[G.R. No. L-41171. July 23, 1987.

INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE VITO BORROMEO,

PATROCINIO BORROMEO-
HERRERA, petitioner, vs. FORTUNATO BORROMEO and HON.
FRANCISCO P. BURGOS, Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu, Branch II, respondents.

FACTS
One Vito Borromeo, died without forced heirs but leaving extensive properties.|
Junquera filed a petition for the probate of a one page document as the last will and
testament left by the said deceased, devising all his properties to Tomas, Fortunato and
Amelia, all surnamed Borromeo, in equal and undivided shares, and designating
Junquera as executor thereof. The probate court held that the document presented as
the will of the deceased was a forgery, the testate proceedings was converted into an
intestate proceedings. Several parties came before the court filing claims or petitions
alleging themselves as heirs of the intestate estate of Vito Borromeo.||Respondent
Fortunato Borromeo, filed a motion before the trial court praying that he be declared as
one of the heirs of the deceased. He asserted and incorporated a Waiver of Hereditary
Rights supposedly signed by five of the nine heirs to whom relinquished to Fortunato
their shares in the disputed estate. The motion was opposed on the ground that
respondent Fortunato Borromeo is estopped from asserting the waiver agreement; that
the waiver agreement is void as it was executed before the declaration of heirs; that the
same is void having been executed before the distribution of the estate and before the
acceptance of the inheritance; and that it is void ab initio and inexistent for lack of
subject matter.|
ISSUE
WON the Waiver of Hereditary Rights executed valid.
HELD
NO. For a waiver to exist, three elements are essential: (1) the existence of a right; (2)
the knowledge of the existence thereof; and (3) an intention to relinquish such right. The
intention to waive a right or advantage must be shown clearly and convincingly, and
when the only proof of intention rests in what a party does, his act should be so
manifestly consistent with, and indicative of an intent to, voluntarily relinquish the
particular right or advantage that no other reasonable explanation of his conduct is
possible. The circumstances of this case that the signatories to the waiver document did
not have the clear and convincing intention to relinquish their right.

1
 [G.R. No. L-18176. October 26, 1966.]

LAZARO B. RAYRAY, plaintiff-appellant, vs. CHAE KYUNG

LEE, defendant-appellee.

FACTS
Plaintiff seeks the annulment of his marriage to defendant. He testified that they
were married in Pusan, Korea, on March 15, 1953. Inasmuch as, the latter's
whereabouts is unknown, and she was formerly a resident of Pusan, Korea,
summons was served by publication. Decision was rendered dismissing plaintiff's
complaint, upon the ground: (1) that the court could not nullify a marriage
contracted abroad; and (2) that the facts proven do not warrant the relief prayed
for. A reconsideration of this decision having been denied, plaintiff appealed to
the Court of Appeals, which certified the case to the Supreme Court, the
jurisdiction of the lower court being in issue in the appeal. In relation thereto, the
|||

court a quo found that it had no jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of plaintiff's
marriage to the defendant, it having been solemnized in Seoul, Korea.
ISSUE
WON the Philippine court has jurisdiction upon the petition.
HELD
YES. In order that a given case could be validly decided by a court of justice, it
must have jurisdiction over: (1) the subject matter of the litigation; (2) the person
of the parties therein; and (3) in actions in rem or quasi-in-rem, the res. This is
|||

an action in rem, for it concerns the status of the parties herein, and status
affects or binds the whole world. The res in the present case is the relation
between said parties, or their marriage tie. Jurisdiction over the same depends
upon the nationality or domicile of the parties, not the place of celebration of
marriage, or the locus celebrationis. Plaintiff herein is a citizen of the Philippines,
domiciled therein. His status is, therefore, subject to our jurisdiction, on both
counts. True that defendant was and — under plaintiff's theory — still is a non-
resident alien. But, this fact does not deprive the lower court of its jurisdiction to
pass upon the validity of her marriage to plaintiff herein.

2
 [G.R. No. 178551. October 11, 2010.]

ATCI OVERSEAS CORPORATION, AMALIA G. IKDAL and

MINISTRY OF PUBLIC HEALTH-KUWAIT, petitioners, vs. MA.
JOSEFA ECHIN, respondent.

FACTS

Respondent was hired by petitioner ATCI Overseas Corporation in behalf

of its principal-co-petitioner, the Ministry of Public Health of Kuwait.
Respondent was deployed on February 17, 2000 but was terminated from
employment on February 11, 2001, she not having allegedly passed the
probationary period as required. Respondent filed with the National Labor
Relations Commission a complaint for illegal dismissal. Petitioners
contentions maintain that they should not be held liable because
respondent's employment contract specifically stipulates that her
employment shall be governed by the Civil Service Law and Regulations of
Kuwait. They thus conclude that it was patent error for the labor tribunals
and the appellate court to apply the Labor Code provisions governing
probationary employment in deciding the present case. |||

ISSUE

WON Philippine Labor Code provisions will apply to the present case.

HELD

YES. Petitioners contentions that Philippine Labor laws on probationary

employment are not applicable, was not substantiated. The application of
foreign law has the burden of proving the law, under the doctrine of
processual presumption which, in this case, petitioners failed to discharge.
The Philippines does not take judicial notice of the foreign laws, hence
they must not only be alleged; they must be proven. To prove a foreign
law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with the
Rules of Court.