Risk Analysis, Vol. 26, No. 1, 2006 DOI: 10.1111/j.1539-6924.2006.00705.

Risk-Based Integrity and Inspection Modeling (RBIIM)

of Process Components/System

Faisal I. Khan,1 ∗ Mahmoud M. Haddara,1 and Subrata K. Bhattacharya1,2

Process plants deal with hazardous (highly flammable and toxic) chemicals at extreme con-
ditions of temperature and pressure. Proper inspection and maintenance of these facilities
is paramount for the maintenance of safe and continuous operation. This article proposes a
risk-based methodology for integrity and inspection modeling (RBIIM) to ensure safe and
fault-free operation of the facility. This methodology uses a gamma distribution to model the
material degradation and a Bayesian updating method to improve the distribution based on
actual inspection results. The method deals with the two cases of perfect and imperfect inspec-
tions. The measurement error resulting from imperfect inspections is modeled as a zero-mean,
normally distributed random process. The risk is calculated using the probability of failure and
the consequence is assessed in terms of cost as a function of time. The risk function is used
to determine an optimal inspection and replacement interval. The calculated inspection and
replacement interval is subsequently used in the design of an integrity inspection plan. Two
case studies are presented: the maintenance of an autoclave and the maintenance of a pipeline
segment. For the autoclave, the interval between two successive inspections is found to be
19 years. For the pipeline, the next inspection is due after 5 years from now. Measurements
taken at inspections are used in estimating a new degradation rate that can then be used to
update the failure distribution function.

KEY WORDS: Failure modeling; integrity assessment and evaluation; quantitative risk assessment; risk-
based inspection; risk-based maintenance

1. INTRODUCTION nancial investment, and the environment against

Maintaining the integrity of a large number of
aging process components is a subject of prime im-
portance to process companies all over the world. In
Canada, there are more than 250,000 km of pipelines
carrying natural gas, crude oil, and petroleum prod-
ucts (Pandey, 1998). To protect the public, the fi-
1 Faculty of Engineering & Applied Science, Memorial University
of Newfoundland, St John’s, NL, A1B 3X5, Canada.
2 Department of Ocean Engineering, Indian Institute of Technol-
ogy, Chennai, 600 036, India.
∗ Address correspondence to Faisal I. Khan, Faculty of Engineering
& Applied Science, Memorial University of Newfoundland, St
John’s, NL, A1B 3X5, Canada; fkhan@engr.mun.ca.
the consequences of failures occurring to these sys-
tems, an assessment of the condition of existing in-
frastructure (major process units, pipelines, etc.) is
necessary. The condition assessment quantifies the
degradation of the material and provides a basis
for the decision-making process regarding preventive
maintenance and/or replacement. With limited main-
tenance resources, it is essential that the available
funds be spent where they are most effective in re-
ducing potential risks (Concord, 1993; Pandey, 1998).
The traditional methods of assessing the condi-
tion of process systems are based on a deterministic
load-resistance methodology in which the integrity
of the components is evaluated by comparing the

203 0272-4332/06/0100-0203$22.00/1 
C 2006 Society for Risk Analysis
204
current operating conditions with a design-limit state
beyond which the component cannot operate safely.
Load-resistance methods have the disadvantage that
they often yield somewhat conservative results, lead-
ing to potentially unnecessary repairs and inspections
that result in an overall increase in maintenance costs.
Use of deterministic methods does not provide in-
formation about potential risk that results in the
unrealistic maintenance planning for process plants
(Desjardins, 2002).
Risk is defined as multiplication of the probabil-
ity of failure and its likely consequence. Risk-based
methods aim at identifying, characterizing, quantify-
ing, and evaluating the likelihood of the loss caused
as a result of the occurrence of a specific event. The
use of risk-based methods for the management of the
process components provides reliable quantification
of potential risks. This provides an alternative strat-
egy for the maintenance of assets instead of the use of
simple ranking (prioritizing) based on reported fail-
ure occurrences.
This approach also provides a means for quan-
titatively establishing future reliability levels for the
components. These levels can be used as a basis for
optimizing reinspection intervals. The uncertainties
associated with the design and operation of process
components have led to an increasing use of risk-
based approaches in making decisions regarding asset
integrity management.
In risk-based inspection (RBI) strategy risk is
used as a criterion to prioritize inspection tasks for the
components in a process plant. This provides many
advantages, which include (1) an increase in plant
availability, (2) a decrease in the number of failure
occurrences, (3) a reduction in the level of risk due
to failure, and (4) a reduction in the direct inspec-
tion cost of the plant. Operational safety of a pro-
cess plant increases as a result of decreasing the num-
ber of failure occurrences and the potential risk due
to failure. This makes RBI a useful strategy to meet
the rising societal expectations regarding operational
safety of complex onshore and offshore process fa-
cilities. These expectations resulted in a number of
regulations that the oil and gas industry has to meet.
The last two decades saw a number of studies that at-
tempted to address the subject. Different methodolo-
gies were suggested to meet maintenance planning re-
quirements. These methodologies range from the fully
qualitative to the fully quantitative. A brief summary
of these approaches is presented in the subsequent
section.
Khan, Haddara, and Bhattacharya
2. AVAILABLE RISK-BASED APPROACHES
Since the late 1980s, numerous quantitative, semi-
quantitative, and qualitative models have been devel-
oped to aid plant engineers with the prioritization of
components inspections. In the following sections, we
outline briefly these methods.
2.1. Qualitative Approaches
Qualitative risk index approaches assign subjec-
tive scores to the different factors that are thought to
influence the probability and consequences of failure
(Muhlbauer, 1992; Cagno et al., 2000; Dey & Gupta,
2001). These scores are then combined using simple
formulas to give an index representing the level of
risk. Risk index approaches provide a ranking of the
different process components based on the perceived
level of risk estimated. The ranking obtained by us-
ing these methods is highly subjective. In addition,
these approaches do not provide any indication of
whether the risk associated with a component is un-
acceptable and consequently no guidance is provided
regarding whether any risk reduction action is nec-
essary. The index system scoring format suggested
by Muhlbauer (1992) accounts for the use of in-line
inspection tools to locate metal loss corrosion by
awarding up to 8 points out of a maximum of
400 points representing resistance to failure (i.e., 2%).
This underestimates the benefits of high-resolution
pigging, which is known to result in significant re-
ductions to the large percentage of failures that are
attributable to corrosion (20–40% of all failures).
Therefore, index systems provide at best an ap-
proximate risk-based ranking of process components,
which has serious limitations when being used as a
basis for integrity management decision making.
2.2. Quantitative Approaches
These approaches determine the level of risk
based on direct estimates of the probability and/or
consequences of failure. Current quantitative risk as-
sessment approaches focus on a single aspect of the
consequence associated with failure. Published stud-
ies deal with either loss of life risk or economic risk
(Hill, 1992; Concord, 1993; Nessim & Stephens, 1995;
Pandey, 1998; Nessim et al., 2000).
Integration of environmental damage, life safety,
and economic risks has not been addressed ad-
equately. Another limitation of quantitative risk
Risk-Based Integrity and Inspection Modeling
assessment approaches is that they typically base the
failure probability estimates on historical failure rates.
Publicly available databases do not usually allow sub-
division of the failure data according to the attributes
of a specific process component and where adequate
subdivision is possible, the amount of data associ-
ated with a particular attribute set is very limited be-
cause of the rarity of the failures. Failure probabilities
estimated from public data are, therefore, not suffi-
ciently specific to represent a given failure in a specific
process component.
Another approach to calculate failure probabil-
ity is based on the concept of structural reliability
that includes Markovian models and hot spots on a
component-by-component basis (a number of inter-
esting articles may be seen in Journal of Infrastruc-
ture Systems). The effect of the correlation from one
hot spot to another has been investigated by Lotsberg
et al. (1998), Faber and Sorensen (1999), Brown and
May (2000), and Montgomery and Serratella (2002).
Faber et al. (2000, 2003) proposed an informal decision
analysis where the number of considered elements is
reduced in a consistent and systematic way. However,
due to the numerical effort required and the stabil-
ity of the method such an approach did not prove to
be practical. Straub and Faber (2000) indicated that
an integrated approach to the decision problem that
is suitable for industrial purposes has not yet been
developed.
2.3. Semi-Quantitative Approaches
Semi-quantitative approaches were developed to
provide a practical and easy tool to be used for de-
signing maintenance programs that optimize the use
of resources and in the meantime ensure effective and
efficient asset management. These approaches use
semi-quantitative models for consequence estimation
as well as failure probability calculations. Examples of
these approaches can be found in Khan and Haddara
(2003a, 2003b), Khan and Haddara (2004), and Khan
et al. (2004). It is easily employed in process plants and
to components like pipelines or pressure components.
These approaches provide a tool to ascertain that the
estimated risk of failure satisfies a predetermined ac-
ceptance criterion (Khan et al., 2004; Willcocks & Bai,
2000; Dey, 2004).
The risk-based inspection and maintenance ap-
proach discussed by Willcocks and Bai (2003) uses
a failure modes effect analysis to identify the failure
modes of system components and their consequences.
It then uses failure patterns and rates to calculate the
205
probability of failure, and it determines the risk to
be used in inspection and maintenance planning. De-
pending on the level of risk for each mode and pattern
of failure, the required analysis, inspection, mainte-
nance, and repair tasks are selected. For example, a
review of historical failure databases indicates that
the major failure modes in a pipeline are internal cor-
rosion and external impact. Thus, the main efforts (in
terms of design, structural modeling, inspections, etc.)
should be focused on these failure modes. Of course,
this is a simple example of risk-based inspection and
maintenance. In practice, more specific details about
the specific pipeline need to be considered.
Guidelines to help hydrocarbon and process
chemical industries in establishing risk-based inspec-
tion programs on fixed equipment and piping were
issued by the American Petroleum Institute (API,
2002). This document describes a recommended
practice for developing risk-based maintenance pro-
grams. The document does not preclude the use of any
of the three methodologies mentioned above, but out-
lines the limitations of each methodology. This docu-
ment explains the basic elements for developing and
implementing a risk-based inspection program.
2.4. Maintenance Optimization
A large number of articles were published on the
subject of optimizing maintenance through the use
of mathematical models (Montgomery & Serratella,
2000; Khan & Haddara, 2003a, 2003b; Willcocks &
Bai, 2003; Dey, 2004). Most maintenance optimiza-
tion models are based on lifetime distributions or
Markovian deterioration models. It is often difficult to
collect enough data for estimating the parameters of
a lifetime distribution or the transition probabilities
of a Markov chain. This presents an obstacle in the
way of using these models to design practical mainte-
nance programs. The combined use of the reliability
index methods and the limit state approach may prove
helpful in removing this drawback.
Typically, structural reliability methods are used
to estimate the probability of failure of components
or structures. In these methods, the condition of the
material is described by a state function g. The state
function represents the strength margin that the ma-
terial has over the applied load. Thus, the limit-state
function, gt is defined as
gt = R − L, (1)
where R is the strength of the material and L is the
applied stress.
206
As degradation of material occurs and operat-
ing conditions change, material strength and applied
stress become random functions of time. Thus, the
limit-state function becomes a stochastic process. A
failure model can be developed based on the limit-
state function approach and allowing for material
degradation variability, operating conditions variabil-
ity, and measurement errors. Data collected during in-
spections provide a means to update the failure model
through the use of Bayes’s theorem.
Risk-based maintenance takes into consideration
the consequence of failure as well as the probability
of failure. In this article, the consequence is measured
in terms of the cost of failure in addition to the cost
of the inspection/maintenance program.
3. QUANTITATIVE RISK-BASED INTEGRITY
AND INSPECTION MODELING (RBIIM)
RBIIM aims at modeling inspection tasks to
achieve safe operating conditions at minimum cost.
Determining the relationship between inspections
periodicity on one side and the level of safety and
maintenance costs on the other, provides an insight
into the application of the as low as reasonable prac-
ticable (ALARP) principle. In order to implement
an integrated RBIIM approach, it is necessary first
to formulate acceptance criteria for each function
of the plant facility. Thereafter, the relationship be-
tween each function and the performance of the
various components responsible for achieving this
function is established. To simplify the implemen-
tation, the acceptance criteria for each function of
the facility are transformed into acceptance criteria
for the individual components. Subsequently, risk as-
sessment is performed relating the event of compo-
nent failure to the consequences in terms of monetary
losses. The main objectives of RBIIM are:
1. To identify critical equipment in a process
plant. These are pieces of equipment that have
a high level of risk.
2. To develop an optimum inspection and main-
tenance strategy for the equipment that will
guarantee the integrity of the plant.
Fig. 1 depicts the overall framework designed to
achieve these objectives. The framework comprises
five stages. These are: identification of equipment
to be analyzed, identification of degradation mech-
anisms for each component, calculation of the risk
associated with the failure of each component, deter-
Khan, Haddara, and Bhattacharya
mination of an optimal inspection policy (interval) for
each component, and development of a comprehen-
sive policy for the plant integrity assessment.
3.1. Material Degradation Mechanisms
Material degradation is a common cause of pro-
cess components failure. Material degradation can be
caused by one or more mechanisms. These include:
internal and external thinning due to corrosion; stress
corrosion cracking; brittle fracture; and fatigue due to
vibration. These mechanisms cause material deterio-
ration and thus affect the ability of the component to
withstand the applied load.
Two basic models will be used in this work to
describe material degradation mechanisms: a thin-
ning model and a crack model. The thinning model
is used to describe the reduction in the thickness of
the component’s material as a result of internal or
external corrosion. The crack model is used to de-
scribe the reduction of the load-carrying capacity of
the component as a result of cracks. Cracks may result
from stress corrosion, brittle fracture, or fatigue (see
Kallen, 2002).
3.1.1. Thinning Model
Corrosion wear failure is a complex failure mode
in which a component is affected by a combination of
corrosion and wear. Continuous wear results in mate-
rial thinning, which may be localized or can spread
over a large surface area. In the former, material
degradation is seen in the form of pitting, while in the
latter, a general thickness loss occurs. Carbon steel or
copper are usually more susceptible to general thin-
ning, while stainless steels and higher alloy materi-
als are usually more prone to localized thinning and
pitting.
The state function in this case, gt , is defined as
   
C × t P×D
gt = R − St = S 1 − − , (2)
d 2×d
where R is material resistance, St is the applied stress,
S is material strength, C is corrosion rate, P is operat-
ing pressure, D is the diameter of the component, d is
the material thickness, and t is a time increment.
Corrosion can occur on the internal or external
surface of the component. The same thinning model
can be used for both cases; however, the corrosion
rate may differ from one case to the other.
The state function gt , is a measure of the ability
of the material to resist failure. Failure will occur only
if the magnitude of the function gt reaches zero.
Risk-Based Integrity and Inspection Modeling 207

Divide the system into independent

(process) components, e.g., vessel, pipeline
segments, reactors, etc.

Select one component at a time and

identify possible degradation mechanisms

Model component
failure using a gamma
stochastic process
Estimate the
consequence using cost
Develop a prior for each data for inspection,
degradation mechanism failure, and replacement

Obtain past
inspection Determine failure
Fig. 1. Framework of risk-based integrity results for the probability using a
and inspection modeling methodology. unit under posterior and past
investigation inspection results

Risk calculations

Estimate optimal inspection and

replacement intervals

Have all
components been
considered?

Develop inspection plan for the

integrity of the process system

Equation (2) can be used to define a margin of PD

safety in terms of material thickness. Assuming a lin-
ear degradation model, the incremental wall thickness
loss (x) during an element of time t, is given by
 
PD
x = Ct = 1 − d.
2dS
The margin of safety in terms of the minimum re-
quired material thickness, mt , is then obtained as
mt = d − . (4)
2S
3.1.2. Stress Corrosion Cracking Model
Stress corrosion cracking (SCC) failure occurs
(3)
when the applied stresses on a component in a corro-
sive environment generate a field of localized surface
cracks, usually along grain boundaries, which renders
the component incapable of performing its function.
208
There are many material/environmental combina-
tions within which SCC can occur. They include caus-
tic cracking, amine cracking, carbonate cracking, sul-
fide stress cracking, hydrogen-induced cracking, and
polythionic acid cracking, and chloride cracking for
stainless steels (Kallen, 2002).
The SCC state function uses a resistance minus
stress model based on Paris’s crack growth law used
in linear elastic fracture mechanics,
 
PD √ 3.2. Material Degradation Model
gc = KIC − Y +S π A, (5)
2d
where KIC is the material fracture toughness, Y is a
dimensionless geometric factor, S is residual stress,
and A is the crack depth.
The crack depth, A, is determined by
lcr = Ccr t n ,
lcr (6)
A= , their variables. For instance, the strength S, the cor-
Rl/a
where lcr , Ccr , and Rl/a are the characteristic crack
length, the crack growth rate, and the crack to length-
to-depth (thickness) ratio, respectively. The value
of KIC , material fracture toughness, is taken to be
300 ksi(in)1/2 (10,425 MPa (mm)1/2 ) for stainless steel.
The material fracture toughness for carbon and low
alloy steel may be calculated using the following for-
mula (Kallen, 2002):
KIC
  √
= Minimum 33.2 + 2.806e(0.02(T+100)) , 200 ksi in.
Equation (6) can be used to derive an expression for
the incremental increase in crack depth as
⎡ ⎤2
Rl/a ⎢ ⎥
⎢ KIC
⎥ . vantages: it has a nonnegative distribution and it is
x = Ccr t = ⎣ ⎦ (7)
π PD
Y +S
2d
The safety margin for wall thickness, mc , becomes
mc = d − Ccr t. (8)
3.1.3. Brittle Fracture and Fatigue
At low temperatures carbon steels may suffer
a brittle fracture at loads significantly below the in-
tended design loads. This is because carbon steels lose
their ductility as the temperature is lowered. The tem-
perature at which ductility is lost is called the transient
temperature. While most materials are designed to
operate well above the transition temperature, some
materials in older plants may still operate near or
Khan, Haddara, and Bhattacharya
below the transition temperature and as a result are
susceptible to brittle fracture. Furthermore, vibration
may cause components to fail prematurely. Improp-
erly supported piping near vibration sources is prone
to fatigue. In contrast to the other degradation mech-
anisms discussed above, this mechanism is modeled
using a simple indexing methodology (Kallen, 2002).
In the previous section, we reviewed the differ-
ent mechanisms that control material degradation.
The net degradation of the material is the total sum
of degradations that take place as a result of one or
more of the above-mentioned mechanisms. Although
the above-mentioned mechanisms are deterministic,
there is a level of uncertainty associated with some of
rosion rate C, and the operating pressure, P in the
thinning model, and KIC , Y, P, S, and A in the stress
corrosion cracking mechanism, have uncertainty as-
sociated with their values. Therefore, these variables
have to be considered random and the material degra-
dation process is expected to be a stochastic process.
Let us define the accumulated material degrada-
tion measured at a certain point in time t, to be the
sum of the incremental degradations that occurred
from the start of service till time t. Let us also as-
sume that the incremental material degradations are
independent, exponentially distributed random vari-
ables. Then, the cumulative degradation from the start
of service till time t, X(t), is a gamma-distributed
stochastic process with stationary increments. The
gamma-distributed stochastic process has many ad-
easy to manipulate.
A gamma density function with a shape parame-
ter α, and a scale parameter β, where α and β > 0, is
given by
βα
f (x) = (x)α−1 e−βx for x > 0. (9)
(α)
For the thinning model, the cumulative degradation is
assumed to be linear in time. Thus, the shape param-
eter, α, will be replaced by a linear function of time
α = α o t.
The probability density function describing the
cumulative wall thickness degradation, X(t), is de-
scribed by Equation (10):
Risk-Based Integrity and Inspection Modeling 209

β αo t The parameters of the gamma process, X(t), are cal-

f X(t) (x) = (x)αot−1 e−βx for x > 0. (10)
(αot) culated as
 μ 2 μ
This distribution will be used to describe cumulative αo = and β = 2 . (17)
material degradation caused by each individual degra- σ σ
dation mechanism described above. Substituting for the parameters of the density func-
Thus, the mean and variance of the cumulative tion, one gets
degradation in the wall thickness, X(t), are given by  tn
α0 1 ν2
μ X(t) = E[X(t)] = t = μt,
β μν 2 tn − x
f X(t) (x) =  n  (x)ν 2 −1 e ν 2 μ
αo t
σ X(t) = Var[X(t)] = 2 t 2 = σ 2 t.
2 (11) 
β ν2


The parameters of the gamma process, X(t), are cal- 1 n 1


= Ga x  2 t , .
culated as ν μν 2 (18)
 μ 2 μ
αo = and β = 2 . (12) Similarly, the above equation can be represented in
σ σ terms of a single variable conditional gamma function
It is common practice to express the standard devia- G as
tion (σ ) in terms of the mean (μ) through the use of 

1 1
a coefficient of variance (υ): σ = υ μ. Using this re- G x  2 t n ,
ν μν 2
lationship, the gamma density function for corrosion
 tn
can be rewritten as 1 ν2
 t
1 ν2 μν 2 tn − x
= f X(t) (x) =  n  (x)ν 2 −1 e ν 2 μ . (19)
μν 2 − x t
  (x)ν 2 −1 e ν 2 μ . 
t
f X(t) (x) = (13)
t ν2

ν2 These gamma density functions are subsequently used
In this expression the average corrosion rate (μ) is the in the inspection updating for the cases of perfect and
only uncertain parameter that would vary with time. imperfect inspections.
Considering this, the above expression can be repre-
sented in terms of single-variable Bayesian gamma 3.3. Inspection Updating Modeling
conditional function G as


1 1 The results of inspection can be effectively used in

G x  2 t, updating the prior knowledge of the average degrada-
ν μν 2
 t tion rate (μ). This updating could be best done using
1 ν2 Bayesian updating. Bayes’s theorem provides a for-
μν 2 − x mal and structured approach that can be used to up-
  (x)ν 2 −1 e ν 2 μ = f X(t) (x).
t
= (14) date the prior based on component data gained from
t
 actual inspections. Inspection updating modeling in-
ν2
volves two main steps: (1) selection of an appropriate
For stress corrosion cracking, the cumulative crack prior, and (2) Bayesian updating of the prior using
depth is assumed to be a function of tn . Thus, in this new inspection data. Bayesian updating can be ap-
case α = α ot n and the density function becomes plied for the two cases: perfect or imperfect inspection
β αo t data. Bayesian updating is widely discussed in the lit-
 (x)αot −1 e−βx
n
f X(t) (x) =  for x > 0. (15) erature; excellent reviews are given by Kallen (2002)
 αo t n
and Kallen and Noortwijk (2003).
The mean and variance for the cumulative wall thick-
ness degradation become
αo 3.3.1. Step I—Selection of a Prior
μ X(t) = E[X(t)] = t n = μt n ,
β Bayes’s theorem indicates that a posterior proba-
αo bility can be obtained from an assumed prior prob-
σ X(t) = Var[X(t)] = 2 t n = σ 2 t n .
2 (16)
β ability when modified based on new knowledge
210 Khan, Haddara, and Bhattacharya

(information). A number of probability distributions 3.3.2. Step II(i)—Posterior: Perfect

have the special property that if used in Bayes’s the- Inspection Updating
orem as a prior distribution and the new informa-
The conditional prior density function for the de-
tion is used in the form of a random variable with
crease in the thickness of the material, X(t), can be
a certain distribution, the posterior distribution has
expressed as
the same distribution as the prior. These pairs of
distributions are called conjugate distributions, ex- l(x | μ)π (μ)
amples of which are normal-normal-normal, normal- π (μ | x) =  ∞ , (21)
lognormal-normal, and gamma-exponential-gamma l(x | μ)π (μ) dμ
0
distributions (see Harr, 1987).
Following the suggestions made by van Noortwijk where π (μ) is the prior density for μ, and l(x | μ)
and van Gelder (1996), Kallen (2002), and Kallen and is the likelihood of a measurement x given μ.
van Noortwijk (2003), the inverted gamma distribu- Kallen (2002) used Equation (21) to obtain a
tion is used here as a prior distribution. The inverted posterior density function for the loss in the mate-
gamma density is given as rial thickness for the perfect inspection case, π (μ | x),
given by
 a+1     
ba 1 b  t x
IX(t) (x) = exp − for x ≥ 0. 
π (μ | x) = IX(t) μ  2 + α, 2 + β , (22)
(a) x x υ υ
(20)
where α and β are the parameters of the prior density.
An inverted gamma density fits very well as a prior Consider the case when the inspection is repeated
density function for the material degradation caused n times, thus, n measurements x1 at time t1 , x2 at
by corrosion and stress corrosion cracking. The den- t2 , . . . , xn at tn are carried out. The posterior for the
sity is nonnegative and has a longer tail, which repre- loss in the material thickness can be written as
sents uncertainty over higher degradation rates. Fig. 2 π (μ | x1 , . . . , xn )
depicts the simple discrete prior density and also the   
 n
ti − ti−1 n
xi − xi−1
continuous version of this density function. The in- 
= IX(t) μ  + α, +β .
verted gamma density function has been fitted to  i=1 υ2 i=1
υ2
the discrete prior given in Fig. 2, through the use of
simulation. (23)

80

70

60

50 Discrete prior (based on expert opinion)

Density (%age)

Inverted gama prior

40 Fig. 2. Discrete prior based on available

information and inverted gamma prior
fitted to these data.
30

20

10

0
0.00 0.06 0.11 0.17 0.22 0.28 0.34 0.39 0.45 0.50 0.56 0.60 0.70
Degradation rate (mm/year)
Risk-Based Integrity and Inspection Modeling 211

 ∞
If one considers that xo = 0 at to = 0, then the posterior
l(y | μ)π (μ) dμ
actually depends only on the last inspection, because 0
the standard deviation (σ ) is expressed in terms of the  ∞ ∞    
1 1
mean (μ). Therefore, the above expression reduces to = G y − ε  2 t n , fε (ε) dε π (μ) dμ.
0 ε=0 υ μυ 2
π (μ | x1 , . . . , xn )
   (28)
 n n
 tn xn This integral can also be approximated by the follow-
= π (μ | xn ) = IX(t) μ  + α, +β .
 i=1 υ 2 υ2 ing summation:
i=1  ∞
(24) l(y | μ)π (μ) dμ
0
Perfect inspections do not usually happen in real life;     

n 
k 1 n 1
it is thus important to model imperfect inspections as ≈ G y − ε  2 t , p(ε j ) p(μi ),
well. i=1 j=1
υ μυ 2
(29)
3.3.3. Step II(ii)—Posterior: Imperfect where p(μi ) = Pr{μ = μi } is the discrete density of
Inspection Model μ. Using these results, the posterior is approximated
as
This model is based on the approach discussed
p(μi | y)
by Newby and Dagg (2002), and Kallen and van  
   
Noortwijk (2003). Let us consider a stochastic pro- k 1 n 1
p(μi ) 
G y− ε 2t , p(ε j )
cess Y(t) given by υ μυ 2
j=1
Y(t) = X(t) + ε, (25) = n     ;
  k 1 n 1
p(μi ) G y − ε  2 t , p(ε j )
where ε is the error in the measurement. The error, ε, υ μυ 2
i=1 j=1
is considered to be a zero mean normal process with
a standard deviation σ ε . Y(t) is the degradation mea- for i = 1, . . . , n.
(30)
sured (material lost) during an inspection at time t. In case of multiple imperfect inspections, we need the
A brief description of the posterior density for- product of the individual likelihoods for the measured
mulation and solution algorithm is presented here; increments
for more details see, Kallen (2002) and Kallen and 
van Noortwijk (2003). The likelihood of a measure- l(y1 , . . . , yk | μ) = lY(tk)−Y(tk−1 ) (yk − yk−1 | μ).
k
ment y given the degradation rate μ is (31)
l(y | μ) = fY(t) (y) Using the convolution integral as before, the above
 ∞ likelihood can be rewritten as
= f X(t)+ε (x) = f X(t) (y − ε) fε (ε) dε, l(y1 , . . . , yk | μ)
−∞
(26)  ∞  ∞
= ... f X(tk)−X(tk−1 ) (yk − yk−1 − δk)
where f X (t) (y − ε) is the likelihood of the gamma in- −∞ −∞ k
crement, X(t), having parameters α and β. To solve
the above integral, we replace the integral in Equa- × f (δ1 , . . . , δk) dδ1 , . . . , dδk, (32)
tion (26) by a summation where δ k = ε k − ε k−1 . Because the δs are not indepen-

n
   dent, the likelihood can be approximated as
fY(t) (y) ≈ G y − εi  αot n , β p(εi );  
i=1

l(y1 , . . . , yk | μ) = E f Dk(dk − δk)
where p(εi ) = 1. (27) k

Equation (27) was developed for a nonlinear material 1 N

 j
degradation model: a linear model can be obtained by ≈ f Dk dk − δk as N → ∞, (33)
N j=1
substituting n = 1.
Using the parameters of the gamma density func- where Dk = X(t k ) − X(t k−1 ) and dk = yk − yk−1 . In
tion, the denominator in Equation (21) becomes the last step we used the strong law of large numbers
212 Khan, Haddara, and Bhattacharya

to approximate the expectation of a function through risk. We will adopt an optimization criterion that has
the use of simulation (see Kallen, 2002). been suggested by Wagner (1975). This criterion is re-
For each k, we sample ε k (j = 1, . . . , N) and calcu- ferred to as “the average cost over unbound region.”
j j j
late δ k = ε k − ε k−1 . Because the gamma distribution This criterion is derived using renewal theory and uses
f Dk = G(x | α[t k − t k−1 ], β) is not defined for x < 0, the concept of a component’s lifecycle. The length of
j
we need to make sure that the condition (dk − δ k ) ≥ this cycle spans the time from the start of the service
0 is satisfied. until a renewal is affected. Renewal consists of either
l(y1 , . . . , yk | μ) a preventive or a corrective replacement. The risk fac-
 tor is calculated as the ratio of the expected costs per
 
1  N 
 j  tk − tk−1 1
 cycle over the expected cycle length. A brief formu-
≈ Ga dk − min δk , dk  , .
N j=1 k υ2 μυ 2 lation of this criterion is presented below (for details,
(34) see van Noortwijk, 2000, 2003).
We will model the maintenance tasks as a dis-
The posterior for multiple imperfect inspections can crete renewal process. In this case, the component
now be obtained as returns to the as-good-as-new condition after each
p(μi | y) replacement. A discrete renewal process {N(n), n =
   1, 2, 3, . . . } is a nonnegative integer-valued stochas-
1 N     t 1
j 
p(μi ) Ga dk − min δk , dk  2 , tic process that registers the successive renewals in
N j=1 k  υ μυ 2
= n   ,
the time interval (0, n). Let the renewal times T 1 , T 2 ,
 1 N     t 1 T 3 , . . . , be nonnegative, independent, identically dis-
j 
p(μi ) Ga dk − min δk , dk  2 , tributed, random quantities having a discrete proba-
i=1
N j=1 k  υ μυ 2
bility function
(35)
Pr {Tk = i} = pi , where i = 1, 2, . . . ,
for i = 1, . . . , n and t k = t k − t k−1 .

∞
We now have a Bayesian updating model that ac- and pi = 1, (36)
cepts the results of multiple imperfect inspections. The i=1
advantage of using the simulation technique to calcu-
where pi represents the probability of a renewal at
late the posterior density as a function of the degra-
time i. The cost (consequence) associated with a re-
dation rate is that one can use different levels for the
newal at time i is denoted by ci , i = 1, 2, 3, . . . . The
magnitude of the error in each inspection.
risk factors (expected average costs per unit time)
are determined by simply averaging the risk factor
3.4. Risk-Based Optimal Inspection
over an unbounded horizon. The expected risk over a
Interval Calculation
bounded horizon (0, n), denoted by R(φ, τ ), is given
Determining an optimal integrity inspection by
and/or maintenance action is a problem of optimiza- n
 
tion under uncertainty. The most comprehensive ap- R(φ, τ ) = pi ci + E(τ (n − i)) ,
proach for solving such a problem is through the use i=1

of decision theory, which provides a systematic and for n = 1, 2, 3, . . . , and τ (0) ≡ 0. (37)
consistent way to evaluate the alternatives and iden-
tify an optimal choice (see Nessim & Stephens, 1995; The cost associated with the occurrence of the event
Nessim et al., 2000; Goyet et al., 2002). T i = i is ci plus the additional expected cost during the
In the previous steps, we have developed a model interval (i, n), i = 1, . . . , n. Using the discrete renewal
to calculate the probability of failure of a process com- theorem, the risk factor (expected average costs per
ponent as a function of time. In order to calculate the unit time) is expressed as
risk, we have to calculate the consequences associated E(cycle risk)
with that failure. In the present study, we estimate the R(φ, τ ) =
E(cycle length)
consequence in terms of the cost incurred as a result
of failure. Having estimated the risk, we will use it ∞
ci (φ, τ ) pi (φ, τ )
to decide when to inspect and when to replace the E(Ci ) i=1
component. In other words, we intend to determine = = , (38)
E(I) ∞
the maximum length of time between two consecutive i pi (φ, τ )
inspections that would result in a minimum accepted i=1
Risk-Based Integrity and Inspection Modeling 213

where ci and pi are the cost incurred during a unit 4. CASE STUDIES
of time i and the probability of renewal during this
4.1. An Autoclave
time, respectively. φ{m, ρ} represents the replace-
ment level, which is the ratio of the material degrada- Geary (2002) presented a review of risk-based
tion to the critical safety margin. It is calculated for inspection approaches practiced in the United King-
each time interval τ . The random variable I is the cy- dom. Four different case studies were performed by
cle length with a cycle cost of cI . Considering replace- seven different agencies. In the present article, we
ment cycle as the time period between two renewals, will apply the methodology outlined above to the
the numerator of Equation (38) represents expected case study no. 3 of Geary’s report: an autoclave. We
cycle risk and the denominator is the expected cycle will determine the optimal inspection interval for this
length (mean lifetime). Equation (38) can be rewrit- component. A brief description of the autoclave is
ten as presented here and the input data used in the study is
given in Table I.
R(φ, τ )
  4.1.1. Process Details

n 
∞
ci (φ, τ ) pi (φ, τ, μ | P, S . . .) p (μ j |
y) The autoclave reactor is filled with water at 75◦ C
j=1 i=1
=   , and pressurized to 10 Barg. The pressure is subse-

n 
∞
quently released and water is then agitated and a vac-
i pi (φ, τ, μ | P, S . . .) p (μ j |
y)
uum is applied to evacuate air from the empty space.
j=1 i=1
(39) Subsequently, an ammonium sulfate solution (as a
catalyst) is introduced along with tetrafluoroethylene
(TFE) (in a gaseous state). TFE is immediately poly-
where π (μ | y) is the posterior density, (p(μj | y)) is the merized by the water. The temperature of the exother-
discrete version of the posterior density over a given mic reaction is controlled by cooling the water jacket
number of the measurements, y = y1 , y2 , . . . , yk . (circulating water at 15◦ C). The process operates in
In order to include the uncertainty over the var- batches, 3 cycles per day for 48 weeks in a year.
ious material and operating characteristics such as The vessel has been inspected three times and the
pressure (P) and material strength (S), we can sam- results of the inspections are given in Table I. This unit
ple these variables from their respective probability has been studied using the methodology outlined in
distribution functions. It is better to include the un- the previous sections and results are briefly discussed
certainty over the degradation rate in the simulation, below.
instead of using a discrete solution. The advantage of
using a simulation technique is that the degradation
rate, μ, can be sampled before we go into the loops to 5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
calculate the expected average risk. Also, there will be The prior and posterior density functions for thin-
no extra loop needed if we assume that other param- ning and cracking in the autoclave’s material are
eters such as the pressure, P, and material strength, shown in Figs. 3 and 4, respectively. It may be observed
S, are also uncertain. The solution in this case is given from Fig. 3 that the posterior supports the prior. The
by posterior for perfect inspections shows a tall peak at
a corrosion rate of 0.185 mm/year, which is compara-
tively higher than the prior peak. Peaks for the pos-
E|R(φ, τ )|
  terior (imperfect inspections) and the prior occur at
1 N ∞
  almost the same location (0.11 mm/year). This indi-
ci (φ, τ ) pi φ, τ | μ , P , S . . .
j j j
cates that the results of the inspection (with possible
N j=1 i=1
=   , errors in the measurements) confirm the suitability of
I n 
∞
  the originally assumed thinning rate.
i pi φ, τ | μ , P , S . . .
j j j
In case of crack growth, the peak of the poste-
N j=1 i=1
rior (perfect inspections) function occurs at a degra-
(40) dation rate of 0.2 mm/year, which is much higher than
where E|R(φ, τ )| denotes expected average risk and that for the prior given as 0.012 mm/year and the
is measured as dollar per unit time. posterior for the imperfect inspections occurring at
214 Khan, Haddara, and Bhattacharya

Background information Vessel manufactured in 1980

Design temperature 100◦ C and pressure 25 Barg
Operating temperature 8–95◦ C and pressure 10 Barg
Autoclave dimensions
Material of construction
Active damage mechanism
Inspection history
Other Parameters
Tensile strength
Operating pressure
Corrosion rate
Crack growth rate
Corrosion allowance
n (power function for crack
growth rate)
Crack length to depth ratio
Inspection cost
Preventive replacement cost
Failure cost
5 ft diameter; 11 diameter, 1 in. wall thickness
Stainless steel 321, carbon steel jacket
Stress corrosion cracking
Internal thinning
Three inspections
Material loss (thinning): mean 0.7 mm 0.9 mm 1.5mm,
CoV 0.50
Crack growth: mean: 0.06 mm 0.3 mm 0.6 mm, CoV 0.20
Values Table I. Input Details for Autoclave
Mean 515 MPa, coefficient of variance (CoV) 0.20
Mean 3.2 MPa, CoV 0.05
Mean 0.1 mm/year; CoV 0.25
Mean 0.01 mm/year; CoV 0.25
4.5 mm
0.50
6
$15,000
$30,000
$3,000,000

a rate of 0.04 mm/year. This indicates that the poste-
rior function for the perfect inspections represents an
idealized condition and does not represent the actual
degradation mechanism in this case. Furthermore, the
prior and posterior functions for the imperfect in-
spections are fairly close together, which indicates
that they give a better representation of the actual
situation.
Calculations for the life cost were made using the
imperfect inspections assumption and considering all
possible variations in the operating parameters. The
results are shown in Figs. 5 and 6 for the thinning and
cracking mechanisms, respectively. It can be seen from
Fig. 5 that the replacement time is 43 years and that the
failure time is about 212 years. There are two minima
observed in the plot. The first is at 43 years (which

30

25
prior
postprior
post_imp_prior
20
post_imp_prior_CDF
Density

15 Fig. 3. Prior and posterior density

distribution for corrosion degradation
mechanism.
10

0
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
Corrosion rate (mm/year)
Risk-Based Integrity and Inspection Modeling 215

70 1.2

60
1

50

Cummulative density function

0.8

40 prior

Density
postprior
0.6
Fig. 4. Prior and posterior density post_imp_prior
distribution for crack growth. 30 post_imp_prior_CDF

0.4
20

0.2
10

0 0
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45
Crack growth rate (mm/year)

coincides with the replacement interval length) and whereas the failure time is calculated to be 554 years.
the second is at 203 years. The second minimum is This plot has also two minima: one at 85 years and the
a mathematical result that has little meaning in real other at 535 years. The second minimum is imprac-
life. The first minimum, which occurs at 43 years, is tical. Now, as the autoclave has already survived for
the one of interest. Considering that the component 24 years, the next inspection should be done within
has already survived for 24 years, the next inspection the next 50 years, assuming SCC to be the only degra-
should be within 19 years. dation mechanism. These results were obtained by
It is evident from Fig. 6 (crack growth) that pre- considering the effects of only one degradation mech-
ventive replacement time is estimated at 91 years anism at a time. This is partially responsible for the

18000

16000

14000
Average cycle cost ($/year)

12000

10000
Average cycle cost
Replacement time
Fig. 5. Average inspection cost/year for
8000 Failure time
corrosion degradation mechanism.

6000

4000

2000

0
0 50 100 150 200 250
Inspection interval (years)
216
6000
5000
Average cycle cost ($/year)
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
0 100 200
Inspection interval (years)
rather long inspection interval. The second reason for
the long inspection interval is the fact that we have
used a relatively slow crack growth rate.
Considering both degradation mechanisms to be
acting at the same time, it is evident that the autoclave
should be inspected at a maximum of 19 years from
now. The analysis suggested here can be used repeat-
edly to modify the inspection interval based on newer
inspection data.
6. A PIPELINE
Pandey (1998) studied the probabilistic models
for the assessment of the condition of a pipeline us-
ing in-line inspection data. He used a segment of
an oil and gas pipeline of 914 mm diameter and
8.74 mm wall thickness to illustrate his approach. We
will consider the same case considered by Pandey
(1998) to illustrate the approach developed in the
present work. Input data used in this example are
given in Table II. Pandey (1998) showed that the
time of inspection should be between 5 and 20 years
depending upon the repair criteria (considering corro-
sion to be the only degradation mechanism). He also
concluded that a single inspection after 10 years with
a repair criterion of 1.4 would minimize the pipeline
failure probability to 0.01 per km over 25 years.
7. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
This is a comparatively new segment of the oil
and gas pipeline and had only one regular inspection.
Khan, Haddara, and Bhattacharya
Average cycle cost
Replacement time
Failure time Fig. 6. Average cycle cost ($/year) for
cracking degradation mechanism.
300 400 500 600
As may be seen from Fig. 7 (for thinning), the peaks
of the prior and the posterior functions are very much
separated from each other. The prior is more spread as
compared to the posterior (perfect and imperfect in-
spections). The posterior distribution for imperfect in-
spections shows the least spread. The results for crack
growth rate are shown in Fig. 8. In this case the peaks
of the posterior functions occur at degradation rates
of 0.2 and 0.195 mm/year for imperfect and prefect
inspections, respectively. These peaks are away from
the prior peak, which occured at a degradation rate
of 0.12 mm/year.
A detailed cost analysis is conducted for both
degradation mechanisms based on the posterior for
imperfect inspections. The results are shown in Figs. 9
and 10. When corrosion is the dominant degradation
mechanism, it was found that the preventive replace-
ment time is 14 years and the failure time is 26 years
(see Fig. 9). The results considering SCC to be the
dominant mechanism are 23 years for the replacement
and 62 years for failure (see Fig. 10). It is evident that
the thinning degradation mechanism is fast and thus
must be used as the basis in inspection planning. The
cost curve has two minima, one at 10 years and the
other at 22 years. The first minimum occurring at an
interval of 10 years (though not the global minimum)
is a more conservative basis for inspection. Since the
pipeline has already been in operation for 5 years,
the next inspection is due in 5 years. The measure-
ments obtained from the next inspection can then be
used to update the distribution and to predict a better
Risk-Based Integrity and Inspection Modeling
Background information
Pipe dimensions
Material of construction
Active damage mechanism
Inspection history
Other Parameters
Table II. Input Details for Segment of Yield strength
Oil and Gas Pipeline Operating pressure
Corrosion rate
SCC rate
Corrosion allowance
n (power function for crack
growth rate)
Crack length-to-depth ratio
Inspection cost
Preventive replacement cost
Failure cost
estimate for the following inspection time. If data ob-
tained from the next inspection support the current
posterior then the following inspection will coincide
with the preventive replacement of this pipeline. The
optimum inspection intervals are calculated, based
50
45
40
35
30
Density
25
Fig. 7. Prior and posterior distribution
for corrosion degradation mechanism.
20
15
10
0
0 0.05 0.1
217
5 years of operation
Design temperature 120◦ C and pressure 7.0 MPa
Operating temperature 40◦ C and pressure 5.7 Barg
914 mm diameter; 1 km length, 8.74 mm wall thickness
Steel grade × 60
Stress corrosion cracking
Internal thinning
One inspection, defect of depth (mean) 0.5 mm, CoV 0.20
Values
Mean 461 MPa, coefficient of variance (CoV) 0.20
Mean 5.7 MPa, CoV 0.05
Mean 0.15 mm/year; CoV 0.25
Mean 0.1 mm/year; CoV 0.25
2.5 mm
0.50
6
$5,000
$10,000
$100,000
on SCC degradation mechanism, as 20 and 55 years.
Because corrosion effects are more dominant in the
case of a pipeline, the SSC-based inspection interval
is not of importance. However, in the next inspection
(5 years from now) inspection for crack growth should
prior
postprior
post_imp_prior
post_imp_prior_CDF
0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45
Corrosion rate (mm/year)
218 Khan, Haddara, and Bhattacharya

14 1.2

12
1

10

Cumulative density function

0.8

8
prior
Density

postprior 0.6 Fig. 8. Prior and posterior density

post_imp_prior distribution for cracking growth in
6 post_imp_prior_CDF
pipeline.
0.4
4

0.2
2

0 0
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
Crack growth rate (mm/year)

also be conducted to verify the posterior and subse- cess components. The material degradation rate can
quent analysis. be linear or nonlinear. The method allows the up-
dating of the probability density function for the ma-
terial degradation, using a Bayesian approach. Thus,
the failure rate can be adjusted based on actual mea-
8. CONCLUSIONS
surements made during inspections. The updated fail-
In this work, we have presented a method for the ure rate obtained reflects the changes in operating
determination of optimal maintenance intervals for and environmental conditions. The inspection inter-
process components. The method takes into account vals obtained are more reliable because they are
the random nature of material degradation of pro- based on actual measurements. The method takes into

7000

6000

5000
Average cycle cost ($/year)

4000 Average cycle cost

Replacement time
Failure time Fig. 9. Average inspection (cost/year) for
3000 corrosion degradation on pipeline.

2000

1000

0
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Inspection interval (years)
Risk-Based Integrity and Inspection Modeling 219

1800

1600

1400

Average cost per cycle ($/year)

1200

Average cycle cost

1000 Replacement time
Fig. 10. Average inspection cost ($/year) Repair time

for crack degradation mechanism in 800

pipeline.
600

400

200

0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Inspection interval (years)

consideration the random error that may be as- pipeline case study, it took about 5 hours of computa-
sociated with the measurements obtained during tion time on a personal computer with an Intel Pen-
inspection. tium 4 (clocks at 1.81GHz) and 256 MB RAM.
The method optimizes maintenance intervals However, the method can be easily programmed
based on the risk associated with component failure. and the data required can be easily obtained from
The optimization criterion is based on a level of risk operational records and original design documents.
that satisfies the acceptable risk criteria. Using risk
as an optimization criterion allows the maintenance
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
interval to be a function of both the probability of fail-
ure as well as the consequences of this failure. Proper The authors gratefully acknowledge the finan-
attention can then be devoted to the maintenance of cial support of Natural Science and Engineering Re-
critical equipment. search Council (NSERC) under a discovery grant and
The gamma distribution seems to describe the Canada Foundation of Innovation (CFI) new oppor-
material degradation process well. Results obtained tunity award.
using the assumption that measurements obtained
during inspections are imperfect are more realistic
NOMENCLATURE
than those assuming perfect measurements.
The method has been applied to two case studies: A Crack depth, mm
an autoclave and a pipeline. The results obtained for D Diameter of the component (vessel,
these two case studies are in general agreement with pipe, etc.), mm
results discussed in the literature. Results of the case C Corrosion rate, mm/year
studies presented above show that the method pro- Ccr Crack growth rate, mm/year
duces reliable estimates for the inspection intervals. cmax Corrosion allowance, mm
The optimal inspection intervals given by the model ci (ρ, k) Costs incurred during unit time (i −
for the case studies considered are reasonable and in 1, i) as a function of replacement
general agreement with results obtained using differ- percentage and inspectional inter-
ent approaches. val, $
The main disadvantage of the method is that C(ρ, k) Expected average costs per unit
it is computationally intensive. For the autoclave time as function of replacement
case study, the simulation using 200 samples (coded percentage and inspection interval,
in MATLAB) took about 8 hours, whereas for the $/year
220
E(X) Expectation of the random variable
X cessive inspections, ε k and ε k−1
f X (X) Probability density function of the
random variable X
G State function, dimensionless
Ga(x | α, β) Gamma density of X as a function
of x with the shape parameter α and
the scale parameter β
Ig(x | α, β) Inverted gamma density of X as a
function of x with the shape param-
eter α and the scale parameter β
KIC Material fracture toughness,
MPa(mm)1/2
lcr Characteristic crack length, mm
L(μ | x) Likelihood of the variable μ given
the measurement x
m Safety margin, the amount of degra-
dation at which the component is as-
sumed to fail, dimensionless
N Crack growth exponent; for exam-
ple, PWHT components n = 0.25
and for non-PWHT components n
= 0.50.
P Operating pressure, kPa
P(μ | y) Conditional probability of failure
due to wall loss y, given degradation
rate μ
Rl/a Crack length-to-depth (thickness)
ratio; it is considered as 6
R Material resistance, MPa
R(φ, τ ) Risk factor, dollar per unit time
E|R(φ, τ )| Expected average risk factor, dollar
per unit
S Material strength, MPa
St Applied stress, MPa
thickness Thickness of the material of con-
struction, mm
X(t) Random variable in stochastic pro-
cess
Y(t) Variable in stochastic process con-
sisting of variable X(t) and an error,
X(t) + ε
Y e Geometric factor, dimensionless
GREEK SYMBOLS
α Shape parameter for gamma and in-
verted gamma densities
β Scale parameter for gamma and in-
verted gamma densities
E Normally distribution error with mean
0 and standard deviation σ ε
Khan, Haddara, and Bhattacharya
δ k Difference of error between two suc-
μ Mean of the uncertain gamma density
(random variable X)
σ Standard deviation of the random vari-
able X
υ Coefficient of variance
ρ Replacement stage, percentage of
safety margin at which the component
should be replaced
φ{m, ρ} Ratio of replacement to failure level
and calculated for each time interval τ
τ Time interval
 (a) Gamma function
(a, x) Incomplete gamma function
π (μ) Prior density of the variable μ
tk Time interval between two inspections
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