A.

Executive Power

Marcos v Manglapus

ISSUE: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. - YES

RULING:

The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel,
but it is our well-considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of international law and, under our Constitution, is part
of the law of the land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution.] However, it is distinct and separate from the right to travel and enjoys a different protection under the
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e., against being "arbitrarily deprived" thereof [Art. 12 (4).]

Faced with the problem of whether or not the time is right to allow the Marcoses to return to the Philippines, the President is, under the Constitution, constrained to
consider these basic principles in arriving at a decision. More than that, having sworn to defend and uphold the Constitution, the President has the obligation under the
Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and advance the national interest. It must be borne in mind that the Constitution, aside from being an allocation
of power is also a social contract whereby the people have surrendered their sovereign powers to the State for the common good. Hence, lest the officers of the
Government exercising the powers delegated by the people forget and the servants of the people become rulers, the Constitution reminds everyone that "[s]overeignty
resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them." [Art. II, Sec. 1.]

The Court cannot close its eyes to present realities and pretend that the country is not besieged from within by a well-organized communist insurgency, a separatist
movement in Mindanao, rightist conspiracies to grab power, urban terrorism, the murder with impunity of military men, police officers and civilian officials, to mention
only a few. The documented history of the efforts of the Marcose's and their followers to destabilize the country, as earlier narrated in this ponencia bolsters the
conclusion that the return of the Marcoses at this time would only exacerbate and intensify the violence directed against the State and instigate more chaos.

The President has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years and lead
to total economic collapse. Given what is within our individual and common knowledge of the state of the economy, we cannot argue with that determination.

WHEREFORE, and it being our well-considered opinion that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of
former President Marcos and his family at the present time and under present circumstances poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and in prohibiting
their return to the Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

Webb vs De Leon

Issue: Whether or not the DOJ Panel unlawfully intruded into judicial prerogative when it failed to charge Jessica Alfaro in the information as an accused.

Petitioner’s argument lacks appeal for it lies on the faulty assumption that the decision whom to prosecute is a judicial function, the sole prerogative of the courts and
beyond executive and legislative interference. In truth, the prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive department of government whose principal power and
responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of this power is the right to prosecute their violators (See R.A. No. 6981 and
section 9 of Rule 119 for legal basis).

With regard to the inconsistencies of the sworn statements of Jessica Alfaro, the Court believes that these have been sufficiently explained and there is no showing
that the inconsistencies were deliberately made to distort the truth.

With regard to the petitioners’ complaint about the prejudicial publicity that attended their preliminary investigation, the Court finds nothing in the records that will prove
that the tone and content of the publicity that attended the investigation of petitioners fatally infected the fairness and impartiality of the DOJ Panel. Petitioners cannot
just rely on the subliminal effects of publicity on the sense of fairness of the DOJ Panel, for these are basically unbeknown and beyond knowing.

Petitioner's argument lacks appeal for it lies on the faulty assumption that the decision whom to prosecute is a judicial function, the sole prerogative of courts and
beyond executive and legislative interference. In truth, the prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive department whose principal power and responsibility is to
see that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of this right is to prosecute their violators.

Philconsa v Enriquez (VETO)

ISSUE: Whether or not the conditions imposed by the President in the items of the GAA of 1994: (a) for the Supreme Court, (b) Commission on Audit (COA), (c)
Ombudsman, (d) Commission on Human Rights, (CHR), (e) Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGU’S) and (f) State Universities and Colleges (SUC’s) are
constitutional; whether or not the veto of the special provision in the appropriation for debt service and the automatic appropriation of funds therefore is constitutional

DOCTRINE: The veto power, while exercisable by the President, is actually a part of the legislative process. There is, therefore, sound basis to indulge in the
presumption of validity of a veto. The burden shifts on those questioning the validity thereof to show that its use is a violation of the Constitution.

The vetoed provision on the debt servicing is clearly an attempt to repeal Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 (Foreign Borrowing Act) and E.O. No. 292, and to reverse the
debt payment policy. As held by the court in Gonzales, the repeal of these laws should be done in a separate law, not in the appropriations law.

On the conditions imposed by the President on certain provisions relating to appropriations to the Supreme Court, constitutional commissions, the NHA and the DPWH,
there is less basis to complain when the President said that the expenditures shall be subject to guidelines he will issue. Until the guidelines are issued, it cannot be
determined whether they are proper or inappropriate. Under the Faithful Execution Clause, the President has the power to take “necessary and proper steps” to carry
into execution the law. These steps are the ones to be embodied in the guidelines.

Laurel vs Garcia

Issues: Whether or not the Chief Executive, her officers and agents, have the authority and jurisdiction, to sell the Roppongi property.

Ruling: It is not for the President to convey valuable real property of the government on his or her own sole will. Any such conveyance must be authorized and
approved by a law enacted by the Congress. It requires executive and legislative concurrence. It is indeed true that the Roppongi property is valuable not so much
because of the inflated prices fetched by real property in Tokyo but more so because of its symbolic value to all Filipinos, veterans and civilians alike. Whether or not
the Roppongi and related properties will eventually be sold is a policy determination where both the President and Congress must concur. Considering the properties'
importance and value, the laws on conversion and disposition of property of public dominion must be faithfully followed.

There is no law authorizing its conveyance. It is not for the President to convey valuable real property of the government on his or her own sole will. Any such
conveyance must be authorized and approved by a law enacted by the Congress. It requires executive and legislative concurrence. The sale of the said property may
be authorized only by Congress through a duly enacted statute, and there is no such law.

B. Executive Immunity

Estrada v Desierto

Issue: The President can invoke Immunity from suit for civil damages arising out of acts done by him while he was President - NO

Doctrine: After his tenure the President cannot invoke immunity from suit for civil damages arising out of acts done by him while he was President which were not
performed in the exercise of official duties.

David vs Arroyo

ISSUE:

Whether or not PP1017 and GO No. 5 are constitutional

HELD:

The assailed PP1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate decrees. legislative power is peculiarly within the province of
the Legislature, Section 1, Article VI categorically states that “the legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines, which shall consist of a Senate
and a House of Representatives”. To be sure, neither martial law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President Arroyo’s exercise of legislative
power by issuing decrees. It follows that these decrees are void and, therefore, cannot be enforced. With respect to “laws”, she cannot call the military to enforce or
implement certain laws such as customs laws, laws governing family and property relations, laws on obligations and contracts, and the like. She can only order the
military under PP1017, to enforce laws pertaining to its duty to suppress lawless violence.

Rodriguez v Arroyo

ISSUE:

WON President Arroyo should be dropped as a respondent by virtue of her presidential immunity from suit

DOCTRINE:
CA’s rationale does not stand anymore since the presidential immunity from suits only applies during her incumbency. “Incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or
from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure but not beyond.”

“A non-sitting President does not enjoy immunity from suit, even for acts committed during the latter’s tenure. We emphasize our ruling therein that courts should look
with disfavor upon the presidential privilege of immunity, especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a right.”

Term vs Tenure: The term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents
shall succeed one another.

The tenure represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds office. The tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of
the incumbent. The intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to limit the president’s immunity from suits during their tenure (and not term).

“It is clear that former President Arroyo cannot use the presidential immunity from suit to shield herself from judicial scrutiny that would assess whether, within the
context of amparo proceedings, she was responsible or accountable for the abduction of Rodriguez.”

Section 4

Macalintal v Comelec

Lopez v Senate

ISSUE

WON the creation by Congress of the Joint Committee to canvass the votes for president and vice president in the 2004 elections is unconstitutional. (NO)

HELD

“Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution expressly empowers Congress “to promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates. “In the exercise of this power,
Congress may validly delegate the initial determination of the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass to a Joint Congressional Committee,
composed of members of the House of Representatives and of the Senate

The creation of the Joint Committee does not constitute grave abuse and cannot be said to have deprived petitioner and the other members of Congress of their
congressional prerogatives, because under the very Rules under attack, the decisions and final report of the said Committee shall be subject to the approval of the
joint session of both Houses of Congress, voting separately.”

Pimetel v Joint Committee