OPENING STATEMENT

Good afternoon, Your Honor and may it please the court, The case is
a petition to review the decisions by the Regional Trial Court and the
Court of Appeals to deny the motions filed by the petitioner, Leslie
Mendoza, which seek to quash the warrant of arrest and the motion
to quash the information filed against her for the crime of cyber libel.
*short description of the facts*. The People hereby pray that this
Honorable Court, in continuing its upstanding tradition of delivering
justice to the People, deny the same motions in the final instance for
the following reasons:
Firstly, the defects which the petitioner allege against the
implementation of the warrant of arrest are neither existent nor a
ground to quash the same;
Next, the information was filed in a court with jurisdiction, despite it not
being a cybercrime court;
Third, the information was filed well within the prescribed 15-year
period for crimes punished with afflictive penalties, such as cyber libel;
Also, the petitioner’s defense of double jeopardy is made
inapplicable by the occurrence of a supervening event;
Lastly, the doctrine of res judicata cannot be applied in this case, not
only because the same is a doctrine of civil law but also because the
requisites of such are not attendant in the case.
 Unto the matter of the alleged defects in the implementation of the
warrant of arrest. Contrary to petitioners’ allegations, the warrant’s
implementation bears no defects. It was made within and according
to the date, time and methods prescribed by the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure (or RRCP). According to Rule 113, Sec. 4 of the
RRCP, a warrant of arrest must be executed within 10 days from its
receipt. The RRCP further provides that the arrest may be made on
any day at any time of the day or night. Neither did petitioner allege
any specific violations of the prescribed methods set by the RRCP.
Furthermore, defects in the implementation of a warrant are not a
ground to quash the same. The list provided in Sec. 3 of Rule 117 of
the RRCP must be presumed exclusive based on the principle of
statutory construction – expressio unius est exclusio alterius . Said list
provides the following grounds:
(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the
offense charged;
(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the
person of the accused;
(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to
do so;
(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single
punishment for various offenses is prescribed by law;
(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a
legal excuse or justification; and
(i) That the accused had been previously convicted or
acquitted of the offense charged or the case against him was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
The petitioner likewise assails the propriety of the venue where the
case for cyber libel was filed. The IRR of the Cybercrime Prevention
Act (CPA) vests the RTC with jurisdiction “over any violation of the
provisions of [the] Act.” Although the same provides for the creation
of special cybercrime courts the venue for the filing of a criminal
action of cyber libel is not qualified. This means that the action may
be filed in a branch of the Regional Trial Court, regardless of whether
they are designated as special cybercrime courts. In fact, this
Honorable Court’s decision in the case of Tolentino v. People ruled to
such effect. Furthermore, sec. 22 of Rule 4 of the IRR states that the
“criminal action for violation of the Act may be filed with the RTC of
the province or city… where any of the damage caused to a natural
or juridical person took place”. Given the nature of the crime of cyber
libel and the accessibility of the article to anyone with Internet access,
the scope of the damage caused against the private respondent
may very well cover the entire country. *It may well be argued that
the Rule on Cybercrime Warrants qualified the venue where criminal
actions for violations of the CPA may be filed by stating that the same
should be filed in a designated cybercrime court, it should be noted
that the Rule was promulgated only on August 15, 2018 – 10 months
after the filing of the information on November 2, 2017. The private
respondent cannot be reasonably expected to have foretold the
promulgation of such a rule. Neither should his reliance on the
contemporary rule at the time of his filing be taken against him in the
present case. The rule cannot be applied. The propriety of the venue
where the action was filed stands.*
Petitioner further claims that the case for cyber libel against her has
prescribed. While the RPC does state that a criminal action for libel
prescribes in one year, the CPA does not specify the same for cyber
libel. Instead, it increases the penalty of cyber libel by one degree,
effectively changing the nature of the penalty from correctional to
afflictive. Further, it was held that the CPA does not give a specific
prescription period, thus it should be read in correlation to Article 90
of the RPC. Since the prescription of actions are based on the nature
of penalties, it thus follows that the action for cyberlibel prescribes in
15 years. In her concurring and dissenting opinion in Disini v. SoJ,
former Chief Justice Sereno recognized that online libel prescribes in
15 years – as such was the intent of legislators, supported by the
transcripts from the Bicameral Conference Committee deliberations.
Therefore, since the criminal complaint was filed only 3 years after the
publication of the article online such action was filed well within the
prescribed 15 year period.
Petitioner’s defense of double jeopardy is likewise unavailing since
there is no identity between the first and second offenses. For double
jeopardy to attach, it is required that the first and second offenses be
identical. Such identity cannot be existent in the case because there
is a substantial distinction between crimes committed through the use
of technology over other means, as previously held by this Honorable
Court in the case of Disini v. SoJ. Additionally, the occurrence of a
supervening event has further prevented the identity of the two
offenses. The supervening events rule provides that “the rule of identity
does not apply when the second offense was not in existence at the
time of the first prosecution, for the simple reason that in such case,
there is no possibility for the accused, during the first prosecution to be
convicted for an offense that was then inexistent. Mendoza cannot
be considered in second jeopardy since the crime of cyber libel was
then inexistent during the prosecution of libel regarding the 2011
article. Furthermore, the publishing of the 2014 article was done after
Torres was acquitted by this Honorable Court in 2013. Mendoza,
having known that the SUVs did not belong to Torres, persisted in
publishing the 2014 article. There is arguably now actual malice
since Mendoza knowingly and untruthfully published that Torres
owns the SUVs which were found at the crime scene. As previously
pointed out, the 2011 and 2014 articles are not identical. Mendoza,
having made other changes to the article, could have as easily
pointed out that Torres was proven to not have had involvement
in the child trafficking which occurred.
The doctrine of res judicata not being applicable in criminal cases
was first laid down in Tecson v. Sandiganbayan. However, assuming
arguendo that res judicata may be made to apply to criminal cases,
the requisites for the same have not been met. The present criminal
case arose from the 2014 Article of the Juicy Scoop, as established this
is a completely separate and different act from the publication of the
2011 newspaper article which was the basis of the libel case previously
resolved. The subject matter in the case before us is the liability of
Mendoza arising from the publication online of the 2014 article.
Clearly, then, there is no bar by prior judgement since there is a
different cause of action. Neither is there a conclusiveness of
judgement, since the subject matter between the first act and the
second acts are different.