ADMIN LAW | B2015
CASES
Vda. de Corpuz v. Commanding General of the Philippine Army
1978
Guerrero
alycat
SUMMARY: For the service-connected death of a military man, his widow and
children were awarded P6,200, as per the Workmen’s Compensation Act. This
award became final and executory. However, the Office of the Commanding
General prepared a voucher in the amount of only P2,950, deducting P3,250, on
the ground that payment of the full award would constitute double compensation,
as Vda. de Corpuz had already been awarded benefits under RA 610 and the
Revised Administrative Code. Notwithstanding vehement protests of Vda. de
Corpuz, and even a directive in her favor by the Office of the President, the
Commanding General still refused to release the balance of the award. Hence,
Vda. de Corpuz filed the instant petition for mandamus. The Supreme Court rules
in her favor, as the award had already become final and executory.
DOCTRINE: Mandamus is the proper remedy against a public officer/ employee,
where there is unlawful neglect to perform an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from such public office, and when there is no other
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy.
FACTS:
 For the service-connected death of Sgt. Cornelio Corpuz, the widow
(petitioner) and her children were awarded P6,000 as compensation,
plus P200 for burial expenses. This award became and final and
executory. (Not mentioned, but this award was as per the Workmen’s
Compensation Act.)
 However, the Office of the Commanding General(respondent), instead of
implementing the award, prepared a General Voucher in the amount of
only P2,950, deducting P3,250 (representing the gratuity already paid to
petitioner under RA 610/ Armed Forces Death Gratuity and Disability
Pension Act, and the burial expenses already paid under Sec. 699 of the
Revised Administrative Code) on the ground that payment of the full
award would constitute double compensation, i.e. payment under the
WCA, and under RA 610 and the Revised Administrative Code are
mutually exclusive.
 The Commanding General refused to make full payment notwithstanding
the vehement protests of Vda. de Corpuz. Hence, Vda. de Corpuz went
to the Office of the President, which rendered a decision that the
deduction was without legal justification, and authorizing the payment of
the entire amount.
 Despite this, the Commanding General insisted that the deduction from
the award was in order. It explained that the Philippine Army has a cause
of action against claimants for reimbursement of the sum of P3,250 to
avoid double compensation.
 On account of this, the Assistant Executive Secretary reiterated that the
deduction cannot be legally sustained. While agreeing that the Philippine
Army has a cause of action for reimbursement against the claimants, he
said that recovery thereof should be pursued through the proper legal
remedy, not by deducting the same from the Workmen’s Compensation
Award. He further emphasized that the Office of the Commanding
General and all other offices under the Executive Department are
powerless to review or alter decisions of the Workmen’s Compensation
Commission, much more after the same has become final and
executory.
 Still, the Commanding General failed to release the balance of the
award, and so Vda. de Corpuz filed the instant petition for mandamus.
ISSUE + RATIO: Should the Commanding General release the balance of the
award? – YES. The award has become final and executory.
The Commanding Genera’s insistence on deducting the award to Vda. de Corpuz,
is an unlawful act of excluding the latter from the use and enjoyment of a right to
which she is entitled under the law. A final and executory award entitles her to its
enforcement. It is not susceptible of any change or alteration by the officer
charged with its implementation, as the latter's duty on the matter constitutes only
a ministerial act. The adamant refusal of the Commanding General to enforce the
award completely is also an unlawful neglect to perform an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from his office. Consequently,
mandamus is a proper remedy.
Clearly, there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law than the issuance of this writ, especially in this case, where
petitioner had sought the help of the office of the Chief Executive, which
consistently ruled in her favor, but failed to convince respondent to effect the full
payment of the award.
For the Commanding General, this petition for mandamus is a mode for the
issuance of "an extraordinary judicial writ to coerce a double payment of
benefits." He also says that “mandamus is not only improper, but it also should
not be used to amend the law, reverse existing court decisions, and create an
unfair advantage for one beneficiary not enjoyed by countless others..."
In support of his stand, the Commanding General cites Republic v. Workmen's
Compensation Commission and Doyon, where the Court ruled: “It will thus be
seen that RA 610 bars payment under other laws; so does the Workmen's
Compensation Act. Hence, if one is paid under Republic Act No. 610, he may not
again be paid under the Workmen's Compensation Act…”
The Court finds this line of reasoning completely devoid of merit, as it
conveniently evades the material fact brought to light by Vda. de Corpuz that the
award has become final and executory. The finality of the award, not having been
denied or disputed, the case is closed against Commanding General.
 ADMIN LAW | B2015
CASES

By reason also of the finality of the award, the doctrine enunciated in Doyon is not
applicable.

While the payment, therefore, of gratuity under RA 610 and the burial expense
benefits under Sec. 699 of the Revised Administrative Code were properly and
timely raised in the Doyon case, such facts were not brought to the attention of
the hearing officer in the instant case, thereby resulting in the rendition of an
award which became final and executory. Moreover, barely two months after the
promulgation of the decision in Doyon, the validity of the doctrine therein laid was
put in issue in the case of Republic v. Workmen's Compensation Commission and
Vda. de Sanchez, where the Court ruled that “…While the origin of the employer's
obligation emanated from only one reason, namely, the employee's injury, illness,
or death, RA 610 is given as a gratuity in appreciation of said employee's past
services, while Act No. 3428 is a social legislation which has for its purpose the
amelioration of service connected injuries or illnesses of the victims and their
dependents, in case of death…” (meaning the grant of the benefits under the two
laws is not mutually exclusive; they serve different purposes)

Vda. de Corpuz herein now prays for a re-examination of the Sanchez doctrine,
claiming that there is no express provision in the law relative to the exclusiveness
of RA 610 vis-a-vis the WCA. She further asserts that while it is true that the RA
makes no express mention about its concept and purpose as a gratuity benefit,
the legislative intent prompting the passage of RA 610 was to give higher benefits
to military men. However, inasmuch as this is a suit for mandamus, the Court
finds that this is not the proper time for the re-examination of the present doctrine.
The right of Vda. de Corpuz to the enforcement of the whole award under the
WCA is clear, well-defined, and certain as the said award has become final and
executory; and it is elementary that once a judgment has become final and
executory, the prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to a writ of
execution. Any opinion expressed by this Court upon the validity of the doctrine
wished to be re-examined would, therefore, be not necessary to the Decision of
this case and would merely constitute an obiter dictum.

RULING: Mandamus granted. The Commanding General is to release the

balance of the award.

Teehankee, CONCURRING: The opinion has nothing to do with our topic.

The persistent refusal of the Commanding General to pay and release to Vda. de
Corpuz the total sum, despite two decisions and directives of the Office of the
President, appears to be a clear case where Vda. de Corpuz may seek proper
redress against said officials, civilly for damages, as well as administratively. Art.
27 of the Civil Code (Dereliction of Duty) expressly grants Vda. de Corpuz such
cause of action.