Psychological Incapacity

1. What is “Psychological Incapacity”?

According to Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines, “A marriage

contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with his obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even
if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.”
The Psychological Incapacity under Article 36 contemplates an incapacity or
inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations, and
is not merely the difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of marital
obligations or ill will. It consists of:
(a) A true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage;
(b) The inability must refer to the essential obligations of marriage, that is,
the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual
help, and the procreation and education of offspring; and
(c) The inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality.
It means that if one of the parties is psychologically incapacitated to comply
with his obligation as a spouse, then the marriage is void from the very
beginning. That is why the legal remedy is to petition the court for nullity of
the marriage.

2. When can the ground of “Psychological Incapacity” be used in the

nullity of marriage?

The term “psychological incapacity” to be a ground for the nullity of

marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of
marriage. (Republic v. Cabantug-Baguio, G.R. No. 171042, June 30, 2008)
These are disorders that result in the utter insensitivity or inability of the
afflicted party to give meaning and significance to the marriage he or she has
contracted. (Toring v. Toring, G.R. No. 165321, August 3, 2010)

Psychological incapacity must refer to no less than a mental (not physical)

incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage. (Navarro, Jr. v. Cecilio-Navarro, G.R. No. 162049,
April 13, 2007)

3. How can I establish that there is Psychological incapacity in my

marriage?

The Supreme Court had laid down the guidelines for the interpretation and
application of Article 36:
a) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
b) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically
or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven
by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
c) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the
celebration” of the marriage.
d) Such incapacity must be also shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable.
e) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume essential obligations of marriage.
f) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles
68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221, and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children.
g) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts.
h) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will
be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.
(Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108763, February 13, 1997)

4. What are the elements of the Psychological Incapacity, for the

marriage to be annulled?

The elements of Psychological incapacity are:

(a) Grave – It must be grave or serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage;
(b) Juridical Antecedence – It must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge
only after the marriage; and
(c) Incurable and Permanent – It must be incurable or, even if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
(Dimayuga-Larena v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159220, September 22 2008)
The Supreme Court held that psychological incapacity should refer to a
mental incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants such as those enumerated in Article 68 of the Family Code
and must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability.
(Santos v. Court of Appeals, G.R.No. 112019, January 04 1995)

5. How is Psychological Incapacity usually manifested?

Some of the instances below are manifestations of Psychological Incapacity

are:

(a) The refusal of one spouse to live, dwell or cohabit with the other spouse
after marriage, without any fault at all from the aggrieved spouse;
(b) By the deliberate refusal to give support to the other spouse, or their
common children;
(c) When marriage is unbearable due to compulsive gambling, alcoholism,
drug addiction or violent jealousy of the spouse.
 6. Would the above instances be enough to prove the existence of
psychological incapacity?

The incapacity of the spouse must such that, that it prevents him from
complying with the essential marital obligations as stated in the Family
Code, like:
(a) To procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation
of children though sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage;
(b) To live together under one roof for togetherness spells the unity in
marriage (Article 68 of the Family Code)
(c) To observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, for love, sexual comfort
and loyalty to one another are the basic postulates of marriage (Article 68 of
the Family Code of the Philippines)
(d) To render mutual help and support for assistance in necessities, both
temporal and spiritual, is essential to sustain the marriage. (Article 68 of the
Family Code of the Philippines)
(e) To jointly support the family for the spouses are joint administrator in
the partnership. (Article 70 of the Family Code of the Philippines)
(f) Not to commit acts which will bring danger, dishonor or injury to each
other or to the family for the safety and security of the family at all times is
a primordial duty of the spouses. (Article 72 of the Family Code of the
Philippines)

7. Would the presentation of an expert witness be enough to prove

the existence of the psychological incapacity in my marriage?

The presentation of expert proof in cases for declaration of nullity of

marriage based on psychological incapacity presupposes a thorough and an
in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist of expert, for a
conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of
psychological incapacity. It is indispensable that the evidence must show a
link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological
incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. (Suazo v. Suazo, G.R. No.
164493, March 12, 2010)
The incapacity should be established by the totality of evidence presented
during trial. (Bier v. Bier, G.R. No. 173294, February 27, 2008)

8. Is there a need for that the party alleged to be psychologically

incapacitated has been personally examined by a physician or
psychologist?

The Supreme Court held that, although there is no requirement that a party
to be declared psychologically incapacitated should be personally examined
by a physician or psychologist, there is a need to prove the psychological
incapacity through independent evidence adduced by the person alleging
such disorder. (Bier v. Bier, G.R. No. 173294, 27 February 2008)

Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that there is no requirement that the
defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a
physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of
nullity of marriage based psychological incapacity. What matters is whether
the totality of evidence presented is adequate to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity. (Marcos v. Marcos, G.R. No. 136490, October 19
2000)

Correspondingly, the presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough

and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a
conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of
psychological incapacity. (Ngo Te v. Yu-Te, G.R. No. 161793, 13 February
2009)

9. When does the action or defense for declaration of nullity

prescribe?

The action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage does
not prescribe, regardless of whether or not the marriage was celebrated
before or after the effectivity of the Family Code.

10. My husband wouldn’t help me in the chores around the house,

saying those are a woman’s job. Can I use the ground of
psychological incapacity in my petition for annulment against
him?
No. It bears stressing that psychological incapacity must be more than just a
“difficulty,” “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of some marital
obligations. Rather, it is essential that the concerned party was incapable of
doing so, due to some psychological illness existing at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. (Marable v. Marable, G.R. No. 178741, January
17, 2011)

The intention of the law is to confine the meaning of “psychological

incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. (Santos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019,
January 04, 1995)

Proving that a spouse failed to meet his or her responsibility and duty as a
married person is not enough; it is essential that he or she must be shown to
be incapable of doing so due to some psychological illness.
(Yambao v. Republic, G.R. No. 184063, January 24, 2011)

11. My husband started showing signs of being psychologically

incapacitated about 4 years ago. However, we had been married
for 15 years, and all that time, he was the perfect husband. Can I
use the ground of psychological incapacity in my petition for
nullity of my marriage?

No. The psychological incapacity must be proved to have been existing

before the marriage. If after the marriage, the ground of psychological
incapacity cannot be used. The Supreme Court had repeatedly pronounced
that the root cause of the psychological incapacity must be identified as a
psychological illness, with its incapacitating nature fully explained and
established by the totality of the evidence presented during the trial.

12. I have not been getting along with my wife for quite a while now.
Can I allege psychological incapacity as a ground for filing an
annulment case against her?
No you cannot. What the law requires to render a marriage void on the
ground of psychological incapacity is downright incapacity, not refusal or
neglect or difficulty much less ill will. The mere showing of “irreconcilable
differences” and “conflicting personalities” does not constitute
psychological incapacity. (Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108763, 13
February 1997)

13. If there is any doubt in my case for nullity of my marriage, how

would the court resolve the case?

The Supreme Court held that the Constitution sets out a policy of protecting
and strengthening the family as the basic social institution and marriage as
the foundation of the family. Marriage, as an inviolable institution protected
by the State, cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties. In petitions for
the declaration of nullity of marriage, the burden of proof to show the nullity
of marriage lies on the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution
and nullity. (Republic v. Cabantug-Baguio, G.R.No. 171042, 30 June 2008)

14. What will happen to the children if the petition for nullity of
marriage has been granted on the ground of psychological
incapacity?

The children will still be considered legitimate. Children of marriages void

under Article 36 (psychological incapacity) and under Article 53 (second
marriage without delivery of legitime to children of the first marriage) are
considered legitimate, as an exception to the general rule.

“SC relaxes rules on psychological incapacity as ground to annul

marriages,” says the news title in a popular newspaper. While the news
article does not mention the title of the case, it’s clearly abundant that it refers
to the 2015 case of Valerio E. Kalaw vs. Ma. Elena Fernandez (G.R. No. 166357,
14 January 2015). Did the Supreme Court, in the case of Kalaw, “relax” the
rules on petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage based on
psychological incapacity? Let’s discuss this question and, at the same time,
highlight ten matters that may be of interest to those seeking answers.
1. The rules provided in Molina remain valid
Practitioners refer to the guidelines for the interpretation and application of
Article 36 as the Molina Doctrine, considering that the set of guidelines
were first compiled in the 1997 case of Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Roridel
Olaviano Molina (G.R. No. 108763). There are eight guidelines: (1) The burden
of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity; (2) The root cause of the
psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified, alleged
in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in the
decision; (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the
celebration” of the marriage; (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable; (5) Such illness must be grave
enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage; (6) The essential marital obligations must be those
embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband
and wife, as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to
parents and their children; (7) Interpretations given by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines,
while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts;
and, (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.
In Kalaw, the Supreme Court reiterated its categorical statement, made in a
2009 case, that “we are not suggesting the abandonment of Molina in this
case.” The set of guidelines in Molina, therefore, stays.
The pronouncement in Kalaw that is closest to “relaxation” of the guidelines
is its reiteration that the “foregoing guidelines have turned out to be rigid,
such that their application to every instance practically condemned the
petitions for declaration of nullity to the fate of certain rejection.” There is no
doubt that the Molina Doctrine is strict, but there is also no doubt that
countless petitions have been granted pursuant to its guidelines.
The Court did not “relax” the rules when it reconsidered the Kalaw ruling.
On the contrary, the ruling falls under the ambit of the Molina guidelines.
The first time the Supreme Court decided Kalaw in 2011, with Justice
Mariano C. Del Castillo as the ponente, the Court dismissed the petition for
insufficiency of evidence. There was no sufficient evidence to prove the
alleged acts of the respondent wife — “constant mahjong sessions, visits to
the beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of their
children.” While it was shown that the respondent-wife played mahjong
(bringing the kids with her), the petitioner-husband failed to show the
FREQUENCY of the mahjong sessions. There is no proof that the “mahjong
sessions were so frequent that respondent neglected her family.” In other
words, the “allegations, which served as the bases or underlying premises
of the conclusions of his experts, were not actually proven.”
In 2015, with Justice Lucas Bersamin as ponente, the Supreme Court
reconsidered its earlier decision. The Supreme Court, “lest it be
misunderstood,” explicitly stated that it’s not abandoning Molina. The
Court, bound by the same set of proven facts, clarified that the failure to
show the frequency of mahjong sessions does not preclude a finding of
psychological incapacity. It’s not the FREQUENCY of the mahjong sessions;
it’s the fact that the respondent-wife should “have known that bringing her
children along her children of very tender ages to her mahjong sessions
would expose them to a culture of gambling and other vices that would
erode their moral fiber.” This, based on the totality of facts in the case,
supports the finding of psychological incapacity. This ruling is very much
consistent with the Molina Doctrine. There is no “relaxation” of the rules in
this respect.
The label that the Court “relaxed” the rules is most likely derived from the
Court’s statement that the rules set forth in Molina are rigid. This is bolstered
by the apparent expression of regret, also reiterated in Kalaw, that “in
hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set
of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological
incapacity.” In my opinion, and as discussed below, the term “rigid” should
not be understood along the lines of “relaxed” as an antonym.
2. Expert testimony is decisive
If there’s anything in Kalaw that can be construed as a “relaxation” or
departure from the Molina Doctrine, it’s the rule on expert witnesses.
Guideline No. 2 in Molina provides that the “root cause of the psychological
incapacity must be medically or clinically identified, alleged in the
complaint, sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in the
decision.” However, it has been established in previous cases that expert
testimony is not a requisite in psychological incapacity cases. In other words,
the absence of an expert witness does not automatically result to a denial of
the petition. In a number of cases, including the case of Mendoza vs.
Republic (G.R. No. 157649, 12 November 2012), the Supreme Court had the
occasion to state that “the expert opinions of psychologists are not
conditions sine qua non in the granting of petitions for declaration of nullity
of marriage,” although the Court added that “the actual medical
examination…was to be dispensed with only if the totality of evidence
presented was enough to support a finding of his psychological
incapacity.” The requirement of the “totality of evidence” is also not new,
having been discussed in similar cases prior to Kalaw.
Going back to the value of expert testimonies, the Supreme Court
in Kalaw restated the rule that “in the task of ascertaining the presence of
psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage, the courts,
which are concededly not endowed with expertise in the field of psychology,
must of necessity rely on the opinions of experts in order to inform
themselves on the matter, and thus enable themselves to arrive at an
intelligent and judicious judgment.” There is no “relaxation” of the rules in
this respect.
Incidentally, in one of our cases, the judge noted that it is for the court — not
the psychologist — to conclude that one or both parties is/are
psychologically incapacitated. Indeed, the existence of psychological
incapacity is a legal conclusion, which is within the exclusive province of the
court, but this does not preclude the expert witness from expressing a similar
“opinion,” pointing to the exact condition or personality disorder of the
spouse/s.
3. The psychologist need not personally examine the incapacitated spouse
The usual objection raised against the testimony of the expert witness,
especially when the services of the expert witness has been obtained by the
petitioner-spouse and there is a conclusion that the respondent-spouse is
psychologically incapacitated, is the usual inability of the psychologist to
examine or interview the respondent spouse. In Kalaw, the Supreme Court
reiterated the rule that “the lack of personal examination and interview of
the person diagnosed with personality disorder…did not per se invalidate
the findings of the experts.” There is no “relaxation” of the rules in this
respect.
The opinion of the expert opinion should not be lightly brushed aside in the
presence of the “totality of evidence” in the case. This is the reason why, in
the cases we are handling, we require the client to present other witnesses to
corroborate the client’s testimony on the facts which constitute the basis for
the finding of the personality disorder and, ultimately, psychological
incapacity. While clients initially complain about the presentation of other
witnesses, we make it a point to carefully explain that this is needed to avoid
an outright denial of the petition.
4. Article 36 is patterned after Church doctrines
It has been said that the Philippines is the only country in the whole world
that does not have divorce. This, of course, did not deter the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) to make, in the language of the Supreme Court, an
“exaggeration” in Molina that Article 36 is the “most liberal divorce
procedure in the world.” In Kalaw, the Supreme Court noted that it was
sensitive to the “exaggeration” of the OSG when it enunciated the “rigid”
rules in Molina. “The unintended consequences of Molina, however, has
taken its toll on people who have to live with deviant behavior, moral
insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like termites, consume
little by little the very foundation of their families, our basic social
institutions. Far from what was intended by the Court, Molina has become a
strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it. Wittingly or
unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed
diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the
like, to continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage. Ironically,
the Roman Rota has annulled marriages on account of the personality
disorders of the said individuals.”
Article 36 is patterned after Church rules. As noted in Molina: “Since the
purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our
civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to
achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to
decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally — subject to our law on evidence
— what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly
void.”
5. Article 36 protects the family
The first guideline under Molina provides that “any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity.” Marriage is protected under the
Constitution and existing laws. In case of DOUBT in petitions for nullity
cases, the doubt must be resolved in favor of the validity of marriage. In
other words, the petition must be examined strictly in favor of the validity
of marriage. If the issue can be resolved both ways — for or against
declaration of nullity — the issue must be resolved in favor of marriage,
which means that petition must be dismissed.
This Constitutional protection of marriage, however, does not apply to void
marriages. As reiterated by the Supreme Court in Kalaw, Article 36 protects
the institution of marriage — “the fulfillment of the constitutional mandate
for the State to protect marriage as an inviolable social institution only relates
to a valid marriage. No protection can be accorded to a marriage that is null
and void ab initio, because such a marriage has no legal existence.”
“Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted
by a psychologically incapacitated person as a nullity, should be deemed as
an implement of this constitutional protection of marriage. Given the
avowed State interest in promoting marriage as the foundation of the family,
which in turn serves as the foundation of the nation, there is a corresponding
interest for the State to defend against marriages ill-equipped to promote
family life. Void ab initio marriages under Article 36 do not further the
initiatives of the State concerning marriage and family, as they promote
wedlock among persons who, for reasons independent of their will, are not
capacitated to understand or comply with the essential obligations of
marriage.”
Here’s the dilemma that I see: the determination whether the marriage is
void (in which case it loses any protection under the Constitution) is done at
the latter part of the trial (the decision), while the application of the
presumption of the validity of marriage (as well as the strict interpretation
in favor of validity) exists at the time of filing of the very same petition.
In my opinion, there is no inconsistency, and there is no “relaxation” of the
rules. A presumption can always be overturned by contrary evidence. Once
contrary evidence is admitted and the marriage is declared void, then the
presumption loses any value and the marriage cease to be constitutionally
protected. Under this scenario, it does not help to be saddled with
presumptions (or assumptions, predilections or generalizations) at the start
of the petition. The task is to examine the evidence and look at the “totality
of the case.” In the words of the Supreme Court, “we reiterate once more the
principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori
assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own
facts.” There should be no rigid application of Molina and “Article 36 of the
Family Code must not be so strictly and too literally read and applied given
the clear intendment of the drafters to adopt its enacted version of less
specificity obviously to enable some resiliency in its application.”
6. Article 36 has no definition
Psychological incapacity is characterized as “as a ground for the nullity of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even prior to the celebration of the
marriage that is permanent as to deprive the party of the awareness of the
duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she was about to
assume.”
However, the Family Code has not defined the term psychological
incapacity. The committee that drafted the Family Code decided to adopt a
provision “with less specificity than expected” in order to have the law
“allow some resiliency in its application.” The intent of the commitee is to
give courts sufficient leeway to “interpret the provision on a case-to-case
basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and the decisions of church tribunals that had
persuasive effect by virtue of the provision itself having been taken from the
Canon Law.”
The intended resiliency of Article 36 “had, somehow, been rendered
ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict standards in Molina,” yet the
Supreme Court still maintains that it is not abandoning Molina.
7. One or both spouses can be psychologically incapacitated
In the Kalaw case, the petitioner-husband alleges that the respondent-wife is
psychologically incapacitated. The wife, in her answer, denies her
psychological incapacity and alleges that the husband is the one
psychologically incapacitated. Both spouses presented expert witnesses to
support each other’s allegation that the other spouse is psychologically
incapacitated.
In the original Kalaw case, the Court focused solely on the psychological
incapacity of the wife, concluding that there was insufficient evidence; the
Court did not discuss the incapacity of the husband. This appears to be
consistent with the first guideline in Molina — the “burden of proof to show
the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.”
In the reconsidered Kalaw case, the Court declared BOTH spouses as
psychologically incapacitated. While it can be argued that this is a deviation,
or “relaxation,” of the rule that was followed in the original Kalaw case, there
is no basis for such argument.
As a rule, the burden of proving the existence of psychological incapacity is
with the petitioner. This is based on the basic rule that he who alleges must
prove the allegation. This basic rule, stated in another manner, simply means
that the person who alleges psychological incapacity must prove such
psychological incapacity.
Under the circumstances, the court has three options: (a) declare the WIFE
as psychologically incapacitated; (b) declare the HUSBAND as
psychologically incapacitated; or (c) declare BOTH spouses as
psychologically incapacitated. It doesn’t matter who raised the allegation of
psychological incapacity. In the words of the Supreme Court in the
reconsidered decision: “The courts are justified in declaring a marriage null
and void under Article 36 of the Family Code regardless of whether it is the
petitioner or the respondent who imputes the psychological incapacity to the
other as long as the imputation is fully substantiated with proof. Indeed,
psychological incapacity may exist in one party alone or in both of them, and
if psychological incapacity of either or both is established, the marriage has
to be deemed null and void.”
As far as remarriage is concerned, it doesn’t really matter who between the
spouses is psychologically incapacitated — there is absolutely no prohibition
for the psychologically incapacitated spouse to marry again.
Let’s consider a number of scenarios. What if, in another case, the husband
alleges that the wife is psychologically incapacitated and the wife simply
denies such allegation, without replying that the husband is the one
psychologically incapacitated? What if the husband alleges that wife is
psychologically incapacitated and the wife fails to answer? If, for one reason
or another, evidence shows that there is no basis for finding that the wife is
psychologically incapacitated, but sufficient evidence exists to support a
finding of psychological incapacity on the part of the husband, can the court
still declare the existence of the psychological incapacity, albeit on the part
of the husband?
8. Trial court decision is binding
In the original Kalaw case, the Supreme Court concluded that there is “no
factual basis for the conclusion of psychological incapacity…The trial court’s
Decision merely summarized the allegations, testimonies, and evidence of
the respective parties, but it did not actually assess the veracity of these
allegations, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight of the evidence.
The trial court did not make factual findings which can serve as bases for its
legal conclusion of psychological incapacity.
In reconsidering its earlier decision in Kalaw, the Supreme Court cited the
general rule that “findings of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) on the existence
or non-existence of a party’s psychological incapacity should be final and
binding for as long as such findings and evaluation of the testimonies of
witnesses and other evidence are not shown to be clearly and manifestly
erroneous. In every situation where the findings of the trial court are
sufficiently supported by the facts and evidence presented during trial, the
appellate court should restrain itself from substituting its own judgment.”
9. There are sufficient safeguards to protect marriage
Without a divorce law, and with the perceived “relaxation” of the rules on
petitions for declaration of nullity, it’s normal to be apprehensive about the
deluge of cases that will choke court dockets. This possible onslaught might
also be interpreted as an attack on the institution of marriage.
In EACH and EVERY petition for annulment or declaration of nullity, the
State (through the OSG and the public prosecutors) is mandated by law to
participate and ensure that the institution of marriage is amply protected.
According to the Supreme Court, it “need not worry about the possible
abuse of the remedy provided by Article 36, for there are ample safeguards
against this contingency, among which is the intervention by the State,
through the public prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the
parties and/or fabrication of evidence. The Court should rather be alarmed
by the rising number of cases involving marital abuse, child abuse, domestic
violence and incestuous rape.”
10. Other perspectives for Article 36
The Supreme Court took pains to stress in Kalaw, again pointing to an earlier
case, that it is “not suggesting the abandonment of Molina in this case.” It is
not accurate to say that the Supreme Court “relaxed” the psychological
incapacity guidelines in Kalaw. Matters that can be interpreted in Kalaw as a
“relaxation” of the rules have been taken up in previous cases. Kalaw simply
reiterates those principles.
What the Supreme Court again pointed out in Kalaw is the need to
emphasize “other perspectives” that should guide courts in dealing with
petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
What are the “other perspectives”? The Supreme Court noted that Article 36
cases should not be decided based on “a priori assumptions, predilections
or generalizations” and emphasized that “courts should interpret the
provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of
experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of
church tribunals.”
This, in my opinion, means that “other perspectives” can run parallel to the
Molina guidelines. In other words, the Molina Doctrine is not the be-all and
end-all of Article 36 interpretation. The intention not to define Article 36
simply means that the provision should not be static; it is intended to be a
“living” provision, with courts “guided by experience, the findings of
experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of
church tribunals.”
Cases that don’t fall squarely under the Molina guidelines should not be
dismissed outright. A “rigid” interpretation of Molina means that petitions
must be strictly construed in favor of the validity of marriage and any
deviation from the guidelines, no matter how reasonable, must lead to the
dismissal of the petition. But it should be remembered that a void marriage
enjoys no protection and not entitled to any presumption of regularity,
which means that even if a particular case does not fall squarely under the
Molina principles, the court must still examine the “totality of evidence” and
must apply “other perspectives.” This way, “diagnosed sociopaths,
schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like” will not be
allowed to “continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage.”
Related Posts:
1. Valerio E. Kalaw vs. Ma. Elena Fernandez (G.R. No. 166357, 14
January 2015)
2. Guidelines in Psychological Incapacity (Article 36, Family Code)
3. Psychological Incapacity: Habitual Lying
4. Annulment in the Philippines: Questions and Answers (Part 2)
5. Venue of Petitions for Annulment or Declaration of Nullity