RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant, v.
JUDGE HERNANDO DOMAGTOY, Aranes vs Judge Occiano
Facts: On September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the marriage
between Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga despite the knowledge that the
groom is merely separated from his first wife. It is also alleged that he performed
a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma D. del
Rosario outside his courts jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. in relation to the
charges against him, respondent judge seeks exculpation from his act of having
solemnized the marriage between Gaspar Tagadan, a married man separated
from his wife , and Arlyn F. Borga by stating that he merely relied in the affidavit
issued by the Municipal trial Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that Mr.
Tagadan and his wife have not seen each other for almost seven years. With
respect to the second charge, he maintains that in solemnizing the marriage
between Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7, paragraph I of the
Family code which states that: “Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any
incumbent member of the judiciary within the court’s jurisdiction”; and that
Article 8 thereof applies to the case in question.
Issue: Whether or not the acts of Judge Domagtoy exhibits gross misconduct,
inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law.
Held: In the first allegation, Gaspar Tagdan did not institute a summary
proceeding for the declaration of his first wife’s presumptive death. Absent this
judicial declaration, he remains married to Ida Penaranda. Whether wittingly, or
unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of respondent judge to have
accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the groom. Such neglect or ignorance of
the law has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void, marriage.
In as much as respondent judge’s jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta.
Monica and Burgos, he was also not clothed with authority to solemnize a
marriage in Dapa, Surigao del Norte. By citing Article 8 and the exceptions therein
as grounds for the exercise of his misplaced authority, respondent judge again
demonstrated a lack of understanding of the basic principles of civil law
Because of the respondent’s failure to apply the legal principles applicable in
these cases, the Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the
law because of this he is suspended for a period of six months.
FACTS: Petitioner Mercedita Mata Arañes charges respondent judge with Gross
Ignorance of the Law. Respondent is the Presiding Judge of the MTCt of Balatan,
Camarines Sur. Petitioner alleges that respondent judge solemnized her marriage
to her late groom Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage license
and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial jurisdiction.
They lived together as husband and wife on the strength of this marriage until her
husband passed away. However, since the marriage was a nullity, petitioner's
right to inherit the "vast properties" left by Orobia was not recognized. She was
likewise deprived of receiving the pensions of Orobia.
Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent judge for his illegal
acts and unethical misrepresentations which allegedly caused her so much
hardships, embarrassment and sufferings.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Judge acted in gross ignorance of the law
when he solemnized the marriage of petitioner
HELD: In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited
to the municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage
of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and
subjects him to administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross ignorance
of the law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human compassion but
nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on marriage.
Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the
requisite marriage license. In People vs. Lara, the Court held that a marriage
which preceded the issuance of the marriage license is void, and that the
subsequent issuance of such license cannot render valid or even add an iota of
validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage license
that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage.
Respondent judge did not possess such authority when he solemnized the
marriage of petitioner. In this respect, respondent judge acted in gross ignorance
of the law.
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BALOGBOG V. CA
Facts:
Petitioners Leoncia and Gaudioso Balogbog are the children of Basilio
Balogbog and Genoveva Arnibal who died intestate in 1951 and 1961,
respectively. They had an older brother, Gavino, but he died in 1935,
predeceasing their parents. Private respondents Ramonito and Generoso
Balogbog brought an action for partition and accounting aginst petitioners,
claiming that they were the legitimate children of Gavino by Catalina Ubas and
that, as such, they were entitled to the one-third share of Gavino in the estate of
their grandpaprents. Petitoners denied this and alleged that their brother Gavino
died single and without issue.
Private respondents presented three witnesses: 1.) Trazo, then the mayor of
their municipality, testified that he knew Gavino and Catalina to be married and
Ramonito to be their first child. Furthermore, he said that he attended the
wedding of Gavino and Catalina. 2.) Pogoy, a family friend of private respondents,
testified that they are the children of Gavino and Catalina. He also said that he
attended their wedding and that Gavino and Catalina lived together. 3.) Catalina,
the alleged wife of Gavina, tesitified concerning her marriage with Gavino. She
testified that after the wedding, she was handed a “receipt”, presumably the
marriage certificate, by Fr. Jomao-as, but it was burned during the war. She said
that they lived together and begot three children, namely, Ramonito, Petronillo,
and Generoso. Petronillo died after an illness at the age of six. On cross-
examination, she stated that after the death of Gavino, she lived in common law
relation with a man for a year and then they separated. Private respondents
furthermore produced various certificates from the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar, the Office of the Treasurer, and the Parish Priest of Asturias Municipality
that the records of the marriage of Gavino and Catalina and the birth of Ramonito
must be presumed to have been either lost or destroyed during the war.
On the other hand, petitioners presented three witnesses: 1.) Leoncia
testified that Gavino died single at the family residence and denied that her
brother had any legitimate children and stated that she did not know private
respondents before the case was filed. 2.) Maranga, the Assistant Municipal
Treasurer, testified that there was no record of the marriage in the Book of
Marriages between 1925 to 1935. 3.) Narvasa tesitified that Gavino died single in
1935 and that Catalina lived with a certain Keriado after the war, although he did
not know whether they were legally married. He added, however, that Catalina
had children by a man she had married before the war. On cross-examination, he
stated that Leoncia, who requested him to testify, was also his bondsman in a
criminal case.
Issue:
Whether or not Gavino and Catalina were married and therefore private
respondents, as their alleged heirs, are entitled to one-third share of Gavino in
the estate of their grandparents?
Held
Yes., Although a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage,
the failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place ─ other evidence
may be presented to prove marriage. Here, private respondents proved, through
testimonial evidence, that Gavino and Catalina were married and they had three
children, one of whom died in infancy; that their marriage subsisted until Gavino
died; and that their children, private respondents herein, were recognized by
Gavino’s family and by the public as the legitimate children of Gavino.
An exchange of vows can be presumed to have been made from the
testimonies of the witnesses who state that a wedding took place, since the very
purpose for having a wedding is to exchange vows of marital commitment. It
would be unusual to have a wedding without an exchange of vows and quite
unnatural for people not to notice its absence.
In accordance with Arts. 266 and 267, CC, in the absence of titles indicated in
Art. 265, CC, which provides that such status shall be proven by record of birth in
the Civil Register, by an authentic document, or by final judgment, the filiation of
children may be proven by continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child and by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court or special laws.
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ARTURIO TRINIDAD, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS
Facts: Patricio Trinidad and Anastacia Briones were the parents of three (3)
children, namely, Inocentes, Lourdes and Felix. When Patricio died in 1940,
survived by the above named children, he left four (4) parcels of land, all situated
at Barrio Tigayon, Kalibo Aklan.
Arturio Trinidad, born on July 21, 1943, claimed to be the legitimate son of
the late Inocentes Trinidad. Sometime after the marriage, he demanded from the
defendants to partition the land into three equal shares and to give him the (1/3)
individual share of his late father, but the defendants refused.
Arturio Trinidad filed, an action for partition of four parcels of land.
Defendants denied that plaintiff was the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad.
Defendants contended that Inocentes was single when he died in 1941, before
plaintiff’s birth. Defendants also denied that plaintiff had lived with them, and
claimed that the parcels of land described in the complaint had been in their
possession since the death of their father in 1940 and that they had not given
plaintiff a share in the produce of the land.
Arturio presented witnesses to prove his position. Jovita Gerardo testified
that Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato are the parents of Arturio; that Felix
and Lourdes as the uncle and aunt of Arturio; and also identified pictures where
the respondents were with Arturio and his family.(At this stage of the trial, Felix
Trinidad [died] without issue and he was survived by his only sister, Lourdes
Trinidad.) Another witness, ISABEL MEREN, 72 years old and a widow testified
that she knows Inocentes Trinidad as the father of Arturio Trinidad; that she knew
Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato as the parents of Arturio and that she
was present when they were married in New Washington, Aklan, by a protestant
pastor by the name of Lauriano Lajaylajay. She further testified that upon the
death of Inocentes, Lourdes took Arturio and cared for him. ARTURIO TRINIDAD,
himself, was presented as witness. As proof that he is the son of Inocentes
Trinidad and Felicidad Molato, he showed a certificate of baptism, and a
certificate of loss issued by the LCR that his birth certificate was burned during
World War 2. He also testified that he lived with Felix and Lourdes and provided
for his needs.
On the other hand, defendants presented Pedro Briones who testified that
Inocentes was not married when he died in 1940s. Lourdes Trinidad also testified
that she was not aware that his brother married anybody and denied that Arturio
lived with them. Beatriz Sayon also testified that Inocentes died in 1941, and that
Felicidad Molato had never been married to Inocentes. The trial court rendered a
twenty-page decision in favor of Arturio. The CA reversed the decision.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner presented sufficient evidence of his parent’s
marriage and his filation.
Ruling: The partition of the late Patricios real properties requires preponderant
proof that petitioner is a co-owner or co-heir of the decedent’s estate. His right as
a co-owner would, in turn, depend on whether he was born during the existence
of a valid and subsisting marriage between his mother (Felicidad) and his putative
father (Inocentes).
When the question of whether a marriage has been contracted arises in
litigation, said marriage may be proven by relevant evidence. To prove the fact of
marriage, the following would constitute competent evidence: the testimony of a
witness to the matrimony, the couple’s public and open cohabitation as husband
and wife after the alleged wedlock, the birth and the baptismal certificates of
children born during such union, and the mention of such nuptial in subsequent
documents.
In the case at bar, petitioner secured a certification from the Office of the
Civil Registrar of Aklan that all records of births, deaths and marriages were lost,
burned or destroyed during the Japanese occupation of said municipality.
Although the marriage contract is considered the primary evidence of the marital
union, petitioner’s failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place, as
other forms of relevant evidence may take its place. In place of a marriage
contract, two witnesses were presented by petitioner: Isabel Meren and Jovita
Gerardo. It further gives rise to the disputable presumption that a man and a
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage. Petitioner also presented his baptismal certificate in which
Inocentes and Felicidad were named as the child’s father and mother, and family
pictures.
The totality of petitioner’s positive evidence clearly preponderates over
private respondent’s self- serving negations.
Yes. In the absence of a marriage certificate, any of the four can be sufficient
proof of marriage:
Fact of marriage ceremony;
Open cohabitation of the parties;
Birth certificate of the child; and
Other documents.
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Virginia Sarmiento and Apolonia Catibayan VS Court of Appeals
Facts: The petitioners are sisters, their parents being Tiburcio and Leogarda. The
respondent is the half brother of Leogarda, with Francisco as their common
father. The petitioners filed a complaint for partition of a piece of land. They claim
that as granddaughters of Francisco, they and respondent are co-owners of ½ of
the lot, as the only heirs of Francisco. But according to private respondent,
petitioners are not legal heirs of Francisco because the mother of the petitioners,
Leogarda, was allegedly an illegitimate child of Francisco and Emilia who were not
married. Under the old Civil Code, Which should be applied since Francisco died
in 1949, an illegitimate child does not have successional rights. The lower court
ordered the parties herein to partition among themselves subject ½ portion of
the lot. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the Trial Court.
Issue: Whether or not a man and a woman who lived together as husband and
wife are presumed married.
Ruling: The fact that no marriage certificate of Francisco and Emilia was
submitted as evidence does not lead to the conclusion that the said parties were
not legally married and that leogarda was their illegitimate child. The respondent
admitted that Francisco and Emilia lived and cohabitated together as husband
and wife. The presumption is that a man and woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.
In the case at bar, the petitioners failed to present preponderant evidence to
prove the marriage of Francisco and Emilia. Hence, the Supreme Court affirmed
the decision of the Court of Appeals in reversing the lower court’s decision.
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IWASAWA VS GANGAN GR 204169
FACTS: Petitioner, a Japanese national, met private respondent sometime in 2002
in one of his visits to the Philippines. Private respondent introduced herself as
“single” and “has never married before.” Since then, the two became close to
each other. Later that year, petitioner came back to the Philippines and married
private respondent on November 28, 2002 in Pasay City. After the wedding, the
couple resided in Japan. In July 2009, petitioner noticed his wife become
depressed. Suspecting that something might have happened in the Philippines,
he confronted his wife about it. To his shock, private respondent confessed to him
that she received news that her previous husband passed away. Petitioner sought
to confirm the truth of his wife’s confession and discovered that indeed, she was
married to one Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo and that their marriage took place
on June 20, 1994. This prompted petitioner to file a petition for the declaration of
his marriage to private respondent as null and void on the ground that their
marriage is a bigamous one.
ISSUE: W/N the marriage of petitioner and respondent is bigamous
RULING: YES. This Court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of nullity
is required before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what
transpires is a bigamous marriage, which is void from the beginning as provided in
Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the Philippines. And this is what transpired in
the instant case. As correctly pointed out by the OSG, the documentary exhibits
taken together concretely establish the nullity of the marriage of petitioner to
private respondent on the ground that their marriage is bigamous. The exhibits
directly prove the following facts: ( 1) that private respondent married Arambulo
on June 20, 1994 in the City of Manila; (2) that private respondent contracted a
second marriage this time with petitioner on November 28, 2002 in Pasay City;
(3) that there was no judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage of private
respondent with Arambulo at the time she married petitioner; (3) that Arambulo
died on July 14, 2009 and that it was only on said date that private respondent's
marriage with Arambulo was deemed to have been dissolved; and ( 4) that the
second marriage of private respondent to petitioner is bigamous, hence null and
void, since the first marriage was still valid and subsisting when the second
marriage was contracted.
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Siga vs Cerado
Facts:
In their Complaint, petitioners Simplicia Cercado-Siga (Simplicia) and Ligaya
Cercado-Belison (Ligaya) claimed that they are the legitimate children of the late
Vicente and Benita Castillo (Benita), who were married last 9 October 1929 in
Pililla, Rizal. In support of the existence thereof, petitioners presented a copy of
the Contrato Matrimonial which was issued by Iglesia Filipina Independiente
church. Petitioners insist that the Contrato Matrimonial is a public document
because it is required by law to be recorded in the local civil registrar and the
National Statistics Office (NSO). Petitioners claim to have in their possession a
duplicate original of the Contrato Matrimonial which should be regarded as
original. Granting that the Contrato Matrimonial is a private document,
petitioners maintain that said document should be considered an ancient
document which should be excluded from the requirement of authentication.
In their Answer, respondents alleged that they are the legitimate heirs of Vicente
and Leonora, who were married on 27 June 1977 as evidenced by a marriage
certificate registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Binangonan, Rizal. In their
Comment, respondents submit that the Contrato Matrimonial is a private
document and the fact that marriages are required to be registered in the local
civil registrar does not ipso facto make it a public document. Respondents assert
that the certificate of baptism is likewise a private document which tends to
prove only the administration of the sacrament of baptism and not the veracity of
the declarations therein. Respondents moreover refute the certification issued by
the local civil registry arguing that it does not prove filiation but only the fact that
there is no record of Ligaya on file with said office.
RTC upheld the validity of the marriage between Vicente and Benita and
considered the subsequent marriage between Vicente and Leonora as void and
bigamous before it concluded that the subject property was part of the conjugal
property of Vicente and Benita. Consequently, the trial court held that the
Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate (Deed) executed and signed by respondents
is null and void because it deprived Benita of her share of the property as
surviving spouse and impaired the shares and legitimes of petitioners. Thus, it
ruled that petitioners are entitled to recover their share in the subject property.
CA ruled that the trial court "can pass upon the issue of the validity of marriage of
Vicente and Leonora [because] no judicial action is necessary to declare a
marriage an absolute nullity and the court may pass upon the validity of a
marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same, as long as it is
essential to the determination of the case before it." However, the appellate
court found that the Contrato Matrimonial of Vicente and Benita, being a private
document, was not properly authenticated, hence, not admissible in evidence.
Moreover, the appellate court did not consider the baptismal certificate
submitted by petitioners as conclusive proof of filiation. The Joint Affidavit
executed by a certain Mario Casale and Balas Chimlangco attesting to the birth of
Ligaya to Vicente and Benita was not given credence by the appellate court for
being a hearsay evidence. For failure of petitioners to prove their cause of action
by preponderance of evidence, the appellate court reversed and set aside the
Decision and Resolution of the RTC.

Issue: Whether the marriage contract or Contrato Matrimonial is sufficient to
prove the fact of marriage between Vicente and Benita.
Ruling: No. Petition is DENIED.
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that it is a private document. As early as in
the case of U.S. v. Evangelista,22 it has been settled that church registries of
births, marriages, and deaths made subsequent to the promulgation of General
Orders No. 68 and the passage of Act No. 190 are no longer public writings, nor
are they kept by duly authorized public officials. They are private writings and
their authenticity must therefore be proved as are all other private writings in
accordance with the rules of evidence.
Petitioners insist on the admissibility of the marriage contract on the ground that
it is a duplicate original, hence, the original need not be produced. The Court do
not agree. The Court had previously ruled in Vallarta v. Court of Appeals that " a
signed carbon copy or duplicate of a document executed at the same time as the
original is known as a duplicate original and maybe introduced in evidence
without accounting for the non- production of the original. But, an unsigned and
uncertified document purporting to be a carbon copy is not competent evidence.
It is because there is no public officer acknowledging the accuracy of the copy."
On the other hand, the document presented to prove Ligaya’s kinship is a Joint
Affidavit executed by two persons to the effect that she was born to Vicente and
Benita. These two affiants were never presented in court. Thus, their statement is
tantamount to hearsay evidence.
Petitioners also presented certifications from the local civil registrar certifying
that the records of birth from 1930 to 1946 were destroyed by fire and/or war. In
said documents, there contains an advice that petitioners may make a further
verification with the NSO because the local civil registrar submits a copy of the
birth certificate of every registered birth with the NSO. The advice was not
heeded. Petitioners failed to present a certification from NSO whether such
records do exist or not.
Considering that petitioners failed to prove the validity of the marriage between
Vicente and Benita, it follows that they do not have a cause of action in the case
for the declaration of nullity of the Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of
Vicente and Leonora.
Ratio:
Ancient documents are considered from proper custody if they come from a place
from which they might reasonably be expected to be found. Custody is proper if it
is proved to have had a legitimate origin or if the circumstances of the particular
case are such as to render such an origin probable. If a document is found where
it would not properly and naturally be, its absence from the proper place must be
satisfactorily accounted for.
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VAN DORN vs. HON. ROMILLO and RICHARD UPTON
FACTS: Petitioner Alice Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines while private
respondent Richard Upton is a citizen of the USA. They were married in Hongkong
in 1972 and begot two children. The parties were divorced in Nevada, USA in
1982. Alice has then re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
In 1983, Richard filed suit against Alice in the RTC-Pasay, stating that Alice’s
business in Ermita, Manila is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that
Alice be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that Richard be
declared with right to manage the conjugal property.
Alice moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred
by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court
wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had “no
community property” as of June 11, 1982.
The Court below (presiding judge: Judge Romillo) denied the MTD in the
mentioned case on the ground that the property involved is located in the
Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is
now the subject of this certiorari proceeding.
ISSUE: What is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged
conjugal property in the Philippines?
HELD: Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to dismiss the
Complaint…
For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine whether the
property relations between Alice and Richard, after their marriage, were upon
absolute or relative community property, upon complete separation of property,
or upon any other regime. The pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada divorce of
the parties.
The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction
over petitioner who appeared in person before the Court during the trial of the
case. It also obtained jurisdiction over private respondent who authorized his
attorneys in the divorce case to agree to the divorce on the ground of
incompatibility in the understanding that there were neither community property
nor community obligations.
As explicitly stated in the Power of Attorney he executed in favor of the law firm
of KARP & GRAD LTD. to represent him in the divorce proceedings:
You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to file an Answer,
appear on my behalf and do all things necessary and proper to represent me,
without further contesting, subject to the following:
1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of incompatibility.
2. That there is no community of property to be adjudicated by the Court.
3. That there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by the court.
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the
States of the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an
American citizen. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid
and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public
policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil
Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute
divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public police and
morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized
in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this
case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from
the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner’s
husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the
Decision of his own country’s Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him,
and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal
property.
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PILAPIL vs. HON IBAY-SOMERA, VICTOR AND GEILING et al
FACTS: Petitioner Imelda Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich
Geiling, a German national, were married in Germany. After about three and a
half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in Geiling initiating
a divorce proceeding against Pilapil in Germany. The Local Court, Federal Republic
of Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage
of the spouses.
More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, Geiling filed two
complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging in one that, while
still married to said Geiling, Pilapil “had an affair with a certain William Chia.” The
Assistant Fiscal, after the corresponding investigation, recommended the
dismissal of the cases on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. However, upon
review, the respondent city fiscal Victor approved a resolution directing the filing
of 2 complaint for adultery against the petitioner. The case entitled “PP
Philippines vs. Pilapil and Chia” was assigned to the court presided by the
respondent judge Ibay-Somera.
A motion to quash was filed in the same case which was denied by the
respondent. Pilapil filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with
a prayer for a TRO, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court denying
her motion to quash.
As cogently argued by Pilapil, Article 344 of the RPC thus presupposes that the
marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal
action for adultery.
ISSUE: Did Geiling have legal capacity at the time of the filing of the complaint for
adultery, considering that it was done after obtaining a divorce decree?
HELD: WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner’s MTQ is SET ASIDE
and another one entered DISMISSING the complaint … for lack of jurisdiction. The
TRO issued in this case … is hereby made permanent.
NO, Under Article 344 of the RPC, the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted
except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has long
since been established, with unwavering consistency, that compliance with this
rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, requirement.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the
action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or
legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is
a logical consequence since the raison d’etre of said provision of law would be
absent where the supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the
alleged offender at the time of the filing of the criminal case.
Stated differently, the inquiry would be whether it is necessary in the
commencement of a criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds between
the complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at the time of the
institution of the action by the former against the latter.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in
his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its
legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is
concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of
status of persons Under the same considerations and rationale, private
respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to
commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended
spouse at the time he filed suit.
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FE D. QUITA, petitioner, VS. COURT OF APPEALS and BLANDINA DANDAN,
Facts:
Fe D. Quita and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines
on May 18, 1941. No children were born out of their marriage. On July 23, 1954,
petitioner obtained a final judgment of divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.
On April 16, 1972, Arturo died leaving no will. On August 31, 1972, Lino Javier
Inciong filed a petition with the RTC for issuance of letters of administration
concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust Company.
Respondent Blandina Dandan, claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo
Dandan and the surviving children, all surnamed Padlan, opposed the petition.
The RTC expressed that the marriage between Antonio and petitioner subsisted
until the death of Arturo in 1972, that the marriage existed between private
respondent and Arturo was clearly void since it was celebrated during the
existence of his previous marriage to petitioner. The Court of Appeals remanded
the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
Issues: 1. Should the case be remanded to the lower court?
2. Who between the petitioner and private respondent is the proper heir of the
decedent?
Held: If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of
the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is
entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary
cases.
No dispute exists as to the right of the six Padlan children to inherit from the
decedent because there are proofs that they have been duly acknowledged by
him and petitioner herself even recognizes them as heirs of Arturo Padlan, nor as
to their respective hereditary shares.
Private respondent is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this
status presupposes a legitimate relationship. Her marriage to Arturo being a
bigamous marriage considered void ab inito under Articles 80 and 83 of the Civil
Code renders her not a surviving spouse.
The decision of the Court of Appeals ordering the remand of the case is affirmed.
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Llorente vs Ca
In 1927, Lorenzo Llorente, then a Filipino, was enlisted in the U.S. Navy. In 1937,
he and Paula Llorente got married in Camarines Sur. In 1943, Lorenzo became an
American citizen.
In 1945, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines for a vacation. He discovered that
Paula was already living illicitly with Ceferino Llorente (brother of Lorenzo).
Ceferino and Paula even had a son.
Lorenzo then refused to live with Paula. He also refused to give her monetary
support. Eventually, Lorenzo and Paula agreed in writing Lorenzo shall not
criminally charge Paula if the latter agrees to waive all monetary support from
Lorenzo. Later, Lorenzo returned to the United States.
In 1951, Lorenzo filed a divorce proceeding against Paula in California. Paula was
represented by an American counsel. The divorce was granted and in 1952, the
divorce became final.
Lorenzo returned to the Philippines. In 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia Fortuno.
They had three children.
In 1981, Lorenzo executed his last will and testament where he left all his estate
to Alicia and their children (nothing for Paula). In 1983, he went to court for the
will’s probate and to have Alicia as the administratrix of his property. In 1985,
before the probate proceeding can be terminated, Lorenzo died. Later, Paula filed
a petition for letters of administration over Lorenzo’s estate.
The trial court ruled that Lorenzo’s marriage with Alicia is void because the
divorce he obtained abroad is void. The trial court ratiocinated that Lorenzo is a
Filipino hence divorce is not applicable to him. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court.
ISSUES: Whether or not Lorenzo’s divorce abroad should be recognized.
HELD: Yes. It is undisputed by Paula Llorente that Lorenzo became an American
citizen in 1943. Hence, when he obtained the divorce decree in 1952, he is
already an American citizen. Article 15 of the Civil Code provides:
Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though
living abroad.
Since Lorenzo was no longer a Filipino, Philipine laws relating to family rights,
duties, or status are no longer applicable to him. Therefore, the divorce decree he
obtained abroad must be respected. The rule is: aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, provided they are valid according to their national law.
However, this case was still remanded to the lower court so as for the latter to
determine the effects of the divorce as to the successional rights of Lorenzo and
his heirs.
Anent the issue on Lorenzo’s last will and testament, it must be respected. He is
an alien and is not covered by our laws on succession. However, since the will was
submitted to our courts for probate, then the case was remanded to the lower
court where the foreign law must be alleged in order to prove the validity of the
will.
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GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, VS. RODERICK A.
RECIO,
FACTS:
The respondent, a Filipino was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in
Rizal in 1987. They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. In 1989, the
Australian family court issued a decree of divorce supposedly dissolving the
marriage. In 1992, respondent acquired Australian citizenship. In 1994, he
married Grace Garcia, a Filipina, herein petitioner, in Cabanatuan City. In their
application for marriage license, respondent was declared as “single” and
“Filipino”. Since October 1995, they lived separately; and in 1996 while in
Autralia, their conjugal assets were divided. In 1998, petitioner filed Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy, claiming that she
learned of the respondent’s former marriage only in November. On the other
hand, respondent claims that he told petitioner of his prior marriage in 1993,
before they were married. Respondent also contended that his first marriage was
dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australia in 1989 and hence, he was
legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994. The trial court declared that the
first marriage was dissolved on the ground of the divorce issued in Australia as
valid and recognized in the Philippines. Hence, this petition was forwarded before
the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was
proven.
2. Whether or not respondent has legal capacity to marry Grace Garcia.
RULING:
The Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts
cannot grant it. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26
of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case
the divorce is “validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry”. A divorce obtained abroad by two aliens, may be recognized in
the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective laws. Therefore,
before our courts can recognize a foreign divorce, the party pleading it must
prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law
allowing it.
In this case, the divorce decree between the respondent and Samson appears to
be authentic, issued by an Australian family court. Although, appearance is not
sufficient; and compliance with the rules on evidence regarding alleged foreign
laws must be demonstrated, the decree was admitted on account of petitioner’s
failure to object properly because he objected to the fact that it was not
registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City, not to its admissibility.
Respondent claims that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted
as evidence, adequately established his legal capacity to marry under Australian
law. However, there are two types of divorce, absolute divorce terminating the
marriage and limited divorce merely suspending the marriage. In this case, it is
not known which type of divorce the respondent procured.
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign
statutes, still restrict remarriage. Under the Australian divorce decree “a party to
a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute commits the
offense of bigamy”. This shows that the divorce obtained by the respondent
might have been restricted. Respondent also failed to produce sufficient evidence
showing the foreign law governing his status. Together with other evidences
submitted, they don’t absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according
to the alleged foreign law.
Case remanded to the court a quo. The marriage between the petitioner and
respondent can not be declared null and void based on lack of evidence
conclusively showing the respondent’s legal capacity to marry petitioner. With the
lack of such evidence, the court a quo may declare nullity of the parties’ marriage
based on two existing marriage certificates.
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Roehr vs Rodriguez
FACTS:
Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen and resident of Germany, married
private respondent Carmen Rodriguez, a Filipina, on December 11, 1980 in
Hamburg, Germany. Their marriage was subsequently ratified on February 14,
1981 in Negros Oriental. Out of their union were born Carolynne and Alexandra
on November 18, 1981 and October 25, 1987, respectively.
On August 28, 1996, private respondent filed a petition5 for declaration of nullity
of marriage before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. Meanwhile,
petitioner obtained a divorce decree from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg-
Blankenese, promulgated on December 16, 1997. The parental custody of the
children was granted to the father.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the respondent judge gravely abused her discretion when she
assumed and retained jurisdiction over the present case despite the fact that
petitioner already has obtained a divorce decree from a German court.
2. To whom should the custody of their children be awarded?
RULING: On the first issue, as a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by
foreigners in other countries are recognizable in our jurisdiction, but the legal
effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and support of the children, must still be
determined by our courts. Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to
a foreign judgment, such as the award of custody to petitioner by the German
court, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been given
ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the
Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).
Anent the second issue, we hereby declare that the trial court has jurisdiction
over the issue between the parties as to who has parental custody, including the
care, support and education of the children, namely Carolynne and Alexandra
Roehr. Let the records of this case be remanded promptly to the trial court for
continuation of appropriate proceedings.
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Republic vs Iyoy
FACTS: Crasus married Fely on 16 December 1961 at Cebu City. After the
celebration of their marriage, respondent Crasus discovered that Fely was “hot-
tempered, a nagger and extravagant.” In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the
United States of America (U.S.A.), leaving all of their five children, the youngest
then being only six years old, to the care of respondent Crasus.
Barely a year after Fely left for the U.S.A., respondent Crasus received a letter
from her requesting that he sign the enclosed divorce papers; he disregarded the
said request. Sometime in 1985, respondent Crasus learned, through the letters
sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got married to an American, with whom
she eventually had a child. At the time the Complaint was filed, it had been 13
years since Fely left and abandoned respondent Crasus, and there was no more
possibility of reconciliation between them.
Respondent Crasus finally alleged in his Complaint that Fely’s acts brought danger
and dishonor to the family, and clearly demonstrated her psychological incapacity
to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Such incapacity, being incurable
and continuing, constitutes a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage under
Article 36, in relation to Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the Family Code of the
Philippines.
Fely filed her Answer and Counterclaim with the RTC on 05 June 1997. She
asserted therein that she was already an American citizen since 1988 and was
now married to Stephen Micklus. She argued that her marriage to her American
husband was legal because now being an American citizen, the law of her present
nationality shall govern her status.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
(1) RTC – Cebu: declared the marriage null and void on the basis of Article 36 of
the Family Code of the Philippines.
(2) CA: affirmed RTC.
ISSUE: Where the marriage between Crasus and Fely remains valid and subsisting
RULING:
YES.
At most, Fely’s abandonment, sexual infidelity, and bigamy, give respondent
Crasus grounds to file for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code of
the Philippines, but not for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of
the same Code. While this Court commiserates with respondent Crasus for being
continuously shackled to what is now a hopeless and loveless marriage, this is
one of those situations where neither law nor society can provide the specific
answer to every individual problem.
I. The totality of evidence presented during trial is insufficient to support the
finding of psychological incapacity of Fely.
The psychological incapacity must be characterized by –
(a) Gravity – It must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage;
(b) Juridical Antecedence – It must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only
after the marriage; and
(c) Incurability – It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would
be beyond the means of the party involved.
Intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of “psychological
incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. The root cause of the incapacity be identified as a
psychological illness and that its incapacitating nature must be fully explained.
II. Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines is not applicable to
the case at bar.
By its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the
case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her
divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen.
At the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to
the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws
III. The Solicitor General is authorized to intervene, on behalf of the Republic, in
proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages.
While it is the prosecuting attorney or fiscal who actively participates, on behalf
of the State, in a proceeding for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage
before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General takes over when the case is
elevated to the Court of Appeals or this Court. Since it shall be eventually
responsible for taking the case to the appellate courts when circumstances
demand, then it is only reasonable and practical that even while the proceeding is
still being held before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General can already
exercise supervision and control over the conduct of the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal therein to better guarantee the protection of the interests of the State.
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Corpuz v Sto. Tomas
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such,
shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1),
(4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated
and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity
to remarry under Philippine law.
Petitioner, GERBERT R. CORPUZ - versus - DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The
SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents
FACTS:
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian
citizenship through naturalization on November 29, 2000. On January 18, 2005,
Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City. Due to
work and other professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the
wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise
Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair with
another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a
petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada
granted Gerbert’s petition for divorce on December 8, 2005. Gerbert filed a
petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage
as dissolved (petition) with the RTC.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
(1) RTC: Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial
recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It
ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
ISSUE: whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to
aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a
foreign divorce decree.
RULING: Yes. The General Rule is that the alien spouse can claim no right under
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as the substantive right it
establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino
spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the
alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.
The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the
party with legal interest to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction
BUT - direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient
to clothe a party with the requisite interest to institute an action before our
courts for the recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we have
declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized
in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or her national
law.
The case is remanded to the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is
consistent with the Canadian divorce law. Pasig City Civil Registry Office has
already recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage
certificate based on the mere presentation of the decree. We consider the
recording to be legally improper; hence, the need to draw attention of the bench
and the bar to what had been done.
But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the
law and the submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize
the decree’s registration. The law should be read in relation with the requirement
of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be given res judicata
effect. In the context of the present case, no judicial order as yet exists
recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office
acted totally out of turn and without authority of law when it annotated the
Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate, on the
strength alone of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert. For being contrary to
law, the registration of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial
recognition is patently void and cannot produce any legal effect.
Cancellation of the entry in the civil registry requirements:
(1) verified petition must be filed with the RTC of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located
(2) civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest must be made
parties to the proceedings
(3) time and place for hearing must be published in a newspaper of general
circulation
As these basic jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the present case,
we cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
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VDA. DE CATALAN V. CATALAN-LEE
DOCTRINE: Aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which maybe recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid ac-cording to their national law.
FACTS: Orlando B. Catalan, a naturalized American citizen,allegedly obtained a
divorce in the United States from his first wife, Felicitas Amor. He then contracted
a second marriage with petitioner.
When Orlando died intestate in the Philippines, petitioner filed with the RTC a
Petition for the issuance of letters of administration for her appointment as
administratrix of the intestate estate. While the case was pending, respondent
Louella A. Catalan-Lee, one of the children of Orlando from his first marriage, filed
a similar petition with the RTC. The two cases were consolidated.
Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the petition filed by the respondent on the
ground of litis pendentia. Respondent alleged that petitioner was not considered
an interested person qualified to file the petition. Respondent further alleged that
a criminal case for bigamy was filed against petitioner by Felicitas Amor
contending that petitioner contracted a second marriage to Orlando despite
having been married to one Eusebio Bristol.
However, the RTC acquitted petitioner of bigamy and ruled that since the
deceased was a divorced American citizen, and that divorce was not recognized
under Philippine jurisdiction, the marriage between him and petitioner was not
valid. The RTC took note of the action for declaration of nullity then pending filed
by Felicitas Amor against the deceased and petitioner. It considered the pending
action to be a prejudicial question in determining the guilt of petition-er for the
crime of bigamy. The RTC also found that petitioner had never been married to
Bristol.
The RTC subsequently dismissed the Petition for the issuance of letters of
administration filed by petitioner and granted that of private respondent.
Contrary to its findings in Crim. Case No. 2699-A, the RTC held that the marriage
between petitioner and Eusebio Bristol was valid and subsisting when she
married Orlando. The RTC held that petitioner was not an interested party who
may file said petition. The CA affirmed the decision of the lower court.
ISSUES: 1. Whether the acquittal of petitioner in the crim. case for bigamy meant
that the marriage with Bristol was still valid.
 2. Whether the divorce obtained abroad by Orlando may be recognized under
Philippine jurisdiction.
HELD: It is imperative for the trial court to first determine the validity of the
divorce to ascertain the rightful party to be issued the letters of administration
over the estate of Orlando. Petition is partially granted. Case is remanded to RTC.
1. No. The RTC in the special proceedings failed to appreciate the finding of the
RTC in Crim. Case that petitioner was never married to Eusebio Bristol. It
concluded that, because petitioner was acquitted of bigamy, it follows that the
first marriage with Bristol still existed and was valid.
2. Yes. Under the principles of comity, Philippine jurisdiction recognizes a valid
divorce obtained by a spouse of for-eign nationality. Aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law. Nonetheless, the fact of divorce must still first be
proven by the divorce decree itself. The best evidence of a judgment is the
judgment itself. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may
be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official
publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of
the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer
in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
Moreover, the burden of proof lies with the “party who alleges the existence of a
fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action.” In civil cases,
plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint
when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of
proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce new
matters. It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial
notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved.
It appears that the trial court no longer required petitioner to prove the validity of
Orlando’s divorce under the laws of the United States and the marriage between
petitioner and the deceased. Thus, there is a need to remand the proceedings to
the trial court for further reception of evidence to establish the fact of divorce.
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FUJIKI vs. MARINAY
Doctrine: Recognition of foreign judgment declaring nullity of marriage – A
recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an
action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment,
which presupposes a case which was already tried and decided under foreign law.
Article 26 of the Family Code further confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to
extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without
undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. The
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides that “[w]here a
marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him
or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law.”
FACTS:
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki), a Japanese national married respondent Maria
Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines on January 23, 2004. Sadly,
petitioner Fujiki could not bring respondent Marinay back to Japan and they
eventually lost contact with one another. In 2008, Marinay met Shinichi Maekara
and they married without the earlier marriage being dissolved.
Marinay suffered abuse from Maekara and so she left him and was able to
reestablish contact with Fujiki and rekindle their relationship. The couple was
able to obtain a judgment in a Japanese court that declared Marinay's marriage
to Maekara void on the ground of bigamy in 2010. Fujiki then filed a petition in
the RTC entitled: “Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of
Absolute Nullity of Marriage)”. In this case, petitioner prayed that:
(1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous
marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initio under Articles
35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines; and (3) for the RTC to direct
the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court
judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to
endorse such annotation to the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar
General in the National Statistics Office (NSO).
The trial court dismissed the petition on the ground that it did not meet standing
and venue requirements as prescribed on the Rule on Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC), specifically, only the spouses (i.e. Marimay or Maekara) may file
an action for declaration of nullity of marriage. Petitioner in a Motion for
Reconsideration claimed that the case should not be dismissed as the above rule
applied only to cases of annulment of marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity and not in a petition for recognition of a foreign judgment. Notably,
when the Solicitor General was asked for comment, it agreed with the Petitioner
stating that the above rule should not apply to cases of bigamy and that insofar as
the Civil Registrar and the NSO are concerned, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
provide the procedure to be followed. Lastly, the Solicitor General argued that
there is no jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a void marriage under Rule 108,
citing De Castro v. De Castro and Niñal v. Bayadog which declared that “[t]he
validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to
recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or
her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.
HELD:
YES. Firstly, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a
petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage
where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-
Llave v. Republic, this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only
the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage
“does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy.”
The Supreme Court further held that:
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of
a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner
only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To
be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence
and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39,
Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court. Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family
Court judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a certification or copy
attested by the officer who has custody of the judgment. If the office which has
custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the certification may be made by
the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan
and authenticated by the seal of office.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not
require relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know
the foreign laws under which the foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot
substitute their judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity of the
foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine
courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of
evidence.
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the
Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law, the
Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public policy,
as bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article 35(4)
of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment
in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section
48(b) of the Rules of Court.
A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an
action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment,
which presupposes a case which was already tried and decided under foreign law.
Article 26 of the Family Code further confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to
extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without
undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. The
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides that “[w]here a
marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him
or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law.”
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Perez vs Catindig
FACTS: Atty. Tristan A. Catindig admitted to Dr. Elmar Perez that he was already
wed to Lily Corazon Gomez. Atty. Catindig told Dr. Perez that he was in the process
of obtaining a divorce in a foreign country to dissolve his marriage to Gomez, and
that he would eventually marry her once the divorce had been decreed.
Consequently, sometime in 1984, Atty. Catindig and Gomez obtained a divorce
decree from the Dominican Republic.
On July 14, 1984, Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in the State of Virginia in the
United States of America (USA).
Years later, Dr. Perez came to know that her marriage to Atty. Catindig is a nullity
since the divorce decree that was obtained from the Dominican Republic by the
latter and Gomez is not recognized by Philippine laws. Sometime in 1997, Dr.
Perez reminded Atty. Catindig of his promise to legalize their union by filing a
petition to nullify his marriage to Gomez.
Sometime in 2001, Dr. Perez alleged that she received an anonymous letter in the
mail informing her of Atty. Catindig’s scandalous affair with Atty. Baydo, and that
sometime later, she came upon a love letter written and signed by Atty. Catindig
for Atty. Baydo dated April 25, 2001. In the said letter, Atty. Catindig professed his
love to Atty. Baydo, promising to marry her once his “impediment is removed.”
On October 31, 2001, Atty. Catindig abandoned Dr. Perez and their son; he moved
to an upscale condominium in Salcedo Village, Makati City where Atty. Baydo was
frequently seen.
Atty. Catindig, in his Comment, admitted that he married Gomez on May 18,
1968. He claimed, however, that immediately after the wedding, Gomez showed
signs that she was incapable of complying with her marital obligations. Eventually,
their irreconcilable differences led to their de facto separation in 1984.
Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew of the foregoing, including the fact
that the divorce decreed by the Dominican Republic court does not have any
effect in the Philippines.
Atty. Catindig claimed that his relationship with Dr. Perez turned sour.
Eventually, he left their home in October 2001 to prevent any acrimony from
developing.a
He denied that Atty. Baydo was the reason that he left Dr. Perez.
For her part, Atty. Baydo denied that she had an affair with Atty. Catindig.
IBP – recommended the disbarment of Atty. Catindig for gross immorality,
violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Complaint against Atty. Baydo – dismissed for dearth of evidence.
ISSUE: WON the respondents committed gross immorality, which would warrant
their disbarment.
HELD: YES.
RATIO: The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
Canon 7 – A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.cralawred
In this regard, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that a lawyer
may be removed or suspended from the practice of law, inter alia, for grossly
immoral conduct.
“A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing any fault
or deficiency in his moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.” Immoral
conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a
moral indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the
community. Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a
criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when
committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the
community’s sense of decency. The Court makes these distinctions, as the
supreme penalty of disbarment arising from conduct requires grossly immoral,
not simply immoral, conduct.roblesvirtuallawlibrary
Contracting a marriage during the subsistence of a previous one amounts to a
grossly immoral conduct.
The facts gathered from the evidence adduced by the parties and, ironically, from
Atty. Catindig’s own admission, indeed establish a pattern of conduct that is
grossly immoral; it is not only corrupt and unprincipled, but reprehensible to a
high degree.
Moreover, assuming arguendo that Atty. Catindig’s claim is true, it matters not
that Dr. Perez knew that their marriage is a nullity. The fact still remains that he
resorted to various legal strategies in order to render a façade of validity to his
otherwise invalid marriage to Dr. Perez. Such act is, at the very least, so
unprincipled that it is reprehensible to the highest degree.
Further, after 17 years of cohabiting with Dr. Perez, and despite the various legal
actions he resorted to in order to give their union a semblance of validity, Atty.
Catindig left her and their son. It was only at that time that he finally decided to
properly seek the nullity of his first marriage to Gomez. Apparently, he was then
already entranced with the much younger Atty. Baydo, an associate lawyer
employed by his firm.
While the fact that Atty. Catindig decided to separate from Dr. Perez to pursue
Atty. Baydo, in itself, cannot be considered a grossly immoral conduct, such fact
forms part of the pattern showing his propensity towards immoral conduct. Lest it
be misunderstood, the Court’s finding of gross immoral conduct is hinged not on
Atty. Catindig’s desertion of Dr. Perez, but on his contracting of a subsequent
marriage during the subsistence of his previous marriage to Gomez.
Atty. Catindig’s subsequent marriage during the subsistence of his previous one
definitely manifests a deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the
marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws. By his own
admission, Atty. Catindig made a mockery out of the institution of marriage,
taking advantage of his legal skills in the process. He exhibited a deplorable lack
of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the bar, which thus
warrant the penalty of disbarment.
There is insufficient evidence to prove the affair between the respondents.
As it is, the evidence that was presented by Dr. Perez to prove her claim was mere
allegation, an anonymous letter informing her that the respondents were indeed
having an affair and the purported love letter to Atty. Baydo that was signed by
Atty. Catindig.
The Court has consistently held that in suspension or disbarment proceedings
against lawyers, the lawyer enjoys the presumption of innocence, and the burden
of proof rests upon the complainant to prove the allegations in his complaint. The
evidence required in suspension or disbarment proceedings is preponderance of
evidence.
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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, – versus – MARELYN TANEDO
MANALO,
On January 20, 2012, respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed a
petition for cancellation of entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan,
Metro Manila, by virtue of a judgment of divorce rendered by a Japanese court.
The petition was later amended and captioned as a petition for recognition and
enforcement of a foreign judgment.
The petition alleged, among others, that: Petitioner is previously married in the
Philippines to a Japanese national named YOSHIDO MINORO;
Recently, a case for divorce was filed by petitioner in Japan and after due
proceeding, a divorce decree was rendered by the Japanese Court;
The trial court (RTC) denied the petition for lack of merit. In ruling that the
divorce obtained by Manalo in Japan should not be recognized, it opined that,
based on Article 15 of the New Civil Code, the Philippine law “does not afford
Filipinos the right to file a divorce, whether they are in the country or living
abroad, if they are married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated their
marriage in the Philippines or in another country” and that unless Filipinos “are
naturalized as citizens of another country, Philippine laws shall have control over
issues related to Filipino family rights and duties, together with determination of
their condition and legal capacity to enter into contracts and civil relations,
including marriages”.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) overturned the RTC decision. It held that
Article 26 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code) is applicable even if
it was Manalo who filed for divorce against her Japanese husband because the
decree they obtained makes the latter no longer married to the former,
capacitating him to remarry. Conformably with Navarro, et al. v. Exec. Secretary,
et al. [663 Phil. 546 (2011)] ruling that the meaning of the law should be based on
the intent of the lawmakers and in view of the legislative intent behind Article 26,
it would be the height of injustice to consider Manalo as still married to the
Japanese national, who, in turn, is no longer married to her. For the appellate
court, the fact that it was Manalo who filed the divorce case is inconsequential.
Issue:
Whether a Filipino citizen, who initiated a divorce proceeding abroad and
obtained a favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated
to remarry, has the capacity to remarry pursuant to Article 26 (2) of the Family
Code.
Ruling: Yes.Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of “a divorce x x x validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry”. Based on a clear
and plain reading of the provision, it only requires that there be a divorce validly
obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse
should be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was
granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or
the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding.
The purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where
the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign
divorce decree that is effective in the country where it is rendered, is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse...
The purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where
the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign
divorce decree that is effective in the country where it is rendered, is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse. The provision is a corrective measure to address
the anomaly where the Filipino spouse is tied to the marriage while the foreign
spouse is free to remarry under the laws of his or her country. Whether the
Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree
dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry
will have the same result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a
husband or a wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the
same place and in like circumstance as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an
alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision should not make a
distinction. In both instance, it is extended as a means to recognize the residual
effect of the foreign divorce decree on Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien
spouses are severed by operation of the latter’s national law.

There is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino who initiated a

foreign divorce proceeding and a Filipino who obtained a divorce decree upon the
instance of his or her alien spouse. In the eyes of the Philippine and foreign laws,
both are considered Filipinos who have the same rights and obligations in an alien
land. The circumstances surrounding them are alike. Were it not for Paragraph 2
of Article 26, both are still married to their foreigner spouses who are no longer
their wives/husbands. Hence, to make a distinction between them are based
merely on superficial difference of whether they initiated the divorce proceedings
or not is utterly unfair. Indeed, the treatment gives undue favor to one and
unjustly discriminate against the other.

Thus, a Filipino citizen, who initiated a divorce proceeding abroad and obtained a
favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry,
has the capacity to remarry pursuant to Article 26 (2) of the Family Code.