoring his own interest or giving undue advantage in favor of or
discriminating against any other interested party.
NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE
SURIGAO DEL NORTE POLICE PROVINCIAL OFFICE
Provincial Summary Hearing, DLOS
Surigao City
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE,

Complainant, ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO.
PRO 13AACNR-01-030917
-versus- FOR: GRAVE MISCONDUCT
PO2 RONIE C. CUSTODIO,

Respondent.
x-----------------x
RESPONDENT’S POSITION PAPER
RESPONDENT, assisted by counsel, to this Honorable Office,

most respectfully submits this position paper:

Respondent
ASSISTED BY:
DANILO C. MENOR
Counsel for Respondent PO2 Ronie C. Custodio
PTR NO. 8366749 - 1-06-2016
IBP O.R. NO. 966719 - 1-06-2016
Roll No. 29461
Surigao City
Copy furnished:
PNP, Surigao City

RECEIVED BY:__________
COUNTER-AFFIDAVIT
I, PO2 RONIE C. CUSTODIO, after being duly sworn in
accordance with law, depose and say:
1.That I am one of the respondents in the above-captioned

case;
2.That I vehemently deny the accusations against me for

the truth being as follows:
g) At around 1:30 o’clock in the afternoon of

November 4, 2016, I was in the Office of Tanariz
Fishermen Multi-Purpose Cooperative (TAFIMCO for
short) for the purpose of following up and
processing with the said cooperative the buy-out of
my loan with PSSLAI. A copy of the loan application
is hereto attached as annex “1”;
h) While I was in TAFIMCO, I met PO1 Arnel Odog, a

member of the PNP assigned at Maritime Group
Regional Office, located at Parrucho St., Surigao
City, who also wanted to avail a loan with TAFIMCO;
i) At around 2:30 o’clock in the afternoon of the same

day, I decided to go to PNB to inquire if the money I
transferred from my CASH account with PSSLAI to
my PNB ATM had already been effected. It was at
this juncture that PO1 Odog
offered me a ride on his motorcycle to which offer I

accepted. We proceeded to PNB Branch at Rizal
St., Surigao City. Upon arrival, I entered the bank
premises and proceeded to where the ATM was
located and made a balance inquiry and found out
that my cash account with PSSLAI was not yet
transferred to my ATM. I went out of the bank but
could not leave as yet because it was raining and
so waited outside for the rain to stop. PO1 Odog
was still in the vicinity of the bank as it was raining
heavily. PO1 Odog asked me if I could accompany
him to Sueños Inn located at Burgos St., because
according to him he would collect from a person
the partial payment of the four (4) pieces of round
posts that he had delivered and was waiting at
room 301 of the inn;
j) PO1 Odog sensed that I badly needed money. At
that time I had no money to buy medicine for my
child who was ill with cough and fever. He told me
that he would give me P500.00, if he would be able
to collect the payment from the person who was
waiting at Sueños Inn.
k) After the rain subsided, we then proceeded to

Sueños Inn. Upon arrival at the said inn, PO1 Odog
immediately went upstairs while I stayed behind
standing just outside in front of the inn. Rain started
to pour so I went inside the inn. I was standing
beside the stairs on the groundfloor waiting for PO1
Odog when I heard shouts coming from upstairs.
Thinking that something happened, I went upstairs
to the third floor. When I reached the third floor of
the inn, to my surprise, two (2) police officers
suddenly held my two (2) arms. I resisted because I
just went upstairs to find out what was taking place.
But the two (2) police officers forcibly brought me
inside room 301 where I saw PO1 Odog already
arrested. PO2 Agbayani kicked and boxed me on
my abdomen and mouth causing injury on my
upper lip. The injury is evidenced by a medical
certificate hereto attached as annex “2”;
l) A body search was conducted on my person and

they recovered no drug or contraband from me.
The evidence will show that nothing illegal was
found in my possession during the body search.

(Please see: Inventory and Joint affidavit of
apprehension/search and seizure of Police Officers
Cellona and Agbayani.
3. That in the affidavit of poseur buyer Police Officer Andit,

he claimed that he was surprised that there was another person
in the room. He further claimed that he saw the other person
(referring to me) handing two (2) sachets of something to PO1
Odog and the sachets were given to him (par. 8 page 2 of joint
affidavit. This is a big lie. Police Officer Andit and I had been
assigned together at Surigao City Police Station for more than (2)
years and we know each other very well. It is, therefore,
unbelievable that Police Officer Andit would not be able to
recognize me. Attached hereto, are: a) Memorandum dated
July 31, 2016; b) Memorandum dated August 4, 2016; c)
Memorandum dated Aug. 8, 2016; ) Memorandum dated
August 10, 2016, which pertain to duty detail on Synchronize
Checkpoint issued by the Chief of Police, to prove my
assignment in the Surigao City Police Station. The documents are
marked as annexes “3”, “4”, “5” and “6” respectively;
4. That the result of the drug test conducted on me was

negative. This simply means that I am not a drug user and a drug
pusher. The Certificate of Coordination issued and approved by
PDEA would show that Alyas Nonoy Odog is the target person
and not me;
5. That the claim of Police Officer Andit that I was the one
who handed to PO1 Odog the two (2) sachets of something is
a fabrication and does not have the slightest semblance of truth;
6. That I have been assigned at the Surigao City Police

Station for more than two (2) years and I have done a lot of
accomplishments in the campaign against illegal drugs. I have
been a recipient of the “Medalya ng Papuri” (to be presented
during the investigation). To show that I am a good and honest
public servant, attached hereto as annex “7”, the certification
of Police Supt. Noel E. Silvosa, dated September 16, 2016, then
Officer-In-Charge of the Surigao City Police Station;
7. That it is well to inform this investigation that I have

participated in a seminar on selected provisions of RA 9165, for
which I was issued a certificate of participation attached
hereto as annex “7”, if only to prove my innocence of the the

accusations against me;
8. That I am executing this affidavit to attest the truth of the

foregoing facts and praying that the instant complaint against
me be dismissed.

this____day of November, 2016 at Surigao City, Philippines.

Affiant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this ____day of

November, 2016 at Surigao City, Philippines. I HEREBY CERTIFY
that I have personally examined the affiant and I am satisfied
that he voluntarily executed and understood his affidavit hereot.
Surigao City
PNP, Surigao City, NPS DOCKET NO. XIII-05-INQ-16K-

Complainant, 00280
-versus- FOR: VIO. OF SECTIONS 5 & 11 OF

RA 9165
PO1 ARNEL G. ODOG alias
“Nonoy” & PO2 RONIE C.
CUSTODIO alias “Ronron”,
Respondents.
x-----------------x
COMPLIANCE
RESPONDENT PO1 RONIE C. CUSTODIO, assisted by

counsel, to this Honorable Office, most respectfully
submits his counter-affidavit and affidavits of his
witnesses, ----- in compliance with the subpoena
requiring him to submit his counter-affidavit and
supporting evidence.
Surigao City, Philippines, November 17, 2016.

Respondent
ASSISTED BY:
DANILO C. MENOR
Counsel for the Movant
PTR NO. 8366749 - 1-06-2016
IBP O.R. NO. 966719 - 1-06-2016
Roll No. 29461
Surigao City
Copy furnished:
PNP, Surigao City

RECEIVED BY:
PUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES)

X------------------X
AFFIDAVIT OF UNDERTAKING
I, RACHEL T. CONSIGNA, Filipino of legal age, single and a

resident of Surigao City, after being duly sworn in accordance
with law, depose and say:
That I am the registered owner of a Kia HSPUR, utility vehicle

that I purchased from Kia Motors Butuan, financed by Maybank
Philippines, Inc., as evidenced by Certificate of Registration No.
242589561 dated May 6, 2016, which motor vehicle is described
as follows:
MAKE: KIA BODY TYPE: HSPUR

MODEL: 2016 FUEL: DIESEL
ENGINE NO. J2727835
CHASSIS NO. KNCSHX71CG7979059
PLATE NO. ACX3101 (Not yet released)
That presently, the above-described motor vehicle is in the

custody of the Surigao City Police Station in connection with the
arrest of Reuven T. Consigna for alleged violation of RA 9165;
That I have filed a motion for the release of the said motor
vehicle with the Office of the City Prosecutor, Surigao City under
NPS DOCKET NO. XIII-05-16H-00263 entitled People vs. Reuven Tiu
Consigna for Violation of Sections 5 & 11 of the RA 9165 the motor
vehicle being an exhibit in the said case and in the event that
the said motion is granted, I undertake to produce the said motor
vehicle whenever required by the Office of the City Prosecutor,
Surigao City or by the Court;


this___day of October, 2016 at Surigao City, Philippines.
RACHEL T. CONSIGNA
Affiant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this _____day of

October, 2016 at Surigao City, Philippines.
MERLITA LAID-KEEFE, NPS DOCKET NO. XIII-05-INQ-
Complainant, 16I-00366
-versus- FOR: QUALIFIED THEFT
DOMINGO UNDANGAN, ET AL.,

Respondents.
x--------------------x
JOINT COUNTER-AFFIDAVIT
KAMI, DOMINGO B. UNDANGAN UG FLORENCIO B.

UNDANGAN, human manumpa subay sa balaod, moasoy ning
mosunod: (WE, DOMINGO UNDANGAN and FLORENCIO
UNDANGAN, after being duly sworn in accordance with law,
depose and say:)
1.Nga kami ang mga kiniha ni-ining maong kaso kauban

sila Robles Undangan, Allan Undangan, Albert Undangan, Lito
Satorio, Jojo Jaril, Casandra U. Diaz, Joeserie U. Loayon ug Joel
Babatuan; (That we are the respondents in the above-
captioned case together with Robles Undangan, Allan
Undangan, Albert Undangan, Lito Satorio, Jojo Jaril, Casandra U.
Diaz, Joeserie U. Loayon and Joel Babatuan;)
2.Nga kami kusganong nanghimakak sa akusasyon batok

kanamo kay ang tinuod mao ang mosunod: (That we are
vehemently denying the accusation against us, truth being as
follows:)
a)Niadtong Septembre 19, 2016 sa mga alas

9 sa buntag, nanguha kami ug lubi sa kalubihan
nga gipanag-iya sa among namatay na nga
amahan nga si Vicente Undangan nahimutang
sa Barangay San Isidro, Siyudad sa Surigao,
nailhan nga Lote Numero 2602. Ang kopya sa
deklarasyon sa yuta ug “chronological history” sa
maong lupa ania gi-attached ug gimarkahan ug
annexes “A” ug
2
“B”; (On September 19, 2016 at around 9:00

o’clock in the morning, we gathered coconuts
from the coconut land owned by our late father,
Vicente Undangan, situated at Barangay San
Isidro, Surigao City, known us Lot No. 2602, a copy
of the Tax Declaration of the land and a copy of
the chronological history of the said parcel of
land are hereto attached as annexes “A” and
“B”, respectively;)
c)) Ang uban nga mga kiniha nga sila, Allan

Undangan ug Albert Undangan, mga anak sila sa
among igsoon nga si Valeriano Undangan, Lito
Satorio, anak sa among igsoon nga si Ursula U.
Satorio, Jojo Jaril, anak sa among igsoon nga si
Nerita U. Jaril, Casandra U. Diaz, anak sa among
igsoon nga si Elicita U. Diaz ug Joeserie U. Loayon,
anak sa among igsoon nga si Josephine U.
Loayon. Kauban sab namo sila Robles Undangan
ug Joel Babatuan nga among mga sinuhulan;
(The other respondents, Allan Undangan and
Albert Undangan, are the sons of our brother
Valeriano Undangan, Lito Satorio, is the son of our
sister Ursula U. Satorio, Jojo Jaril, is the son of our
sister Nerita U. Jaril, Casandra U. Diaz, is the
daughter of our sister Elicita U. Diaz and Joeserie
Loayon, is the daughter of our sister Josephine U.
Loayon. With us also at that time were hired
hands respondents Robles Undangan and Joel
Babatuan;
d) Ang akusasyon nga kami nanguha ug

lubi sa kalubihan ni Elma O. Laid nga igsoon ni
Merlita Laid-keefe dili tinuod ug walay basihan;
(The accusation that we gathered coconuts from
the coconut land owned by Elma O. laid, sister of
the Merlita Laid-Keefe, is not only incorrect, but
has no basis;)
3.Nga ang Lote No. 2602 gi survey ni Engr. Lofranco ug ang

lugar diin kami nanguha ug lubi sulod sa Lote Numero 2602 nga
gipanag-iya sa among amahan Vicente Undangan; (That Lot
2602 was surveyed by Engr. Lofranco and the area where we
gathered coconuts was inside Lot 2602 owned by our father
Vicente Undangan;)
3
4.Nga sigon sa papeles gikan sa opisina sa City Assessor nga
gi-attached dinhi ug markado ug annexes “C” ug “D”, ang mga
lote nga gi-claim sa nagsumbong ubos sa Tax Declaration Nos.
18701 ug 2330 walay numero nga mga lote ug ang mga tax
declaration kutob ra sa tuig 1980; (That based on the document
from the Office of the City Assessor hereto attached as annexes
“C” and “D”, the lots claimed by the complainant under tax
declaration Nos. 18701 and 2330 do not have Lot Numbers and
the tax declarations are only up to year 1980;)
5. Nga kami nagbuhat ni-ining deklarasyon aron pagpakita

nga dakong bakak ang kiha batok kanamo. (That we are
executing this affidavit to show that the accusation against us is a
big lie.)
ARON PAGMATUOD AMO KINING PIRMAHAN ning

petsa_____sa Nobyembre, 2016 dinhi sa Siyudad sa Surigao,
Pilipinas. (IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have hereunto set our hands
this___da of November, 2016 at Surigao City, Philippines.)
DOMINGO B. UNDANGAN FLORENCIO B. UNDANGAN

Affiant Affiant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this___day of

November, 2016 at Surigao City, Philippines. I HEREBY CERTIFY that
I have personally examined the affiants and I am satisfied that
they voluntarily executed and understood their affidavit hereof.

National Prosecution Service
Surigao City


Respondents.
x--------------------x
KAMI, ALLAN UNDANGAN, ALBERT UNDANGAN, LITO SATORIO,

JOJO JARIL, CASANDRA U. DIAZ ug JOESERIE U. LOAYON, mga
Pilipino nga hingkod na ang panuigon, nagpuyo sa San Isidro,
Siyudad sa Surigao, human manumpa pinasubay sa balaod
moasoy ning mosunod: (WE, ALLAN UNDANGAN, ALBERT
UNDANGAN, LITO SATORIO, JOJO JARIL, CASANDRA U. DIAZ and
JOESERIE U. LOAYON, Filipino citizens of legal ages, residents of
San Isidro, Surigao City, after being duly sworn in accordance
with law, depose and say:)
1.Nga kami ang mga sinumbong ni-ining kaso kauban sila

Domingo Undangan, Florencio Undangan, Robles Undangan ug
Joel Babatuan: (That we are the respondents in the above-
captioned case together with Domingo Undangan, Florencio
Undangan, Robles Undangan and Joel Babatuan;)
2.Nga kami mga pag-umangkon sa mga kiniha nga sila

Domingo Undangan, Florencio Undangan ug kami mga apo ni
anhing Vicente Undangan; (That we are the nephews of
respondents Domingo Undangan and Florencio Undangan and
grandchildren of the late Vicente Undangan;)
3.Nga dili tinuod ang kiha batok kanamo nga nanguha kami
ug lubi sa kalubihan ni Elma O. Laid-Cobre nga igsoon ni Merlita
Laid-Keefe;) (That there is no truth to the accusation against us
that we gathered coconut nuts from the coconut land of the
sister of Merlita Laid-Keefe, Elma O. Laid- Cobre;)
4.Nga niadtong Septembre 19, 2016 sa mga alas 9:00 ang

takna sa buntag, kauban Domingo Undangan, Florencio
Undangan ug sinuhulan nga sila Robles Undangan ug Joel
Babatuan, nanguha kami ug mga lubi sa kalubihan sa among
lolo nga si Vicente Undangan, nahimutang sa Barangay San
Isidro, Siyudad sa Surigao, nailhan nga lote numero 2602 ug
delarado sa ngalan ni Lolo Vicente Undangan; (That on
September 19, 2016 at around 9:00 o’clock in the morning,
together Domingo Undangan, Florencio Undangan and our hired
hands, Robles Undangan and Joel Babatuan, we gathered
coconut nuts from the coconut land of our late grandfather
Vicente Undangan, situated at - San Isidro, Surigao City, known as
Lot No. 2602 and declared for taxation purposes in the name of
our grandfather Vicente Undangan;)
5.Nga basi ni-ining among deklarasyon walay katinuoran and

kiha batok kanamo. (That based on this declaration there is no
truth to the accusation against us.)
ARON PAGMATUOD, amo kining pirmahan ning petsa_____sa

Novembre, 2016 dinhi sa Siyudad s Surigao, Pilipinas. (IN WITNESS
WHEREOF, we have hereunto set our hands this___day of
November, 2016 at Surigao City, Philippines.)
ALLAN UNDANGAN ALBERT UNDANGAN

Affiant Affiant
LITO SATORIO JOJO JARIL

Affiant Affiant
CASANDRA U. DIAZ JOESERIE U. LOAYON

Affiant Affiant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this___day of

November, 2016 at Surigao City, Philippines. I HEREBY CERTIFY that

Surigao City

Respondents.
x--------------------x
KAMI, ROBLES UNDANGAN ug JOEL BABATUAN, Pilipino ug

hingkod na ang panuigon, human manumpa subay sa balaod,
moasoy ning mosunod: (WE, ROBLES UNDANGAN and JOEL
BABATUAN, Filipino citizens of legal ages and residents of San
Isidro, Surigao City, after being duly sworn in accordance with
law, depose and say:)
Nga kami mga kiniha ni-ining kaso kauban sila Domingo

Undangan, Florencio Undangan ug unom (6) pa nga kauban;
(That we are the respondents in the above-captioned case
together with Domingo Undangan, Florencio Undangan and six
(6) others;)
Nga niadtong petsa 19 sa Septembre, 2016 sa alas 9:00 sa

buntag, gisuhulan kami nila Domingo Undangan ug Florencio
Undangan aron pag panguha ug lubi sa kalubihan nga
gipanag-iya sa ilang namatay na nga amahan Vicente
Undangan nga naa sa Barangay San Isidro, Siyudad sa Surigao;
(That on September 19, 2016 at around 9:00 o’clock in the
morning, we were hired by respondents Domingo Undangan and
Florencion Undangan to gather coconut nuts from the coconut
land owned by their late father, Vicente Undangan, situated in
San Isidro, Surigao City;)
Nga sumala sa among nahibaw-an, ang kalubihan diin kami

nanguha ug mga lubi niadtong petsa 19 sa Septembre, 2016,
gipanag-iya sa namatay na nga amahan nila Domingo
Undangan ug Florencio Undangan ug Lolo usab sa uban pang

mga kiniha ning kasoha; (That as far as we know, the coconut
land where we gathered coconut nuts on September 19, 2016, is
owned by the late father of Domingo Undangan and Florencio
Undangan and the grandfather of the other remaining
respondents, whose name is Vicente Undangan;)
Nga nagbuhat kami ning deklarasyon aron pagmatuod sa

tanan ug aron pagpahibalo sa mga otoridad. (That we are
executing this affidavit to attest the truth of the foregoing facts
and to inform the authorities concerned.)
ARON PAGMATUOD, amo kining pirmahan ning petsa _____sa

Nobyembre, 2016 dinhi sa Siyudad sa Surigao, Pilipinas. (IN
WITNESS WHEREOF, we have hereunto set our hands this____day
of November, 2016 at Surigao City, Philippines.)
ROBLES UNDANGAN JOEL BABATUAN

Affiant Affiant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this_____day of

November, 2016 at Surigao City, Philppines. I HEREBY CERTIFY that

Surigao City

Respondents.
x--------------------
COMPLIANCE
Respondents DOMINGO UNDANGAN and FLORENCIO

UNDANGAN, in compliance with the subpoena requiring them to
submit their respective counter-affidavits, most respectfully submit
to this Honorable Office their joint counter-affidavit and following,
to wit:
a) Joint Counter-Affidavit of Respondents Allan

Undangan, Albert Undangan, Lito Satorio, Jojo
Jaril, Casandra U. Diaz and Joeserie U. Loayon;
b) Joint Counter-Affidavit of Respondents Robles

Undangan and Joel Babatuan.
Most respectfully submitted.
Surigao City, Philippines, November 4, 2016.
DOMINGO UNDANGAN FLORENCIO UNDANGAN
Copy furnished:
Merlita Laid-Keefe
Brgy. San Isidro, Surigao City
ENTRY OF APPEARANCE WITH

URGENT MOTION FOR RESETTING
The undersigned counsel, to this Honorable Office, most
respectfully enters his appearance as counsel for the
respondents in the above-captioned case and moves that the
scheduled preliminary investigation on October 27, 2016 &
November 3, 2016, be reset to November 7, 2016 at 2:00 o’clock
in the afternoon, in support thereof, alleges:
1.That the respondents engaged the services of the

undersigned counsel only yesterday, October 25, 2016;
2.That the undersigned counsel needs more time to be able

to prepare the counter-affidavits of the respondents because
apart from lack of sufficient time, the undersigned counsel has
also instructed the respondents to secure some documents
needed for their defense that will take time;
3.That this motion is filed without any intention to delay the

proceedings in the above-captioned case, but solely for the
above-stated reasons.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable

Office that this motion be granted.
Sujrigao City, Philippines, October 26, 2016.
DANILO C. MENOR
Counsel for the Respondents
PTR NO. 8366749 - 1-06-2016
IBP O.R. NO. 966719 - 1-06-2016
Roll No. 29461
Surigao City
Copy furnished:
Ms. Merlita laid-Keefe
Purok 2, San Isidro, Surigao City
by Reg. Mail –
Reg. Rec. No.
OPPOSITION TO THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Respondents, through the undersigned counsel, to this

Honorable Office, most respectfully oppose the motion for
reconsideration filed by the complainant, in support thereof,
allege:
1.That a motion for reconsideration must be verified as

required under the Public Prosecutor’s Manual. In the case of the
instant motion, it is not verified, thus, it violates the requirement of
the Public Prosecutors Manual. Its outright denial, therefore,
would be in order;
2. That the Inquest Prosecutor correctly ruled that in the

absence of a certification from the Firearms and Explosive
Division of the PNP, Camp Crame, it is presumed that the
respondents are licensed to own and possess firearms, that their
respective firearms are registered and that they have permits to
carry the same outside their residence;
3. That one of the elements of the offense charged in the

instant case is that the respondents have no authority or license
to possess the firearm in their possession. Being an element of the
offense, the same must be proved by the complainant by
competent evidence. In this regard, the only competent
evidence to prove that the respondents are not authorized or
licensed to possess the firearm is the certification to that effect
from the Firearms and Explosive Division of the PNP, Camp
Crame.
4. That the instant case is an inquest case. Having been

dismissed and the respondents ordered released from custody
during the inquest proceedings, filing a motion for
reconsideration on the resolution of the Inquest Prosecutor is not
the proper action to take.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable office

that the motion ffor reconsideration be denied for lack of merit.
Surigao City, Philippines, October 24,2016.
DANILO C. MENOR
Counsel for the Respondent
PTR NO. 8366749 - 1-06-2016
IBP O.R. NO. 966719 - 1-06-2016
Roll No. 29461
Surigao City
Copy furnished:
SPO2 RODOLFO C. GABISAY

CIDG, Surigao City
CIDG 13 RSOT, Camp Rafael Rodriguez
Libertad, Butuan City
BY: REGISTERED MAIL
Reg. Rec. No.__________________
RACHEL T. CONSIGNA, assisted by counsel, to this
Honorable Office, most respectfully moves for the release of Kia
HSPUR Utility Vehicle described below, in support thereof, alleges:
1.That the movant is the registered owner of a Kia HSPUR,

utility vehicle that she purchased Kia Motors Butuan, financed by
Maybank Philippines, Inc., as evidenced by Certificate of
Registration No. 242589561 dated May 6, 2016, which motor
vehicle is described as follows:

ENGINE NO. J2727835
2. That on October 17, 2016, the police operatives, in the

course of their alleged operation against the respondent, took
into their custody the above-described motor vehicle and
presently impounded at the Surigao City Police Station
Compound. The said motor vehicle is one of the exhibits of the
complainant in NPS DOCKET NO. XIII-05-INQ- 16
2. That the said motor vehicle is not an instrument in the

commission of the offense and not the proceeds of the alleged
drug activities of the respondent and the movant has no
knowledge whatsoever of the alleged illegal activities of the
respondent, granting for the sake of argument, that the
accusations against him are true;
2
3. That there is no legal basis for the continued custody by

the police authorities of the subject motor vehicle;
4. That if this motion is granted, the movant undertakes to

produce the said motor vehicle whenever required by this Office
or by the court;
5. That attached hereto are copies of the certificate of

registration, official receipt, affidavit of undertaking and the
photographs of the motor vehicle;
WHEREFORE, is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Office

that this motion be granted.
Surigao City, Philippines, October 18, 2016.
RACHEL T. CONSIGNA
Movant
ASSISTED BY:
DANILO C. MENOR
Counsel for the Movant
PTR NO. 8366749 - 1-06-2016
IBP O.R. NO. 966719 - 1-06-2016
Roll No. 29461
Surigao City
Copy furnished:
PNP, Surigao City

RECEIVED BY:
PUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES)
X------------------X
AFFIDAVIT OF UNDERTAKING
I, RACHEL T. CONSIGNA, Filipino of legal age, single and a

resident of Surigao City, after being duly sworn in accordance
with law, depose and say:
That I am the registered owner of a Kia HSPUR, utility vehicle

that I purchased from Kia Motors Butuan, financed by Maybank
Philippines, Inc., as evidenced by Certificate of Registration No.
242589561 dated May 6, 2016, which motor vehicle is described
as follows:

ENGINE NO. J2727835
That presently, the above-described motor vehicle is in the

custody of the Surigao City Police Station in connection with the
arrest of Reuven T. Consigna for alleged violation of RA 9165;
That I have filed a motion for the release of the said motor
vehicle with the Office of the City Prosecutor, Surigao City under
NPS DOCKET NO. XIII-05-16H-00263 entitled People vs. Reuven Tiu
Consigna for Violation of Sections 5 & 11 of the RA 9165 the
motor vehicle being an exhibit in the said case and in the event
that the said motion is granted, I undertake to produce the said
motor vehicle whenever required by the Office of the City
Prosecutor, Surigao City or by the Court;


this___day of October, 2016 at Surigao City, Philippines.
RACHEL T. CONSIGNA
Affiant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this _____day of

October, 2016 at Surigao City, Philippines.
i[1]
In CA-G. R. CR No. 22255, promulgated on July 09, 1999. Aquino, J., ponente, Mabutas,
Jr. and Agnir, Jr., JJ., concurring. Petition, Annex A, Rollo, pp. 21-28.
ii[2]
Regional Trial Court Records, pp. 2-3.
iii[3]
Ibid., p. 21.
iv[4]
Note well that petitioner is a resident of Barangay Tigbe, Norzagaray, Bulacan. The
certification issued by P/Sr. Insp. Edwin C. Roque referred to Vicente Vic del Rosario of
Barangay Bigte, Norzagaray, Bulacan.
v[5]
Petition, Annex A, Rollo, pp. 22-28, at pp. 23-24; CA Rollo, pp. 87-93, at pp. 88-89.
Promulgated on July 13, 1998, Regional Trial Court Records, p. 173.
vi[6]
Notice of Appeal, dated July 17, 1998, Regional Trial Court Records, p. 175. Docketed
as CA-G. R. CR No. 22255.
vii[7]
Rollo, pp. 22-28.
viii[8]
CA Rollo, pp. 94-116.
ix[9]
Resolution, Rollo, pp. 60-61.
x[10]
Petition, filed on April 24, 2000. Rollo, pp. 9-20. On June 14, 2000, we required
respondent to comment on the petition (Rollo, p. 129). On October 26, 2000, respondent
filed its comment (Rollo, pp. 143-156). On December 6, 2000, we gave due course to the
petition (Temp. Rollo, pp. 1-2).
xi[11]
On the ground that the judge who issued the search warrant did not personally ask
searching questions to the applicant and his witnesses (Prudente v. Dayrit, 180 SCRA 69
[1989]; Pendon v. Court of Appeals, 191 SCRA 429 [1990]; Silva v. RTC Negros Oriental,
203 SCRA 140 [1991].
xii[12]
Siguan v. Lim, 318 SCRA 725, 734 [1999]; de los Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 313
SCRA 632, 645 [1999]; American Express International, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 308
SCRA 65, 69 [1999]; Pimentel v. Court of Appeals, 307 SCRA 38, 43 [1999].
xiii[13]
Sta. Maria v. Court of Appeals, 349 Phil. 275, 282-283 [1998].
xiv[14]
Guerrero v. Court of Appeals, 349 Phil. 605, 614 [1998].
xv[15]
See Exhibit L, Folder of Exhibits, Regional Trial Court Records, p. 6.
xvi[16]
See Petition, Annex C, Supplement to the Motion for Reconsideration, Annex B,
Rollo, p. 57. We also checked these data from the records of the Commission on Elections.
xvii[17]
But the trial court and the Court of Appeals ignored the sworn certification dated
August 16, 1999, to the effect that Barangay Tigbe and Barangay Bigte, Norzagaray,
Bulacan are two different and distinct barangays.
xviii[18]
People v. Lazaro, 317 SCRA 435, 446 [1999].
xix[19]
Exh. 1, Folder of Exhibits, Regional Trial Court Records, p. 10; See also p. 21.
xx[20]
See reverse side of Exhibit 1, back of p. 10 and p. 21.
xxi[21]
Exh. 3-A, Folder of Exhibits, Regional Trial Court Records, p. 14; See also Exh. 1,
ibid., p. 21.
xxii[22]
The trial court, by taking judicial notice, ruled that a .45 cal. pistol can not be licensed.
The trial court committed two errors here. One, for taking judicial notice of a disputed fact
without hearing and receiving evidence thereon (Salamera v. Sandiganbayan, 303 SCRA
217 [1999]). Second, no law prohibits the licensing of a .45 cal pistol; the power to issue
license is vested in the discretion of the Chief of Constabulary, now the Chief, Philippine
National Police (Rules and Regulations Implementing P. D. No. 1866, Section 2).
xxiii[23]
TSN, November 26, 1996, p. 3.
xxiv[24]
People v. Mendoza, 301 SCRA 66, 82 [1999].
xxv[25]
People v. de Vera, Sr., 308 SCRA 75, 100 [1999].
xxvi[26]
Exh. 1, dorsal side, Folder of Exhibits, Regional Trial Court Records, back of p. 21;
see also Annex 5.2, CA Rollo, p. 112.
xxvii[27]
Exh. 3-A, Folder of Exhibits, Regional Trial Court Records, p. 14.
xxviii[28]
Motion for Reconsideration and/or new trial, Annex 5.1, Rollo, pp. 29-51, at p. 46;
See also CA Rollo, pp. 94-116, at p. 111.
xxix[29]
Exh. 3-b, Folder of Exhibits, Regional Trial Court Records, p. 15. See also Exhibit 1-
Motion, ibid., p. 21.
xxx[30]
Pastrano v. Court of Appeals, 346 Phil. 277, 284 [1997].
xxxi[31]
Supra, Note 28.
xxxii[32]
He is the same P/Sr. Insp. Edwin C. Roque who certified on May 10, 1996, that one
Vicente Vic del Rosario of barangay Bigte, Norzagaray, Bulacan is not a licensed/registered
firearm holder of any kind and caliber, basis of the issuance of a search warrant. Supra, Note
15.
xxxiii[33]
Exh. 2, Folder of Exhibits, Regional Trial Court Records, p. 11. See also Exhibit 5,
ibid., p. 18.
xxxiv[34]
Supplement to the motion for reconsideration and/or new trial, Annex C, CA Rollo,
pp. 118-124, at p. 124.
xxxv[35]
People v. Castillo, 325 SCRA 613, 620 [2000]; People v. Dorimon, 321 SCRA 43, 48
[1999]; People v. Cerveto, 315 SCRA 611, 624 [1999]; Cadua v. Court of Appeals, 312
SCRA 703, 722 [1999]; People v. Khor, 307 SCRA 295, 311 [1999].
xxxvi[36]
People v. Bansil, 304 SCRA 384, 394 [1999].
xxxvii[37]
People v. Khor, supra, Note 35, at p. 310.
xxxviii[38]
People v. Cortez, 324 SCRA 335, 344 [2000].
xxxix[39]
People v. Lubo, 101 Phil. 179 [1957], citing U. S. v. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 128 [1909];
People v. Bayona, 61 Phil. 181 [1935]; People v. Cava, G. R. No. L-9416, August 31, 1956
[unpublished].
xl[40]
People v. Lubo, supra, Note 39.
xli[41]
People v. Jubilag, 331 Phil. 897, 910 [1996].
xlii[42]
People v. Figueroa, G. R. No. 134056, July 6, 2000.
xliii[43]
TSN, November 26, 1996, pp. 7-9.
xliv[44]
Decision, Regional Trial Court Records, pp. 147-171, at p. 168.
xlv[45]
Supra, Note 22.
xlvi[46]
People v. Montilla, 349 Phil. 640, 656 [1998].
xlvii[47]
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 325 Phil. 762, 821-822 [1996].
xlviii[48]
Uy Kheytin v. Villareal, 42 Phil. 886 [1933]. In Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687,
there was a search warrant but it was declared invalid because of failure to conduct proper
examination. The seizure of guns not described in the warrant was held illegal because there
was no valid search warrant, and the articles seized were not in plain view but deliberately
sought (taken from A Handbook on Arrest, Search and Seizure and Custodial Investigation,
by Justice Oscar M. Herrera, 1994 ed., p. 178).
xlix[49]
People v. Valdez, G. R. No. 129296, September 25, 2000.
l[50]
People v. Doria, 301 SCRA 668 [1999]. Cf. Veroy v. Layaque, 210 SCRA 97 [1992],
the seizure of a gun found inside an unlocked drawer was rejected because there was no
valid search.
li[51]
Ibid., at p. 716, citing Section 2, Bill of Rights, 1987 Constitution.
lii[52]
People v. Valdez, supra, Note 49.
liii[53]
People v. Aruta, 351 Phil. 868, 879 [1998].
liv[54]
233 SCRA 716, 725, 727 [1994].
lv[55]
People v. de la Rosa, 348 Phil. 173, 184-185 [1998], citing People v. Soyang, 110 Phil.
565 [1960].
lvi[56]
Supra, Note 50, concurring opinion of Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, pp. 726-727,
citing People v. Musa, 217 SCRA 597, 611 [1993].
lvii[57]
Rep. Act No. 3846, as amended.

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Republic of the Philippines

ARIES CRISPO FERNANDEZ, NPS DOCKET NO. XIII-05-INV-19C-

-versus- FOR: RAPE

JOSEPH BALCOS ALBANO, ET AL.,

AKO, JOSEPH B. ALBANO, hingkod na ang panuigon, minyo

1.Nga dili tinuod an kaso nga gipasaka sa ako ni Aries

2.Nga ang tinuod nga istorya si Aries Crispo Fernandez ug

3.Nga dilli tinuod nga ako ako tagpasakitan o tagsumbag si

4. Nga ang away ug pagsinumbagay ni Aries Crispo

4. Nga dinhi akong gi-attach and joint affidavit sa akong

AKO KINI PIRMAHAN ning petsa___sa Hunyo, 2019 dinhi sa

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this___day of July,

Aries Crispo Fernandez

KAMI, FREDERICK TAMBONG, IMELOU JEAN L. BALCOS ug

1.Nga kami nakasaksi sa hitabo di-in nagsinumbagay sila

2.Nga dili tinuod nga si Joseph Balcos Albano mipasakit ug

3.Nga kami naghimo ni-ini nga deklarasyon aron pagsulti sa

AMO KINI PIRMAHAN ning petsa___sa Hulyo, 2019 dinhi sa

FREDERICK TAMBONG IMELOU JEAN L. BALCOS

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this___day of June,

I, ROLAND S. PAGARA, Filipino of legal age, married and a

That I am presently working as dump truck driver Integrated

That I personally know Reymundo Pabas, he being my

That the whole day of April 11, 2019, Reymundo Pabas,

That I am executing this affidavit to attest the truth of the

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this___day of June,

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES)

I, JESUS V. SEVILLA, JR., Filipino of legal age, married and a

That I am a civil engineer and presently the project engineer

That I personally know Reynan Sevilla Enlacinto, he being a

That I am executing this affidavit to attest the truth of the

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand

JESUS V. SEVILLA, JR.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this___day of June,

Menchie Ann G. Gozon

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, CRIM. CASE NO. 13681

-versus- FOR: VIO. OF RA 9615

JOSE LUIS QUINTANA VASQUEZ,

OMNIBUS MOTION TO QUASH SEARCH WARRANT NO. 01-

ACCUSED, through counsel, to this Honorable Court, most

1.That Search Warrant No. 01-2018 was issued by the

2.That as a result of the implementation of the said search

Search Warrant was issued without probable cause.

4. That the accused is not the owner, lessee or occupant of

building searched is owned by Mr. & Mrs. Ferdinand P. Sembrano

Under the facts obtaining, the search warrant should have

5. That the fact that no firearm was recovered in the

Evidence obtained (a grenade) is not admissible in evidence and

6. That it must be pointed out that the fragmentation

“The marijuana bricks were wrapped in

Moreover, when the NARCOM agents saw the

No presumption of regularity may be invoked by

that the marijuana is inadmissible in evidence against

In another case, the Supreme Court, ruled:

“With respect to the .22 caliber revolver with Serial

7. That prior to implementation of the subject search

8. That it is very clear that even before he search warrant

9. That based on the factual setting in the case at bar, that

The arrest of the accused was illegal.

As discussed in the preceding paragraphs of this omnibus

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully

Surigao City, Philippines, April 2, 2018.

The City Prosecutor The Clerk of Court