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1915
Recommended Citation
Ernst Freund, Classification and Definition of Crimes, 5 J. Am. Inst. Crim. L. & Criminology 807 (May 1914 to March 1915)
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CLASSIFICATION AND DEFINITION OF CRIMES.
(Report of Committee D of the Institute.)
ERNST FREuNo.'
I. The codification of the criminal law.-The statutory definition
of offenses is a fundamental principle of criminalistic policy. In
continental jurisprudence it is expressed by the maxim "no punish-
ment without a statute," whieli was made part of the French Declara-
tion of Rights of 1789.
In Anglo-American jurisprudence the principle is less uniformly
as such (Tucker's Blackstone I, p. 438); in nearly all states the
criminal law is in part at least unwritten. But as early as the
Fourteenth Century the demand for the certainty of written law
gave rise to the statute of treason (25 Ed. III, 1352) ; the objection
to an unwritten common law of crimes was largely responsible for
the refusal to recognize a federal common law for the United States
as such (Tucker's Blackstone I, p. 438); in nearly all states the
criminal law has been codified, leaving to the common law at most
a subsidiary force; and in a number of states no act can be punished
as a crime unless its constituent elements are specifically set forth
in a statute.2
I. Specific offenses.-The prevailing system of defining of-
fenses can be best understood by comparing it with the rule of civil
liability for torts.
It is a general common law principle that an act or other form
of conduct, generically characterized as violating a legal duty, or in
addition also causing loss or damage, constitutes an actionable civil
807 :
ERNST FREUND
injury, and the German Code provides in even more general manner
that whoever intentionally injures another in a manner contrary to
the common standards of right conduct, is bound to indemnify him.
There is no corresponding common law principle or code pro-
vision, to the effect that conduct involving a culpable state of mind
and causing danger or injury to public interests can be prosecuted
as a punishable offense; but certain types of acts designated by readily
ascertainable objective criteria of objects or interests attacked and
of method or manner of injury, are specified as distinctive offenses,
and certain kinds and grades of penalties fixed for their punishment.
. Thus we have the offenses of levying war against the state;
killing a person; forging an instrument; counterfeiting money; brib-
ing an official; swearing a false oath in a judicial or other official
proceeding, etc.
The result of this system of specialization of offenses is that if
a misdeed does not fit into one of the specified categories, the wrong
doer is not criminally liable, however morally culpable he nay be,
or however dangerous or detrimental his act.
III. Generic off enses.-The system of specialization is neces-
sarily a matter of degree, and there are a few offenses in which the
constituent elements are indicated in such a general manner, that
the characteristic features of the system are almost lost. The common
law offenses of nuisance and conspiracy are the most conspicuous
instances in point, but illustrations are also to be found in modern
codes.
In the New York Penal Law (See. 530) coercion is defined merely
by reference to the means used (intimidation by threat or force);
any legal right may be the object attacked; and in the German Code
the offense is almost equally general. In the Indian Penal Code
fraud is defined almost as widely as coercion is in New York, for the
protection- extends to body, mind, reputation or property, i. e. prac-
tically any legal right. Under the German Code the definition of
fraud, while likewise very general, at least requires injury to property
rights and intent of unlawful gain (or under the new draft See. 291,
malice); whereas the American codes have no generic offense of
fraud, but punish merely specified forms, particularly the use of
false pretences for the purpose of obtaining property, or the signature
to some instrument, and certain designated swindling tricks (New
York Penal Law, See. 920-940).
On the other hand, the American codes, following the common
law, treat official misfeasance as a generic offense, while the German
CLASSIFICATION AND DEFINITION OF CRIMES