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I
n Naissance de la biopolitique, the text of his course at the
Collège de France in the academic year 1978–1979, Michel Foucault argues
that two distinct forms of governed subjectivity emerged in the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries: first, the legal subject (le sujet de droit), the
individual conceived as possessor of rights and foundation of legitimate
sovereignty; and second, the subject of interest (le sujet d’intérêt), a subject
of calculation and choice. In opposition to the legal subject, the subject of
interest did not determine the legitimacy of states but rather their practi-
cal ability to exist: the state that fails to take into account the basic fact
that all individuals pursue their own interests will, irrespective of its
legal status, soon cease to govern at all. In fact, according to the mode
of governmentality that emerged in the eighteenth century, individuals,
Foucault maintains, were said to be governable only to the extent that
they were understood as subjects of interest. Interest alone, understood
as a calculation of gain and loss, would render their conduct, not only in
what we understand today to be economic matters but even in their most
intimate and private choices, both intelligible and predictable.
his work as a whole in relation to what Foucault called the two forms of
modern subjectivity, the subject of law or right and the subject of interest.
Some of the most important contributions in recent Spinoza scholarship
have demonstrated Spinoza’s critique of the idea of the subject of right, his
insistence that right in any meaningful sense is coextensive with power
and that a contract is nothing more than an expression of a relation of force
(which is quite distinct, needless to say, from deducing right from interest).
Accordingly, I want to argue that just as we can read parts of the Tractatus
Theologico-Politicus (ttp) and the entire Tractatus Politicus (tp) as cri-
tiques of the legal subject (and of the entire apparatus of right, contract,
and consent), it is possible to see the Ethics as containing one of the most
rigorous critiques of the concept of the subject of interest ever written.
To approach this critique, however, we must first acknowledge
and explain not only the appeal of Spinoza to the partisans of interest (who
are themselves, albeit unwittingly, partisans of the concept of the subject
of interest), but also his incontestable influence on figures as varied as
Mandeville and Ludwig von Mises. Both drew inspiration from Spinoza’s
epigrammatic utterance at the conclusion of the preface to Ethica 3: “I will
therefore discuss the nature and force of the affects, as well as the power
of the mind over them according to the same method I just employed in
relation to God and the mind, and I will consider human appetites and
actions as if it were a question of lines, planes and bodies.” The move
from moralistic denunciation of the affects or passions to the project of
comprehending them as necessary parts of nature opened the possibil-
ity of judging them by their effects rather than according to theological
prejudices. This, together with the idea that God is the immanent cause of
all things, allowed a kind of sanctification of the effort to preserve one’s
own being. That which preserves one’s being is good and that which harms
or threatens to harm it is bad; we are thus led by nature and our nature
to choose the good over the bad, to choose that which is useful over that
which is harmful.
Certain philosophers of the period turned to the stoic tradi-
tion to assert that the effort to conserve one’s being was the prompting
of Providence within, our desire seeking the end proper to the design of
nature as a whole. The Greek term όρμή (“instinct” or “inclination”) cap-
tured the sense in which individuals were impelled to serve natural ends,
an impulsion that they experienced as desire. Thus the sexual impulse
that individuals sought to gratify served the natural end of the propaga-
tion of the species. Such notions were easily adapted to society by later
58 Imitating the Affects of Beasts
be counted on to perform their covenants and obey the laws of the com-
monwealth as long as there is “a visible power to keep them all in awe”: the
Leviathan. The theoreticians of self-preservation as natural principle who
followed Hobbes (particularly Mandeville and Smith) tended to fault him
for failing to penetrate beyond the appearance of discord to the underlying
harmony it concealed; self-seeking individuals not only unwittingly real-
ized the goals of nature, they just as unwittingly served to create a social
harmony whose design remained invisible to them. While they believed
they acted only to secure their own prosperity with indifference, if not
active enmity, to others whose pleas for material aid or even mere pity
were received with scorn, they in fact contributed to the general welfare
to a far greater extent than any voluntary act of assistance. Thus interest
was not merely the real motive for human action; it was just as importantly
laudable, worthy of the approbation that prejudice denied it.
The term conatus as it functions in the Ethics (esp. pt. 3, prop.
4–8) has as little in common with these ideas as Spinoza’s “God, or Nature”
does with the God of Christianity. First, conatus is not peculiar to human
or even animate existence; it is neither instinct nor voluntary or animal
motion. It is not inscribed in a providential design, nor does it describe the
way that every individual in animate nature acts, with the end of its own
preservation in view, an end that in turn serves the end of the preservation
of the species of which it is a member, which itself preserves the delicate
balance of species as a whole in nature. Spinoza’s conatus is disengaged
from any teleology; it is simply the tendency for any singular thing (res
singularis) at all, animate or inanimate, a stone or a human being, to
persist as it is. The conatus of each singular thing “is nothing other than
its actual essence” (Ethica 3, prop. 7), a phrase that rules out any final-
ism (immanent or transcendent); the thing is not striving to realize its
essence or potential. The essence of a thing coincides entirely with its
actual existence and has no meaning outside of that existence (“by reality
and perfection I mean the same thing”). To complicate matters further, a
singular thing, far from exhibiting an irreducible simplicity, is “several
individuals [plura individua] concurring [concurrant] in one action, such
that they are all simultaneously the cause of the same effect” (Ethica 2,
def. 7). This definition is extremely important in a number of respects for
any understanding of the conatus. How can a “thing” that is nothing more
than a number of other things united long enough to produce an effect be
endowed with something like an “instinct” or impulse of self-preservation?
Further, if Spinoza’s definition, as rendered in English, would appear to
confer upon the thing a kind of precariousness, the Latin verb Spinoza
60 Imitating the Affects of Beasts
But to tell the truth, if from experience they did not know that
they not infrequently do something that they later regret, and
that often, when they are in the grip of opposing affects, they
see the better and pursue the worse [meliora videre, et deteriora
sequi] nothing would prevent them from believing that they act
freely in all things. (pt. 3, prop. 2, schol.)
In this way, I believe that I have shown why men are moved more
by opinion than by true reason and why the true knowledge of
good and bad excites the soul and gives way to every kind of
libidinal desire; from which comes the phrase of the Poet: I see
the better, approve it, and pursue the worse [ Video meliora,
proboque, deteriora sequo]. (pt. 4, prop. 17, schol.)
closely, the phrase takes on a more specific ethical and political function:
it reveals that the nature of “servitude” is to act or be acted upon in ways
that weaken us, including fighting a war in the interest of the tyrant who
oppresses us. But it also suggests that human beings are always affected
in contrary ways by antagonistic affects, some impelling us to greater
power, others to weakness and even decomposition (and it is in Ethica 4
that Spinoza will consider the forms by which we destroy ourselves slowly
and imperceptibly, as well as the case of desiring and bringing about our
own death at the behest of causes external to and incompatible with our
nature, that of suicide).
In the third passage, Spinoza attributes the phrase he has
already used twice without any indication that it was a citation to, simply,
the Poet. In fact, it is a verbatim citation of Medea’s words in book 7 of
Ovid’s Metamorphoses as she struggles to “shake off” (excute) the passion
she has inexplicably conceived for the foreigner and enemy, Jason (line
17). The statement differs from the two preceding versions not only by the
fact that it is in the first person rather than the third but also because it
contains an additional element that sets the mind in partial conflict with
the actions of the body. The speaker not only sees the better but “approves”
or “judges” (proboque) it to be so. He not only perceives but knows through
the mental act of judgment that it indeed is the better, and yet he pursues
the worse. It is here that Spinoza tips his hand: to assume that individu-
als follow their interest not only as conceived abstractly according to
some philosophical system but even as they themselves define it is simply
another form of “conceiving men not as they are” but as the philosophers
want and need them to be.
The subject of interest, in all its diversity, from Hobbes to Smith,
rests on a fantasy of how people should be rather than how they are, even
if its norms diverge from those of Christianity. Spinoza, in fact, rules out
even the concept of a deceived subject of interest: the problem here is not
that people pursue illusory rather than real interests or those of others
rather than their own without knowing it. Spinoza’s example leads to a far
more disturbing conclusion: while we sleepwalk through the motions of
obedience to that which weakens and destroys us, a part of us is awake to
see and understand our utter subjection to what we know is the worse. It
is not that we are ignorant but that our knowledge, our use of reason, is
powerless in the face of the determinations that compel us, against what we
know to be the case, to follow the worse. Immediately after the citation from
“the Poet,” Spinoza adds another citation as a kind of gloss: “It is this that
64 Imitating the Affects of Beasts
narrated that God forbade free man from eating of the tree of
the knowledge of good and evil and that as soon as he ate from
it, he would fear death rather than desire to live. Then, man
having found woman, who completely agreed with his nature,
he knew that there could be nothing in nature more useful to
him than she; but that, believing that the beasts were similar to
him [ bruta sibi similia esse credidit], he soon began to imitate
their affects [see Ethica 3, prop. 27] and allowed his freedom
to escape, which was later recovered by the Patriarchs led by
the Spirit of Christ, that is, by the idea of God, on which alone
depends the fact that man is free and desires for other men the
good he desires for himself.
The sentence begins with the word then, as if Spinoza intends to continue
the narrative of the eating of the fruit. Instead, however, he inserts a
parenthetical clause whose significance would appear to be at odds with
the account of the fall into servitude that occupies the remainder of the
sentence. It is, in fact, an account of Adam’s conatus, of his endeavoring
to persist in his own being and increasing his power to do so through his
fortuitous encounter with Eve (we should note that Spinoza says Adam
68 Imitating the Affects of Beasts
first man from part 4, however, the fact of similitude is problematized and,
with it, any permanent demarcation between the human and the animal;
the border between the similar and the dissimilar is now condemned to
constant fluctuation. The phrase “a thing similar to us” ceases necessarily
to designate humanity or even humanity together with beasts (and Spinoza
does not use the term animalia, but bruta) in a metahuman universalism,
but may just as well function to narrow the class of things we “believe”
to be similar to us and whose affects we are therefore prone to imitate to
a mere portion of what we formerly understood as humanity. In fact, in
Ethica 3, proposition 46, Spinoza appears to acknowledge a tendency in
affective existence to exclude from the category of those we experience as
similar to us those of “a different class, or nation” (classis, sive nationis).
In the case of Adam, however, Spinoza seems to imply that the expansion
of the limit of the similar to beasts is not only what brought about Adam’s
imitation of their affects but more importantly what caused him to abandon
his freedom, that is, to cease to endeavor to persist in his own being and
to be overpowered by external causes destructive of his very nature. His
belief that he is similar to the beasts is thus not so much false in the sense
that it does not accurately reflect the true state of affairs as it is destructive
of his being, of his power and pleasure.
The specificity of the bestial in this sentence, then, appears to
concern the power not so much of the animal as the inhuman, so defined
by the effects of decomposition and death that it produces in man. Spinoza’s
account of Genesis (from which Eve has all but disappeared) suggests
that Adam imitated the desire of the serpent in an act of emulatio (the
imitation of another’s desire) that subjected Adam to determinations more
powerful than he and inimical to his being. In the scholium of proposi-
tion 27 in Ethica 3, Spinoza argues that there can be no doubt that beasts
feel and that they have affects. The affects of animals, however, differ as
much from those of men as their nature differs from human nature: the
libidinal desire of a horse is as different from that of a man as an insect’s
is from that of a fish. As might be expected, however, the Ethics subjects
every notion of “class” or “species” to a destabilization that is never sim-
ply a reduction of a secondary whole to its primary parts in the spirit of a
methodological individualism. A species must henceforth be considered
a singular thing in exactly the sense we noted earlier: it is nothing more
or less than a concurrence of singular things at a given time. As such, it
exists in a perpetual recomposition that may render it greater or lesser,
more or less powerful. But between it and the “individuals” that compose
70 Imitating the Affects of Beasts
weaken us, and we, of necessity, seek to “deliver them from their misfor-
tune,” driven not by reason but by the sad and passive affect Spinoza calls
pity. Pity, he tells us, often moves an individual to relieve the distress of
the other in ways he will later regret (Ethica 4, prop. 50, schol.). But what
of those who endeavor neither by reason nor by passion to increase the
power and pleasure of others as they do their own? Those who, as it were,
heed the voice of the serpent, the most cunning of all animals, to turn
away from others, insensible to their affects, sad and joyful, passive as
well as active, and, thinking to embrace a good that they alone can enjoy,
bring about their own destruction? “He who is moved neither by reason
nor pity to help others is rightly called inhuman. For he no longer appears
to resemble a man.”
From Spinoza’s point of view, the production of the subject
of interest as it occurred in the course of the eighteenth century can be
nothing less than the inhumanization of politics. Inhumanization in this
sense would not be a deviation from an essential and given humanity,
for the boundaries of the human must constantly expand for its power
to increase, according to Spinoza. Rather, the inhuman can only ever
be defined conjuncturally as that which at a given moment undoes the
human composition, subjecting it to an antagonistic external cause whose
reverberations are felt within—that is, the eruption of the external inter-
nally—disrupting the concurrence of its parts so that it is no longer what
it once was. The demand that individuals separate their interests from all
others and ignore their affects is already in itself an imitation of death and
of that which demands death in the service of something other than life.
To take Spinoza seriously is to acknowledge that the separation of inter-
ests and desires, of bodies and forces, does not exist merely at the level
of philosophical concepts; it must simultaneously operate in the physical,
corporeal dimension as well. It is only in the act of resisting this separation
in body as well as mind that virtue and perfection as Spinoza understood
them exist; it is in such resistance alone that life can, for the moment or
for eternity, be preserved against death.
Works Cited Cicero. De finibus bonorum et malorum. The Latin Library. www.thelatinlibrary.com/
cicero/fin.shtml (accessed 13 Aug. 2009).
Deleuze, Gilles. Spinoza: Practical Philosophy. Trans. Robert Hurley. San Francisco: City
Lights, 1988.
Force, Pierre. Self-Interest before Adam Smith: A Genealogy of Economic Science. Cambridge:
Cambridge up, 2003.
Hirschman, A. O. The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism before
Its Triumph. Princeton: Princeton up, 1977.
Spinoza, Benedict de. Complete Works. Trans. Samuel Shirley. Indianapolis: Hackett, 2002.