LAW 114

LABOR
RELATIONS
FINALS
BRIES, CABALLA, PROVISIONS + CASE SUMMARIES +
NOTES FROM THE LECTURES,
LOPEZ, C., PUA, THE AZUCENA COMMENTARY,
& VILLARAMA AND THE C2015 REVIEWER

VII. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING (CB):
GENERAL CONCEPT, PROCEDURE, AND ISSUES .
A. GENERAL CONCEPT
1. Policy Declaration
LC, Art. 217. Declaration of Policy. A. It is the policy of
the State: (a) To promote and emphasize the primacy of
free collective bargaining and negotiations, including
voluntary arbitration, mediation and conciliation, as modes
of settling labor or industrial disputes;
LC, Art 217(B). To encourage a truly democratic method
of regulating the relations between the employers and
employees by means of agreements freely entered into
through collective bargaining, no court or administrative
agency or official shall have the power to set or fix wages,
rates of pay, hours of work or other terms and conditions
of employment, except as otherwise provided under this
Code.
Book V, Rule XVI, Sec. 1
Policy—It is the policy of the State to promote and
emphasize the primacy of free and responsible exercise of
the right to self-organization and collective bargaining,
either through single enterprise level negotiations or
through the creation of a mechanism by which different
employers and recognized or certified labor unions in their
establishments bargain collectively.
Art. XIII, Sec. 3 Constitution
The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and
overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full
employment and equality of employment opportunities for
all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-
organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and
peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in
accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of
tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage.
They shall also participate in policy and decision-making
processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be
provided by law.
The State shall promote the principle of shared
responsibility between workers and employers and the
preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes,
including conciliation, and shall enforce their mutual
compliance therewith to foster industrial peace.
The State shall regulate the relations between workers
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. and employers, recognizing the right of labor to its just
share in the fruits of production and the right of
enterprises to reasonable returns to investments, and to
expansion and growth.
2. Definition/Nature and Purposes
KIOK LOY v. NLRC (1986)
D: Collective bargaining, which is defined as negotiations
towards a collective agreement, is one of the democratic
frameworks under the New Labor Code, designed to
stabilize the relation between labor and management and
to create a climate of sound and stable industrial peace. It
is a mutual responsibility of the employer and the Union
and is characterized as a legal obligation. So much so
that the Labor Code makes it ULP for an employer to
violate the duty to bargain collectively.
F: Union submitted CBA proposals to the company and
requested for its counter‐proposals, but the Company
ignored them. The case was submitted to the NLRC for
compulsory arbitration. The company postponed
proceedings several times, hence the NLRC declared the
company guilty of unjustified refusal to bargain.
H: The Union has a valid cause to complain. The
company’s attitude is indicative of failure to bargain in
good faith.
3. Mechanics of CB: Conditions
[Kiok Loy v. NLRC] While it is a mutual obligation of the
parties to bargain, the employer, however, is not under
any legal duty to initiate contract negotiation. The
mechanics of CB is set in motion only when the following
jurisdictional preconditions are present:
(1) possession of the status of majority
representation of the employees' representative in
accordance with any of the means of selection or
designation provided for by the Labor Code;
(2) proof of majority representation; and
(3) a demand to bargain under Art. 256 (a)
• When the 3 jurisdictional preconditions are
present, the collective bargaining should begin
within the 12 months following the determination
and certification of the employees’ exclusive
bargaining representative. This period is called
the certification year.
• When a majority representative has been
selected/ designated, it is ULP for an employer to
negotiate with the minority representative to the
exclusion of the majority representative.

B. BARGAINABLE ISSUES
LC, Art. 258—Meaning of Duty to Bargain
Collectively. The duty to bargain collectively means the
performance of a mutual obligation to meet and convene
promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose
of negotiating an agreement with respect to wages, hours
of work and all other terms and conditions of employment
including proposals for adjusting any grievances or
questions arising under such agreement and executing a
contract incorporating such agreements if requested by
either party but such duty does not compel any party to
agree to a proposal or to make any concession.
MANILA FASHIONS v. NLRC (1996)
D: Parties to a CBA can establish stipulations, clauses,
terms and conditions as they may deem convenient
provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order, and public policy.
F: Union filed a complaint charging the company of non‐
compliance with a wage increase order. Union and the
company agreed to condone the increase, and this was
placed in their CBA. Union admitted the existence of the
condoning provision but claimed it was invalid as there
was no due consultation with union members.
H: The CBA provision violated the wage order, (contrary
to law and public policy) hence it is void.
UNION OF FILIPRO EMPLOYEES-DRUG v. NESTLE
(2006)
D: Inclusion in the CBA as part of economic benefits
extended by the company to its employees to provide
them a measure of financial security after they shall have
ceased to be employed in the company, reward their
loyalty, boost their morale and efficiency and promote
industrial peace, gives “a consensual character” to a
benefit so that it may not be terminated or modified at will
by either party.
F: Union initiated collective bargaining negotiations. Nestle
responded, but insisted that the Retirement Plan was a
unilateral grant by the company and not subject to
negotiation.
H: Retirement Plan was a proper subject of the CBA
negotiations, as this benefit was in the existing CBA,
showing it was consensual in nature, and thus negotiable.
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1. Mandatory subjects of CB
• Employer’s duty to bargain is limited to the
mandatory subjects. As to other matters, he is
free to bargain/ not to bargain.
• There is no duty to agree; either party may
bargain to an impasse as long as he bargains in
good faith.
• In order for a matter to be subject to mandatory
collective bargaining, it must materially/
significantly affect the terms and conditions
of employment.
Examples of subjects considered mandatory:
(1) Wages and other types of compensation
(2) Working hours/ days/ shifts
(3) Vacations and holidays
(4) Bonuses
(5) Pensions and retirement plans
(6) Seniority
(7) Transfer
(8) Lay-offs
(9) Employee workloads
(10) Work rules and regulations
(11) Rent of company houses
(12) Union security arrangements
2. Permissive subjects of CB
• May be discussed if both parties desire, but a
strike/ lockout cannot be used to compel
negotiation or agreement.
SAMAHAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA TOP FORM v.
NLRC (1998)
D: Where a proposal raised by a contracting party does
not find print in the CBA, it is not a part of the CBA and
there can be no claim for its implementation.
F: In the negotiations for a new CBA, the union was
persuaded to withdraw its proposal that wage increases
mandated by the government be automatically
implemented across-the-board. According to the union, it
withdrew this because management promised it would
implement increases across-the‐board, as it had done
before. However, the company did not do so. Union
alleged that the company was guilty of bargaining in bad
faith.
H: Bad faith bargaining would be present if the provision
that is being forced into the CBA during the negotiations
is merely a permissive one. The minutes in their
negotiations are not binding because they merely reflect
the discussion that the parties undertook in the process of
creating the CBA.

C. BARGAINING PROCEDURE
Book V, Rule XVI
Sec. 1. Policy—It is the policy of the State to promote
and emphasize the primacy of free and responsible
exercise of the right to self-organization and collective
bargaining, either through single enterprise level
negotiations or through the creation of a mechanism by
which different employers and recognized or certified
labor unions in their establishments bargain collectively.
Sec. 2. Disclosure of Information—In collective
bargaining, the parties shall, at the request of either of
them, make available such up-to-date financial
information on the economic situation of the undertaking,
which is normally submitted to relevant government
agencies, as is material and necessary for meaningful
negotiations. Where the disclosure of some of this
information could be prejudicial to the undertaking, its
communication may be made condition upon a
commitment that it would be regarded as confidential to
the extent required. The information to be made available
may be agreed upon between the parties to collective
bargaining.
Secs. 3-6, infra
Sec. 7. Posting and Registration of CBA—Two (2)
signed copies of CBA reached through multi-employer
bargaining shall be posted for at least five (5) days in two
conspicuous areas in workplace of the employer units
concerned. Said CBA shall affect only those employees in
the bargaining units who have ratified it.
The same CBA shall be registered with the Department in
accordance with the following Rule.
1. Private Procedure
LC, Art. 257—Duty to Bargain Collectively in the
Absence of CBAs.
In the absence of an agreement or other voluntary
arrangement providing for a more expeditious manner of
collective bargaining, it shall be the duty of employer and
the representatives of the employees to bargain
collectively in accordance with the provisions of this Code.
2. Labor Code Procedure
LC Art. 256—Procedure in Collective Bargaining.
The following procedures shall be observed in collective
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bargaining:
a) When a party desires to negotiate an agreement, it
shall serve a written notice upon the other party with
a statement of its proposals. The other party shall
make a reply thereto not later than ten (10) calendar
days from receipt of such notice;
b) Should differences arise on the basis of such notice
and reply, either party may request for a conference
which shall begin not later than ten (10) calendar days
from the date of request;
c) If the dispute is not settled, the Board shall intervene
upon the request of either or both parties or at its
own initiative and immediately call the parties to
conciliation meetings. The Board shall have the power
to issue subpoenas requiring the attendance of the
parties to such meetings. It shall be the duty of the
parties to participate fully and promptly in the
conciliation meetings the Board may call;
d) During the conciliation proceedings in the Board, the
parties are prohibited from doing any act which may
disrupt or impede the early settlement of the disputes;
and
e) The Board shall exert all efforts to settle disputes
amicably and encourage the parties to submit their
case to a voluntary arbitrator.
LC, Art. 257—Duty to Bargain Collectively in the
Absence of CBAs, supra
LC, Art. 239—Privileged Communication. Information
and statements made at conciliation proceedings shall be
treated as privileged communication and shall not be
used as evidence in the Commission. Conciliators and
similar officials shall not testify in any court or body
regarding any matters taken up at conciliation
proceedings conducted by them.
LC, Art. 266—Grievance Machinery and Voluntary
Arbitration. The parties to a CBA shall include therein
provisions that will ensure the mutual observance of its
terms and conditions. They shall establish a machinery for
the adjustment and resolution of grievances arising from
the interpretation or implementation of their CBA and
those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of
company personnel policies.
All grievances submitted to the grievance machinery
which are not settled within seven (7) calendar days from
the date of its submission shall automatically be referred
to voluntary arbitration prescribed in the CBA.
For this purpose, parties to a CBA shall name and
designate in advance a Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of

Voluntary Arbitrators, or include in the agreement a
procedure for the selection of such Voluntary Arbitrator or
panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, preferably from the listing of
qualified Voluntary Arbitrators duly accredited by the
Board. In case the parties fail to select a Voluntary
Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, the Board shall
designate the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary
Arbitrators, as may be necessary, pursuant to the
selection procedure agreed upon in the CBA, which shall
act with the same force and effect as if the Arbitrator or
panel of Arbitrators has been selected by the parties as
described above.
CALTEX REFINERY EA V. BRILLANTES (1997)
D: No particular setup for grievance machinery is
mandated by law. The minimum requirement in Art. 260
(now in Art. 266), provides for a single grievance
machinery to settle problems arising from interpretation of
implementation of the CBA.
F: Union and Company submitted unresolved issues to
the jurisdiction of the Labor Secretary, who affirmed a
resolution to shorten the periods to process/resolve
machinery from 45 to 30 days at the first step and from
10 to 7 days at the second step, as well as removing the
step of establishing a joint council.
H: Labor Secretary affirmed. The procedure ordered by
the Secretary sufficiently complied with the minimum
requirement of the law. In fact, he went beyond the
minimum by providing for 2 steps. Leaving the number of
voluntary arbitrators (whether 1 or 3) to the choice of the
parties is valid, allowing the parties latitude to decide for
themselves.
a. Single Enterprise Bargaining
Book V, Rule XVI, Secs. 3-4
Sec. 3. When Single Enterprise Bargaining
Available—Any voluntarily recognized or certified labor
union may demand negotiations with its employer for
terms and conditions of work covering employees in the
bargaining unit concerned.
Sec. 4. Procedure in Single Enterprise Bargaining—A
recognized or certified labor union that desires to
negotiate with its employer shall submit such intentions in
writing to the employer, together with its proposals for
collective bargaining.
• The agreed rules are the procedural law as long
as they respect the parties’ right and provide for
a more expeditious manner of CB.
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• LC procedure applies suppletorily only.
2. Multi-employer Bargaining
• When a number of employers join gorces for
purposes of CB, the unit structure is described
as a multi-employer bargaining unit. CB can
take place at the national, industry, or enterprise
level.
• Prof. Daway notes that this is more expeditious,
especially in industry-wide bargaining, because
employers can compare the benefits they grant.
Book V, Rule XVI, Secs. 5-6
Sec. 5. When Multi-Employer Bargaining Available—
A legitimate labor union(s) and employers may agree in
writing to come together for the purpose of collective
bargaining, provided:
a) only legitimate labor unions who are incumbent
exclusive bargaining agents may participate and
negotiate in multi-employer bargaining;
b) only employers with counterpart legitimate labor
unions who are incumbent bargaining agents may
participate and negotiate in multi-employer
bargaining; and
c) only those legitimate labor unions who pertain to
employer units who consent to multi-employer
bargaining may participate in multi-employer
bargaining.
Sec. 6. Procedure in Multi-Employer Bargaining—
Multi-employer bargaining may be initiated by the labor
unions or by the employers.
a) Legitimate labor unions who desire to negotiate with
their employers collectively shall execute a written
document among themselves, which shall contain the
following:
(1) the names of the labor unions who desire to avail
of multi-employer bargaining
(2) each labor union in the employer unit;
(3) the fact that each of the labor unions are the
incumbent exclusive bargaining agents for their
respective employer units;
(4) the duration of the CBAs, if any, entered into by
each labor union with their respective employers.
Legitimate labor unions who are members of the
same registered federation, national, or industry union
are exempt from execution of this written agreement.
b) The legitimate labor unions who desire to bargain with
multi-employers shall send a written notice to this
effect to each employer concerned. The written

agreement stated in the preceding paragraph, or the
certificates of registration of the federation, national,
or industry union, shall accompany said notice.
Employers who agree to group themselves or use
their existing associations to engage in multi-
employer bargaining shall send a written notice to
each of their counterpart legitimate labor unions
indicating their desire to engage in multi-employer
bargaining. Said notice shall indicate the following:
(1) the names of the employers who desire to avail of
multi-employer bargaining;
(2) their corresponding legitimate labor
organizations;
(3) the fact that each corresponding legitimate union
is any incumbent exclusive bargaining agent;
(4) the duration of the current CBA, if any, entered
into by each employer with the counterpart
legitimate labor union.
c) Each employer or concerned labor union shall
express its willingness or refusal to participate in
multi-employer bargaining in writing, addressed to its
corresponding exclusive bargaining agent or
employer. Negotiations may commence only with
regard to respective employers and labor unions who
consent to participate in multi-employer bargaining;
d) During the course of negotiations, consenting
employers and the corresponding legitimate labor
unions shall discuss and agree on the following:
(1) the manner by which negotiations shall proceed;
(2) the scope and coverage of the negotiations and
the agreement; and
(3) where appropriate, the effect of the negotiations
on current agreements or conditions of
employment among the parties.
3. Conciliation/ Preventive Mediation
LC, Art. 239—Privileged Communication.
Information and statements made at conciliation
proceedings shall be treated as privileged communication
and shall not be used as evidence in the Commission.
Conciliators and similar officials shall not testify in any
court or body regarding any matters taken up at
conciliation proceedings conducted by them.
LC, Art. 256 (c), (d), (e)—Procedure in Collective
Bargaining, supra
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The following procedures shall be observed in collective
bargaining:
(c) Dispute not settled à Board intervenes upon the
request of either/ both parties/ at its own initiative à
immediately call the parties to conciliation meetings
• Board can issue subpoenas requiring the
attendance of the parties to such meetings
• Duty of the parties to participate fully and
promptly in the conciliation meetings
(d) During the conciliation proceedings, parties are
prohibited from doing any act which may disrupt/ impede
the early settlement of the disputes; and
(e) The Board shall exert all efforts to settle disputes
amicably; encourage the parties to submit case to VA
Book V, Rule XXII, Secs. 1, 2 and 9
Sec. 1. Conciliation of Labor-Management Disputes.
The board may, upon request of either of both parties or
upon its own initiative, provide conciliation-mediation
services to labor disputes other than notices of strikes or
lockouts. Conciliation cases which are not subjects of
notices of strike or lockout shall be docketed as
preventive mediation cases.
Sec. 2. Privileged Communication. Information and
statements given in confidence at conciliation
proceedings shall be treated as privileged
communications. Conciliators and similar officials shall not
testify in any court or body regarding any matter taken up
at conciliation proceedings conducted by them.
Sec. 9. Action on Notice. Upon receipt of the notice, the
regional branch of the Board shall exert all efforts at
mediation and conciliation to enable the parties to settle
the dispute amicably. The regional branch of the Board
may, upon agreement of the parties, treat a notice as a
preventative mediation case. It shall also encourage the
parties to submit the dispute to voluntary arbitration.
During the proceedings, the parties shall not do any act
which may disrupt or impede the early settlement of the
dispute. They are obliged, as part of their duty to bargain
collectively in good faith and to participate fully and
promptly in the conciliation meetings called by the regional
branch of the Board.
A notice, upon agreement of the parties, may be referred
to alternative modes of dispute resolution, including
voluntary arbitration.
4. Duty to Bargain
LC, Art. 256. Procedure in CB, supra

LC, Art. 258, supra
DUTY TO BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY - performance of
a mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly and
expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating
an agreement with respect to wages, hours of work and
all other terms and conditions of employment including
proposals for adjusting any grievances or questions
arising under such agreement and executing a contract
incorporating such agreements if requested by either
party but such duty does not compel any party to agree
to a proposal or to make any concession.
LC, Art. 259—Duty to Bargain Collectively When
There Exists a CBA. When there is a CBA, the duty to
bargain collectively shall also mean that neither party shall
terminate nor modify such agreement during its lifetime.
However, either party can serve a written notice to
terminate or modify the agreement at least sixty (60) days
prior to its expiration date. It shall be the duty of both
parties to keep the status quo and to continue in full force
and effect the terms and conditions of the existing
agreement during the 60-day period and/or until a new
agreement is reached by the parties.
LC, Art. 248(c)—Rights of Legitimate Labor
Organizations LLO shall have the right: (c) To be
furnished by the employer, upon written request, with its
annual audited financial statements, including the balance
sheet and the profit and loss statement, within thirty (30)
calendar days from the date of receipt of the request, after
the union has been duly recognized by the employer or
certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining
representative of the employees in the bargaining unit, or
within sixty (60) calendar days before the expiration of the
existing CBA, or during the CB negotiation.
LC, Art. 239(f)—Grounds for cancellation of union
registration (Note: before amendment by RA 9481; no
counterpart to this provision in the grounds for
cancellation of union registration)
The following shall constitute grounds for cancellation of
union registration:
(f) Entering into CBAs which provide terms and conditions
of employment below minimum standards established by
law;
LC, Art. 248(g). ULP of employers.
It shall be unlawful for an employer to commit any of the
following ULP:
(g.) To violate the duty to bargain collectively as
prescribed by this Code;
LC, Art. 249(c). ULP of labor organizations. It shall be
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ULP for a labor organization, its officers, agents or
representatives:
(c) To violate the duty, or refuse to bargain collectively with
the employer, provided it is the representative of the
employees
PI MFG. V. PI MFG. SUPERVISORS (2008)
D: A CBA is the law between the parties when freely and
voluntarily entered into. The duty to bargain requires that
the parties deal with each other with open and fair minds.
F: RA 6640 increased the statutory minimum wage and
salary rates of private employees. Meanwhile, the union
and the company entered into a new CBA where
supervisors and foremen were given increases. The CBA
included a provision/quitclaim where the Union absolved
and released the Company for any monetary claim that
might have existed prior to the signing of the CBA. The
company contended that the union had already waived
the wage distortion brought by RA 6640.
H: The wage distortion was already cured by the new
CBA wherein salary increases re-established and
broadened the gaps. The CBA is more than substantial
compliance with the RA. The union cannot invoke the
beneficial provisions of the CBA but disregard the
concessions it voluntarily extended to the company.
FACULTY ASSN. OF MAPUA V. CA (2007)
D: The duty to bargain collectively shall also mean that
neither party shall terminate nor modify such agreement
during its lifetime. Until a new CBA is executed by and
between the parties, they are duty-bound to keep the
status quo and to continue in full force and effect the
terms and conditions of the existing agreement.
F: Mapua implemented a new faculty ranking instrument
as agreed upon in the new CBA. A month after
implementation, Mapua requested amendments to the
faculty ranking and rates. The union opposed, claiming
this was in violation of their CBA.
H: The proposed amendments were unauthorized
modifications of the CBA. According to Art 253 (now Art.
259), as a general rule, neither party to a CBA shall
terminate or modify the agreement during its lifetime.
D. THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT
1. Definition/ Contents
Book V, Rule 1, Sec. 1((j). “CBA” refers to the contract
between a legitimate labor union and the employer
concerning wages, hours of work, and all other terms and

conditions of employment in a bargaining unit.
LC Art. 266. Grievance machinery and voluntary
arbitration. The parties to a CBA shall include therein
provisions that will ensure the mutual observance of its
terms and conditions. They shall establish a machinery for
the adjustment and resolution of grievances arising from
the interpretation or implementation of their CBA and
those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of
company personnel policies.
All grievances submitted to the grievance machinery
which are not settled within seven (7) calendar days from
the date of its submission shall automatically be referred
to voluntary arbitration prescribed in the CBA.
For this purpose, parties to a CBA shall name and
designate in advance a Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of
Voluntary Arbitrators, or include in the agreement a
procedure for the selection of such Voluntary Arbitrator or
panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, preferably from the listing of
qualified Voluntary Arbitrators duly accredited by the
Board. In case the parties fail to select a Voluntary
Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, the Board shall
designate the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary
Arbitrators, as may be necessary, pursuant to the
selection procedure agreed upon in the CBA, which shall
act with the same force and effect as if the Arbitrator or
panel of Arbitrators has been selected by the parties as
described above.
• The provisions of the CBA must be respected
since its terms and conditions constitute the
law between the parties.
Effects Of Sub-Standard Contract
LC Art. 239 Grounds for cancellation of union
registration (f) Entering into CBAs which provide terms
and conditions of employment below minimum standards
established by law; (This no longer exists after Art 239
NOW ART 245 was amended by RA 9481. Now, there
are only 3 grounds.)
• This has been repealed but the effect would be
the certification election result. If a labor
organization enters a substandard contract, it will
not be elected as SEBA; but as to legitimacy, no
effect.
LEPANTO CERAMICS, INC. v. LEPANTO CERAMICS
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (2010)
D: A CBA refers to a negotiated contract between a
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legitimate labor organization and the employer,
concerning wages, hours of work and all other terms and
conditions of employment in a bargaining unit. As in all
other contracts, the parties to a CBA may establish such
stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may
deem convenient, provided these are not contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order or public policy. CBA
is the law between the parties and they are obliged to
comply with its provisions. THUS since the bonus is
integrated without any condition, even financial condition,
it should be given.
F: Lepanto gave its employees a P3k Christmas bonus.
Subsequently, on 1999, the union (a CEBA) entered into a
CBA where it included a provision that grants the EEs a
Christmas gift/bonus. Company gave each of the
members of respondent Association Tile Redemption
Certificates equivalent to P3k. In 2002 however, the
company only gave P600 as bonus + a cash advance
equivalent to 1 month of salary. This was objected to by
the respondents, arguing that it was in violation of the
CBA.
H: Since the Bonus was integrated in the CBA, it now
partakes of a demandable obligation. It is now not merely
an act of generosity but a contractual obligation the ER
has undertaken.
PHIL. AIRLINES INC. v. PAL EEs ASSOC. (PALEA)
(2008)
D: A CBA refers to a negotiated contract between a
legitimate labor organization and the employer concerning
wages, hours of work and all other terms and conditions
of employment in a bargaining unit. As in all other
contracts, the parties to a CBA may establish such
stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may
deem convenient, provided these are not contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order or public policy.
Where the CBA is clear and unambiguous, it becomes the
law between the parties, and compliance therewith is
mandated by the express policy of the law.
F: PALEA assailed the implementation of the guidelines on
the ground that all employees of PAL, regular or non-
regular, must be paid their 13th month pay.
H: Court held that the 13th month pay is separate and
distinct from the Christmas bonus as provided in the CBA
2. Registration
LC Art. 237. Registry of unions and file of CBAs. The
Bureau shall keep a registry of legitimate labor

organizations. The Bureau shall also maintain a file of all
CBAs and other related agreements and records of
settlement of labor disputes and copies of orders and
decisions of voluntary arbitrators. The file shall be open
and accessible to interested parties under conditions
prescribed by the Secretary of Labor and Employment,
provided that no specific information submitted in
confidence shall be disclosed unless authorized by the
Secretary, or when it is at issue in any judicial litigation, or
when public interest or national security so requires.
Within thirty (30) days from the execution of a CBA, the
parties shall submit copies of the same directly to the
Bureau or the Regional Offices of the Department of
Labor and Employment for registration, accompanied with
verified proofs of its posting in two conspicuous places in
the place of work and ratification by the majority of all the
workers in the bargaining unit. The Bureau or Regional
Offices shall act upon the application for registration of
such CBA within five (5) calendar days from receipt
thereof. The Regional Offices shall furnish the Bureau with
a copy of the CBA within five (5) days from its submission.
The Bureau or Regional Office shall assess the employer
for every CBA a registration fee of not less than one
thousand pesos (P1,000.00) or in any other amount as
may be deemed appropriate and necessary by the
Secretary of Labor and Employment for the effective and
efficient administration of the Voluntary Arbitration
Program. Any amount collected under this provision shall
accrue to the Special Voluntary Arbitration Fund.
The Bureau shall also maintain a file and shall undertake
or assist in the publication of all final decisions, orders and
awards of the Secretary of Labor and Employment,
Regional Directors and the Commission.
Book V, Rule XVII, Secs. 1-3, REGISTRATION OF
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS
Sec. 1. Where to File. Within thirty (30) days from
execution of a CBA, the parties thereto shall submit two
(2) duly signed copies of the agreement to the Regional
Office which issued the certificate of registration/certificate
of chartered local of the labor union-party to the
agreement. Where the certificate of creation of the
concerned chartered local was issued by the Bureau, the
agreement shall be filed with the Regional Office which
has jurisdiction over the place where it principally
operates. Multi-employer CBA shall be filed with the
Bureau.
Sec. 2. Requirements For Registration. The
application for CBA registration shall be accompanied by
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the original and two (2) duplicate copies of the following
documents which must be certified under oath by the
representatives(s) of the employer(s) and labor union(s)
concerned:
(a) the CBA;
(b) a statement that the CBA was posted in at least two
(2) conspicuous places in the establishment or
establishments concerned for at least five (5) days before
its ratification; and
(c) a statement that the CBA was ratified by the majority of
the employees in the bargaining unit of the employer or
employers concerned. No other document shall be
required in the registration of CBAs.
Sec. 3. Payment of Registration Fee. The Certificate of
registration of CBA shall be issued by the Regional Office
upon payment of the prescribed registration fee.
• The Bureau maintains a file of all CBAs and other
related agreements and records of settlement of
labor disputes and copies of orders and
decisions of voluntary arbitrators
PROCESS FOR APPLICATION OF REGISTRATION:
1) Within 30 days from a CBA’s execution, the parties
shall submit to the Bureau or the Regional Office of DOLE
for registration:
a) Copies of the CBA
b) Verified proof of its posting in 2 conspicuous
places in the place of work
c) Verified proof of its ratification by the majority of
all the workers in the bargaining unit
• No other document shall be required.
2) The Bureau or Regional Office shall act upon the
application within 5 calendar days from receipt thereof.
• (If application in Regional Office) Regional Office
shall furnish the Bureau with a copy of the CBA
within 5 Days from its submission.
3) Bureau/Regional Office assess employer a registration
fee of at least P1,000.
• Amount as set by the Secretary of Labor for the
effective and efficient administration of the
Voluntary Arbitration Program.
• Amounts collected here go to the Special
Voluntary Arbitration Fund.
3. Beneficiaries
LC Art. 261. Exclusive bargaining representation and
workers’ participation in policy and decision-
making. The labor organization designated or selected by
the majority of the employees in an appropriate collective
bargaining unit shall be the exclusive representative of the

employees in such unit for the purpose of collective
bargaining. However, an individual employee or group of
employees shall have the right at any time to present
grievances to their employer.
Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding,
workers shall have the right, subject to such rules and
regulations as the Secretary of Labor and Employment
may promulgate, to participate in policy and decision-
making processes of the establishment where they are
employed insofar as said processes will directly affect
their rights, benefits and welfare. For this purpose,
workers and employers may form labor-management
councils: Provided, That the representatives of the
workers in such labor-management councils shall be
elected by at least the majority of all employees in said
establishment.
• The beneficiaries of a CBA are all the workers in
the respective bargaining unit.
• The CBA’s benefits extend to the laborers and
employees not part of the chosen bargaining
labor organization
MACTAN WORKERS UNION v. ABOITIZ (1972)
D: Benefits of the CBA extend to all members of the
collective bargaining unit, not only those members of the
SEBA. Any other view would be discrimination and would
frustrate the point of collective bargaining insofar as
non-members are concerned
F: Profit sharing bonus scheme in the CBA of ALU and
company where 10% of net profits to be given to ALU for
distribution to employees. Members of rival union MWU
failed to get their share.
H: MWU members are entitled to the profit-sharing bonus.
4. Minutes of Negotiations
• A proposal mentioned in the negotiation minutes
but not embodied in the collective bargaining
contract itself is not part of the CBA. It cannot
serve as basis of a charge of violating the CBA or
of bargaining in bad faith.
SMTFM-UWP v. NLRC (1998), supra p. 2
D: Only provisions embodied in the CBA should be
interpreted and complied with. Where a proposal raised
by a contracting party does not find print in the CBA, it is
not a part thereof and the proponent has no claim
whatsoever to its implementation.
5. Interpretation, Administration and Enforcement
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CC Art. 1700. The relations between capital and labor are
not merely contractual. They are so impressed with public
interest that labor contracts must yield to the common
good. Therefore, such contracts are subject to the special
laws on labor unions, collective bargaining, strikes and
lockouts, closed shop, wages, working conditions, hours
of labor and similar subjects.
NORKIS FREE AND INDEPENDENT WORKERS
UNION, VS. NORKIS TRADING COMPANY (2005)
D: Stipulations in a contract must be read together, not in
isolation from one another. The CBA is no ordinary
contract, but one impressed with public interest.
Employees are not entitled to the claimed salary increase,
simply because they are not within the coverage of the
Wage Order, as they were already receiving salaries
greater than the minimum wage fixed by the Order.
F: Employees, pursuant to a MOA, were already granted a
PHP10 increase in salary. When the RTWPB issued Wage
Order establishing a new minimum wage of PHP165, the
union sought an across-the-board increase. Company
refused because they were already paying the minimum
wage. Wage Order No. ROVII-06 should be considered in
the implementation of the government-decreed increase.
H: SC ruled for the Company. The Wage Order was
intended to fix a new minimum wage only, not to grant
across-the-board wage increases.
a. Nature
CC Art. 1315. Contracts are perfected by mere consent,
and from that moment the parties are bound not only to
the fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated but
also to all the consequences which, according to their
nature, may be in keeping with good faith, usage and law.
(1258)
1) CBA: The Law between the parties
• The intent of the parties should be ascertained by
considering the relevant provisions of the CBA.
The intention of the parties is primordial: if
the terms of the contract are clear, the
literal meaning of such shall control.
ZUELLIG PHARMA V. SIBAL (2013)
D: A CBA refers to the negotiated contract between a
legitimate labor organization and the employer concerning
wages, hours of work and all other terms and conditions
of employment in a bargaining unit. Where the CBA is
clear and unambiguous, it becomes the law between the

parties and compliance therewith is mandated by the
express policy of the law. Parties’ CBA provides in no
uncertain terms that whatever amount of money the
employees will receive as retirement gratuity shall be
chargeable against separation pay. Acceptance of
retirement gratuity forecloses receipt of separation pay
and vice versa.
F: Zuellig Pharma terminated the employment of 36
employees due to redundancy. Employees were given
separation pay and employees signed release and
quitclaim. Employees then demanded for retirement
gratuity and monetary equivalent of unused sick leaves.
H: SC held that they are barred from recovering both
separation pay and gratuity as provided in their CBA. The
employees cannot recover twice because there is only
one fund from which benefits shall be taken.
DOLE PHILS. V. PAWIS NG MAKABAYANG OBRERO
(2003)
D: The exercise of management prerogative is subject to
limitations found in law, CBA or general principles of fair
play and justice. The CBA is the norm of conduct
between DOLE and PAMAO-NFL and compliance
therewith is mandated by the express policy of the law.
F: Dispute arose as to the interpretation of the “meal
allowance” provision of the CBA between DOLE and
PAMAO-NFL, with regard to whether the provision
requires that free meals be given to OT workers after
exactly 3 hours of OT work or after more than 3 hours of
OT work.
H: Court held that the former is the correct interpretation.
The terms of CBA are clear. The omission in the present
CBA of the phrase “more than” shows the intent of the
parties. The CBA is the norm of conduct between DOLE
and PAMAO-NFL and compliance therewith is mandated
by the express policy of the law.
PANTRANCO NORTH EXPRESS v. NLRC (1996)
D: Being a union member, respondent is bound by the
CBA because its terms and conditions constitute the law
between the parties. The parties are bound not only to the
fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated but also
to all the consequences which according to their nature,
may be in keeping with good faith, usage and law. It binds
not only the union but also its members.
F: Respondent Suniga contends that the CBA provision
on compulsory retirement before turning 60, but after
rendering 25 years of service, should not be enforced
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thus, his dismissal was illegal.
H: Court held that such provision is not against the law
and that early retirement is actually a reward of
employment. Ultimately held that, when private
respondent ratified the CBA with the union, he not only
agreed to the CBA but also agreed to conform to and
abide by its provisions.
b. Liberal Construction/ In Case of Doubt
CC Art 1700, supra
CC Art. 1702. In case of doubt, all labor legislation and all
labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety
and decent living for the laborer.
• A CBA, imbued with public interest, must be
construed liberally and yield to the common
good.
• BUT contracts which are not ambiguous are to
be interpreted according to their literal meaning
and should not be interpreted beyond their
obvious intendment.
BPI v. BPI EMPLOYEES UNION-METRO MANILA
(2012)
D: Any doubt or ambiguity in the contract between
management and the union members should be resolved
in favor of the latter. Therefore, there is no doubt, that the
welfare of the laborers stands supreme.
F: BPI implemented the NO NDB POLICY as a new
condition for availing loans. The Union objected, alleging
that it violates the CBA.
H: The Court held that the said policy goes beyond the
CBA and that the CBA must prevail. The Court also held
that all labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be
construed in favor of the safety and decent living of the
laborer.
c. Grievance Procedure
Art 261, supra
Art 266, supra
GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE:
The parties to a CBA shall include provisions that will
ensure mutual observance of its terms and conditions, i.e.
establish a grievance machinery.
• For the adjustment and resolution of grievances
arising from:

(1) The interpretation or implementation of the CBA
and
(2) Arising from the interpretation or enforcement of
company personnel policies.
• Grievances submitted to such machinery which
are not settled within 7 days shall be
automatically referred to voluntary arbitration (as
Prescribed in the CBA).
o The CBA Should name and designate in
advance a Voluntary Arbitrator or panel
of VAs, or include a procedure for
selection of the same.
o In case of the parties’ failure to select a
VA or panel of VAs, the Board shall
designate.
USAEU-FFW v. CA (2006)
D: CBA provides for a grievance machinery to resolve any
“complaint or dissatisfaction arising from the interpretation
or implementation of the CBA and those arising from the
interpretation or enforcement of company personnel
policies.” The same CBA provides that should the
grievance machinery fail to resolve the grievance or
dispute, the same shall be “referred to a Voluntary
Arbitrator for arbitration and final resolution.”
F: USAEU-FFW had a 5 year CBA with the University of
San Agustin. They had negotiations on the economic
provisions of the final 2 years of the said CBA but they
proved futile. A notice of strike was filed by the Union and
this led to a CA ruling which declared it illegal.
Consequently, the Union officers were dismissed. A 2 nd
attempt on negotiations pursued but it again, failed. Thus,
another notice of strike was filed by the Union. The CA
issued a partial amended decision stating that the SOLE
abused its discretion by taking cognizance of the case,
and declared that the proceedings be referred to
Voluntary Arbitration as stated in the CBA.
H: The SC affirmed the CA partial amended decision.
ATLAS FARMS, INC. vs. NLRC, JAIME O. DELA
PEÑA and MARCIAL I. ABION (2002)
D: Where dispute is just in the interpretation,
implementation/enforcement stage, it may be referred to
grievance machinery set up in the CBA/brought to
voluntary arbitration. Where there was already actual
termination, with alleged violation of the employee’s rights,
it is already cognizable by the labor arbiter.
F: Peña and Abion were allegedly illegally dismissed. They
filed this case which LA dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
NLRC reversed and CA affirmed with modification stating
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that reinstatement is no longer possible.
H: SC held that Peña and Abion were illegally dismissed
and that LA and NLRC have jurisdiction over this illegal
dismissal case.
d. Voluntary Arbitration
LC, Art. 267. Jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrators or
panel of Voluntary Arbitrators. The Voluntary Arbitrator
or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all unresolved
grievances arising from the interpretation or
implementation of the CBA and those arising from the
interpretation or enforcement of company personnel
policies referred to in the immediately preceding article.
Accordingly, violations of a CBA, except those which are
gross in character, shall no longer be treated as ULP and
shall be resolved as grievances under the CBA. For
purposes of this article, gross violations of CBA shall
mean flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with the
economic provisions of such agreement.
The Commission, its Regional Offices and the Regional
Directors of the Department of Labor and Employment
shall not entertain disputes, grievances or matters under
the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Voluntary
Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators and shall
immediately dispose and refer the same to the Grievance
Machinery or Voluntary Arbitration provided in the CBA.
LC, Art. 268. Jurisdiction over other labor disputes.
The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators,
upon agreement of the parties, shall also hear and decide
all other labor disputes including ULPs and bargaining
deadlocks.
LC, Art. 269. Strikes, Picketing and lockouts: (h)
Before or at any stage of the compulsory arbitration
process, the parties may opt to submit their dispute to
voluntary arbitration.
e. Contract Infirmity
ASSOCIATED LABOR UNIONS (ALU) v.
FERRER-CALLEJA (1989)
D: A CBA with contract infirmities is defective and without
legal effects.
F: GAW (employer) recognized ALU as its workers’ SEBA.
Because of this, other unions in GAW staged a strike to
prevent the recognition of ALU. GAW and ALU then
executed a CBA, and then filed it with the DOLE. Pursuant

to a petition for direct certification by the other union,
Med-Arb Cumba ordered the holding of a certification
election. Upon appeal, BLR reversed Med-Arb and held
that a CBA has been effective and valid, thUs the
contract-bar rule applies. Upon MR, BLR reversed, saying
the contract bar rule is inapplicable because of infirmities
in the CBA.
H: SC affirms this decision, holding that the CBA suffered
from the following infirmities: 1) the standing of ALU as
exclusive bargaining representative is dubious, to say the
least; 2) the CBA not posted in at least 2 conspicuous
places at least 5 days before the ratification; 3) there were
workers who “ratified” the CBA who are now
denying/repudiating it; and 4) the CBA was filed after a
PCE has already been filed. Because of these infirmities,
the CBA between ALU and GAW is defective, hence
unproductive of legal effects.
f. Contract Ambiguity
LC Art. 4. Construction in favor of labor. All doubts in
the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of
this Code, including its implementing rules and
regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor.
CC Art. 1702, supra
HOLY CROSS OF DAVAO, COLLEGE INC v. HOLY
CROSS FACULTY UNION KAMAP (2005)
D: Any doubt or ambiguity in the CBA between
management and the union members should be resolved
in favor of the latter.
F: Legaspi, an HS English teacher, was selected as a
recipient of a scholarship in Japan. She requested that the
College allow her to be on study leave with grant-in-aid
equivalent to her 18 month salary and allowance,
pursuant to the CBA. She was only granted 12 months
study leave without pay.
H: SC ruled that the CBA provisions are clear and Legaspi
is entitled to the grant-in-aid.
g. Contract Duration and Renewal
LC Art. 259. Duty to bargain collectively when there
exists a CBA, When there is a CBA, the duty to bargain
collectively shall also mean that neither party shall
terminate nor modify such agreement during its lifetime.
However, either party can serve a written notice to
terminate or modify the agreement at least sixty (60) days
prior to its expiration date. It shall be the duty of both
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parties to keep the status quo and to continue in full force
and effect the terms and conditions of the existing
agreement during the 60-day period and/or until a new
agreement is reached by the parties.
LC Art. 259-A. Terms of a CBA. Any CBA that the
parties may enter into shall, insofar as the representation
aspect is concerned, be for a term of five (5) years. No
petition questioning the majority status of the incumbent
bargaining agent shall be entertained and no certification
election shall be conducted by the Department of Labor
and Employment outside of the sixty-day period
immediately before the date of expiry of such five-year
term of the CBA. All other provisions of the CBA shall be
renegotiated not later than three (3) years after its
execution. Any agreement on such other provisions of the
CBA entered into within six (6) months from the date of
expiry of the term of such other provisions as fixed in such
CBA, shall retroact to the day immediately following such
date. If any such agreement is entered into beyond six
months, the parties shall agree on the duration of
retroactivity thereof. In case of a deadlock in the
renegotiation of the CBA, the parties may exercise their
rights under this Code.
LC Art. 262 par 2. At the expiration of the freedom
period, the employer shall continue to recognize the
majority status of the incumbent bargaining agent where
no petition for certification election is filed.
Rule XVII, Book V
REGISTRATION OF CBAs
Sec. 7. Term of Representation Status; Contract Bar
Rule. The representation status of the incumbent
exclusive bargaining agent which is a party to a duly
registered CBA shall be for a term of five (5) years from
the date of the effectivity of the CBA. No petition
questioning the majority status of the incumbent exclusive
bargaining agent or petition for certification election filed
outside of the sixty-­‐day period immediately preceding
the expiry date of such five-­‐ year term shall be
entertained by the Department. The five-­‐year
representation status acquired by the incumbent
bargaining agent either through single enterprise collective
bargaining or multi-­‐employer bargaining shall not be
affected by a subsequent CBA executed between the
same bargaining agent and the employer during the same
five-­‐year period.
Sec. 8. Renegotiation Of CBAs. All provisions of a
CBA, except the representation status of the incumbent
bargaining agent, shall, as a matter of right,

MERALCO V. SEC. QUISUMBING AND MEWA (2000)
D: It shall be the duty of both parties to keep the status
quo and to continue in full force and effect the terms and
conditions of the existing agreement during the 60-day
freedom period and/or until a new agreement is reached
by the parties. Despite the lapse of the formal effectivity of
the CBA the law still considers the same as continuing in
force and effect until a new CBA shall have been validly
executed.
F: Meralco filed a Motion For Partial Modification of an SC
resolution holding that the arbitral award shall retroact to
the first day after the 6-month period following the
expiration of the last day of the CBA. Meralco argued that
nothing in Art. 253-A (now 259-A) which states that
arbitral awards or renewals of a CBA shall always be
retroactive.
H: Balancing Meralco’s interests as imbued with public
interest, with the policy of social justice, the award was
made to retroact to the first day after the 6-month period
following the expiry of the last day of the CBA. SC
maintains the rule in the Feb resolution pro hac vice.
RIVERA V. HON. ESPIRITU AND LAGUESMA (2002)
D: The right to free collective bargaining includes the right
to suspend it, such right was intentional waived by the
employees.
F: Due to severe financial distress, PAL was about to
close shop. This led union members to agree in a
referendum for PAL to continue business but in exchange
their CBA would be suspended for ten years. Some union
officers assail the agreement in an action.
H: The Court ruled the agreement as valid because there
is no prohibition against waiving or suspend the
mandatory timetables.
UNION OF FILIPRO EMPLOYEES v. NLRC
and NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC. (1990)
D: Articles 259 and 259-A mandate the parties to keep
the status quo and to continue in full force and effect the
terms and conditions of the existing agreement during the
60-day period prior to the expiration of the old CBA
and/or until a new agreement is reached by the parties.
Consequently, there being no new agreement reached,
the automatic renewal clause provided for by the law
which is deemed incorporated in all CBAs, provides the
reason why the new CBA can only be given a prospective
effect.
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F: Deadlock in collective bargaining between the parties.
NLRC ruled, among other issues, that the CBA is effective
only upon the promulgation of the assailed resolution. This
was questioned by the UFE.
H: Court held that the assailed resolution which
incorporated the CBA to be signed by the parties was
promulgated June 5, 1989, and hence outside the 6
month period from June 30, 1987, the expiry date of the
past CBA. BAsed on the provision of Art 259-A, its
retroactivity should be agreed upon by the parties. But
since no agreement to that effect was made, NLRC did
not abuse its discretion in giving the said CBA a
prospective effect.
FVC LABOR UNION v. SAMA-SAMANG
NAGKAKAISANG MANGGAGAWA SA FBC (2009)
D: By express provision of Article 259-A, the exclusive
bargaining status cannot go beyond five years and the
representation status is a legal matter not for the
workplace parties to agree upon. In other words, despite
an agreement for a CBA with a life of more than five years,
either as an original provision or by amendment, the
bargaining union’s exclusive bargaining status is effective
only for five years and can be challenged within sixty (60)
days prior to the expiration of the CBA’s first five years.
F: Petitioner union and Company had a CBA effective for
5 years, to expire on Jan 30, 2003. On the CBA’s 3rd
year, they renegotiated some provisions of the CBA and
accordingly extended its duration by 4 months, to expire
on May 31, 2003. Nine days before the original expiry
date, respondent union filed for a certification election.
This was opposed by Petitioner union because it was
beyond the 60-day freedom period, counting from the
amended expiry date.
H: The SC ultimately held that the negotiated extension of
the CBA term has no legal effect on Petitioner union’s
exclusive bargaining representation status which remained
effective only for five years, ending on the original expiry
date of January 30, 2003.
1) Automatic renewal
1.a Employer’s right to conduct disciplinary
proceedings vis-à-vis VA
LC Art. 259. Duty to bargain collectively when there
exists a CBA. (last sentence) It shall be the duty of both
parties to keep the status quo and to continue in full force
and effect the terms and conditions of the existing
agreement during the 60-day period and/or until a new
agreement is reached by the parties.

IN RELATION TO
LC Art. 262 par 2. At the expiration of the freedom
period, the employer shall continue to recognize the
majority status of the incumbent bargaining agent where
no petition for certification election is filed. (As amended
by Section 23, Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989)
DURATION: 5 years for the representation aspect and
not more than three years for all other provisions
• Representation aspect: the identity and majority
status of the union that negotiated the CBA as
the exclusive representative of the bargaining unit
• All other provisions: the rest of the CBA,
economic as well as non-economic
Illustration: CBA Jan 1, 2010 – Dec 31, 2014
• Another labor organization can question
the majority party or file a petition for
certification election ONLY during the
freedom period which is Nov 2- Dec 31,
2014
• They can renegotiate regarding all other
provisions not later than Dec 31, 2012
(which is 3 years after execution)
EFFECTIVITY AND RENEWAL:
• If the CBA is the first ever, the effectivity date is
whatever date the parties agree on.
• If the CBA is a renegotiated CBA, effectivity date
depends upon the duration of conclusion
- If it is concluded within 6 months from the
expiry date, the new CBA will retroact to the
date following the expiry date (i.e. Expiry
date: Dec 13; effectivity date: Dec 14)
- If the renegotiated CBA is concluded beyond
6 months from the expiry date, the matter of
retroactivity and effectivity is left with the
parties. They can agree on it.
AUTOMATIC RENEWAL: Status quo prevails until a new
agreement is reached (status quo also prevails during the
freedom period).
• It is the duty of both parties to keep this status
quo and to continue in full force and effect the
existing CBA.
• However, in case of bargaining deadlock, they
may exercise their rights under the LC (grievance
machinery, strike, deadlock, etc.)
• Automatic Renewal pertains to economic
provisions only and does not include the
representational aspect of the CBA. An existing
CBA cannot constitute a bar to a filing of a
petition for certification election
UP LAW C2017 LABOR 2 (PROF. DAWAY) FINALS REVIEWER | 14
PICOP RESOURCES INC. (PRI) v. TAÑECA (2010)
D: Automatic renewal pertains only to the economic
provisions of the CBA, not the representational aspects of
the CBA. While it is incumbent for the employer to
continue to recognize the majority status of the incumbent
bargaining agent even after the expiration of the freedom
period, they could only do so when NO petition for
certification election was filed.
Requisites in termination the employment of an employee
by enforcing the union security clause (constitute just
cause):
(1) the union security clause is applicable;
(2) the union is requesting for the enforcement of the
union security provision in the CBA; and
(3) there is sufficient evidence to support the decision of
the union to expel the employee from the union.
F: Respondents were regular RAF employees of PRI who
were dismissed due to their alleged acts of disloyalty to
the union. NAMAPRI-SPFL (the union) claimed that the
respondents ‘signed the PCE’ of FFW (another union)
during the existence of the CBA and before the freedom
period. Thus, pursuant to the union security clause in the
CBA, the union demanded that PRI terminate the said
employees. The said employees were terminated. The
employees accused PRI (and other officers) of ULP. LA
ruled in favor of respondents. NLRC reversed. CA
reversed NLRC and reinstated LA.
H: The SC affirmed CA. The SC held that the third
requisite for termination by enforcing the union security
clause was not fulfilled. The mere signing of the
authorization in support of the Petition for Certification
Election of FFW on March 19, 20 and 21, or before the
"freedom period," is not sufficient ground to terminate the
employment of respondents inasmuch as the petition itself
was actually filed during the freedom period. Nothing in
the records would show that respondents failed to
maintain their membership in good standing in the Union.
Respondents did not resign or withdraw their membership
from the Union to which they belong. Respondents
continued to pay their union dues and never joined the
FFW.
GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION-INDEPENDENT
LABOR UNION (GMC-ILU) v.
GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION (2011)
D: Article 259 mandates the parties to keep the status
quo and to continue in full force and effect the terms and
conditions of the existing agreement during the 60-day
period prior to the expiration of the old CBA and/or until a
new agreement is reached by the parties with no

exception nor qualification on which economic provisions
to retain its force and effect, the law does not distinguish
between a CBA duly agreed upon by the parties and an
imposed CBA like the one under consideration.
F: One day before the expiration of the CBA, the Union
sent a draft CBA proposal to GMC, with a request for
counter-proposals from the latter. GMC failed to comply.
Union commenced the complaint for ULP which was
dismissed for lack of merit. On appeal, said dismissal was
reversed and set aside in the 30 January 1998 decision
rendered by the NLRC. Union filed the petitions for
certiorari before the CA, which in turn reversed and set
aside the NLRC’s resolution. GMC elevated the case to
SC via the petition for review on certiorari. In SC, the CA
resolution were affirmed. With the ensuing finality of the
foregoing decision, the Union filed a motion for issuance
of a writ of execution dated 21 March 2005, to enforce
the claims of the covered employees which it computed in
the sum of P433,786,786.36 and to require GMC to
produce said employee’s time cards for the purpose of
computing their overtime pay, night shift differentials and
labor standard benefits for work rendered on rest days,
legal holidays and special holidays. GMC filed a petition
for review on certiorari.
H: Anent its period of effectivity, Article XIV of the imposed
CBA provides that "(t)his Agreement shall be in full force
and effect for a period of five (5) years from 1 December
1991, provided that sixty (60) days prior to the lapse of
the third year of effectivity hereof, the parties shall open
negotiations on economic aspect for the fourth and fifth
years effectivity of this Agreement."
Considering that no new CBA had been, in the meantime,
agreed upon by GMC and the Union, we find that the
CA's Special Twentieth Division correctly ruled that,
pursuant to Article 253 of the Labor Code, the provisions
of the imposed CBA continues to have full force and effect
until a new CBA has been entered into by the parties.
h. CBA and 3rd Party Liability
ASSOCIATED LABOR UNIONS v. NLRC (1991)
D: Unless expressly assumed, labor contracts such as
employment contracts and CBAs are not enforceable
against a transferee of an enterprise, labor contracts
being in personam, thus binding only between the parties.
F: MOPI sold its business to Caltex. Employees and
MOLE were notified and termination pay package were
given. Complainants are now charging MOPI with ULP.
Caltex was impleaded being a 3rd party privy to the sale
UP LAW C2017 LABOR 2 (PROF. DAWAY) FINALS REVIEWER | 15
of the business.
H: The Court held that Caltex may not be said to have
stepped into the picture as an assignee of the CBA
because of the very fact of such closure.
GENERAL RULE: There is no law requiring a bona fide
purchaser of assets of an on-going concern to absorb in
its employ the employees of the latter.
EXCEPTION: Although the purchaser of the assets or
enterprise is not legally bound to absorb in its employ the
employees of the seller of such assets or enterprise, the
parties are liable to the employees if the transaction
between the parties is colored or clothed with bad faith.
I. CBA and Disaffiliation/ Substitutionary Doctrine
SUBSTITUTIONARY DOCTRINE provides that the
employees cannot revoke the validly executed collective
bargaining contract with their employer by the simple
expedient of changing their bargaining agent. And it is in
the light of this that the phrase "said new agent would
have to respect said contract" must be understood. It only
means that the employees, thru their new bargaining
agent, cannot renege on their collective bargaining
contract, except of course to negotiate with management
for the shortening thereof.
Conditions:
a) change of bargaining agent (through affiliation,
disaffiliation, or other means)
b) existing CBA with the previous bargaining agent
Effects:
(1) new bargaining agent cannot revoke and must
respect the existing CBA
(2) it may negotiate with management to shorten the
existing CBA’s lifetime
ELISCO-ELIROL LABOR UNION V. NORIEL (1977)
D: In formulating the 'substitutionary' doctrine, the only
consideration involved is the employees' interest in the
existing bargaining agreement. The agent's interest never
entered the picture. In fact, the justification for said
doctrine was that the majority of the employees, as an
entity under the statute, is the true party in interest to the
contract, holding rights through the agency of the union
representative. Thus, any exclusive interest claimed by the
agent is defeasible at the will of the principal.
F: ELISCO-ELIROL then affiliated w/ the mother union
NAFLU, entered into a CBA w/ the company. By valid
resolution of the Board of Directors and approved by the

general membership, the union applied for registration.
After having registered, they disaffiliated w/ NAFLU. Who
should be recognized as SEBA w/ authority to enforce the
CBA?
H: The Court held that the members of the local union
were the principal party to the CBA and the NAFLU
merely acted as an agent. Also, under the substitutionary
doctrine, even during the effectivity of the CBA, the
employees can change the agent, but the contract
continues to bind them up to the expiration date.
j. Jurisdiction
POLICY INSTRUCTIONS NO. 56-93 (April 6, 1993)
CLARIFYING THE JURISDICTION BETWEEN
VOLUNTARY ARBITRATORS AND LABOR
ARBITERS OVER TERMINATION CASES AND
PROVIDING GUIDELINES FOR THE REFERRAL OF
SAID CASES ORIGINALLY FILED WITH THE NLRC
TO THE NCMB
In line with the policy of the Labor Code of the Philippines
to promote and emphasize the primacy of free collective
bargaining and negotiations, including voluntary
arbitration, mediation and conciliation, as modes of
settling labor of industrial disputes, the following
guidelines are hereby promulgated:
1. Termination cases arising in or resulting from the
interpretation and implementation of CBAs and
interpretation and enforcement of company personnel
policies which were initially processed at the various steps
of the plant-level Grievance Procedures under the parties
CBAs fall within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of
the voluntary arbitrator pursuant to Article 217 (c) and
Article 261 of the Labor Code.
2. Said cases, if filed before a Labor Arbiter, shall be
dismissed by the Labor Arbiter for lack of jurisdiction and
referred to the concerned NCMB Regional Branch for
appropriate action towards an expeditious selection by
the parties of voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators
based on the procedures agreed upon in the CBA.
This issuance shall take effect immediately.
1) Plenary Jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrators vis-à-
vis Labor Arbiters
1.a) Employer’s right to conduct disciplinary
proceedings vis-à-vis VA
LC, Arts. 267, 268 supra
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LC Art. 269. Strikes, picketing and lockouts. (g)
When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing
or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry
indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of
Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the
dispute and decide it or certify the same to the
Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such assumption
or certification shall have the effect of automatically
enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as
specified in the assumption or certification order. If one
has already taken place at the time of assumption or
certification, all striking or locked out employees shall
immediately return-to-work and the employer shall
immediately resume operations and readmit all workers
under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the
strike or lockout. The Secretary of Labor and Employment
or the Commission may seek the assistance of law
enforcement agencies to ensure compliance with this
provision as well as with such orders as he may issue to
enforce the same.
In line with the national concern for and the highest
respect accorded to the right of patients to life and health,
strikes and lockouts in hospitals, clinics and similar
medical institutions shall, to every extent possible, be
avoided, and all serious efforts, not only by labor and
management but government as well, be exhausted to
substantially minimize, if not prevent, their adverse effects
on such life and health, through the exercise, however
legitimate, by labor of its right to strike and by
management to lockout. In labor disputes adversely
affecting the continued operation of such hospitals, clinics
or medical institutions, it shall be the duty of the striking
union or locking-out employer to provide and maintain an
effective skeletal workforce of medical and other health
personnel, whose movement and services shall be
unhampered and unrestricted, as are necessary to insure
the proper and adequate protection of the life and health
of its patients, most especially emergency cases, for the
duration of the strike or lockout. In such cases, therefore,
the Secretary of Labor and Employment may immediately
assume, within twenty four (24) hours from knowledge of
the occurrence of such a strike or lockout, jurisdiction
over the same or certify it to the Commission for
compulsory arbitration. For this purpose, the contending
parties are strictly enjoined to comply with such orders,
prohibitions and/or injunctions as are issued by the
Secretary of Labor and Employment or the Commission,
under pain of immediate disciplinary action, including
dismissal or loss of employment status or payment by the
locking-out employer of backwages, damages and other
affirmative relief, even criminal prosecution against either
or both of them.

The foregoing notwithstanding, the President of the
Philippines shall not be precluded from determining the
industries that, in his opinion, are indispensable to the
national interest, and from intervening at any time and
assuming jurisdiction over any such labor dispute in order
to settle or terminate the same.
LC Art. 223. Jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters and
the Commission.
a. Except as otherwise provided under this Code,
the Labor Arbiters shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty (30) calendar
days after the submission of the case by the parties for
decision without extension, even in the absence of
stenographic notes, the following cases involving all
workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural:
1. ULP cases;
5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this
Code, including questions involving the legality of strikes
and lockouts;
The VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR has original and
exclusive jurisdiction over termination cases arising in or
resulting from:
a) The interpretation and implementation of CBAs
b) The interpretation of enforcement personnel policies
which were initially processed at the various steps of
the plant-level Grievance Procedures under the
parties’ CBAs.
GOYA, INC. v. GOYA, INC. EMPLOYEES UNION-FFW
(2013)
D: Generally, the arbitrator is expected to decide only
questions expressly delineated by the submission
agreement. Nevertheless, the arbitrator can assume that
he has the necessary power to make a final settlement
since arbitration is the final resort for the adjudication of
disputes. Law and jurisprudence give the voluntary
arbitrator enough leeway of authority as well as adequate
prerogative to accomplish the reason for which the law on
voluntary arbitration was created – speedy labor justice.
F: Goya and the Union submitted to the Voluntary Arbiter
for resolution the issue WON the Company was guilty of
ULP in engaging the service of a third party service
provider. The VA dismissed the charge of ULP but
directed the Company to observe and comply with its
commitment under the CBA to hire casual employees.
Goya argues that because such order was not covered by
the sole issue submitted.
H: SC ruled that the arbitrator is expected to decide only
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questions expressly delineated by the submission
agreement however the arbitrator can assume that he has
the necessary power to make a final settlement since
arbitration is the final resort for the adjudication of
disputes
MANILA PAVILION HOTEL, OWNED AND
OPERATED BY ACESITE (PHILS.) HOTEL
CORPORATION v. DELADA (2012)
D: General rule: Voluntary arbitrator had plenary
jurisdiction and authority to interpret the agreement to
arbitrate and to determine the scope of his own authority -
subject only, in a proper case, to the certiorari jurisdiction
of this Court.
F: Delada was transferred to another restaurant within the
Manila Pavilion Hotel. He questioned the validity of the
transfer order, and pending this grievance, he disobeyed
several orders from MPH to just report for his new
assignment. The matter of the transfer was eventually
raised with the PVA but administrative proceedings
against him were also ongoing with MPH. MPH put him
under preventive suspension but later on meted out the
penalty of a 90-day suspension. PVA ruled that the
suspension was invalid because it went beyond the 30-
day period for preventive suspension. Could the PVA
herein view that the issue presented before it - the
question of the validity of the transfer order - necessarily
included the question of respondent Delada's
insubordination and willful disobedience of the transfer
order?
H: PVA did not make a ruling on the specific issue of
insubordination and willful disobedience of the transfer
order. The PVA merely said that its disagreement with the
90-day penalty of suspension stemmed from the fact that
the penalty went beyond the 30-day limit for preventive
suspension. The PVA herein did not make a definitive
ruling on the merits of the validity of the 90-day
suspension. SC ruled that in this case MPH did not lose
its authority to discipline respondent for his continued
refusal to report to his new assignment. LA had
jurisdiction.
METRO DRUG DISTRIBUTION INC. V. METRO DRUG
CORPORATION EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION –
FEDERATION OF FREE WORKERS (2005)
D: In order to avail of the extraordinary writ of certiorari, it
is incumbent upon petitioner to establish that the denial of
the motion to dismiss was tainted with grave abuse of
discretion. Under NLRC, no appeal may be taken from an
order denying a motion to dismiss. The NLRC rule is
similar to the general rule in civil procedure that an order

denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory, hence not
appealable until final judgment or order is rendered. The
remedy of the aggrieved party in case of denial of the
motion to dismiss is to file an answer and interpose, as a
defense or defenses, the ground or grounds relied upon in
the motion to dismiss, proceed to trial and in case of
adverse judgment, to elevate the entire case by appeal in
due course.
F: Metro Drug filed a Motion to Dismiss the Union’s
complaint for ULP. Their MTD was denied so they filed a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA.
H: SC held that this was the improper remedy since the
remedy of the aggrieved party in case of denial of the
motion to dismiss is to file an answer and interpose, as a
defense or defenses, the ground or grounds relied upon in
the motion to dismiss, proceed to trial and in case of
adverse judgment, to elevate the entire case by appeal in
due course.
7K CORPORATION V. EDDIE ALBARICO (2013)
D: Voluntary arbitrators may, by agreement of the parties,
assume jurisdiction over a termination dispute.
F: Albarico was terminated by 7K Corporation due to
allegedly poor sales performance. Albarico submitted his
money claims before the NCMB. In the parties’
Submission Agreement, the issue for voluntary arbitration
concerned his entitlement to separation pay and sales
commission. The VA held 7K liable for illegal dismissal,
awarded separation pay, backwages, and attorney’s fees
(AF was deleted by CA).
H: Court held that voluntary arbitrators may, by
agreement of the parties, assume jurisdiction over a
termination dispute, pursuant to LC 262, which provides
for one of the exceptions to the general rule in LC 217
that the Labor Arbiter shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over termination disputes. Also, the VA
properly assumed jurisdiction in deciding on the legality of
the dismissal (since it was the core issue behind the issue
of separation pay) and awarding backwages (since
arbitration is a final resort for the adjudication of disputes,
the VA can assume that he has the necessary power to
make a final settlement).
2) Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters
LC, Art. 223. Jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters and
the Commission. – (a) Except as otherwise provided
under this Code, the Labor Arbiters shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty (30)
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calendar days after the submission of the case by the
parties for decision without extension, even in the
absence of stenographic notes, the following cases
involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-
agricultural:
(1) ULP cases;
(2) Termination disputes;
(3) If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those
cases that workers may file involving wages, rates of
pay, hours of work and other terms and conditions of
employment;
(4) Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms
of damages arising from the employer-employee
relations;
(5) Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this
Code, including questions involving the legality of
strikes and lockouts; and
(6) Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social
Security, Medicare and maternity benefits, all other
claims arising from employer-employee relations,
including those of persons in domestic or household
service, involving an amount exceeding five thousand
pesos (P5,000.00) regardless of whether
accompanied with a claim for reinstatement.
(b) The Commission shall have exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over all cases decided by Labor Arbiters.
(c) Cases arising from the interpretation or implementation
of CBAs and those arising from the interpretation or
enforcement of company personnel policies shall be
disposed of by the Labor Arbiter by referring the same to
the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration as may
be provided in said agreements. (As amended by Section
9, Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989).
LC, Art. 267. Jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrators or
panel of Voluntary Arbitrators. – The Voluntary
Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators shall have
original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all
unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or
implementation of the CBA and those arising from the
interpretation or enforcement of company personnel
policies referred to in the immediately preceding article.
Accordingly, violations of a CBA, except those which are
gross in character, shall no longer be treated as ULP and
shall be resolved as grievances under the CBA. For
purposes of this article, gross violations of CBA shall
mean flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with the
economic provisions of such agreement.
The Commission, its Regional Offices and the Regional
Directors of the Department of Labor and Employment

shall not entertain disputes, grievances or matters under
the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Voluntary
Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators and shall
immediately dispose and refer the same to the Grievance
Machinery or Voluntary Arbitration provided in the CBA.
LC, Art. 268. Jurisdiction over other labor disputes. –
The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators,
upon agreement of the parties, shall also hear and decide
all other labor disputes including ULPs and bargaining
deadlocks.
NEGROS METAL V. LAMAYO (2010)
D: Under Art. 217, it is clear that a labor arbiter has
original and exclusive jurisdiction over termination
disputes. On the other hand, under Art. 261, a voluntary
arbitrator has original and exclusive jurisdiction over
grievances arising from the interpretation or enforcement
of company policies. Thus, the general rule is termination
disputes should be brought before LA except when the
parties, under Art. 262, unmistakably express that they
agree to submit the same to voluntary arbitration
F: Lamayo was terminated after two suspensions. He filed
a complaint with LA for illegal dismissal. The company
argued that LA had no jurisdiction since their CBA
provides that such matter should be first brought to the
company’s grievance machinery.
H: LA had jurisdiction.
3) Jurisdiction of Labor Secretary
LC, Art. 269. Strikes, picketing and lockouts. (g)
supra p. 16; first par: When, in his opinion, there exists a
labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout
in an industry indispensable to the national interest, the
Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume
jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the
same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such
assumption or certification shall have the effect of
automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or
lockout as specified in the assumption or certification
order. If one has already taken place at the time of
assumption or certification, all striking or locked out
employees shall immediately return to work and the
employer shall immediately resume operations and
readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions
prevailing before the strike or lockout. The Secretary of
Labor and Employment or the Commission may seek the
assistance of law enforcement agencies to ensure
compliance with this provision as well as with such orders
as he may issue to enforce the same.
UP LAW C2017 LABOR 2 (PROF. DAWAY) FINALS REVIEWER | 19
ASIA BREWERY v. TPMA (2013)
D: It is a well-settled that factual findings of labor
administrative officials, if supported by substantial
evidence, are entitled not only to great respect but even to
finality. It is also recognized that abuse of discretion may
attend the exercise of the Secretary's arbitral functions;
his findings in an arbitration case are usually based only
on position papers and their supporting documents.
F: TPMA had been negotiating for a new CBA. The parties
encountered a deadlock. The Sec. of Labor resolved the
deadlock between the parties and granted arbitral
awards. On appeal, the CA modified the award and then,
remanded the case to the Sec. of Labor on the issue of
backwages.
H: The remand is proper. This Court has recognized the
Secretary of Labor's distinct expertise in the study and
settlement of labor disputes falling under his power of
compulsory arbitration.
4) RTC Jurisdiction
General Rule: RTC has no jurisdiction in disputes
involving an employer-employee relationship. (Halagueña
v. PAL)
Exceptions: RTC may have jurisdiction when the
principle relief cannot be resolved with only the application
of labor law as it is outside the competence and expertise
of the LAs and the NLRC OR when the dispute is not
between the Union and the Company, but between
specific employees and the Company.
HALAGUEÑA v. PAL, Inc. (2009)
D: Not every controversy or money claim by an employee
against the employer or vice-versa is within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the labor arbiter. Actions between
employees and employer where the employer-employee
relationship is merely incidental and the cause of action
precedes from a different source of obligation is within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the regular court. Thus, where the
principal relief sought is to be resolved not by reference to
the Labor Code or other labor relations statute or a CBA
but by the general civil law, the jurisdiction over the
dispute belongs to the regular courts of justice.
F: PAL had a CBA with FASAP with a provision on
compulsory retirement for women FAs at 55 and men FAs
at 60. Petitioners, women FAs wanted the provision to be
declared void because it discriminatory against women so
they filed with the RTC a special civil action for declaratory

relief. RTC granted TRO but CA declared that RTC had no
jurisdiction.
H: SC declared that RTC HAS jurisdiction because the
annulment of the CBA provision is incapable of pecuniary
estimation, an ordinary civil action and beyond the
jurisdiction of labor tribunals.
k. Proper Balancing of Interests in CB Disputes
ASIA BREWERY v. TPMA (2013), supra p. 19
D: The best way in approaching this task holistically is to
consider the available objective facts, including, where
applicable, factors such as the bargaining history of the
company, the trends and amounts of arbitrated and
agreed wage awards and the company's previous CBAs,
and industry trends in general. As a rule, affordability or
capacity to pay should be taken into account but cannot
be the sole yardstick in determining the wage award,
especially in a public utility. Merely finding a “middle
ground” between the demands of the company and the
union, and "splitting the difference" is a simplistic solution
that fails to recognize that the parties may already be at
the limits of the wage levels they can afford.
VIII. UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE (ULP)
9 ULP Acts of an Employer:
1. Interference
2. “Yellow dog” condition
3. Contracting out
4. Company unionism
5. Discrimination for/against union membership
6. Discrimination because of testimony
7. Violation of duty to bargain
8. Paid negotiation
9. Gross violation of CBA
6 ULP Acts of a Labor Organization:
1. Restraint/ coercion (not interference)
2. Union-induced discrimination
3. Refusal to bargain
4. Illegal exaction, featherbedding
5. Negotiation/ attorney’s fees
6. Gross violation of CBA
A. IN GENERAL
1. Definition and Primary Concept
LC, Art. 218 (k). Definitions. "Unfair labor practice"
means any ULP as expressly defined by the Code.
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LC, Art. 252. Non-abridgment of right to self-
organization. – It shall be unlawful for any person to
restrain, coerce, discriminate against or unduly interfere
with employees and workers in their exercise of the right
to self-organization. Such right shall include the right to
form, join, or assist labor organizations for the purpose of
collective bargaining through representatives of their own
choosing and to engage in lawful concerted activities for
the same purpose or for their mutual aid and protection,
subject to the provisions of Article 264 of this Code. (As
amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 70, May 1, 1980).
LC, Art. 253. Concept of ULP and procedure for
prosecution thereof. – ULPs violate the constitutional
right of workers and employees to self-organization, are
inimical to the legitimate interests of both labor and
management, including their right to bargain collectively
and otherwise deal with each other in an atmosphere of
freedom and mutual respect, disrupt industrial peace and
hinder the promotion of healthy and stable labor-
management relations.
Consequently, ULPs are not only violations of the civil
rights of both labor and management but are also criminal
offenses against the State which shall be subject to
. prosecution and punishment as herein provided.
Subject to the exercise by the President or by the
Secretary of Labor and Employment of the powers vested
in them by Articles 263 and 264 of this Code, the civil
aspects of all cases involving ULPs, which may include
claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of
damages, attorney’s fees and other affirmative relief, shall
be under the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters. The Labor
Arbiters shall give utmost priority to the hearing and
resolution of all cases involving ULPs. They shall resolve
such cases within thirty (30) calendar days from the time
they are submitted for decision.
Recovery of civil liability in the administrative proceedings
shall bar recovery under the Civil Code.
No criminal prosecution under this Title may be instituted
without a final judgment finding that an ULP was
committed, having been first obtained in the preceding
paragraph. During the pendency of such administrative
proceeding, the running of the period of prescription of
the criminal offense herein penalized shall be considered
interrupted: Provided, however, that the final judgment in
the administrative proceedings shall not be binding in the
criminal case nor be considered as evidence of guilt but
merely as proof of compliance of the requirements therein
set forth.

Super general definition (LC, Art. 218 (k))
• Any ULP as expressly defined by the Labor Code
General definition (LC, Art. 252)
• Any abridgement of employees’ and workers’
right to self-organization
- Restrain, coerce, discriminate
against, or unduly interfere in the
exercise of the right
- ULP is related to the workers’ right
to self-organization and to the
observance of the CBA. Without
that element, the act, no matter how
unfair, is not ULP as legally defined.
(Azucena)
EXCEPTION: LC, Art. 254 (f) (to dismiss, discharge, or
otherwise prejudice or discriminate against an employee
for having given or being about to give testimony under
the Labor Code)
Why are ULPs punished? (LC, Art. 253)
• Violation of constitutional right to self-organization
• Inimical to the legitimate interests of both labor
and management
• Disrupt industrial peace
• Hinder promotion of healthy and stable labor-
management–relations
• Both violations of labor and management’s civil
rights AND criminal offenses against the State
SEE AGAIN: BAUTISTA v. VILLANUEVA (2013)
D: Workers’ and employers’ organizations shall have the
right to draw up their constitutions and rules to elect their
representatives in full freedom, to organize their
administration and activities and to formulate their
programs.
F: Union members filed impeachment complaint against
the union president. The members were expelled from the
union and terminated from their employment.
H: Company not guilty of ULP. Members violated the
provisions of the union’s constitution and by-laws when
they filed petitions for impeachment against their union
officers and for audit before the DOLE without first
exhausting all internal remedies available within their
organization.
2. ULP vis-à-vis Management Prerogative; Exception
LC, Art. 269 (g). supra p. 16 [labor dispute causing or
likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry
indispensable to the national interest]
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• An act may not be considered a ULP if it’s a valid
exercise of management prerogative.
• Management may regulate, according to its
discretion or judgment, all aspects of
employment, as long as it’s exercised in good
faith for the advancement of the employer’s
interest, and not exercised in a malicious, harsh,
oppressive, vindictive, or wanton manner.
(Azucena)
• The law on ULP is not intended to deprive
employers of their fundamental right to prescribe
rules they honestly believe to be necessary to the
proper operation of their business (Philcom
Employees v. Philcom)
NELSON A. CULILI v.
EASTERN TELECOMM PHIL. INC. (2011)
D: The concept of ULP is provided in Article 247 of the
Labor Code. In the past, we have ruled that "ULP refers to
‘acts that violate the workers' right to organize. The
prohibited acts are related to the workers' right to self-
organization and to the observance of a CBA. ETPI merely
exercised its valid management prerogative.
F: Culili was dismissed because his position in the
company has become redundant by virtue of a Program
implemented by ETPI due to business losses. Culili
alleged ULP alleging that ETPI contracted out his
position’s functions and discriminated against his as to
retirement benefits offered to other employees in violation
of Art. 248 (c)(e) of the Labor Code.
H: There is no showing that ETPI, in implementing its
Right-Sizing Program, was motivated by ill will, bad faith
or malice, or that it was aimed at interfering with its
employees’ right to self-organize. In fact, ETPI negotiated
and consulted with ETEU before implementing its Right-
Sizing Program.
SMC. EMPLOYEES UNION v. BERSAMIRA (1990)
D: SC recognizes the proprietary right of San Mig to
determine whether it should contract out the performance
of some of its work to independent contractors. However,
the rights of all workers to self­organization, collective
bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted
activities, including the right to strike in accordance with
law (Section 3, Article XIII, 1987 Const.) equally call for
recognition and protection. Those interests must be
placed in proper perspective and equilibrium.
F: SanMig was employing labor-only contractors. These
contractors wanted to join the Union in the Company, and

the Union sent a letter to the company. Upon learning of
the demand, the Union staged picketing near the
entrance of the lobby of SanMig. Union filed an injunction
case – RTC granted. Union filed to suspend the injunction.
H: SC grants suspension. No EE-ER relation, but there is
still a labor dispute. Must remand to RTC.
1. Requisites
(ER-EE relationship; Expressly defined by LC as ULP)
a) Employer-Employee Relationship
• Why? ULP is a violation of the right to self-
organize, a right exercisable by employees in
relation to their employer (Azucena)
• Art. 252 (non-abridgement of right to self-
organization) says “any person,” so ULPs may
also be committed by the employer’s
representative or agent.
STERLING PRODUCTS INT. INC. v. SOL (1963)
D: The mere fact that while performing the duties
assigned, a purported employee was not under the
supervision of the employer, does not render her a
contractor, when what she has to do, the hours that she
has to work and the report that she has to submit are
according to instructions given by the employer. An
independent contractor is one who does not receive
instructions as to what to do, how to do, without specific
instructions. Also, under the Industrial Peace Act, the
employer cannot be considered as having committed an
ULP against an employee who is not connected with any
labor organization.
F: Sol filed a ULP charge against Sterling Products,
whose defense was that (1) Sol was an independent
contractor, not an employee, and (2) since she was not
affiliated with any union, the company could not have
committed ULP.
H: The CIR and the SC found that (1) Sol was an
employee, since she was given specific instructions as to
her work, and (2) the company could not have committed
ULP since she was not connected to, nor did she attempt
to join, any union. She was awarded separation pay,
however.
AMERICAN PRESIDENT LINES INC. v. CLAVE (1982)
D: In determining the existence of employer-employee
relationship, the following elements are generally
considered, namely: 1) the selection and engagement of
the employee; 2) the payment of wages; 3) the power of
dismissal; and 4) the power to control the employee’s
UP LAW C2017 LABOR 2 (PROF. DAWAY) FINALS REVIEWER | 22
conduct – although the latter is the most important
element
F: APL and Maritime Security Agency entered into a one-
year contract wherein the later would recruit and supply
watchmen on ships and vessels of APL. Upon the
expiration of the contract, APL entered into a contract
with a different agency. The members of the Maritime
Security Union filed a ULP case against APL for the
latter’s refusal to negotiate an agreement with them and
discrimination against them with regard to their tenure of
employment, for no other reason than their membership
with the union and union activities.
H: The Supreme Court held that there was no ULP due to
the fact that there was no employer-employee relationship
between American President Lines and the union.
b) Act must be specifically defined in the law
• LC, Art. 218 (k) in relation to Art. 254 (ULPs
committed by employers) and Art. 255 (ULPs
committed by labor organizations)
LC, Art. 254. ULPs of employers. – It shall be unlawful
for an employer to commit any of the following ULP:
a) To interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the
exercise of their right to self-organization;
b) To require as a condition of employment that a
person or an employee shall not join a labor
organization or shall with-draw from one to which he
belongs;
c) To contract out services or functions being performed
by union members when such will interfere with,
restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their
rights to self-organization;
d) To initiate, dominate, assist or otherwise interfere with
the formation or administration of any labor
organization, including the giving of financial or other
support to it or its organizers or supporters;
e) To discriminate in regard to wages, hours of work and
other terms and conditions of employment in order to
encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization. Nothing in this Code or in any other law
shall stop the parties from requiring membership in a
recognized collective bargaining agent as a condition
for employment, except those employees who are
already members of another union at the time of the
signing of the CBA. Employees of an appropriate
bargaining unit who are not members of the
recognized collective bargaining agent may be
assessed a reasonable fee equivalent to the dues and
other fees paid by members of the recognized
collective bargaining agent, if such non-union

members accept the benefits under the CBA:
Provided, that the individual authorization required
under Article 242, paragraph (o) of this Code shall not
apply to the non-members of the recognized
collective bargaining agent;
f) To dismiss, discharge or otherwise prejudice or
discriminate against an employee for having given or
being about to give testimony under this Code;
g) To violate the duty to bargain collectively as
prescribed by this Code;
h) To pay negotiation or attorney’s fees to the union or
its officers or agents as part of the settlement of any
issue in collective bargaining or any other dispute; or
i) To violate a CBA.
The provisions of the preceding paragraph
notwithstanding, only the officers and agents of
corporations, associations or partnerships who have
actually participated in, authorized or ratified ULPs shall
be held criminally liable.
LC, Art. 255. ULPs of labor organizations. – It shall be
ULP for a labor organization, its officers, agents or
representatives:
a) To restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of
their right to self-organization. However, a labor
organization shall have the right to prescribe its own
rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of
membership;
b) To cause or attempt to cause an employer to
discriminate against an employee, including
discrimination against an employee with respect to
whom membership in such organization has been
denied or to terminate an employee on any ground
other than the usual terms and conditions under
which membership or continuation of membership is
made available to other members;
c) To violate the duty, or refuse to bargain collectively
with the employer, provided it is the representative of
the employees;
d) To cause or attempt to cause an employer to pay or
deliver or agree to pay or deliver any money or other
things of value, in the nature of an exaction, for
services which are not performed or not to be
performed, including the demand for fee for union
negotiations;
e) To ask for or accept negotiation or attorney’s fees
from employers as part of the settlement of any issue
in collective bargaining or any other dispute; or
f) To violate a CBA.
The provisions of the preceding paragraph
notwithstanding, only the officers, members of governing
UP LAW C2017 LABOR 2 (PROF. DAWAY) FINALS REVIEWER | 23
boards, representatives or agents or members of labor
associations or organizations who have actually
participated in, authorized or ratified ULPs shall be held
criminally liable.
4. Burden of Proof
Basically, the burden of proof is on the party which alleges
ULP.
• The union has the burden of proof to present
substantial evidence to support its ULP
allegations against management. (Schering v.
Schering)
SCHERING EMPLOYEES LABOR UNION v.
SCHERING PLOUGH CORP. (2005)
D: It is the union who had the burden of proof to present
substantial evidence to support its allegations of ULPs
committed by management. It is not enough that the
union believed that the employer committed acts of ULP
when the circumstances clearly negate even a prima facie
showing to warrant such a belief.
F: Sereneo was dismissed for breach of trust. She
contended that company was guilty of ULP and illegal
dismissal.
H: The Court rule that her violations of the company rules
showed a willful breach of trust that justified dismissal.
The union has the burden of proof to present evidence to
substantiate the allegation of ULP, which it failed to
satisfy.
5. Construction/ Interpretation
LC, Art. 4. Construction in favor of labor. supra
NCC, Art. 1700, supra
NCC, Art. 1702, supra
Labor contracts are subject to special laws (e.g. laws on
working conditions and wages).
• Why? Because the relations between labor and
capital aren’t merely contractual; they are
impressed with public interest (Civil Code, Art.
1700).
In case of doubt, how should labor laws be interpreted?
• In favor of labor (Labor Code, Art. 4)
• In favor of the safety and decent living for the
laborer (Civil Code, Art. 1702)
CALTEX FILIPINO MANAGERS AND SUPERVISORS
ASSN. v. CIR (1972)

D: A labor contract must yield to the common good (Art.
1700, Civil Code of the Philippines) and in case of doubt
shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent living
for the laborer (Art. 1702, ibid). The provisions of RA 875
should be liberally construed in favor of employees and
strictly against the employer, unless otherwise intended by
or patent from the language of the statute itself.
F: The Union informed the company of its registration. The
company questions the constitution of the company as it
was composed of managers and supervisors. A dispute
ensued and certain incidents occurred which lead the
union to hold a strike. The company filed a complaint for
illegal strike while the Union filed a case for ULP.
H: There is substantial, credible and convincing evidence
that appear on record which established beyond doubt
the ULP of the company. Pursuant to the mandate of Art.
24 CC that courts must be vigilant for the protection of
one at a disadvantage—the Association in this case being
the party at a disadvantage—adequate affirmative relief
must be awarded.
1. Inter-relations of ULP Acts
LC, Art. 254, supra.
LC, Art. 255, supra.
REPUBLIC SAVINGS BANK v. CIR (1967)
D: The employees shall have a right to engage in
concerted activities for their mutual aid or protection even
though no union activity be involved, for collective
bargaining be contemplated. And if the company commits
actions that prejudice the employee because they did
these acts, then the company would be guilty of ULP.
F: Respondents, who were officers of their respective
unions, were discharged by their employer Bank for
writing a letter charge to the Board of Directors,
demanding the President’s resignation for his alleged
immorality, nepotism, favoritism and discrimination in the
promotion of bank employees. The CIR and the SC
upheld their dismissal as an ULP under Sec. 4(a)(5) of the
Industrial Peace Act, which makes it an ULP for an
employer to “dismiss...an employee…for having filed
charges.” The letter complaint, though written in their
individual capacities, constituted a concerted activity in
the exercise of their right to self organization, as the
complaint touched on labor-management relations. ULP
was further established by the Bank’s refusal to enter into
collective bargaining.
H: Their dismissal constituted an ULP. Even assuming
that they acted in their individual capacities, they were
UP LAW C2017 LABOR 2 (PROF. DAWAY) FINALS REVIEWER | 24
nonetheless protected for they were engaged in
concerted activity in the exercise of their right of self-
organization that includes concerted activity for mutual aid
and protection. The SC also said instead of dismissing the
respondents, the Bank should have referred the letter to
the grievance committee. Note: This is where J. Fernando
disagrees. To him, there was no collective bargaining
because it the respondents, in calling for the President’s
resignation, gave an ultimatum. Their hardline position
was not in accordance with the definition of collective
bargaining, which presupposes the give-and-take of
discussion. J. Fernando is also of the opinion that the ULP
should be categorized as “interference, restraint or
coercion” instead.
Justice Fernando's concurring opinion in Republic
Saving Bank v. CIR explains the inter-relations of
ULP acts. (Note: while the decision refers to the first
subsection Industrial Peace Act, such section is actually
similar to Art. 254 (a) and Art. 255 (b) of the Labor Code,
hence the applicability of the explanation)
• The first subsection of the Industrial Peace Act on
“interference, restraint, or coercion,” covering as
it does such a broad range of ULPs on the part
of employers, is a catch-all provision for
borderline cases inimical to the right of self-
organization or to collective bargaining justifying a
finding of ULP. The succeeding ULPs
enumerated in the Act are designed not to
impose limitations or restrictions upon the general
guarantees of the first, but rather to spell out with
particularity some of the practices that have been
most prevalent and most troublesome. It’s
impossible to specify in precise and unmistakable
language each incident which constitutes a ULP,
so it’s up to the court to apply the Act’s general
prohibitory language in the light of infinite
combinations of events which may be charged as
violative of its terms.
B. ACTS VIOLATIVE OF RIGHT TO
SELF-ORGANIZATION
1. Interference, Restraint and Coercion
LC, Art. 254 (a). ULPs of employers. – It shall be
unlawful for an employer to commit any of the following
ULP: (a) To interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in
the exercise of their right to self-organization;
LC, Art. 261. Exclusive bargaining representation
and workers’ participation in policy and decision-
making. – The labor organization designated or selected

by the majority of the employees in an appropriate
collective bargaining unit shall be the exclusive
representative of the employees in such unit for the
purpose of collective bargaining. However, an individual
employee or group of employees shall have the right at
any time to present grievances to their employer.
Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding,
workers shall have the right, subject to such rules and
regulations as the Secretary of Labor and Employment
may promulgate, to participate in policy and decision-
making processes of the establishment where they are
employed insofar as said processes will directly affect
their rights, benefits and welfare. For this purpose,
workers and employers may form labor-management
councils: Provided, That the representatives of the
workers in such labor-management councils shall be
elected by at least the majority of all employees in said
establishment.
LC, Art. 283 (g) (h). Miscellaneous provisions. (g) The
Ministry shall help promote and gradually develop, with
the agreement of labor organizations and employers,
labor-management cooperation programs at appropriate
levels of the enterprise based on the shared responsibility
and mutual respect in order to ensure industrial peace
and improvement in productivity, working conditions and
the quality of working life.
(h) In establishments where no legitimate labor
organization exists, labor-management committees may
be formed voluntarily by workers and employers for the
purpose of promoting industrial peace. The Department of
Labor and Employment shall endeavor to enlighten and
educate the workers and employers on their rights and
responsibilities through labor education with emphasis on
the policy thrusts of this Code.
LC, Art. 255 (a). ULPs of labor organizations. - It shall
be ULP for a labor organization, its officers, agents or
representatives: (a) To restrain or coerce employees in the
exercise of their right to self-organization. However, a
labor organization shall have the right to prescribe its own
rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of
membership;
T&H SHOPFITTERS CORP. v.
T&H SHOPFITTERS UNION
D: The test of whether an employer has interfered with
and coerced employees in the exercise of their right to
selforganization, that is, whether the employer has
engaged in conduct which, it may reasonably be said,
tends to interfere with the free exercise of employees’
UP LAW C2017 LABOR 2 (PROF. DAWAY) FINALS REVIEWER | 25
rights; and that it is not necessary that there be direct
evidence that any employee was in fact intimidated or
coerced by statements of threats of the employer if there
is a reasonable inference that anti-union conduct of the
employer does have an adverse effect on self-organization
and collective bargaining.
F: The Union, together with 21 others filed a case of ULP
(union-busting & illegal lockout) against the companies
T&H and Gin Queen (taken as a single entity and sole
employer). They respondents allege that the company
interfered with and coerced the employees in their
exercise of right to self-organization when they actively
campaigned against the union, send the non-union
members in a field trip, and relocate union-members to a
talahiban and reduced their work hours.
H: The Court held that the petitioners are guilty of ULP.
PRINCE TRANSPORT, INC. & R. CLAROS v. GARCIA
(2011)
D: Their act of transferring the union members and then
leaving them hanging later on was a clear manifestation of
their opposition to the formation of a union in the
company, clearly violating the right of the EEs to self-
organization. Under Article 248 (a) and (e) of the Labor
Code, an employer is guilty of ULP if it interferes with,
restrains or coerces its employees in the exercise of their
right to self-organization or if it discriminates in regard to
wages, hours of work and other terms and conditions of
employment in order to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization.
F: When Garcia, et al, employees of PTI, started
conducting meetings with the company to negotiate their
commissions, the company suspected that they were
about to form a union and expressed its disagreement to
it. Thereafter, the employees were transferred to another
company, Lubas, allegedly to frustrate the formation of
the union. When Lubas deteriorated and had to dismiss
the employees, the latter filed for illegal dismissal and ULP
against PTI.
H: Court held that petitioners were indeed guilty of ULP by
transferring respondents and then refusing to properly
operate Lubas Transport. Respondents’ transfer of work
assignments to Lubas was a subterfuge to frustrate their
right to organize themselves into a union. Evidence of
petitioners' ULP is shown by the established fact that,
after respondents' transfer to Lubas, petitioners left them
high and dry insofar as the operations of Lubas was
concerned.

PARK HOTEL v. SORIANO (2012)
D: Art. 248(a), LC considers it ULP when an employer
interferes, restrains or coerces employees in the exercise
of their right to self-organization or the right to form an
association. Substantial evidence is required, or such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. Respondents were
unceremoniously dismissed from work by reason of their
intent to form and organize a union.
F: Respondents were terminated allegedly for forming a
union. Respondents filed complaints for illegal dismissal,
ULP, and payment of damages and attorney’s fees. They
alleged that the real reason for their dismissal was that
they were organizing a union for the company’s
employees.
H: The Court held that petitioners were guilty of ULP for
allegedly interfering with the employees’ right to self-
organization.
a. Interrogation
“Blue Flash Doctrine”
• An employer is not denied the privilege of
interrogating its employees as to their union
affiliation, provided the same is for a legitimate
purpose and assurance is given by the employer
that no reprisals would be taken against unionists
Questioning of employees concerning union membership
and activities, made in such a way as to hamper the
exercise of free choice on the part of the employees,
constitutes ULP (Scoty’s v. Miller; Philippine Steam v.
Philippine Marine)
SCOTY’S DEPARTMENT STORE v. MICALLER (1956)
D: Questioning of employees concerning union
membership and activities and disparaging remarks by
supervisory employees made in such a way as to hamper
the exercise of free choice on the part of the employees,
have been uniformly condemned as a violation of the Act.
F: Nena was an outstanding employee working at Scoty’s
Dept Store. She formed a union and affiliated with
National Labor Union. Her employers questioned her and
the other employees about their union participation.
Several criminal charges were filed against her. Eventually,
she was dismissed from work allegedly due to
misconduct.
H: However, the Court found the employers guilty of ULP
for dismissing her because of her union participation.
UP LAW C2017 LABOR 2 (PROF. DAWAY) FINALS REVIEWER | 26
STEAM NAVIGATION CO. v.
PHIL. MARINE OFFICERS GUILD (1965)
D: An employer is not denied the privilege of interrogating
its employees as to their union affiliation, provided the
same is for a legitimate purpose and assurance is given
by the employer that no reprisals would be taken against
unionists. Nonetheless, any employer who engages in
interrogation does so with notice that he risks a finding of
ULP if the circumstances are such that his interrogation
restrains or interferes with employees in the exercise of
their rights to self-organization.
F: Philippine Marine Officers Guild wanted to bargain
collectively with Philippine Steam Navigation Co.
Philsteam demanded proof that PMOG represented the
majority of its employees, and started its own investigation
even before PMOG could reply to the demand. PMOG
eventually filed a notice of strike alleging ULPs on the part
of Philsteam.
H: SC ruled that PHILSTEAM committed ULP in having
interfered with, restrained and coerced employees in the
exercise of their rights to self-organization. A company
subjecting its employees to a series of questions
regarding their membership in the union or their union
activities in such a way as to hamper the exercise of free
choice on their part constituted ULP.
b. Speech, espionage, economic coercion
Note: Test for ULP – Totality of Conduct Doctrine
Speech
• A company commits ULP when it writes letters to
employees containing “bribes” and threats of
dismissal to induce strikers to return to work.
Such letters, when taken together with the other
circumstances, aren’t protected by the free
speech provisions of the Constitution (Insular Life
Assurance Co., Ltd. Employees Association v.
Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd.).
Espionage
• A company commits ULP when there is good
ground to believe that a former union member
was made to spy on union activities and testify
against union members on behalf of the
company. (Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd.,
Employees Association v. Insular Life Assurance
Co., Ltd.)
Economic coercion
• A company commits ULP when it offers “bribes,”
e.g. bonuses to “loyal” employees and wage
increases to strikers in exchange for returning to
work.

INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO. EMPLOYEES
ASSN. V. INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO. (1971)
D: It is ULP for an employer operating under a CBA to
negotiate or attempt to negotiate with his employees
individually in connection with changes in the agreement.
The basis of the prohibition regarding individual bargaining
with the strikers is that although the union is on strike, the
employer is still under the obligation to bargain with the
union as the employees’ bargaining representative.
The free speech protection under the Constitution is
inapplicable where the expression of opinion by the
employer or his agent contains a promise of benefit, or
threats, or reprisal.
F: Unions jointly submitted proposals to modify the
renewal of their respective CBAs. Negotiations were
conducted but there was a deadlock. The Unions
eventually went on strike. To try and get the employees
back to work, the Companies sent two letters. In the first,
they “bribed” the workers with promises of free meals,
comfortable cots, overtime pay, free coffee and
occasional movies, as well as more benefits for their
families while in the second, they subtly threatened the
strikers by saying that they could no longer hold the
strikers’ positions open and by giving an ultimatum. The
Companies also attempted to break the picket lines, filed
criminal charges against some strikers, and used two of
their employees who were the former legal counsels of the
Unions.
H: Companies were guilty of violating the employees’ right
to organize, form and join labor organizations. They
committed unwarranted acts of interference in trying to
“bribe” the strikers to go back to work, threatening them
with eventual dismissal, and in utilizing the former legal
counsels of the Unions in negotiations. The letters
containing such bribes and threats, when taken together
with other circumstances, are not covered by the free
speech provisions of the Constitution. There was also
good ground to believe that a former union member was
made to spy on union activities and testify against union
members on behalf of the company.
c. Concerted activities
• A company commits ULP when it doesn’t permit
all of its employees to join a mass demonstration
against alleged police abuses (PBM v. PBM
Employees Organization
PBM EMPLOYEES ORGANIZATION V. PHILIPPINE
BLOOMING MILLS CO., (1973)
D: Restraint or inhibition on the Union’s concerted action
for mutual aid and protection constitutes an ULP
UP LAW C2017 LABOR 2 (PROF. DAWAY) FINALS REVIEWER | 27
guarantees to the employees the right "to engage in
concert activities for ... mutual aid or protection." The
joining in protests or demands, even by a small group of
employees, if in furtherance of their interests, is a
concerted activity protected by the Industrial Peace Act
and the Constitution. It is not necessary that union activity
be involved or that collective bargaining be contemplated.
F: PBMEO staged a mass demonstration against alleged
police abuses. Company PBM denied their request to be
excused from work and charged them with a violation of
“No Strike-No Lockout” provision in CBA. PBM dismissed
the officers of the Union for participating in the illegal
strike.
H: SC declared that the Union had the constitutional right
to speech and to petition for redress of grievances against
the State, which was subordinate to the property rights of
the Company. It was the company that was guilty of ULP
for restraining the rights of the employees to concerted
action.
2. Non-union membership or withdrawal of
membership as a condition of employment
LC, Art. 254 (b). ULPs of employers. – It shall be
unlawful for an employer to commit any of the following
ULP: (b) To require as a condition of employment that a
person or an employee shall not join a labor organization
or shall with-draw from one to which he belongs;
“Yellow-dog contract”
• Promise exacted from workers or prospective
employees that they will not belong to nor form a
union during their employment (Azucena) A
company commits ULP when it refuses to admit
seasonal workers (whose services it had engaged
in previous seasons) belonging to a particular
union, and tells such workers that they must
leave that union if they want to continue working
for the company (Visayan Stevedore Trans. Co. v.
CIR)
VISAYAN STEVEDORE TRANS. CO. v. CIR (1967)
D: Regarding the charge of the ULP against the company,
such charge is substantially borne out by the evidence of
record, it appearing that the workers which were not
admitted to work were precisely those belonging to the
UFWA and the Branch Manager had told them point-
blank that severance of their connection with the UFWA
was the remedy if they wanted to continue working with
the company. This act done by the company is
considered ULP.

F: The workers of Visayan Stevedoring are supplied by
UWFA, a labor organization. After the milling season of
Nov. 11,1955, the company refused to engage the
services of Dano-og, Agarcio and 137 others. They filed a
complaint for ULP.
H: SC found the company and Xaudaro guilty of ULP and
ordered reinstatement of the workers.
3. Contracting out to discourage unionism
LC, Art. 254 (c). ULPs of employers. – It shall be
unlawful for an employer to commit any of the following
ULP: (c) To contract out services or functions being
performed by union members when such will interfere
with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their
rights to self-organization
Subcontracting is NOT always tantamount to ULP.
• When is it ULP? When it’s motivated by a desire
to prevent employees from organizing (Azucena)
• When is it NOT ULP? If it’s done for business
reasons (e.g. decline in business, inadequacy of
equipment, need to reduce cost) (Azucena)
DIGITAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS, PHIL., INC. v.
DIGITEL EMPLOYEES UNION (2012)
D: Regarding the dismissal of the employees, this
dismissal constitutes also an ULP under Art. 248(c) of the
Labor Code, which refers to contracting out services or
functions being performed by union members when such
will interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the
exercise of their rights to self-organization
F: Pending the assumption order of the Secretary of
Labor to enjoin an impending strike, Digiserv effected the
dismissal of several employees. Digitel, on the other hand,
defied the assumption order by abruptly closing down
Digiserv.
H: Court held that the closure of Digiserv pending the
existence of an assumption order coupled with the
creation of a new corporation performing similar functions
as Digiserv leaves no iota of doubt that the target of the
closure are the union member-employees.
4. Company domination of union
LC, Art. 218 (i). "Company union" means any labor
organization whose formation, function or administration
has been assisted by any act defined as ULP by this
Code.
UP LAW C2017 LABOR 2 (PROF. DAWAY) FINALS REVIEWER | 28
LC, Art. 254 (d). ULPs of employers. – It shall be
unlawful for an employer to commit any of the following
ULP: (d) To initiate, dominate, assist or otherwise interfere
with the formation or administration of any labor
organization, including the giving of financial or other
support to it or its organizers or supporters;
What’s a “company union”? (Art. 218(i))
• Any labor organization whose formation, function
or administration has been assisted by any act
defined as ULP by the Labor Code
Common manifestations (Azucena)
• Initiation by the employer of the company union
idea
o Outright formation of the union by the
employer
o Employee formation of the union upon
employer’s demand/influence
o Employee formation motivated by
management
• Financial support to union
o Union expenses
o Attorney’s fees
• Employer encouragement and assistance
o Immediately recognizing a union as
SEBA without first determining if it
represents the majority
• Supervisory assistance
o Soliciting membership
o Permitting union activities during working
hours
PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT CORP. v. CIR (1977)
D: It can be concluded that the employees were indeed
dismissed because of their refusal to resign from ACEA
and to affiliate with PEU. It was shown that the company
had a hand in the formation of PEU. It can also be seen
that PEU was organized to camouflage the company’s
dislike for ACEA and to stave off their recognition.
F: ACEA, on behalf of 48 members, instituted a case for
ULP in the CIR against PDC, and four officers of PDC and
PEU, a labor organization existing in the PDC. The
complaint by ACEA alleged, among others, that the
supervisors of PDC encouraged and assisted in the
formation or PEU and coerced the employees to
disaffiliate from ACEA and to affiliate with the PEU.
H: PEU was formed purportedly to bust the complainant
union and that the PDC and PEU were guilty of ULP.

5. Discrimination to Encourage/ Discourage
Unionism
LC Art. 254(e). ULP of employers : To discriminate in
regard to wages, hours of work and other terms and
conditions of employment in order to encourage or
discourage membership in any labor organization.
Nothing in this Code or in any other law shall stop the
parties from requiring membership in a recognized
collective bargaining agent as a condition for
employment, except those employees who are already
members of another union at the time of the signing of
the CBA. […]
LC Art. 255(b). ULP of labor organizations : To
cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate
against an employee, including discrimination against
an employee with respect to whom membership in
such organization has been denied or to terminate an
employee on any ground other than the usual terms
and conditions under which membership or
continuation of membership is made available to other
members;
Discrimination in regard to what?
• Terms and conditions of employment (e.g.
wages, hours of work)
Why discriminate?
• To discourage/encourage membership in a labor
organization
Who commits ULP?
• The employer who discriminates
• The labor organization which causes or attempts
to cause the employer to discriminate
Discrimination vs. differentiation/classification
• There are valid differentiations based on
differences in job requirements. It’s not ULP
when management classifies jobs with varying
pay/benefits. (Azucena)
a. Discriminatory discharge
• Discrimination occurs when a union member,
involved in union activity, is treated differently
from a non-union worker.
• Antiunion animus is found when the
employer’s conduct is not motivated, or at
least is not entirely motivated by legitimate and
substantial business reasons but by a desire
to penalize/ reward employees for union
activities.
• Constructive discharge – where employee
resigns as a result of the discrimination; may
be remedied in a ULP proceeding
UP LAW C2017 LABOR 2 (PROF. DAWAY) FINALS REVIEWER | 29
• Test of discrimination: Underlying reason for
discharge; essentially a question of fact
b. Exception: Valid “discrimination”
UNION SECURITY CLAUSE – generic term which is
applied to and comprehends “closed shop”, “union
shop”, “maintenance of membership”, or any other
form of agreement which imposes upon employees the
obligation to acquire/retain union membership as a
condition affecting employment.
• Objective: Assure union’s continued existence
• It is “the most prized achievement of unionism”
• It is discrimination favoring unionism; it is a
valid kind of discrimination.
As opposed to open shop – does not require union
membership as a condition of employment.
Kinds of Union Security Agreements:
• Closed shop* – only union members can be
hired by the company and they must remain
union members to retain employment.
• Union shop* – non-members may be hired,
but to retain employment, they must become
union members within a certain period. The
requirement applies to present and future
employees.
• Modified union shop – employees who are
not union members at the time of signing the
ontract need not join the union, but all workers
hired thereafter must join.
• Maintenance of membership* – no
employee is compelled to join the union, but
all present or future members must remain in
good standing in the union as a condition of
employment.
• Exclusive bargaining shop – the union is
recognized as the exclusive bargaining agent
for all employees in the bargaining unit,
whether union members or not.
• Bargaining for members only – the union is
recognized as the bargaining agent only for its
own members
Note: Phil. Diamond Hotel - bargaining in behalf only of
its members would only “fragment the employees”,
more particularly, the rank-and-file employees; the
workers who are not members are at a serious
disadvantage, because they will be economically
impaired and will not be able to negotiate their terms
and conditions of work, thus defeating the very
essence and reason of collective bargaining
• Agency shop/ maintenance of treasury
shop – agreement whereby employees must
either join the union or pay to the union as
exclusive bargaining agent a sum equal to that

paid by the members. This is directed against
“free rider” employees who benefit from union
activities without contributing financially to
union support.
* - included in the outline
Advantages of Closed-Shop Agreements
• Increases the bargaining power of labor orgs
• Prevents non-union workers from sharing in
the benefits of the union’s activities without
also sharing in its obligations
• Prevents the weakening of labor orgs caused
by discrimination against union members
• Eliminates the lowering of standards caused
by competition with non-union members
• Enables labor orgs effectively to enforce CNAs
• Facilitates the collection of dues and the
enforcement of union rules
• Creates harmonious relations between the
employer and the employees
Disadvantages of Closed-Shop Agreements
• Results in monopolistic domination of
employment by labor orgs
• Interferes with the freedom of contract and
personal liberty of the individual worker
• Compels employers to discharge all non-union
workers regardless of efficiency, length of
service, etc.
• Facilitates the use of labor organizations by
unscrupulous union leaders for the purpose of
extortion, restraint of trade, etc.
• Denies to non-union workers equal opportunity
for employment
• Allows union to charge exorbitant dues and
initiation fees
Exempted from Compulsory Membership
1. Religious objectors – protected by R.A. 3350
2. Members of minority unions
3. Confidential employees
4. Employees expressly excluded by stipulation
Requisites for Dismissal by Enforcing the Union
Security Clause (Alabang Country Club v. NLRC)
The employer needs only to determine and prove that:
(1) the union security clause is applicable;
(2) the union is requesting for the enforcement of
the union security provision in the CBA; and
(3) there is sufficient evidence to support the
union’s decision to expel the employee from
the union.
UP LAW C2017 LABOR 2 (PROF. DAWAY) FINALS REVIEWER | 30
ALABANG COUNTRY CLUB v. NLRC (2008)
D: Termination of employment by virtue of a union
security clause embodied in a CBA is recognized and
accepted in our jurisdiction. This practice strengthens
the union and prevents disunity in the bargaining unit
within the duration of the CBA. The authorized
bargaining representative gains more numbers and
strengthens its position as against other unions.
F: Alabang Country Club and Union had a CBA with a
union shop and maintenance of membership shop
clause in the CBA. Former officers of the Union were
found to be guilty of malversation of funds. Club
terminated them.
H: The language the CBA is unequivocal: Union
members must maintain their membership in good
standing as a condition sine qua non for their
continued employment with the Club. It is also clear
that upon demand by the Union and after due process,
the Club shall terminate the employment of a regular
rank­and­file employee who may be found liable for
certain offenses, one of which is malversation.
GENERAL MILLING CORP v. CASIO ET AL. (2010)
D: Despite a closed shop provision in the CBA and the
expulsion of members from the union, law and
jurisprudence imposes upon the company the
obligation to the expelled members substantive and
procedural due process before complying with the
demand of the union to dismiss them from service. The
failure of the company to carry out this obligation
makes it liable for illegal dismissal.
F: Officers and members of IBM-Local 31 issued a
Resolution expelling Casio, et al. from the union for
“acts inimical to the interest of the union”. The union
pressured GMC to terminate the employment of the
employed members. VA dismissed their complaint
since the dismissal was due to the enforcement of the
provisions in the CBA. CA set the VA’s award aside
and held that the dismissal was illegal for lack of due
process. SC affirmed.
H: The third requisite for termination by enforcing the
union security clause (evidence to support the union’s
decision) is lacking. GMC, by its own admission, did
not conduct a separate and independent investigation
to determine the sufficiency of the evidence supporting
the expulsion of Casio, et al. by IBP-Local 31. Casio,
et al. are entitled to backwages and separation pay
considering that reinstatement is no longer possible
because the positions they previously occupied are no

longer existing, as declared by GMC$.
PICOP RESOURCES v. TAÑECA (2010), supra
D: The power to dismiss is a normal prerogative of the
employer. This, however, is not without limitations. The
employer is bound to exercise caution in terminating
the services of his employees especially so when it is
made upon the request of a labor union pursuant to
the CBA. Dismissals must not be arbitrary and
capricious. Due process must be observed in
dismissing an employee, because it affects not only his
position but also his means of livelihood. Employers
should, therefore, respect and protect the rights of
their employees, which include the right to labor.
c. Collection of agency fees
• Considered a lesser form of union security
LC, Art. 254 (e) […] Employees of an appropriate
bargaining unit who are not members of the
recognized collective bargaining agent may be
assessed a reasonable fee equivalent to the dues and
other fees paid by members of the recognized
collective bargaining agent, if such non-union
members accept the benefits under the CBA:
Provided, that the individual authorization required
under Article 247, paragraph (o) of this Code shall not
apply to the non-members of the recognized collective
bargaining agent;
DEL PILAR ACADEMY, ET AL. v. DEL PILAR
ACADEMY EMPLOYEES UNION (2008)
D: The employee's acceptance of benefits resulting
from $a CBA justifies the deduction of agency fees from
his pay and the union's entitlement thereto. In this
aspect, the legal basis of the union's right to agency
fees is neither contractual nor statutory, but
quasi­contractual, deriving from the established
principle that non­union employees may not unjustly
enrich themselves by benefiting from employment
conditions negotiated by the bargaining union. $
F: Under the CBA between Del Pilar Academy (DPA)
and the respondent Union, certain benefits were
extended to non-members of the said Union. To this
extent, the Union requested DPA to deduct agency
fees from the salaries and wages of the non-members.
DPA refused, claiming that they are not required to do
so in the absence of a written authorization.
H: Article 254 (e) makes it explicit that Article 247 (o)
requiring written authorization is inapplicable to
UP LAW C2017 LABOR 2 (PROF. DAWAY) FINALS REVIEWER | 31
non­union members, especially in this case where the
non­union employees receive several benefits $u nder
the CBA. The employer is duty bound to deduct the
said agency fees from their salaries/ wages. It is the
Union’s right to receive the agency fees as a quasi-
contractual right (that the non-members may not
unjustly enrich themselves by the efforts of the Union).
6. Retaliatory discharge or retaliation for
testimony against employer/ Indirect
discrimination
LC, Art. 254 (f). ULP of employers. It shall be
unlawful for an employer to commit any of the
following ULP: […] (f) To dismiss, discharge or
otherwise prejudice or discriminate against an
employee for having given or being about to give
testimony under this Code;
• This is an indirect assault against the
employee’s right to engage in concerted
activity, which does not always require a
number of employees to act in unison. An
employee acting alone in pursuing a group
interest may be said to be doing a concerted
activity which the employer cannot curtail.
• Retaliation based on refusal to testify in favor
of the employer is considered an analogous
situation (Mabeza v. NLRC).
ITOGON-SUYOC MINES, INC. v. BALDO (1964)
D: Dismissing an employee based on union
membership and giving of testimony adverse to the
employer is a ULP act. The dismissal was unjust and
illegal. An examination of the offense imputed shows
that they were not so serious as to warrant immediate
and permanent dismissal.
F: Baldo was dismissed from the company. He
brought his case to the grievance committee.$ During
the hearing of a certification election case, he gave a
testimony favorable to his union and in some way
adverse to the interests of the company.$ Afterwards,
his case before the grievance committee was
immediately “dropped”.
H: Considering that Baldo's case was pending before
the grievance committee when he was asked not $t o
testify, and soon after he had testified adversely to the
employer his case was dropped by the grievance
committee, the conclusion is inescapable that the
management had much to do with the dropping of
Baldo's case, and because of the dropping of that

case the company never reinstated Baldo. $
7. Illegal exaction – Featherbedding
LC, Art. 255 (d). ULP of labor organizations. It shall
be unlawful for a labor organization, its officers, agents
or representatives: (d) To cause or attempt to cause
an employer to pay or deliver or agree to pay or deliver
any money or other things of value, in the nature of an
exaction, for services which are not performed or not
to be performed, including the demand for fee for
union negotiations;
FEATHERBEDDING or “make work” – a term given
to employee practices which create or spread
employment by “unnecessarily” maintaining or
increasing the number of employees used, or the
amount of time consumed, to work on a particular job.
This stems from a desire for job security in the face of
technological improvements or subcontracting.
C. Acts Violative of Right to Collective Bargaining
1. Violation of Duty to Bargain
LC, Art. 254 (g). ULP of employers. It shall be
unlawful for an employer to commit any of the
following ULP: […] (g) To violate the duty to bargain
collectively as prescribed by this Code;
LC, Art. 255 (c). ULP of labor organizations. It shall
be unlawful for a labor organization, its officers, agents
or representatives: (c) To violate the duty, or refuse to
bargain collectively with the employer, provided it is
the representative of the employees;
LC, Art. 256. Procedure in collective bargaining,
supra
LC, Art. 257. Duty to bargain collectively in the
absence of CBAs. In the absence of an agreement or
other voluntary arrangement providing for a more
expeditious manner of collective bargaining, it shall be
the duty of employer and the representatives of the
employees to bargain collectively in accordance with
the provisions of this Code.
LC, Art. 258. Meaning of duty to bargain
collectively . The duty to bargain collectively means
the performance of a mutual obligation to meet and
convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for
the purpose of negotiating an agreement with respect
to wages, hours of work and all other terms and
UP LAW C2017 LABOR 2 (PROF. DAWAY) FINALS REVIEWER | 32
conditions of employment including proposals for
adjusting any grievances or questions arising under
such agreement and executing a contract
incorporating such agreements if requested by either
party but such duty does not compel any party to
agree to a proposal or to make any concession.
LC, Art. 259. Duty to bargain collectively when
there exists a CBA. When there is a CBA, the duty to
bargain collectively shall also mean that neither party
shall terminate nor modify such agreement during its
lifetime. However, either party can serve a written
notice to terminate or modify the agreement at least 60
days prior to its expiration date. It shall be the duty of
both parties to keep the status quo and to continue in
full force and effect the terms and conditions of the
existing agreement during the 60-day period and/or
until a new agreement is reached by the parties.
SHELL OIL WORKERS UNION V. SHELL CO (1971)
D: Collective bargaining does not end with the
execution of an agreement, being a continuous
process, the duty to bargain necessarily imposing on
the parties the obligation to live up to the terms of
such a CBA if entered into, it is undeniable that
non­compliance therewith constitutes ULP.
F: Shell wanted to dissolve its security guard section
and replace it with an outside agency. However, this
section was covered and assured of continuance in an
existing CBA. As a response to the dissolution, the
Union held a strike. Shell argued that the dissolution
was within the valid exercise of management
prerogative (economic efficiency), and the CIR ruled in
favor of Shell.
H: The CBA is effectively a bar against the dissolution
and transfer. Since a ULP was done by the company,
the strike is a legal reaction towards a breach of the
CBA. The violent acts committed during a handful of
days during the actual strike period do not revoke that
legality, as it was otherwise peaceful—however, liability
is incurred by those guilty of such acts of violence that
call for loss of employee status. Only those who
committed said acts will be dismissed, or reinstated
but without backwages.
DLSU v. DLSU EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (2012)
D: A void in the leadership does not constitute a valid
ground to refuse to negotiate because the company’s
duty to bargain under the law is due and demandable
under the law by the union as a whole and not by any
faction within the union.

F: Following a contested union election, DLSU
acceded to the losing party’s request and declared
that a void leadership existed pending a DOLE
declaration. The Union requested negotiations on the
economic terms of their CBA but DLSU replied that no
renegotiation can occur given the void in the
leadership of the Union. SOLE found DLSU guilty of
ULP, violating its duty to bargain.
H: After the election of the union officers, continued
refusal by the University to negotiate amounts to ULP.
Such an act constituted an intentional avoidance of a
duty imposed by law. The issue of union leadership is
distinct and separate from the duty to bargain.
a. Setting a pre-condition to bargaining
UNION OF FILIPRO EMPLOYEES –
DFAI UNIONS KMU v. NESTLE (2008)
D: The duty to bargain collectively is mandated by
Articles 252 and 253 of the Labor Code. The purpose
of collective bargaining is the reaching of an
agreement resulting in a contract binding on the
parties; but the failure to reach an agreement after
negotiations have continued for a reasonable period
does not establish a lack of good faith. The statutes
invite and contemplate a collective bargaining contract,
but they do not compel one. The duty to bargain does
not include the obligation to reach an agreement.
F: UFE-DFA-KMU filed two petitions for certiorari in the
CA assailing various orders of the SOLE denying the
ULP allegations of the union against Nestle. The union
is charging the company with ULP because of a letter
stating that some grants are not proper subjects of
CBA and therefore shall be excluded. Union claims
that Nestle purportedly imposed a pre-condition to its
agreement to discuss and engage in collective
bargaining negotiations.
H: There was no ULP in this case, said letter is not
tantamount to refusal to bargain. This is not a case
where the employer exhibited an indifferent attitude
towards collective bargaining. Nestlé’s desire to settle
the dispute and proceed with the negotiation being
evident in its cry for compulsory arbitration is proof
enough of its exertion of reasonable effort at good-
faith bargaining.
INSULAR LIFE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION v.
INSULAR LIFE (1971), supra
D: It is a ULP for an employer operating under a CBA
UP LAW C2017 LABOR 2 (PROF. DAWAY) FINALS REVIEWER | 33
to negotiate or to attempt to negotiate with his
employees individually in connection with changes in
the agreement. The employer is under obligation to
bargain with the union as the employees' bargaining
representative.
b. Duty to resume negotiations
CABEU-NFL v.
CENTRAL AZUCARERA DE BAIS (2010)
D: For a charge of ULP to prosper, it must be shown
that the company was motivated by ill will, "bad faith,
or fraud, or was oppressive to labor, or done in a
manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public
policy, and, of course, that social humiliation, wounded
feelings or grave anxiety resulted […]" in suspending
negotiations.
F: CABEU-NFL and CAB reached a bargaining
deadlock. While in the jurisdiction of the NCMB,
CABEU-NFL asked for a conciliation meeting, but CAB
replied that the purpose of the meeting was moot and
academic because 90% of CABEU-NFL withdrew their
support and organized a new union, CABELA. Based
on this letter, CABEU-NFL filed with the LA a complaint
for ULP for CAB’s refusal to bargain.
H: There was no refusal to bargain. CAB believed that
CABEU­NFL was no longer the representative of the
workers. It just wanted to foster industrial peace by
bowing to the wishes of the overwhelming majority of
its rank and file workers and by negotiating and
concluding in good faith a CBA with CABELA. Such
actions of CAB are nowhere tantamount to
anti­unionism, the evil sought to be punished in cases
of ULP.
2. Negotiation or Attorneys Fees
LC, Art. 254 (h). ULP of employers. It shall be
unlawful for an employer to commit any of the
following ULP: […] (h) To pay negotiation or attorney’s
fees to the union or its officers or agents as part of the
settlement of any issue in collective bargaining or any
other dispute;
LC, Art. 255 (e). ULP of labor organizations. It shall
be unlawful for a labor organization, its officers, agents
or representatives: (e) To ask for or accept negotiation
or attorney’s fees from employers as part of the
settlement of any issue in collective bargaining or any
other dispute;

3. Gross Violation of CBA
LC, Art. 254 (i). ULP of employers. It shall be
unlawful for an employer to commit any of the
following ULP: […] (i) To violate a CBA.
LC, Art. 255 (f). ULP of labor organizations. It shall
be unlawful for a labor organization, its officers, agents
or representatives: (f) To violate a CBA.
LC, Art. 267. Jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrators
or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators. […] Accordingly,
violations of a CBA, except those which are gross in
character, shall no longer be treated as ULP and shall
be resolved as grievances under the CBA. For
purposes of this article, gross violations of CBA shall
mean flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with
the economic provisions of such agreement. […]
BPI EMPLOYEES UNION-DAVAO CITY-FUBU v.
BPI (2013)
D: Only gross violations of the economic provisions of
the CBA are treated as ULP. Violations of the CBA are
treated only as grievances.
F: BPI implemented the BOMC agreement in BPI
Davao wherein certain support services would be
contracted out. Thereafter, BPI and FEBTC merged,
with BPI as the surviving corporation. The former
FEBTC employees were transferred to BOMC. The
Union claims that a union shop agreement is stipulated
in the existing CBA. It is ULP for employer to
outsource the positions in the existing bargaining unit,
citing the case of Shell Oil Workers’ Union.
H: The Union’s reliance on the Shell Oil case is
misplaced. The rule now is covered by Article 261
(Now 267) which provides that only gross violations of
the economic provisions of the CBA are treated as
ULP. The alleged violation of the union shop
agreement in the CBA, even assuming it was malicious
and flagrant, is not a violation of an economic provision
in the agreement.
SAN MIGUEL FOODS, INC. v.
SMC EMPLOYEES UNION (2007)
D: For a ULP case to be cognizable by the LA/NLRC,
the allegations in the complaint should show prima
facie the concurrence of two things, namely: (1) gross
violation of the CBA; and (2) the violation pertains to
the economic provisions of the CBA.
F: Employees of SMFI’s Finance Department, through
UP LAW C2017 LABOR 2 (PROF. DAWAY) FINALS REVIEWER | 34
the Union, brought a grievance against the Finance
Manager in accordance with the grievance machinery
adopted in the CBA. SMFI wanted to address it
through a work management review which did not lead
to anything. Union filed a ULP complaint. The Union
also charged SMFI with promoting less senior
employees. SMFI challenged the LA’s jurisdiction.
H: Violation of grievance machinery not cognizable by
the LA (not an economic provision), but the violation of
the seniority rule is cognizable. Since the seniority rule
in the promotion of employees has a bearing on salary
and benefits, it may, following a liberal construction of
Article 261, be considered an “economic provision”.
However, It may not be seriously disputed that this
charge is a gross or flagrant violation of the seniority
rule. The Union did not allege that they were done to
encourage or discourage membership in a labor
organization. In fact, those promoted were members of
the complaining Union. The promotions do not thus
amount to ULP under Article 248(e) of the Labor Code.
ARELLANO UNIVERSITY EMPLOYEES AND
WORKERS UNION v. CA (2006)
D: To constitute ULP, violations of the CBA must be
gross. Gross violation of the CBA, under Art. 261 of
the Labor Code, means flagrant and/or malicious
refusal to comply with the economic provisions
thereof.
F: The Union filed two notices of strike and later on
staged a strike. They were charging AU of ULP for
interfering in union activities, union busting and
contract workout. AU claimed that its withholding of
union dues and death aid benefits was upon the
written request of several union members themselves.
H: The University cannot be faulted for ULP as it in
good faith merely heeded the request of Union
members.
D. Motive, Conduct, and Proof
1. Employer Motive and Proof
PHIL. METAL FOUNDRIES, INC. v. CIR (1979)
D: In determining whether a discharge is
discriminatory, the true reason must be established.
While union activity is no bar to a discharge, the
existence of a lawful cause for discharge is no defense
if the employee was actually discharged for union
activity. The question of whether an employee was
discharged because of his union activities is essentially
a question of fact as to which the findings of the CIR

are conclusive and binding if supported by substantial
evidence considering the record as a whole.
F: The union declared a strike after the company
terminated their president, believing that the same
constituted ULP. The company countered that it was
because of his unexcused absences.
H: Based on the evidence found by CIR (that his
absences were ignored by the company, and that it
was only when he handed the letter requesting for a
grievance conference as union president, that they
terminated him on the same day) his discharge was
ultimately triggered by his union activity, thus a ULP.
2. Totality of Evidence
ROYAL UNDERGARMENT CORPORATION
OF THE PHIL. v. CIR (1990)
D: Where the attendant circumstances, the history of
the employer’s past conduct and like considerations,
coupled with an intimate connection between the
employer’s action and the union affiliations or activities
of the particular employee or employees taken as a
whole raise a suspicion as to the motivation for the
employer’s action, the failure of the employer to
ascribe a valid reason may justify an inference that his
unexplained conduct in respect of the particular
employee or employees was inspired by the latter’s
union membership or activities.
F: Cruz, was dismissed by Royal Undergarments
twice; first for sending proposals for collective
bargaining, and second for campaigning for a
nationwide strike.
H: The totality of evidence as found by the CIR
supports the conclusion that Cruz has been unjustly
dismissed by reason of his union activities.
E. Enforcement, Remedies, and Sanctions
1. Parties Against Whom ULP Committed
LC, Art. 218. Definitions.
(e) "Employer" includes any person acting in the
interest of an employer, directly or indirectly. The term
shall not include any labor organization or any of its
officers or agents except when acting as employer.
(f) "Employee" includes any person in the employ of an
employer. The term shall not be limited to the
employees of a particular employer, unless the Code
UP LAW C2017 LABOR 2 (PROF. DAWAY) FINALS REVIEWER | 35
so explicitly states. It shall include any individual whose
work has ceased as a result of or in connection with
any current labor dispute or because of any ULP if he
has not obtained any other substantially equivalent and
regular employment.
(g) "Labor organization" means any union or
association of employees which exists in whole or in
part for the purpose of collective bargaining or of
dealing with employers concerning terms and
conditions of employment.
2. Parties Liable for Acts
a) Employer
LC, Art. 254. ULP of employers. […] The provisions
of the preceding paragraph notwithstanding, only the
officers and agents of corporations, associations or
partnerships who have actually participated in,
authorized or ratified ULPs shall be held criminally
liable.
LC, Art. 294. Penalties . Except as otherwise
provided in this Code, or unless the acts complained
of hinge on a question of interpretation or
implementation of ambiguous provisions of an existing
CBA, any violation of the provisions of this Code
declared to be unlawful or penal in nature shall be
punished with a fine of not less than One Thousand
Pesos (P1,000.00) nor more than Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000.00) or imprisonment of not less than three
months nor more than three years, or both such fine
and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.
In addition to such penalty, any alien found guilty shall
be summarily deported upon completion of service of
sentence.
Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding,
any criminal offense punished in this Code, shall be
under the concurrent jurisdiction of the Municipal or
City Courts and the Courts of First Instance.
LC, Art. 295. Who are liable when committed by
other than natural person. If the offense is
committed by a corporation, trust, firm, partnership,
association or any other entity, the penalty shall be
imposed upon the guilty officer or officers of such
corporation, trust, firm, partnership, association or
entity.
LC, Art. 296. Offenses . Offenses penalized under this

Code and the rules and regulations issued pursuant
thereto shall prescribe in three (3) years.
All ULP arising from Book V shall be filed with the
appropriate agency within one (1) year from accrual of
such ULP; otherwise, they shall be forever barred.
b) Labor Organization
LC, Art. 255. ULP of labor organizations. […] The
provisions of the preceding paragraph
notwithstanding, only the officers, members of
governing boards, representatives or agents or
members of labor associations or organizations who
have actually participated in, authorized or ratified
ULPs shall be held criminally liable.
LC, Art. 294-296, supra
NATIONAL LABOR UNION v. CIR (1982)
D: The concatenation of circumstances clearly
indicates the participation of the former owner and the
new owner in the ULP. Hence, they should be solidarily
liable for the payment of backwages to the
complaining employees.
F: 21 workers from Everlasting entered into a CBA
days after the company was purchased by a new
owner. The new owner dismissed these workers for no
reason so they filed complaint for ULP. CA originally
ruled that Ang Wo Long, the new owner, is liable, but
overturned this, stating that he was not even aware of
the union and the CBA.
H: It is irrational if not specious to assume that Mr.
Ang bought a business lock, stock, and barrel without
inquiring into its labor­ management situation and that
his dismissal of all the union members without
retaining a few experienced workers and their
replacement with a completely new set of employees
who were strangers to the company was anything
other than an attempt to rid the firm of unwanted union
activity. Ang Wo Long should be jointly and severally
liable with Benito S. Estanislao for the payment of
backwages to the complaining employees.
3. Prosecution and Prescriptive Period
a) Civil Aspect
LC, Art. 253. Concept of ULP and procedure for
prosecution thereof. […] Consequently, ULPs are
not only violations of the civil rights of both labor and
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management but are also criminal offenses against the
State which shall be subject to prosecution and
punishment as herein provided.
Subject to the exercise by the President or by the
Secretary of Labor and Employment of the powers
vested in them by Articles 263 and 264 of this Code,
the civil aspects of all cases involving ULPs, which may
include claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other
forms of damages, attorney’s fees and other
affirmative relief, shall be under the jurisdiction of the
Labor Arbiters. The Labor Arbiters shall give utmost
priority to the hearing and resolution of all cases
involving ULPs. They shall resolve such cases within
thirty (30) calendar days from the time they are
submitted for decision.
Recovery of civil liability in the administrative
proceedings shall bar recovery under the Civil Code.
[…]
LC, Art. 296, supra
• Offenses prescribe in 3 years
• ULP complaints shall be filed within 1 year
from accrual; otherwise, forever barred.
4. Compromise
CCLC EG GOCHANGCO WORKER’S UNION v.
NLRC (1988)
D: ULP cases are not, in view of the public interest
involved, subject to compromises.
F: Union requested permission for certain members
and officers to attend the hearing for PCE. Company
preventively suspended the employees who attended
and ultimately terminated their contracts due to
“abandonment of work”. There was an alleged order
by LA Aquino, which dismissed cases due to Waiver of
Claims, Rights or Interests in a separate case involving
the same parties.
H: LA's resolution refers to other cases and not the
instant ULP controversy. The Commission cannot feign
simple mistake for such a lapse. In any event, we have
held that ULP cases are not, in view of the public
interest involved, subject to compromises.
Furthermore, these alleged waivers do not appear to
have been presented in the first instance. They cannot
be introduced for the first time on appeal.

5. Remedies and Sanctions
a) Civil Remedies
LC, Art. 253, supra
• Subject to exercise by the President/SOLE of
the powers vested in them by Arts. 263 and
264, the civil aspects of all cases involving
ULP, which may include damages, attorney’s
fees and other affirmative relief, shall be under
the jurisdiction of the LAs.
• LAs shall give utmost priority to the hearing
and resolution of ULP cases. They shall
resolve such cases within 30 calendar days
from the time they are submitted for decision.
• Recovery of civil liability in the administrative
proceedings shall bar recovery under the Civil
Code.
LC, Art. 229. Appeal. Decisions, awards, or orders of
the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless
appealed to the Commission by any or both parties
within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such
decisions, awards, or orders. Such appeal may be
entertained only on any of the following grounds:
a) If there is prima facie evidence of abuse of
discretion on the part of the Labor Arbiter;
b) If the decision, order or award was secured
through fraud or coercion, including graft and
corruption;
c) If made purely on questions of law; and
d) If serious errors in the findings of facts are
raised which would cause grave or irreparable
damage or injury to the appellant.
In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an
appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon
the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a
reputable bonding company duly accredited by the
Commission in the amount equivalent to the monetary
award in the judgment appealed from.
In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter
reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, insofar
as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall
immediately be executory, even pending appeal. The
employee shall either be admitted back to work under
the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his
dismissal or separation or, at the option of the
employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. The posting
of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution
for reinstatement provided herein.
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To discourage frivolous or dilatory appeals, the
Commission or the Labor Arbiter shall impose
reasonable penalty, including fines or censures, upon
the erring parties.
In all cases, the appellant shall furnish a copy of the
memorandum of appeal to the other party who shall
file an answer not later than ten (10) calendar days
from receipt thereof.
The Commission shall decide all cases within twenty
(20) calendar days from receipt of the answer of the
appellee. The decision of the Commission shall be final
and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt
thereof by the parties.
Any law enforcement agency may be deputized by the
Secretary of Labor and Employment or the
Commission in the enforcement of decisions, awards
or orders.
LC, Art. 279. Security of tenure. In cases of regular
employment, the employer shall not terminate the
services of an employee except for a just cause or
when authorized by this Title. An employee who is
unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other
privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of
allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary
equivalent computed from the time his compensation
was withheld from him up to the time of his actual
reinstatement.
b) Penal Remedies
LC, Art. 253. Concept of ULP and procedure for
prosecution thereof. […] No criminal prosecution
under this Title may be instituted without a final
judgment finding that an ULP was committed, having
been first obtained in the preceding paragraph. During
the pendency of such administrative proceeding, the
running of the period of prescription of the criminal
offense herein penalized shall be considered
interrupted: Provided, however, that the final judgment
in the administrative proceedings shall not be binding
in the criminal case nor be considered as evidence of
guilt but merely as proof of compliance of the
requirements therein set forth.
LC, Art. 296, supra
QUADRA v. CA (2006)
D: It is proper to award moral and exemplary damages

to illegally dismissed employees as their dismissal was
tainted with ULP. The filing of a petition for damages
before the CIR did not constitute splitting of cause of
action under the Revised Rules of Court.
F: PCSO filed an administrative charge against Quadra
for neglect of duty and conduct prejudicial to the
service. CSC recommended his dismissal. PCSO
dismissed Quadra the day after. Quadra filed a petition
for damages before the CIR. CIR awarded moral and
exemplary damages. Court found that Quadra was
illegally dismissed for being active in union activities.
H: Quadra’s dismissal constituted ULP. It was done to
interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the
exercise of their right to self-organization. Moreover,
the petition for damages filed before the CIR was
proper because at the time of filing, the Court in a
previous case already upheld the jurisdiction of CIR
over claims for damages incidental to employee’s
illegal dismissal.
6. Effect of Closure Vis-à-vis ULP
POLYMER RUBBER CORP. v.
BAYOLO SALAMUDING (2013)
D: Even an employer who is found guilty of ULP in
dismissing his employee may not be ordered so to pay
backwages beyond the date of closure of business
where such closure was due to legitimate business
reasons and not merely an attempt to defeat the order
or reinstatement.
F: Petitioners are contesting the computation of
monetary awards given to respondents as it included
the period after the cessation of company operations.
H: Court held that computation must be based on the
number of days when Polymer was in actual
operations. It cannot be held liable to pay separation
pay beyond such closure of business because even if
the illegally dismissed employees would be reinstated,
they could not possibly work beyond the time of the
cessation of its operations.
IX. UNION CONCERTED ACTIVITIES . permanent injunction can issue in a labor dispute.
A. Basis of Right to Engage
in Concerted Activities
1. Constitution – Art. XIII, Sec. 3
Section 3. The State shall afford full protection to
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labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized,
and promote full employment and equality of
employment opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-
organization, collective bargaining and negotiations,
and peaceful concerted activities, including the
right to strike in accordance with law. They shall
be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of
work, and a living wage. They shall also participate in
policy and decision-making processes affecting their
rights and benefits as may be provided by law.
The State shall promote the principle of shared
responsibility between workers and employers and the
preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes,
including conciliation, and shall enforce their mutual
compliance therewith to foster industrial peace.
The State shall regulate the relations between workers
and employers, recognizing the right of labor to its just
share in the fruits of production and the right of
enterprises to reasonable returns to investments, and
to expansion and growth.
BISIG NG MANGGAGAWA SA CONCRETE
AGGREGATES, INC. v. NLRC (1993)
D: The restoration of the right to strike is the most
valuable gain of labor after the EDSA revolution. It is
the employees’ sole weapon which can effectively
protect their basic rights especially in a society where
the levers of powers are nearly monopolized by the
propertied few or their franchisees. In recognition of its
importance, our Constitution has accorded the right to
strike a distinct status while our laws have assured
that its rightful exercise will not be negated by the
issuance of unnecessary injunctions.
F: Union struck. The company filed a petition for
injunction to enjoin the union from striking, which
NLRC granted.
H: Article 218 (e) of the Labor Code provides both the
procedural and substantive requirements which must
strictly be complied with before a temporary or
NLRC failed to fulfill the requirements, especially of
pars. (4) and (5) of the law.
2. Statutory
LC, Art. 217-A. Declaration of Policy. It is the policy
of the State:

a) To promote and emphasize the primacy of free
collective bargaining and negotiations, including
voluntary arbitration, mediation and conciliation, as
modes of settling labor or industrial disputes;
b) To promote free trade unionism as an instrument
for the enhancement of democracy and the
promotion of social justice and development;
c) To foster the free and voluntary organization of a
strong and united labor movement;
LC, Art. 269. Strikes, picketing, and lockouts.
a) It is the policy of the State to encourage free trade
unionism and free collective bargaining.
b) Workers shall have the right to engage in
concerted activities for purposes of collective
bargaining or for their mutual benefit and
protection. The right of legitimate labor
organizations to strike and picket and of
employers to lockout, consistent with the national
interest, shall continue to be recognized and
respected. However, no labor union may strike
and no employer may declare a lockout on
grounds involving inter-union and intra-union
disputes.
RULE XXII
CONCILIATION, STRIKES AND LOCKOUTS
(as amended by DOLE D.O. No. 40-H-13, s. 2013)
Section 1. Conciliation of labor-management
disputes. - The board may, upon request of either of
both parties or upon its own initiative, provide
conciliation-mediation services to labor disputes other
than notices of strikes or lockouts. Conciliation cases
which are not subjects of notices of strike or lockout
shall be docketed as preventive mediation cases.
Section 2. Privileged communication. - Information
and statements given in confidence at conciliation
proceedings shall be treated as privileged
communications. Conciliators and similar officials shall
not testify in any court or body regarding any matter
taken up at conciliation proceedings conducted by
them.
Section 3. Issuance of subpoena. - The Board shall
have the power to require the appearance of any
parties at conciliation meetings.
Section 4. Compromise Agreements. - Any
compromise settlement, including those involving labor
standard laws, voluntarily agreed upon by the parties
with the assistance of the Board and its regional
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branches shall be final and binding upon the parties.
The National Labor Relations Commission or any court
shall not assume jurisdiction over issues involved
therein except in case of non-compliance thereof or if
there is prima facie evidence that the settlement was
obtained through fraud, misrepresentation, or
coercion. Upon motion of any interested party, the
Labor Arbiter in the region where the agreement was
reached may issue a writ of execution requiring a
sheriff of the Commission or the courts to enforce the
terms of the agreement.
Section 5. Grounds for strike or lockout. - A strike
or lockout may be declared in cases of bargaining
deadlocks and ULPs. Violations of CBAs, except
flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with its
economic provisions, shall not be considered ULP and
shall not be strikeable. No strike or lockout may be
declared on grounds involving inter- union and intra-
union disputes or without first having filed a notice of
strike or lockout or without the necessary strike or
lockout vote having been obtained and reported to the
Board. Neither will a strike be declared after
assumption of jurisdiction by the Secretary or after
certification of submission of the dispute to
compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the
pendency of cases involving the same grounds or the
strike or lockout. (As amended by DO 40_A-03 [Italized
word "or" added].)
Section 6. Who may declare a strike or lockout. -
Any certified or duly recognized bargaining
representative may declare a strike in cases of
bargaining deadlocks and ULPs. The employer may
declare a lockout in the same cases. In the absence of
a certified or duly recognized bargaining
representative, any legitimate labor organization in the
establishment may declare a strike but only on
grounds of ULPs.
Section 7. Notice of strike or lockout. - In
bargaining deadlocks, a notice of strike or lockout shall
be filed with the regional branch of the Board at least
thirty (30) days before the intended date thereof, a
copy of said notice having been served on the other
party concerned. In cases of ULP, the period of notice
shall be fifteen (15) days. However, in case of ULP
involving the dismissal from employment of any union
officer duly elected in accordance with the union
constitution and by-laws which may constitute union-
busting where the existence of the union is threatened,
the fifteen-day cooling-off period shall not apply and
the union may take action immediately after the strike

vote is conducted and the results thereof submitted to
the appropriate regional branch of the Board.
Section 8. Contents of notice. - The notice shall
state, among others, the names and addresses of the
employer and the union involved, the nature of the
industry to which the employer belongs, the number of
union members and of the workers in the bargaining
unit, and such other relevant data as may facilitate the
settlement of the dispute, such as a brief statement or
enumeration of all pending labor disputes involving the
same parties.
In cases of bargaining deadlocks, the notice shall, as
far as practicable, further state the unresolved issues
in the bargaining negotiations and be accompanied by
the written proposals of the union, the counter-
proposals of the employer and the proof of a request
for conference to settle the differences. In cases of
ULPs, the notice shall, as far as practicable, state the
acts complained of and the efforts taken to resolve the
dispute amicably.
In case a notice does not conform with the
requirements of this and the foregoing section/s, the
regional branch of the Board shall inform the
concerned party of such fact.
Section 9. Action on Notice. - Upon receipt of the
notice, the regional branch of the Board shall exert all
efforts at mediation and conciliation to enable the
parties to settle the dispute amicably. The regional
branch of the Board may, upon agreement of the
parties, treat a notice as a preventive mediation case.
It shall also encourage the parties to submit the
dispute to voluntary arbitration.
During the proceedings, the parties shall not do any
act which may disrupt or impede the early settlement
of the dispute. They are obliged, as part of their duty
to bargain collectively in good faith and to participate
fully and promptly in the conciliation meetings called by
the regional branch of the Board.
A notice, upon agreement of the parties, may be
referred to alternative modes of dispute resolution,
including voluntary arbitration.
Section 10. Strike or lockout vote. - A decision to
declare a strike must be approved by a majority of the
total union membership in the bargaining unit
concerned obtained by secret ballot in meetings or
referenda called for the purpose. A decision to declare
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a lockout must be approved by a majority of the Board
of Directors of the employer, corporation or
association or the partners in a partnership obtained
by a secret ballot in a meeting called for the purpose.
The regional branch of the Board may, at its own
initiative or upon request of any affected party,
supervise the conduct of the secret balloting. In every
case, the union or the employer shall furnish the
regional branch of the Board and the notice of
meetings referred to in the preceding paragraph at
least twenty-four (24) hours before such meetings as
well as the results of the voting at least seven (7) days
before the intended strike or lockout, subject to the
cooling-off period provided in this Rule
Section 11. Declaration of strike or lockout. -
Should the dispute remain unsettled after the lapse of
the requisite number of days from the filing of the
notice of strike or lockout and of the results of the
election required in the preceding section, the labor
union may strike or the employer may lock out its
workers. The regional branch of the Board shall
continue mediating and conciliating.
Section 12. Improved offer balloting. - In case of a
strike, the regional branch of the Board shall, at its
own initiative or upon the request of any affected
party, conduct a referendum by secret balloting on the
improved offer of the employer on or before the 30th
day of strike. When at least a majority of the union
members vote to accept the improved offer, the
striking workers shall immediately return to work and
the employer shall thereupon re-admit them upon the
signing of the agreement.
In case of a lockout, the regional branch of the Board
shall also conduct a referendum by secret balloting on
the reduced offer of the union on or before the 30th
day of the lockout. When at least a majority of the
board of directors or trustees or the partners holding
the controlling interest in the case of partnership vote
to accept the reduced offer, the workers shall
immediately return to work and the employer shall
thereupon readmit them upon the signing of the
agreement.
Section 13. Peaceful picketing. - Workers shall have
the right to peaceful picketing. No person engaged in
picketing shall commit any act of violence, coercion or
intimidation or obstruct the free ingress to or egress
from the employer's premises for lawful purposes, or
obstruct public thoroughfares.

No person shall obstruct, impede or interfere with, by
force, violence, coercion, threats or intimidation, any
peaceful picketing by workers during any labor
controversy or in the exercise of the right to self-
organization or collective bargaining or shall aid or
abet such obstruction or interference. No employer
shall use or employ any person to commit such acts
nor shall any person be employed for such purpose.
Section 14. Injunctions. - No court or entity shall
enjoin any picketing, strike or lockout, except as
provided in Articles 218 and 263 of the Labor Code.
The Commission shall have the power to issue
temporary restraining orders in such cases but only
after due notice and hearing and in accordance with its
rules. The reception of evidence for the application of a
writ of injunction may be delegated by the Commission
to any Labor Arbiter who shall submit his
recommendations to the Commission for its
consideration and resolution.
Any ex parte restraining order issued by the
Commission, or its chairman or Vice-Chairman where
the Commission is not in session and as prescribed by
its rules, shall be valid for a period not exceeding
twenty (20) days.
Section 15. Assumption by the Secretary of Labor
and Employment. — When a labor dispute causes or
is likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry
indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of
Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over
the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the
National Labor Relations Commission for compulsory
arbitration, provided, that any of the following
conditions is present:
1. Both parties have requested the Secretary of
Labor and Employment to assume jurisdiction
over the labor dispute; or
2. After a conference called by the Office of the
Secretary of Labor and Employment on the
propriety of its issuance, motu proprio or upon
a request or petition by either parties to the
labor dispute.
Such assumption shall have the effect of automatically
enjoining an impending strike or lockout. If a
strike/lockout has already taken place at the time of
assumption, all sriking or locked out employees and
other employees subject of the notice of strike shall
immediately return to work and the employer shall
immediately resume operations and readmit all
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employees under the same terms and conditions
prevailing before the strike or lockout.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, parties to the case may
agree at any time to submit the dispute to the
Secretary of Labor or his duly authorized
representative as Voluntary Arbitrator or to a duly
accredited Voluntary Arbitrator or to a panel of
Voluntary Arbitrators.
Section 16. Industries Indispensable to the
National Intersest. – For the guidance of the workers
and employers in the filing of petition for assumption of
jurisdiction, the following industries/services are hereby
recognized as deemed indispensable to the national
interest:
a) Hospital sector;
b) Electric power industry;
c) Water supply services, to exclude small water
supply services such as bottling and refilling
stations;
d) Air traffic control; and
e) Such other industries as may be
recommended by the National Tripartite
Industrial Peace Council (TIPC).
Section 17. Requirement for Minimum
Operational Service . — In labor disputes adversely
affecting the continued operation of hospitals, clinics,
or medical institutions, it shall be the duty of the
striking union tor locking-out employer to provide and
maintain an effective skeletal workforce of medical and
other health personnel, whose movement and services
shall be unhampered and unrestricted, as are
necessary to ensure the proper and adequate
protection of the life and health of its patients, most
especially emergency cases, for the duration of the
strike or lockout.
Section 18. Decision of the Assumed Labor
Dispute; Finality. — Within five (5) days from the
issuance of the assumption or certification order, a
preliminary conference or hearing shall immediately be
conducted by the Office of the Secretary of Labor and
Employment, the NLRC, or the Voluntary Arbitrator or
Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, as the case may be.
The decision of the Secretary of Labor and
Employment, the NLRC or voluntary arbitrator or panel
of voluntary arbitrators shall be rendered within thirty
(30) calendar days from submission of the case for
resolution and shall be final and executory ten (10)
calendar days after receipt thereof by the parties.

Section 19. Prohibitions on Law Enforcement
Agencies or Public Officials/Employees, Armed
Persons, Private Security Guards and Similar
Personnel in The Private Security Agency.
Exception. — No public official or employee, including
officers and personnel of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines or the Philippine National Police, or armed
person, private security guards and similar personnel
in the private security agency shall bring in, introduce
or escort in any manner, any individual who seeks to
replace strikers in entering or leaving the premises of a
strike area, or work in place of the strikers.
The police force shall keep out of the picket lines
unless actual violence or other criminal acts occur
therein.
But any public officer, the Secretary of Labor and
Employment or the NLRC may seek the assistance of
law enforcement agencies to maintain peace and
order, protect life and property, and/or enforce the law
and legal order pursuant to the providions or the joint
DOLE-DILG-PEZA guidelines in the conduct of PNP
personnel, economic zone police and security guards,
company security guards and similar personnel during
labor disputes.
Section 20. Criminal Prosecution. — The regular
courts shall have jurisdiction over any criminal action
under Article 272 of the Labor Code, as amended, but
subject to the required clearance from the DOLE on
cases arising out of or related to a labor dispute
pursuant to the Ministry of Justice (now Department of
Justice) circular no. 15 series of 1982, and circular no.
9, series of 1986.
ILAW AT BUKLOD NG MANGGAGAWA (IBM) v.
NLRC (1991)
D: Concerted activities may be forbidden or restricted
by law or contract.
F: IBM wanted SMC to implement a wage increase
pursuant to the Wage Rationalization Act. SMC only
gave P7 across the board increase out of the P15
demand. In retaliation, the workers of SMC followed an
8 hour shifting which led to substantial losses to SMC.
SMC sought to declare the strike illegal.
H: The strike was illegal. In the instance of "distortions
of the wage structure within an establishment"
resulting from "the application of any prescribed wage
increase by virtue of a law or wage order," Section 3 of
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RA 6727 prescribes a specific, detailed and
comprehensive procedure for the correction thereof,
thereby implicitly excluding strikes or lockouts or other
concerted activities as a modes of settlement of the
issue. Moreover, the CBA between the SMC and the
Union also prescribes a similar eschewal of strikes or
other similar or related concerted activities as a mode
of resolving disputes or controversies, generally, said
agreement clearly stating that settlement of "all
disputes, disagreements or controversies of any kind"
should be achieved by the stipulated grievance
procedure and ultimately by arbitration.
3. Limitations
BLT BUS CO. v. NLRC (1992)
D: The strike is indeed a powerful weapon of the
working class. But precisely because of this, it must be
handled carefully, like a sensitive explosive, lest it blow
up in the workers' own hands. Thus, it must be
declared only after the most thoughtful consultation
among them, conducted in the only way allowed, that
is, peacefully, and in every case conformably to
reasonable regulation. Any violation of the legal
requirements and strictures, such as a defiance of a
return­to­work order in industries affected with public
interest, will render the strike illegal, to the detriment of
the very workers it is supposed to protect.
F: 190 union members were allegedly refused
admission when they tried to report back to work after
they participated in an allegedly illegal strike
conducted by their union for alleged ULP and violation
of CBA provisions. NLRC dismissed the complaint for
ULP and ordered for the union officials’ and members’
reinstatement.
H: Employees should be reinstated. An employee who
forthwith takes steps to protest his lay-off cannot by
any logic be said to have abandoned his work. For
abandonment to constitute a valid cause for
termination of employment, there must be a deliberate,
unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his
employment. A worker who joins a strike does so
precisely to assert or improve the terms and conditions
of his employment. If his purpose is to abandon his
work, he would not go to the trouble of joining a strike.

B. STRIKE
1. Definition
Art. 218 (o). Definitions . "Strike" means any
temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action
of employees as a result of an industrial or labor
dispute.
Bk. V, Rule 1, Sec. 1 (uu) "Strike" refers to any
temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action
of employees as a result of a labor or industrial
dispute.
NARANJO ET AL. v.
BIOMEDICA HEALTH CARE, INC. (2012)
D: Art. 212(o) of the Labor Code defines a strike as
“any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted
action of employees as a result of any industrial or
labor dispute.” “Concerted” is defined as “mutually
contrived or planned” or “performed in unison.”
F: Five employees of Biomedica were absent one day
(happened to be Biomedica President’s birthday).
Biomedica terminated them for gross misconduct and
holding an illegal strike.
H: SC held that it was not a strike, but an individual
availment of leave benefits. Their absences are
presumed to be for valid causes, in good faith, and in
the exercise of their right to avail themselves of CBA or
company benefits. The 5 workers went on leave for
various reasons and were in different places to attend
to their personal needs or affairs. They did not go to
the company premises to petition Biomedica for their
grievance. Thus, there was NO INTENT TO STRIKE.
PILIPINO TELEPHONE CORP. v. PILTEA (2007)
D: Procedural requirements for a valid strike are
mandatory in nature. Failure to comply therewith
renders the strike illegal. Strike, as the most
preeminent economic weapon of the workers to force
management to agree to an equitable sharing of the
joint product of labor and capital, exert some
disquieting effects not only on the relationship between
labor and management, but also on the general peace
and progress of society and economic well-being of
the State. This weapon is so critical that the law
imposes the supreme penalty of dismissal on union
officers who irresponsibly participate in an illegal strike
and union members who commit unlawful acts during
a strike.
F: CBA negotiations between PILTEA and the
Company failed. DOLE Secretary assumed jurisdiction.
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PILTEA staged a strike which was held to be illegal
(defiance of the assumption order, noncompliance with
the procedural requirements for the conduct of a
strike).
H: Strike was illegal. Union officers punishable with
dismissal.
BUKLURAN NG MGGWA. SA CLOTHMEN
KNITTING CORP v. CA (2005)
D: A strike is any temporary stoppage of work by the
concerted action of employees as a result of an
industrial or labor dispute, while a labor dispute
includes any controversy or matter concerning terms
or conditions of employment or the association or
representation of persons in negotiating, fixing,
maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and
conditions of employment, regardless of whether the
disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer
and employee. For a strike to be valid, the following
requirements must be complied with: (a) a notice of
strike must be filed; (b) a strike-vote must be taken;
and (c) the results of the strike-vote must be reported
to the DOLE. These are MANDATORY, and non-
compliance makes the strike illegal.
F: CK issued Memoranda informing its Dyeing and
Finishing Division employees of a temporary shutdown
of operations and advising them to go on vacation
leave. A service truck was stopped by employees led
by the union president. The union members began
picketing outside the CK compound, demanding 13th
month pay and resumption of work.
H: Strike is illegal for non-compliance with mandatory
requirements for a valid strike.
G&S TRANSPORT CORP. v. INFANTE (2007)
D: A strike is “any temporary stoppage of work by the
concerted action of employees as a result of an
industrial or labor dispute.” A valid strike presupposes
the existence of a labor dispute.
F: Tito Infante et al were drivers of G&S Transport.
G&S claimed to have received a letter memorandum
from the Union demanding the dismissal of 2
employees on the ground that they were guilty of
committing acts of disloyalty by filing a petition calling
for a local election. These 2 employees were
dismissed. The drivers learned of this incident and
stopped driving their taxicabs in sympathy for their
dismissed colleagues. Although G&S ordered the
drivers to return to work, some drivers refused to do

so, prompting G&S to file an action against the latter
for illegal strike. The drivers then filed a case for illegal
dismissal against G&S.
H: A valid strike presupposes the existence of a labor
dispute. In this case, there was no labor dispute. Thus,
they committed an illegal strike in the form of a sit-
down strike. Unlike union officers, mere participation of
members in an illegal strike isn’t a sufficient ground for
termination of services. To warrant dismissal, the
members must have committed illegal acts, and since
there was no proof of the commission of illegal acts,
they should not be dismissed.
2. Nature and Purpose
BLT BUS CO. v. NLRC (1992), supra p. 42
D: The right to strike is one of the rights recognized
and guaranteed by the Constitution as an instrument
of labor for its protection against exploitation by
management. By virtue of this right, the workers are
able to press their demands for better terms of
employment with more energy and persuasiveness,
poising the threat to strike as their reaction to the
employer's intransigence.
3. Rationale for Regulation by Law
LAPANDAY WORKERS UNION v. NLRC (1992)
D: Undeniably, strikes exert some disquieting effects
not only on the relationship between labor and
management but also on the general peace and
progress of society. Our laws thus regulate their
exercise within reasons by balancing the interests of
labor and management together with the overarching
public interest.
F: A member of the Board of Directors of the Union,
was gunned down in his house. The gunman was later
identified an alleged member of the new security
forces of the companies. The day after the killing, most
of the members of the Union refused to report for
work. They returned to work the following day but they
did not comply with the "quota system" adopted by
the management to bolster production output.
Allegedly, the Union instructed the workers to reduce
their production to thirty per cent (30%). Companies
charged the Union with economic sabotage through
slowdown.
H: The strike was plainly illegal as it was held within 7-
day waiting period. The haste in holding the strike
prevented the DOLE from verifying whether it carried
UP LAW C2017 LABOR 2 (PROF. DAWAY) FINALS REVIEWER | 44
the approval of the majority of the union members. It
set to naught an important policy consideration of our
law on strike.
4. Scope of the term “strike”
STA. ROSA COCA-COLA PLANT EMPLOYEES
UNION v. CCBP (2007)
D: The fact that the conventional term ‘strike’ was not
used by the striking employees to describe their
common course of action is inconsequential, since the
substance of the situation, and not its appearance, will
be deemed to be controlling.” The term “strike”
encompasses not only concerted work stoppages, but
also slowdowns, mass leaves, sit-downs, attempts to
damage, destroy or sabotage plant equipment and
facilities, and similar activities. Picketing involves
merely the marching to and fro at the premises of the
employer, usually accompanied by the display of
placards and other signs making known the facts
involved in a labor dispute.
F: Union informed the Company of its desire to
renegotiate CBA terms but the Company wasn’t
amenable. The Union filed a “Notice of Strike” and filed
applications for LOA (which the Company denied). The
Office of the Mayor issued a permit to the Union,
allowing it to conduct a mass protest within the
perimeter of the Plant for 3 hrs. All of the 14 personnel
of the Engineering Section of the Company did not
report for work, and 71 production personnel were
also absent. The Company filed a “Petition to Declare
Strike Illegal”. The Union filed an Answer with a Motion
to Dismiss/Suspend proceedings alleging the mass
action conducted by its officers and members was not
a strike but just a valid exercise of their right to picket.
H: The basic elements of a strike are present in this
case: 106 members of the Union, whose respective
applications for LOA were disapproved, opted not to
report for work on said date, and gathered in front of
the company premises to hold a mass protest action.
Petitioners deliberately absented themselves and
instead wore red ribbons, carried placards with
slogans. Thus, petitioners engaged in a concerted
activity that affected the company’s operations. The
mass concerted activity constituted a strike.
5. Effect on Work Relationship
Art. 218 (o). "Strike" means any temporary stoppage
of work by the concerted action of employees as a
result of an industrial or labor dispute.
 UP LAW C2017 LABOR 2 (PROF. DAWAY) FINALS REVIEWER |
CHUAYUCO STEEL v.
BUKLOD NG MANGGAGAWA (1992)
D: A union officer may be declared to have lost his
employment status if he knowingly participates in the
commission of illegal acts during the strike.
F: Labor organization held a strike for refusal of
company to recognize the newly elected officers from
the recently concluded special elections. The and LA,
NLRC and CA were unanimous in finding the strike
staged by the respondent illegal because of the
commission of violent acts and barricading.
H: Even if the purpose of the strike staged was valid,
the means employed were illegal. Thus, a union officer
may be declared to have lost his employment status if
he knowingly participates in the commission of illegal
acts during the strike. Nevertheless, responsibility for
these illegal acts must be on an individual and not
collective basis.
G&S TRANSPORT CORP. v. INFANTE (2007),
supra p. 43
D: Unlike union officers, mere participation of members
in an illegal strike isn’t a sufficient ground for
termination of services. To warrant dismissal, the
members must have committed illegal acts, and since
there was no proof of the commission of illegal acts,
they should not be dismissed.
6. Types and Conversion
Kinds of Strike According to EXTENT
a) General
b) Local/particular
Kinds of Strike According to NATURE
a) Strike proper
b) Sit-down strike
c) Partial/ quickie strike
Kinds of Strike According to DEGREE OF
EMPLOYEE INTEREST
a) Primary strike
b) Secondary strike
c) Sympathetic strike
Kinds of Strike According to PURPOSE/ NATURE
OF EMPLOYEE INTEREST
a) Economic strike
b) ULP strike
45
• General strike – extends over a whole
community, province, state, or country
• Local strike – undertaken by workers in a
particular enterprise, locality, or occupation;
usually involves only one union/industry
• Sit-down strike – combination of the traditional
strike plus a refusal of the strikers to leave the
plant and machines, and a refusal to permit the
latter to be operated; striking employees remain
on the employer’s business premises, and,
without working, retain such dominion over the
plant’s facilities so as to prevent access to and
the continued operation of these facilities
• Slowdown – willful reduction in the rate of work
by a group of employees for the purpose of
restricting the output of the employer; retarding
production and distribution in an effort to compel
compliance by the employer with the labor
demands made upon him; inherently illegal
• Partial strike (a.ka. “quickie strike”, sometimes
used interchangeably with “wildcat strike”) –
intermittent, unannounced work stoppage,
including slowdowns, unauthorized extension of
rest periods, and walkouts for portions of a shift
or for entire shifts.
• Primary strike – one declared by the
employees who have a direct and immediate
interest, whether economic or otherwise, in
the subject of the dispute, which exists
between them and their employer (e.g.
employees who strike for a wage raise)
• Secondary strike – employees in concert
refuse to assist or cooperate with the employer
not because of a complaint over labor standards,
but because the employer deals with a third
person against whom they have a grievance; an
attempt to secure the economic assistance of
their employer to compel the third person to
capitulate to the union
• Sympathetic strike – striking employees
have no demands or grievances of their own,
but strike for the purpose of directly or
indirectly aiding others, without direct relation
to the advancement of the interest of the
strikers
• Economic strike (a.k.a. “bargaining strike”)–
intended to force wage and other concessions
from the employer, which he is not required by
law to grant
• ULP strike – called against the ULPs of the
employer, usually for the purpose of making
him desist from committing such practices

MASTER IRON LABOR v. NLRC (1993)
D: An economic strike is one which is to force wage or
other concessions from the employer which he is not
required by law to grant. Withdrawal of the complaint
for ULP does not convert the other grievances into
economic demands.
F: MILU staged a strike against Master alleging that
the latter violated the provisions of the CBA
(subcontracting, disregard of grievance procedure,
among others). The LA and the NLRC held that the
strike was illegal because it is an economic strike and
hence, a violation of the no strike no lockout provision
in the CBA.
H: The strike is not an economic strike and hence, not
a violation of the no-strike clause. Not illegal.
SHELL OIL WORKERS UNION v. SHELL CO.
(1971), supra p. 32
D: Not every form of violence suffices to affix the seal
of illegality on a strike or to cause the loss of
employment by the guilty party. It is enough that
individual liability be incurred by those guilty of such
acts of violence that call for loss of employee status.
b. Bargaining Deadlock – Economic/ULP
LC, Art. 269. Strikes, picketing, and lockouts. (c)
In case of bargaining deadlocks, the duly certified or
recognized bargaining agent may file a notice of strike
or the employer may file a notice of lockout with the
Ministry at least 30 day before the intended date
thereof. In cases of unfair labor practice, the period of
notice shall be 15 days and in the absence of a duly
certified or recognized bargaining agent, the notice of
strike may be filed by any legitimate labor organization
in behalf of its members. However, in case of dismissal
from employment of union officers duly elected in
accordance with the union constitution and by-laws,
which may constitute union busting, where the
existence of the union is threatened, the 15-day
cooling-off period shall not apply and the union may
take action immediately.
CONSOLIDATED LABOR ASSOCIATION OF THE
PHILS. v. MARSMAN AND CO. (1964)
D: The strike changed its character from the time the
Company refused to reinstate complainants because
of their union activities after it had offered to admit all
the strikers and in fact did readmit the others. It was
then converted into an unfair labor practice strike.
UP LAW C2017 LABOR 2 (PROF. DAWAY) FINALS REVIEWER | 46
F: Union staged a strike after a bargaining deadlock
with the company. They returned to work after the
company promised to discuss their demands.
However, 69 union officers and members were not
admitted thus they resumed the strike. Despite
repeated requests for reinstatement, Company still
refused, thus union filed a case of ULP.
H: The initial economic strike was converted into a
ULP strike upon the refusal of the company to
reinstate the 69 employees.
c. Non-Conversion: Strike to Lockout
SUKHOTHAI CUISINE AND RESTAURANT v. CA
(2006)
D: In case of alleged union busting where the
existence of the union is threatened, it is only the 15-
day cooling-off period that may be dispensed with.
The three remaining requirements – notice, strike vote,
and 7-day report period – cannot be dispensed with.
F: The Union filed a notice of strike and the results of
the strike vote were submitted. They still staged a
strike despite the pendency of arbitration proceedings.
H: The strike was illegal. As to the argument that the
requirement may be dispensed with because
Sukhothai was guilty of union busting, the language of
the law leaves no room for doubt that the cooling-off
period and the 7-day strike ban after the strike-vote
report were intended to be mandatory, and in case of
union busting where the existence of the union is
threatened, it is only the 15-day cooling-off period that
may be dispensed with.
7. Grounds
Rule XXII, Section 5. Grounds for strike or
lockout. - A strike or lockout may be declared in
cases of bargaining deadlocks and ULPs. Violations of
CBAs, except flagrant and/or malicious refusal to
comply with its economic provisions, shall not be
considered ULP and shall not be strikeable. No strike
or lockout may be declared on grounds involving inter-
union and intra-union disputes or without first having
filed a notice of strike or lockout or without the
necessary strike or lockout vote having been obtained
and reported to the Board. Neither will a strike be
declared after assumption of jurisdiction by the
Secretary or after certification of submission of the
dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during

the pendency of cases involving the same grounds or
the strike or lockout.
a. Allowable Strikes/ Strikeable Grounds
LC recognizes only 2 strikeable grounds:
(1) CB deadlock
(2) Employers’ ULP
LC, Art. 269 (c), supra
b. Prohibited Strikes/ Non-Strikeable Grounds
LC, Art. 269. Strikes, picketing, and lockouts.
(b) supra p. 39
• “[N]o labor union may strike and no employer
may declare a lockout on grounds involving
inter-union and intra-union disputes.”
(g) supra p. 16
• In an industry indispensable to the national
interest, SOLE’s “assumption or certification
shall have the effect of automatically enjoining
the intended or impending strike or lockout as
specified in the assumption or certification
order.”
• “[S]trikes and lockouts in hospitals, clinics and
similar medical institutions shall, to every
extent possible, be avoided…”
Art. 270. Prohibited activities. (a) No labor
organization or employer shall declare a strike or
lockout without first having bargained collectively in
accordance with Title VII of this Book or without first
having filed the notice required in the preceding Article
or without the necessary strike or lockout vote first
having been obtained and reported to the Ministry.
No strike or lockout shall be declared after
assumption of jurisdiction by the President or the
Minister or after certification or submission of the
dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or
during the pendency of cases involving the same
grounds for the strike or lockout.
Any worker whose employment has been terminated
as a consequence of any unlawful lockout shall be
entitled to reinstatement with full backwages. Any
union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal
strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly
participates in the commission of illegal acts during a
strike may be declared to have lost his employment
status: Provided, That mere participation of a worker
in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground
for termination of his employment, even if a
UP LAW C2017 LABOR 2 (PROF. DAWAY) FINALS REVIEWER | 47
replacement had been hired by the employer during
such lawful strike.
Art. 271. Improved offer balloting, infra
i) Assumption of jurisdiction
LC Art. 269. Strikes, picketing and lockouts. (g),
supra p. 16
• When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute
causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an
industry indispensable to the national interest, the
SOLE may assume jurisdiction over the dispute
and decide it or certify the same to the
Commission for compulsory arbitration.
• Effect: Automatically enjoin the intended or
impending strike or lockout as specified in the
assumption or certification order.
• If one has already taken place, all striking or
locked out employees shall immediately return-
to-work and the employer shall immediately
resume operations and readmit all workers.
• SOLE may seek the assistance of law
enforcement agencies to ensure compliance with
this provision as well as with such orders as he
may issue to enforce the same.
• President of the Philippines shall not be
precluded from determining the industries that, in
his opinion, are indispensable to the national
interest, and from intervening at any time and
assuming jurisdiction over any such labor dispute
in order to settle or terminate the same.
BIFLEX PHILS., INC. LABOR UNION v. FIFLEX
INDUSTRIAL AND MANUFACTURING
CORPORATIONA AND BIFLEX PHILS. (2006)
D: Stoppage of work due to welga ng baya n is in the
nature of a general strike, an extended sympathy
strike. Employees who have no labor dispute with their
employer but who, on a day they are scheduled to
work, refuse to work and instead join a welga ng
bayan commit an illegal work stoppage.
F: Petitioners staged a work stoppage to protest the
rise in oil prices without complying with the necessary
requirements prompting the LA to declare their strike
illegal and the companies to terminate the Union
officers.
H: Employees who have no labor dispute with their
employer but who refuse to work and instead join a
welga ng bayan commit an illegal work stoppage.
There being no showing that petitioners notified

respondents of their intention, or that they were
allowed by the companies, to join the welga ng bayan ,
their work stoppage is beyond legal protection.
ILAW AT BUKLOD NG MANGGAGAWA (IBM) v.
NLRC (1991), supra p. 42
D: Joint or coordinated activities may be forbidden or
restricted by law or contract. Section 3 of RA 6727
prescribes a specific, detailed and comprehensive
procedure for the correction thereof, thereby implicitly
excluding strikes or lockouts or other concerted
activities as modes of settlement of the issue.
ii) Certification order/Compulsory arbitration, Def.
LC, Art. 269 (g), supra p. 47
UNION OF FILIPRO EMPLOYEES v. NLRC and
NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC. (1990), supra p. 13
D: Once an assumption/certification order is issued,
strikes are enjoined, or if one has already taken place, all
strikers shall immediately return to work. A strike that is
undertaken despite the issuance by the Secretary of
Labor of an assumption or certification order becomes a
prohibited activity and thus illegal.
iii) Submission agreement/ Voluntary arbitration
iv) Pendency of some issues in other cases
v) Intra-union/ Inter-union dispute
Bk. V, Rule I, Sec. 1
(x) "Inter-Union Dispute" refers to any conflict between
and among legitimate labor unions involving
representation questions for purposes of collective
bargaining or to any other conflict or dispute
between legitimate labor unions.
(bb) "Intra-Union Dispute" refers to any conflict
between and among union members, including
grievances arising from any violation of the rights
and conditions of membership, violation of or
disagreement over any provision of the union's
constitution and by-laws, or disputes arising from
chartering or affiliation of union.
EMPLOYEES UNION OF BAYER PHIL. ET AL. v.
BAYER PHIL. INC. (2010)
D: An intra­union dispute refers to any conflict
between and among union members, including
grievances arising from any violation of the rights and
UP LAW C2017 LABOR 2 (PROF. DAWAY) FINALS REVIEWER | 48
conditions of membership, violation of or disagreement
over any provision of the union's CBL, or disputes
arising from chartering or disaffiliation of the union.
Sections 1 and 2, Rule XI of D.O. 40­03, s.2003 of the
DOLE enumerate the circumstances constituting
inter/intra­union disputes.
F: Two complaints for ULP were filed by EUBP: 1)
against the Company for non-remittance of union dues
and 2) against Company AND splinter group: REUBP.
Both were dismissed by LA for lack of jurisdiction.
H: The 1st complaint against Company was
erroneously dismissed because it was a matter of ULP
(validity of remitting to REUBP union dues despite
existing CBA with EUBP). The 2nd complaint was
validly dismissed because issues pertained to intra-
union dispute (legality of establishment of REUBP and
propriety of disaffiliation) – outside LA and NLRC
jurisdiction.
vi) No strike/ No lockout clause in the CBA
PANAY ELECTRIC CO. v. NLRC (1995)
D: A "no strike, no lock­out" provision in the CBA is a
valid stipulation although the clause may be invoked by
an employer only when the strike is economic in nature
or one which is conducted to force wage or other
concessions from the employer that are not mandated
to be granted by the law itself.
F: Panay Electric directed a plan against Huyan to
transfer him from the Assistant Personnel Assistant
position to that of Report Clerk. Huyan was suspected
of being the author of an item in the Union’s Digest
which featured alleged wrongdoings on the part of top
company officials. Huyan refused the position; he was
dismissed. Union of which Huyan was an officer went
on strike despite the No Strike, No Lockout proviso in
their CBA.
H: The strike was illegal. Right to strike is not absolute.
A No strike, No Lockout provision in the CBA is a valid
stipulation although the clause may be invoked by an
employer when the strike is economic in nature.
MALAYANG SAMAHAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA M.
GREENFIELD v. RAMOS (2000)
D: A no strike, no lock out provision can only be
invoked when the strike is economic in nature, i.e. to
force wage or other concessions from the employer
which he is not required by law to grant. Such a
provision cannot be used to assail the legality of a

strike which is grounded on ULP, as was the honest
belief of herein petitioners. Again, whether or not there
was indeed ULP does not affect the strike.
F: The local union and federation had a bitter
disagreement due to a P50 fine imposed on several
union members who absented from a general
membership meeting. The federation placed the LU
under a trusteeship and expelled 30 union officers
from the union and demanded their separation from
employment pursuant to the Union Security Clause.
The company terminated them, and a strike was held.
The strike was attended with violence, force and
intimidation on both sides resulting to physical injuries
to several employees, both striking and non-striking,
and damage to company properties.
H: The evidence on record show that the violence
cannot be attributed to the striking employees alone,
for the company itself employed hired men to pacify
the strikers. With violence committed on both sides,
the management and the employees, such violence
cannot be a ground for declaring the strike as illegal.
vii) Wage Distortion
R.A. 6727 (Wage Rationalization Act), Sec. 3,
portion that amends Art. 124:
“Where the application of any prescribed wage
increase by virtue of law or Wage order issued by any
Regional Board results in distortions of the wage
structure within an establishment, the employer and
the union shall negotiate to correct the distortions. Any
dispute arising from wage distortions shall be resolved
through the grievance procedure under their collective
bargaining agreement and, if it remains unresolved,
through voluntary arbitration. Unless otherwise agreed
by the parties in writing, such dispute shall be decided
by the voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary
arbitrators within ten (10) calendar days from the time
said dispute was referred to voluntary arbitration.
In cases where there are no collective agreements or
recognized labor unions, the employers and workers
shall endeavor to correct such distortions. Any dispute
arising therefrom shall be settled through the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board and, if it remains
unresolved after ten (10) calendar days of conciliation,
shall be referred to the appropriate branch of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). It shall
be mandatory for the NLRC to conduct continuous
hearings and decide the dispute within twenty (20)
calendar days from the time said dispute is submitted
UP LAW C2017 LABOR 2 (PROF. DAWAY) FINALS REVIEWER | 49
for compulsory arbitration.
The pendency of a dispute arising from a wage
distortion shall not in any way delay the applicability of
any increase in prescribed wage rates pursuant to the
provisions of law or Wage Order.”
Sec. 16, last par: “Any issue involving wage distortion
shall not be a ground for a strike/lockout.”
ILAW AT BUKLOD NG MANGGAGAWA (IBM) v.
NLRC (1991), supra p. 42
D: Section 3 of RA 6727 prescribes a specific, detailed
and comprehensive procedure for the correction
thereof, thereby implicitly excluding strikes or lockouts
or other concerted activities as modes of settlement.
8. Striking Party
Book V, Rule XXII, Sec. 6— Who May Declare A
Strike or Lockout. Any certified or duly recognized
bargaining representative may declare a strike in cases
of bargaining deadlocks and unfair labor practices. The
employer may declare a lockout in the same cases. In
the absence of a certified or duly recognized
bargaining representative, any legitimate labor
organization in the establishment may declare a strike
but only on grounds of unfair labor practices.
9. Procedural Requirements
Book V, Rule XXII, Secs. 5-11, supra pp. 39-40
Summary of Procedural Requirements:
(1) Grounds
a. CB deadlock
b. Employer’s ULP
i. If no certified bargaining agent,
ULP is the only available ground
(2) Notice of strike
a. Filed with regional branch of NCMB at
least 30 days before (15 days in case of
ULP strike)
i. ULP involving dismissal of union
officer (union-busting): 15-day
cooling off period doesn’t apply
b. Contents of notice:
i. Names and the addresses of the
employer and the union
ii. Nature of the industry
iii. Number of union members
iv. Number of workers in the
bargaining unit

v. Such other relevant data as may
facilitate the settlement of the
dispute, such as a brief statement
or enumeration of all pending
labor disputes involving the same
parties
vi. In case of bargaining deadlocks:
1. State the unresolved
issues in the bargaining
negotiations
2. Union’s proposals
3. Employer’s
counterproposals
4. Proof of a request for
conference to settle the
differences
c. Copy served on other party
(3) Strike vote
a. Approved by a majority of the total union
membership in the bargaining unit
concerned
b. Obtained by secret ballot in meetings or
referenda called for the purpose
c. May be supervised by regional branch of
NCMB at its own initiative or upon request
of any affected party
d. Union shall furnish the regional branch of
NCMB and the notice of meetings 24
hours before
(4) 7-day report period: Submit results of the voting at
least 7 days before the intended strike or lockout,
subject to the cooling-off period
(5) If unsettled after lapse of cooling-off period, the
union may strike. The regional branch of the
NCMB shall continue mediating and conciliating.
a. Effort to Bargain
LC, Art. 270. Prohibited Activities (a), supra p. 50
• No labor organization or employer shall declare a
strike or lockout without first having bargained
collectively in accordance with Title VII of this Book
LC, Arts. 256-258, supra p. 3
1. Employer’s Counter-Proposal
CLUB FILIPINO V. BAUTISTA (2009)
D: The Implementing Rules use the words "as far as
practicable." In this case, attaching the counter-
proposal of the company to the notice of strike of the
union was not practicable, when the union had yet to
be furnished with it. One cannot give what one does
UP LAW C2017 LABOR 2 (PROF. DAWAY) FINALS REVIEWER | 50
not have. Compliance was impossible because no
counter-proposal existed at the time the union filed a
notice of strike.
F: The company claimed that the union’s strike was
illegal because the union failed to attach the
company’s counter‐proposal to the notice of strike, as
required under Art. 264(a), now Art. 270 (a).
H: Requirement does not apply. Art. 264(a) [now Art.
270 (a)] is qualified by the phrase “as far as
practicable”. It was impossible for the union to have
attached the counter-proposal to its notice of strike as
the company had yet to furnish the same.
b. Filing of Notice of Intention
LC, Art. 269. Strikes, picketing, and lockouts.
(c) In case of bargaining deadlocks, the duly certified
or recognized bargaining agent may file a notice of
strike or the employer may file a notice of lockout with
the Ministry at least 30 days before the intended date
thereof. In cases of unfair labor practice, the period of
notice shall be 15 days and in the absence of a duly
certified or recognized bargaining agent, the notice of
strike may be filed by any legitimate labor organization
in behalf of its members. However, in case of dismissal
from employment of union officers duly elected in
accordance with the union constitution and by-laws,
which may constitute union busting, where the
existence of the union is threatened, the 15-day
cooling-off period shall not apply and the union may
take action immediately.
(d) The notice must be in accordance with such
implementing rules and regulations as the Minister of
Labor and Employment may promulgate.
(e) During the cooling-off period, it shall be the duty of
the Ministry to exert all efforts at mediation and
conciliation to effect a voluntary settlement. Should the
dispute remain unsettled until the lapse of the requisite
number of days from the mandatory filing of the notice,
the labor union may strike or the employer may declare
a lockout.
LC, Art. 270. Prohibited Activities , supra
• No labor organization or employer shall
declare a strike or lockout without first having
bargained collectively in accordance with Title
VII of this Book or without first having filed the
notice required in the preceding Article.

Book V, Rule XXII, Sec. 7— Notice of Strike or
Lockout. In bargaining deadlocks, a notice of strike or
lockout shall be filed with the regional branch of the
Board at least thirty (30) days before the intended date
thereof, a copy of said notice having been served on
the other party concerned. In cases of unfair labor
practice, the period of notice shall be fifteen (15) days.
However, in case of unfair labor practice involving the
dismissal from employment of any union officer duly
elected in accordance with the union constitution and
by-laws which may constitute union-busting where the
existence of the union is threatened, the fifteen-day
cooling-off period shall not apply and the union may
take action immediately after the strike vote is
conducted and the results thereof submitted to the
appropriate regional branch of the Board.
c. Observance of Cooling-Off Period
LC, Art. 269. (c) and (e), supra
d. Vote
LC, Art. 269. Strikes, picketing, and lockouts.
(f) A decision to declare a strike must be approved by
a majority of the total union membership in the
bargaining unit concerned, obtained by secret ballot in
meetings or referenda called for that purpose. A
decision to declare a lockout must be approved by a
majority of the board of directors of the corporation or
association or of the partners in a partnership,
obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that
purpose. The decision shall be valid for the duration of
the dispute based on substantially the same grounds
considered when the strike or the lockout vote was
taken. The Ministry may, at its own initiative or upon
the request of any affected party, supervise the
conduct of the secret balloting. In every case, the
union or the employer shall furnish the Ministry the
results of the voting at least seven days before the
intended strike or lockout, subject to the cooling-off
period herein provided.
LC, Art. 270. Prohibited Activities , supra
• No labor organization or employer shall
declare a strike or lockout without […] the
necessary strike or lockout vote first having
been obtained and reported to the Ministry.
PILIPINO TELEPHONE CORP v. PILTEA (2007),
supra p. 43
D: With the enactment of RA 6715, the requirements
UP LAW C2017 LABOR 2 (PROF. DAWAY) FINALS REVIEWER | 51
as to the filing of a notice of strike, strike vote, and
notice given to the DOLE are mandatory in nature. Art.
263 (now Art. 269), and Rule XXII, Book V enumerate
the procedural requirements for a valid strike. These
are mandatory in nature. Failure to comply makes the
strike illegal.
SUKHOTHAI CUISINE AND RESTAURANT v. CA
(2006), supra p. 46
D: In case of alleged union busting where the
existence of the union is threatened, it is only the 15-
day cooling-off period that may be dispensed with.
The three remaining requirements – notice, strike vote,
and 7-day report period – cannot be dispensed with.
10. Test of Legality
a. Legal Strikes
i. Purpose and Means Test
RELIANCE SURETY V. NLRC (1991)
D: Failure of the striking personnel to observe legal
requirements renders the strike illegal. Good faith is a
valid defense against claims of illegality of a strike, but
here the strike was staged in bad faith.
F: The company changed the employees’ seating
arrangements. Union members protested and refused
to comply. They were suspended and after
investigation, dismissed. Union held a strike—however,
the Union failed to observe procedural requirements
(notice, 2/3 strike vote by secret ballot, and
submission of the strike vote to the DOLE seven days
prior to the strike) and some strikers harassed non‐
strikers and committed acts of violence.
H: The strike was illegal. In effecting a change in the
seating arrangement in the office of the underwriting
department, the company merely exercised reasonable
management prerogative.
ii. Guidelines and Balancing of Interest
STAMFORD MARK V. JULIAN (2004)
D: The right to strike, while constitutionally recognized,
is not without legal restrictions. The LC regulates the
exercise of that right by balancing the interests of labor
and management in the light of the overarching public
interest. The requirements under Art. 263 (c)-(f) are
mandatory. Non-compliance makes the strike illegal.

F: After receiving a letter to inform management that
the employees of several companies had formed a
union and demanded recognition, management of
these companies began dismissing employees.
Employees went on strike.
H: Illegal strike. No showing that the union was a
legitimate labor organization entitled to file a notice of
strike. The requirements prescribed in Art. 263(c)-(f)
were not complied with. The law regulates the right to
strike by providing procedural steps before strikes may
be conducted. Failure to follow these steps makes the
strike illegal.
SHELL OIL WORKERS UNION v. SHELL CO.
(1971), supra p. 32
D: In determining WON a strike is legal, utmost
consideration should be given to the particular
circumstances of each case, with a view to having the
most comprehensive understanding of the motivations
of the parties, in the light of human needs on the part
of labor, and in the perspective of the orderly and
economical conduct of business and industry, on the
part of management.
iii. Defenses—Good Faith
NATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS HOTELS
v. NLRC (1998)
D: A strike based on a non-strikeable ground is
illegal; a strike grounded on ULP is illegal if no such
acts actually exist. However, even if no ULP acts are
committed by the employer, if the employees believe in
good faith that ULP acts exist so as to constitute a
valid ground to strike, then the strike held may be
legal. No such valid ground here.
F: There was a breakaway faction from the existing
SEBA union due to impeachment of the officers. The
hotel refused to recognize the faction, which then filed
a notice of strike on the basis of ULP. NCMB
dismissed the notice because the issue was an intra-
union dispute, and thus non-strikeable. Meanwhile, the
hotel dismissed one of the faction’s officers, which led
to a wildcat strike.
H: Illegal strike. Even when the employer did not
commit ULP, a strike is still legal if the strikers believed
in good faith that ULP acts existed. This belief must be
warranted by the circumstances. The dismissal of one
of their officers was not a sufficient ground to justify
the strike. There were alternative remedies, such as
questioning the legality of the dismissal.
UP LAW C2017 LABOR 2 (PROF. DAWAY) FINALS REVIEWER | 52
MASTER IRON LABOR v. NLRC (1993), supra p. 46
D: The strike staged was legal even though it may
have been called to offset what the strikers believed in
good faith to be ULP on the part of the employer.
Presumption of legality prevails even if the allegations
of ULP are subsequently found out to be untrue.
b. Illegal Strikes
1. Basis of Illegality
LC, Art. 269. Strikes, picketing, and lockouts.
(b) supra p. 39
• “[N]o labor union may strike and no employer
may declare a lockout on grounds involving
inter-union and intra-union disputes.”
(c) supra p. 46 – non-observance of cooling-off period
LC, Art. 270. Prohibited Activities (a) supra p. 50
• No labor organization or employer shall
declare a strike or lockout without
o having bargained collectively
o notice of strike
o strike/lockout vote + report
• No strike or lockout shall be declared
o after assumption of jurisdiction by the
President/ SOLE, or
o after certification or submission of the
dispute to arbitration, or
o during the pendency of cases
involving the same grounds for the
strike or lockout.
LC, Art. 271— Improved Offer Balloting, infra
SORIANO AVIATION v. EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION OF A. SORIANO AVIATION (2009)
D: Even if the purpose of a strike is valid, the strike
may be held illegal where the means employed are
illegal. The employment of violence, intimidation,
restraint of coercion in carrying out concerted
activities, which are injurious to right to property,
renders a strike illegal.
F: Members of the union refused to render
overtime work based on a new work schedule
imposed, resulting in 8 mechanics being suspended,
so the union went on strike. Over 9 non-consecutive
days across 8 months, strikers shouted insults through
a megaphone; threw water at a personnel manager,
shouted at the COO, a manager, non-striking
employees and officers; threw gravel and sand at the

car of the company’s lead man, etc.
H: Illegal strike. Even an otherwise legal strike may be
rendered illegal if the means employed were illegal.
Even if the acts were committed on non-consecutive
days, the acts were still pervasive. Art. 264 (now Art.
270) doesn’t require that violence must be continuous
or that they should exist for the entire duration of the
strike.
ii) Illegal acts/ Prohibited activities
Art. 270. Prohibited activities.
a. No labor organization or employer shall declare a
strike or lockout without first having bargained
collectively in accordance with Title VII of this Book or
without first having filed the notice required in the
preceding Article or without the necessary strike or
lockout vote first having been obtained and reported to
the Ministry.
No strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption
of jurisdiction by the President or the Minister or after
certification or submission of the dispute to
compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the
pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the
strike or lockout.
Any worker whose employment has been terminated
as a consequence of any unlawful lockout shall be
entitled to reinstatement with full backwages. Any
union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal
strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly
participates in the commission of illegal acts during a
strike may be declared to have lost his employment
status: Provided, That mere participation of a worker in
a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for
termination of his employment, even if a replacement
had been hired by the employer during such lawful
strike.
b. No person shall obstruct, impede, or interfere with,
by force, violence, coercion, threats or intimidation,
any peaceful picketing by employees during any labor
controversy or in the exercise of the right to self-
organization or collective bargaining, or shall aid or
abet such obstruction or interference.
c. No employer shall use or employ any strike-breaker,
nor shall any person be employed as a strike-breaker.
d. No public official or employee, including officers and
UP LAW C2017 LABOR 2 (PROF. DAWAY) FINALS REVIEWER | 53
personnel of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines
or the Integrated National Police, or armed person,
shall bring in, introduce or escort in any manner, any
individual who seeks to replace strikers in entering or
leaving the premises of a strike area, or work in place
of the strikers. The police force shall keep out of the
picket lines unless actual violence or other criminal
acts occur therein: Provided, That nothing herein shall
be interpreted to prevent any public officer from taking
any measure necessary to maintain peace and order,
protect life and property, and/or enforce the law and
legal order. (As amended by Executive Order No. 111,
December 24, 1986)
e. No person engaged in picketing shall commit any
act of violence, coercion or intimidation or obstruct the
free ingress to or egress from the employer’s premises
for lawful purposes, or obstruct public thoroughfares.
BAGONG PAGKAKAISA NG MANGGAGAWA NG
TRIUMPH v. DOLE (2010)
D: Labor Secretary's assumption of jurisdiction over
the dispute or its certification to the National Labor
Relations Commission for compulsory arbitration shall
have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended
or impending strike or lockout and all striking or locked
out employees shall immediately return to work and
the employer shall immediately resume operations and
readmit all workers under the same terms and
conditions before the strike or lockout.
F: Long dispute between the Union and the company
over the increase in daily wage proposals for the new
CBA. Secretary of Labor assumed jurisdiction and
issued return-to-work order Union stopped some
employees from going back to work by blocking the
company entrances. Secretary issued another return-
to-work order, complete with police assistance. Union
agreed to go back to work, but company stopped
employees (union officers) from entering the premises,
and placed them on preventive suspension and 1st
notice with chance to explain. Employees went to
Secretary for relief, and the latter ordered the company
to reinstate them. Company reinstated them only in
payroll and issued another 1st notice with chance to
explain, based on different grounds. Employees
offered explanation but were terminated anyway. CA
affirmed Secretary’s award of daily wage increase for
the new CBA, but resolved the issue of illegal dismissal
itself, holding that only dismissal was supported by
substantial evidence.
H: The union and its officers, as well as the workers,

defied the Labor Secretary's assumption of
jurisdiction, especially the accompanying return-to-
work order within twenty-four (24) hours; their defiance
made the strike illegal under the law and applicable
jurisprudence. The union officers were answerable not
only for resisting the Labor Secretary's assumption of
jurisdiction and return-to-work orders; they were also
liable for leading and instigating and, in the case of
Figura, for participating in a work slowdown (during the
CBA negotiations), a form of strike 69 undertaken by
the union without complying with the mandatory legal
requirements of a strike notice and strike vote. These
acts are similarly prohibited activities.
iii) Effect of Union Non-registration
MAGDALA MULTIPURPOSE & LIVELIHOOD COOP
v. KILUSANG MANGGAGAWA NG LGS (2011)
D: The mandatory notice of strike and the conduct of
the strike-vote report were ineffective for having been
filed and conducted before KMLMS acquired legal
personality as a legitimate labor organization violating
Art. 269(c), (d) and (f) of the Labor Code and Rule XXII,
Book V of the Omnibus Rules.
F: KMLMS held a strike-vote one day before its
registration was granted. It later staged a strike where
several illegal acts were committed. The company
argued that the strike was illegal, and all participating
union members should be declared to have forfeited
their employment.
H: SC ruled in favor of the company. The mandatory
notice of strike and the conduct of the strike-vote
report were ineffective for having been filed and
conducted before KMLMS acquired legal personality
as an LLO.
ABARIA v. NLRC (2011)
D: Not being a labor organization, NAMA is not entitled
to those rights granted to a legitimate labor
organization under Art. 241.
F: Intra-union dispute between NAMA-MCCH-NHL
(Nava’s group are members) and the federation
NFL(exclusive bargaining rep of MCCHI rank-and-file
employees) because of NFL’s decision to disaffiliate
with KMU. Nava’s group submitted CB proposals to
the company, demanding it negotiate with them
directly. Because of this, the company suspended
collection of union fees. The union also suspended the
membership of Nava’s group. Nava’s group wore red
armbands to work, which were taken by MCCHI as a
UP LAW C2017 LABOR 2 (PROF. DAWAY) FINALS REVIEWER | 54
strike. DOLE issued certifications that NAMA is not
registered, thus not a legitimate labor organization.
Thus, their Notice to Strike was deemed not filed. They
staged a strike that led to the termination of Nava and
the other union members.
H: MCCHI is not guilty of ULP when it refused to
negotiate with Nava’s group. Only legitimate labor
organizations may enter into CB negotiations, file
Notice to Strike and avail of other rights under LC. The
strike was illegal, hence their dismissals were valid.
iv. Effect of Illegality
LC, Art. 270. Prohibited Activities (a) supra p. 53
PHIMCO INDUSTRIES v.
PHIMCO INDUSTRIES LABOR ASSN (2010)
D: Despite the validity of the purpose of a strike and
compliance with the procedural requirements, a strike
may still be held illegal where the means employed are
illegal. Means become illegal when they come within
the prohibitions under Art. 264(e). This resulting
illegality affects the liability of the strikers wherein Art.
264(a) applies.
F: PILA staged a strike, where strikers pickets, moved
in circles with hands-to-shoulders and placed benches
in front of the company gates, where strikers would
stand. PHIMCO filed a petition for preliminary
injunction and TRO with NLRC to enjoin the strikers
from preventing through force, intimidation and
coercion the ingress and egress of non-striking
employees into and from the company premises.
NLRC issued an ex-parte TRO. After, PHIMCO sent a
letter to 36 union members, directing them to explain
within 24 hours why they should not be dismissed for
the illegal acts they committed during the strike. Three
days later PHIMCO informed the 36 members of their
dismisssal. PILA filed a complaint for ULP and illegal
dismissal with the NLRC. Acting Labor Sec. Brillantes
assumed jurisdiction over the dispute, and issued a
return-to-work order. PHIMCO filed a petition with the
NLRC to declare the strike illegal, including a prayer for
the dismissal of PILA officers and members who
knowingly participated in the illegal strike. PHIMCO
claimed that the strikers prevented ingress to and
egress from their premises, paralyzing their business.
H: STRIKE ILLEGAL. The SC found that while the
strike was not marred by actual violence and patent
intimidation, the picketing blocked free ingress to and
egress from PHIMCO premises, preventing employees

not on strike, as well as company vehicles from
entering the PHIMCO compound.
SUKHOTHAI CUISINE AND RESTAURANT v. CA
(2006), supra p. 46
D: Well-settled is the rule that even if the strike were to
be declared valid because its objective or purpose is
lawful, the strike may still be declared invalid where
the means employed are illegal. Among such limits are
the prohibited activities under Article 264 (now 270).
v) Liabilities of participating members/ officers of
the union
VISAYAS COMMUNITY MEDICAL CENTER
(VCMC) v. EMMA YBALLE,
NELIA ANGEL, ELEUTERIA CORTEZ & EVELYN
ONG (2014)
D: A worker merely participating in an illegal strike may
not be terminated from employment. It is only when he
commits illegal acts during a strike that he may be
declared to have lost employment status. In contrast, a
union officer may be terminated from employment for
knowingly participating in an illegal strike or
participates in the commission of illegal acts during a
strike.
F: Emma, Nelia, Eleuteria, and Evelyn all worked for
VCMC (previously MCCHI) as staff nurses or midwives.
They were all dismissed for having allegedly
participated in the illegal concerted activities of their
unregistered union, NAMA.
H: SC ruled that respondents who are mere union
members were illegally dismissed for participating in
the illegal strike conducted by the Nava group.
FADRIQUELAN, ET AL. v.
MONTEREY FOODS CORP. (2011)
D: The ordinary worker cannot be terminated for
merely participating in the strike. There must be proof
that he committed illegal acts during its conduct. On
the other hand, a union officer can be terminated upon
mere proof that he knowingly participated in the illegal
strike.
F: The union filed a notice of strike. The DOLE
Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the dispute. The
union filed another notice of strike. The company then
terminated the employment of 17 union officers. The
union filed a third notice of strik . The DOLE Secretary
included the last 2 notices of strike in his assumption
UP LAW C2017 LABOR 2 (PROF. DAWAY) FINALS REVIEWER | 55
order. The DOLE Secretary upheld termination of the
union officers.
H: Of the 17 union officers, only 4 were illegally
dismissed. The company was not able to show that all
17 deserved to be dismissed.
ESCARIO ET AL. v. NLRC (2010)
D: On the consequences of an illegal strike, the
provision distinguishes between a union officer and a
union member participating in an illegal strike. A union
officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike is
deemed to have lost his employment status, but a
union member who is merely instigated or induced to
participate in the illegal strike is more benignly treated.
Part of the explanation for the benign consideration for
the union member is the policy of reinstating rank-and-
file workers who are misled into supporting illegal
strikes, absent any finding that such workers
committed illegal acts during the period of the illegal
strikes.
F: All the officers and some 200 members of the Union
walked out of company premises and proceeded to
the barangay office to show support an officer of the
Union charged with oral defamation by the personnel
manager and the latter’s secretary. A settlement was
reached, and the officers and members returned to
work. As a result of the walkout, PINA preventively
suspended all officers; they were terminated after a
month. The strike was later declared to be illegal.
H: On the consequences of an illegal strike, the
provision distinguishes between a union officer and a
union member participating in an illegal strike.
vi) Effect of Assumption/ Certification Order
LC Art. 269. Strikes, picketing and lockouts. (g),
supra p. 16
• Effect: Automatically enjoin the intended or
impending strike or lockout as specified in the
assumption or certification order.
• If one has already taken place, all striking or
locked out employees shall immediately return-
to-work and the employer shall immediately
resume operations and readmit all workers.
• SOLE may seek the assistance of law
enforcement agencies to ensure compliance with
this provision as well as with such orders as he
may issue to enforce the same.
• President of the Philippines shall not be
precluded from determining the industries that, in

his opinion, are indispensable to the national
interest, and from intervening at any time and
assuming jurisdiction over any such labor dispute
in order to settle or terminate the same.
TABANGCO SHELL REFINERY EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION v.
PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORP. (2014)
D: Such assumption or certification shall have the
effect of automatically enjoining the intended or
impending strike or lockout as specified in the
assumption or certification order. If one has already
taken place at the time of assumption or certification,
all striking or locked out employees shall immediately
return to work and the employer shall immediately
resume operations and readmit all workers under the
same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike
or lockout. The Secretary of Labor and Employment or
the Commission may seek the assistance of law
enforcement agencies to ensure the compliance with
this provision as well as with such orders as he may
issue to enforce the same.
F: Union and Company attempt to negotiate for a new
CBA since the previous one is about to end. However,
both parties cannot agree as to the economic
provision. The Union alleged that the company is
bargaining in bad faith and filed a notice of strike. Prior
to the strike, the company was able to obtain a
certification order from the DOLE where the Sec. of
DOLE shall assume jurisdiction. The DOLE eventually
decided in favor of the Company and ruled that there
was no bad faith bargaining on the part of the
company.
H: Jurisdiction over a labor dispute causing or likely to
cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable
to the national interest, and decide the same
accordingly. And, as a matter of necessity, it includes
questions incidental to the labor dispute; that is, issues
that are necessarily involved in the dispute itself, and
not just to that ascribed in the Notice of Strike or
otherwise submitted to him for resolution. The power
of the Secretary of Labor and Employment to assume
jurisdiction over this dispute includes and extends to
all questions and controversies arising from the said
dispute, such as, but not limited to the union’s
allegation of bad faith bargaining. As there is already
an existing controversy on the matter of wage
increase, the Secretary of Labor and Employment
need not wait for a deadlock in the negotiations to
take cognizance of the matter.
UP LAW C2017 LABOR 2 (PROF. DAWAY) FINALS REVIEWER | 56
BAGONG PAGKAKAISA NG MANGGAGAWA NG
TRIUMPH v. DOLE (2010), supra p. 53
D: Labor Secretary's assumption of jurisdiction over
the dispute or its certification to the National Labor
Relations Commission for compulsory arbitration shall
have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended
or impending strike or lockout and all striking or locked
out employees shall immediately return to work and
the employer shall immediately resume operations and
readmit all workers under the same terms and
conditions before the strike or lockout.
vii) Mass Leave
SOLIDBANK CORP. V GAMIER (2010)
D: Article 218 of the Labor Code defines strike as any
temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action
of employees as a result of an industrial or labor
dispute. The term ―strike shall comprise not only
concerted work stoppages, but also slowdowns, mass
leaves, sitdowns, attempts to damage, destroy or
sabotage plant equipment and facilities and similar
activities. Thus, the fact that the conventional term
―strike was not used by the striking employees to
describe their common course of action is
inconsequential, since the substance of the situation,
and not its appearance, will be deemed to be
controlling.
F: Deadlock in renegotiation. Union members staged
mass actions. Secretary assumed jurisdiction. Union
members protested at DOLE and bank branches. The
concerted action of the respondents was not limited to
the protest rally in front of the DOLE Office on April 3,
2000. Respondent Union had also picketed the Head
Office and Paseo de Roxas Branch. About 712
employees, including those in the provincial branches,
boycotted and absented themselves from work in a
concerted fashion for three continuous days that
virtually paralyzed the employer’s banking operations.
H: The mass action is illegal. Strike that is undertaken
despite the issuance by the Secretary of Labor of an
assumption order and/or certification is a prohibited
activity and thus illegal.
11. In case of illegal strike, illegal lockout/ in pari
delicto doctrine- Status quo ante
• In case of illegal strike and illegal lockout at
the same time, the in pari delicto doctrine is
applicable. Such situation warrants the

restoration of the status quo ante and bringing
the parties back to the respective positions
before the illegal strike and illegal lockout.
(Automotive Engine Rebuilders v.
Progresibong Unyon)
AUTOMOTIVE ENGINE REBUILDERS v.
PROGRESIBONG UNYON (2011)
D: In cases of illegal strike or illegal lockout where both
the employer and the employees are in pari delicto, the
parties should be restored to their respective positions
prior to the illegal strike or lockout. But while they are
entitled to reinstatement, the employees are not
entitled to backwages, as these are only ordered
under exceptional circumstances (e.g. employer is
guilty of oppression and union-busting activities, and
strikers ordered reinstated are denied such
reinstatement). Since the strike was illegal, the
principle of “no work, no pay” is applicable.
F: Progresibong Unyon is the legitimate labor union of
the rank and file employees of AER. AER accused the
Union of illegal concerted activities while the Union
accused AER of unfair labor practice, illegal
suspension and illegal dismissal. The two parties
presented different versions of the facts. Basically,
there was a petition for certification election filed by
the Union after it was organized. A drug test was
conducted and some employees were found positive
for drugs. Some of these employees were suspended
and later dismissed. Some members of the Union
thereafter staged a strike and tried to cart away a
boring machine located in another office of AER for
fear that AER was operating a runaway shop.
H: AER was guilty of illegal lockout and that the Unyon
was guilty of illegal concerted activities. Since both
parties were guilty of ULP, they were in pari delicto.
The situation warrants the restoration of the status quo
ante, bringing the parties back to their respective
positions before the illegal strike and illegal lockout
through the reinstatement of the employees
(Philippines Inter-Fashion, Inc. v NLRC). The dismissed
employees should be reinstated but without
backwages.
12. Employment of Strike Breakers
• No employer shall use or employ any strike-
breaker, nor shall any person be employed as
a strike-breaker. (Art. 270(c))
• "Strike-breaker" - any person who:
UP LAW C2017 LABOR 2 (PROF. DAWAY) FINALS REVIEWER | 57
o obstructs, impedes, or interferes with
by force, violence, coercion, threats,
or intimidation.
o any peaceful picketing:
o affecting wages, hours or conditions
of work • in the exercise of the right of
self-organization or collective
bargaining (Art. 218(r))
LC, Art. 270 (c). Prohibited activities. No employer
shall use or employ any strikebreaker, nor shall any
person be employed as a strike-breaker.
LC, Art. 218 (r). Definitions. "Strike-breaker" means
any person who obstructs, impedes, or interferes with
by force, violence, coercion, threats, or intimidation
any peaceful picketing affecting wages, hours or
conditions of work or in the exercise of the right of
self-organization or collective bargaining.
13. Improved Offer Balloting and Strikes
On or before the 30th day of the strike, DOLE shall
conduct a referendum by secret ballot on the improved
offer of the employer
• When a majority of the members vote to
accept the improved offer, the striking workers
shall immediately return to work and the
employer shall readmit them upon the signing
of the agreement (Art. 271, Book V, Rule XXII,
Sec. 12)
LC, Art. 271. Improved offer balloting. – In an effort
to settle a strike, the Department of Labor and
Employment shall conduct a referendum by secret
ballot on the improved offer of the employer on or
before the 30th day of the strike. When at least a
majority of the union members vote to accept the
improved offer the striking workers shall immediately
return to work and the employer shall thereupon
readmit them upon the signing of the agreement.
In case of a lockout, the Department of Labor and
Employment shall also conduct a referendum by secret
balloting on the reduced offer of the union on or before
the 30th day of the lockout. When at least a majority of
the board of directors or trustees or the partners
holding the controlling interest in the case of a
partnership vote to accept the reduced offer, the
workers shall immediately return to work and the
employer shall thereupon readmit them upon the
signing of the agreement.

Book V, Rule XXII, Sec. 12. Improved offer
balloting. – In case of a strike, the regional branch of
the Board shall, at its own initiative or upon the
request of any affected party, conduct a referendum
by secret balloting on the improved offer of the
employer on or before the 30th day of strike. When at
least a majority of the union members vote to accept
the improved offer, the striking workers shall
immediately return to work and the employer shall
thereupon re-admit them upon the signing of the
agreement.
In case of a lockout, the regional branch of the Board
shall also conduct a referendum by secret balloting on
the reduced offer of the union on or before the 30th
day of the lockout. When at least a majority of the
board of directors or trustees or the partners holding
the controlling interest in the case of partnership vote
to accept the reduced offer, the workers shall
immediately return to work and the employer shall
thereupon readmit them upon the signing of the
agreement.
C. SLOWDOWN AS CONCERTED ACTIVITY
• “Slowdown is generally condemned as
inherently illicit and unjustifiable, because while
the employees "continue to work and remain
at their positions and accept the wages paid
to them," they at the same time "select what
part of their allotted tasks they care to perform
of their own volition or refuse openly or
secretly, to the employer's damage, to do
other work" in other words, they "work on their
own terms.” (IBM v. NLRC)
ILAW AT BUKLOD NG MANGGAGAWA (IBM) v.
NLRC (1991), supra p. 42
D: A slowdown is an inherently illegal activity,
essentially illegal even in the absence of a no-strike
clause in a collective bargaining contract, or statute or
rule. A slowdown is a "strike on the installment plan;" a
willful reduction in the rate of work by concerted action
of workers for the purpose of restricting the output of
the employer, in relation to a labor dispute; as an
activity by which workers, without a complete
stoppage of work, retard production or their
performance of duties and functions to compel
management to grant their demands.
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D. SIT-DOWN STRIKE
• One wherein workers take over possession of
the property of such business to cease
production and to refuse access to owners.
MALAYANG MANGGAGAWA NG STAYFAST v.
NLRC (2013)
D: Participation in a sit-down strike can be a ground
for termination if it is made without notice and in
violation of company rules.
F: Petitioner filed a Notice of Strike alleging that the
company has committed acts of discrimination, union
busting and illegal lockout against them. Company
filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that petitioner
was not the SEBA and hence lacked personality to file
a notice of strike. The parties made concessions
leading up to the union withdrawing its notice of strike.
Soon thereafter, union staged a sit-down strike.
Company required them to explain why they should
not be terminated within 24hours. No response. The
strikers thus were terminated. They filed a Notice of
Strike and complaint for unfair labor practice.
H: The Court held that the strikers’ sit-down strike was
in violation of the company rules and they ignored the
opportunity given to them to explain their misconduct,
consequently they were justly terminated. Respondent
company and its General Manager also argue that the
sit-down strike which subsequently became a full
blown strike was illegal as it had previously withdrawn
its notice of strike.
E. PICKETING
1. Definition
• Picketing is the marching to and fro at the
employer’s premises, usually accompanied by
the display of placards and other signs (IBM v.
NLRC)
2. Nature and Purpose of Picket Line
• “The heated altercations and occasional blows
exchanged on the picket line do not affect or
diminish the right to strike…some disorder is
unfortunately quite usual in any extensive or
long drawn out strike. Fist-fighting between
union and non-union employees in the midst
of a strike is no bar to reinstatement" (Insular
Life v. Insular)

INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO. EMPLOYEES
ASSN. V. INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO. (1971),
supra p. 27
D: It must be conceded that some disorder is
unfortunately quite usual in any extensive or long
drawn out strike. A strike is essentially a battle waged
with economic weapons. Engaged in it are human
beings whose feelings are stirred to the depths. Rising
passions call forth hot words. Hot words lead to blows
on the picket line. The transformation from economic
to physical combat by those engaged in the contest is
difficult to prevent even when cool heads direct the
fight. Violence of this nature, however much it is to be
regretted, must have been in the contemplation of the
Congress when it provided in Sec. 13 of Act 29 USCA
Sec. 163, that nothing therein should be construed so
as to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way
the right to strike. If this were not so, the rights
afforded to employees by the Act would indeed be
illusory. It was accordingly recently held that it was not
intended by the Act that minor disorders of this nature
would deprive a striker of the possibility of
reinstatement.
STA. ROSA COCA-COLA PLANT EMPLOYEES
UNION v. CCBP (2007), supra p. 44
D: Picketing involves merely the marching to and fro at
the premises of the employer, usually accompanied by
the display of placards and other signs making known
the facts involved in a labor dispute. As applied to a
labor dispute, to picket means the stationing of one or
more persons to observe and attempt to observe. The
purpose of pickets is said to be a means of peaceable
persuasion.
3. Picketing and Libel Laws
It is a fact of industrial life that in the continuing
confrontation between labor and management, it is far
from likely that the language employed would be both
courteous and polite. As first announced by the Court
through Justice Malcolm in US vs. Bustos, the
judiciary, in deciding suits for libel, must ascertain
whether or not the alleged offending words may be
embraced by the guarantees of free speech and free
press. (Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank v.
Philnabank Employees)
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL
BANK v. PHILNABANK EMPLOYEES ASSN. (1981)
D: In deciding suits for libel, the judiciary must
ascertain whether or not the alleged offending words
may be embraced by the guarantees of free speech
and free press (U.S. v. Bustos). From the time of
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Mortrera v. CIR (1947), the SC has been committed to
the view that peaceful picketing is part of the freedom
of speech guarantee of the Constitution. The labor
union made use of its constitutional right to picket.
F: PEMA declared a strike against PNB. In said strike,
placards and signboards were displayed, on of which
contained a writing which mentioned PCIB. Because of
this, PCIB filed a libel case against PEMA. PEMA
denied the libelous nature of the writing complained of.
They claimed that such was simply part of their legal
labor strategy denouncing PNB management. Lower
Court sustained PEMA’s defense and dismissed the
libel complaint. SC affirmed the lower court decision.
H: Courts follow a sympathetic approach to
inaccuracies and imprecision in language in the use of
placards as part of peaceful picketing in labor
controversies. It found no libelous statement,
underscoring that it can hardly be expected that the
“inaccuracies and imprecision” in language arising
from strikes and other labor disputes (which elicit
strong emotional response from both labor and
management) will be courteous and polite.
4. Curtailment
The wholesale condemnation of peaceful picketing is
bereft of support in law. Peaceful picketing is
embraced in freedom of expression… and is part of
the freedom of speech guarantee of the Constitution.
Such cannot be prohibited as long as it doesn’t involve
acts of illegality. (Nagkahiusang Manggagawa v Libron)
NAGKAHIUSANG MANGGAGAWA SA CUIZON
HOTEL v. LIBRON (1983)
D: Peaceful picketing is part of the freedom of speech
guarantee of the Constitution. Thus, picketing cannot
be prohibited as long as it is done peacefully.
However, peaceful picketing cannot countenance acts
of illegality. The peaceful picketing authorized cannot
countenance acts of illegality. No person engaged in
picketing shall commit any act of violence, coercion or
intimidation or obstruct the free ingress to or egress
from the employer's premises for lawful purposes, or
obstruct public thoroughfares.
F: The Labor Arbiter issued an order ruling that since a
strike had been declared illegal, sanctions would
likewise be imposed on immediate incidents thereto,
such as picketing. In other words, once strikers are
permanently enjoined from staging the illegal strike, the
picketing staged should also be simultaneously lifted

H: The SC did not agree. The order of the labor arbiter
certainly cannot be declared final and executory upon
the mere issuance thereof.
5. Regulation/Restrictions, Innocent Third Party
Rule and Liabilities
• The Union’s right to strike, although
guaranteed by the Constitution, may be
regulated if the rights of third parties or
“innocent bystanders” are affected. (Liwayway
Publishing Co v. Permanent Concrete Workers
Union)
LIWAYWAY PUBLISHING CO. INC. v. PERMANENT
CONCRETE WORKERS UNION (1981)
D: The right to picket is not an absolute one. While
peaceful picketing is entitled to protection as an
exercise of free speech, we believe that courts are not
without power to confine or localize the sphere of
communication or the demonstration to the parties to
the labor dispute, including those with related interest,
and to insulate establishments or persons with no
industrial connection or having interest totally foreign
to the context of the dispute. Thus, the right may be
regulated at the instance of third parties or 'innocent
bystanders' if it appears that the inevitable result of its
exercise is to create an impression that a labor dispute
with which they have no connection or interest exists
between them and the picketing union or constitute an
invasion of their rights.
F: Liwayway was a sublessee in the premises owned
by Permanent Concrete Products (company). When
the union in the company staged a strike, Liwayway
was prevented by the members in accessing its
bodega in the premises, where its daily newsprint
supply are located. It was forced to rent another
bodega and transfer the supplies. As such, it filed for
injunction and damages before the CFI of Manila. The
union moved to dismiss arguing that the CIR has
exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute.
H: The CFI, nonetheless, granted the reliefs. The SC
affirmed, finding that the facts of the case is materially
and essentially different from the labor dispute pending
before the CIR. Liwayway, not being a party to the
labor dispute, was an innocent bystander. (Liwayway is
not in any way related to the striking union, except for
the fact that it was the sublessee of a bodega in the
company’s compound. Liwayway’s business is
exclusively the publication of weekly magazines, which
has absolutely no relation or connection whatsoever
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with the cause of the strike of the union against their
company, much less with the terms, conditions or
demands of the strikers.) As such, the CFI could validly
issue a writ of preliminary injunction against the union
to protect Liwayway’s interests.
6. Prohibited Activities – Peaceful Picketing
Limitations for picketers: No person engaged in
picketing shall commit
• any act of violence, coercion or intimidation ,
or
• obstruct the free ingress to or egress from the
employer's premises for lawful purposes, or
• obstruct public thoroughfares.
Prohibited acts against picketers:
• Obstructing, impeding or interfering with, by
force, violence, coercion, threats or
intimidation, any peaceful picketing by
workers:
o during any labor controversy or
o in the exercise of the right to self-
organization or collective bargaining
• Aiding or abetting such obstruction or
interference.
• No employer shall use or employ any person
to commit such acts nor shall any person be
employed for such purpose. (Book V, Rule
XXII, Sec. 13, 270(b))
LC, Art. 270(b). Prohibited activities. No person
shall obstruct, impede, or interfere with, by force,
violence, coercion, threats or intimidation, any peaceful
picketing by employees during any labor controversy
or in the exercise of the right to self-organization or
collective bargaining, or shall aid or abet such
obstruction or interference.
Book V, Rule XXII, Sec. 13. Peaceful picketing. –
Workers shall have the right to peaceful picketing. No
person engaged in picketing shall commit any act of
violence, coercion or intimidation or obstruct the free
ingress to or egress from the employer's premises for
lawful purposes, or obstruct public thoroughfares.
No person shall obstruct, impede or interfere with, by
force, violence, coercion, threats or intimidation, any
peaceful picketing by workers during any labor
controversy or in the exercise of the right to
selforganization or collective bargaining or shall aid or
abet such obstruction or interference. No employer
shall use or employ any person to commit such acts

nor shall any person be employed for such purpose.
F. ROLE OF PEACE OFFICERS DURING STRIKES
AND PICKETING
1. Escorting
Peace officers not allowed
• To bring in, introduce or escort in any manner,
• Any individual who:
o seeks to replace strikers in entering or
leaving the premises of a strike area,
or
o work in place of the strikers.
• Peace officers shall keep out of the picket
lines unless actual violence or other criminal
acts occur therein, but they cannot be
prevented from taking any measure necessary
to
o maintain peace and order,
o protect life and property, and/or
o enforce the law and legal order. (Art.
270(d))
LC, Art. 270(d). Prohibited activities. No public
official or employee, including officers and personnel of
the New Armed Forces of the Philippines or the
Integrated National Police, or armed person, shall
bring in, introduce or escort in any manner, any
individual who seeks to replace strikers in entering or
leaving the premises of a strike area, or work in place
of the strikers. The police force shall keep out of the
picket lines unless actual violence or other criminal
acts occur therein: Provided, That nothing herein shall
be interpreted to prevent any public officer from taking
any measure necessary to maintain peace and order,
protect life and property, and/or enforce the law and
legal order.
2. Arrest and Detention of Law Violators
Generally, no union members or union organizers may
be arrested or detained for union activities without
previous consultations with the Secretary of Labor
• Exceptions: They can be arrested on the
grounds of
o national security and public peace
o commission of a crime (Art. 272)
LC, Art. 272. Requirement for arrest and
detention. – Except on grounds of national security
and public peace or in case of commission of a crime,
no union members or union organizers may be
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arrested or detained for union activities without
previous consultations with the Secretary of Labor.
X. EMPLOYER LOCKOUT .
A. BASIS, LIMITATION AND DEFINITION
Art 269. Strikes, picketing and lockouts.
(b) Workers shall have the right to engage in concerted
activities for purposes of collective bargaining or for
their mutual benefit and protection. The right of
legitimate labor organizations to strike and picket and
of employers to lockout, consistent with the national
interest, shall continue to be recognized and
respected. However, no labor union may strike and no
employer may declare a lockout on grounds involving
inter-union and intra-union disputes.
Art 218 (p). "Lockout" means any temporary refusal of
an employer to furnish work as a result of an industrial
or labor dispute.
Book V, Rule I, Sec 1(gg) "Lockout" refers to the
temporary refusal of an employer to furnish work as a
result of a labor or industrial dispute.
B. EFFECT ON WORK RELATIONSHIP
Art 218 (p). supra
C. GROUND FOR LOCKOUT
Art 269. Strikes, picketing and lockouts.
(c) In case of bargaining deadlocks, the duly certified
or recognized bargaining agent may file a notice of
strike or the employer may file a notice of lockout with
the Ministry at least 30 day before the intended date
thereof. In cases of unfair labor practice, the period of
notice shall be 15 days and in the absence of a duly
certified or recognized bargaining agent, the notice of
strike may be filed by any legitimate labor organization
in behalf of its members. However, in case of dismissal
from employment of union officers duly elected in
accordance with the union constitution and by-laws,
which may constitute union busting, where the
existence of the union is threatened, the 15-day
cooling-off period shall not apply and the union may
take action immediately.
D. PROHIBITED LOCKOUT
LC, Art 269 (b), supra p. 61
• “[N]o employer may declare a lockout on grounds

involving inter-union and intra-union disputes.”.
LC, Art 269 (g), supra p. 16
• When SOLE has assumed jurisdiction/ certified the
dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration,
the effect is to automatically enjoin the intended or
impending strike or lockout as specified in the
assumption or certification order
LC, Art. 270. Prohibited Activities (a) supra p. 47
• No employer shall declare a lockout without
o having bargained collectively
o notice of strike
o strike/lockout vote + report
• No lockout shall be declared
o after assumption of jurisdiction by the
President/ SOLE, or
o after certification or submission of the
dispute to arbitration, or
o during the pendency of cases
involving the same grounds for the
strike or lockout.
E. PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS
LC, Art. 270 (a), (c), (d), (e) supra p. 53
LC, Art. 269. Strikes, picketing, and lockouts. (e)
During the cooling-off period, it shall be the duty of the
Ministry to exert all efforts at mediation and conciliation
to effect a voluntary settlement. Should the dispute
remain unsettled until the lapse of the requisite number
of days from the mandatory filing of the notice, the
labor union may strike or the employer may declare a
lockout.
Book V, Rule XXII, Secs. 5-11, supra pp. 39-40
Summary of Procedural Requirements:
(1) Grounds
a. CB deadlock
b. Employee’s ULP
(2) Notice of lockout
a. Filed with regional branch of NCMB at
least 30 days before (15 days in case
of ULP strike)
b. Contents of notice:
i. Names and the addresses of
the employer and the union
ii. Nature of the industry
iii. Number of union members
iv. Number of workers in the
bargaining unit
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v. Such other relevant data as
may facilitate the settlement of
the dispute, such as a brief
statement or enumeration of
all pending labor disputes
involving the same parties
vi. In case of bargaining
deadlocks:
1. State the unresolved
issues in the
bargaining
negotiations
2. Union’s proposals
3. Employer’s
counterproposals
4. Proof of a request for
conference to settle
the differences
c. Copy served on other party
(3) Lockout vote
a. Approved by a majority of the Board
of Directors of the employer,
corporation or association or the
partners
b. Obtained by secret ballot in meetings
or referenda called for the purpose
c. May be supervised by regional branch
of NCMB at its own initiative or upon
request of any affected party
d. Employer shall furnish the regional
branch of NCMB and the notice of
meetings 24 hours before
(4) 7-day report period: Submit results of the voting at
least 7 days before the intended strike or lockout,
subject to the cooling-off period
(5) If unsettled after lapse of cooling-off period, the
employer may lock out its workers. The regional
branch of the NCMB shall continue mediating and
conciliating.
PHILTREAD ETC v. NLRC (1993)
D: Effects of defiance – Non-compliance with return to
work order shall be considered an illegal act
committed in the course of the strike or lockout.
Authorizes SOLE/Commission to enforce the same
under pain of loss of employment status or entitlement
to full employment benefits from the locking-out
employer or backwages, damages and/or other
positive and/or affirmative reliefs, even to criminal
prosecution against the liable parties.
F: Union filed a notice of strike. Company filed a notice
of lockout and terminated 36 union officers. Union

picketed against company and filed an illegal dismissal
complaint. Company filed libel charges against the 36.
SOLE certified the case to the NLRC for compulsory
arbitration and issued a return-to-work order.
Company refused to reinstate the 36.
H: Although the company complied with the
procedural requirements under LC 263 (now 269), it is
still liable for failure to comply with the return-to-work
order.
F. EFFECT OF ILLEGAL LOCKOUT
LC, Art 270 (a) […] Any worker whose employment
has been terminated as a consequence of any unlawful
lockout shall be entitled to reinstatement with full
backwages.
XI. LABOR INJUNCTION
A. DEFINITION AND NATURE
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES v. NLRC (1998)
D: Injunction is a preservative remedy to protects
one’s substantive rights and interests. Art 218 (e) does
not provide blanket authority to NLRC or its divisions
since injunction is only an ancillary remedy in ordinary
labor disputes.
F: Flight stewards were dismissed for being allegedly
involved in currency smuggling. NLRC issued a
temporary mandatory injunction enjoining PAL to
cease and desist from enforcing dismissal.
H: NLRC cannot entertain an action for injunction and
issue writ enjoining PAL from enforcing orders of
dismissal without a complaint for illegal dismissal filed
by the flight stewards.
B. GENERAL RULE – PROHIBITION
Art. 260. Injunction prohibited. No temporary or
permanent injunction or restraining order in any case
involving or growing out of labor disputes shall be
issued by any court or other entity, except as
otherwise provided in Articles 218 (now 224) and 264
(now 270) of this Code.
Art 229. Appeal . Decisions, awards, or orders of the
Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed
to the Commission by any or both parties within ten
(10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions,
awards, or orders. Such appeal may be entertained
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only on any of the following grounds
(a) If there is prima facie evidence of abuse of
discretion on the part of the Labor Arbiter.
LC, Art 224. Powers of the Commission. The
Commission shall have the power and authority:
(e) To enjoin or restrain any actual or threatened
commission of any or all prohibited or unlawful
acts or to require the performance of a particular
act in any labor dispute which, if not restrained or
performed forthwith, may cause grave or
irreparable damage to any party or render
ineffectual any decision in favor of such party:
Provided, That no temporary or permanent
injunction in any case involving or growing out of a
labor dispute as defined in this Code shall be
issued except after hearing the testimony of
witnesses, with opportunity for cross-examination,
. in support of the allegations of a complaint made
under oath, and testimony in opposition thereto, if
offered, and only after a finding of fact by the
Commission, to the effect:
1) That prohibited or unlawful acts have been
threatened and will be committed and will be
continued unless restrained, but no injunction or
temporary restraining order shall be issued on
account of any threat, prohibited or unlawful act,
except against the person or persons, association
or organization making the threat or committing the
prohibited or unlawful act or actually authorizing or
ratifying the same after actual knowledge thereof;
2) That substantial and irreparable injury to
complainant’s property will follow;
3) That as to each item of relief to be granted, greater
injury will be inflicted upon complainant by the
denial of relief than will be inflicted upon defendants
by the granting of relief;
4) That complainant has no adequate remedy at law;
and
5) That the public officers charged with the duty to
protect complainant’s property are unable or
unwilling to furnish adequate protection.
Such hearing shall be held after due and personal
notice thereof has been served, in such manner as the
Commission shall direct, to all known persons against
whom relief is sought, and also to the Chief Executive
and other public officials of the province or city within

which the unlawful acts have been threatened or
committed, charged with the duty to protect
complainant’s property: Provided, however, that if a
complainant shall also allege that, unless a temporary
restraining order shall be issued without notice, a
substantial and irreparable injury to complainant’s
property will be unavoidable, such a temporary
restraining order may be issued upon testimony under
oath, sufficient, if sustained, to justify the Commission
in issuing a temporary injunction upon hearing after
notice. Such a temporary restraining order shall be
effective for no longer than twenty (20) days and shall
become void at the expiration of said twenty (20) days.
No such temporary restraining order or temporary
injunction shall be issued except on condition that
complainant shall first file an undertaking with
adequate security in an amount to be fixed by the
Commission sufficient to recompense those enjoined
for any loss, expense or damage caused by the
improvident or erroneous issuance of such order or
injunction, including all reasonable costs, together with
a reasonable attorney’s fee, and expense of defense
against the order or against the granting of any
injunctive relief sought in the same proceeding and
subsequently denied by the Commission.
The undertaking herein mentioned shall be understood
to constitute an agreement entered into by the
complainant and the surety upon which an order may
be rendered in the same suit or proceeding against
said complainant and surety, upon a hearing to assess
damages, of which hearing, complainant and surety
shall have reasonable notice, the said complainant and
surety submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of the
Commission for that purpose. But nothing herein
contained shall deprive any party having a claim or
cause of action under or upon such undertaking from
electing to pursue his ordinary remedy by suit at law or
in equity: Provided, further, That the reception of
evidence for the application of a writ of injunction may
be delegated by the Commission to any of its Labor
Arbiters who shall conduct such hearings in such
places as he may determine to be accessible to the
parties and their witnesses and shall submit thereafter
his recommendation to the Commission.
Book V, Rule XXII, Section 14. Injunctions. - No
court or entity shall enjoin any picketing, strike or
lockout, except as provided in Articles 218 (now 224)
and 263 (now 269) of the Labor Code.
The Commission shall have the power to issue
temporary restraining orders in such cases but only
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after due notice and hearing and in accordance with its
rules. The reception of evidence for the application of a
writ of injunction may be delegated by the Commission
to any Labor Arbiter who shall submit his
recommendations to the Commission for its
consideration and resolution.
Any ex parte restraining order issued by the
Commission, or its chairman or Vice-Chairman where
the Commission is not in session and as prescribed by
its rules, shall be valid for a period not exceeding
twenty (20) days.
SAN MIGUEL CORP V. NLRC (2003)
D: Art 260 of LC provides that no temporary or
permanent injunction or restraining order in any
case involving or growing out of labor disputes shall be
issued by any court or other entity EXC as otherwise
provided in Art 224 and 270. Art 270 (a) explicitly
states that a declaration of strike without first having
filed the required notice is a prohibited activity, which
may be prevented through an injunction in accordance
with Art 260.
F: BM filed a notice of strike. NCMV found the issues
non-strikeable and converted the proceeding into a
preventive mediation. Despite this, IBM still held a
strike. SMC filed with NLRC a petition for injunction.
NLRC issued a TRO. Subsequently, IBM and SMC
entered into a MoA wherein it was expressly stated
that cases filed in relation to their dispute will continue
and will not be affected in any manner whatsoever by
the agreement. The picket lines ended and work was
then resumed. IBM sought the reconsideration of the
issuance of the TRO. NLRC allowed the lapse of the
TRO and denied SMC’s petition for injunction.
H: Contrary to the NLRC’s finding, at the time the
injunction was being sought, there existed a threat to
revive the unlawful strike as evidenced by the flyers
then being circulated by the IBM-NCR Council which
led the union.
CALTEX FILIPINO MANAGERS AND SUPERVISORS
ASSN. v. CIR (1972), supra pp. 23-24
D: CIR cannot validly enjoin strikes. The CIR is virtually
prohibited from issuing injunctive relief arising from labor
disputes (in order to give labor a comparable bargaining
power with capital). The exception is when a labor dispute
arises in an industry indispensible to the national interest
and such dispute is certified by the President to the CIR
(pursuant to Sec. 9(d) of RA875 and Social Security
Employees Assoc. v Hon. Soriano). However, in this

exception, the purpose of the injunction is not to enjoin
the strike itself, but only unlawful activities.
C. EXCEPTIONS – WHEN ALLOWED
LC, Art. 260, supra p. 63– Injunctions prohibited
except as otherwise provided in Articles 218 (now 224)
and 264 (now 270) of this Code.
LC, Art 224 (e), supra pp. 63-64
• NLRC has the power and authority to
o enjoin/ restrain any actual/ threatened
commission of any or all prohibited or
unlawful acts or
o require the performance of a particular act
in any labor dispute
which, if not restrained or performed forthwith,
may cause grave/ irreparable damage to any party
or render ineffectual any decision in his/her favor
• No injunction shall be issued in any case involving/
growing out of a labor dispute except after:
o Hearing after due and personal notice
thereof has been served, in such manner
as the NLRC shall direct, to all known
persons against whom relief is sought,
and also to the Chief Executive and other
public officials of the province or city
within which the unlawful acts have been
threatened or committed charged with the
duty to protect complainant's property
o Reception of the testimony of witnesses,
with opportunity for cross-examination, in
support of the allegations of a complaint
made under oath, and testimony in
opposition thereto, if offered, and only
after a finding of fact by the Commission,
to the effect:
1. That prohibited/ unlawful acts have been
threatened and will be committed and will
be continued unless restrained
§ BUT no injunction or temporary
restraining order shall be issued
except against the person or
persons, association or
organization making the threat or
committing the prohibited or
unlawful act or actually authorizing
or ratifying the same after actual
knowledge thereof;
2. That substantial and irreparable injury to
complainant’s property will follow;
3. That as to each item of relief to be
granted, greater injury will be inflicted
UP LAW C2017 LABOR 2 (PROF. DAWAY) FINALS REVIEWER | 65
upon complainant by the denial of relief
than will be inflicted upon defendants by
its granting
4. That the complainant has no adequate
remedy at law; and
5. That the public officers charged with the
duty to protect complainant’s property are
unable or unwilling to furnish adequate
protection.
• If a complainant shall also allege that, unless a
TRO shall be issued without notice, a substantial
and irreparable injury to complainant’s property will
be unavoidable:
o TRO may be issued upon testimony under
oath, sufficient, if sustained, to justify the
Commission in issuing a temporary
injunction upon hearing after notice.
o TRO shall be effective for no longer than
20 days, after which it shall become void
o Complainant shall first file an undertaking
with adequate security (bond) in an
amount to be fixed by the Commission
sufficient to recompense those enjoined
for any loss, expense or damage caused
by the improvident or erroneous issuance
of such order or injunction
• Reception of evidence for the application of a writ
of injunction may be delegated to the Las who
shall conduct such hearings in such places as he
may determine to be accessible to the parties and
their witnesses and shall submit thereafter his
recommendation to the NLRC
LC, Art. 270, supra p. 53
ILAW AT BUKLOD NG MANGGAGAWA (IBM) v.
NLRC (1991), supra p. 42
D: Article 264 (now 270) lists down specific "prohibited
activities" which may be forbidden or stopped by a
restraining order or injunction. Article 218 (now 224)
inter alia enumerates the powers of the NLRC and lays
down then conditions under which a restraining order
or preliminary injunction may issue, and the procedure
to be followed in issuing the same. As a rule such
restraining orders or injunctions do not issue ex parte,
but only after compliance with the requisites in the
pertinent articles (see outline above). However, a TRO
may be issued ex parte in certain situations (see
outline; more detailed explanation infra ).
D. ISSUING AGENCY
1. NLRC; Labor Arbiter
LC, Art. 224 (e), supra

NATIONAL MINES AND ALLIED WORKERS UNION
v. VERA (1984)
D: Art. 254 which prohibits injunctions or restraining
orders in any case involving or growing out of a 'labor
dispute' contemplates parties to the labor case; not
parties to the civil case.
F: NAMAWU was awarded almost P4.3M for
severance pay, educational allowance, etc. against
Philippine Iron Mines (PIM). NLRC issued a writ of
execution and appointed sheriffs to levy PIM’s
properties. The properties levied, however, were
already foreclosed and owned by banks (through a civil
case) who filed for a TRO and a writ of Preliminary
Injunction to stop the public auction for the sale of the
levied properties.
H: SC upheld the TRO and said “ which neither
"involves" nor "grows out" of a labor dispute. What
'involves' or 'grows out' of a labor dispute is the NLRC
case between petitioners and the judgment debtor,
PIM; the banks are not parties to the said NLRC case.
NESTLE PHILS., INC. v. NLRC (1991)
D: The power of NLRC to issue writs of injunction is
found in Art. 218 LC: “(e) To enjoin or restrain any
actual or threatened commission of any or all
prohibited or unlawful acts or to require the
performance of a particular act in any labor dispute”.
“Labor dispute” includes any controversy or matters
concerning terms or conditions of employment or the
association or representation of persons in negotiating,
fixing, maintaining, changing or arranging the terms
and conditions of employment, regardless of whether
the disputants stand in the proximate relation of
employer and employee.
F: As EEs of Nestle, Nunez, et al, were able to avail of
the company’s car loan. However, the company later
on terminated their employment. They filed an illegal
dismissal case, which was denied. Pending appeal,
the company sent them letters asking them to either
pay their balance or return the cars. They then filed a
petition for a writ of injunction with the NLRC, which
granted it.
H: NLRC exceeded its jurisdiction when it granted the
injunction since the issue involved is not a labor
dispute.
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2. Procedural Requirements and Rules for the
Issuance of Labor Injunctions
LC, Art. 224 (e), supra
BISIG NG MANGGAGAWA SA CONCRETE v. NLRC
(1993)
D: Both procedural and substantive requirements
(provided in Art 230e) must be strictly complied with
before a temporary or permanent injunction can issue
in a labor dispute. Issuance of ex parte TRO in a labor
dispute is not per se prohibited but it should be
characterized with care and caution – justified by
considerations of extreme necessity.
F: Bisig ng Manggagawa (Union) staged a strike
against Concrete Aggregates (Company). Company
then filed a petition for TRO to enjoin the strike.
However, the Union was not furnished a copy of the
petition, so the TRO was granted ex parte.
H: TRO is invalid for failing to meet the procedural and
substantive requirements of Art 218 (e), which
provides that “no temporary or permanent injunction in
any case... shall be issued except after hearing the
testimony of witnesses, with opportunity for
cross­examination, in support of the allegations of a
complaint made under oath, and testimony in
opposition thereto, if offered, and only after a finding of
fact by the commission” of 5 certain requirements (see
Art 230e)
ILAW AT BUKLOD NG MANGGAGAWA (IBM) v.
NLRC (1991), supra p. 42
As a rule such restraining orders or injunctions do
not issue ex parte, but only after compliance with
the following requisites, to wit:
a) a hearing held after due and personal notice
thereof has been served, in such manner as the
Commission shall direct, to all known persons
against whom relief is sought, and also to the
Chief Executive and other public officials of the
province or city within which the unlawful acts
have been threatened or committed charged with
the duty to protect complainant's property
b) reception at the hearing of "testimony of
witnesses, with opportunity for cross­examination,
in support of the allegations of a complaint made
under oath," as well as "testimony in opposition
thereto, if offered
c) a finding of fact by the Commission, to the effect:
(1) That prohibited or unlawful acts have been
threatened and will be committed and will be

continued unless restrained, but no injunction
or temporary restraining order shall be issued
on account of any threat, prohibited or
unlawful act, except against the person or
persons, association or organization making
the threat or committing the prohibited or
unlawful act or actually authorizing or ratifying
the same after actual knowledge thereof;
(2) That substantial and irreparable injury to
complainant's property will follow;
(3) That as to each item of relief to be granted,
greater injury will be inflicted upon complainant
by the denial of relief than will be inflicted upon
defendants by the granting of relief;
(4) That complainant has no adequate remedy at
law; and
(5) That the public officers charged with the duty
to protect complainant's property are unable
or unwilling to furnish adequate protection.
However, a TRO may be issued ex parte under the
following conditions:
a) the complainant shall also allege that, unless a
temporary restraining order shall be issued without
notice, a substantial and irreparable injury to
complainant's property will be unavoidable;
b) there is testimony under oath, sufficient, if
sustained, to justify the Commission in issuing a
temporary injunction upon hearing after notice;
c) the complainant shall first file an undertaking with
adequate security in an amount to be fixed by the
Commission sufficient to recompense those
enjoined for any loss, expense or damage caused
by the improvident or erroneous issuance of such
order or injunction, including all reasonable costs,
together with a reasonable attorney's fee, and
expense of defense against the order or against
the granting of any injunctive relief sought in the
same proceeding and subsequently denied by the
Commission; and
d) the TRO shall be effective for no longer than 20
days and shall become void at the expiration of
said 20 days.
The reception of evidence "for the application of a writ
of injunction may be delegated by the Commission to
any of its Labor Arbiters who shall conduct such
hearings in such places as he may determine to be
accessible to the parties and their witnesses and shall
submit thereafter his recommendation to the
Commission.
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3. Temporary Restraining Order
Art 230 (e), supra
• If a complainant shall also allege that, unless a
TRO shall be issued without notice, a substantial
and irreparable injury to complainant’s property will
be unavoidable:
o TRO may be issued upon testimony under
oath, sufficient, if sustained, to justify the
Commission in issuing a temporary
injunction upon hearing after notice.
o TRO shall be effective for no longer than
20 days, after which it shall become void
o Complainant shall first file an undertaking
with adequate security (bond) in an
amount to be fixed by the Commission
sufficient to recompense those enjoined
for any loss, expense or damage caused
by the improvident or erroneous issuance
of such order or injunction
DINIO V. LAGUESMA (1997)
D: In the case of labor injunctions/ TROs, one may
issue only in instances where the complainant or
applicant will suffer grave or irreparable damages.
Damage is “irreparable” if: 1) of constant and frequent
recurrence that no fair or reasonable redress can be
had in a court of law, or 2) no standard by which their
amount can be measured with reasonable accuracy
(not susceptible of mathematical computation.)
“[Injunction] is the strong arm of equity that never
ought to be extended unless to cases of great injury,
where courts of law cannot afford an adequate or
commensurate remedy in damages. The right must be
clear, the injury impending or threatened, so as to be
averted only by the protecting preventive process of
injunction.”
F: 2 days before the conduct of the PCIBEU elections,
one contending party (PFR) applied for and was
granted a TRO. However, only the elections in Metro
Manila were suspended. After the lapse of the 20-day
period, elections were held in Metro Manila and the
results were consolidated with the provincial elections.
PFR contested the results.
H: SC held that the TRO should not have been issued,
and the elections were valid.
Diligent hands will rule,
but laziness ends in forced labor.
Proverbs 12:24 (NIV)