PEOPLE VS PATALIN 311 SCRA 186

Facts: Alfonso Patalin and Alex Mijaque, herein accused were convicted of Robbery with Multiple Rape committed in the
evening of August 11, 1984 against the Aliman family. They were meted the supreme penalty of death. At the time the crimes
charged were committed in 1984, robbery with rape was punishable by death, however, by virtue of the ratification of the
1987 Constitution, the death penalty was abolished and all death penalties already imposed were reduced to reclusion
perpetua. The decision for the present case was promulgated on June 14, 1995, after the effectivity of RA 7659 which
restored the death penalty. Appellants now contend that the trial court erred in imposing the death penalty as the same was
suspended upon ratification of the 1987 Constitution.

Issue: When the death penalty was abolished in 1987 and was retroactively applied to herein accused, did they gain a vested
right thereto so that any future law restoring the death penalty would no longer cover them?

Held: Although at the time of the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution the present case was still its trial stage, it is clear that
the framers intended the provision to have a retroactive effect on pending cases without any penalty of death having been
imposed yet. The retroactive effect may be given during three possible stages of a criminal prosecution: a) when the crime
has been committed and the prosecution began; b) when sentence has been passed but service has not begun; and c) when
the sentence is being carried out. The abolition of the death penalty benefits herein accused by virtue of Art 22 of the RPC
which provides that penal laws shall have retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of the felony who is not a
habitual criminal. Hence, they are subject to a reduction of penalty from death to reclusion perpetua. A subsequent statute
cannot be applied retroactively as to impair a right that accrued under the old law.

Fil estate vs Homena Valencia

For resolution is a Motion for Reconsideration[1] dated 19 November 2007 filed by petitioners Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. and
Blue-waters Resort and Country Club, seeking reconsideration of the Decision[2] of this Court dated 15 October 2007 which
denied their petition.

A brief recapitulation of the relevant facts, even though they have already been narrated in the Decision, is in order.

In 1998, private respondent Sullian Sy Naval filed a complaint[3] against petitioners, seeking the recovery of a parcel of land
which petitioners had allegedly taken possession of by constructing a golf course within the vicinity of her property. Counsel
for petitioners failed to attend the pre-trial, and only private respondent presented evidence before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Aklan which heard the complaint. The RTC rendered a decision[4] in favor of private respondent of which petitioners
moved for reconsideration.

The crux of the present matter lies with the facts surrounding the motion for reconsideration. The motion was filed on 10
May 2000,[5]thirteen (13) days after petitioners received their copy of the RTC's decision. On 26 July 2000, the RTC issued an
order[6] of even date denying the motion. Petitioners alleged in their petition that they received the order denying the
motion for reconsideration on 9 August 2000. They filed a Notice of Appeal on 11 August 2000,[7] but the postal money
orders purchased and obtained to pay the filing fee were posted

only on 25 August 2000, or beyond the reglementary period to perfect the appeal. Consequently, the RTC denied the
appeal[8] and such denial was sustained by the Court of Appeals after petitioners filed a special civil action for
certiorari[9] assailing the RTC's refusal to give due course to the appeal.

The Petition[10] before this Court relied on a rather idiosyncratic theory that only upon the adoption of the amendments to
Section 13, Rule 41 of the Rules of Civil Procedure effective 1 May 2000 did it become obligatory on the part of trial courts to
dismiss appeals on account of the failure to pay the full docket fees. The Court, in its 15 October 2007 Decision,[11] rejected
this theory and reaffirmed the rule ordaining the disallowance of the appeal or notice of appeal when the docket fee is not
paid in full within the period for taking the appeal.

The present Motion for Reconsideration[12] centers on a different line of argument: that following our 2005 decision
in Neypes v. Court of Appeals,[13] their Notice of Appeal was perfected on time as the full docket fees were paid within
fifteen (15) days from their receipt of the RTC's order denying their motion for reconsideration. Neypes has established a new
rule whereby an appellant is granted a fresh 15-day period, reckoned from receipt of the order denying the motion for
reconsideration, within which to perfect the appeal.

Petitioners clarify that they received the RTC's order denying their motion for reconsideration on 11 August 2005,[14] a fact
which is confirmed by the case records even though the petition had misstated that said order was received on 9 August 2005.
Petitioners argue that following Neypes, they were entitled to a new 15-day period, i.e., until 26 August 2005 or one (1) day
after they had posted the full appellate docket fees, to perfect the appeal.

Most vitally, petitioners point out that on 10 October 2007, or just five (5) days before the promulgation of the assailed
Decision, the Court through the Third Division rendered a decision in Sps. De los Santos v. Vda. De Mangubat[15] declaring
that the Neypes ruling indeed can be retroactively applied to prior instances.

Private respondent filed her Comment[16] on the Motion for Reconsideration. She insists that Neypes should not be
retroactively applied, but she fails to cite any authority on that argument or otherwise contend with the ruling in Sps. De
los Santos.

The determinative issue is whether the "fresh period" rule announced in Neypes could retroactively apply in cases where the
period for appeal had lapsed prior to 14 September 2005 when Neypes was promulgated. That question may be answered
with the guidance of the general rule that procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage, there being no vested rights in the rules of procedure.[17] Amendments to
procedural rules are procedural or remedial in character as they do not create new or remove vested rights, but only operate
in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights already existing.[18]

Sps. De los Santos reaffirms these principles and categorically warrants that Neypes bears the quested retroactive effect, to
wit:

Procedural law refers to the adjective law which prescribes rules and forms of procedure in order that courts
may be able to administer justice. Procedural laws do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive
law, or the general rule against the retroactive operation of statues they may be given retroactive effect on
actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and this will not violate any right of a person
who may feel that he is adversely affected, insomuch as there are no vested rights in rules of procedure.

The "fresh period rule" is a procedural law as it prescribes a fresh period of 15 days within which an appeal
may be made in the event that the motion for reconsideration is denied by the lower court. Following the
rule on retroactivity of procedural laws, the "fresh period rule" should be applied to pending actions, such as
the present case.

Also, to deny herein petitioners the benefit of the "fresh period rule" will amount to injustice, if not
absurdity, since the subject notice of judgment and final order were issued two years later or in the year
2000, as compared to the notice of judgment and final order inNeypes which were issued in 1998. It will be
incongruous and illogical that parties receiving notices of judgment and final orders issued in the year 1998
will enjoy the benefit of the "fresh period rule" while those later rulings of the lower courts such as in the
instant case, will not.[19]

Notably, the subject incidents in Sps. De los Santos occurred in August 2000, at the same month as the relevant incidents at
bar. There is no reason to adopt herein a rule that is divergent from that in Sps. De los Santos.

We have reexamined the petition to ascertain whether there is any other impediment to granting favorable relief to
petitioners based on the retroactive application of the Neypes doctrine.

Private respondent does argue in her comment on the petition[20] and on the motion for reconsideration[21] that
petitioners' special civil action for certiorari before the Court of Appeals was not timely lodged. This argument is premised on
petitioners' requested relief that direct that proceedings de novo be had starting from pre-trial, by annulling the RTC's
decision and the court's ruling on the motion for reconsideration, which was filed by petitioners beyond the 60-day period
mandated by Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for filing a special civil action for certiorari.

Petitioners, in their Reply,[22] argue that the certiorari action was timely filed since the RTC had disallowed the notice of
appeal in its 13 September 2000 Order, a copy of which was received by petitioners on 22 September 2000 or within the
60-day period prior to the filing of their certiorari petition.

Certainly, the RTC's order denying the notice of appeal was timely assailed by petitioners via a special civil action filed with
the Court of Appeals. Granting positive relief on that point would have the effect of giving due course to the notice of appeal.
But is there basis for this Court to take the extra step as requested by petitioners and go as far as to annul the RTC's rulings
that granted the complaint filed by private respondent?

We deem the challenges raised by petitioners against the correctness of the RTC's decision and its subsequent resolution on
the motion for reconsideration as inappropriate for this Court to decide. Such issues may very well be tackled in petitioners'
appeal before the Court of Appeals. After all, as is now conceded, the appeal was timely filed and the existence of such
appeal would, per Section 1, Rule 65, bar the certiorari action from correcting errors which may be reversed on appeal.
Besides, the resolution of such issues requires a certain level of factual determination, especially as to the circumstances
surrounding the resignation of the counsel who had initially appeared in behalf of the petitioners, the service of the order
resetting the pre-trial and all subsequent notices of trial to petitioners after private respondent had been allowed to present
evidence ex parte. Unlike the Court of Appeals, this Court is not a trier of facts.[23]

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is GRANTED and the instant petition is GRANTED IN PART. The assailed rulings of
the Court of Appeals and the RTC Order dated 13 September 2000 are SET ASIDE. The Court of Appeals is DIRECTED to give
due course to petitioners' appeal in Civil Case No. 5626, and to hear and decide such appeal with deliberate dispatch. No
pronouncement as to costs.

D. M. CONSUNJI, INC., petitioner,vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA J. JUEGO, respondents.

FACTS: Jose A. Juego was crushed to death when the platform he was then on board and performing work, fell. And the
falling of the platform was due to the removal or getting loose of the pin which was merely inserted to the connecting points
of the chain block and platform but without a safety lock. Jose Juego’s widow, Maria, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pasig a complaint for damages against the deceased’s employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer raised, among other
defenses, the widow’s prior availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund. RTC rendered a decision in favor of the
widow Maria Juego. On appeal by D. M. Consunji, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto. D. M.
Consunji now seeks the reversal of the CA decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not Maria Juergo can still claim damages with D.M. Consunji apart from the death benefits she claimed in
the State Insurance Fund.

HELD: Yes. The respondent is not precluded from recovering damages under the civil code.

As a general rule a claimant has a choice of either to recover from the employer the fixed amounts set by the Workmen’s
Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinary civil action against the tort fees or for higher damages but he cannot pursue
both courses of action simultaneously. But There is an exception is where a claimant who has already been paid under the
Workmen’s Compensation Act may still sue for damages under the Civil Code on the basis of supervening facts or
developments occurring after he opted for the first remedy. The choice of the first remedy based on ignorance or a mistake
of fact, nullifies the choice as it was not an intelligent choice.
Here, the CA held that private respondent’s case came under the exception because private respondent was unaware of
petitioner’s negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits from the State Insurance Fund. Private respondent filed
the civil complaint for damages using the police investigation report to support her complaint may just be an afterthought
after receiving a copy of the Memorandum of the Prosecutor’s Office dismissing the criminal complaint for insufficiency of
evidence. This court is more inclined to believe appellee’s allegation that she learned about appellant’s negligence only after
she applied for and received the benefits under ECC. This is a mistake of fact that will make this case fall under the exception

Payments already made to private respondent pursuant to the Labor Code shall be deducted therefrom. In all other respects,
the Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

Chinese Young Men vs Remington

Remington Steel Corporation[3] (Remington) leased ground floor units 964 and 966 and second floor unit 963 of a
building owned by the Manila Downtown YMCA (YMCA) in Benavidez St., Binondo, Manila. Remington used the combined
areas of ground floor units 964 and 966 as hardware store, offices, and display shops for its steel products, as well as a
passageway to second floor unit 963 which was used as staff room for its Manila sales force.

On February 27, 1997, YMCA formally terminated the lease over second floor unit 963 and gave Remington
until March 31, 1997 to vacate the premises. On March 24, 1997, Remington filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) ,
Manila a case for the Fixing of Lease Period over unit 963, docketed as Civil Case No. 154969-CV. On April 8, 1997, YMCA filed
in the same court an action for Unlawful Detainer involving the same unit 963 against Remington, docketed as Civil Case No.
155083-CV. The two cases were consolidated before Branch 26 of MeTC-Manila (MeTC-Branch 26).

During the pendency of Civil Case Nos. 154969-CV and 155083-CV, Remington filed a Petition for Consignation of
Rentals on the ground that YMCA refused to receive rentals for ground floor units 964 and 966, docketed as Civil Case No.
155897 and assigned to Branch 24 of MeTC-Manila (MeTC-Branch 24). On June 23, 1998, Remington filed a Formal Surrender
of the Leased Premises,[4] opting to surrender possession of units 964 and 966 effective July 1, 1998 and tendering two checks
to cover all past rentals due on the two units. On June 25, 1998, YMCA filed a No Objection to the Turn Over of the Leased
Premises at #964 and 966 Benavidez St., Binondo, Manila.[5] On July 9, 1998, MeTC- Branch 24 issued an Order[6] declaring
the consignation case closed.

Remington, however, continued to use ground floor units 964 and 966 as passageway to second floor unit 963. It
kept the premises padlocked and failed to give YMCA the keys to the premises.

On August 11, 1998, MeTC-Branch 26 rendered a Decision in Civil Case Nos. 154969-CV and 155083-CV extending for
three years from finality of the decision the lease period on second floor unit 963 and dismissed YMCA's complaint
for ejectment.

On August 21, 1998, Remington filed in MeTC-Branch 26 a Motion to Constitute Passageway alleging that it had no
means of ingress or egress to second floor unit 963. MeTC-Branch 26 assigned a Commissioner to conduct an ocular
inspection. He reported that Remington was still in possession of the keys to ground floor units 964 and 966 because YMCA
failed to provide an adequate passageway to second floor unit 963. The issue on the passageway, however, was not resolved
by MeTC-Branch 26, for it had to forward the records of the case to Branch 30, Regional Trial Court, Manila (RTC-Branch 30)
in connection with the appeals taken by the parties from its decision, docketed as Civil Case Nos. 99-93836 and 99-93837.
 On March 15, 2000, RTC-Branch 30, acting as an appellate court, rendered a Decision[7] in Civil Case Nos. 99-93836
and 99-93837 granting Remington a longer extension period of five years for second floor unit 963 and ordering YMCA to
provide a two-meter passageway between units 964 and 966.

Dissatisfied, YMCA filed an appeal with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 58957. On September 19, 2003, the CA
held that the lower courts had authority to fix an extension of the lease period. It found that although the lease contract had
expired, Remington's continued occupation of unit 963 resulted in a new lease on a month-to-month basis, which subsisted
for over a year; thus, while YMCA had the right to seek its termination, Remington was entitled to a judicial lengthening of its
period based on equity. Nonetheless, the CA ordered Remington to vacate the premises, as the continuation of the lease was
no longer tenable after the lapse of six years, since the parties' formal contract had expired. It also noted that since
Remington had already transferred to its own building, there was no more reason to continue the lease. Remington filed a
Motion for Reconsideration, which the CA considered as moot, for Remington had vacated the premises.

It bears stressing that the facts of the present case and those of G.R. No. 171858 are substantially the same. The only
difference is the unit involved; G.R. No. 171858 involves unit 966 while the present case involves unit 964. The opposing
parties are likewise the same. Clearly, in the light of the final Resolution dated August 31, 2007 in G.R. No. 171858, which the
Court follows as precedent, Remington unlawfully withheld possession of the leased premises because its constructive
delivery did not amount to an effective transfer of possession to YMCA. It is the Courts duty to apply the previous ruling in the
final Resolution dated August 31, 2007 in G.R. No. 171858 to the instant case. Once a case has been decided one way, any
other case involving exactly the same point at issue, as in the present case, should be decided in the same manner.

The doctrine of stare decisis enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It requires courts in a country to follow the rule
established in a decision of the Supreme Court thereof. That decision becomes a judicial precedent to be followed in
subsequent cases by all courts in the land. The doctrine of stare decisis is based on the principle that once a question of law
has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument.[14]

In Chinese Young Men’s Christian Association of the Philippine Islands v. Remington Steel Corporation,[15] the Court
expounded on the importance of the foregoing doctrine, stating that:

The doctrine of stare decisis is one of policy grounded on the necessity for securing certainty and stability of judicial decisions,
thus:

Time and again, the court has held that it is a very desirable and necessary judicial practice that when a court has laid down
a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases in
which the facts are substantially the same. Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Stand by the decisions and disturb not what
is settled. Stare decisis simply means that for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be applied to
those that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may be different. It proceeds from the
first principle of justice that, absent any powerful countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike. Thus,
where the same questions relating to the same event have been put forward by the parties similarly situated as in a previous
case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue