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POLITICAL LAW (STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF THE GOVERNMENT)

I. IN GENERAL

A. Political Law Defined

POLITICAL LAW has been defined as that branch of public law, which deals with the organization and operation of the governmental organs of the State and define the relations of the state with the inhabitants 1 of its territory. (People vs. Perfecto, 43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922])

"The supreme power of the State to govern persons and things within its territory” and “AUTO LIMITATION”.

Nothing is better settled than that the Philippines being independent and sovereign, its authority may be exercised over its entire domain. There is no portion thereof that is beyond its power. Within its limits, its decrees are supreme, its commands paramount. Its laws govern therein, and everyone to whom it applies must submit to

its terms. That is the extent of its jurisdiction, both territorial and personal. Necessarily,

likewise, it has to be exclusive. If it were not thus, there is a diminution of its

sovereignty.

It is to be admitted that any state may, by its consent, express or implied, submit to a restriction of its sovereign rights. There may thus be a curtailment of what otherwise

is a power plenary in character. 2

That is the concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation, which, in the succinct language

of

Jellinek, "is the property of a state-force due to which it has the exclusive capacity

of

legal self-determination and self-restriction." 3

A

state then, if it chooses to, may refrain from the exercise of what otherwise is

illimitable competence.

DEFINITION / EFFECTIVITY

Case: Bernardita R. Macariola charged respondent Judge Elias B. Asuncion of the Court of First Instance of Leyte. The complainant alleged that respondent Judge violated paragraphs 1 and 5, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce when he associated himself with the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. as a stockholder and a ranking officer, said corporation, having been organized to engage in business. Said Article provides that:

Article 14 -The following cannot engage in commerce, either in person or by proxy, nor can they hold any office or have any direct, administrative, or financial intervention in commercial or industrial companies within the limits of the districts, provinces, or towns in which they discharge their duties:

1. Justices of the Supreme Court, judges and officials of the department of public prosecution in active service. This provision shall not be applicable to mayors, municipal judges, and municipal prosecuting attorneys nor to those who by chance are temporarily discharging the functions of judge or prosecuting attorney. xxxx

5. Those who by virtue of laws or special provisions may not engage in commerce in a determinate territory.

1 This includes not only citizens as there are rights protected by the Constitution for Inhabitants

2 G.R. No. L-26379 December 27, 1969 WILLIAM C. REAGAN, ETC., vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondent

3 Jellinek as quoted in Cohen, Recent Theories of Sovereignty, p. 35 (1937).

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Part 1 Rule: It is Our considered view that although the aforestated provision is incorporated in the Code of Commerce which is part of the commercial laws of the Philippines, it, however, partakes of the nature of a political law as it regulates the relationship between the government and certain public officers and employees, like justices and judges.

Political Law has been defined as that branch of public law which deals with the organization and operation of the governmental organs of the State and define the relations of the state with the inhabitants of its territory (People vs. Perfecto, 43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922…. Specifically, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce partakes more of the nature of an administrative law because it regulates the conduct of certain public officers and employees with respect to engaging in business: hence, political in essence. It is significant to note that the present Code of Commerce is the Spanish Code of Commerce of 1885, with some modifications made by the "Commission de Codificacion de las Provincias de Ultramar," which was extended to the Philippines by the Royal Decree of August 6, 1888, and took effect as law in this jurisdiction on December 1, 1888.

Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and later on from the United States to the Republic of the Philippines, Article 14 of this Code of Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated because where there is change of sovereignty, the political laws of the former sovereign, whether compatible or not with those of the new sovereign, are automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign.

Thus, We held in Roa vs. Collector of Customs (23 Phil. 315, 330, 311 [1912]) that:

By well-settled public law, upon the cession of territory by one nation to another, either following

those laws which are political in their nature and pertain to the

prerogatives of the former government immediately cease upon the transfer of sovereignty. (Opinion, Atty. Gen., July 10, 1899).

a conquest or otherwise

While municipal laws of the newly acquired territory not in conflict with the, laws of the new sovereign continue in force without the express assent or affirmative act of the conqueror, the political laws do not. (Halleck's Int. Law, chap. 34, par. 14). However, such political laws of the prior sovereignty as are not in conflict with the constitution or institutions of the new sovereign, may be continued in force if the conqueror shall so declare by affirmative act of the commander-in-chief during the war, or by Congress in time of peace. (Ely's Administrator vs. United States, 171 U.S. 220, 43 L. Ed. 142). In the case of American and Ocean Ins. Cos. vs. 356 Bales of Cotton (1 Pet. [26 U.S.] 511, 542, 7 L. Ed. 242), Chief Justice Marshall said:

U.S.] 511, 542, 7 L. Ed. 242), Chief Justice Marshall said: On such transfer (by cession)

On such transfer (by cession) of territory, it has never been held that the relations of the inhabitants with each other undergo any change. Their relations with their former sovereign are dissolved, and new relations are created between them and the government which has acquired their territory. The same act which transfers their country, transfers the allegiance of those who remain in it; and the law which may be denominated political, is necessarily changed, although that which regulates the intercourse and general conduct of individuals, remains in force, until altered by the newly- created power of the State.

Likewise, in People vs. Perfecto (43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922]), this Court stated that: "It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory the previous political relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated”

There appears no enabling or affirmative act that continued the effectivity of the aforestated provision of the Code of Commerce after the change of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and then to the Republic of the Philippines. Consequently, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce has no legal and binding effect and cannot apply to the respondent, then Judge of the Court of First Instance, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals. Macariola vs. Asuncion- 114 SCRA 77, - A.M. No. 133-J May 31, 1982

Hence, As To Laws Which Are Not Political In Nature;

Rule: As to whether the Indeterminate Sentence Act was in force during the occupation, the answer is in the affirmative. A proclamation of the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese forces of January 2, 1942, directed that "so far as the military administration permits, all the laws now in force in the Commonwealth, as well as executive and judicial institutions, shall continue to be effective for the time being as in the past." This was nothing more than a confirmation of the well-known rule of the Law of Nations that municipal laws, as contra-distinguished from laws of political nature, are not

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Part 1 abrogated by a change of sovereignty. (Kim Cham vs. Valdes Tan Keh and Dizon (75 Phil., 113) The Indeterminate Sentence Law is not a political law. It does not affect political relations. In fact, it is a part of the Commonwealth's criminal and penal system directly related to the punishment of crime and the maintenance of public peace and order, which Article 43 of Section III of the Hague Regulations of 1907 compels the belligerent occupant to take all steps in his power to reestablish and insure as far as possible.G.R. No. L-1352 April 30, 1947 ALFONSO MONTEBON vs. THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS

Case: On May 22, 1944, Herminigildo and Raymunda Locquiao executed a deed of donation propter nuptias in favor of their son, respondent Benito Locquiao and his then prospective and eventual bride By the terms of the deed, the donees were gifted with four (4) parcels of land, including the land in question, in consideration of the impending marriage of the donees. Herminigildo and Raymunda died on December 15, 1962.

Years later, the donation was questioned by the Petitioner as allegedly it did not observe the form required by law as there was no written acceptance on the document itself or in a separate public instrument. The issue to be threshed out is whether acceptance of the donation by the donees is required.

Rule: It is settled that only laws existing at the time of the execution of a contract are applicable thereto and not later statutes, unless the latter are specifically intended to have retroactive effect. Consequently, it is the Old Civil Code which applies in this case since the donation propter nuptias was executed in 1944 and the New Civil Code took effect only on August 30, 1950. The fact that in 1944 the Philippines was still under Japanese occupation is of no consequence. It is a well-known rule of the Law of Nations that municipal laws, as contra-distinguished from laws of political nature, are not abrogated by a change of sovereignty. This Court specifically held that during the Japanese occupation period, the Old Civil Code was in force. As a consequence, applying Article 1330 of the Old Civil Code in the determination of the validity of the questioned donation, it does not matter whether or not the donees had accepted the donation. The validity of the donation is unaffected in either case. G.R. No. 122134 October 3, 2003 ROMANA LOCQUIAO VALENCIA and CONSTANCIA L. VALENCIA vs. BENITO A. LOCQUIAO

B. Scope of Political Law:

a. The law of PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION. This deals with the organization and management of the different branches of the government

b. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. Deals with the guaranties of the constitution to individual

rights and the limitations on governmental action

c. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW. Deals with the exercise of executive power in the making

of rules and the decision of questions affecting private rights

d. The law on PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. Deals with the governmental agencies for

local government or for other special purpose

agencies for local government or for other special purpose C. Constitutional Law defined Constitutional law is

C. Constitutional Law defined

Constitutional law is a term used to designate the law embodied in the constitution and the legal principles growing out of the interpretation and application made by courts of the constitution in specific cases. (Sinco, Phil. Political Law)

It “is a body of rules resulting from the interpretation by a high court of cases in which the validity, in relation to the constitutional instrument, of some act of government, has been challenged.” (Bernas)

Constitutional law consist not only of the constitution, but also of the cases decided by the Supreme Court on constitutional grounds, i.e., every case where the ratio decidendi is based on a constitutional provision. (Defensor-Santiago)

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Constitutional law is the study of the maintenance of the proper balance between authority represented by the three inherent powers of the State and liberty as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. (Cruz, Constitutional Law)

D. Constitution Defined

A constitution is both a legal document and a political plan. It, therefore, embodies

legal rules as well as political principles. And so when we speak of constitutional law

in the strict sense of the tern, we refer to the legal rules of the constitution. 4

It is defined by Judge Story to be a fundamental law or basis of government. It is established by the people, in their original sovereign capacity, to promote their own happiness, and permanently to secure their rights, property, independence, and common welfare. (McKoan vs. Devries, 3 Barb., 196, 198 [quoting 1 Story, Const., secs. 338, 339];Church vs. Kelsey, 7 Sup. Ct., 897, 898; 121 U. S., 282; 30 L. ed.,

960.)

A constitution is delineated by the mighty hand of the people, in which certain first

principles of fundamental laws are established. The constitution is certain and fixed.

It

contains the permanent will of the people, and is the supreme law of the land. It

is

paramount to the legislature, and can be revoked or altered only by the authority

that made it. (Vanhornes's Lessee vs. Dorrance, 2 U. S. [2 Dall.] 304, 308; 28 Fed. Cas., 1012;1 L. ed., 391.)

A constitution is an act of extraordinary legislation by which the people establish the

structure and mechanism of their government, and in which they prescribe fundamental rules to regulate the motions of the several parts. (Eakin vs. Raub [Pa.] 12 Serg. & R., 330, 347.) A constitution is the written charter enacted and adopted by the people of a state through a combination of representatives, or in any way the people may choose to act, by which a government for them is obtained and established, and by which the people give organic and corporate form to that ideal thing, a state, for all time to come, or during the life of the state. (Lynn vs. Polk, 76 Tenn. [8 Lea], 121, 165.)

It is a law for the government, safeguarding individual rights, set down in writing. (Hamilton) It may be more specifically defined as a written instrument organizing the government, distributing its powers and safeguarding the rights of the

According to Schwartz, “it is seen as an organic

instrument,

circumscribed.” Such stress upon both grant and limitation of authority is fundamental in American theory. “The office and purpose of the constitution is to shape and fix the limits of governmental activity.” (Fernando)

and

People(Tañada and Fernando)

under

which

governmental

powers

are

both

conferred

Comprehensive Definition: That body of rules and maxims in accordance with which the powers of sovereignty are habitually exercised. (Cooley) This covers written and unwritten constitutions. (Cruz, Constitutional Law)

American sense: A constitution is a written instrument by which the fundamental powers of government are established, limited, and defined and by which these powers are distributed among several departments, for their more safe and useful exercise, for the benefit of the body politic. (Justice Miller)

With particular reference to the Philippine Constitution: That written instrument enacted by direct action of the people by which the fundamental powers of the government are established, limited and defined, and by which those powers are

limited and defined, and by which those powers are 4 Mendoza Notes Political Law 1 2018

4 Mendoza Notes

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distributed among several departments for their safe and useful exercise for the benefit of the body politic. (Malcolm, Philippine Constitutional Law, p. 6)

E. Doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy

In Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board, 5 the Court held that, "It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution."

In Sabio v. Gordon 6 , the Court held that, "the Constitution is the highest law of the land. It is the ‘basic and paramount law (to which all other laws must conform.’"

In Atty. Macalintal v. Commission on Elections 7 , the Court held that, "The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights must be determined and all public authority administered. Laws that do not conform to the Constitution shall be stricken down for being unconstitutional

In Manila Prince Hotel v. Government Service Insurance System, the Court held that:

Rule: A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates. It has been defined as the fundamental and paramount law of the nation. It prescribes the permanent framework of a system of government, assigns to the different departments their respective powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed principles on which government is founded. The fundamental conception in other words is that it is a supreme law to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights must be determined and all public authority administered. Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes is null and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract.G.R. No. 122156 February 3, 1997 MANILA PRINCE HOTEL vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM - quoting 8 Wall. 603 (1869).

“…When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern” Art 7, New Civil Code’’

Rule: As the new Civil Code puts it: "When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern. Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws of the Constitution." It is understandable why it should be so, the Constitution being supreme and paramount. Any legislative or executive act contrary to its terms cannot survive.CIR v. San Roque Power Corp., G.R. No. 187485, 8 October 2013

v. San Roque Power Corp., G.R. No. 187485, 8 October 2013 F. Foreign Jurisprudence and Constitutional

F. Foreign Jurisprudence and Constitutional Law

Rule: American jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American Constitution, are of dubious application for these are no longer controlling within our jurisdiction and have only limited persuasive merit insofar as Philippine constitutional law is concerned. As held in the case of Garcia vs. COMELEC, (227 SCRA 100 (1993).)"[i]n resolving constitutional disputes, [this Court] should not be beguiled by foreign jurisprudence some of which are hardly applicable because they have been dictated by different constitutional settings and needs." Indeed, although the Philippine Constitution can trace its origins to that of the United States, their paths of development have long since diverged.

5 G.R. Nos. 157870, 158633 and 161658, 3 November 2008, 570 SCRA 410

6 G.R. No. 174340, 17 October 2006, 504 SCRA 704.

7 453 Phil. 586 (2003).

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Part 1 In the colorful words of Father Bernas, "[w]e have cut the umbilical cord." G.R. No. 160261 November 10, 2003 FRANCISCO, JR. vs THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

RuleForeign decisions and authorities are not per se controlling in this jurisdiction. At best, they are persuasive and have been used to support many of our decisions. We should not place undue and fawning reliance upon them and regard them as indispensable mental crutches without which we cannot come to our own decisions through the employment of our own endowments. We live in a different ambience and must decide our own problems in the light of our own interests and needs, and of our qualities and even idiosyncrasies as a people, and always with our own concept of law and justice. Our laws must be construed in accordance with the intention of our own lawmakers and such intent may be deduced from the language of each law and the context of other local legislation related thereto. More importantly, they must be construed to serve our own public interest which is

the be-all and the end-all of all our laws. And it need not be stressed that our public interest is distinct

.GALLANT MARITIME

and different from others. G.R. No. 167614 March 24, 2009 SERRANO

vs.

G. Types of Constitution

1. In relation to the amendment process:

RIGID CONSTITUTION - is one that can be amended only by a formal and usually difficult process. This may not be amended except through a special process distinct from and more involved than the method of changing ordinary laws.

The constitution is rendered difficult to change and thereby acquires a greater degree of stability;

FLEXIBLE CONSTITUTION - is one that can be changed by ordinary legislation. (Cruz, Constitutional Law p 5).

It may be changed in the same manner and through the same body that enacts ordinary legislation. Example: British Constitution.

2. As to its adaption:

WRITTEN CONSTITUTION - is one whose precepts are embodied in one document or set of documents. The provisions have been reduced to writing and embodied in one or more instruments at a particular time 8 .

UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION - consists of rules which have not been integrated into a single, concrete form but are scattered in various sources, such as statues of a fundamental character, judicial decisions, commentaries of publicists, customs and traditions, and certain common law principles. (Cruz, Constitutional Law pp 4-5) Such has not been committed to writing at any specific time but is the accumulated product of gradual political and legal development. 9

3. As to its enactment

ENACTED or CONVENTIONAL CONSTITUTION - is enacted, formally struck off at a definitive time and place following a conscious or deliberate effort taken by a constituent body or ruler;

CUMULATIVE OR EVOLVED - is the result of political evolution, not inaugurated at any specific time but changing by accretion rather than by systematic method. (Cruz, Constitutional Law p 5)

8 They have been also called conventional or enacted because they are given definite form by a steadily constituted body, the constitutional convention, at a particular time. Example: U.S. and Philippine Constitution

9 They are also known as cumulative or evolved because they are not formulated at any definite time but are rather the outcome of a political evolutionary process. Example: English Constitution

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4. Others:

NORMATIVE - adjusts to norms, those that function more truly as prescriptive documents, such as the Constitution of the United States, are called normative constitutions.

NOMINAL not yet fully operational. Constitutions such as that of the former Soviet Union are called nominal constitutions. The Soviet Constitution claimed to guarantee Freedom of Speech, press, and assembly, but in practice the Soviet government continually repressed those who sought to express those freedoms.

SEMANTIC – A Fundamental law for the perpetuation of power. (“pseudo- constitution”), enforced to formalize and legalize the monopoly of power in authoritarianism or even totalitarianism.

What is the Philippine Constitution? The Constitution of the Philippines is written, conventional and rigid.

H. Qualities of a Good Constitution

BROAD. Because it provides for the organization of the entire government and covers all persons and things within the territory of the State and also because it must be comprehensive enough to provide for every contingency. (Cruz, Constitutional Law pp 5-6)

Case: A constitution is not intended to provide merely for the exigencies of a few years but is to

endure through generations for as long as it remains unaltered by the people as ultimate sovereign,

a constitution should be construed in the light of what actually is a continuing instrumentto govern

not only the present but also the unfolding events of the indefinite future. Although the principles embodied in a constitution remain fixed and unchanged from the time of its adoption, a constitution must be construed as a dynamic process intended to stand for a great length of time, to be progressive and not static. G.R. No. 196271 February 28, 2012 DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA vs. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Case: Constitutions are designed to meet not only the vagaries of contemporary events. They should be interpreted to cover even future and unknown circumstances. It is to the credit of its drafters that

a Constitution can withstand the assaults of bigots and infidels but at the same time bend with the

refreshing winds of change necessitated by unfolding events. As one eminent political law writer and

respected jurist explains:

“The Constitution must be quintessential rather than superficial, the root and not the blossom, the base and frame-work only of the edifice that is yet to rise. It is but the core of the dream that must take shape, not in a twinkling by mandate of our delegates, but slowly "in the crucible of Filipino minds and hearts," where it will in time develop its sinews and gradually gather its strength and finally achieve its substance. In fine, the Constitution cannot, like the goddess Athena, rise full-grown from the brow of the Constitutional Convention, nor can it conjure by mere fiat an instant Utopia. It must grow with the society it seeks to re-structure and march apace with the progress of the race, drawing from the vicissitudes of history the dynamism and vitality that will keep it, far from becoming a petrified rule, a pulsing, living law attuned to the heartbeat of the nation.” Taňada vs. Angara G.R. No. 118295 May 2, 1997

BRIEF. It must confine itself to basic principles to be implemented with legislative details more adjustable to change and easier to amend. (Cruz, Constitutional Law pp 4-5)

DEFINITE. To prevent ambiguity in its provisions which could result in confusion and divisiveness among the people. (Cruz, Constitutional Law pp 4)

I. Essential Parts of a Good Constitution

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Constitution of GOVERNMENT. The series of provisions outlining the organization of the government, enumerating its powers, laying down certain rules relative to its administration and defining the electorate. (ex. Art VI, VII, VIII and IX)

and defining the electorate . (ex. Art VI, VII, VIII and IX) Constitution of LIBERTY .

Constitution of LIBERTY. The series of proscriptions setting forth the fundamental civil and political rights of the citizens and imposing limitations on the powers of government as a means of securing the enjoyment of those rights. (Ex. Article III)

Constitution of SOVEREIGNTY. The provisions pointing out the mode or procedure in accordance with which formal changes in the fundamental law may be brought about. (Ex. Art XVII)

J. Philosophical View of the Constitution

Case: The Constitution, aside from being an allocation of power is also a social contract whereby the people have surrendered their sovereign powers to the State for the common good. Hence, lest the officers of the Government exercising the powers delegated by the people forget and the servants of the people become rulers, the Constitution reminds everyone that "[s]overeignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them. G.R. No. 88211 September 15, 1989 FERDINAND E. MARCOS vs. HONORABLE RAUL MANGLAPUS

II. THE BACKGROUND OF THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION

A- Precedents

Treaty of Paris: (signed December 10, 1898; became effective on April 11, 1899)

The Philippines was ceded by Spain to the U.S. Spain relinquished its sovereignty over the Philippines Islands, and with this,

All laws of political nature were automatically abrogated.

It provided that the civil and political status of all inhabitants of the islands were to be determined by the US Congress.

The US Constitution did not apply to the Philippines unless the US Congress expressly enacted its provisions.

McKinley’s Instructions: (issued by Pres. McKinley on April 7, 1900 as “Letter of Instruction to the Second Philippines Commission” under Taft)

It set up a “divided civil and military governmentwith the existing Military governor as the Executive and a Philippine Commission, created on September 1, 1900, as the Legislative. Both represented the US President as Commander-in-Chief.

It extended to the Philippines all the rights in the Bill of Rights of the US Federal Constitution except

o

the right to bear arms 10 and

o

the rights to a trial by jury 11 .

This was the first Organic Act (a law which establishes the structure and limitations of the government) of the Philippines. What it lacked, as a constitution, were the ratification by the people and the right of amendment which was reserved solely to the US President)

The judiciary was subsequently established on 11 June 1901, with a Supreme Court, Courts of First Instance, and Justice of Peace Courts

10 The Philippines was then in rebellion

11 Due to the distrust of the US to Filipinos

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Spooner Amendment:

July 4, 1901: The Spooner Amendment, was actually a rider to the “Army and Navy Appropriation Act.

It changed the then “divided military and civil government” into a fully civil government under the US Congress. All acts of the Philippines Commission would now begin: “Be it enacted by the authority of the US government,” and no longer by authority of the US President.

Philippine Bill of 1902: (Philippines’ organic act from 1902 to 1906)

The Governor-General retained all executive power, including the power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus upon recommendation of the Philippine Commission.

The Philippine Commission was the upper house. It established an elective lower house called the Philippines Assembly, composed entirely of Filipinos.

It defined for the first time who are the citizens of the Philippines. They were all the inhabitants of the Philippine islands who were subjects of Spain as of April 11, 1989, who continued to reside therein, and all the children subsequent thereto.

Jones Law (or the Philippine Autonomy Act): (passed on August 29, 1916 by the US Congress)

It established a tripartite government with real separation of powers; this was the prototype of our present set-up.

o

The executive power was in the hands of an American Governor- General, who was independent of the Legislature, and who was given the power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and impose martial law without the recommendation of the Legislature. The Legislature was composed of the Senate and the House of Representatives, all composed of Filipinos. The judiciary continued to be made up of the Supreme Court, the CFIs and Justice of Peace Courts.

o

Under this set-up, while the Filipinos has all the legislative power, the Americans had all the executive power and thus, also the control of the government

Tydings-McDuffie Law: (not an organic act)

It is an enabling statute that provided the mechanism whereby the constitution of an independent Philippines could be adopted.

of an independent Philippines could be adopted . This provided for: 1. The calling of Constitutional

This provided for:

1. The calling of Constitutional Convention to draft our Constitution.

2. The adoption of a Constitution that established a republican government, with a

Bill of Rights and a separation of Church and state.

3. Submission of the draft to the US President for certification that the Constitution

was in conformity with the condition set by the Tydings-McDuffie Law.

4. Its ratification by the people in a plebiscite.

Complete independence was to take place ten (10) years after its effectivity.

1935 Constitution: (took effect on November 15, 1935)

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This served as the charter of the Commonwealth and upon withdrawal of US sovereignty, of the Republic.

It provides for a tripartite government, with the executive lodged in the President who had a 6-year term, the legislative in a unicameral National Assembly and the judiciary in a Supreme Court, CFI’s, and Justice of Peace Courts.

Amendments:

1. 1940. Provided a bicameral Congress, a term of 4 years for the President with

re-election, and establishment of Commission on Elections

2. 1947. Included Parity Rights Agreement which stated that Congress acting as

constituent body, needed ¾ vote to propose an amendment to the Constitution

3. 1967. Provided the amendment of the Constitution by a Convention

1973 Constitution:

This was ratified by the citizens’ assembly (January 10-15, 1973 which was called by Pres. Marcos during the Martial Law. After the ratification, Proclamation No. 1102 on 17 January 1973, certified and proclaimed that the Constitution proposed by the Constitutional Convention of 1971 had been ratified by the Filipino people and thereby come into effect.

Relevant Law: PROCLAMATION NO. 1102 ANNOUNCING THE RATIFICATION BY THE FILIPINO PEOPLE OF THE CONSTITUTION PROPOSED BY THE 1971 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION.

WHEREAS, the Constitution proposed by the nineteen hundred seventy-one Constitutional Convention is subject to ratification by the Filipino people;

WHEREAS, Citizens Assemblies were created in barrios, in municipalities and in districts/wards in chartered cities pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 86, dated December 31, 1972, composed of all persons who are residents of the barrio, district or ward for at least six months, fifteen years of age or over, citizens of the Philippines and who are registered in the list of Citizen Assembly members kept by the barrio, district or ward secretary;

WHEREAS, the said Citizens Assemblies were established precisely to broaden the base of citizen participation in the democratic process and to afford ample opportunity for the citizenry to express their views on important national issues;

WHEREAS, responding to the clamor of the people and pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 86-A, dated January 5, 1973, the following questions were posed before the Citizens Assemblies or Barangays: Do you approve of the New Constitution? Do you still want a plebiscite to be called to ratify the new Constitution?

WHEREAS, fourteen million nine hundred seventy-six thousand five hundred sixty-one (14,976,561) members of all the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) voted for the adoption of the proposed Constitution, as against seven hundred forty-three thousand eight hundred sixty-nine (743,869) who voted for its rejection; while on the question as to whether or not the people would still like a plebiscite to be called to ratify the new Constitution, fourteen million two hundred ninety-eight thousand eight hundred fourteen (14,298,814) answered that there was no need for a plebiscite and that the vote of the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) should be considered as a vote in a plebiscite;

WHEREAS, since the referendum results show that more than ninety-five (95) per cent of the members of the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) are in favor of the new Constitution, the Katipunan ng Mga Barangay has strongly recommended that the new Constitution should already be deemed ratified by the Filipino people;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers in me vested by the Constitution, do hereby certify and proclaim that the Constitution proposed by the nineteen hundred and seventy-one (1971) Constitutional Convention has been ratified by an overwhelming majority of all of the votes cast by the members of all the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) throughout the Philippines, and has thereby come into effect.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the Republic of the Philippines to be affixed.

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Done in the City of Manila, this 17th day of January, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy- three.

(Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS "President of the Philippines

"By the President:

"ALEJANDRO MELCHOR "Executive Secretary"

Amendments:

1. 1976. Gave the President legislative powers even if the Interim Batasang Pambansa was already operating.

2. 1980. Raised the retirement of justices from 65 to 70. 12

3. 1980. Changed the form of government from Parliamentary to Presidential.

4. 1984. Provided for a Vice President.

B- The 1986 Revolution and proclamation of the provisional Constitution

The alleged electoral fraud in the “snap presidential election” in February 7, 1986, sparked demonstrations with the demands for the ouster of Marcos. Then Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and the Armed Forces Vice-Chief of Staff command of Fidel V. Ramos, who barricaded themselves at Camp Crame and Camp Aguinaldo, withdrew their support from the Marcos government and called for the resignation of the late president. With the support of the church and mass media, thousands of Filipinos to march the street of EDSA.

1. Proclamation of the Freedom Constitution.

a. Proclamation No. 1 February 25, 1986 (Provisional Government) Announced the assumption of power of Aquino and Laurel

This supposed to have established the Provisional Government but Proclamation No. 3 seemed to suggest that it was a revolutionary government since in its preamble, it announced that the “new government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces,” referring to the EDSA revolution.

The popular view was that the Aquino government was not an offshoot of the 1973 Constitution for under that Constitution a procedure was given for the election of the President proclamation by the Batasan and the candidate proclaimed was Marcos. Was the Aquino Government legitimate? This was said to be not a justiceable matter. This view was affirmed in Lawyers League v Aquino where the legitimacy of the Aquino government is questioned on the ground that it was not established pursuant to the 1973 Constitution

Case: The SC ruled that petitioners had no personality to sue and their petition states no cause of action. "For the legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines are the judge. And the people have made the judgment; they have accepted the government of President Aquino which is in effective control of the entire country so that it is not merely a de facto 13 government but in fact and law a de jure

de facto 1 3 government but in fact and law a de jure 1 2 To

12 To extend the terms of presidential allies

13 Kinds of de facto government: 1. The government that gets possession and control of or usurps, by force or by the voice of the majority, the rightful legal government and maintains itself against the will of the latter. 2. That established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a country who rise in insurrection against the parent state. 3. That which is established and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war and which is denominated as a government of paramount force, like the 2nd Republic of the Philippines established by the Japanese belligerent.

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Part 1 government. Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present government. All the eleven members of this Court as reorganized, have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of the Republic under her government."

The Aquino government was a result of a "direct state action." It was not as if a small group revolted and succeeded in wresting power in the end. Rather, the entire state revolted and overthrew the government, so that right from the beginning, the installation was already lawful and the government was at all times de jure 14 .- Lawyers League v Aquino (GR Nos. 73748, 73972 & 73990, May 22,

1986

Case: Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions state no cause of action. For the legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines are the judge. And the people have made the judgment; they have accepted the government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control of the entire country so that it is not merely a de facto8 government but in fact and law a de jure government. Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present government. All the eleven members of this Court, as reorganized, have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of the Republic under her government. (Joint Resolution of May 22, 1986 in G.R. No. 73748 [Lawyers League for a Better Philippines, etc. vs. President Corazon C. Aquino, et al.]; G.R. No. 73972 [People's Crusade for Supremacy of the Constitution. etc. vs. Mrs. Cory Aquino, et al.]; and G.R. No. 73990 [Councilor Clifton U. Ganay vs. Corazon C. Aquino, et al.])

For the above-quoted reason, which are fully applicable to the petition at bar, mutatis mutandis 15 , there can be no question that President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel are the incumbent and legitimate President and Vice-President of the Republic of the Philippines for the above-quoted reasons, which are fully applicable to the petition at bar, G.R. No. 76180 October 24, 1986 IN RE: SATURNINO V. BERMUDEZ

b. Proclamation No. 3 March 25, 1986 (Provisional Constitution), announced the promulgation of the Provisional (Freedom) Constitution, pending the drafting and ratification of a new Constitution. It abrogated the legislative provisions of the 1973 Constitution, modified the provision regarding the executive department, and totally reorganized the government.

It adopted certain provisions in the 1973 Constitution, contained additional articles on the executive department, on government reorganization, and on existing laws. It provided for the calling of a Constitution Commission composed of 30 to 50 members appointed by the President within 60 days.

C- Adoption and Effectivity of the Present Constitution

1. Adoption of the Constitution.

Proclamation No. 9, creating the Constitutional Commission of 50 members

October 15, 1986 - Approval of the draft Constitution by the Constitutional Commission

February 2, 1987 - Plebiscite held for the present constitution

2. Article V of the Provisional Constitution

Provisional Const., Art. V

Characteristics: a. Its existence is maintained by active military power within the territories and against the rightful authority of an established and lawful government. b. During its existence, it must necessarily be obeyed in civil matters by private citizens who, by acts of obedience rendered in submission to such force, do not become responsible, as wrongdoers, for those acts, though not warranted by the laws of the rightful government. 14 In this regard, it must be noted that there is no such thing as a constitutional right of revolution. A revolution, from the point of view of a State, is always lawful since a State can never go wrong; it can change its government in whatever way the sovereign sees fit. But this right of revolution, inherent in sovereignty, cannot be recognized in a Constitution, for this would be self-destructive. The nature of a Constitution is to set-up a government and provide for an orderly way to change this government. A revolution contradicts this nature. 15 With necessary changes in points of detail (Black’s Law Dictionary)

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Section 1: Within sixty (60) days from date of this Proclamation, a Commission shall be appointed by the President to draft a New Constitution. The Commission shall be composed of not less than thirty (30) nor more than (50) natural born citizens of the Philippines, of recognized probity, known for their independence, nationalism and patriotism. They shall be chosen by the President after consultation with various sectors of society.

Section 2: The Commission shall complete its work within as short a period as may be consistent with the need both to hasten the return of normal constitutional government and to draft a document truly reflective of the ideals and aspirations of the Filipino people.

Section 3: The Commission shall conduct public hearings to insure that the people will have adequate participation in the formulation of the New Constitution

Section 4: The plenary sessions of the Commission shall be public and recorded.

Section 5: The New Constitution shall be presented by the Commission to the President who shall fix the date for the holding of a plebiscite. It shall become valid and effective upon ratification by a majority of the votes cast in such plebiscite which shall be held within a period of 20 days following its submission to the President.

3. Section 27. Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution

This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose and shall supersede all previous Constitutions.

the purpose and shall supersede all previous Constitutions . The foregoing proposed Constitution of the Republic
the purpose and shall supersede all previous Constitutions . The foregoing proposed Constitution of the Republic

The foregoing proposed Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines was approved by the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the twelfth day of October, Nineteen hundred and eighty-six, and accordingly signed on the fifteenth day of October, Nineteen hundred and eighty-six at the Plenary Hall, National Government Center, Quezon City, by the Commissioners whose signatures are hereunder affixed.”

4. Proclamation No. 58 February 11, 1987 - proclaiming the ratification of the

Constitution

Rule: The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that date, therefore, the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been superseded. Having become inoperative, respondent OIC Governor could no longer rely on Section 2, Article III, thereof

By virtue of the provision of Article XVIII, Section 27 of the 1987 Constitution that it "shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose," the 1987 Constitution took effect on February 2, 1987, the date of its ratification in the plebiscite held on that same date.

So that is the date of the ratification" and that "the canvass thereafter [of the votes] is merely the mathematical confirmation of what was done during the date of the plebiscite and the proclamation of the President is merely the official confirmatory declaration of an act which was actually done by the Filipino people in adopting the Constitution when they cast their votes on the date of the plebiscite. DE LEON vs. ESGUERRA G.R. No. 78059 August 31, 1987

(As compared to the effectivity and the Publication of laws: Taňada vs. Tuvera 136 SCRA 27 - 1985)

Context:

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication. (New Civil Code)

Rule: Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

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Part 1 The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned.

It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general

applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound

by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents.

The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published, shall have no force and effect. (Taňada vs. Tuvera G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985)

Rule: After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties, both on the original petition and on the instant motion, we have come to the conclusion and so hold, that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication.

Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended.

The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law does not affect the public although it unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people. The subject of such law is a matter of public interest which any member of the body politic may question in the political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in the courts of justice. In fact, a law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires 16 act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest even if itmight be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and to the public as

a whole.

We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must a also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.

Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place. All presidential decrees must be published, including even, say, those naming a public place after a favored individual or exempting him from certain prohibitions or requirements. The circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce.

However, no publication is required of the instructions issued by, say, the Minister of Social Welfare on the case studies to be made in petitions for adoption or the rules laid down by the head of a government agency on the assignments or workload of his personnel or the wearing of office uniforms. Parenthetically, municipal ordinances are not covered by this rule but by the Local Government Code.

16 Beyond the powers or if within the powers are not binding due to lack of consent of stakeholders

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We agree that publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. As correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the mere mention of the number of the presidential decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication requirement. This is not even substantial compliance. This was the manner, incidentally, in which the General Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree undeniably of general applicability and interest, was "published" by the Marcos administration. The evident purpose was to withhold rather than disclose information on this vital law.

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot feint parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.

It is hereby declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately upon their approval, or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become effective only after fifteen days from their publication, or on another date specified by the legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code. Taňada vs. Tuvera G.R. No. L-63915 December 29, 1986

Law: E.O. 200 June 18, 1987 Amending Article 2 of the Civil Code

“Sec. 1. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided.”

III. Judicial Elaboration of the Constitution

A. Construction

- IN CASE OF DOUBT, THE CONSTITUTION SHOULD BE CONSIDERED SELF- EXECUTING RATHER THAN NON-SELF-EXECUTING

Case: The controversy arose when respondent GSIS, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent MHC (Manila Hotel). In a close bidding only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.

Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary contracts, petitioner in a letter to respondent GSIS dated 28 September 1995 matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad and subsequently sent a manager's check Bid Security to match the bid of the Malaysian Group, which respondent GSIS refused to accept. Hence, the case.

Petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier generation of Filipinos who believed in the nobility and sacredness of independence and its power and capacity to release the full potential of the Filipino people. To all intents and purposes, it has become a part of the national patrimony Petitioner also argues that since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the ownership of the business of the hotel which is owned by respondent GSIS, a government-owned and controlled corporation, the hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the national economy. Thus, any transaction involving 51% of the shares of stock of the MHC is clearly covered by the term national economy, to which Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, 1987 Constitution, applies.

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Part 1 Rule: Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII 17 of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable.

Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and principles. Their provisions command the legislature to enact laws and carry out the purposes of the framers who merely establish an outline of government providing for the different departments of the governmental machinery and securing certain fundamental and inalienable rights of citizens. A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self- executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self- executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action.

In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing constitutional provision does not render such a provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The omission from a constitution of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make it more available. Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable. (G.R. No. 122156 February 3, 1997 MANILA PRINCE HOTEL vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM)

Also the case of GAMBOA VS TEVES* reiterates the ruling of Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS

Case: Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution, like other provisions of the Constitution expressly reserving to Filipinos specific areas of investment, such as the development of natural resources and ownership of land, educational institutions and advertising business, is self-executing. There is no need for legislation to implement these self-executing provisions of the Constitution. The rationale why these constitutional provisions are self-executing was explained in Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, thus:

x x x Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self- executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self- executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that

in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-

.Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should

be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute.

In Manila Prince Hotel, even the Dissenting Opinion of then Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, later Chief Justice, agreed that constitutional provisions are presumed to be self-executing. Justice Puno stated that ”Courts as a rule consider the provisions of the Constitution as self-executing, rather than as requiring future legislation for their enforcement. The reason is not difficult to discern. For if they are not treated as self-executing, the mandate of the fundamental law ratified by the sovereign

17 “In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.” (NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY)

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Part 1 people can be easily ignored and nullified by Congress. Suffused with wisdom of the ages is the unyielding rule that legislative actions may give breath to constitutional rights but congressional inaction should not suffocate them.” G.R. No. 176579, June 28, 2011, WILSON P. GAMBOA vs. FINANCE SECRETARY MARGARITO B. TEVES

Also, the Court explained in Tañada v. Angara, that the provisions of Article II of the 1987 Constitution, the declarations of principles and state policies, are not self- executing. Legislative failure to pursue such policies cannot give rise to a cause of action in the courts.

Case: Arguing mainly (1) that the WTO requires the Philippines "to place nationals and products of member-countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products" and (2) that the WTO "intrudes, limits and/or impairs" the constitutional powers of both Congress and the Supreme Court, the instant petition before this Court assails the WTO Agreement for violating the mandate of the

1987 Constitution to "develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled

(to) give preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use of

by Filipinos

Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods."

Simply stated, does the Philippine Constitution prohibit Philippine participation in worldwide trade liberalization and economic globalization? Does it proscribe Philippine integration into a global economy that is liberalized, deregulated and privatized? These are the main questions raised in this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus

Issue: Whether the provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization contravene the provisions of Sec. 19, Article II,

Section 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.

Rule: Declaration of Principles, Not Self-Executing

By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a "declaration of principles and state policies." The counterpart of this article in the 1935 Constitution 18 is called the "basic political creed of the nation" by Dean Vicente Sinco. 19 These principles in Article II are not intended to be self-executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts. 20 They are used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws. As held in the leading case of Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato, 21 the principles and state policies enumerated in Article II and some sections of Article XII 22 are not "self-executing provisions, the disregard of which can give rise to a cause of action in the courts. They do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation."

In the same light, we held in Basco vs. Pagcor that broad constitutional principles need legislative enactments to implement Taňada vs. Angara G.R. No. 118295 May 2, 1997

Case: Petitioner questions his being declared a nuisance candidate

Rule: Implicit in the petitioner’s invocation of the constitutional provision ensuring "equal access to opportunities for public office" is the claim that there is a constitutional right to run for or hold public office and, particularly in his case, to seek the presidency. There is none. What is recognized is merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. Section 26, Article II of the Constitution neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort.

18 Also entitled "Declaration of Principles." The nomenclature in the 1973 Charter is identical with that in the

1987's.

19 Philippine Political Law, 1962 Ed., p. 116.

20 Bernas, The Constitution of the Philippines: A Commentary, Vol. II, 1988 Ed., p. 2. In the very recent case of Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997, p. 8, it was held that "A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self- executing."

21 246 SCRA 540, 564, July 17, 1995. See also Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance, G.R. No. 115455 and consolidated cases, August 25, 1995.

22 NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY

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Part 1 The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled "Declaration of Principles and State Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally considered not self- executing, and there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the "equal access" provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the courts.

As earlier noted, the privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations. Some valid limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates" and COMELEC Resolution No. 6452 dated December 10, 2002 outlining the instances wherein the COMELEC may motu proprio refuse to give due course to or cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. G.R. No. 161872 April 13, 2004 PAMATONG vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

Rule:As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a different principle and have often become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that

in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-

executing

considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute. G.R. No. 193459February 15, 2011 MA. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE. et al

Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be

OTHERS;

There are three well-settled principles of constitutional construction:

First, VERBA LEGIS, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution should be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed;

Second, where there is ambiguity, RATIO LEGIS EST ANIMA, meaning that the words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers; and

Third, UT MAGIS VALEAT QUAM PEREAT, meaning that the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole. 23

1. The Constitution has to be Interpreted as a Whole (UT MAGIS VALEAT QUAM PEREAT)

Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another. 24

Rule: Economic Nationalism should be read with other constitutional mandates to attain Balanced Development of Economy.

It is true that in the recent case of Manila Prince Hotel vs. Government Service Insurance System, et al., this Court held that "Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rule for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to

23 Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003.

24 Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317 (1991).

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Part 1 put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable." However, as the constitutional provision itself states, it is enforceable only in regard to "the grants of rights, privileges and concessions covering national economy and patrimony" and not to every aspect of trade and commerce. It refers to exceptions rather than the rule. The issue here is not whether this paragraph of Sec. 10 of Art. XII is self-executing or not. Rather, the issue is whether, as a rule, there are enough balancing provisions 25 in the Constitution to allow the Senate to ratify the Philippine concurrence in the WTO Agreement. And we hold that there are.

All told, while the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. The Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the development of the Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair. Taňada vs. Angara G.R. No. 118295 May 2, 1997

Rule: x x x [T]he members of the Constitutional Convention could not have dedicated a provision of our Constitution merely for the benefit of one person without considering that it could also affect others. When they adopted subsection 2, they permitted, if not willed, that said provision should function to the full extent of its substance and its terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction with all other provisions of that great document. Chiongbian v. De Leon 82 Phil 771 (1949).

Rule: It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand together.

In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a construction which will render every word operative, rather than one which may make the words idle and nugatory.Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,194 SCRA 317 (1991)

2. Plain Meaning Rule. Whenever Possible the Words Used in the Constitution Must Be Given their Ordinary Meaning Except When Technical Terms are Employed. (VERBA LEGIS)

Verba legis non est recedendum from the words of a statute there should be no departure. 26

The fundamental principle in constitutional construction however is that the primary source from which to ascertain constitutional intent or purpose is the language of the provision itself. The presumption is that the words in which the constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained. In other words, verba legis prevails. Only when the meaning of the words used is unclear and equivocal should resort be made to extraneous aids of construction and interpretation, such as the proceedings of the Constitutional

25 Secs. 1 and 13 Sec. 1. The goals of the national economy are a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income, and wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of goods and services produced by the nation for the

benefit of the people; and an expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all especially the underprivileged. The State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on sound agricultural development and agrarian reform, through industries that make full and efficient use of human and natural resources, and which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets. However, the State shall protect Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade practices. In the pursuit of these goals, all

xxx

sectors of the economy and all regions of the country shall be given optimum opportunity to

xxx xxx Sec. 13. The State shall pursue a trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity.

26 G.R. No. 186400 October 20, 2010 CYNTHIA S. BOLOS vs. DANILO T. BOLOS.

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Commission or Convention to shed light on and ascertain the true intent or purpose of the provision being construed. 27

Rule: In construing provisions of the Constitution, the first rule is verba legis, "that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed." G.R. No. 196271 February 28, 2012 DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA vs. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Rule: We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. We do not of course stop there, but that is where we begin. It is to be assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained. They are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the people's consciousness, its language as much as possible should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Thus these are the cases where the need for construction is reduced to a minimum.J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration 31 SCRA 413 (1970)

Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration 31 SCRA 413 (1970) Case: Whether or not petitioner herein

Case: Whether or not petitioner herein has resided in the subject congressional district for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the May 11, 1998 elections.

Allegedly, counting, from the day after June 22, 1997 when respondent registered at Precinct No. 4400-A, up to and until the day of the elections on May 11, 1998, respondent lacks the one (1) year residency requirement provided for candidates for Member of the House of Representatives under Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution.

Rule: Records show that petitioner's domicile of origin was Candon, Ilocos Sur and that sometime in 1991, he acquired a new domicile of choice at 24 Bonifacio St. Ayala Heights, Old Balara, Quezon City, as shown by his certificate of candidacy for the position of representative of the 3rd District of Quezon City in the May 1995 election. Petitioner is now claiming that he had effectively abandoned his "residence" in Quezon City and has established a new "domicile" of choice at the Province of Sarangani.

It is doctrinally settled that the term "residence," as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for elective office, means the same thing as "domicile," which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention 28 . "Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, whenever absent for business, pleasure, or some other reasons, one intends to return. "Domicile" is a question of intention and circumstances. In the consideration of circumstances, three rules must be borne in mind, namely: (1) that a man must have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2) when once established it remains until a new one is acquired; and (3) a man can have but one residence or domicile at a time.

(3) a man can have but one residence or domicile at a time. As a general

As a general rule, the principal elements of domicile, physical presence in the locality involved and intention to adopt it as a domicile, must concur in order to establish a new domicile. No change of domicile will result if either of these elements is absent. Intention to acquire a domicile without actual residence in the locality does not result in acquisition of domicile, nor does the fact of physical presence without intention.

The lease contract entered into sometime in January 1997, does not adequately support a change of domicile. The lease contract may be indicative of DOMINO's intention to reside in Sarangani but it does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of one's original domicile. The mere absence of individual from his permanent residence, no matter how long, without the intention to abandon it does not result in loss or change of domicile. Thus the date of the contract of lease of a house and lot located in the province of Sarangani, i.e., 15 January 1997, cannot be

27 Ang Bagong Bayani v. COMELEC, 412 Phil. 308, 338-339, June 26, 2001, per Panganiban, J., citing JM Tuason & Co., Inc. v. LTA, 31 SCRA 413, 422-423, February 18, 1970, as cited in Agpalo, Statutory Construction (1990), pp. 311 and 313.

28 Verba Legis - Plain meaning rule. Whenever possible the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except when technical terms are employed.

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Part 1 used, in the absence of other circumstances, as the reckoning period of the one-year residence requirement.

Further, Domino's lack of intention to abandon his residence in Quezon City is further strengthened by his act of registering as voter in one of the precincts in Quezon City. While voting is not conclusive of residence, it does give rise to a strong presumption of residence especially in this case where DOMINO registered in his former barangay.

Exercising the right of election franchise is a deliberate public assertion of the fact of residence, and is said to have decided preponderance in a doubtful case upon the place the elector claims as, or believes to be, his residence. G.R. No. 134015 July 19, 1999 JUAN DOMINO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

Case:R.A 10354, otherwise known as RH Law, was enacted by Congress on 2012. This was challenged the constitutionality of RH Law, as purportedly such violates the right to life of the unborn and compromises Right to life

Rule:The traditional meaning of the word "conception" which, as described and defined by all reliable and reputable sources, means that life begins at fertilization.Records of the Constitutional Convention also shed light on the intention of the Framers regarding the term "conception" used in Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. From their deliberations, it clearly refers to the moment of "fertilization." The records reflect the following:

Rev. Rigos: In Section 9, page 3, there is a sentence which reads:

"The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment of conception." When is the moment of conception?

xxx

Mr. Villegas: As I explained in the sponsorship speech, it is when the ovum is fertilized by the sperm that there is human life. x x x.

One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction that the language employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. As much as possible, the words of the Constitution should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Verba legis non est recedendum - from the words of a statute there should be no departure.

The raison d' etre for the rule is essentially two-fold: First, because it is assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained; and second, because the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document but essentially that of the people, in whose consciousness it should ever be present as an important condition for the rule of law to prevail.

The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of the unborn child was to thwart the Legislature from passing a measure allowing abortion. The Court cannot interpret this otherwise. The Reproductive Health Law is in line with this intent and actually prohibits abortion. By using the word “or” in defining abortifacient (Section 4(a)), the said Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation but also those that induce abortion and induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb. The RH Law recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a bounded duty to protect it. James M. Imbong v. Hon. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., G.R. No. 204819, 8 April 2014

Case: Invoking the Court's original jurisdiction under Section 5(1), Article VIII of the Constitution in relation to the special civil action under Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General filed the present Petition for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of quo warranto to declare as void respondent's appointment as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and to oust and altogether exclude respondent therefrom.

Respondent opposed the petition and anchors her position that she can be removed from office only by impeachment, based on jurisprudence.

Rule: Impeachment is not an exclusive remedy by which an invalidly appointed or invalidly elected impeachable official may be removed from office.

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ARTICLE XI provides Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.

It is a settled rule of legal hermeneutics that if the language under consideration is plain, it is neither necessary nor permissible to resort to extrinsic aids, like the records of the constitutional convention, for its interpretation. The provision uses the permissive term "may" which, in statutory construction, denotes discretion and cannot be construed as having a mandatory effect. We have consistently held that the term "may" is indicative of a mere possibility, an opportunity or an option. The grantee of that opportunity is vested with a right or faculty which he has the option to exercise. An option to remove by impeachment admits of an alternative mode of effecting the removal. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by SOLICITOR GENERAL JOSE C. CALIDA vs. MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO. G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018

3. The words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers (RATIO LEGIS ET ANIMA)

Still, it is a basic principle in statutory construction that the law must be given a reasonable interpretation at all times 29 . The Court may, in some instances, consider the spirit and reason of a statute, where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, or injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the law makers. 30 Applying a verba legis or strictly literal interpretation of the constitution may render its provisions meaningless and lead to inconvenience, an absurd situation, or an injustice. To obviate this aberration, and bearing in mind the principle that the intent or the spirit of the law is the law itself, resort should be made to the rule that the spirit of the law controls its letter. 31

Following the verba legis doctrine, (a) law must be applied exactly as worded (if) it is clear, plain and unequivocal. 32

Interpretation according to spirit. The words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of the framers.

Rule: Ratio legis est anima. The spirit rather than the letter of the law. A statute must be read according to its spirit or intent, for what is within the spirit is within the statute although it is not within its letter, and that which is within the letter but not within the spirit is not within the statute. Put a bit differently, that which is within the intent of the lawmaker is as much within the statute as if within the letter, and that which is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless within the intent of the lawmakers. Withal, courts ought not to interpret and should not accept an interpretation that would defeat the intent of the law and its legislators. G.R. No. 180050 April 12, 2011 RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, VICTOR F. BERNAL, and RENE O. MEDINA vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA 33

Rule: Truly, law must be understood not by "the letter that killeth but by the spirit that giveth life." Law should not be read and interpreted in isolated academic abstraction nor even for the sake of logical symmetry but always in context of pulsating social realities and specific environmental facts. Truly, "the real essence of justice does not emanate from quibblings over patchwork legal technicality. It proceeds from the spirit's gut consciousness of the dynamic role of law as a brick in the ultimate development of the social edifice." Frivaldo vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 120295, p. 56, June 28, 1996

29 Millares v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 110524, July 29, 2002.

30 People v. Manantan, G.R. No. 14129, July 31, 1962, citing Crawford, Interpretation of Laws, Sec. 78, p. 294

31 Navarro v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 180050, February 10, 2010

32 G.R. No. 183880 January 20, 2014 COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. TOLEDO POWER, INC.

33 Citing League of Cities of the Philippines v. Commission on Elections G.R. Nos. 176951, 177499, and 178056, December 21, 2009, 608 SCRA 636, 644-645

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Part 1 Rule: As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer’s document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the people’s consciousness, its language as much as possible should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Thus these are cases where the need for construction is reduced to a minimum.

However, where there is ambiguity or doubt, the words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers or ratio legis et anima. A doubtful provision must be examined in light of the history of the times, and the condition and circumstances surrounding the framing of the Constitution. In following this guideline, courts should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished in adopting a doubtful constitutional provision, and the evils sought to be prevented or remedied. Consequently, the intent of the framers and the people ratifying the constitution, and not the panderings of self-indulgent men, should be given effect. Atty. Romulo A. Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 191618, November 23, 2010, 635 SCRA 783, 797-799. cited in G.R. No. 202242 April 16, 2013FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR.

Rule: Ratio legis est anima."A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision under consideration.Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the history of the times, and the condition and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that purpose."G.R. No. 207851July 8, 2014 ANGEL G. NAVAL vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and NELSON B. JULIA

Case: A local elective official pleaded exemption from the application of the three-term limit on the ground that there was an interruption in his service after the penalty of suspension was imposed upon him.

Rule: As worded, the constitutional provision fixes the term of a local elective office and limits an elective official’s stay in office to no more than three consecutive terms. This is the first branch of the rule embodied in Section 8, Article X.Significantly, this provision refers to a "term" as a period of time three years during which an official has title to office and can serve.

This examination of the wording of the constitutional provision and of the circumstances surrounding

its formulation impresses upon us the clear intent to make term limitation a high priority constitutional

objective whose terms must be strictly construed and which cannot be defeated by, nor sacrificed for, values of less than equal constitutional worth. We view preventive suspension vis-à-vis term limitation with this firm mindset.

Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term limit rule demands that preventive suspension should not be considered an interruption that allows an elective official’s stay in office beyond three terms.

A preventive suspension cannot simply be a term interruption because the suspended official

continues to stay in office although he is barred from exercising the functions and prerogatives of the office within the suspension period. The best indicator of the suspended official’s continuity in office

is the absence of a permanent replacement and the lack of the authority to appoint one since no

vacancy exists.G.R. No. 184836 December 23, 2009SIMON B. ALDOVINO, JR., DANILO B.

FALLER AND FERDINAND N. TALABONG vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND WILFREDO F. ASILO

- OTHER CASES

Case: Petitioners allege that the Health Sector Reform Agenda should be declared void, since it runs counter to the aspiration and ideals of the Filipino people as embodied in the Constitution. They claim that the HSRA’s policies of fiscal autonomy, income generation, and revenue enhancement violate Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15 and 18 of Article II, Section 1 of Article III; Sections 11 and 14 of Article XIII; and Sections 1 and 3 of Article XV of the 1987 Constitution. Such policies allegedly resulted in making inaccessible free medicine and free medical services. This contention is unfounded.

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Part 1 Rule: As a general rule, the provisions of the Constitution are considered self-executing, and do not require future legislation for their enforcement. For if they are not treated as self-executing, the mandate of the fundamental law can be easily nullified by the inaction of Congress. However, some provisions have already been categorically declared by this Court as non-self-executing.

In Tanada v. Angara, the Court specifically set apart the sections found under Article II of the 1987 Constitution as non-self-executing and ruled that such broad principles need legislative enactments before they can be implemented:

By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a "declaration of principles and state policies." x x x. These principles in Article II are not intended to be self-executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They are used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws.

In Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, this Court declared that Sections 11, 12, and 13 of Article II; Section 13 of Article XIII; and Section 2 of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution are not self-executing provisions. In Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, the Court referred to Section 1 of Article XIII and Section 2 of Article XIV of the Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights. These provisions, which merely lay down a general principle, are distinguished from other constitutional provisions as non- self-executing and, therefore, cannot give rise to a cause of action in the courts; they do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights

Some of the constitutional provisions invoked in the present case were taken from Article II of the Constitution -- specifically, Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15 and 18 -- the provisions of which the Court categorically ruled to be non-self-executing in the aforecited case of Tañada v. Angara.

Moreover, the records are devoid of any explanation of how the HSRA supposedly violated the equal protection and due process clauses that are embodied in Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution. There were no allegations of discrimination or of the lack of due process in connection with the HSRA. Since they failed to substantiate how these constitutional guarantees were breached, petitioners are unsuccessful in establishing the relevance of this provision to the petition, and consequently, in annulling the HSRA.

In the remaining provisions, Sections 11 and 14 of Article XIII and Sections 1 and 3 of Article XV, the State accords recognition to the protection of working women and the provision for safe and healthful working conditions; to the adoption of an integrated and comprehensive approach to health; to the Filipino family; and to the right of children to assistance and special protection, including proper care and nutrition. Like the provisions that were declared as non-self-executory in the cases of Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation and Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, they are mere statements of principles and policies. As such, they are mere directives addressed to the executive and the legislative departments. If unheeded, the remedy will not lie with the courts; but rather, the electorate’s displeasure may be manifested in their votes.

The rationale for this is given by Justice Dante Tinga in his Separate Opinion in the case of Agabon v. National Labor Relations Commission:

x x x However, to declare that the constitutional provisions are enough to guarantee the full exercise of the rights embodied therein, and the realization of the ideals therein expressed, would be impractical, if not unrealistic. The espousal of such view presents the dangerous tendency of being overbroad and exaggerated. x x x Subsequent legislation is still needed to define the parameters of these guaranteed rights. x x x Without specific and pertinent legislation, judicial bodies will be at a loss, formulating their own conclusion to approximate at least the aims of the Constitution.G.R. No. 167324 July 17, 2007 TONDO MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS

B. Theory of Judicial Review

1.The Theory and the Basis

Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the Constitution, that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private persons for private

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purposes, is null and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract. 34 As such, the law provides therefore that “…When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern35

Judicial reviewguarantees that all laws, or governmental actions must conform to the Constitution. Otherwise, they may be struck down due to the contradiction.

The power of judicial review is an aspect of judicial power that allows this Court every opportunity to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. 36

Mostly, Judicial Review is sparingly used by the courts because of deference or

respect for the other branches of Constitution;

government. It finds its basis from the

“All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or law, which shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all other cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc, including those involving the constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.” (Article VIII Section 4 (2)

2. Judicial Review and Separation of Powers

Case: Spurred in large part by the findings contained in the CoA Report and the Napoles controversy, several petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional.

Rule: The "limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies‖ carries the assurance that "the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of

government."

which, under the classic formulation of Baker v. Carr applies when there is found, among others, "a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department," "a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it" or "the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non- judicial discretion." Cast against this light, respondents submit that the "the political branches are in the best position not only to perform budget-related reforms but also to do them in response to the specific demands of their constituents" and, as such, "urge the Court not to impose a solution at this stage." 1

Essentially, the foregoing limitation is a restatement of the political question doctrine

Suffice it to state that the issues raised before the Court do not present political but legal questions which are within its province to resolve. A political question refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure." The intrinsic constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System" is not an issue dependent upon the wisdom of the political branches of government but rather a legal one which the Constitution itself has commanded the Court to act upon.710 SCRA 1.G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013 GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA et.al. vs. HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA et. al, G.R. No. 208493 SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) PRESIDENT SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, vs. HONORABLE FRANKLIN M. DRILON et.al. G.R. No. 209251 PEDRITO M.

34 G.R. No. 122156 February 3, 1997 MANILA PRINCE HOTEL vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM

35 Art 7, New Civil Code

36 G.R. No. 138268 May 26, 1999 JURRY ANDAL, RICARDO ANDAL and EDWIN MENDOZA, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

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Part 1 NEPOMUCENO, vs. PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III* and SECRETARY FLORENCIO BUTCH ABAD, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT

Case: For resolution are the consolidated petitions assailing the constitutionality of the Disbursement Acceleration Program(DAP), National Budget Circular (NBC) No. 541, and related issuances of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) implementing the DAP. This followed after Sen. Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada delivered a privilege speech in the Senate of the Philippines to reveal that some Senators, including himself, had been allotted an additional P50 Million each as "incentive" for voting in favor of the impeachment of Chief Justice Renato C. Corona.

The DBM issued a public statement explaining that the funds released to the Senators had been part of the DAP, a program designed by the DBM to ramp up spending to accelerate economic expansion. DBM cited that this had been sourced from savings generated by the Government, and from unprogrammed funds; and that the savings had been derived from (1) the pooling of unreleased appropriations and 2) the withdrawal of unobligated allotments also for slow-moving programs and projects that had been earlier released to the agencies of the National Government.

At the core of the controversy is Section 29(1) of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, a provision of the fundamental law that firmly ordains that "[n]o money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." The tenor and context of the challenges posed by the petitioners against the DAP indicate that the DAP contravened this provision by allowing the Executive to allocate public money pooled from programmed and unprogrammed funds of its various agencies in the guise of the President exercising his constitutional authority under Section 25(5) of the 1987 Constitution to transfer funds out of savings to augment the appropriations of offices within the Executive Branch of the Government. But the challenges are further complicated by the interjection of allegations of transfer of funds to agencies or offices outside of the Executive.

Nine petitions assailing the constitutionality of the DAP and the issuances relating to the DAP were filed. All the petitions are filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, and include applications for the issuance of writs of preliminary prohibitory injunction or temporary restraining orders.

Issue: Whether or not certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus are proper remedies to assail the constitutionality and validity of the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP),

Rule: The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other department; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. x x x

What are the remedies by which the grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government may be determined under the Constitution?

The present Rules of Court uses two special civil actions for determining and correcting grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. These are the special civil actions for certiorari and prohibition, and both are governed by Rule 65. A similar remedy of certiorari exists under Rule 64, but the remedy is expressly applicable only to the judgments and final orders or resolutions of the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit.

With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi- judicial or ministerial functions but also to set right, undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.

Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and executive officials.

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Part 1 Necessarily, in discharging its duty under the law to set right and undo any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, the Court is not at all precluded from making the inquiry provided the challenge was properly brought by interested or affected parties. The Court has been thereby entrusted expressly or by necessary implication with both the duty and the obligation of determining, in appropriate cases, the validity of any assailed legislative or executive action. This entrustment is consistent with the republican system of checks and balances.G.R. No. 209287 July 1, 2014, MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO vs. BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III

Case: In the elections of September 17, 1935, petitioner was proclaimed as member elect of National Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas. He took his oath of office on November 15, 1935. On December 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed a Resolution No. 8 confirming the election of its members against whom no protest had thus far been filed. On the other hand, the electoral commission adopted a resolution on December 9, 1935 fixing said date as the last day for the filing of protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of National Assembly, notwithstanding the previous confirmation made.

Prior to December 9, or on December 8, 1935, respondent Ynsua, a defeated candidate, filed a “motion of protest”, being the only protest filed after the passage of resolution No. 8, asking for the nullification of petitioner’s election. The ‘motion to dismiss the protest' filed by petitioner was denied. Hence, this present petition for the issuance of a writ of prohibition.

Issues: 1. Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative,

2. Has the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to the cognizance of the protest filed the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly?

Rule: Upon principle, reason and authority, we are clearly of the opinion that upon the admitted facts of the present case, this court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly."

The Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua against the election of the herein petitioner Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935 cannot in any manner toll the time for filing protests against the elections, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.

The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. For example, the Chief Executive under our Constitution is so far made a check on the legislative power that this assent is required in the enactment of laws. This, however, is subject to the further check that a bill may become a law notwithstanding the refusal of the President to approve it, by a vote of two-thirds or three-fourths, as the case may be, of the National Assembly. The President has also the right to convene the Assembly in special session whenever he chooses. On the other hand, the National Assembly operates as a check on the Executive in the sense that its consent through its Commission on Appointments is necessary in the appointments of certain officers; and the concurrence of a majority of all its members is essential to the conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, in its power to determine what courts other than the Supreme Court shall be established, to define their jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for their support, the National Assembly controls the judicial department to

a certain extent. The Assembly also exercises the judicial power of trying impeachments. And the

exercises the judicial power of trying impeachments. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court

judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments

in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts

void if violative of the Constitution.

Page28

Part 1 But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government. The overlapping and interlacing of functions and duties between the several departments, however, sometimes makes it hard to say just where the one leaves off and the other begins. In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.

The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does

not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive

G.R. No. L-45081 July 15, 1936

JOSE A. ANGARA vs. THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION, PEDRO YNSUA, MIGUEL CASTILLO and DIONISIO C. MAYOR

and legislative departments of the governments of the government

Rule: The cardinal postulate explains that the three branches must discharge their respective functions within the limits of authority conferred by the Constitution. Under the principle of separation of powers, neither Congress, the President, nor the Judiciary may encroach on fields allocated to the other branches of government. The legislature is generally limited to the enactment of laws, the executive to the enforcement of laws, and the judiciary to their interpretation and application to cases and controversies.

The role of the Courts is to ascertain whether a branch or instrumentality of the Government has transgressed its constitutional boundaries. But the Courts will not interfere with executive or legislative discretion exercised within those boundaries. Otherwise, it strays into the realm of policy decision-making.

In Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, the Court added;

x x x [A] court is without power to directly decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of Congress or of the President. It may, however, look into the question of whether such exercise has been made in grave abuse of discretion.

In Francisco, Jr. v. UEM-MARA Philippines Corporation, the Court elucidated the co-equal status of the three branches of government:

Considering the co-equal status of the three branches of government, courts may not tread into matters requiring the exercise of discretion of a functionary or office in the executive and legislative branches, unless it is clearly shown that the government official or office concerned abused his or its discretion. x x x

Furthermore,

"x x x courts, as a rule, refuse to interfere with proceedings undertaken by administrative bodies or officials in the exercise of administrative functions. This is so because such bodies are generally better equipped technically to decide administrative questions and that non-legal factors, such as government policy on the matter, are usually involved in the decisions."

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Part 1 Corollary to the principle of separation of powers is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction that the courts will DEFER to the decisions of the administrative offices and agencies by reason of their expertise and experience in the matters assigned to them. Administrative decisions on matters within the jurisdiction of administrative bodies are to be respected and can only be set aside on proof of grave abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law.

The only instance when the Courts ought to interfere is when a department or an agency has acted with grave abuse of discretion or violated a law. G.R. Nos. 177857-58 September 17, 2009 PHILIPPINE COCONUT PRODUCERS FEDERATION, INC. (COCOFED) vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

While each branch of government is governed by the Separation of Powers, the supremacy of the Constitution may allow the Courts to look into transgressions of the Fundamental Law in the carrying out of their official mandates.

Rule: There is no "reasonable and legitimate" ground to violate the Constitution. The Constitution should never be violated by anyone. Right or wrong, the President, Congress, the Court…. have no choice but to follow the Constitution. Any act, however noble its intentions, is void if it violates the Constitution. This rule is basic.

In Social Justice Society, the Court held that, "In the discharge of their defined functions, the three departments of government have no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed." In Sabio, the Court held that, "the Constitution is the highest law of the land. It is ‘the basic and paramount law to which x x x all persons, including the highest officials of the land, must defer. No act shall be valid, however noble its intentions, if it conflicts with the Constitution.’" In Bengzon v. Drilon, the Court held that, "the three branches of government must discharge their respective functions within the limits of authority conferred by the Constitution." In Mutuc v. Commission on Elections, the Court held that, "The three departments of government in the discharge of the functions with which it is [sic] entrusted have no choice but to yield obedience to [the Constitution’s] commands. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed."

Police power does not include the power to violate the Constitution. Police power is the plenary power vested in Congress to make laws not repugnant to the Constitution. This rule is basic.

In Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Viron Transportation Co., Inc., the Court held that, "Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, not repugnant to the Constitution." In Carlos Superdrug Corp. v. Department of Social Welfare and Development, the Court held that, police power "is ‘the power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances x x x not repugnant to the constitution.’" In Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Garin, the Court held that, "police power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty, is the power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances x x x not repugnant to the Constitution."

When the effect of a law is unconstitutional, it is void. In Sabio, the Court held that, "A statute may be declared unconstitutional because it is not within the legislative power to enact; or it creates or establishes methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles; or its purpose or effect violates the Constitution or its basic principles." The effect of Section 47 violates the Constitution, thus, it is void.

In Strategic Alliance Development Corporation v. Radstock Securities Limited, the Court held that, "This Court must perform its duty to defend and uphold the Constitution." In Bengzon, the Court held that, "The Constitution expressly confers on the judiciary the power to maintain inviolate what it decrees." In Mutuc, the Court held that:

“The concept of the Constitution as the fundamental law, setting forth the criterion for the validity of any public act whether proceeding from the highest official or the lowest functionary, is a postulate of our system of government. That is to manifest fealty to the rule of law, with priority accorded to that which occupies the topmost rung in the legal hierarchy. The three departments of government in the discharge of the functions with which it is [sic] entrusted have no choice but to yield obedience to its commands. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed. Congress in the enactment of statutes must ever be on guard lest the restrictions on its authority, whether substantive or formal,

Page30

Part 1 be transcended. The Presidency in the execution of the laws cannot ignore or disregard what it ordains. In its task of applying the law to the facts as found in deciding cases, the judiciary is called upon to maintain inviolate what is decreed by the fundamental law. Even its power of judicial review to pass upon the validity of the acts of the coordinate branches in the course of adjudication is a logical corollary of this basic principle that the Constitution is paramount. It overrides any governmental measure that fails to live up to its mandates. Thereby there is a recognition of its being the supreme law.”G.R. No. 166471 March 22, 2011 TAWANG MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE vs. LA TRINIDAD WATER DISTRICT

In the absence of any transgression of the Constitution by the other branches of government, Courts must respect the boundaries established by the Fundamental Law

Rule: The courts could intervene in the Secretary of Justice’s determination of probable cause only through a special civil action for certiorari. That happens when the Secretary of Justice acts in a limited sense like a quasi-judicial officer of the executive department exercising powers akin to those of a court of law. But the requirement for such intervention was still for the petitioner to demonstrate clearly that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Unless such a clear demonstration is made, the intervention is disallowed in deference to the doctrine of separation of powers. G.R.No. 191567 March 20, 2013 MARIE CALLO- CLARIDAD vs. PHILIP RONALD P. ESTEBAN and TEODORA ALYN ESTEBAN

Rule: Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the courts have no right to directly decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Executive Branch of the Government, or to substitute their own judgments for that of the Executive Branch, represented in this case by the Department of Justice. The settled policy is that the courts will not interfere with the executive determination of probable cause for the purpose of filing an information, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion. That abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law, such as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. x x x Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. (Metrobank) v. Tobias III G.R. No. 177780 January 25, 2012

3.Judicial Review and Presumption of Constitutionality

When confronted with a constitutional question, it is elementary that every court must approach it with grave care and considerable caution bearing in mind that every statute is presumed valid and every reasonable doubt should be resolved in favor of its constitutionality. The policy of our courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume that the acts of the political departments are valid in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain, this presumption is based on the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon each department a becoming respect for the acts of the other departments.The theory is that as the joint act of Congress and the President of the Philippines, a law has been carefully studied, crafted and determined to be in accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally enacted. 37

Note the following:

1. It is disputably presumed that official duty has been regularly performed

Section 3. Disputable presumptions. The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:

xxx(m)That official duty has been regularly performed; xxx Rule 131 (Rules of Court)

2. Interpretation of laws: The New Civil Code provides;

Art. 10. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.

37 G.R. No. 169364 September 18, 2009 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. EVANGELINE SITON y SACIL

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Page31

3. Passage of laws: A Bill before becoming a law passes the necessary readings as well as the assessment of the President. Hence, the presumption of Constitutionality.

4. As to government actions: Sovereignty belongs to the people, and the Constitution is the written instrument through which the people entrust to government a measure of its own sovereignty and no more., What is entrusted to government is limited power. Hence every act of government must conform to the terms of the empowerment (Bernas)

Case: Petitioner Zenon R. Perez seeks a review of his conviction by the Sandiganbayan for malversation of public funds under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.

Petitioner contends that the law relied upon in convicting him and the sentence imposed is cruel and therefore violates SECTION 19 OF ARTICLE III (BILL OF RIGHTS) OF THE CONSTITUTION, considering that there was already payment of the shortaged amount.

Rule: First. What is punished by the crime of malversation is the act of a public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same, or shall take and misappropriate or shall consent, or through abandonment or negligence shall permit any other person to take such public funds or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property.

Payment or reimbursement is not a defense for exoneration in malversation; it may only be considered as a mitigating circumstance. This is because damage is not an element of malversation.

Second. There is strong presumption of constitutionality accorded to statutes.

It is established doctrine that a statute should be construed whenever possible in harmony with,

rather than in violation of, the Constitution. The presumption is that the legislature intended to enact

a valid, sensible and just law and one which operates no further than may be necessary to effectuate

the specific purpose of the law. It is presumed that the legislature has acted within its constitutional powers. So, it is the generally accepted rule that every statute, or regularly accepted act, is, or will be, or should be, presumed to be valid and constitutional.

He who attacks the constitutionality of a law has the onus probandi to show why such law is repugnant to the Constitution. Failing to overcome its presumption of constitutionality, a claim that a law is cruel, unusual, or inhuman, like the stance of petitioner, must fail. G.R. No. 164763 February 12, 2008 ZENON R. PEREZ vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SANDIGANBAYAN

Rule: To justify the nullification of the law or its implementation, there must be a clear and unequivocal, not a doubtful, breach of the Constitution. In case of doubt in the sufficiency of proof

establishing unconstitutionality, the Court must sustain legislation because "to invalidate [a law] based on xx x baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature that passed

it but also of the executive which approved it."This presumption of constitutionality can be overcome

only by the clearest showing that there was indeed an infraction of the Constitution, and only when such a conclusion is reached by the required majority may the Court pronounce, in the discharge of

the duty it cannot escape, that the challenged act must be struck down. G.R. No. 204429

18, 2014SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC., vs.MUNICIPALITY OF MALVAR, BATANGAS

February

Should there be no transgression, the Court shall

“constitutional” as it enjoys that presumption, It shall only declare the same to be not unconstitutional

be

not declare a

law

to

Further reference: Annotation: Judicial Review, 583 SCRA 142

C. Conditions for the Exercise of Judicial Review

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

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Page32

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. - Article VIII, 1987 Constitution

of the Government . - Article VIII, 1987 Constitution 1. Judicial Power The Constitution states that

1. Judicial Power

The Constitution states that judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice not only "to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable" but also "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." It has thereby expanded the concept of judicial power, which up to then was confined to its traditional ambit of settling

actual

enforceable. 38

controversies

involving

rights

that

were

legally

demandable

and

By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is an actual case or controversy. 39 In other words, "there must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence." 40

Rule: Judicial power is "the right to determine actual controversies arising between adverse litigants Muskrat vs. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911).

Rule: Judicial power is the authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving rights that are enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice or the redress of wrongs for violations of such right. G.R. No. L-25716 July 28, 1966 FERNANDO LOPEZ vs. GERARDO ROXAS and PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

2. Grave Abuse of Discretion

Rule: “We have previously ruled that grave abuse of discretion may arise when a lower court or tribunal violates and contravenes the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence. By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law. The word "capricious," usually used in tandem with the term "arbitrary," conveys the notion of willful and unreasoning action. Thus, when seeking the corrective hand of certiorari, a clear showing of caprice and arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion is imperative.” G. R. No. 174350 August 13, 2008 BALANGAUAN vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

Rule:"Grave abuse of discretion is the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment on the part of the public officer concerned which is equivalentto an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic mannerby reason of passion or hostility."Singian, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 195011-19, September 30, 2013

3. Actual Case and Controversy

In People v Vera, 66 Phil 56 (1937), J. Laurel laid down the doctrine that judicial review can only be exercised in an actual case and controversy.

According to Fr. Bernas;

38 G.R. No. 209287 July 1, 2014, MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO vs. BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III

39 Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, G.R. Nos. 178552, 178554, 178581, 178890, 179157, and 179461, October 5, 2010, 632 SCRA 146, 175.

40 Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain (GRP), G.R. Nos. 183591, 183752, 183893, 183951, and 183962, October 14, 2008, 568 SCRA 402,

450.

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The Court cannot pass upon issues of constitutionality through advisory opinions

Courts cannot resolve feigned or hypothetical constitutional problems

Courts cannot resolve friendly suits collusively arranged between parties without real adverse interests

Moot cases, as they have no more “flesh and blood

The following must be avoided:

(i) political questions, (ii) advisory opinions,

(iii)

moot and academic issues, and

(iv)

no standing.

Rule: The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency oflegislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the

No. L-45081 July

15, 1936 JOSE A. ANGARA vs. THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION, PEDRO YNSUA, MIGUEL

A. ANGARA vs. THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION, PEDRO YNSUA, MIGUEL executive and legislative departments of the governments

executive and legislative departments of the governments of the government

G.R.

CASTILLO, and DIONISIO C. MAYOR

Rule: An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion. The rule is that courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging. The controversy must be justiciable- definite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. In other words, the pleadings must show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a denial thereof, on the other; that is, it must concern a real, tangible and not merely a theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.James M. Imbong v. Hon. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., G.R. No. 204819, 8 April 2014

An ACTUAL CASE AND CONTROVERSY requires the following;

(1) a PARTY with a PERSONAL AND SUBSTANTIAL INTEREST, (2) an APPROPRIATE CASE, (3) a CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION raised at the EARLIEST POSSIBLE TIME, and (4) a constitutional question that is the VERY LIS MOTA OF THE CASE, i.e. an unavoidable question.

To elaborate;

(1) A PARTY WITH A PERSONAL AND SUBSTANTIAL INTEREST

General Concept:

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Page34

A

party has a standing in a case if his interest is such that he stands to be benefited

if

the case is resolved in his favor, and he stand to be really injured if it is decided

against him. Standing is established by two nexuses: the party's status and the type of legislative act being questioned, or his status and the precise nature of the constitutional infringement. The test of standing is whether the party has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure such concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. 41

A lesser but not insignificant reason for screening the standing of persons who desire

to litigate constitutional issues is economic in character. Given the sparseness of our resources, the capacity of courts to render efficient judicial service to our people is severely limited. For courts to indiscriminately open their doors to all types of

suits and suitors is for them to unduly overburden their dockets, and ultimately render themselves ineffective dispensers of justice.

The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustained, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. 42 A person has standing to challenge the governmental act only if he has a personal and substantialinterest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. 43

Case: This petition for prohibition seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing Republic Act (RA) 93352 (Attrition Act of 2005) which intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board.

Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the constitutionality of RA 9335, tax reform legislation. They contend that, by establishing a system of rewards and incentives, the law "transform[s] the officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters" as they will do their best only in consideration of such rewards. Thus, the system of rewards and incentives invites corruption and undermines the constitutionally mandated duty of these officials and employees to serve the people with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.

Rule: The Court finds that petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality in favor of RA 9335.

An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial adjudication 44 .A closely related requirement is ripeness, that is, the question must be ripe for adjudication. And a constitutional question is ripe for adjudication when the governmental act being challenged has a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. 45 Thus, to be ripe for judicial adjudication, thepetitioner must show a personal stake in the outcome of the case or an injury to himself that can be redressed by a favorable decision of the Court. 46

In this case, aside from the general claim that the dispute has ripened into a judicial controversy by the mere enactment of the law even without any further overt act, petitioners fail either to assert any specific and concrete legal claim or to demonstrate any direct adverse effect of the law on them. They are unable to show a personal stake in the outcome of this case or an injury to themselves. ABAKADA vs. HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008

GENERAL THE ELEMENTS OF STANDING:

41 Baker v Carr 369 U.S. 186, 7 L. Ed. 2d 633 [1962]

42 G.R. No. L-45685 November 16, 1937 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION vs. JOSE O. VERA

43 Mendoza

44 Cruz, Isagani, Philippine Constitutional Law, 1995 edition, p. 23.

45 Bernas, Joaquin, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 edition, pp.

848-849.

46 Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, 400 Phil. 904 (2000). (Vitug, J., separate opinion)

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Rule:Indeed, a citizenwill be allowed to raise a constitutional question only when

1. He can show that he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the

allegedly illegal conduct of the government;

2. The injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and

3. The injury is likely to be redressed by the remedy brought about by the party. G.R. No. 132922

April 21, 1998 TELECOMMUNICATIONS BROADCAST ATTORNEYS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

Case: Petitioners, holders of permits, contend that the right of a citizen to own and operate a school is guaranteed by the Constitution, and any law requiring previous governmental approval or permit, as in the case of the questioned law (Act 2706) before such person could exercise said right, amounts to censorship of previous restraint, a practice abhorrent to our system of law and government.

Rule: None of the petitioners has cause to present this issue, because all of them have permits to

operate and are actually operating by virtue of their permits.

constitutionality of a law upon the complaint of one who fails to show that he is injured by its operation. The power of courts to declare a law unconstitutional arises only when the interests of

litigant require the use of that judicial authority for their protection against actual interference, a

No.

hypothetical

PHILIPPINE

ASSOCIATION OF COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES vs. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION

Courts will not pass upon the

31,

1955

threat

being

insufficient.G.R.

L-5279

October

Case: All thirty-five (35) art lovers, petitioners in this Special Civil Action for Prohibition and Mandamus with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order seek to enjoin the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) from proceeding with the auction sale scheduled on 11 January 1991 by Christie's of New York of the Old Masters Paintings and 18th and 19th century silverware seized from Malacañang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila and placed in the custody of the Central Bank, the same being part of Filipino heritage.

Rule: The Court will exercise its power of judicial review only if the case is brought before it by a party who has the legal standing to raise the constitutional or legal question. "Legal standing" means a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The term "interest" is material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. Moreover, the interest of the party plaintiff must be personal and not one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third and related party.

They themselves allege that the paintings were donated by private persons from different parts of the world to the Metropolitan Museum of Manila Foundation, which is a non-profit and non-stock corporations established to promote non-Philippine arts. The foundation's chairman was former First Lady Imelda R. Marcos, while its president was Bienvenido R. Tantoco. On this basis, the ownership of these paintings legally belongs to the foundation or corporation or the members thereof, although the public has been given the opportunity to view and appreciate these paintings when they were placed on exhibit.Having failed to show that they are the legal owners of the artworks or that the valued pieces have become publicly owned, petitioners do not possess any clear legal right whatsoever to question their alleged unauthorized disposition. G.R. No. 96541 August 24, 1993, JOYA vs. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG)

Standing of Taxpayers, Voters Legislators, and Citizens, GENERALLY

In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo 47 , the Court laid out the bare minimum norm before the so-called "non-traditional suitors" may be extended standing to sue, thus: If in cases involving constitutional issues;

1.) For TAXPAYERS, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional;

47 G.R. Nos. 171396, 171409, 171485, 171483, 171400, 171489 & 171424, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 161.

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2.) For VOTERS, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question;

3.) For CONCERNED CITIZENS, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental importance which must be settled early; and

4.) For LEGISLATORS, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes their prerogatives as legislators.

Case: In this case, petitioner seeks judicial intervention, in questioning the composition of the JBC, as a taxpayer, a concerned citizen and a nominee to the position of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. As a taxpayer, petitioner invokes his right to demand that the taxes he and the rest of the citizenry have been paying to the government are spent for lawful purposes. According to petitioner, "since the JBC derives financial support for its functions, operation and proceedings from taxes paid, petitioner possesses as taxpayer both right and legal standing to demand that the JBC’s proceedings are not tainted with illegality and that its composition and actions do not violate the Constitution."

Rule: Anent locus standi, the question to be answered is this: does the party possess a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that there is real, concrete and legal conflict of rights and duties from the issues presented before the Court? In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo (522 Phil. 705 in 2006), the Court summarized the rules on locus standi as culled from jurisprudence. There, it was held that taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to sue, provided that the following requirements are met: (1) cases involve constitutional issues; (2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional; (3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question; (4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental importance which must be settled early; and (5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators.

In public suits, the plaintiff, representing the general public, asserts a "public right" in assailing an allegedly illegal official action. The plaintiff may be a person who is affected no differently from any other person, and can be suing as a "stranger," or as a "citizen" or "taxpayer." Thus, taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through theenforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. Of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute.

Clearly, petitioner has the legal standing to bring the present action because he has a personal stake in the outcome of this controversy.

The Court disagrees with the respondents’ contention that petitioner lost his standing to sue because he is not an official nominee for the post of Chief Justice. While it is true that a "personal stake" on the case is imperative to have locus standi, this is not to say that only official nominees for the post of Chief Justice can come to the Court and question the JBC composition for being unconstitutional. The JBC likewise screens and nominates other members of the Judiciary. Albeit heavily publicized in this regard, the JBC’s duty is not at all limited to the nominations for the highest magistrate in the land. A vast number of aspirants to judicial posts all over the country may be affected by the Court’s ruling. More importantly, the legality of the very process of nominations to the positions in the Judiciary is the nucleus of the controversy. The Court considers this a constitutional issue that must be passed upon, lest a constitutional process be plagued by misgivings, doubts and worse, mistrust. Hence, a citizen has a right to bring this question to the Court, clothed with legal standing and at the same time, armed with issues of transcendental importance to society. The claim that the composition of the JBC is illegal and unconstitutional is an object of concern, not just for a nominee to a judicial post, but for all citizens who have the right to seek judicial intervention for rectification of legal blunders.

With respect to the question of transcendental importance, it is not difficult to perceive from the opposing arguments of the parties that the determinants established in jurisprudence are attendant in this case: (1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in the questions being raised. The allegations of constitutional violations in this case are not empty attacks on the wisdom of the other branches of the government. The allegations are

the wisdom of the other branches of the government . The allegations are Political Law 1

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Part 1 substantiated by facts and, therefore, deserve an evaluation from the Court. The Court need not elaborate on the legal and societal ramifications of the issues raised. It cannot be gainsaid that the JBC is a constitutional innovation crucial in the selection of the magistrates in our judicial system.G.R. No. 202242 July 17, 2012 FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR.

Case: Before us is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order, seeking to nullify and enjoin the implementation of Executive Order No. (EO) 7 issued by the Office of the President on September 8, 2010. Petitioner Jelbert B. Galicto asserts that EO 7 is unconstitutional for having been issued beyond the powers of the President and for being in breach of existing laws.

Based on the findings of the Senate Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises that "officials and governing boards of various [GOCCs] and [GFIs] x x x have been granting themselves unwarranted allowances, bonuses, incentives, stock options, and other benefits [as well as other] irregular and abusive practices," the Senate issued Senate Resolution No. 17 "urging the President to order the immediate suspension of the unusually large and apparently excessive allowances, bonuses, incentives and other perks of members of the governing boards of [GOCCs] and [GFIs]."

Heeding the call of Congress, Pres. Aquino, on September 8, 2010, issued EO 7, entitled "Directing the Rationalization of the Compensation and Position Classification System in the [GOCCs] and

[GFIs], and for Other Purposes." EO 7 provided for the guiding principles and framework to establish

a fixed compensation and position classification system for GOCCs and GFIs. A Task Force was

also created to review all remunerations of GOCC and GFI employees and officers, whileGOCCs and GFIs were ordered to submit to the Task Force information regarding their compensation. Finally, EO 7 ordered (1) a moratorium on the increases in the salaries and other forms of compensation, except salary adjustments under EO 8011 and EO 900, of all GOCC and GFI employees for an indefinite period to be set by the President, and (2) a suspension of all allowances,

bonuses and incentives of members of the Board of Directors/Trustees until December 31, 2010.

of the Board of Directors/Trustees until December 31, 2010. The petitioner claims that as a PhilHealth

The petitioner claims that as a PhilHealth employee, he is affected by the implementation of EO 7, which was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Rule: Petitioner lacks locus standi. To support his claim that he has locus standi to file the present petition, the petitioner contends that as an employee of PhilHealth, he "stands to be prejudiced by [EO] 7, which suspends or imposes a moratorium on the grants of salary increases or new or increased benefits to officers and employees of GOCC[s] and x x x curtail[s] the prerogative of those officers who are to fix and determine his compensation." The petitioner also claims that he has standing as a member of the bar in good standing who has an interest in ensuring that laws and orders of the Philippine government are legally and validly issued and implemented.

In the present case, we are not convinced that the petitioner has demonstrated that he has a personal

stake or material interest in the outcome of the case because his interest, if any, is speculative and

based on a mere expectancy. In this case, the curtailment of future increases in his salaries and other benefits cannot but be characterized as contingent events or expectancies. To be sure, he has

no vested rights to salary increases and, therefore, the absence of such right deprives the petitioner

of legal standing to assail EO 7.

If the asserted injury is more imagined than real, or is merely superficial and insubstantial, then the

courts may end up being importuned to decide a matter that does not really justify such an excursion into constitutional adjudication.

Neither can the lack of locus standi be cured by the petitioner’s claim that he is instituting the present petition as a member of the bar in good standing who has an interest in ensuring that laws and orders

of the Philippine government are legally and validly issued. This supposed interest has been branded

by the Court in Integrated Bar of the Phils. (IBP) v. Hon. Zamora, "as too general an interest which

is shared by other groups and [by] the whole citizenry." Thus, the Court ruled in IBP that the mere

invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true,

is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in that case G.R. No. 193978 February 28, 2012 JELBERT

B. GALICTO vs. H.E. PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III

- As Legislators:

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Part 1 Rule: In Kilosbayan, Inc. vs. Morato (246 SCRA 540 [1995]), we held that members of Congress may properly challenge the validity of an official act of any department of the government only upon showing that the assailed official act affects or impairs their rights and prerogatives as legislators. G.R. No. 138298 June 19, 2001 RAOUL B. DEL MAR vs. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION, ET. AL (OPINION of MELO, J.

Rule To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.

An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial injury, which can be questioned by a member of Congress. In such a case, any member of Congress can have a resort to the courts.

Indeed, legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any official action which, to their mind,infringes on their prerogatives as legislatorG.R. No. 192935 December 7, 2010 LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO, vs. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010

- As Taxpayers:

A taxpayer has a standing to sue if

1. He has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of moneys raised by taxation

2. He will sustain a direct injury in consequence of its enforcement.

Rule: Yet, there are many decisions nullifying, at the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of public funds, upon the theory that "the expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds," which may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer. G.R. No. 71977 February 27, 1987 DEMETRIA vs. ALBA

Case: For consideration of the Court is an original action for certiorari assailing the constitutionality and legality of the implementation of the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) as provided for in Republic Act (R.A.) 9206 or the General Appropriations Act for 2004 (GAA of 2004). Petitioner Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP), a group of lawyers who have banded together with a mission of dismantling all forms of political, economic or social monopoly in the country, also sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order to enjoin respondent Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) from making, and, thereafter, releasing budgetary allocations to individual members of Congress as "pork barrel" funds out of PDAF. LAMP likewise aimed to stop the National Treasurer and the Commission on Audit (COA) from enforcing the questioned provision.

The GAA of 2004 contains the following provision subject of this petition:

PRIORITY DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE FUND

For fund requirements of priority development programs and projects, as indicated hereunder P 8,327,000,000.00

x x x x

Special Provision

1. Use and Release of the Fund. The amount herein appropriated shall be used to fund priority programs and projects or to fund the required counterpart for foreign-assisted programs and projects: PROVIDED, That such amount shall be released directly to the implementing agency or Local Government Unit concerned: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That the allocations authorized herein may be realigned to any expense class, if deemed necessary:

PROVIDED FURTHERMORE, That a maximum of ten percent (10%) of the authorized allocations by district may be used for procurement of rice and other basic commodities which shall be purchased from the National Food Authority.

According to LAMP, the above provision is silent and, therefore, prohibits an automatic or direct allocation of lump sums to individual senators and congressmen for the funding of projects. It does not empower individual Members of Congress to propose, select and identify programs and projects to be funded out of PDAF.

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In this case, the petitioner contested the implementation of an alleged unconstitutional statute, as citizens and taxpayers. According to LAMP, the practice of direct allocation and release of funds to the Members of Congress and the authority given to them to propose and select projects is the core of the law’s flawed execution resulting in a serious constitutional transgression involving the expenditure of public funds. Undeniably, as taxpayers, LAMP would somehow be adversely affected by this. A finding of unconstitutionalitywould necessarily be tantamount to a misapplication of public funds which, in turn, cause injury or hardship to taxpayers. This affords "ripeness" to the present controversy.

Further, the allegations in the petition do not aim to obtain sheer legal opinion in the nature of advice concerning legislative or executive action. The possibility of constitutional violations in the implementation of PDAF surely involves the interplay of legal rights susceptible of judicial resolution. For LAMP, this is the right to recover public funds possibly misapplied by no less than the Members of Congress. Hence, without prejudice to other recourse against erring public officials, allegations of illegal expenditure of public funds reflect a concrete injury that may have been committed by other branches of government before the court intervenes. The possibility that this injury was indeed committed cannot be discounted. The petition complains of illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation and this is sufficient reason to say that there indeed exists a definite, concrete, real or substantial controversy before the Court.

Issues: Whether or not the mandatory requisites for the exercise of judicial review are met in this case;

Here, the sufficient interest preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation required in taxpayers’ suits is established. Thus, in the claim that PDAF funds have been illegally disbursed and wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law, LAMP should be allowed to sue.

Lastly, the Court is of the view that the petition poses issues impressed with paramount public interest. The ramification of issues involving the unconstitutional spending of PDAF deserves the consideration of the Court, warranting the assumption of jurisdiction over the petition.G.R. No. 164987 April 24, 2012 LAWYERS AGAINST MONOPOLY AND POVERTY (LAMP) vs. THE SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT

Case: This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order pursuant to Section 7, Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, seeking to annul and set aside Commission on Audit (COA) Circular No. 89-299, which lifted its system of pre-audit of government financial transactions.

The rationale for the circular was, first, to reaffirm the concept that fiscal responsibility resides in management as embodied in the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines; and, second, to contribute to accelerating the delivery of public services and improving government operations by curbing undue bureaucratic red tape and ensuring facilitation of government transactions, while continuing to preserve and protect the integrity of these transactions.

As a taxpayer, Petitioner filed this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. He alleges that the pre-audit duty on the part of the COA cannot be lifted by a mere circular, considering that pre-audit is a constitutional mandate enshrined in Section 2 of Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution. He further claims that, because of the lack of pre-audit by COA, serious irregularities in government transactions have been committed, such as the P728-million fertilizer fund scam, irregularities in the P550-million call center laboratory project of the Commission on Higher Education, and many others.

Rule: Standing - This Petition has been filed as a taxpayer’s suit. A taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is established that public funds from taxation have been disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or the Constitution. Petitioner claims that the issuance of Circular No. 89-299 has led to the dissipation of public funds through numerous irregularities in government financial transactions. These transactions have allegedly been left unchecked by the lifting of the pre-audit performed by COA, which, petitioner argues, is its Constitutional duty. Thus, petitioner has standing to file this suit as a taxpayer, since he would be adversely affected by the illegal use of public money. G.R. No. 180989 February 7, 2012 Gualberto J. Dela Llana vs. The Chairperson, Commission on Audit, The Executive Secretary and the National Treasurer

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Part 1 Case: Spurred in large part by the findings contained in the CoA Report and the Napoles controversy, several petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional.

1. On August 28, 2013, petitioner Alcantara, President of the Social Justice Society, filed a Petition

for Prohibition, seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional, and a writ of prohibition be issued permanently restraining respondents as the incumbent Senate President and

Speaker of the House of Representatives, from further taking any steps to enact legislation appropriating funds for the "Pork Barrel System," in whatever form and by whatever name it may be called, and from approving further releases pursuant thereto.

2. On September 3, 2013, petitioners Belgica et.al. filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and

Prohibition With Prayer For The Immediate Issuance of a TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in the provisions of the GAA of 2013 which provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, be declared unconstitutional and null and void for being acts constituting grave abuse of discretion. Also, they pray that the Court issue a

TRO against respondents who are the incumbent Executive Secretary, Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, and National Treasurer, or their agents, for them to immediately cease any expenditure under the aforesaid funds. Further, they pray that the Court order the foregoing respondents to release to the CoA and to the public: (a) "the complete schedule/list of legislators who have availed of their PDAF and VILP from the years 2003 to 2013, specifying the use of the funds, the project or activity and the recipient entities or individuals, and all pertinent data thereto"; and (b) "the use of the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, including the proceeds from the x

x

x Malampaya Funds and remittances from the PAGCOR x x x from 2003 to 2013, specifying the x

x

x project or activity and the recipient entities or individuals, and all pertinent data thereto."Also, they

pray for the "inclusion in budgetary deliberations with the Congress of all presently off-budget, lump-

sum, discretionary funds including, but not limited to, proceeds from the Malampaya Funds and remittances from the PAGCOR."109

3. On September 5, 2013, petitioner Nepomuceno filed a Petition dated, seeking that the PDAF be declared unconstitutional, and a cease and desist order be issued restraining President Aquino and Secretary Abad from releasing such funds to Members of Congress and, instead, allow their release to fund priority projects identified and approved by the Local Development Councils in consultation with the executive departments, such as the DPWH, the Department of Tourism, the Department of Health, the Department of Transportation, and Communication and the National Economic Development Authority.

The three cases were consolidated.

Issues: Whether or not petitioners have legal standing to sue;

Rule: Locus Standi. -Petitioners have come before the Court in their respective capacities as citizen- taxpayers and accordingly, assert that they "dutifully contribute to the coffers of the National Treasury."Clearly, as taxpayers, they possess the requisite standing to question the validity of the existing "Pork Barrel System" under which the taxes they pay have been and continue to be utilized.

It is undeniable that petitioners, as taxpayers, are bound to suffer from the unconstitutional usage of

public funds, if the Court so rules. Invariably, taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law,as in these cases.

Moreover, as citizens, petitioners have equally fulfilled the standing requirement given that the issues they have raised may be classified as matters "of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest."Indeed, of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute.G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013 GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA et.al. vs. HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA et. al, G.R. No. 208493 SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) PRESIDENT SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, vs. HONORABLE FRANKLIN M. DRILON et.al. G.R. No. 209251 PEDRITO M. NEPOMUCENO, vs. PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III* and SECRETARY FLORENCIO BUTCH ABAD, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT

- As Citizens

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1. When the issue of transcendental significance to the people, as when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public

2. The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing. Section 18, Article VII, 1987 Constitution

3. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such stations as may be provided by law. (Article III, Sec. 7 of the 1987 Constitution) Access to public documents and records is a public right, and the real parties in interest are the people themselves. G.R. No. 130716 December 9, 1998

GOOD

FRANCISCO

I.

CHAVEZ

vs.

PRESIDENTIAL

COMMISSION

ON

GOVERNMENT (PCGG)

Case: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to permanently enjoin the sale of the Angat Hydro-Electric Power Plant (AHEPP) to Korea Water Resources Corporation (K-Water) which won the public bidding conducted by the Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation (PSALM) a government-owned and controlled corporation created by virtue of Republic Act No. 9136 48 (EPIRA).

Sometime in August 2005, PSALM commenced the privatization of the 246-megawatt (MW) AHEPP located in San Lorenzo, Norzagaray, Bulacan. After a post-bid evaluation, PSALM’s Board of Directors approved and confirmed the issuance of a Notice of Award to the highest bidder, K-Water. As such, the present petition with prayer for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction was filed by The Petitioners

Petitioners contend that PSALM gravely abused its discretion when, in the conduct of the bidding it disregarded and violated the people’s right to information guaranteed under the Constitution, as the same was granted sans any transparency.

Petitioners reiterate their legal standing to file the present suit in their capacity as taxpayers, or as Filipino citizens asserting the promotion and protection of a public right, aside from being directly injured by the proceedings of PSALM.

Issues: Legal standing of petitioners;

Rule: We rule that petitioners possess the requisite legal standing in filing this suit as citizens and taxpayers.

"Legal standing" or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged, alleging more than a generalized grievance.

Moreover, we have held that if the petition is anchored on the people’s right to information on matters of public concern, any citizen can be the real party in interest. The requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of the general public which possesses the right. There is no need to show any special interest in the result. It is sufficient that petitioners are citizens and, as such, are interested in the faithful execution of the laws. G.R. No. 192088 October 9, 2012 INITIATIVES FOR DIALOGUE AND EMPOWERMENT THROUGH ALTERNATIVE LEGAL SERVICES, INC. (IDEALS, INC.) vs. POWER SECTOR ASSETS AND LIABILITIES MANAGEMENT CORPORATION (PSALM)

48 "Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 - Said law mandated PSALM to manage the orderly sale, disposition, and privatization of NPC generation assets, real estate and other disposable assets, and Independent Power Producer (IPP) contracts with the objective of liquidating all NPC financial obligations and stranded contract costs in an optimal manner

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- More cases, and instances on standing;

a. “Transcendental Importance” and “Paramount Public Interest”

Case: This is a special civil action for prohibition and injunction, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, which seeks to prohibit and restrain the implementation of the "Contract of Lease" of an on-line lottery system for the PCSO executed by the latter and the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC).

Petitioner Kilosbayan, Incorporated (KILOSBAYAN) avers that it is a non-stock domestic corporation composed of civic-spirited citizens, pastors, priests, nuns, and lay leaders who are committed to the cause of truth, justice, and national renewal. The rest of the petitioners, except Senators Freddie Webb and Wigberto Tañada and Representative Joker P. Arroyo, are suing in their capacities as members of the Board of Trustees ofKILOSBAYAN and as taxpayers and concerned citizens. Senators Webb and Tañada and Representative Arroyo are suing in their capacities as members of Congress and as taxpayers and concerned citizens of the Philippines.

Rule: We find the instant petition to be of transcendental importance to the public. The issues it raised are of paramount public interest and of a category even higher than those involved in many of the aforecited cases. The ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the social, economic, and moral well-being of the people even in the remotest barangays of the country and the counter- productive and retrogressive effects of the envisioned on-line lottery system are as staggering as the billions in pesos it is expected to raise. The legal standing then of the petitioners deserves recognition and, in the exercise of its sound discretion, this Court hereby brushes aside the procedural barrier which the respondents tried to take advantage of.G.R. No. 113375 May 5, 1994 KILOSBAYAN vs. GUINGONA

Rule: We rule that petitioners possess the requisite legal standing in filing this suit as citizens and taxpayers.

"Legal standing" or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged, alleging more than a generalized grievance. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges "such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." This Court, however, has adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people, as when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public. Thus, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest.

There can be no doubt that the matter of ensuring adequate water supply for domestic use is one of paramount importance to the public. That the continued availability of potable water in Metro Manila might be compromised if PSALM proceeds with the privatization of the hydroelectric power plant in the Angat Dam Complex confers upon petitioners such personal stake in the resolution of legal issues in a petition to stop its implementation. G.R. No. 192088 October 9, 2012 INITIATIVES FOR DIALOGUE AND EMPOWERMENT THROUGH ALTERNATIVE LEGAL SERVICES, INC. (IDEALS, INC.) vs. POWER SECTOR ASSETS AND LIABILITIES MANAGEMENT CORPORATION (PSALM)

Rule: The Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.

With these said, even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an "as- applied challenge, still, the Court has time and again acted liberally on the locus standi requirement. It has accorded certain individuals standing to sue, not otherwise directly injured or with material interest affected by a Government act, provided a constitutional issue of transcendental importance is invoked. The rule on locus standi is, after all, a procedural technicality which the Court has, on more than one occasion, waived or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may not have been directly injured by the operation of a law or any other government act. James M. Imbong v. Hon. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., G.R. No. 204819, 8 April 2014

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Case:Despite calls to withhold support thereto, however, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012. Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said

law, challengers from various sectors of society came knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning

it to wield the sword that strikes down constitutional disobedience.

Aware of the profound and lasting impact that its decision may produce, the Court now faces this controversy, as presented in fourteen petitions and two petitions- in-intervention, persons and entities in their personal capacities as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers and on behalf of their minor children; on behalf of the generations unborn as members of the Bar, and as one as an accredited political party.

A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of

RH Law on the following GROUNDS:

• The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn.

• The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products.

• The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom.

• The RH Law violates the constitutional principle of non-delegation of legislative authority. The petitioners question the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether a

product is non-abortifacient and to be included in the Emergency Drugs List (EDL).

The RH Law violates the one subject/one bill rule provision under Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution

• The RH Law violates Natural Law.

• The RH Law violates the principle of Autonomy of Local Government Units (LGUs) and the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao {ARMM). It is contended that the RH Law, providing for reproductive health measures at the local government level and the ARMM, infringes upon the powers devolved to LGUs and the ARMM under the Local Government Code and R.A . No. 9054.54

It is also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious objectors of criminal prosecution,

imprisonment and other forms of punishment, as it compels medical practitioners 1] to refer patients who seek advice on reproductive health programs to other doctors; and 2] to provide full and correct information on reproductive health programs and service, although it is against their religious beliefs

and convictions. It is also argued that the RH Law providing for the formulation of mandatory sex education in schools should not be allowed as it is an affront to their religious beliefs.

The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive arguments of the petitioners, pray for the dismissal of the petitions for the principal reasons that some petitioners lack standing to question the RH Law

The OSG attacks the legal personality of the petitioners to file their respective petitions. It contends that the "as applied challenge" lodged by the petitioners cannot prosper as the assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied against them, and the government has yet to distribute reproductive health devices that are abortive.

The petitioners, for their part, invariably invoke the "transcendental importance" doctrine and their status as citizens and taxpayers in establishing the requisite locus standi.

Rule: Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental act. It requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.

In relation to locus standi, the "as applied challenge" embodies the rule that one can challenge the

constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts a violation of his own rights. The rule prohibits one from challenging the constitutionality of the statute grounded on a violation of the rights of third persons not before the court. This rule is also known as the prohibition against third-party standing.

Transcendental Importance. Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is

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Part 1 of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest."

to society, or of paramount public interest ." With these said, even if the constitutionality of

With these said, even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an "as- applied challenge, still, the Court has time and again acted liberally on the locus standi requirement. It has accorded certain individuals standing to sue, not otherwise directly injured or with material interest affected by a Government act, provided a constitutional issue of transcendental importance is invoked. The rule on locus standi is, after all, a procedural technicality which the Court has, on more than one occasion, waived or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may not have been directly injured by the operation of a law or any other government act.

In view of the seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents, not only to the public, but also to the bench and bar, the issues raised must be resolved for the guidance of all. After all, the RH Law drastically affects the constitutional provisions on the right to life and health, the freedom of religionand expression and other constitutional rights. Mindful of all these and the fact that the issues of contraception and reproductive health have already caused deep division among a broad spectrum of society, the Court entertains no doubt that the petitions raise issues of transcendental importance warranting immediate court adjudication. More importantly, considering that it is the right to life of the mother and the unborn which is primarily at issue, the Court need not wait for a life to be taken away before taking action.

The Court cannot, and should not, exercise judicial restraint at this time when rights enshrined in the Constitution are being imperiled to be violated. To do so, when the life of either the mother or her child is at stake, would lead to irreparable consequences.James M. Imbong v. Hon. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., G.R. No. 204819, 8 April 2014

b. “Intergenerational Responsibility”

Rule: This case, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety. G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993 OPOSA VS. FACTORAN

Case: Before Us are two consolidated Petitions filed under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court, concerning Service Contract No. 46 (SC-46), which allowed the exploration, development, and exploitation of petroleum resources within Tañon Strait, a narrow passage of water situated between the islands of Negros and Cebu

Among others, Petitioners collectively referred to as the "Resident Marine Mammals" in the petition, are the toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean species, which inhabit the waters in and around the Tañon Strait. They are joined by Ramos and Eisma-Osorio as their legal guardians and as friends who allegedly empathize with, and seek the protection of, the aforementioned marine species.

Incidentally, recently, the Court passed the landmark Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, which allow for a "citizen suit," and permit any Filipino citizen to file an action before our courts for violations of our environmental laws:

before our courts for violations of our environmental laws: SEC. 5. Citizen suit. - Any Filipino

SEC. 5. Citizen suit. - Any Filipino citizen in representation of others, including minors or generations yet unborn, may file an action to enforce rights or obligations under environmental laws. Upon the filing of a citizen suit, the court shall issue an order which shall contain a brief description of the cause of action and the reliefs prayed for, requiring all interested parties to manifest their interest to intervene in the case within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof. The plaintiff may publish the order once in a newspaper of a general circulation in the Philippines or furnish all affected barangays copies of said order.( A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, effective April 29,

2010 RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL CASES

)

Rule: Even before the Rules of Procedure for Environmental · Cases became effective, this Court had already taken a permissive position on the issue of locus standi in environmental cases. In Oposa, we allowed the suit to be brought in the name of generations yet unborn "based on the

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Part 1 concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned." Furthermore, we said that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology, a right that does not even need to be stated in our Constitution as it is assumed to exist from the inception of humankind, carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.

In light of the foregoing, the need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal standing has been eliminated by our Rules, which allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a suit to enforce our environmental laws. It is worth noting here that the Stewards are joined as real parties in the Petition and not just in representation of the named cetacean species. The Stewards, Ramos and Eisma-Osorio, having shown in their petition that there may be possible violations of laws concerning the habitat of the Resident Marine Mammals, are therefore declared to possess the legal standing to file this petition.RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF THE PROTECTED SEASCAPE TAÑON STRAIT V. ANGELO REYES, ET AL. G.R. NO. 180771 & 181527, 21 APRIL 2015

Concurrent opinion:The expansion of what constitutes "real party in interest" to include minors and generations yet unborn is a recognition of this court's ruling in Oposa v. Factoran. This court recognized the capacity of minors (represented by their parents) to file a class suit on behalf of succeeding generations based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility to ensure the future generation's access to and enjoyment of [the] country's natural resources.

To allow citizen's suits to enforce environmental rights of others, including future generations, is dangerous for three reasons:

First, they run the risk of foreclosing arguments of others who are unable to take part in the suit, putting into. question its representativeness. Second, varying interests may potentially result in arguments that are bordering on political issues, the resolutions of which do not fall upon this court. Third, automatically allowing a class or citizen's suit on behalf of minors and generations yet unborn may result in the oversimplification of what may be a complex issue, especially in light of the impossibility of determining future generation's true interests on the matter.

The danger in invoking Oposa v. Factoran to justify all kinds of environmental claims lies in its potential to diminish the value of legitimate environmental rights. Extending the application of "real party in interest" to the Resident Marine Mammals, or animals in general, through a judicial pronouncement will potentially result in allowing petitions based on mere concern rather than an actual enforcement of a right. It is impossible for animals to tell humans what their concerns are. At best, humans can only surmise the extent of injury inflicted, if there be any. Petitions invoking a right and seeking legal redress before this court cannot be a product of guesswork, and representatives have the responsibility to ensure that they bring "reasonably cogent, rational, scientific, well-founded

arguments"

THE

PROTECTED SEASCAPE TAÑON STRAIT V. ANGELO REYES, ET AL. G.R. NO. 180771 & 181527, 21 APRIL 2015

on

behalf

of

those

they

represent.RESIDENT

MARINE

MAMMALS

OF

(2) AN APPROPRIATE CASE

Political Question. An issue is a political question when it does not deal with the interpretation of a law and its application to a case, but with the very wisdom of the law itself. When a judge attempts to resolve a political question, he is not exercising a judicial function, but is rather supplanting his conscience to that of the political branch of the government.

Baker v. Carr, 369 US 186 (1962) has attempted to formulate some guidelines for determining whether a question is political or not.

Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found;

- a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a political department;

- or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it;

- or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion;

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- or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government;

- or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made, or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.

Case: Spurred in large part by the findings contained in the CoA Report and the Napoles controversy, several petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional.

Issues: Whether or not (the issues raised in the consolidated petitions are matters of policy not subject to judicial review

Rule: Matters of Policy: the Political Question Doctrine. The "limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies‖ carries the assurance that "the courts will not intrude into areas

committed to the other branches of government."

restatement of the political question doctrine which, under the classic formulation of Baker v. Carr applies when there is found, among others, "a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department," "a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it" or "the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non- judicial discretion." Cast against this light, respondents submit that the "the political branches are in the best position not only to perform budget-related reforms but also to do them in response to the specific demands of their constituents" and, as such, "urge the Court not to impose a solution at this stage."

Essentially, the foregoing limitation is a

Suffice it to state that the issues raised before the Court do not present political but legal questions which are within its province to resolve. A political question refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure." The intrinsic constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System" is not an issue dependent upon the wisdom of the political branches of government but rather a legal one which the Constitution itself

has commanded the Court to act upon.G.R. No. 208566

ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA et.al. vs. HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA et. al,

November 19, 2013 GRECO

Advisory Opinion. A case becomes an advisory opinion when there is no actual case and controversy that demands constitutional construction for its resolution. It is not wise for the court to engage in an advisory opinion because:

a) This only leads to dialectics or contentions, to abstract legal arguments and

sterile conclusions (Laurel quoting Frankfurter)

b) The judicial function is impoverished since it thrives on facts that draw out the

meaning of the law.

Advisory Opinion vs. Declaratory Relief

Declaratory Relief.Section 1, Rule 63 (Rules of Court) Declaratory Relief

By whom? Any person who; 1. Has interests in a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or 2. Has rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may

When? Before breach or violation thereof bring an action in the appropriate RTC

Reason: To determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.

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Now, an action for declaratory relief is only proper when the following requisites are present:

1. There must be a justiciable controversy;

2. The controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse;

3. The person seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy;

Rule: the appellant not being one of the contracting parties to the deed of sale executed by the appellees spouses but took part only as notary public before whom they acknowledged the execution thereof is not entitled to file an action for declaratory judgment. G.R. No. L- 16474 January 31, 1962 TOMAS B. TADEO vs. THE PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF PANGASINAN

4. The issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination.

Read: G.R. No. 178552 October 5, 2010, SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT NETWORK, INC. vs.