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1. PESIGAN VS. ANGELES (LIMITATIONS) Fleischer, father of deceased Davis Fleischer. This is located in the
129 SCRA 174 (1994)
Nature: Petition to review the order of the RTC of Caloocan City,
Angeles.
Facts: Anselmo and Marcelino Pesigan, both carabao dealers,
transported 26 carabaos and a calf from Sipocot Camarines Sur to
Batangas on April 2, 1982 with the necessary permits. In spite of the
permits, the carabaos were confiscated by Lt. Zenarosa and Dr.
Mirancda while passing Basud, Camarines Norte. The confiscation was
based on EO No. 626-A which provided that no carabaos shall be
transported from one province to another and violation would result to
confiscation of said animals and distribution to deserving farmers. The
carabaos were distributed accordingly. The Pesigans filed for replevin
and damages but was dismissed by Judge Angeles for lack of merit.
Issue: W o N the Pesigans can be held liable for violating EO 626-A
which was published on June 14, 1982.
Held: The trial court’s order of dismissal, reversed and set aside.
The executive order should not be enforced against the Pesigans on
April 2, 1982 because it is a penal regulation punished more than two
months later in the Official Gazette dated June 14, 1982. It became
effective only 15 days thereafter.
The word “laws” in Art. 2 of Civil Code includes circulars and
regulations which prescribe penalties. Publication is necessary to
apprise the public of the contents of the regulations and make the
penalties binding on the persons affected by it.
2. TANADA VS. TUVERA (LIMITATIONS)
136 SCRA 27 (1985)
Nature and Facts: This is a case where the petitioners, Lorenzo
Tañada, et al., seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondents, Juan
Tuvera (in his capacity as Exec Asst to the Pres), et al., to publish
and/or cause the publication in the official gazette of various
presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamation, executive orders, letter of implementation and
administrative orders
Issue: Whether or not these presidential decrees are already enforceable
and binding even before publication (contained special provisions as to
the date they are to take effect)
Held: “The government, as a matter of policy, refrains form
prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the same shall have been
published in the official gazette or in some other publication, even
though some criminal laws provide that they shall take effect
immediately.”
Without publication, the people have no means of knowing what
presidential decrees have actually been promulgated. Without such
notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of
the maxim “ignorantia legis non excusat.”
3. PEOPLE VS. NARVAEZ (PROSPECTIVITY OF CRIMINAL
LAW AND SELF DEFENSE/DEFENSE OF PROPERTY)
121 SCRA 389 (1983)
Nature: Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of
South Cotabato, Branch I convicting the accused of murder.
Facts: At about 2:30 in the afternoon of August 22, 1968, Graciano
Juan, Jesus Verano and Cesar Ibañez, together with the two deceased
Davis Fleischer and Flaviano Rubia, were fencing the land of George
municipality of Maitum, South Cotabato. At the place of the fencing is
the house and rice drier of appellant Mamerto Narvaez.
At that time, appellant was taking his rest, but when he heard that the
walls of his house were being chiselled, he arose and there he saw the
fencing going on. If the fencing would go on, appellant would be
prevented from getting into his house and the bodega of his ricemill. So
he addressed the group, saying -'Pare,if possible you stop destroying
my house and if possible we will talk it over - what is good,' addressing
the deceased Rubia, who is appellant's compadre. The deceased
Fleischer, however, answered: 'No, gademit, proceed, go ahead.'
Appellant apparently lost his equilibrium and he got his gun and shot
Fleischer, hitting him. As Fleischer fell down, Rubia ran towards the
jeep, and knowing there is a gun on the jeep, appellant fired at Rubia,
likewise hitting him. Both Fleischer and Rubia died as a result of the. It
appears, however, that this incident is intertwined with the long drawn
out legal battle between the Fleischer and Co., Inc. of which deceased
Fleischer was the secretary-treasurer and deceased Rubia the assistant
manager, on the one hand, and the land settlers of Cotabato, among
whom was the appellant.
Issue: W o N Narvaez defense of property can be appreciated.
Held: Narvaez that he did so in defense of his person and of his rights,
and therefore he should be exempt from criminal liability. Defense of
one's person or rights is treated as a justifying circumstance under Art.
11, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code, but in order for it to be
appreciated, the following requisites must occur: "First. Unlawful
aggression; "Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it; "Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of
the person defending himself".
The aggression referred to by appellant is the angry utterance by
deceased Fleischer. There is no question, therefore, that there was
aggression on the part of the victims: Fleischer was ordering, and Rubia
was actually participating in the fencing. This was indeed aggression,
not on the person of appellant, but on his property rights.
The third element of defense of property is present, i.e., lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of appellant who was defending his
property. As a matter of fact, there was no provocation at all on his part,
since he was asleep at first and was only awakened by the noise
produced by the victims and their laborers. His plea for the deceased
and their men to stop and talk things over with him was no provocation
at all. Be that as it may, appellant's act in killing the deceased was not
justifiable, since not all the elements for justification are present,
particularly the reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel such attack. He should therefore be held responsible
for the death of his victims, but he could be credited with the special
mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense, pursuant to paragraph
6, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.
The SC finds the aggravating (qualifying) circumstance of evident
premeditation not sufficiently established. Since in the case at bar, there
was no direct evidence of the planning or preparation to kill the victims
nor that the accused premeditated the killing, and clung to his
premeditated act, the trial court's conclusion as to the presence of such
circumstance may not be endorsed. Evident premeditation is further
negated by appellant pleading with the victims to stop the fencing and
destroying his house and to talk things over just before the shooting.
But the trial court has properly appreciated the presence of the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, it appearing that
appellant surrendered to the authorities soon after the shooting.
Likewise, SC also finds that passion and obfuscation attended the
commission of the crime. The appellant awoke to find his house being
damaged and its accessibility to the highway as well as of his rice mill
bodega being closed.
4. PEOPLE VS. BERNARDO (NULLUM CRIMEN NULLA
POENA SINE LEGE)
123 SCRA 365 (1983)
Nature: Petition for certiorari of the decision of CFI Bulacan, Br. VI
convicting the petitioners of violating PD 772 (Anti-Squatting Act),
sentencing them to pay P 2, 500 each with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency.
Facts: ISIDRO BERNARDO, tenant of Leda Sta. Rosa in her Riceland
in PLARIDEL, BULACAN from Oct. 1972- Aug. 1974, constructed a
house for their dwelling. Without the knowledge of Sta. Rosa, Isidro
left and transferred to San Nicolas, transferring his tenancy rights to his
son, CAYETANO. Through Dr. Patricio Cruz, Sta. Rosa took
possession of the whole land and filed forcible entry against the
petitioners. Petitioners lost in the CFI and lower courts but still failed to
vacate the land. On Aug. 22, 1974, a criminal complaint for the
violation of PD 772 was filed against the Bernardos and hence were
found guilty by CFI of Bulacan.
Issue: Whether or not PD772 applies to pasture lands.
Held: Petition granted, judgment of conviction set aside; criminal case
dismissed.
PD 772 is intended to apply only to urban communities, particularly
illegal constructions. No person shall be brought within the terms of a
penal statute who is not clearly within them; nor should any act be
pronounced criminal which is not clearly made so by the statute. (There
is no crime when there is no law punishing it.)
5. PASCUAL vs. BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS (STRICT
CONSTRUCTION)
28 SCRA 344 (1969)
Nature: Appeal from a decision of the CFI of Manila for the writ of
prohibition rendered on Aug. 2, 1965
Facts: At the initial hearing for an administrative case for alleged
immorality, counsel for complainants called as his first witness, the
appellee, Arsenio Pascual Jr., who was the one charged with
malpractice.
Issue/s: W o N the Board was right to call and coerce Pascual to take
the witness stand against himself?
W o N the right against self-incrimination can be availed of in an
administrative hearing.
Held: Decision of the lower court affirmed.
The constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination extends to
administrative hearings which possess a criminal or penal act. The
Board cannot compel the person to take the witness stand without his
consent. A proceeding for malpractice possesses a criminal or penal
aspect in the sense that the respondent would suffer revocation of his
license as a medical practitioner.
The right against self-incrimination extends not only to the right to
refuse to answer questions put to the accused while on the witness
stand, but also to forego testimony and remain silent and refuse to take
the witness stand. That while crimes should not go unpunished,
objectives should not be accomplished by means offensive to the high
sense of respect accorded to the human personality.
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6. PEOPLE vs. TEMBLON (DOLO)
161 SCRA 623 (1988)
Nature: Appeal from the judgment of CFI of Agusan del Norte and
Butuan City convicting VICENTE TEMBLOR alias “Ronald” for
murder sentencing him to the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Facts: On Dec. 30, 1980, at around 7:30 pm in Brgy. Talo-ao,
Buenavista, Agusan del Sur, TEMBLOR bought a half-pack of Hope
cigarette from the store of JULIUS CAGAMPANG. While the latter
was opening the pack, a gun shot was heard and CAGAMPANG fell to
the floor with a gunshot wound in the head. The accused, together with
another, barged into the room, demanding the firearms of the victim.
Before fleeing with the victim’s .38 caliber gun, TEMBLOR filed tow
more shots.
On Aug. 1981, during the mass surrender of dissidents, TEMBLOR
surrendered to Mayor Dick Carmona. On Nov. 26, 1981, he was
arrested by the Buenavista Police at the public market and detained at
the municipal jail where he was seen by VICTORIA CAGAMPANG,
the victim’s widow and was positively identified.
TEMBLOR’s defense was an alibi: on the said date, he and his father
had been in the house of SILVERIO PEROL in Brgy. Camagong.
Issue: W o N motive is essential in convicting Temblor
Held: Decision of lower court affirmed; civil indemnity increased to
P30,000.
Motive is not essential when culprit has been identified. Fact that
accused has knowledge of the deceased’s firearm is sufficient enough
for motive. The fleeing of the accused after killing and taking
CAGAMPANG’s firearm implies admission of guilt.
Accused’s alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the
witness who had no base motive to accuse him of the crime. In order
for alibi to be acceptable as a defense, it is not enough for the appellant
to be elsewhere when the crime was committed, but it must be proven
beyond reasonable doubt that it was physically impossible for him to be
at the scene of the crime. Nasipit is accessible to Talo-ao by jeep or
tricycle for 15 to 20 minutes.
7. PEOPLE vs. HASSAN
157 SCRA 261 (1988)
Nature: Appeal from a decision of the RTC of Zamboanga City finding
the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and
sentenced to reclusion peretua.
Facts: July 23, 1981, at around 7pm JOSE SAMSON was a
backrider on the motorcycle of RAMON PICHEL JR. when they went
to buy mangoes at the Fruit Paradise near the Barter Trade Zone in
Zamboanga City. SAMSON saw a person stab PICHEL only once
while he was parked 2-3 meters away. After stabbing, the suspect fled
to PNB. SAMSON rushed the victim to the General Hospital where the
latter died. In the hospital, the witness was interrogated as to the
suspect’s description, who according to him was had semi-long hair,
wearing white polo short-sleeved shirt, maong pants, standing 5’5’’ and
with a dark complexion. According to SAMSON, he only knows the
suspect by face and not by name. At Funeraria La Merced, police
brought the accused – alone, for identification where the witness
positively identified him as the killer.
Held: Decision reversed; accused is acquitted.
Evidence of the prosecution does not satisfy quantum of proof—
beyond reasonable doubt. Value judgment must not be separated from
the constitutionally guaranteed presumption of innocence. Prosecution’s
evidence is weak and unconvincing. Expert testimony of the medico-
legal officer (DR.VALENTIN BERNALEZ) contradicted on material
points of the lone witness. He found two stab wounds, (chest and at the
left arm posterior), the nature of the wounds indicating they were
inflicted while the suspect was in front of the victim.
The investigation conducted by the police was not satisfactory. The
lone presentation of HASSAN to SAMSON at the funeral parlor
violated the accused rights to counsel in all the stages of investigation
into the commission of a crime.
Motive is essential when there is doubt as to the identity of the culprit.
8. PEOPLE vs. AH CHONG (MISTAKE OF FACT)
15 PHIL 488 (1910)
Nature: Appeal from the judgment of CFI of Rizal convicting the
appellant of the crime of simple homicide with extenuating
circumstances sentenced to 6 years 1 day of presidio mayor.
Facts: Ah Chong was employed as a cook at Fort McKinley. He was
roommates with the deceased, PASCUAL GUALBERTO at officer’s
quarters #27, about 40 meters away form the nearest building, without a
lock and had only 1 door opening to the porch and 1 window. As a
safety precaution, Ah Chong and Gualberto had an understanding that if
either returned late at night, he should knock and acquaint the other as
to his identity. On Aug. 14, 1908 at around 10 pm, he was awakened by
someone trying to force open the door. He called out twice, “Who is
there?”, to which no answer was given. Because of the vines covering
the porch, the room was very dark. While calling out a threat to the
invader, he was struck above the knee by the edge of the chair which
was thrown towards his direction when the door was opened forcibly.
Getting the common knife under his pillow and struck wildly at the
intruder which turned out to be GUALBERTO. Seeing it was his
roommate, Ah Chong ran back to his room to secure bandages and
called to his employees in Room #28 for help.
Prior to the incident, there had been several instances of robberies
inside the port.
Issue/s: W o N one can be held criminally liable for doing an act that
would be exempt form criminal liability had there been no mistake of
fact.
W o N malice or criminal intent is an essential element or ingredient of
the crimes of homicide and assassination as defined and penalized in
the penal code.
Held: Decision reversed; accused is acquitted.
The definitions of crimes and offenses as set out in the penal code
rarely contain provisions expressly declaring that malice or criminal
intent is an essential ingredient of the crime. Nevertheless, the
provisions of Art. 1 indicate malice and criminal intent as an essential
requisite.
Voluntary act is a free, intelligent and intentional act, and which,
without intention there can be no crime. Voluntary implies and includes
the words “con malice” or with malice. When the act which was
actually intended to be done was in itself a lawful one, and in the
absence of negligence or imprudence, in general without intention,
there can be no crime.
*Requisites of Mistake of fact:
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The act would have been lawful had the facts be how the accused
believed them to be;
The intention would have been lawful;
The mistake was not attended by any fault or negligence on the part of
the accused.
There must be no reasonable opportunity to ascertain the facts
Excessive force negates mistake of fact (OANIS)
9. PEOPLE VS. OANIS
74 PHIL 257 (1943)
Nature: Appeal from the judgment of CFI of Nueva Ecija finding the
accused guilty of homicide through reckless imprudence.
Facts: On December 24, 1938, Provincial Inspector, CAPT.
GODOFREDO MONSOD received a telegram from MAYOR GUIDO
ordering the arrest (whether dead or alive) of one ANSELMO
BALAGTAS, who was an escaped convict. The said convict was
informed to be with a bailarina named IRENE. MONSOD then
informed the defendants and instructed them to arrest Balagtas, and if
overpowered, they were to follow the instructions in the telegram.
OANIS, knowing a certain IRENE, accompanied GALANTA and went
to the location of IRENE at Rizal St. Upon reaching the place, they
asked BRIGADA MALLARE to point where IRENE’s room was. They
were also informed that Irene was sleeping with her paramour. When
they reached the room, seeing a man with his back towards the door,
they simultaneously and successively fired at him killing him. The man
killed turned out not to be Balagtas, but one SERAPIO TECSON.
Issue: W o N the killing of Tecson was a mistake of fact to exempt
Oanis and Galanta from criminal liability.
Held: Defendants are guilty of murder with the mitigating circumstance
of incomplete requisites of performance of duty appreciated in their
favor and sentenced to reclusion temporal.
Ignorance of fact can be appreciated only when the mistake is
committed without fault of carelessness. Defendants had ample time
and opportunity to ascertain the victim’s identity since he was asleep.
Mistake in the identity of the intended victim cannot be considered
reckless imprudence.
10. PEOPLE VS. BUAN (CULPA)
22 SCRA 1383 (1968)
Nature: Appeal from an order of CFI Bulacan in its Criminal Case
#5423, overruling a motion to quash on the ground of double jeopardy.
Facts: JOSE BUAN was driving a passenger bus of the La Mallorca
Company on July 23, 1962 along McArthur Highway, Guiguinto,
Bulacan when it collided with the passenger jeep of Sergio Lumidao
injuring 9 passengers. (6 suffered slight physical injuries, 3 serious
physical injuries and damaging the jeep to the extent of P 1, 395.00)
On December 19, 1963, he was acquitted in the Justice of Peace Court
for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence. However, prior
the acquittal, the provincial fiscal of Bulacan filed in the CFI a case for
serious physical injuries and damage through property through reckless
imprudence.
Issue: W o N the 2nd case places the appellant twice in jeopardy for the
same offense and is barred by the previous acquittal.
Held: The order of the CFI is reversed and is ordered to quash and
dismiss the charges.
Once acquitted or convicted of a specific act of reckless imprudence,
the accused may not be prosecuted again for the same act. The gravity
of the consequences is only taken into account to determine the penalty,
it does not qualify the substance of the offense.
11. PEOPLE VS. DIZON (NEGLIGENCE) 158 SCRA 127 (1988)
Nature: An administrative complaint against respondent Baltazar R.
Dizon for rendering a manifestly erroneous decision due to gross
incompetence and gross ignorance of the law
Facts: The case in which the respondent rendered a decision of
acquittal involved a tourist, Lo Chi Fai, who was caught by a Customs
guard at the Manila International Airport while attempting to smuggle
foreign currency and foreign exchange instruments out of the country.
At the time of his apprehension, he was found carrying with him
foreign currency and foreign exchange instruments (380 pieces)
amounting to US$355,349.57, in various currency denominations
without authority as provided by law.
At the time the accused was apprehended, he was able to
exhibit two currency declarations, which he was supposed to have
accomplished upon his arrival in Manila in previous trips.
Information was filed against Lo Chi Fai with the RTC of
Pasay City for violation of Sec. 6, Central Bank Circular No. 960.
The respondent judge, in his decision acquitting the accused,
stated: “The factual issue for this Court to determine is whether or not
the accused willfully violated Sec. 6 of Circular No. 960. The fact that
the accused had in his possession the foreign currencies when he was
about to depart from the Philippines did not by that act alone make him
liable for violation of Sec. 6. What is imperative is the purpose for
which the act of bringing foreign currencies out of the country was
done – the very intention.”
Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge was guilty of gross
incompetence or gross ignorance of the law in rendering the decision in
question
Held: The Court found the respondent judge guilty of gross
incompetence, gross ignorance of the law and grave and serious
misconduct.
The respondent judge has shown gross incompetence or gross
ignorance of the law in holding that to convict the accused for violation
of Central Bank Circular No. 960; the prosecution must establish that
the accused had the criminal intent to violate the law. The respondent
ought to know that proof of malice or deliberate intent (mens rea) is not
essential in offenses punished by special laws, which are mala
prohibita.
12. PEOPLE VS. VALDEZ (PROPOSAL AND CONSPIRACY)
159 SCRA 153 (1988)
Nature:This case is before us on automatic review of the decision of
the Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, Branch 26, San
Fernando, La Union, convicting the accused-appellants Danilo Valdez
and Simplicio Orodio of the crime of murder and sentencing each of
them to death.
Facts: The house of the Maquiling family stands on the slope of a
mountain in Barangay Ambagat, Santol, La Union. At about 8:00
o'clock in the evening of 7 June 1977, the victim Eleno Maquiling, his
sisters Leticia and Thelma, his mother Esmenia, and his father Juanito
were all in the yard of their house. Esmenia and Juanito were under the
awning of their house facing north, engaged in stringing together
tobacco leaves. The victim's brother Dionisio was eating his dinner in
the wall-less kitchen located on the ground floor of the house. The
4
victim Eleno was seated with his back toward the north and plucking a
guitar. The place and its surroundings were lighted by a 300 candle
power petromax lamp hanging under the northern end of the awning of
the house.
While the Maquilings were thus seated in their yard, a relative of the
family, one Carolina, arrived and asked Esmenia to accompany her to a
prayer meeting. Esmenia demurred and instead asked Eleno to
accompany Carolina. The victim was then just about two (2) meters
away from his parents and about to stand up when suddenly a very loud
gun shot rang out from the northern side of the yard and Eleno fell to
the ground, crying out to his father for help. Juanito rushed to his fallen
son and carried him into their house; Eleno, however, died immediately
thereafter.
The victim's mother Esmenia was about to succor Eleno when she
instinctively looked toward the direction from whence the gunshot
came and saw the two(2) accused, Danilo Valdez and Simplicio Orodio,
running down the hill away from the bamboo groves on the northern
side of the house. Dionisio Maquiling, brother of the victim, also
testified that he too had seen Danilo with a gun and Simplicio both
running away in a westernly direction. Danilo stated that he was then
about seven (7) meters away from the accused-appellants. Danilo
Valdez was a neighbor and a relative of the Maquilings, while
Simplicio Orodio was their old acquaintance residing in Sitio Villaga,
Barangay Corooy of the same town; thus, both were well-known to
Esmenia and Dionisio Maquiling. On 8 June 1977, the Municipal
Health, Officer of Balaoan, Dr. Monico O. Morales, conducted an
autopsy which showed that the victim Eleno had sustained eight (8)
gunshot (pellet) wounds on his back.
The morning after the shooting, on 8 June 1977, Sgt. Segundo Tuvera
of the Integrated National Police, Santol, La Union, went to the house
of the Maquilings to investigate the death of Eleno. He saw a petromax
lamp hanging from the awning of the northern end of the house, as well
as footprints near the bamboo groves near the northern side of the
house. During his investigation, neither Esmenia nor Dionisio informed
Sgt. Tuvera of what they had seen.
On 10 June 1977, Juanito Maquiling, the victim's father, executed a
sworn statement before the police in the Santol Police Substation.
Juanito admitted in his statement that he had not seen the accused-
appellants on the night of the shooting. He did relate, however, that
three(3) days prior to the shooting of Eleno, Eleno had informed him
that in case something untoward happened to him (Eleno), the accused-
appellants Danilo Valdez and Simplicio Orodio should be held
responsible, since he (Eleno) had quarreled with them concerning their
stealing and robbing. Juanito, further, stated that the accused Danilo has
had a personal grudge against Eleno; Danilo had mortgaged to Eleno's
brother a stolen spading fork, a circumstance that Eleno discovered
when the real owner of the spading fork came to talk to him. Esmenia,
Eleno's mother, gave no sworn statement on that day. Ten (10) days
later, on 20 June 1977, however, she made a sworn statement to the
Philippine Constabulary in San Fernando, La Union. Shortly thereafter,
on 23 June 1977, Dionisio Maquiling, Eleno's brother, gave his own
separate sworn statement also to the Philippine Constabulary. Both
Esmenia and Dionisio identified Danilo Orodio as Eleno's killers. At
the trial, Esmenia Maquiling was firm and categorical in identifying the
appellants as the men she saw running from the bamboo groves
immediately after the shooting..
Held: There is nothing in the record to show that the prosecution
witnesses were moved by any improper motive to accuse falsely the
accused-appellants — one a relative and the other an old acquaintance
— of so grave a crime as murder.
The prosecution's evidence was more than adequate to sustain the
finding of the trial court of a conspiracy between Danilo Valdez and
Simplicio Orodio. Conspiracy being present, it does not matter that the
prosecution had failed to show who as between the two actually pulled
the trigger of the shotgun that killed Eleno Maquiling. 17 Both Danilo
Valdez and Simplicio Orodio are liable as co-conspirators since any act
of a co-conspirator becomes the act of the other regardless of the
precise degree of participation in the act.
The trial court correctly appreciated the presence of treachery and
evident premeditation. The accused had purposely sought nocturnity
and hid themselves behind the bamboo groves located close by the
victim's house and had fired at Eleno Maquiling suddenly, without any
warning, from behind obviously to ensure the success of their deadly
purpose without any risk to themselves and without any possibility of
retaliation.
Since both treachery and evident premeditation were present, and only
one qualifying circumstance is necessary to constitute homicide into
murder, evident premeditation may be considered as a generic
aggravating circumstance. The circumstance of nighttime is, however,
absorbed by treachery. A second aggravating circumstance — that the
victim who had given no provocation was slain in his dwelling — was
also found by the trial court.
13. PEOPLE VS. NACIONAL
248 SCRA 122 (1995)
Nature: Appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Legazpi City
Facts: The six accused, including the accused-appellant, were all
civilian members of the barangay organization of the CPP-NPA at
Daraga, Albay. Their organization had a conference for the purpose of
identifying suspected informers of the military whom they perceived as
posing a threat to the NPA’s operations within the vicinity. They
identified Quirino Lagason and Joel Lagason as military informers and
were targeted for liquidation.
According to Crisanto Miranda, a neighbor who accompanied
the accused that day, Walter Nacional approached Quirino and said
something to him. Walter then pulled out a gun from his waist and shot
Quirino in the face, hitting him between the eyebrows. Quirino fell to
the ground and died instantly. A few seconds later, Absalon Millamina
shot Joel Lagason on the head. The group then fled towards the
direction of the RCPI Relay Station. Joel’s mother, who was at the
scene of the crime, rushed him to the hospital where he died a few
hours later.
The defense set up by the accused consisted of denials.
Accused-appellant Javier Mirabete insisted on his claim that he was
merely watching a volleyball game when the shooting happened. He
denied being a member of the NPA or any rebel organization. He
likewise denied the existence of a plot and a conspiracy to kill the
Lagasons. Accused-appellants claimed that he was a mere farmer,
already 69 years old and had barely finished third grade in school.
According to him, his advanced age made it impossible for him to join
the NPA at the time of the incident. He contended that the testimonies
of the witnesses identifying him with the group that killed the Lagasons
were unreliable and hearsay because both witnesses never knew him.
Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant’s contention is with merit
Held: The decision appealed from was affirmed insofar as the criminal
liability of accused-appellant was concerned.
Evidence proved beyond doubt that accused-appellant was a
civilian member of the CPP-NPA and was part of the group that
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deliberately planned the killing of the Lagasons. The events that led to
the victim’s deaths also showed that the group members deliberately
planned, plotted and premeditated their victims’ deaths. Evident
premeditation exists when the execution of the criminal act was
preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out
the criminal intent. There must be, between the reflection and execution
of the crimes, a space of time sufficient for the offender to arrive at a
calm judgment.
It was also held that the prosecution had clearly and
convincingly established the existence of a conspiracy in the planning
and execution of the crimes. Conspiracy arises at the very instant the
plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the felony and
forthwith to actually pursue it. It hardly matters that the accused-
appellant was not actually present at the specific place of the shooting.
He was at the waiting shed but this was for the purpose of providing
security to those who carried out the shooting. The waiting shed was
located along the way to the Lagason’s house, strategically at the
entrance to and exit from it. A conspiracy, once established, makes each
of the conspirators liable for the acts of the others. All conspirators are
liable as co-principals regardless of the extent of their participation
because in the contemplation of law, the act of one is the act of all.
14. PEOPLE VS. TRINIDAD
169 SCRA 51 (1989)
Nature: APPEAL from the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of
Bayugan, Agusan del Sur, Br. 7, convicting the accused of two counts
of murder and frustrated murder.
Facts: The deceased victim, Lolito Soriano, was a fish dealer based in
Davao City. His helpers were Ricardo Tan, a driver, and the other
deceased victim Marcial Laroa. On 19 January 1983, using a Ford
Fiera, they arrived at Butuan City to sell fish. In the morning of 20
January 1983 Soriano together with Laroa and a helper of one Samuel
Comendador left for Buenavista. Tan was left behind in Butuan but
followed to later in the morning.
While at Buenavista, accused Emeliano Trinidad, a member of the
Integrated National Police, assigned at Nasipit Police Station, and
residing at Baan, Butuan City, asked for a ride to Bayugan, Agusan del
Sur, which is on the way to Davao City. He was in uniform and had two
firearms, a carbine, and the other, a side-arm .38 caliber revolver. The
four left Butuan on 20 January 1983 at about 5:20 P.M. bound for
Davao City. Tan was driving, seated to his right were Soriano, then
Laroa and the accused. When they reached the stretch between El Rio
and Afga, the police advised them to drive slowly because, according to
him, the place was dangerous. All of a sudden, Tan heard two gunshots.
Soriano and Laroa slumped dead. He did not actually see the shooting
of Laroa but he witnessed the shooting of Soriano, having been alerted
by the sound of the first gunfire. Both were hit on the head. The
accused had used his carbine in killing the two victims.
Ricardo hurriedly got off the Fiera, ran towards the direction of Butuan
City and hid himself in the bushes. He heard a shot emanating from the
Fiera while he was hiding in the bushes, then a passenger jeep passed
by, he hailed it and rode on the front seat. However, after sometime, he
noticed that the accused-appellant was seated at the back. Apparently
noticing him as well, the accused ordered him to get out and to
approach him. Instead of following, Tan moved backward and ran
around the jeep followed by the appellant. When the jeep started to
drive away, Ricardo clung to its side. The accused fired two shots, one
of which hit Tan on his right thigh. As another passenger jeep passed
by, he jumped from the first jeep and ran to the second. However, the
passengers in the latter jeep told him to get out not wanting to get
involved in the affray. Pushed out, Ricardo crawled until a member of
the P.C. chanced upon him and helped him board a bus for Butuan City.
Trinidad was convicted for the murder of Laroa and Soriano and for the
frustrated murder of Ricardo.
Issue: W o N the accused the attack on Tan constitutes frustrated or
attempted murder.
Held: Decision modified. Trinidad was found guilty of the two murders
and attempted murder.
The defense is correct in contending that in the Frustrated Murder case,
TRINIDAD can only be convicted of Attempted Murder. He had
commenced the commission of the felony directly by overt acts but was
unable to perform all the acts of execution which would have produced
it by reason of causes other than his spontaneous desistance, such as,
that the jeep to which TAN was clinging was in motion, and there was a
spare tire which shielded the other parts of his body. Moreover, the
wound on his thigh was not fatal and the doctrinal rule is that where the
wound inflicted on the victim is not sufficient to cause his death, the
crime is only attempted Murder, the accused not having performed all
the acts of execution that would have brought about death.
15. PEOPLE VS. VELASCO
73 SCRA 574 (1976)
Nature: Appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court
Facts: On Nov. 2, 1967, the offended party, Estelita Lopez, five years
old, accompanied by her cousin Nenita Lopez, was at the North
Cemetery, Manila. The defendant, Ricardo Velasco, called them, gave
Nenita a five-centavo coin and asked her to buy cigarettes for him.
After she left, the accused held Estelita by the hand and brought her to
an alley. Once in a hidden place between the tombs, he kissed her on
the lips, took off her panties and placed himself on top of the girl while
she was lying down on the ground face up and tried to insert his sexual
organ into that of the victim. The girl shouted in pain, “Aray, aray!”
Arsenio Perez, who happened to see the accused holding the
hand of the girl while walking along 24th street in the cemetery as well
as when they turned into the alley and who at first thought that the
accused was a relative of the girl, upon hearing the shouts of the girl
and because of the shouts believed that something bad was being done
to the girl, proceeded to the place where the shouts came and upon
standing on top of one of the tombs he saw, a short distance away, the
accused on top of the girl, with his pants and drawers lowered down to
his knees, and the dress of the girl raised up and the buttocks of the
accused making upward and downward movements. He tried to seek
for help and upon seeing Jose Castro on the 24 th street told him, “Mang
Pepe, Mang Pepe, the daughter of Mang Pidiong is being raped!”
Castro proceeded to the place pointed by Perez with the latter following
him, and while standing on top of a tomb, a short distance away, Castro
saw the defendant on top of the girl.
The accused then stood up and raised his pants while the girl
rose from the ground crying. Castro approached the defendant and the
girl and asked him what happened, and he said the girl lost her way and
was crying. The girl was bleeding at the same time and he noticed that
she even wiped off with her dress the blood on the front part of her
thighs.
Issue: Whether or not the accused is guilty of consummated rape
Ruling: The decision of the lower court finding the accused guilty of
the crime of consummated rape was affirmed.
There was no question that rape was the crime committed, but
because of the tender age of the victim, penetration was impossible due
to the infantile character of the vagina. However, considering the
anatomical position of the labia majora and minora, that these two
external parts of the female sexual organ cover the hymen and the
vaginal opening and, therefore, in order to rupture the hymen and
produce the medico-legal finding that the “vaginal opening was painful
and sensitive to touch.” The conclusion was inevitable that the sexual
6
organ of the accused must have entered and had passed the labia
majora.
16. URBANO VS. IAC
157 SCRA 1 (1998)
Nature: This is a petition to review the decision of the then
Intermediate Appellate Court which affirmed the decision of the Circuit
Criminal Court of Dagupan City finding petitioner Filomeno Urbano
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide.
Issue: Whether or not there was an efficient intervening cause from the
time Javier was wounded until his death which would exculpate Urbano
from any liability for Javier’s death.
Facts: (1) At about 8:00o’clock in the morning of October 23, 1980,
petitioner Filomeno Urbano went to his rice field at Barangay Anonang,
San Fabian, Pangasinan located at 100 meters from the tobacco seedbed
of Marcelo Javier . He found the place where he stored his palay
flooded with water coming from the irrigation canal nearby which had
overflowed. Urbano went to the elevated portion of the canal to see
what happened and there he saw Marcelo Javier and Emilio Erfe cutting
grass. He asked them who was responsible for the opening of the
irrigation canal and Javier admitted that he was the one. Urbano then
got angry and demanded that Javier pay for his soaked palay. A quarrel
between them ensued. Urbano unsheathed his bolo (about 2 feet long,
including the handle, by 2 inches wide) and hacked Javier hitting him
on the right palm of his hand, which was used in parrying the bolo
hack. Javier who was then unarmed ran away from Urbano but was
overtaken by Urbano who hacked him again hitting Javier on the left
leg with the back portion of said bolo, causing a swelling on said leg.
When Urbano tried to hack and inflict further injury, his daughter
embraced and prevented him fro hacking Javier.
(2) Upon the intercession of Councilman Solis, Urbano and Javier
agreed to settle their differences. Urbano promised to pay Php 700.00
for the medical expenses of Javier. Hence, on October 27, 1980, the two
accompanied by Solis appeared before the San Fabian Police to
formalize their amicable settlement.
(3) However, at about 1:30 a.m. on November 11, 1980 Javier as rushed
to the Nazareth General Hospital in very serious condition. When
admitted to the hospital Javier lockjaw and was having convulsion Dr.
Edmundo Exconde who personally attended to Javier found the latter’s
serious condition was caused by tetanus toxin. Eh noticed the presence
of a hearing wound in Javier’s palm which could have been infected by
tetanus.
(4) In an information dated April 10, 1981 Filomeno Urbano was
charged with crime of homicide before the then Circuit Court of
Dagupan City, Third Judicial District. Upon agreement, Urbano pleaded
“not guilty.” After trial, the trial court found Urbano guilty as charged.
We was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of twelve (12)
years of prision mayor, as minimum to seventeen (17) years., four (4)
months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, together
with the accessories of the law to indemnify the heirs of the victim,
Marcelo Javier, in the amount of Php 12,000.00 without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. He was
ordered confined at the New Bilibid Prison, in Muntinlupa, Rizal upon
finality of the decision, in view of the nature of his penalty. The then
Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the conviction of Urbano on
appeal but raised the award of indemnity to the heirs of the deceased to
Php 30,000.00 with cost against the appellant. The appellant filed a
motion for reconsideration and/or new trial. The motion for new trial
was based on an affidavit of Barangay Captain Menardo Soliven.
(5) The motion was denied. Hence, this petition.
Ruling: The instant petition is granted, the questioned decision of the
then Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeal, is reversed
and set aside. The petitioner is acquitted of the crime of homicide.
Costs de oficio.
Rationale: (a) The evidence on record does not clearly show that the
wound inflicted by Urbano was infected with tetanus at the time of the
infliction of the wound. The evidence merely confirms that the wound,
which was already healing at the time Javier suffered the symptoms of
the fatal ailment, somehow got infected with tetanus. However, as to
when the wound was infected is not clear from the record. (b) Doubts
are present. There is likelihood that the wound was but the remote
cause and its subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary
precautions, with tenants may have been the proximate cause of
Javier’s death with which the petitioner had nothing to do.
17. PEOPLE VS. ABARCA
153 SCRA 735 (1987)
Nature: This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Palo, Leyte, sentencing the accused-appellant Francisco Abarca to
death for the complex crime of murder with double frustrated murder.
Issue: The accused-appellant assigns the following errors by the court a
quo: (i) in convicting the accused for the crime charged instead of
entering a judgment of conviction under article 247 of the Revised
Penal Code, and (ii) in finding that the killing was attended by the
qualifying circumstance of treachery.
Facts: (1) Khingsley Paul Koh and the wife of accused Francisco
Abarca. Jenny had illicit relationship. The illicit relationship apparently
began while the accused was in Manila reviewing for the 1983 bar
examinations.
(2) On July 15, 1984, the accused was in his residence in Tacloban,
Leyte. On the morning of that date he went to the bus station to go to
Dolores, Easter Samar, to fetch his daughter. However, he was not able
to catch the first trip (in the morning). He went back to the station in the
afternoon to take the 2:00 o’clock trip but the bus engine trouble and
could not leave. The accused then proceeded to the residence of his
father after which he went home. He arrived at his residence at the V &
G Subdivision in Tacloban City at around 6:00 o’clock in the afternoon.
(3) Upon reaching home the accused found his wife, Jenny and
Khingsley in the act of sexual intercourse. When the wife and Koh
noticed the accused, the wife pushed her paramour who got his
revolver. The accused who was then peeping above the built-in cabinet
in their room jumped and ran away.
(4) The accused went to look for a firearm at Tacloban City. He went to
the house of PC soldier, C2C Arturo Talbo, arriving there at around
6:30 p.m. He got Talbo’s firearm, an M-16 rifle and went back to his
house at V & G Subdivision. He was not able to find his wife and Koh
there. He proceeded to the “mahjong session” as it was the “hangout”
of Kingsley Koh. The accused found Koh playing mahjong. He fired at
Kingsley Koh three times with his rifle. Koh was hit. Arnold and Lina
Amparado who were occupying a room adjacent to the room where
Koh was playing mahjong were also hit by shots fired by the accused
Kingsley Koh died instantaneously of cardiorespiratory arrest due to
shock and hemorrhage as a result of multiple gunshot wounds in the
head, trunk and abdomen. Arnold Amparado was hospitalized and
operated on in the kidney to remove a bullet. His wife, Lina Amparado,
was also treated in the hospital as she was hit by bullet fragments.
Ruling: The decision appealed from is modified. The accused-appellant
is sentenced to four months and 21 days to six months of arresto mayor.
The period within which he has been in confinement shall be credited
in the service of these penalties. He is furthermore ordered to indemnify
Arnold and Lina Amparado in the Sum of Php 16,000.00 as and for
Arnold Amparado’s loss of earning capacity. No special pronouncement
as to costs.
7
Rationale: (a) Art. 247 of the RPC apply in the instant case. There is
no question that the accused surprised his wife and her paramour, the
vacuum in this case, in the act of illicit copulation, as, a result of which
he went out to kill the deceased in a fit of passionate outburst. Article
247 prescribes the following elements: (1) that a legally married person
surprises his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with
another person, and (2) that he kills any of them or both of them in the
act or immediately thereafter. These elements are present in this case.
The trail court, in convicting the accused-appellant of murder, therefore
erred. (b) Article 247, or the exceptional circumstances mentioned
therein, amount to an exempting circumstances mentioned therein,
amount to an exempting circumstance, for even where death or serious
physical injuries is inflicted, the penalty is so greatly lowered as to
result to no punishment at all. (c) Article 247 of the Revised Penal code
does not define and provide for specific crime, but grants a privilege or
benefit to the accused for the killing of another or the infliction of
serious physical injuries under the circumstances. Punishment
consequently is not inflicted upon the accused. He is banished, but that
is intended for his protection. (d) The next question refers to the
liability of the accused-appellant for the physical injuries suffered by
Lina Amparado and Arnold Amparado who were caught in the crossfire
as the accused-appellant shot the victim. The Solicitor General
recommends a finding of double frustrated murder against the accused-
appellant and being the more severe offense, proposes the imposition of
reclusion perpetua in its maximum periods pursuant to Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code. This where we disagree. The accused-appellant
did not have the intent to kill the Amparado couple. Although as a rule,
one committing as offense is liable for all the consequences of his act,
that rule presupposes that the act done amounts to a felony. Here, the
accused-appellant was not committing murder when he discharges his
rifle upon the deceased. Inflicting death under exceptional
circumstances is not murder.
18. PEOPLE VS. ABAGON
161 SCRA 255 (1988)
Nature: This is an appeal from the decision of the RTC, which found
the accused guilty of the crime murder.
Issue: Accused-appellant, thru their counsel, raise the following
assignments of error: (i) The Honorable Regional Trial Court erred in
finding that the prosecution’s evidence consisting of the testimony of its
witnesses sufficiently established the guilt beyond reasonable doubt of
the accused for the killing of ones Celis Lupango, which killing was
qualified to murder by treachery, (ii) The Honorable Regional Trial
Court erred in holding that the defense of alibi on the part of the
accused Mateo Abagon and of self-defense on the part of Abner
Ongonion will no lie, (iii) The Honorable Trial court erred in declaring
that conspiracy had been sufficiently established, and (iv) The
Honorable Regional Trial Court erred in finding both accused guilty of
the crime of murder considering that their guilt were not established
beyond reasonable doubt.
Facts: (1) About 6:00 o’clock in the afternoon of April 17, 1981, at
Barangay Pinamarubuhan, Mobo, Masbate, while the herein victim
Celis Lupango and companions Isabelo Radaza, Jr., Benjamin Bergado
and Nilo Lalaguna were inside the store of Corazon Cana to celebrate
the birthday of Isabelo Radaza, Jr., two persons, later identified as
Mateo Abagon and Abner Ongonion, entered and stabbed Celis
Lupango. First to enter was Abner Ongonion, followed closely behind
Mateo Abagon, and with a six-inches double bladed knife stabbed Celis
Lupango three or four times. Mateo Abagon, in turn, with a seven-inch
knife also stabbed Celis Lupango ‘several times.’
(2) After Celis Lupango fell to the ground the two accused left. At this
point Terisito Lupango, brother of Celis Lupango, arrived and he
carried Celis Lupango, with the help of Benjamin Bergado and Nilo
Lalaguna whom he found inside the store, outside the store intending to
bring him to the hospital. Outside the store, the waiting Abner
Ongonion, who was with Mateo Abagon, Julio Ongonion, Alejandro
Ongonion, Romulo Barruga, Antonio Danao and Arnel Onarosa, he
drew his firearm and fire two shots at them. Upon being fire at,
Benjamin Bergado and Nilo Lalaguna ran away while Teresito Lupango
sought cover. Abner Ongonion and his companions approached and
they took turns in stabbing the prostate body of Celis Lupango with
bolos and knives. Terisito eventually able to report the incident.
(3) “The cause of death was established to be shock, secondary to
massive external. Hemorrhage caused by multiple stabs and incised
wounds.” Testifying, Dr. Quemi admitted the possibility that the
wounds were afflicted the possibility that the wounds were inflicted by
one or two assailants.
(4) “The defense presented both accused to deny the charges. “For his
defense, accused Mateo Abagon claims that at the time of the incident
he was in his house at the seashore of Pinamarubuhan about 100 meters
away from the scene of the incident. He went out of the house only he
learned of the stabbing incident when he saw many persons running
towards the scene. After seeing the lifeless body of the victim, he
returned home immediately. He did not see his co-accused Abner
Ongonion at the scene. In fact he did not see any other person there.
“On the other hand, accused Abner Ongonion claims that at that
particular time he left his house to fetch his mother at the Tugbo River
where she washed clothes. On his way he passed by the store of
Corazon Cana to buy cigarettes. At the store he was pulled inside by
Celis Lupango, where the latter was drinking with others, among who
was June Radaza. He was asked to drink but he refused because of a
headache. Celis then asked him “why are you brave” and then he pulled
his knife, but at as he did so the knife bumped the edge of the table and
fell to the ground. As Celis recovered the knife from the ground,
Ongonion was able to get hold of Celis’ hand and they grappled for the
knife. While grappling he succeeded in thrusting the knife to the left
breast of Celis and again thrust it to the stomach. After he was able to
get possession of the knife he kept on stabbing Celis, being by then
angry. In the meantime, as they grappled, the companions of Celis
Lupango jumped out of the window, while June Radaza who was there
watching ran away when he saw Celis was stabbed. Eh then went out
and proceeded to the PC Headquarters at Masbate and surrendered.
Benjamin Bergado and Teresito Lupango were not seen by him in the
store. He then stated that his co-accused Mateo Abagon was in the
store.
Ruling: Wherefore the judgment appealed from is affirmed except that
the penalties are modified. Appellant Mateo Abagon is sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from twelve years and
one day of prision mayor as minimum to eighteen years, eight months,
and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum. Appellant Abner
Ongonion is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment from ten years and one day of prision mayor as minimum
to seventeen years, four moths and one day of reclusion temporal as
maximum. The two accused-appellants shall pay jointly the amount of,
thirty thousand pesos to the heirs of Celis Lupango as indemnity
Rationale: (i) Appellant Ongonion’s theory of self-defense is
untenable. According to the testimonies of Bergado, Radaza, and
Lupango, the attack by the assailant was unprovoked. The sudden
attack on the victim with knives drawn indicates that the stabbing was
unintentional. No other conclusion can likewise be surmised from their
gunshots fired by the assailants at those who tried to bring Celis to the
hospital, while the victim’s body lay helpless i=on the street, the
appellants kept on stabbing the victim, thereby ensuring his death. (ii)
Having admitted the killing Ongonion must clearly establish that he
acted in self-defense, the burden of proof is now shifted to him, he
must, therefore, rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the
8
weakness of the prosecution (People vs.’ Sandie, 149 SCRA 240; and
People vs. Regulacion) for even if the latter’s evidence is weak, it could
not be disbelieved after the appellant admitted the killing. The number
and nature of the stab wounds inflicted by more than one person
beloved Ongonion’s theory of self-defense. These and the testimonies
of two eyewitnesses and one peace officer further serve to destroy
Ongonion’s statement. Moreover it is a well settled rule that the
findings of the fact of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are
generally accorded the highest respect by the appellee court (People vs.
Traya, 147 SCRA 381) for these courts have the privileges of
examining the deportment and demeanor of witnesses, and therefore,
can discern if such witnesses, and therefore, can discern if such
witnesses are telling the truth or not (People vs. Ramilo, 147 SCRA
102). (iii) Ongonion’s claim of self-defense is likewise negated by the
physical evidence and other circumstances, such as his failure to
present the knife upon surrender, his failure to tell the police authorities
that he killed the deceased in self-defense and the absence of any injury
on the body of Ongonion while the deceased suffered eleven wounds
when, according to the appellant, there was supposedly a struggle that
tool place. For self-defense to prosper, the following elements should
have been proven by appellant: (a) unlawful aggression, (b) reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of
provocation on the part of the one defending himself. On the contrary,
all the evidence on record shows that not one of the elements of self-
defense is present. (iv) Appellant Abagaon’s defense on the other hand,
is alibi, an inherently weak defense especially when it can be proved
that it was not physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the
crime. In order to be given full faith and credit, alibi must not leave any
room for doubt as to its plausibility and veracity. The appellant at the
time of the crime was allegedly in a place which approximately only
100 meters away from the scene of the crime, renders his defense of
alibi not credible. (v) More important, Abagon and his companion were
positively identifies by eyewitnesses Bergado and Lalaguna. The
records show that the appellants took turns at stabbing the victim inside
and outside the store. The presence and location of the eleven stab
wounds, as testified by Dr. Quemi also indicate that the same were
inflicted by more than one person. (vi) The assailants acted in concerted
efforts with community of criminal purpose to ensure the death of the
victim is indicative of conspiracy between them. Conspiracy is
established by concerted action It may be noted that even if conspiracy
had not been established, the liability of the two appellants would not
change for each inflicted on his own, multiple stabbing blows on the
victim resulting in mortal injuries. They acted as principals by direct
participation. (vii) Treachery was likewise proven by the evidence
presented. The attack was immediate, sudden and unexpected.
Treachery exists when the offender commits any crime against person,
employing means, methods or forms in the execution, without risk to
him arising from any defense which the offended party might make.
19. PEOPLE VS. IGNACIO
G.R. NO. 134563 (FEB. 2000)
Nature: Appeal on the May 18, 1998 decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Masbate, Masbate, convicting Eulogio Ignacio of murder
Facts: On January 11, 1997 (morning) in Barangay Divisoria,
Municipality of Dimasalang, Masbate, Jessie Lacson and Edwin
Velasco were gathering shells from the seashore. They got thirsty, went
to the fishpond and get coconuts or “butong”. The fishpond is owned by
Cielo Cortes alias “Malagring”. Eulogio Ignacio, “Loloy”, is the
caretaker, which stays at the house inside the fishpond. Jessie then got 1
coconut, walked ahead of Edwin in going to the dike, to break open the
coconut. Eulogio saw Jessie as Jessie reached the dike, he did not see
Edwin walking behind Jessie. |Eulogio asked Jessie to put down the
young coconut. Jessie did. Eulogio fired his homemade shotgun at
Jessie hitting the left portion of his breast. Eulogio was meters away
fro, Jessie. Edwin was meters away. Eulogio cranked his homemade
shotgun aimed it at Edwin but did not fire. Edwin went to Jessie’s
parents, then to Carlit Alcove, the Baraga Tanned. Carlit asked Eulogio
to surrender which he did.
Version of the Defense: Eulogio acted on the defense of property. On
January 9, 1997, he was informed by his neighbor, Gil Aristotle’s
regarding a theft incident in the fishpond. On January 11, 1997, he saw
Jessie and Edwin coming out of his house carrying a basket  his
house was filled with 28 crabs. Upon seeing Eulogio, Jessie and Edwin
fled. He ordered them to stop; they did not, so he fired his gun (without
intention to kill them). He then reported incident to Kalawao Gil
Aristotle’s.
Ruling: There was no legal reason for him to shoot the victim, an
unarmed minor; killing was qualified as murder because of the presence
of treachery.
Issue:
1st issue: Evidence of appellant’s guilt
For jstifyi8ng circumstances to be appreciated, the accused
has the burden of proving unlawful aggression on the part the victim.
 Eulogio was not attacked by Jessie.
2nd issue: Treachery
A killing is qualified as treachery when the accused employs
means without risk to him arising from the defense which the offended
party might make.
- Victim and companion stopped after Eulogio
shouted at them
- Jessie was already facing him when he shot
him
- There was no proof that he “deliberately and
consciously adopted any means to kill” – did not act on mere impulse
3rd issue: Mitigating Circumstance
Mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender because he
allegedly gave himself up?
Mitigating Circumstance:
1. offender has not been actually arrested
2. offender surrender himself to a person of
authority
3. surrender is voluntary
=No mitigating circumstance – he forced to give himself up
Main issue: Whether Eulogio acted in unlawful defense of the
landowner’s property.
Held: Appeal is denied, assailed decision is affirmed.
20. PEOPLE VS. RICOHERMOSO
56 SCRA 431 (1974)
Nature: Severo Padernal and Juan Padernal appealed from the decision
of the Circuit Criminal Court at Lucena City, convicting them of
murder, sentencing each of them to reclusion perpetua and ordering
them to pay solitarily the sum of twelve thousand pesos to the heir’s pf
Geminiano de Leon ad to pay the costs (Criminal Case No. CCC-IX-
37- Quezon or 1922-CFI-Gumaca).
In the same decision they were convicted of lesions levees. Each one
was sentences to suffer the penalty of fifteen (15 days of arresto manor
and to pay the costs. Rosendo Perpeñan, Rito Monterey and Macario
Monterey were acquitted (Criminal Case No. CCC-IX-38- Quezon or
1923-CFI-Gumaca).
9
Issue: The only issue in this appeal, which concerns Juan Padernal, is
whether he conspired with Ricohermoso and Severo Padernal to kill
Geminiano de Leon.
Facts:
1. At about nine o’clock in the morning of January 30,
1965 Geminiano de Leon, together with his thirty-three-year old
common-law wife Fabian Rosales, his twenty year old son Marian to de
Leon and one Rizal Rosales, encountered Poi Ricohermoso in Barrio
Tagabawa Silage, Catamaran, Quezon.
2. Geminiano owned a parcel of land in that barrio
which Ricohermoso cultivated as kingpin. Geminiano asked
Ricohermoso about his share of the palay harvest. He added that he
should at least be allowed to taste the palay harvested from his land.
Ricohermoso answered that Geminiano could go to his house anytime
and he would give the latter palay. Geminiano rejoined that he could
not get the palay that morning because he was on his way to Barrio Bag
basin but, on his return, he would stop at Ricohermoso house and get
the palay.
3. When Geminiano returned to Barrio Tagabawa Silage,
he stopped at Ricohermoso place. It was about two o’clock in the
afternoon. Geminiano sat on a sack beside Fabian Rosales in front of
the house while Marian to stood about three meters behind his father.
Ricohermoso stood near the door of his house while Severo Padernal
was stationed near the eaves of the house.
4. Geminiano asked Ricohermoso about the palay. The
latter, no longer conciliatory and evidently hostile, answered in a
defiant tone: “Whatever happens, I will not give you palay.” Geminiano
restated: “Why did you tell us to pass by your house, you were not
willing to give the palay?”
5. At that juncture, as if by pre-arrangement,
Ricohermoso unsheathed his bolo and approached Geminiano from the
left, while Severo Padernal (Ricohermoso father-in-law) got an axe and
approached and approached Geminiano from the right. The latter
looked up to the sexagenarian Severo Padernal, with both hands raised
and pleaded: “Mama (grandpa), why will you do this to us. We will not
fight you.” While Geminiano was still looking up to Severo Padernal
on his right, Ricohermoso walked to Guinean’s left, and, when about
one meter from him ,stabbed him on the nick with his bolo. Geminiano
fell face downward on the ground. While in that helpless position, he
was hacked on the back with an axe by Severo Padernal.
6. At the same place and time, while Severo Padernal
and Ricohermoso were assaulting Geminiano de Leon, another episode
was taking place. Juan Padernal (Ricohermoso’s brother-in-law and the
son of Severo) suddenly embraced Marianito de Leon from behind ,
with his right armed locked around Marionette’s neck and his left hand
pressing Marionette’s left forearm. They grappled and rolled downhill
towards a camote patch. Marianito passed out. When he regained
consciousness, his rifle was gone. He walked uphill, saw his mortally
wounded father Geminiano in his death those, and embraced him, He
carried Geminiano for a short distance. The fifty-one year old
Geminiano died at two o’clock on that sane day.
7. Doctor Matundan said that the first wound was fatal.
It could have caused instantaneous death because it was a deep wound
which pierced the carotoid artery and jugular vain. The second wound
on the back could likewise have caused the victim’s death if it had
penetrated the kidney.
8. Doctor Matundan found that Marianito de Leon
sustained multiple abrasions on the nick and abdomen and a lacerated
wound on the left foot which would heal from one to nine days even
without medical treatment.
9. Appellants’ version is that in the afternoon of January
30, 1965, when Ricohermoso refused to give any palay to Geminiano
de Leon, because the land tilled by the former as allegedly a public
land, Geminiano approached Ricohermoso. When Geminiano
unsheathed his bolo, Ricohermoso met him drew his bolo and struck
Geminiano on the left side of the neck. The latter tried to parry the
blow. He was wounded in the wrist. As Geminiano turned right to flee,
Ricohermoso struck him again on the left side of the body, causing him
to fall on the ground. Geminiano died on the spot due to the bleeding
from the wound on his neck. While Geminiano was being assaulted, his
son Marianito tried to shoot with his rifle but Juan Padernal disabled
him and wrested the gun. Marianito suffered abrasions on the neck and
other parts of the body.
10. The appellants filed their brief on February 6, 1970.
Later, Severo Padernal withdrew his appeal
Ruling: Wherefore, the judgment of the lower court as to appellant
Juan Padernal is affirmed with costs against him.
Rationale:
 The trial court rationalized its conclusion that there was
conspiracy by stating that their conduct revealed unity of purpose and a
concerted effort to encompass Geminiano death.
 Appellant Juan Padernal invokes the justifying circumstance
of avoidance of a greater evil or injury in explaining his act of
preventing Marianito de Leon from shooting Ricohermoso and Severo
Padernal. His reliance on that justifying circumstance is erroneous. The
act of Juan Padernal in preventing Marianito de Leon from shooting
Ricohermoso and Severo Padernal, who were the aggressors, was
designed to insure the killing of Geminiano de Leon without any risk to
his assailants.
 Juan Padernal was not avoiding any evil when he sought to
disable Marianito. Adrenal’s malicious intention was to forestall any
interference in the felonious assault made by his father and brother-in-
law on Geminiano. That situation is unarguably not the case envisaged
in paragraph 4 of article 11.
 It should be recalled that, in the morning, Geminiano had an
understanding with Ricohermoso that he would return in the afternoon
to get his share of the palay harvest Ricohermoso gave Geminiano the
impression that he was amenable to giving Geminiano his share of the
harvest. However, during the interval, Ricohermoso changed his mind.
Instead of remaining steadfast to his original intention to give
Geminiano palay, Ricohermoso planned with his father in law, Severo
Padernal, the manner of liquidating Demonian so as to stop him from
pestering Ricohermoso with demands for a share in the harvest. So,
when Geminiano reappeared at Ricohermoso’s place in the afternoon,
Severo Padernal, Ricohermoso, Juan Padernal, like actors in a well –
rehearsed play, performed their assigned roles with dramatic positions.
Severo Padernal and Ricohermoso, one armed with an axe and the other
with a bolo, in a pincer movement, confronted Geminiano de Leon.
Simultaneously with that maneuver, the 35 year old Juan Padernal
embraces Marianito de Leon and prevented him from firing at Severo
Padernal and Ricohermoso or from helping his father.
 Considering the trio’s behavior and appellant Juan Adrenal’s
close relationship to Ricohermoso and Severo Padernal ineluctable
conclusion is that he acted in conspiracy with them. The circumstances
surrounding the killing of Geminiano de Leon alevosia and treachery.
His hands were raised and he was pleading for mercy with Severo
Padernal, when Ricohermoso struck him on the neck with a bolo.
21. PEOPLE VS. BERONILLA
96 PHIL 566 (1955)
Nature: This is an appeal by accused Manuel Beronilla, Policarpio
Paculdo, Filipino Velasco, and Jacinto Adriatico from the judgment of
the Court of First Instance of Abra (Criminal Case No. 70) convicting
them of murder for the execution of Arsenio Borjal in the evening of
April 18, 1945, in the town of La Paz , Province of Abra.
Facts: Arsenio Borjal was the elected mayor of La Paz, Abra, at the
outbreak of war, and continued to serve as Mayor during the Japanese
occupation, until March 10, 1943, when he moved to Bangued because
10
of an attempt upon his life by unknown persons. On December 18,
1944, appellant Manuel Beronilla was appointed Military Mayor of La
Paz by Lt. Col. R. H. Arnold, regimental commander of the 15th
Infantry, Philippine Army, operating as a guerrilla unit in the province
of Abra. Simultaneously with his appointment as Military Mayor,
Beronilla received copy of a memorandum issued by Lt. Col. Arnold to
all Military Mayors in Northern Luzon, authorizing them "to appoint a
jury of 12 bolomen to try persons accused of treason, espionage, or the
aiding and abetting (of ) the enemy" (Exhibit 9). He also received from
the Headquarters of the 15th Infantry a list of all puppet government
officials of the province of Abra (which included Arsenio Borjal,
puppet mayor of La Paz), with a memorandum instructing all Military
Mayors to investigate said persons and gather against them complaints
from people of the municipality for collaboration with the enemy
(Exhibit 12-a).
Sometime in March, 1945, while the operations for the liberation of the
province of Abra were in progress, Arsenio Borjal returned to La Paz
with his family in order to escape the bombing of Bangued. Beronilla,
pursuant to his instructions, placed Borjal under custody and asked the
residents of La Paz to file complaints against him. In no time, charges
of espionage, aiding the enemy, and abuse of authority were filed
against Borjal; a 12-man jury was appointed by Beronilla, composed of
Jesus Labuguen as chairman, and Benjamin Adriatico, Andres Afos,
Juanito Casal, Santiago Casal, Benjamin Abella, Servillano Afos,
Mariano Ajel, Felimon Labuguen, Felix Murphy, Pedro Turqueza, and
Delfin Labuguen as members; while Felix Alverne and Juan Balmaceda
were named prosecutors, Policarpio Paculdo as clerk of the jury, and
Lino Inovermo as counsel for the accused. Later, Atty. Jovito Barreras
voluntarily appeared and served as counsel for Borjal. Sgt. Esteban
Cabanos observed the proceedings for several days upon instructions of
Headquarters, 15th Infantry. The trial lasted 19 days up to April 10,
1945; the jury found Borjal guilty on all accounts and imposed upon
him instruction from his superiors. Mayor Beronilla forwarded the
records of the case to the Headquarters of the 15th Infantry for review
and on the night of the same day, April 18, 1945, Beronilla ordered the
execution of Borjal. Jacinto Adriatco acted as executioner and Anotnio
Palope as grave digger.
Two years thereafter, Manuel Beronilla as military mayor, Policarpio
Paculdo as Clerk of the jury, Felix Alverne and Juan Balmaceda as
prosecutors, Jesus Labuguen, Delfin Labuguen, Filemon Labuguen,
Servillano Afos, Andres Afos, Benjamin Adriatico, Juanito Casel,
Santiago Casel, Mariano Ajel, Felix Murphy, Benjamin Abella, and
Pedro Turqueza as members of the jury, Jacinto Adriatico as
executioner, Severo Afos as grave digger, and Father Filipino Velasco
as an alleged conspirator, were indicted in the Court of First Instance of
Abra for murder, for allegedly conspiring and confederating in the
execution of Arsenio Borjal. Soon thereafter, the late President Manuel
A. Roxas issued Executive Proclamation No. 8, granting amnesty to all
persons who committed acts penalized under the Revised Penal Code in
furtherance of the resistance to the enemy against persons aiding in the
war efforts of the enemy. Defendant Jesus Labuguen, then a master
sergeant in the Philippine Army, applied for and was granted amnesty
by the Amnesty Commission, Armed Forces of the Philippines
(Records, pp. 618-20). The rest of the defendant filed their application
for amnesty with the Second Guerrilla Amnesty Commission, who
denied their application on the ground that the crime had been inspired
by purely personal motives, and remanded the case to the Court of First
Instance of Abra for trial on the merits.
Issue: The crucial question thus becomes whether or not this message,
originally sent to Arnold's quarters in San Esteban, Ilocos Sur, was
relayed by the latter to appellant Beronilla in La Paz, Abra, on the
morning of April 18, 1945, together with the package of records of
Borjal's trial that was admittedly returned to and received by Beronilla
on that date, after review thereof by Arnold (Exhibit 8-8-a). Obviously,
if the Volckmann message was known to Beronilla, his ordering the
execution of Borjal on the night of April 18, 1945 can not be justified.
Ruling: The judgment appealed from is reversed and the appellants are
acquitted with costs de officio.
Rationale:
 The records are ample to sustain the claim of the defense that
the arrest, prosecution and trial of the late Arsenio Borjal were done
pursuant to express orders of the 15th Infantry Headquarters. (Exhibit 9
and 12-a), instructing all military mayors under its jurisdiction to gather
evidence against puppet officials and to appoint juries of at least 12
bolomen to try the accused and find them guilty by two thirds vote. It is
to be noted that Arsenio Borjal was specifically named in the list of
civilian officials to be prosecuted (Exhibit 12-b).
 In truth, the prosecution does not seriously dispute that the trial
and sentencing of Borjal was done in accordance with instructions of
superior military authorities, although it point to irregularities that were
due more to ignorance of legal processes than personal animosity
against Borjal. The state, however, predicates its case principally on the
existence of the radiogram Exhibit H from Col. Volckmann, overall
area commander, to Lt. Col. Arnold, specifically calling attention to the
illegality of Borjal's conviction and sentence, and which the prosecution
claims was known to the accused Beronilla.
 We have carefully examined the evidence on this important
issue, and find no satisfactory proof that Beronilla did actually receive
the radiogram Exhibit H or any copy thereof. The accused roundly
denied it. The messenger, or "runner", Pedro Molina could not state
what papers were enclosed in the package he delivered to Beronilla on
that morning in question, nor could Francisco Bayquen (or Bayken),
who claimed to have been present at the delivery of the message, state
the contents thereof.
 The plain import of the affidavit is that the witness Rafael
Balmaceda was not with Beronilla when the message arrived, otherwise
Beronilla would have given him his orders direct, as he (Balmaceda)
testified later at the trial. Moreover, it is difficult to believe that having
learned of the contents of the Volckmann message, Balmaceda should
not have relayed it to Borjal , or to some member of the latter's family,
considering that they were relatives. In addition to Balmaceda was
contradicted by Bayken, another prosecution witness, as to the hatching
of the alleged conspiracy to kill Borjal. Balmaceda claimed that the
accused-appellants decided to kill Borjal in the early evening of April
18, while Bayken testified that the agreement was made about ten
o'clock in the morning, shortly after the accused had denied Borjal's
petition to be allowed to hear mass.
 Our conclusion is that Lt. Col. Arnold, for some reason that can
not now be ascertained, failed to transmit the Volckmann message to
Beronilla. And this being so, the charge of criminal conspiracy to do
away with Borjal must be rejected, because the accused had no need to
conspire against a man who was, to their knowledge, duly sentenced to
death.
22. TABUENA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
268 SCRA 332 (1997)
Nature: This is a separate petition to review the decision of the
Sandiganbayan dated October 12, 1990 convicting them of
malversation under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code as well as
the Resolution dated December 20, 1991 denying reconsideration
3 criminal cases were filed against Tabuena who appears as
the principal accused and one for Peralta since the total amount
of 55 million pesos was taken on 3 separate dates of January,
namely 10, 16, and 29. They were convicted of malversation under
Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.
Facts:
 Then President Marcos instructed Tabuena over the phone to
pay directly to the President’s office and in cash what the MIAA owes
the PNCC to which Tabuena replied. “Yes, sir. I will do it”.
11
 On January 8, 1986, one week after the phone conversation
Tabuena received from Mrs. Gimenez, the personal secretary of Pres.
Marcos, a Presidential Memorandum reiterating in black and white the
verbal instruction of the President.
 In obedience to President Marcos verbal instruction and
Memorandum, Tabuena, with the help of Dabao and Peralta caused the
release of 55 million pesos of MIAA funds by means of 3 withdrawals.
 1st withdrawal was made on January 10, 1986 for P25 million
following a letter of even date signed by Tabuena and Dabao requesting
the PNB extension office at the MIAA depository branch of MIAA
funds to issue a manager check for said amount payable to Tabuena and
was encashed at the PNB Villamor Branch. Subsequently, the P25
million in cash was delivered by Tabuena with the use of an armored
car of the PNB to the office of Mrs. Gimenez located at Aguado St.
fronting Malacanang. There was no receipt issued for the delivery of
the money.
 Similar circumstances surrounded the second
withdrawal/encashment and delivery of another P25 million made on
January 16, 1986.
 The 3rd and last withdrawal was made on January 31, 1986
for P5 million. Peralta was Tabuena’s co-signatory to the letter-request
for the manager’s check for the amount Peralta did not go with Tabuena
to deliver the money to the office of Mrs. Gimenez. It was only upon
this delivery that Mrs. Gimenez issued a receipt, dated January 30,
1986, for all the amounts she received from Tabuena.
Issue:
1. Whether the Sandiganbayan erred in convicting
petitioners of a crime not charged in the amended informations
2. Whether the defense of Good Faith of the
petitioner’s relieve then from the crime of malversation, and;
3. Whether the petitioners’ constitutional rights to due
process was violated
Held:
1. No. It is stated in Cabello vs. Sandiganbayan “even on
putative assumption that the evidence against petitioner yielded a case
of malversation by negligence but the information was for intentional
malversation, under the circumstances of this case his conviction under
the first mode of misappropriation would still be in order. Malversation
is committed either intentionally or by negligence. The dolo or the
culpa present in the offense is only a modality in the perpetration of the
felony. Even if the mode charged differs from the mode proved, the
same offense of malversation is involved and conviction thereof is
proper. Moreover, SEC. 5 Rule 116 of the Rules of court does not
require that all the essential elements of the offense charged in the
information be proved, it being sufficient that some of said essential
elements or ingredients thereof be established to constitute the crime
proved.
2. Yes. Firstly, Marcos was undeniably. Tabuena’s superior and
as a recipient of such kind of a directive coming from the highest
official of the land no less, GOOD FAITH should be read on Tabuena’s
compliance, without hesitation nor any question, with the MARCOS
Memorandum. The superior-subordinate relationship was clearly
established and so is the lawfulness of the order contained in the
MARCOS Memorandum for its purpose partial payment of the liability
of one government agency (MIAA) to another (PNCC). Tabuena is
therefore entitled to the justifying circumstance of “Any person who
acts in obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful
purpose.” Secondly, there is no denying that the disbursement did not
comply with certain auditing rules and regulations. But this deviation
was inevitable under the circumstances Tabuena was in because he did
not have the luxury of time to observe all auditing procedures of
disbursement considering the last that the MARCOS Memorandum
enjoined his “immediate compliance” with the directive that he
forwarded to the President’s office P55 million in cash. Tabuena surely
cannot escape responsibility for the emission but since he was acting in
good faith, his liability should only be administrative or civil in nature
and not criminal. Thirdly, the Sandiganbayan made the finding that
Tabuena had already converted and misappropriated the P55 million
when he delivered the same to Mrs. Gimenez and not to the PNCC
however it was stated in the memorandum to pay immediately the
PNCC, thru his office, the sum of 55 million pesos and that was what
Tabuena precisely did when he delivered the money to the President’s
office thru his secretary Mrs. Gimenez. Therefore, Tabuenas good faith
in delivering the money to the President in strict compliance with the
memorandum was not at all affected even if it later turned out that
PNCC never received the money. Fourthly, even assuming that the real
and sole purpose behind the MARCOS Memorandum was to siphon-
out public money for personal benefit of those then in power still, no
criminal liability can be imputed to Tabuena. There is no showing that
he had anything to do whatsoever with the execution of the MARCOS
Memorandum. There is also no proof that he profited from the
felonious scheme in short, no conspiracy was established between
Tabuena and the real embezzlers of the P55 million. This is not a sheer
case of blind and misguided obedience, but obedience in good faith of a
duly executed order.
3. Yes. The “cold neutrality of an impartial judge” is an essential
requirement for due process because it would show that the courts are
impartial, and unbiased. Moreover, the trial judge has the right to
question witness in view of satisfying his mind upon any material point
which presents itself during the trial o a case over which he presides but
it is limited only to “clarifactory questions” only. However, the
appellate court, while going over the records, noticed that the way the
Sandiganbayan actively took part in the questioning of a defense
witness and of the accused themselves and basing on its manner
indicated prejudgment of guilt, bias, hatred, or hostility against the said
appellants. It would be noticed by the volume of questions hurled by
the Sandiganbayan and more importantly, it is noticed that the questions
were in the nature of cross-examinations characteristic of confrontation,
probing, and insinuation.
Decision: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing herein petitioners
Luis A. Tabuena and Adolfo M. Peralta are hereby ACQUITTED of the
crime of malversation as defined and penalized under Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code The Sandiganbayan Decision of October 12, 1990
and the Resolution dated December 20, 1991 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.
23. PEOPLE VS. PUNO
105 SCRA 151 (1991)
Nature: Automatic Review from the decision of Circuit Criminal Court
of Pasug, Rizal.
FACTS:
At about two o’clock in the afternoon of September 8, 1970, Ernesto
Puno, 28, a jeepney driver, entered a bedroom in the house of Francisca
Col (Aling Kikay), 72, a widow. The house was located in the area
known as Little Baguio, Barrio Tinajeros, Malabon, Rizal. On seeing
Aling Kikay sitting in bed, Puno insulted her by saying “Mangkukulam
ka mambabarang. Mayroon kang bubuyog.” Then, he repeatedly
slapped her and struck her several times on the head with a hammer
until she was dead. The assault was witnessed by Hilaria de la Cruz, 23,
who was in the bedroom with the old woman, and by Lina Pajes, 27, a
tenant of the adjoining room. They testified that Puno’s eyes were
reddish. His look was baleful menacing.
After the killing Puno went to the room of Lina where Hilaria had taken
refuge and according to Hilaria, he made the following confession and
threat: “Huwag kayong magkakamaling tumawag ng pulis at sabihin
ninyo na umalis kayo ng bahay at hindi ninyo alam kung sino ang
pumatay sa matanda.” And according to Lina, Puno said: “Pinatay ko
12
iyong matanda. Huwag kayong tumawag ng pulis. Pag tumawag kayo
ng pulis kayo ang paghihigantihan ko.”
Puno, a native of Macabebe, Pampanga, who testified about five
months after the killing, pretended that he did not remember having
killed Aling Kikay. He believes that there are persons who are
“mangkukulam” “mambabarang” and “mambubuyog” and that when
one is victimized by those persons, his feet might shrink of his hands
might, swell. Puno believes that a person harmed by a “mambabarang”
might have a headache or a swelling nose and ears and can be cured
only by a quack doctor (herbolaryo). Consequently, it is necessary to
kill the “mangkukulam” and “mambabarang”.
The trial court concluded that if Puno was a homicidal maniac who had
gone berserk, he would have killed also Hilaria and Lina. The fact that
he singled out Aling Kikay signified that he really disposed of her
because he thought that she was a witch.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the death penalty is set aside. The accused
is sentenced to reclusion perpetua. The indemnity imposed by the trial
court is affirmed. Costs de oficio.
24. PEOPLE VS. PAMBID
G.R. NO. 124453 (MARCH 2000)
Nature: Appeal from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City Branch 81
Facts: This an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court
Branch 81 Quezon City, finding the accused appellant Jose C. Pambid
guilty beyond reasonably doubt of two counts of statutory rape and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with all the
accessibly penalties and to indemnify the victim Maricon Delvie C.
Grifalda at P50, 000 plus costs of each count of rape. Maricon told her
mother on the two incidents of rape, that sometime in April and May
1993, when she was on the way home after having been told for an
errand, the accused appellant, their neighbor, brought her to his house,
and raped her. The accused appellant threatened to beat her if she would
not comply and used a deadly weapon. During the time wherein the
accused was already raping the victim, they were interrupted by the
knock on the door by the mother of the accused. The other incident of
rape happened on one morning when Maricon was going on the nearby
store where there was no other people around. Joseph then carried her
to the sofa of his house and raped her. After the accused was arrested,
he pleaded not guilty and use alibi as means I escape by saying that he
was not in his mother’s house at that time but in Caloocan City on his
father’s house.
Issue: Whether or not the accused appellant is guilty of two counts of
rape.
Held: The Supreme Court held that on the first error assign by the
accused that the victim is inconsistent of her statement. The Supreme
Court held that this contention is without merit considering the
revelation made by Maricon and her voluntary submission of the
medical examination and willingness to undergo public trial where she
was compelled to give details of the assault on her dignity. Her
testimony was given respect by The Supreme Court considering his
consistency and composure during the interrogation was commendable.
Secondly, the defense that he was not in his mother’s was not given
credit. The defense of insanity that the accused was suffering
schizophrenia and mind retardation was mere concoctions because he
was not able to establish that indeed he was deprived of intelligence or
freedom of will. Lastly, the decision of the trial court in rendering the
accused appellant in rendering the penalty reclusion perpetua with the
use of the deadly weapon considering that it is punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death, this is in consideration also on the suspension of the
death penalty at the time that the crime was committed. The Supreme
Court said that the trial court was wrong with this decision and since
the accused did not object of charging two counts of rape in one
information. The trial court failed to consider that the accused did not
object to the validity of the information or raise the issue of duplicity of
offense since the information does not charge him with more than one
offense or occasion of rape.
Decision: WHEREFORE, the decision of the RTC Branch 81. Quezon
City is set aside and another one is rendered finding accused appellant
Joseph Pambid guilty of one count of rape, sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and order him to pay Maricon P50, 000 as
civil indemnity and the same amount on moral damages.
25. PEOPLE VS. DOQUENA
68 PHIL 580 (1939)
Nature: Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan which held that the accused acted with discernment in
committing the act imputed to him and ordered him sent to the Training
School for Boys to remain therein until he reaches the age of majority.
Facts: Between 1 and 2 o’clock in the afternoon, Juan Ragojos and
Epifanio Rarang were playing volleyball in the yard of the intermediate
school. Valentin, who was also playing there intervened and catching
the ball, tossed it to Juan Ragojos hitting him in the stomach. For his
act, Juan chased Valentin upon overtaking him slapped him on the nape.
Valentin then turned against Juan with a threatening attitude, so Juan
struck him on the mouth with his fist. Juan then returned and continued
playing with Epifanio. Valentin was offended and looked around for a
stone to attack Juan. He found none so he approached a cousin named
Romualdo Cecal to lend him his knife.Valentin approached Juan and
challenged the latter to give him another blow with his fist to which
Juan answered that he did not want to because he was bigger than
Valentin. Juan ignored Valentin and continued playing. Valentin then
stabbed him in the chest
Issue: Whether or not Valentin acted with discernment
Held: Decision is affirmed.
Points to Ponder:
 Discernment is the mental capacity to understand
the difference between right and wrong and such capacity may be
known and should be determined by taking into consideration all the
facts and circumstances afforded by the records in each case, the very
appearance, the very attitude, the very comportment of the said minor,
not only before and during the act, but also after and even during trial.
26. PEOPLE VS. LORENO
130 SCRA 311 (1984)
Nature: Appeal on the conviction of the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Sur charging Eustaquio Malaga and Jimmy Marantal of
Robbery with Double Rape.
Facts: On the evening of January 7, 1978, Barangay Captain Elias
Monge was at his house with his two daughters, Monica, 14 years old
and Cristina, 22 years old. His wife, Beata Monge, was still changing
the diaper of baby Rachel Baybayon. The other occupants of their
house that evening were Mario, 11 years old. Nilo, 13 years old and
farm helper, Francisco Fable.
At around 7:40pm, four men with flashlights approached
their house calling Elias saying that there was a letter for the chief.
Elias then invited the man with dark sweater to come inside the sala.
Monica and Elias the read the letter “Kami ang NPA”. Elias was poked
with a gun and they were all ordered to stay on the floor. Fable the
13
recognized one of the men was Eustaquio Loreno. Loreno then tied him
with rattan. Fable also recognized Jimmy Marantal as one of the
lookouts.
The man in the dark sweater then dragged Monica to her
room and succeeded in raping her. Below in the sala they could hear
Monica’s shouts for help, but Loreno pointed hid gun at them telling
them not to rise off if they wanted to live. Loreno then brought Beata to
the other rooms to get other contents. Then the man in the dark sweater
returned and took Cristina and also raped her in one of the rooms.
Moreover, Loreno entered the room and embraced her trying to kiss her
and touch her private parts.
The lower court found Loreno guilty of robbery with double
rape sentencing him to life imprisonment. Jimmy Marantal was found
guilty of robbery sentencing him to prison correccional as minimum of
prison mayor.
Issue: Whether or not the accused Loreno and Marantal were acting on
irresistible force or uncontrollable fear
Held: All facts demonstrated the voluntary participation and conspiracy
of the appellants. All the conspirators are liable as co-principals
regardless of the extend character of their participation because in the
contemplation of law, the act of one is the act of all. Decision of the
court is modified. Jimmy Marantal is sentenced to life imprisonment as
well.
27. PEOPLE VS. FORONDA
222 SCRA 71 (1993)
Nature:A review on the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Cagayan finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the
crime of murder against the brothers Esminio and Edwin Balaan.
Facts: At about 6:00am, June 11, 1986, the deceased Balaan brothers
were taken by 7 armed men in fatigue with long firearms suspected to
be NPA members, accompanied by the accused Rudy Fronda and
Roderick Padua from the house of one Ferminio Balaan, at Brgy.
Cataratan, Allacapan, Cagayan. Rudy Fronda and Roderick Padua were
residents of the same places.The armed men tied the hands of the
deceased at their backs, in front of their house.The armed men together
with Fronda and Padua proceeded towards sitio Cataratan, Allacapan,
Cagayan passing through the rice fields (taking along with them the
Balaan brothers).
Trial court found Fronda guilty as a principal by indispensable
cooperation.
(Testimony of Rudy Fronda)
On the night of June 10, 1986, he was taken by the NPA from his house,
accompanied by Robert Peralta, alias Ka Jun and Roderick Padua, to
look for the Balaan brothers.
There were around 9 NPA’s with them. They found the Balaan brothers
at the house of Ferminio Balaan, a brother.
They tied their wrists/hands and brought them to the mountains of Sitio
Tulong, Cataratan, Allacapan, Cagayan.
After that, the NPA instructed them to go home, but the in afternoon of
the same day, Robert Peralta, alias Ka Jun sent Elmer Martinez,
Orlando Gonzales, George Peralta, and Librado Duran to get him and
further he was ordered to get a spade and a crowbar. They were ordered
to dig a hole in the mountain, one kilometer away from his house.
Appellant interposes the exempting circumstance of uncontrollable fear
(Art 12 [6] RPC) claiming that all his acts were performed under the
impulse of uncontrollable fear and to save his life.
Issue: W o N the accused-appellants acts make him liable for a
principal by indispensable cooperation.
Held: Decision modified. Accused-appellant could only be convicted as
an accomplice of the crime. No incontrovertible proof was adduced by
the prosecution supporting the conclusion that the appellant agreed with
the members of the armed group to kill the Balaan brothers.
Undoubtedly, even without appellant’s participation, the assailants
could have easily located the Balaan brothers through the assistance of
Roderick Padua. Taking account the numbers of the assailants alone, it
is apparent that the armed men could have nevertheless committed the
crime easily without the appellant abetting the commission thereof. As
aforesaid to be considered principal by indispensable cooperation, there
must be direct participation in the criminal design by another act
without which the crime could have not been committed.
However, appellant’s act of joining the armed men in going to the
mountains, and his failure to object to their unlawful orders, or show
any reluctance in obeying the same, may be considered as
circumstances evincing his concurrence with the objectives of the
malefactors and had effectively supplied them with material and moral
aid, thereby, making him as an accomplice.
28. PEOPLE VS. BANDIAN
63 PHIL 530 (1936)
Nature: Charged with the crime of infanticide, convicted thereof and
sentenced to reclusion perpetua and the corresponding accessory
penalties, with the costs of the son. Josefina Bandian appealed from
said sentence.
Facts: At a0bout 7 o’clock in the morning of January 31, 1936,
Valentin Aguilar, the appellant’s neighbor, saw the appellant go to a
thicket about four or five brazas from her house, apparently to respond
to a call of nature because it was there that the people of the place used
to go for that purpose. A few minutes later, he again saw her emerge
from the thicket with her clothes stained with blood both in the front
and back, staggering and visibly showing signs of not being able to
support her. He ran to her and said, having noted that she was very
weak and dizzy, he supported and helped her go up to her house and
placed her in her own bed. Upon being asked before Aguilar brought
her to her house, what had happened to her, the appellant merely
answered that she was very dizzy. Not wishing to be alone with the
appellant in such circumstances. Valentin Aguilar called Adriano
Comcom, who lived nearby, to help them, and later requested him to
take bamboo leaves to stop the hemorrhage which had come upon the
appellant. Comcom had scarcely gone about five brazas when he saw
the body of newborn baby near a path adjoining the thicket where the
appellant had gone a few moments before Comcom informed Aguilar
of it and the latter told him to bring the body to the appellant’s house.
Upon being asked whether the baby which had just been shown to her
was hers or not, the appellant answered in the affirmative.
Upon being notified of the incident of 2 o’clock in the afternoon of said
day, Dr. Emilio Nepomuceno, president of the sanitary division of
Talisayan, Oriental Misamis, went to the appellant’s house and found
her lying in bed still bleeding. Her bed, the floor of her house and
beneath it, directly under the bed, was full of blood. Basing his opinion
upon said facts, the physician in question declared that the appellant
gave birth in her house and in her own bed; that after giving birth she
threw her child into the thicket to kill it for the purpose of concealing
her dishonor from the man, Luis Kirol, with whom she had theretofore
been living martially, because the child was not but of another man with
whom she had previously had another relations. To give force to his
conclusions, he testified that the appellant had admitted to turn that she
had killed her child, when he went to her house at the time and on the
date above-stated.
Ruling: In conclusion, taking into account the foregoing facts and
considerations, and granting that the appellant was aware of her
involuntary childbirth in the thicket and that she later to take her child
14
therefore, having been so prevented by reason of causes independent of
her will, it should be held that the alleged errors attributed to the lower
court by the appellant are and it appearing that under such
circumstances said appellant has the fourth and seventh exempting
circumstances in her favor, she is hereby acquitted of the crime of
which she had been accused and convicted with costs de oficio, and as
she is actually confined in jail in connection with the case it is ordered
that she be released immediately.
29. PEOPLE VS. URAL
56 SCRA 138 (1974)
NATURE: An appeal of defendant Domingo Ural from the decision of
Judge Vicente G. Ericta of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del
Sur, convicting him of murder, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua,
and ordering him to indemnify the heirs of Felix Napola in the sum of
twelve thousand pesos and to pay the costs.
FACTS: Upon arrival of Brigido Alberto in the municipal building at
around eight o'clock, he witnessed an extraordinary occurrence. He saw
Policeman Ural (with whom he was already acquainted) inside the jail.
Ural was boxing the detention prisoner, Felix Napola. As a consequence
of the fistic blows, Napola collapsed on the floor. Ural, the tormentor,
stepped on his prostrate body.
Ural went out of the cell. After a short interval, he returned with a
bottle. He poured its contents on Napola's recumbent body. Then, he
ignited it with a match and left the cell. Napola screamed in agony. He
shouted for help. Nobody came to succor him.
Much perturbed by the barbarity which he had just seen, Alberto left the
municipal building. Before his departure, Ural cautioned him: "You
better keep quiet of what I have done" (sic). Alberto did not sleep
anymore that night. From the municipal building, he went to the
crossing, where the cargo trucks passed. He hitchhiked in a truck
hauling iron ore and went home.
Doctor Luzonia R. Bakil, the municipal health officer, certified that the
thirty-year old victim, whom she treated twice, sustained second-degree
burns on the arms, neck, left side of the face and one-half of the body
including the back (Exh. A). She testified that his dermis and epidermis
were burned. If the burns were not properly treated, death would ensue
from toxemia and tetanus infection. "Without any medical
intervention", the burns would cause death", she said. She explained
that, because there was water in the burnt area, secondary infection
would set in, or there would be complications.
Napola died on August 25, 1966. The sanitary inspector issued a
certificate of death indicating "burn" as the cause of death (Exh. B).
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused committed the crime as guilty
beyond reasonable doubt?
HELD: Lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong offsets the generic
aggravating, circumstance of abuse of his official position. The trial
court properly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua which is the
medium period of the penalty for murder (Arts. 64[4] and 248, Revised
Penal Code).
Finding no error in the trial court's judgment, the same is
affirmed with costs against the appellant.
RULING: This case is covered by article 4 of the Revised Penal code
which provides that "criminal liability shall be incurred by any person
committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended". The presumption is "that a
person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary act" (Sec.
5[c], Rule 131, Rules of Court).
There is a rule that "an individual who unlawfully inflicts wounds upon
another person, which result in the death of the latter, is guilty of the
crime of homicide, and the fact that the injured person did not receive
proper medical attendance does not affect the criminal responsibility"
(U.S. vs. Escalona, 12 Phil. 54). In the Escalona case, the victim was
wounded on the wrist. It would not have caused death had it been
properly treated. The victim died sixty days after the infliction of the
wound. It was held that lack of medical care could not be attributed to
the wounded man. The person who inflicted the wound was responsible
for the result thereof.
The crime committed by appellant Ural was murder by means of fire
(incendio) (Par. 3, Art. 248, Revised Penal Code; People vs. Masin, 64
Phil. 757; U.S. vs. Burns, 41 Phil. 418, 432, 440).
The trial court correctly held that the accused took advantage of his
public position (Par. 1, Art. 14, Revised Penal Code). He could not have
maltreated Napola if he was not a policeman on guard duty. Because of
his position, he had access to the cell where Napola was confined. The
prisoner was under his custody. "The policeman, who taking advantage
of his public position maltreats a private citizen, merits no judicial
leniency." The methods sanctioned by medieval practice are surely not
appropriate for an enlightened democratic civilization. While the law
protects the police officer in the proper discharge of his duties, it must
at the same time just as effectively protect the individual from the abuse
of the police." U.S. vs. Pabalan, 37 Phil. 352).
But the trial court failed to appreciate the mitigating circumstance "that
the offender had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that
committed" (Par. 3, Art. 13, Revised Penal Code). It is manifest from
the proven facts that appellant Ural had no intent to kill Napola. His
design was only to maltreat him may be because in his drunken
condition he was making a nuisance of himself inside the detention cell.
When Ural realized the fearful consequences of his felonious act, he
allowed Napola to secure medical treatment at the municipal
dispensary.
30. PEOPLE VS. REGATO
127 SCRA 287 (1984)
Nature: For automatic review is death sentence imposed on accused-
appellants Miguel Regato and Jose Salceda by the then Court of First
Instance of Leyte, Branch IV, in Criminal Case No.12, entitled “People
vs. Miguel Regato, et al., “for robbery with homicide. They were also
ordered to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of Victor Flores
the sum of P 12,000.00; the further sum of P 8,000.00 and each to pay
one third of the costs.
Issue: In this appeal, appellants contend that the trial court erred
(1)when it denied Salcedos motion for new trial and did not acquit him
of the crime charged; (2) in convicting Regato of robbery with
homicide and not with simple robbery; (3) in not considering in their
favor the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a
wrong as that committed; (4) in considering the aggravating
circumstance of nocturnity against them and (5) in failing to consider
that the aggravating circumstance of craft is absorbed by the
aggravating circumstance of nocturnity.
Facts: About nine o’clock in the evening of November 22, 1969, three
persons called at the house of Victor Flores at Sitio Macaranas, Bo.
Capirawa, Palo Leyte asking if they could buy cigarettes. Felicisima
Flores, wife of Victor, was then maintaining a small sari-sari store
inside their house. Upon hearing them, she stood up and after lighting a
small kerosene lamp, opened the door of the house and extended the
lamp out to recognize the persons outside. She saw accused Miguel
Regato who was then at the porch and Jose Salceda.
As she kept on exposing the light at them, Regato approached
Felicisima and struck her hand holding the lamp, causing it to fall.
Regato then pointed a gun at Felicisima who moved backwards,
15
towards the kitchen after which she jumped out and ran to the house of
Filomeno Pilmaco, a neighbor. She asked for help and was told to sty in
the house while he and his companions would rush to poblacion of Palo
to inform the police if the incident. After Pilmaco and his companions
had left, Felicisima heard a gun explosion from the direction of their
house.
In the meantime, Godofredo Flores, the 12 years old son of Felicisima,
who was sleeping in the sala, was awakened by the voice of the
robbers. He observed that his mother was not in the house but his father
was being dragged down the stairway by Rito Ramirez and Miguel
Regato. He saw also appellant Salceda then lighted the lamp which was
then on the floor of the sala of the house and then he brought Florencio
inside the bedroom where Godofredo was then hiding. Rito Ramirez
and appellant Regato in turn, brought Victor Flores inside the sala.
Thereafter, Regato hit Victor Flores with the butt of his gun and said:
“Where is your money? Where is your money? When Victor answered
that they do not have any, Rito Ramirez boxed Victor at the mouth
breaking one of his teeth.
While Victor was being maltreated by Rito and Regato force him to
reveal where their money was, Salceda was busy ransacking a trunk
inside the bedroom which contain P 870.00 in a box. Salceda took and
went to the kitchen. He told Ramirez that he had the money and
Ramirez hit the man as he was angry for Victor telling them earlier that
he does not have money. Ramirez shot Victor Flores following which
Regato, Salceda and Ramirez rushed out the house and fled.
After some minutes, Felicisima Flores went back and found her
husband bleeding. Things inside the bedroom and found the money
inside the trunk gone. With the help of a nephew, Victor was brought to
the poblacion of Palo. On the way, they met a police patrol which
proceeded to the scene of the robbery.
The party of Victor reached the municipal building of Palo,
Leyte about midnight of November 22 and few minutes thereafter, he
gave a written statement which is now marked as Exhibit “C”.
The following morning, Victor was admitted at the Leyte
Provincial Hospital but due to severe hemorrhage, secondary to gunshot
wound, he died the same day.
Felicisima was formally investigated by the police to whom
she gave her affidavit now marked as Exhibit “F”. Jose Salceda on
November 26, 1969 was brought to the police department as a suspect
in the case. He was identified by Felicisima Flores. Regato was
likewise apprehended and a case against the three. Miguel Regato, Jose
Salceda and Rito Ramirez were filed for Robbery with Homicide. The
case was tried against Regato and Salceda only because Rito Ramirez
remains at large.
The defense is in denial and alibi. Regato claimed that on the
night of November 22, 1969, he was in he Gacao, Palo, Leyte attending
a novena prayers for his late father-in-law were his testimony
corroborated by the defense witnesses. Salceda, on the other hand
testified that in the morning of November 22, 2969 he was in Bo.
Gacao, Palo to transport palay. In that evening he had a drinking spree
with his group until 2 o’clock in the following morning.
HELD: WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED
except as to the penalty, which is hereby modified to reclusion
perpetua.
RATIONALE:
 We find no merit in the 2nd assigned error. Appellants with
Ramirez arrived together at the residence of Victor Flores and
pretended to buy cigarettes. When Felicisima Flores opened the door,
they went inside the house and demanded Victor Flores to bring out the
money. When he refused, Ramirez and Regato maltreated him while
Salceda went inside the bedroom and ransacked he trunk where the
money was kept. Ramirez then inquired whether he found the money
and he answered in the affirmative. It is the time that the shooting of
Victor Flores tool place after the money had been taken and it was only
when Flores called them “robbers” that Ramirez shot him. As partly
stated by the lower court, “It is clear that the killing was done by reason
or on the occasion of the robbery, that the accused are guilty of the
special complex crime of robbery with homicide”.
 Likewise, we find no merit in the contention that there was
lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that committed. Intention
is a mental process and is an internal state of mind, the intention must
be judged by his action, conduct and external acts of the accused. What
men do is the best index of their intention. IN the case at bar, the
aforesaid mitigating circumstance cannot be appreciated considering
that the acts employed by the accused were reasonable sufficient to
produce the result they actually made – death of the victim.
 With the respect to the fourth and fifth assigned errors,
nighttime and craft, the evidence is clear that the crime was committed
past 9:00 in the evening which “the culprits had especially sought he
hiding mantle of the night I order to facilitate its commission”. Craft
involves intellectual trickery or cunning on the part of the accused.
Herein appellants, in order to enter the house of Flores, shouted from
the outside that they wanted to buy cigarettes, which induced the
inmates to open the door for the, As held in People vs. Napili, 85 Phil
521, gaining entrance by pretending to buy cigarettes or drink water
constitutes craft.
 By and large, the conspiracy among appellants and Ramirez
in the commission of the crime is evident upon the facts as prove. Their
acts, collectively and individually executed, have demonstrated the
existence of a common design towards the accomplishment of unlawful
purpose and objective. The shooting and death of Victor Flores bear a
direct relation and intimate connection between the robbery and the
killing which occurred during and on the occasion of the robbery.
Whether the latter be prior or subsequent to the former, there is no
doubt that he complex crime of robbery with homicide has been
committed.
 On the other hand, appellants’ alibi must fall. In the first
place, Regato’s submittal that he should have been convicted of simple
robbery only, instead of robbery with homicide is an admission of his
presence at the scene of the crime contrary to his testimony that he was
in his house that evening of November 22, 1969 attending to novena
prayers for his late father-in-law. Secondly, to establish an alibi, it is not
enough to prove that appellants were at some other place when the
crime was committed but must, likewise demonstrate that it was
physically impossible for them to have been at the place of commission
at such time. The distance between the place of the commission of the
offense to the place where appellants were supposed to be at the time is
only 1 ½ kilometers, and these places are connected with passable roads
that could have facilitated the easy negotiation by the appellants
between their respective homes and the scene of the crime. Appellant’s
evidence on this point is not sufficient to overcome the positive
identification made by the prosecution witnesses – Felicisima Flores
and Godofredo Flores.
31. PEOPLE VS. PAGAL
79 SCRA 570 (1977)
Nature: This is an appeal on the Criminal Case No. CCC-VI-5 (70) of
the Circuit Criminal Court of Manila, wherein the accused, Pedro Pagal
y Marcelino and Jose Torcelino y Torazo, were charged with the crime
of robbery with homicide.
Facts: That on or about December 26, 1969, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating together
and mutually helping each other, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, with intent to gain, and by means of violence, take
away from the person of one Gau Guan, cash amounting to P1,281.00,
Philippine currency, to the damage and prejudice of the said Gau Guan
in the said sum of P1,281.00.
16
That on the occasion of the said robbery and for the purpose of enabling
them to take, steal and carry away the said amount of P1,281.00, the
herein accused, in pursuance of their conspiracy, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill and taking
advantage of their superior strength, treacherously attack, assault and
use personal violence upon the said Gau Guan, by then and there
stabbing him with an icepick and clubbing him with an iron pipe on
different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon him mortal wounds
which were the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter.
When the case was called for arraignment, counsel de oficio for the
accused informed said court of their intention to enter a plea of guilty
provided that they be allowed afterwards to prove the mitigating
circumstances of sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the
offended party immediately preceding the act, and that of having acted
upon an impulse so powerful as to produce passion and obfuscation.
Held: Since the alleged provocation which caused the obfuscation of
the appellants arose from the same incident, that is, the alleged
maltreatment and/or ill treatment of the appellants by the deceased,
these two mitigating circumstances cannot be considered as two distinct
and separate circumstances but should be treated as one.
Secondly, the circumstance of passion and obfuscation cannot be
mitigating in a crime which — as in the case at bar — is planned and
calmly meditated before its execution.
Finally, the appellants claim that the trial court erred in considering the
aggravating circumstances of nighttime, evident premeditation, and
disregard of the respect due the offended party on account of his rank
and age. Although the trial court correctly considered the aggravating
circumstance of nocturnity because the same was purposely and
deliberately sought by the appellants to facilitate the commission of the
crime, nevertheless, We disagree with its conclusion that evident
premeditation and disregard of the respect due the offended party were
present in the commission of the crime. Evident premeditation is
inherent in the crime of robbery. However, in the crime of robbery with
homicide, if there is evident premeditation to kill besides stealing, it is
considered as an aggravating circumstance. In other words, evident
premeditation will only be aggravating in a complex crime of robbery
with homicide if it is proved that the plan is not only to rob, but also to
kill. In the case at bar, a perusal of the written statements of the
appellants before the police investigators show that then original plan
was only to rob, and that, they killed the deceased only when the latter
refused to open the "kaha de yero", and fought with them. The trial
court, therefore, erred in taking into consideration the aggravating
circumstance of evident premeditation.
32. PEOPLE VS. PARANA
64 PHIL 331 (1937)
NATURE: The accused Primo Parana appeals from the judgment of
the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros sentencing him, for the
crime of murder committed on the person of Manuel Montinola, to the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to infirmity the heirs of the deceased
in the sum of P1, 000.00 with costs.
FACTS: On the morning of May 19, 1936, in the municipality of Silay,
Occidental Negros, the deceased, who was taking part in a game of
monte in the house of Jose Lapuos, was informed by the chauffeur
Valentin Poblacion that his brother Glicerio Montinola’s car which he
had ordered for his trip to the municipality of Cadiz, was ready to start.
Five minutes later the deceased came downstairs and upon reaching the
street, he turned towards the car which was waiting for him.
At that moment the chauffeur Poblacion, who saw the
appellant behind the deceased in the attitude of stabbing him with a
dagger shouted to warn him of the danger, and the deceased’s looking
behind, really saw the appellant about to stab him. The deceased,
defending himself retreated until he fell on his back into a ditch two
meters wide and 1.7 meters deep. Without lessening the aggression on
the appellant mounted astride of the deceased and continued to stab him
with the dagger.
After the appellant and the deceased had been separated, the
former still asked Montelibano for the weapon taken from him but at
that moment a policeman arrived and the appellant was placed under
arrest. When the deceased was later removed from the ditch into which
he had fallen, he was found wounded and was taken to the provincial
hospital where he was treated by Dr. Ochoa, expiring six days later, as a
result of general peritonitis produces by one of his wounds.
The preceding nights, at about 11o’closk, monte had also
been played in the house of Glicerio Montinola, brother of the
deceased. The deceased took part in said game where the appellant was
designated to attend to the players. One Lamay, who was also taking
part in the game, gave appellant the sum of P2 to buy beer. For failure
of the appellant to immediately comply with this request, a discussion
ensued between him and Lamay and, as both raised their voices, they
were admonished by the deceased. As the appellant disregarded said
admonition, the deceased slapped him and ordered him to leave the
house. The appellant left and went to Lapuos’ house where he lived,
where the deceased took part in another game on the following day, and
where said deceased came from when he was attacked.
At about 7 o’clock in the morning of the crime, the appellant
purchased from the store of the Japanese Matzu Akisama, a hunting
knife (Exhibit F) which is the same knife used by him in attacking the
deceased.
On the same morning, at about seven thirty, the appellant
went to the house of Crispin Espacio for who he used to work to ask to
wreak vengeance on somebody. Espacio advised him against it as he
might again go to Bilibid prison, inasmuch as he had already served a
term for the crime homicide.
The appellant’s testimony is the only evidence in his defense.
According to him, on the morning of the crime he saw the deceased
taking part in the game in Lapuos’ house where he lived. The deceased
then uttered threatening words to him which he disregarded, leaving the
house and going to a nearby Chinese store. Sometime, later as he was
on his way for Lapuos’ house, he saw the deceased coming down and
approaching the latter, he spoke to him about the incident of the
previous night and of their meeting a few minutes before asking said
deceased to forgive and met wreak vengeance on him. The deceased, by
way of an answer drew the revolver which he carried on his belt, and
the appellant in the efface suck attitude, attempted to wrest the weapon
from him. In the struggle the deceased fell on his back into a ditch and
the appellant mounted astride of him tried to wrest the revolver from
him, and at the same time drew the knife which he carried, attacking the
deceased therewith. When the appellant had succeeded in taking
possession of the revolver, the deceased got up and walked towards the
car. At that moment Liboro Montelibano appeared and the appellant
turned over the knife and the revolver to him.
The version of the incident given by the appellant in his
testimony, without any corroboration is contradicted by the testimony
of the chauffeur Poblacion and of Liboro Montelibano. Furthermore, it
is improbable taking into consideration the fact that he was the
offended [arty, suffering from the injustice of the offense received,
provided himself with lethal weapon and approached the deceased,
which circumstances do not agree with his attitude according to his
testimony.
HELD: The court finds the appellant guilty of the crime of murder
qualified by treachery and taking into consideration the presence of one
aggravating and two mitigating circumstances in the commission of the
crime and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, Act No. 4103, he
is sentenced to the penalty of from ten years of prision mayor, as the
minimum, to seventeen years, four months and one day of reclusion
temporal, as the maximum, affirming the appealed sentence in all other
respects with the costs.
17
RATIONALE:
 The court correctly found that the qualifying circumstance of
treachery was present in the commission of the crime. The appellant,
inspite of having seen the deceased in the upper story of Lapuos' house,
did nor wish to attack the latter there undoubtedly to avid his being
defended by the many players who were with him. Instead, he waited
for the deceased at the nearby store until the latter came down, and
attack him while he had his back turned and could not see the appellant.
All these, which were the beginning of the execution of the appellant’s
design to kill ye deceased, constitute treachery inasmuch as they tended
to avoid every risk to himself arising from the defense which the
deceased might make.
 The aggravating circumstance that the appellant is a recidivist
must be taken into consideration. The mitigating circumstance that he
had acted in the immediate vindication of a grave offense committed
against him a few hours before, when he was slapped by the deceased
in the presence of many persons, must likewise be taken into
consideration. Although this offense, which engenders perturbation of
mind, was not so immediate, that the influence thereof, by reason o it
gravity and the circumstances under which it was inflicted, lasted until
the moment the crime was continued. Lastly, the other mitigating
circumstance that the appellant had voluntarily surrendered himself to
the agents of the authorities must be considered.
33. PEOPLE VS. DIOKNO
63 PHIL 601 (1936)
Nature: Appeal from a judgment of the CFI (Court of First Instance
now Regional Trial Court) of Laguna.
Facts: The deceased Yu Hiong was a vendor of sundry goods in
Lucena, Tayabas. At 7 o’clock in the morning of January $, 1935,
Salome Diokno, to whom Yu Hiong was engaged for about a year,
invited the latter to go with her. Yu Hiong accepted the invitation but he
told Salome that her father was angry with him. At about 6 o’clock in
the afternoon of said day, Yu Hiong and Salome Diokno took an
automobile and went to the house of Vicente Verina, Salome’s cousin in
Pagbilao.
On January 5th or 6th of said year, Roman Diokno telegraphed his father
Epifanio Diokno, who was in Manila, informing him that Salome had
eloped with the Chinese Yu Hiong, on the morning of January 7, 1935,
Epifanio and Roman Diokno went to San Pablo, in search of the
elopers. Upon arriving near the house, they saw Yu Hiong coming
down the stairs. When Yu Hiong saw them, he ran upstairs and they
pursued him. At the moment, he was overtaken by the accused that
carried knives locally known as balisong, of different size. Yu Hiong
fell on his knees and implored pardon. Roman Diokno stabbed him
with the knife I the back and the later in the left side. Epifanio stabbed
at once.
Issue: Whether or not said accused were physically stronger than the
deceased? And whether or not the said accused abused such
superiority?
Held: Neither does this court find the existence of the other
circumstance qualifying murder, that is, evident premeditation proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. In order that premeditation may be
considered either as an aggravating or as an qualifying circumstance, it
must be evident, that5 is the intention to kill must be manifest and it
must have been planned in the mind of the offender and carefully
meditated therefore, there having been neither abuse of superior
strength nor evident premeditation, the crime committed by the accused
is simple homicide.
The presence of 5th mitigating circumstance of Article 13 of the Revised
Penal Code maybe taken into consideration in favor of the two accused,
because the offense did not cease while Salome’s whereabouts
remained unknown and her marriage to the deceased unlegalized.
Therefore, there was no interruption from the time of offense was
committed to the vindication thereof.
The presence of the 6th mitigating circumstance of Article 13 of the
RPC may also be taken into consideration in favor of the accused. The
fact that the accused saw the deceased ran upstairs when he became
aware of their presence, as if he refused to deal with them after having
gravely offended him.
The 7h mitigating circumstance of Article 13 of the RPC should also be
taken in favor of the accused Epifanio Diokno.
The court conclude that accused are guilty of reasonable beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide, the penalty therein being
reclusion temporal in its full extent, 3 mitigating circumstances must be
taken into consideration in favor of the accused Epifanio and 2
mitigating circumstances in favor of the accused Roman Diokno with
no aggravating circumstances.
Both accused should be granted the benefits of the indeterminate
sentence which prescribe a penalty the minimum of which shall be
taken from the next lower to prision mayor, or prision correccional of
from 6 months and 1 day to 6 years. Taking into account the
circumstances of the case, the indeterminate penalty to which each of
said accused must be sentenced is fixed at from 2 years and 1 day of
prision correccional. Wherefore, the accused was guilty of the crime of
homicide and sentence each of them to an indeterminate penalty from 2
years, 1 day of prison correccional to 8 years, 1 day of prision mayor.
34. PEOPLE VS. MUIT
117 SCRA 696 (1982)
NATURE: Appeal from the Decision of the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Sur, Branch I (Naga City), in Criminal Case No. R-7 (1847),
convicting the accused Delfin Muit, a retired PC 2nd Lieutenant, of
Murder, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetual
for the gunning down of the victim, Rodolfo Torrero.
FACTS: On February 26, 1976 at about 2:45 o'clock in the afternoon,
while the deceased Rodolfo Torrero, his family and friends, were
passing by the house of accused Delfin Muit at barrio Tamban,
Tinambac, Camarines Sur, on their Nay home from a picnic, the
accused invited them to his house to take a rest. At that time Muit was
alone as his wife and children were not around. Once the group was
inside his house, accused Muit who is a retired PC lieutenant remarked
that his invitation showed that he had no ill-feeling against the Torreros
and that he knew the latter had no ill-feeling also against him. As they
engaged in some amenities, a group of barangay members and PC
authorities in !barge of the sanitation and cleanliness program on that
particular lay, which was Community Day, paid them a visit, and after a
short talk, said group left. The deceased Torrero conducted the group on
their way out and upon his return; accused Muit requested him to take a
seat.
The accused then confronted Rodolfo Torrero why the latter always
visits his wife even during nighttime and why he often invites her out.
Torrero replied that being the barangay zone auditor, he had to confer
with the accused's wife on barangay matters as the latter was the
barangay zone president. The accused then asked why Torrero even
gave food and money to his (accused's) children if he had no bad
intention at all on his wife. Torrero's wife answered that they did it out
of pity because there were times when they would see the accused's
children in need of food and money. The accused, however, angrily
stood up and countered, "Why should you give when your husband had
also a family to support?” To avoid any trouble, the deceased Torrero
likewise stood up and said, 'If that is the way we talked about this will
end to nothing, so it is better that I should leave', and he proceeded to
move out of the house.
18
When Torrero was already outside the house of the accused and while
walking along the pathway, the accused followed him and on reaching
the door the accused shouted, "Wait because we have not yet finished".
At that instant, the accused raised his left hand towards Torrero and
with his right hand; he pulled out his .45 caliber pistol and aimed it at
the deceased. Angrily, he fired his gun at Torrero who was just 3½
meters away, hitting the latter at the lower left side below the nape. On
being hit by the bullet, Torrero spun from his left to the right, with his
two hands inclined to the right, his face writhing in pain, his left elbow
raised parallel to his armpit and his right hand placed on his breast.
Upon hearing the gunshot, witness Gubatan immediately grabbed and
held the accused from behind with an embrace, and said, "Manoy
Delfin, why are you like that?” But as soon as Gubatan embraced the
accused from behind, a second shot was fired, this time hitting the
elevated left hand of Torrero, with the bullet penetrating through the
breast. Consequently, Torrero fell on his knees, bent forward with face
downward and body in a prone position his left elbow supporting him
on his left lap while his right hand extended to the ground. Witness
Gubatan on the other hand tightened his grip around the accused as he
tried to wrestle with him.
The wife of Torrero, who was shocked by the first shot thereupon
rushed towards her fallen husband. But the accused on seeing Mrs.
Torrero rushed towards the deceased, aimed his gun at her. Fortunately,
witness Gubatan quickly grabbed the right forearm of the accused that
held the gun and jerked it upward so that the third shot was fired
towards the sky, thus missing its target Id). Witness Gubatan then said,
"Manoy Delfin that is enough". Gubatan thereafter moved the accused
away and brought him near a coconut tree. Mrs. Torrero, on the other
hand, hugged her husband and cried for help, even as blood was oozing
out from the deceased's body and mouth. Shortly thereafter, Torrero
died.
Near the coconut tree, the accused tried to free himself from the hold of
Gubatan. He even pointed his gun at Gubatan and said, "Set me free
Benny or I will shoot you.” When Gubatan could no longer hold the
accused as the latter kept on struggling, he let him go and said, "Alright
Kuya Delfin, shoot me, after all I have no fault". Slowly, the accused
put down his arm, his eyes at static condition. He (appellant) then
started to move away, and as he did, he made a short last look at his
victim, after which, he continued on his way. After the incident, the
accused proceeded to the PC detachment to surrender himself and his
gun.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused can involve passion and
obfuscation as mitigating circumstance?
HELD: Modifying the judgment appealed from, the accused Delfin
Muit, is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight
(8) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and
eight (8) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, with the
judgment being affirmed in an other respects.
RATIONALE:
During the trial the accused involved passion and obfuscation
as mitigating circumstance. There can be no question that the accused
was driven strongly buy jealousy because of rumors regarding the
amorous relationship between his wife and the victim. The feeling of
resentment resulting from rivalry in amorous relation with a woman is a
powerful stimulant from rivalry and amorous relation with a woman is
a powerful stimulant to jealously and is sufficient to produce loss of
reason and self-control. In other words, it is a powerful instigation of
jealously and prone to produce anger and obfuscation.
35. PEOPLE VS. AQUINO
G.R. O. 128887 (JAN. 2000)
NATURE: Appeal from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Olongapo City, Branch 75
FACTS: On January 19, 1996, Roselyn Lampera, daughter of Valerio
and Esmeralda Lampera was in their house, together with her mother,
younger brother Daniel and younger sister. Their house is like a small
cubicle without any partitions, elevated from the ground by about 2 1/2
feet.
In the morning of that fateful day, Roselyn's mother, Esmeralda, was in
their house taking care of Roselyn's younger sister who was sick at the
time. Her younger brother, on the other hand, was playing on the
ground near their house. Appellant Edgardo Aquino (who was their
neighbor) arrived, looking for their father. Both Roselyn and her mother
informed Edgardo that Valerio, Roselyn's father, was in Olongapo.
Unsatisfied with their answer, Edgardo (who was near the door at the
time) peeped in their house and when he did not see Valerio, pulled out
his knife. Initially, he tried to stab Roselyn's younger brother. When
Roselyn and her mother saw this, they rushed towards the younger boy
in an attempt to protect him. When Edgardo saw their reaction, Edgardo
stepped inside their house, eager to vent his ire on Roselyn, intending to
stab her. Roselyn's mother pulled her aside, shouting. Edgardo went for
her mother who tried valiantly to evade his thrust as she was then
carrying Roselyn's sick younger sister. Roselyn saw Edgardo repeatedly
stab her mother in the latter's stomach and chest areas. Out of fear,
Roselyn managed to destroy their nipa wall and jumped out of their
house. Despite her shouts for help, no help came.
At about the same time also, Benjamin Costimiano, a purok leader, was
in his house when he heard some kind of shouting or commotion. Being
a purok leader, he went to the place of incident and saw the victim. He
heard the people there say that the culprit was Edgardo Aquino. He
went after Edgardo and was able to catch up with him in the house of
one Francisco Franco. Benjamin asked Edgardo (who was still armed
with a knife at that time) to put down the knife and the latter gave him
the knife. Benjamin described the knife used as a double-bladed one,
and when it was handed to him, the handle still had some blood on it.
Dr. Nancy Valdez, Medico-legal Officer III of the San Marcelino
District Hospital, testified that she was the one who conducted the
autopsy on the cadaver of the victim. She noted four (4) stab wounds at
the xiphoid processes/chest area, two (2) of which were fatal as they
penetrated the thoracic cavity, causing lacerations on the anterior
portion of the superior lobe of the left lung.
Valerio Lampera, Esmeralda's husband, declared that the untimely
death of Esmeralda caused him pain and compelled the family to incur
expenses in the amount of P2, 500. Daniel Isaac, Esmeralda's 8-year-
old son, was likewise psychologically and emotionally affected by the
unexpected demise of his mother. He cried on the witness stand when
asked of the whereabouts of his mother.
EDGARDO had another story to tell. According to him, Esmeralda's
husband was his business partner in the sale of fish. In the evening of
19 January 1996, he went to the house of the Lamperas to get his
capital for the business. He saw Roselyn standing by the stairs of the
house and asked her about the whereabouts of her father Valerio. When
she informed him that Valerio was not there, he left for the store of
Francisco Franco. On his way to the store, he heard shouts coming from
the Lampera's house, which he mistook to be just another ordinary
fight. He proceeded to Franco's store. Then Benjamin Costimiano, a
purok leader, arrived at the store, carrying with him a knife which,
according to him, was recovered from inside Esmeralda's house.
Benjamin invited EDGARDO to go with him to the Police Department
of Subic, Zambales. Upon arrival thereat Costimiano ordered the
detention of EDGARDO allegedly because the latter was a suspect in
the killing of Esmeralda. EDGARDO was detained for two months but
was not investigated by the police. He could not remember having been
brought to the office of the Provincial Prosecutor and having given a
statement thereat. He insisted that he did not kill Esmeralda and that the
19
knife presented by the prosecution was not taken from him. Besides, he
had no reason to kill the wife of his business partner
ISSUE: Whether or not that treachery can be appreciated as aggravating
circumstance; and temporary insanity, passion and obfuscation,
intoxication, and voluntary surrender as mitigating circumstances in the
crime committed by the accused
HELD: The challenged decision of Branch 75 of the Regional Trial
Court of Olongapo City in Criminal Case No. 56-96 is MODIFIED. As
modified, accused-appellant EDGARDO AQUINO y PUMAWAN is
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principal, of the crime of
homicide, defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code, and is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty
ranging from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion
temporal as maximum. The awards of P50, 000 as indemnity, P50, 000
as moral damages, P30, 000 as exemplary damages, and P2, 500 as
actual damages stand
RATIONALE: There was treachery in view of the sudden and
unexpected attack upon the unarmed victim, who had not committed
the slightest provocation and who was totally unaware of EDGARDO's
murderous designs. Neither the victim nor her children anticipated the
attack. EDGARDO did not give any warning that he was about to start
a stabbing spree. The victim, then carrying a sick child, never had the
chance to defend her or to retaliate. All that she managed to do was to
try to evade EDGARDO's knife blows. In this case, the victim,
Esmeralda, was forewarned of the impending attack on her, since it was
preceded by EDGARDO's attempts to attack her son and daughter. It
cannot be said that she was in no position to defend her; for, in fact, she
succeeded in repelling appellant's aggression against her children.
When EDGARDO turned to her, she "tried to evade the thrust" causing
her 6-year-old child whom she was carrying to be thrown away.
Furthermore, there is no sufficient evidence that the appellant
deliberately and consciously adopted the means of execution employed
by him. What is apparent is that the killing was done impulsively or on
the spur of the moment.
"Temporary insanity" is not recognized in this jurisdiction
and that mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude
imputability. In any case, EDGARDO had the burden of proving his
alleged "temporary insanity," as it is a basic principle in our rules on
evidence that he who alleges a fact must prove the truth thereof.
However, he did not raise this argument below, and it is only now that
he belatedly raises it.
Anent EDCARDO's claim of the mitigating circumstance of
passion or obfuscation, the same is bereft of merit because his acts did
not result from an impulse arising from lawful sentiments but from a
spirit of lawlessness.
We disagree with the trial court in appreciating in appellant's
favor the mitigating circumstance of intoxication, EDGARDO declared
that he drank liquor on the day of the incident in question, and the trial
court held that his intoxication was corroborated by Roselyn's
testimony that EDGARDO's eyes were "red" when she saw him. For
intoxication to be mitigating, the following conditions must be present:
(1) the same is not habitual or is not subsequent to the plan of the
commission of a felony; otherwise, it is aggravating if it is habitual and
intentional; and (2) the consumption of alcoholic drinks was in such
quantity as to blur the accused's reason and deprive him of a certain
degree of control. In this case, EDGARDO was unable to prove both
requisites.
Nevertheless, we appreciate in EDGARDO's favor the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. Immediately after the
incident, when purok leader Benjamin Costimiano followed him in the
house of Francisco Franco, EDGARDO voluntarily gave the knife to
Franco and went with the latter to the Police Headquarters where he
was forthwith detained. The information against him was filed much
later.
36. PEOPLE VS. CAMAGUIN
229 SCRA 166 (1994)
37. PEOPLE VS. DULOS
237 SCRA 141 (1994)
Nature: It is an appeal from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Cotabato City Br. 13 which found accused Efren Dulos guilty of the
crime of Murder committed with treachery and sentencing him
reclusion perpetua.
Facts: On the evening of march 15, 1987, professional entertainers,
Susan and Alice, were sitting at the lobby of the New Imperial Hotel in
Cotabato city, waiting for prospective clients. A military police assigned
at the said hotel as watchman approached them and told them that the
accused-appellant had some male guests who wished to be entertained.
Both parties agreed to a charge of Php 100.00 each for Susan and Alice
as fee for their services. The parties then went to a disco house however
Alice left early and decided to wait for Susan at the lobby of the Hotel.
Susan , apparently decided to check in with one of the accused-
appellant’s guests at the upper floor of the disco house for an additional
fee of Php 500.00. After receiving the money, she changed her mind,
thus, spawning a fight with her customer. After MP Gara intervene,
Susan came down to the lobby of the Hotel to meet her boyfriend Paul
Tamse who was waiting for her. Upon hearing the reneged deal, the
irate accused-appellant confronted Susan and Paul. Accused-appellant
demanded the return of his money. Susan handed the Php 100.00 to
accused-appellant however she denied having received Php 500.00
unless her boyfriend would find out that she agreed to check in with a
customer. She tried to grapple with the accused-appellant for the gun
but was violently pushed aside. The boyfriend on the other hand
pleaded for mercy by kneeling down and raising his hands up. Despite
the plea, he was shot by the accused-appellant twice killing him on the
spot. The accused-appellant surrendered the gun to the military
authorities in Camp Siongco, Maguindanao and was not placed under
custody by the military authorities as he was free to roam around as he
pleased.
Issue: Won a mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender could be
appreciated in this case.
Ruling: No, a mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender could not
be appreciated in this case. The SC held that in order that voluntary
surrender may be appreciated, it is necessary that “it must be
spontaneous and made in such manner that it shows the intent of the
accused to surrender unconditionally to the authorities, either because
he acknowledged his guilt or because he wishes to save the trouble and
expenses necessarily incurred in his search and capture. In this case the
elements were not present. There was no conscious effort on the part of
Dulos to voluntarily surrender to the military authorities. As he himself
admitted in his testimony, he was not placed under custody by the
military as he was free to roam around as he pleased. Likewise, his
claim that he surrendered his gun without surrendering his person to the
authorities does not constitute voluntary surrender
38. PEOPLE VS. CRISOSTOMO
160 SCRA 47 (1998)
Nature: It is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance
of Bulacan which found Eugenio Crisostomo guilty of the crime of
murder and sentences him to Reclusion Perpetua, and to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased in the sum fo Php 12,000.00 and to pay the costs.
20
Facts: On December 25, 1967 between six and seven o’clock in the
evening at Sto. Rosario, Hagonoy, Bulacan, while Eugenio Crisostomo
was passing near the house of Romeo Geronimo, he met the latter and
invited him to have a drink in the place of a friend. Romeo declined the
offer. Suddenly Eugenio rushed towards Romeo who was then standing
near a store facing the street with his back towards Eugenio and shot
him with a .22 caliber revolver at a distance of one meter. The bullet
entered into his armpit and came out on the right side of the chest about
one inch in the sternum. Romeo fell to the ground mortally wounded
while Eugenio ran away. By-standers who were near the place came to
the aide of the fallen victim and brought him to the Reyes Hospital in
Hagonoy where the doctor pronounced the victim dead upon arrival.
Upon arraignment wherein accused entered a plea of not guilty and
again during the trial, the accused signified his intention to withdraw hi
plea of not guilty to the charge of murder and to substitute it with a plea
of guilty to a lesser charge of homicide and prayed that he be allowed
to prove the mitigating circumstances. The same plea was made by the
accused after the prosecution had rested its case but the fiscal did not
agree. Thus the lower court denied the petition.
Issue: Won a mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilt be
appreciated in this case.
Ruling: No, the mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilt is
not appreciated in this case. The SC held that he cannot be credited
with the mitigating circumstance of a plea of guilty to a lesser offense
of the charge of homicide. The requisites of the mitigating circumstance
of voluntary plea of guilty are: (1) that the offender spontaneously
confessed his guilt; (2) that the confession of guilt was made in open
court, that is, before the competent court that is to try the case; and (3)
that the confession of guilt was made prior to the presentation of
evidence for the prosecution. In the present case the appellant offered to
enter a plea of guilty to the lesser offense of homicide only after some
evidence of the prosecution had been presented. He reiterated his offer
after the prosecution rested his case. This is certainly not mitigating.
39. PEOPLE VS. JOSE ET AL.
37 SCRA 450 (1971)
Nature: Appeal from and automatic review of a decision of the Court
of first Instance of Rizal.
Facts: At about 4:30 am, June 26, 1967, Miss De la Riva, was driving
her car accompanied by her maid Helen Calderon. As she was
approaching her house at No. 48, 12th Street, New Manila, Quezon
City, a Pontiac two-door convertible car with the four accused came
abreast of her car and tried to bump it. Pineda stopped the car which he
was driving, jumped out of it and rushed towards her.
The girl became so frightened at this turn of events that she tooted the
horn of her car continuously. Undaunted, Pineda opened the door of
Miss De la Riva's car and grabbed the the victim’s arm and dragged her
inside the car. The complainant was made to sit between Jaime Jose and
Edgardo Aquino at the back seat; Basilio Pineda, Jr. was at the wheel,
while Rogelio Cañal was seated beside him. The two men seated on
each side of Miss De la Riva started to get busy with her body: Jose put
one arm around the complainant and forced his lips upon hers, while
Aquino placed his arms on her thighs and lifted her skirt. The car
reached a dead-end street. Pineda turned the car around and headed
towards Victoria Street. Then the car proceeded to Araneta Avenue, Sta.
Mesa Street, Shaw Boulevard, thence to Epifanio de los Santos Avenue.
When the car reached Makati, Aquino took a handkerchief from his
pocket and, with the help of Jose, blindfolded Miss De la Riva. Not
long after, the car came to a stop at the Swanky Hotel in Pasay City.
The blindfolded lady was led out of the car to one of the rooms on the
second floor of the hotel.
Inside the room Miss De la Riva was made to sit on bed. Her blindfold
was removed. She saw Pineda and Aquino standing in front of her, and
Jose and Cañal sitting beside her, all of them smiling meaningfully.
Pineda ordered the victim to striptease to which the other men agreed
to. After which, the four men took turns in raping her starting with
Jose, Aquino, Pineda and Canal. Whenever dela Riva passed out, they
would pour water on her face and slapp her to revive her. Mention must
be made of the fact that while each of the four appellants was struggling
with the complainant, the other three were outside the room, just behind
the door, threatening the complainant with acid and telling her to give
in because she could not, after all, escape, what with their presence.
After the appellants had been through with the sexual carnage, they
dropped her in front of the Free Press Building not far from Epifanio de
los Santos Avenue near Channel 5 to make it appear, according to them,
that the complainant had just come from the studio.
Issue: W/N a plea of guilty is mitigating, at the same time it constitutes
an admission of all the material facts alleged in the information.
Held: the judgment under review is hereby modified as follows:
appellants Jaime G. Jose, Basilio Pineda, Jr., and Edgardo P. Aquino are
pronounced guilty of the complex crime of forcible abduction with
rape, and each and every one of them is likewise convicted of three (3)
other crimes of rape. As a consequence thereof, each of them is hereby
sentenced to four (4) death penalties.
Ratio: Appellant Pineda claims that insofar as he is concerned there
was a mistrial resulting in gross miscarriage of justice. He contends that
because the charge against him and his co-appellants is a capital offense
and the amended complaint cited aggravating circumstances, which, if
proved, would raise the penalty to death, it was the duty of the court to
insist on his presence during all stages of the trial. The contention is
untenable.
Because of the aforesaid legal effect of Pineda's plea of guilty, it was
not incumbent upon the trial court to receive his evidence, much less to
require his presence in court. It would be different had appellant Pineda
requested the court to allure him to prove mitigating circumstances, for
then it would be the better part of discretion on the part of the trial court
to grant his request.
The technicalities in plain simple language of the contents of
aggravating circumstances and apprised him of the penalty he would
get, and we have given said accused time to think. After a while I
consulted him - for three times - and his decision was still the same.
Three days after the arraignment, the same counsel stated in court that
he had always been averse to Pineda's idea of pleading guilty, but that
he acceded to his client's wish only after the fiscal had stated that he
would recommend to the court the imposition of life imprisonment on
his client.
40. PEOPLE VS. VILLA
G.R. 129899 (APRIL 2000)
Nature: Appeal from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Olongapo City
Facts: In the early morning of 22 June 1991 Dionito Fernandez was
cutting grass in his yard in New Cabalan, Olongapo City. Accused
Rodolfo Villa, Jr., a member of the CAFGU and neighbor of Dionito,
suddenly came out of his house with his M-1 Garand rifle and shot
Dionito from behind killing him instantly. Ronald Fernandez and Sheila
Fernandez, children of Dionito, rushed to their father's rescue after
hearing the gunshot but the accused also fired at them fatally hitting
Ronald who was embracing his father, and mortally wounding Sheila
on the thigh and stomach. Samuel Eclevia, another neighbor of the
Fernandezes, attempted to wrestle the rifle from the accused but Samuel
too was gunned down.
21
After his rampage, Rodolfo Villa Jr. surrendered to a certain Captain
Dolino of S2 OMDC (Olongapo Metropolitan District Command
Issue: W/N taking advantage of his public position as a CAFGU
member should be considered against accused-appellant.
Held: The assailed Decision of the trial court convicting accused-
appellant RODOLFO VILLA, JR. Y DELGADO of four (4) separate
counts of Murder is AFFIRMED, subject to the MODIFICATION of
the penalties imposed.
The SC did not agree that the aggravating circumstance of "taking
advantage of his public position" as a CAFGU member should be
considered against accused-appellant. The mere fact that he was a
member of the CAFGU and was issued an M-1 Garand rifle is not
sufficient to establish that he misused his public position in the
commission of the crimes.
41. PEOPLE VS. GAPASIN
231 SCRA 728 (1994)
Nature: This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch XVI, Isabela in Criminal Case No. IV-781, finding appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder qualified by treachery, with
the attendance of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender,
and the aggravating circumstances of taking advantage of public
position and evident premeditation sentencing him to suffer reclusion
perpetua.
FACTS: According to prosecution witness Alberto Carrido, he and
Rodrigo Ballad left the house of Enteng Teppang at about 2:00 P.M. of
October 6, 1979 after attending the "pamisa" for the deceased father of
Teppang. Jerry Calpito followed them. While they were walking along
the barangay road, Calpito was shot by appellant with an armalite rifle.
When Calpito fell on the ground, appellant fired more shots at him.
Thereafter, accused Amor Saludares planted a .22 caliber revolver on
the left hand of Calpito. Upon hearing the shots, Faustina Calpito ran to
succor her fallen husband.
Accused Nicanor Saludares pointed his gun at Faustina while accused
Soriano fired his gun upwards. Saludares warned that he would kill any
relative of Jerry Calpito who would come near him. Faustina and the
other relatives of the victim scampered away as the Saludares' group
chased them.
Appellant invoked self-defense. He testified that he was issued a
mission order on September 23, 1979 to investigate a report regarding
the presence of unidentified armed men in Barrio San Jose, Roxas,
Isabela. The following day, he was instructed by Sgt. Dominador
Ignacio to get in touch with Nicanor Saludares who may be able to give
him information on the identities of the persons with unlicensed
firearms in the place. When appellant met Nicanor Saludares on
September 29, 1979, he was informed that Jerry Calpito had an
unlicensed firearm.
The body of Calpito was autopsied by Dr. Bernardo Layugan, who
found that the victim sustained four bullet wounds: (1) on the right
lateral side of the arm fracturing the humerus; (2) on the right lateral
side of the thorax between the 7th and 8th ribs with exit wound at the
sternum; (3) on the left side of the thorax, anterior, between the 5th and
6th ribs; and (4) on the right fronto-parietal portion of the head
"severing the skull and brain tissues" (Exh. "F"). Dr. Layugan opined
that the victim was in a standing position when he was shot by someone
positioned at his right.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appellants are guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of murder qualified by treachery, with the attendance of the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, and the aggravating
circumstances of taking advantage of public position and evident
premeditation?
HELD: Appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder
qualified by treachery, with the attendance of the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender, and the aggravating circumstances
of taking advantage of public position and evident premeditation.
Appellant's claim of self-defense is belied by the finding of the trial
court that the victim was shot by someone who was standing on his
right side.
The fact that the prosecution witnesses are relatives of the victim does
not necessarily indicate that they were biased as to impair their
credibility.
42. PEOPLE VS. RODIL
109 SCRA 308 (1981)
Nature: Automatic Review of the judgement of the Circuit Criminal
Court of Pasig Rizal.
Facts: At about 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of April 24, 1971, the
deceased, PC Lt. Guillermo Masana, together with PC soldier Virgilio
Fidel, Philippine Coast Guard serviceman Ricardo Ligsa, and
Patrolman Felix Mojica of Indang, Cavite, was having lunch inside a
restaurant in front of the Indang market (pp. 2, 3, t.s.n., Oct. 30, 1971;
pp. 10, 19, t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971; p. 21, t.s.n., Jan. 20, 1972). While they
were eating, they saw, through the glass panel of the restaurant,
appellant outside the restaurant blowing his whistle. Their attention
having been drawn to what appellant was doing, Lt. Masana, then in
civilian clothing, accompanied by PC soldier Virgilio Fidel, went out of
the restaurant, approached appellant and asked the latter, after
identifying himself as a PC officer, whether the gun that was tucked in
his waist had a license. Instead of answering the question of Lt.
Masana, appellant moved one step backward and attempted to draw his
gun. PC soldier Virgilio Fidel immediately grabbed appellant's gun
from appellant's waist and gave it to Lt. Masana. After that, Lt. Masana
told the appellant to go inside the restaurant. PC soldier Virgilio Fidel
followed. Lt. Masana and the appellant occupied a separate table about
one and one-half (1 1/2) meters from the table of Lt. Masana's three
companionsFidel, Ligsa and Mojica (p. 10, t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971). After
the two were already seated, Lt. Masana placed appellant's gun on the
table. After that Lt. Masana pulled out a piece of coupon bond paper
from his pocket and wrote thereon the receipt for the gun, and after
signing it, he asked appellant to countersign the same, but appellant
refused to do so. Instead, he asked Lt. Masana to return the gun to him.
Lt. Masana rejected appellant's plea, telling the latter that they would
talk the matter over in the municipal building of Indang, Cavite. When
Lt. Masana was about to stand up, appellant suddenly pulled out a
double-bladed dagger and with it he stabbed Lt. Masana several times,
on the chest and stomach causing his death several hours thereafter.
Issue: W/N the attack on the victim, who was known to the appellant
as a peace officer, could be considered only as aggravating, being "in
contempt of/or with insult to the public authorities", or as an "insult or
in disregard of the respect due the offended party on account of his
rank.
Held: GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF HOMICIDE
AGGRAVATED BY CONTEMPT FOR OR INSULT TO A PUBLIC
AUTHORITY, THE JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM IS AFFIRMED,
PENALTY MODIFIED.
22
While the evidence definitely demonstrated that appellant knew
because the victim, who was in civilian clothing, told him that he was
an agent of a person in authority, he cannot be convicted of the complex
crime of homicide with assault upon an agent of a person in authority,
for the simple reason that the information does not allege the fact that
the accused then knew that, before or at the time of the assault, the
victim was an agent of a person in authority. The information simply
alleges that appellant did, "attack and stab PC Lt. Guillermo Masana
while the latter was in the performance of his official duties, . . . " Such
an allegation .cannot be an adequate substitute for the essential
averment to justify a conviction of the complex crime, which
necessarily requires the imposition of the maximum period of the
penalty prescribed for the graver offense. Like a qualifying
circumstance, such knowledge must be expressly and specifically
averred in the information; otherwise, in the absence of such allegation,
the required knowledge, like a qualifying circumstance, although
proven, would only be appreciated as a generic aggravating
circumstance.
43. PEOPLE VS. DANIEL
86 SCRA 511 (1978)
Nature: APPEAL from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Baguio City.
Facts: On September 20, 1965, at about three o'clock in the afternoon,
Margarita Paleng had just arrived in the City from Tublay in a Dangwa
bus. Because it was then raining and the bus was parked several meters
away from the bus station, she waited inside the bus . After about three
minutes of waiting, the accused came and started molesting her by
inquiring her name and getting hold of her bagShe called the attention
of the bus driver and the conductor about the actuation of the accused,
but it seemed that the former were also afraid of him
"Despite the rain, she left the bus and went to ride in a jeep parked
some 100 meters away. The accused closely followed her (P. 4, id.).
When the jeep started to go, the accused also rode and sat beside her
"When the jeep reached Guisad, she alighted on the road but she still
had to negotiate a distance of ten meters The accused also alighted and
again he tried to carry her bag Although he was not allowed to carry her
bag, he was adamant in following her
"Reaching her boarding house, she opened the door and was about to
close it when the accused dashed in and closed the door behind him
When she entered her room, the accused went in, pulled a dagger eight
inches long and threatened her and then raped her.
Issue: W/N renting a bedspace in a boarding house constitute for all
and purposes a dwelling.
Held: The judgment of conviction of Amado Daniel for the crime of
rape as charged is affirmed.
Although Margarita was merely renting a bedspace in a boarding house,
her room constituted for all intents and purposes a "dwelling" as the
term is used in Article 14(3), Revised Penal Code. It is not necessary,
under the law, that the victim owns the place where he lives or dwells.
Be he a lessee a boarder or a bed-spacer, the place is his home the
sanctity of which the law seeks to protect and uphold.
44. PEOPLE VS. MANDOLADO
123 SCRA 128 (1983)
Nature: Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Cotabato convicting Martin Mandolado and Julian Ortillano of murder
qualified with aggravating circumstances of treachery, evident
premeditation and abuse of confidence/obvious ungratefulness.
Facts: Sometime in October 1977, four draftees of third infantry
Batallion were passengers of a bus bound for Midsayap Cotabato City.
Arriving at the terminal, they decided to drink ESQ rum where Martin
after going inside the market and fired his caliber machine gun. They
then boarded a car and forced the driver to bring them to Midsayap
Crossing and in the way, Herminigildo got his knife and tried to attack
the driver. After they alighted from the jeep, the accused started firing
his gun and hit the occupants of the jeep while Julian fired his armalite
downwards in order to show that they were fighting with some MILF
rebels.
Issue: W/N abuse of confidence and obvious ungratefulness can be
inferred from the mere fact that an army draftee who was allowed on
board a vehicle later on fired his gun at its occupants.
Held. Decision is modified as to penalty but affirmed in all other
respects.
There is merit in appellants' contention that there could be no abuse of
confidence as the evidence on record showed the lack of confidence by
the victims to the appellants, that this confidence was abused, and that
the abuse of the confidence facilitated the commission of the crimes. In
order that abuse of confidence be deemed as aggravating, it is necessary
that "there exists a relation of trust and confidence between the accused
and one against whom the crime was committed and the accused made
use of such a relationship to commit the crime." (People vs.
Comendador, 100 SCRA 155, 172). It is also essential that the
confidence between the parties must be immediate and personal such as
would give that accused some advantage or make it easier for him to
commit the crime; that such confidence was a means of facilitating the
commission of the crime, the culprit taking advantage of the offended
party's belief that the former would not abuse said confidence (People
vs. Hanasan, 29 SCRA 534). In the instant case, there is absolutely no
showing of any personal or immediate relationship upon which
confidence might rest between the victims and the assailants who had
just met each other then. Consequently, no confidence and abuse
thereof could have facilitated the crimes.
Similarly, there could have been no obvious ungratefulness in the
commission of the crime for the simple reason that the requisite trust of
the victims upon the accused prior to the criminal act and the breach
thereof as contemplated under Article 14, par. 4 of the Revised Penal
Code are manifestly lacking or non-existent. In all likelihood, the
accused Army men in their uniforms and holding their high-powered
firearms cowed the victims into boarding their jeep for a ride at
machine gun point which certainly is no source of gratefulness or
appreciation.
45. PEOPLE VS. MARRA
236 SCRA 565 (1994)
Nature: APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Dagupan City.
Facts: Jimmy Din, recounted that at around 2:00 A.M. on March 7,
1992, he and his friend, Nelson Tandoc, were conversing with each
other in front of Lucky Hotel located at M. H. del Pilar Street, Dagupan
City, which was owned by the witness' father and of which he was the
administrator. He noticed a man pass by on the opposite side of the
street. The man made a dirty sign with his finger and Din informed
Tandoc thereof. The man repeated his offensive act and called them by
waving his hands. Infuriated, they followed the man until the latter
stopped in front of the Dunkin' Donuts store at the corner or Arellano
and Fernandez streets. They demanded an explanation from the man but
they were not given any.
At that instant, two men arrived and one of them inquired what was
going on. Tandoc informed him that they were just demanding an
explanation from the man. Din was surprised when Tandoc
23
unexpectedly slapped one of the two men. A brawl ensued, with Tandoc
clashing with the two men while Din exchanged blows with the man
who made the dirty finger sign. After the fisticuffs, their three
opponents ran away in a westward direction.
Tandoc and Din then decided to walk back to the hotel. When they were
about to enter the place, they noticed that the men with whom they just
had a fight were running towards them. Sensing danger, they ran inside
the annex building of the hotel and immediately secured the lock of the
sliding outer door. They entered a room and waited until they felt that
the situation had normalized. After ten to fifteen minutes, thinking that
the men were no longer in the vicinity, they left the room. Having
decided to go home, Tandoc opened the sliding door, All of a sudden,
Din saw appellant, who at that time was wearing a security guard's
uniform, shoot Tandoc with a revolver, There was a fluorescent bulb
installed at the front of the hotel which enabled Din to identify the
assailant. Tandoc was shot in the middle of the chest and he fell down.
Then, Din saw four to five men scamper away from the scene.
Aware of his injury, Tandoc told Din, "Tol, I was shot." The latter tried
to chase appellant and his companions but he failed to catch up with
them. Din and his wife then brought Tandoc to the Villaflor Hospital.
The victim was taken to the emergency room but he expired an hour
later.
Issue: W/N nocturnity was specially sought by appellant or taken
advantage of by him to facilitate the commission of the crime or to
ensure his immunity from capture.
Held: The judgment of the court is AFFIRMED.
However, the crime committed by appellant was murder qualified by
treachery, the SC rejected the finding that the same was aggravated by
nighttime. No evidence was presented by the prosecution to show that
nocturnity was specially sought by appellant or taken advantage of by
him to facilitate the commission of the crime or to ensure his immunity
from capture. At any rate, whether or not such aggravating
circumstance should be appreciated, the penalty to he imposed on
appellant would not be affected considering the proscription against the
imposition of the death penalty at the time when the offense in the
instant case was committed.
46. PEOPLE VS. DESALISA (UNINHABITED PLACE)
299 SCRA 35 (1994)
Nature: Appeal on the conviction of Emmanuel Desalisa of the crime
of parricide.
Facts:
Emmanuel lived with his 18 year old wife, Norma and 2 year old
daughter on a small nipa house on a hill at Pinaductan, San Juan,
Bacon, Sorsogon. 2 other houses in the neighborhood, 150 meters
away, cannot be seen because of the fruit tree. Paulina Dioneda,
Norma’s mom at about 10am of Oct, 9, 1983 (day of crime), was
informed by emmanuel’s mother that the couple had an altercation. He
slapped and boxed her on the stomach. At 5pm same day, Norma
complained that Emmanuel was a jealous man, even before he
manhandled by Emmanuel.
Vicente Dioneda, father of Norma, stated that around 6 or 7pm,
Emmanuel left his child with them. The following morning, around 6 or
7am, he went to house of Emmanuel and Norma.
He saw plates scattered, rope of hammock missing. He thought of
feeding pig so he climbed the coconut tree. On the third step, he saw
the back of the body of Norma. He went down the tree, called her, he
touched her, and she swayed!
He realized he was hanging, her feet approximately 4 inches above the
ground. He informed his wife and they went to Carlito Dichoso and
fetched the authorities. He saw Emmanuel at the municipal building of
Bacon on Oct. 10, he asked him why he killed her, he did not answer
but just stooped down.
Carlito Dichoso, neighbor, testified that around 6 or 7pm of Oct. 9,
Emmanuel went to his house, it was raining. Emmanuel borrowed a
flashlight because he was looking for his wife.
After 2 ½ hrs, Emmanuel returned to Carlito’s house, he sat on a bench.
Carlito asked him if he found his wife, he did not answer. He said that
= “my wife is continuously possessed with devils.”
Around 5am, Emmanuel told Carlito that “if there is something that
happened, Manoy Carlito, what would I do?”
Accused was convicted based on circumstantial evidence.
Issue: W o N the place can be considered “uninhabited”.
Held: The decision appealed from is hereby modired. Aclised-
appellant is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime
of parricide with unintentional abortion and sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua
The aggravating circumstance of uninhabited place is present. The
uninhabitedness of a place is determined not by the distance of the
nearest house to the scene of the crime but whether or not in the place
of the commission, there was reasonable possibility of the victim
receiving some help. Considering that the killing was done during
nighttime and many fruit trees and shrubs obstruct the view of
neighbors and passersby, there was no reasonable possibility for the
victim to receive any assistance.
Note that the trial court convicted accused-appellant of the crime of
parricide only. This is an error. The evidence on record has shown
beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant has committed the
complex crime of parricide with unintentional abortion. The abortion
was caused by the same violence that caused the death of the victim. It
is unintentional because accused-appellant must have merely intended
to kill the victim but not necessarily to cause an abortion.
47. PEOPLE VS. LUG-AW (TREACHERY)
Nature: Appeal from a decision of the RTC of Cabarroquis, Quirino
convicting Julio Lug-aw and Rogelio Bannay of murder sentencing
both to reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
Facts: On Dec. 12, 1985, Carlos Pal-oy was putting up a fence allegedly
upon the instruction of the public forester to straighten out the
boundary line. His daughters Sonia and Carina were with him. Pal-oy
was proceeding towards the house when Sonia heard a gun report.
Immediately, she went uphill and just as a second gun report resounded,
she saw Rogelio Bannay and Julio Lug-aw from a distance of around
four meters. She saw too that as her father was about to draw his bolo,
Lug-aw shot him.
Trial court appreciated both treachery and evident premeditation against
the accused.
Issue: W o N the trial court correctly ruled that the crime committed
was murder.
Held: Appellant Lug-aw is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of homicide and Bannay is acquitted.
Sonia’s testimony concludes that the crime committed was homicide
instead of murder. The qualifying circumstances of treachery and
evident premeditation had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
The trial court drew the conclusion of the presence of treachery because
the attack was sudden as Pal-loy was simply going about his task of
fencing. The SC however, finds that no one witnessed the initial attack.
Absent any particulars as to the manner in which the aggression
commenced or how the act which resulted in the death of the victim
unfolded, treachery cannot be appreciated to qualify the killing to
24
murder. Evident premeditation cannot be appreciated because its
requisites are not present.
As to Bannay, his presences at the scene of the crime, unless conspiracy
is proven, do not by itself, indicate criminal culpability. Conspiracy
must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
48. PEOPLE VS. CAMILET (EVIDENT PREMEDITATION)
Nature: Appeal from the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo
convicting Regino Camilet of murder and sentenced to life
imprisonment.
Facts: On July 2, 1982 at around 7pm, in Coyogan Sur, Leon, Iloilo
City, a prayer meeting was held at the residence of Brgy. Capt. Perfecto
Camancho Sr. At around 9pm, Dione Camancho, a dumb nephew of
Perfecto arrived crying and making signs that he was spanked at the
buttocks by someone at a certain place. Accompanied by Dione,
Perfecto Camancho, Jr., Rosita Camayo and Joven Cagayoa and
Perfecto, Sr. went to the place indicated by Dione. When they had
walked a distance of around 150 meters, Camilet suddenly stepped
from a grove of banana plants and without word or warning, stabbed
Perfecto, Sr. with a one-foot long, sharp-bladed knife. Perfecto, Sr. died
as a result.
Prior to the incident, there was a misunderstanding between the
Camanchos and the accused-appellant regarding a portion of land
belonging to Camilet’s mother-in-law, where Camilet was working. The
settlement reached apparently did not satisfy Camilet.
The information alleged treachery, evident premeditation, nighttime and
disregard of rank and age as aggravating circumstances, however, the
trial court’s decision did not indicate what circumstances qualified the
killing to murder but considered disregard of rank an aggravating
circumstance.
Issue: W o N evident premeditation can be considered to qualify the
killing into murder.
Held: Judgment of trial court modified. Regino Camilet is found guilty
of homicide, instead of murder.
In the absence of a qualifying circumstance, the fatal stabbing of
Perfecto, Sr. is a homicide, not a murder. Treachery cannot be
appreciated in this case. Mere suddenness of an attack is not sufficient
to constitute treachery where it does not appear that the aggressor
adopted such mode of attack to facilitate the perpetration of the killing
without risk to himself. Likewise, evident premeditation was not
established by the prosecution. Although the facts tend to show that
Camilet may have harbored ill-feelings towards the Camanchos
regarding the parcel of land, there is no evidence of: (1) the time when
he determined to commit the crime, (2) an act manifestly indicating that
he has clung to his determination, and (3) sufficient lapse of time
between determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the
consequences of his act and to allow his conscience to overcome the
resolution of his will. Nighttime cannot be considered aggravating since
there was no proof that it was especially sought by the accused to
perpetuate the crime. Lastly, disregard of rank cannot likewise be
considered because, there is no clear evidence that the accused
committed the crime in disregard of the respect due to the victim.
49. PEOPLE VS. ILAOA (CRUELTY)
Note: Cruelty exists when the culprit enjoys and delights in making his
victim suffer slowly but gradually causing him unnecessary pain in the
consummation of the act.
Requisites:
injury caused be deliberately increased by causing another wrong;
the other wrong must be unnecessary for the execution of the purposes
of the offender.
Nature: Appeal from judgment of RTC of Angeles City finding RUBEN
and ROGELIO ILAOA guilty of Murder with the aggravating
circumstances of Evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength, and
cruelty, sentencing them to life imprisonment.
Facts: On Nov. 5, 1987, Nestor de Loyola’s body was found in a grassy
portion of Tinio St., Angeles City. He was decapitated, had 43 stab
wounds on the chest and slight burns all over his body.
The night before, at around 11pm, de Loyola was seen drinking with
Ruben Ilaoa and 3 others outside Ilaoa’s apartment. A few minutes later
an argument arose between the two, after which Ruben and his drinking
companions mauled, kicked and dragged the victim towards the
accused apartment. He was heard crying “aray!” and “pare, bakit niyo
ako ginaganito, hirap na hirap na ako.”
At around 2am, Ruben borrowed Alex Villamil’s tricycle on the pretext
that a neighbor needed to be brought to the hospital as she was about to
give birth. However, he was seen driving alone with a sack placed in
the sidecar, which looked like as if it contained a human body. When
the tricycle was returned, there wee blood stains on the floor. Susan
Ocampo, Ruben’s live-in partner, was also seen sweeping blood at the
entrance of their apartment and blood was found on his shirt when
police investigated him and the hair near his right forehead was partly
burned.
Held: Rogelio was acquitted, while Ruben was convicted for homicide
only.
Rogelio was acquitted because the circumstances relied upon to
establish his guilt, particularly the dragging of the victim’s body into
the house of his brother, is totally inadequate for a conviction.
Ruben’s liability was modified to homicide only because the qualifying
circumstances were not sufficiently proved. There was no evidence
whatsoever that appellant was physically superior to the deceased and
tat he took advantage of such superior physical strength to overcome
the latter. (Mere numerical advantage is not enough to be qualified as
an abuse of superior strength). Number of wounds alone is not the
criterion for the appreciation of cruelty, neither can it be inferred from
the mere fact that the victim’s dead body was dismembered. There was
no showing that appellant for his pleasure and satisfaction caused the
victim to suffer slowly and painfully and inflicted on him unnecessary
physical and moral pain. Evident premeditation cannot be appreciated
also since there is no proof that such killing was the result of
meditation, calculation or resolution on the part of Ruben.
50.PEOPLE VS. MARQUEZ (CRAFT, FRAUD, DISGUISE)
117 SCRA 165 (1982)
Nature: An appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Quezon finding the accused guilty of the crime of robbery with rape as
defined under Article 294, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code and
sentenced them to life imprisonment.
*note: Renato Marquez died during trial.
Facts: On November 16, 1966, between seven and seven-thirty in the
evening, Francisca Marquez-Tan was in their house in barrio Dahican
Catanauan, Quezon together with her seven children and maid Rufina
Martinez. She heard somebody call out in front of their window who
identified themselves as PC soldiers looking for contraband. She
replied that they did not have any contraband and that her husband,
Angel Tan, was in the poblacion at that time. The men ordered her to
open up otherwise they will shoot up their house. She opened up her
window and Renato jumped inside. She was able to recognize Renato
25
Marquez as the light was bright, and as he was her distant relative.
Renato held her by the nape and pushed her towards the door and at
gunpoint ordered her to open the same. When she opened the door,
accused Samuel Jacobo and Francisco Forneste, both armed with guns,
entered and ordered her to put out their contraband and when she told
them that they did not have any, the intruders demanded for money. She
pointed at the table, which Renato open and took P300 there from.
Jacobo also pried open their aparador where he got P200. Jacobo also
dispossessed her of her ring worth P15.00 and a pair of earrings worth
also that much. At that instant, the other accused Forneste was upstairs
guarding her children and helper. Samuel Jacobo asked her why they
have only a small amount of money when they are copra-buyers and
she replied that they were just starting on their business. Whereupon,
Jacobo demanded: "kuarta o buhay" so that she put out her pillow
which Jacobo grabbed and ripped open and took there from P820.00.
Afterwards, Samuel Jacobo raped her at gunpoint while Renato
ransacked their store and took merchandise there from. After five
minutes, Jacobo took her upstairs and tied both her arms and made her
he face down on the floor together with her children. Subsequently, her
daughter Leticia and helper Rufina Martinez were taken downstairs by
Francisco Forneste. Shortly after the men left, the victims were able to
free themselves and Francisca found out that the two women were
raped also.
Leticia Tan corroborated the foregoing testimony of her
mother. The rapes, according to her were committed in the following
manner: when her mother, Francisco Marquez was taken upstairs,
Renato Marquez brought her downstairs, to their store. Inside the store
Renato Marquez to her " to give something and if I refused I would be
killed. Simultaneously Renato Marquez "poked a gun and also a
balisong" at her causing her to be afraid she called for her mother but
then she was told not to shout because "I am going to be killed."
Thereafter, she was forcibly made to lie down and Renato Marquez
committed the act on her. Leticia related that during the time that she
was with Renato Marquez, Rufina Martinez was with Francisco
Forneste and that immediate after the departure of Renato Marquez,
Francisco Forneste and Samuel Jacobo, Rufina Martinez told her that
she was also raped by Francisco Forneste.
Held: The evidence adduced is not sufficient to show any conspiracy
among the accused in the commission of the crime of rape against the
persons of Francisca Marquez, Leticia Tan and Rufina Martinez.
Therefore, the lower court was correct in concluding that the crime
committed by the accused appellants was robbery with rape not robbery
with multiple rapes as alleged in the information.
51. PEOPLE VS. EMPACIS
222 SCRA 59 (1993)
Nature: An appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu City, Branch 14 finding the accused guilty of robbery with
homicide as defined and penalized under Article 294 (1) of the Revised
Penal Code, and considered the attendance of the four generic
aggravating circumstance of dwelling, nighttime, craft or fraud and
superior strength, not offset by any mitigating or extenuating
circumstance, sentencing him to death.
Facts: At about 9 o'clock on the night of September 16, 1986, as Fidel
Saromines and his wife, Camila, were about to close to their small
store, located in their house at Kanguha, Dumanjug, Cebu, two men
came and asked to buy some sardines and rice. They were Romualdo
(or Maldo) Langomez and Crisologo Empacis. Camila served them and
they proceeded to make a meal of the rice and sardines.
After they finished eating, Romualdo told Fidel to sell him
cigarettes. As Fidel was handing over the cigarettes, Romualdo
announced a "hold-up" and commanded Fidel to give up his money. As
it happened, Fidel then had P12, 000.00 in his house, wrapped in
cellophane. This he started to give to Romualdo but as the latter was
taking hold of the packet, Fidel suddenly decided to fight to keep his
money. A struggle followed in the course of which Romualdo stabbed
Fidel about three times. Crisologo joined in and with his own knife also
stabbed Fidel. At this time, gunshots were heard outside of the house;
and a neighbor of the Saromineses, Balbino Bulak, recognized one of
those doing the shooting as certain Carlito Antiga. 8 A voice was heard
from below saying, "Stab him!" 9 to which Langomez replied, "I already
stabbed (him)."
From his little sister's room, Fidel's thirteen-year old son,
Peter, saw his father fighting for his life with Romualdo and Crisologo
Empacis. Heeding his father's cry for help, Peter took hold of a "pinuti"
(a long bolo), and struck inflicting wounds on the latter’s shoulder and
neck. The two accused jumped out of the house and fled. Peter then
turned to his wounded father, but found him already dead from his
injuries.
Crisologo Empacis repaired to the clinic of Dr. Eustaquio
Deiparine at the poblacion of Sibonga, Cebu, for treatment of the
wounds inflicted on him by Peter, arriving there between 10 and 11
o'clock that same night. Dr. Deiparine asked Crisologo how he had
come by these wounds. Crisologo said that at around 6 to 7 o'clock that
evening, near the Papan Market, he was assaulted without warning by a
young man, who injured him with a bolo.
The next day police officers went to Dr. Deiparine’s clinic
and asked for information regarding a man who might have been
treated for hacking wounds. They were directed to the public market
where Empacis was and he was arrested.
Issue: Whether or not craft, fraud or disguise was used for the
commission of the crime
Held: Judgment affirmed, modification in costs. The aggravating
circumstance of craft or fraud was properly appreciated against
Empacis. He and Romualdo pretended to be bona fide customers of the
victim's store and on his pretext gained entry into the latter's store and
later, into another part of his dwelling.
The SC has held stratagems and ruses of this sort to constitute the
aggravating circumstance of fraud or craft, e.g.: where the accused a)
pretended to be constaabulary soldiers and by that ploy gained entry
into the residence of their prey whom they thereafter robbed and killed.
52. PEOPLE VS. RUELLAN (SUPERIOR STRENGTH) 231
SCRA 650 (1994)
Nature: an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Davao City, Branch 13, convicting the accused, Fordito Ruelan, of the
crime of MURDER and imposing on him the penalty of "life
imprisonment."
Facts: On August 4, 1988, Spouses Ricardo and Rosa Jardiel hired
appellant as a store helper at their store located in Bankerohan Public
Market, Davao City. Appellant helped Jardiel spouses in selling and
delivering rice to various customers. He stayed in the couple's residence
but he had separate quarters for sleeping.
On August 18, 1988, at around 4:00 a.m., Ricardo Jardiel was
roused by the closing of the bedroom door and he saw his wife Rosa
Jardiel leaving his room. Ricardo Jardiel stood up and followed his wife
who went towards the gate of the house. Rosa Jardiel was joined by
appellant since they would open the store in Bankerohan Public Market.
Rosa Jardiel talked to appellant and ordered him to bring an axe which
would be used in repairing some fixtures in the store. Appellant
followed her order and took an axe and sack. When they were about to
leave the premises, Rosa Jardiel's house dog got loose and went out
towards the street. Rosa Jardiel got angry and scolded appellant while
she walked ahead of him along Tulip Drive going to McArthur
Highway. Appellant pleaded Rosa Jardiel to stop berating him but Rosa
26
Jardiel did not heed to his request. Appellant got fed up and with the
use of his axe, he struck Rosa Jardiel behind her right ear causing her to
fall face down. Thereafter, appellant dragged Rosa Jardiel to a grassy
portion at the side of the street and then immediately left the place.
Issue: W o N there was abuse of superior strength.
Held: Judgment modified. Accused is guilty only of homicide and
ordered to suffer a penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prison
mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1)
day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
To properly appreciate the aggravating circumstance of abuse
of superior strength, the prosecution must prove that the assailant used
purposely excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense
available to the person attacked.19 In the instant case, the appellant
clearly took advantage of his superior strength as the victim while the
appelllant was then only 20 years old, of good statute and build and was
armed with an axe with which to kill the victim. However, the
aggravating circumstances of abuse superior strength cannot qualify the
killing of the victim and raised it to the category of murder because the
same was not alleged in the information. The rule in case like this is
clear. A qualifying circumstance like abuse of superior strength must be
pleaded in considered as a generic aggravating circumstance in the
imposition of the correct penalty.
53. PEOPLE VS. PADILLA
233 SCRA 46 (1994)
Nature: An appeal from a decision of the then Court of First Instance
of Catbalogan, Samar finding the accused guilty of murder qualified by
treachery with the generic aggravating circumstance of taking
advantage of his public position, but appreciating at the same time the
mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation and imposing the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Facts: On 4 May 1981, Pat. Omega was on duty at Pier 1 in
Catbalogan, Samar, from eleven o'clock in the evening to seven o'clock
the following morning. At past midnight, 5 May 1981, Pfc. Edino
Ontuca, Officer-in-Charge of the Talalora Police
Sub-Station, approached him for assistance claiming he was maltreated
by strangers. Pat. Omega responded and both proceeded to where
complainant was reportedly assaulted, passing by Malayan Hotel at the
pier area to get Ontuca's service revolver.
When they reached the corner of Rizal Avenue and Del
Rosario Street, the two (2) policemen saw three (3) men in the company
of a woman. Pat. Omega approached them, identified himself as a
police officer, and then began to investigate the reported "castigo" or
manhandling of complainant. A certain C1C Belino spoke for the
group. He introduced himself first and then his companions, Maj. de la
Cruz and Sgt. Padilla. Pat. Omega tapped Pfc. Ontuca's shoulder and
admonished the latter saying, "Brod, let us stop; just keep silent; just go
home and sleep. Pfc. Ontuca took the advice and returned to the pier
with Pat. Omega.
When they reached Malayan Hotel, Pfc. Ontuca stayed
behind at the entrance while Pat. Omega proceeded to the Lion's
Waiting Shed some fifty (50) meters away. Suddenly, there was a
commotion in front of the hotel. Pfc. Ontuca was being ganged up by
three (3) men. Pat. Omega then rushed towards the hotel where he saw
his companion already down on his right knee with both arms stretched
behind him, his left arm held by Maj. de la Cruz and his right by Sgt.
Padilla, while C1C Belino held him by the waist and took his service
revolver away. Pat. Omega tried to intervene but C1C Belino and Maj.
de la Cruz poked their pistols at him. C1C Belino disarmed Pat. Omega
and handed over his service pistol to Maj. de la Cruz who then grabbed
Omega by the collar saying, "Let us go to the hospital because you are
drunk."
 Pat. Omega denied that he was drunk. Maj. de la Cruz
summoned a certain Sgt. Bongosia to accompany them to the hospital
purportedly in order to have the two policemen undergo "liquor test".
Sgt. Bongosia obliged and then cocked his armalite.
All six (6), namely, Maj. de la Cruz, Pat. Omega, Pfc. Ontuca,
C1C Belino, Sgt. Bongosia and the accused then proceeded east along
Curry Avenue. Upon reaching the intersection of Rizal Avenue and San
Bartolome Street, Pfc. Ontuca turned right, eastward. The accused
followed by Maj. de la Cruz and Pat. Omega, pursued Pfc. Ontuca,
while Sgt. Bongosia did not take the same route; he ran straight along
Curry Avenue and then turned left, north, along San Francisco Street.
C1C Belino dashed to the opposite direction, turning left towards Del
Rosario Street. When Pfc. Ontuca reached a fruit stand beside Cinex
Theater, he grabbed a girl named Lilia, an employee at the nearby
Bahay Kawayan Disco situated along Callejon, a narrow street
connecting Rizal Avenue. Lilia struggled and screamed for help as Pfc.
Ontuca held her tightly by the waist, using her as a human shield
against the accused who was pointing his pistol at him. Finally, Pfc.
Ontuca and Lilia fell to the ground giving the latter a chance to escape.
Left without any protection, Pfc. Ontuca squatted on the ground and
reached for a piece of plywood which he held upward to cover his head.
Maj. de la Cruz and Pat. Omega was just across the street
standing in front of the Bonifacio Nardo Store some fifteen (15) meters
away. From where they stood, they could clearly see the side view of
the accused and the victim facing each other.
Pfc. Ontuca begged for his life. "I am not going to fight with
you," he said. But the accused, showing no mercy, squeezed the trigger
of his .45 cal. automatic pistol pumping a single bullet into the head of
his victim who was just some three to four meters from him. The time
was exactly two o'clock in the morning. After shooting Pfc. Ontuca, the
accused backtracked and then returned to the fallen policeman and
tauntingly kicked him saying, "Are you still alive?" The accused then
went to Maj. de la Cruz and talked to him.
Issue: Whether or not there was an abuse of superior strength
Held: Judgment affirmed. The killing was qualified by the aggravating
circumstance of abuse of superior strength which was alleged in the
information and proved during the trial. Abuse of superior strength is
present not only when the offenders enjoy numerical superiority, or
there is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the
aggressor, but also when the offender uses a powerful weapon which is
out of proportion to the defense available to the offended party. The
accused was armed with a powerful pistol, which he purposely used,
gaining him an advantage over his victim who only had a piece of
plywood to cover himself after he was disarmed.
The accused did not abuse his public position in committing
the crime. For this circumstance to be appreciated as aggravating, the
public official must use his influence, prestige and ascendancy, which
his office gives him in realizing his purpose. It could not be said that
the accused purposely used or took advantage of his position or rank in
killing the victim because he could have committed the crime just the
same by using another weapon not necessarily his service firearm.
54. PEOPLE VS. VERCHEZ
233 SCRA 174 (1994)
Nature: An appeal from the Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 19, Bacoor, Cavite convicting the accused of murder qualified
by treachery.
Facts: Verchez invited Balane on August 15, 1985 to visit his brother,
who was then living in Queen's Row Subdivision, Bacoor, Cavite. On
their way, the two chanced upon Aldave, a "compadre" of Verchez'
brother, who joined them. They arrived at their destination at about 2:30
P.M. but found that Verchez' brother was not at home. However, they
27
saw Alfredo Mamuntag, the caretaker of the house, Alfredo's son,
Hector, and Gilbert Ang, who were then visiting with Alfredo.
Verchez decided to wait and drink liquor at the yard. At about
3:00 P.M., Balane drove away to buy cigarettes and "pulutan." He had
not driven far when a car blocked his way, with the occupants pointing
their firearms at him. Then another car arrived. One of the passengers
from the second car approached Balane and frisked him. Thereafter he
was dragged out of the car, handcuffed and blindfolded. After he was
boxed on the face and stomach, he was pushed inside a car.
Verchez saw several cars stop in front of the house. Men in
civilian clothes with firearms alighted from the cars. One of the men
ordered him to open the door. Suddenly, he heard a gunshot and Aldave,
who was then at the back of the house, shouted that someone took a
shot at him. After the two ran inside the house, they heard more
gunshots.
Verchez got a loaded M-16 Armalite rifle from one of the
rooms and fired back at his attackers. Aldave looked around and found
an Armalite rifle. He also fired back.
Balane, still blindfolded and handcuffed, was ordered by
Capt. Castaneda to advise his companions to surrender. Hence, he
shouted, "Sumuko na kayo si Vic ito." However, someone also shouted
"Huwag na kayong sumurender, papatayin nalang namin kayo."
The firing continued for 15 minutes, after which the police
were able to enter the house. Verchez and Aldave, together with the
other occupants of the house, surrendered and were brought to Camp
Crame.
Verchez and Aldave claimed that at Camp Crame, they were
tortured into admitting participation in several bank robberies. They
were forced into signing a prepared statement confessing their illegal
activities, including having engaged the police officers in a fire fight on
August 15, 1985.
Issue: Whether or not there was treachery
Held: In convicting appellants of murder, the trial court ruled that
the killing of Sgt. Norcio was qualified by treachery as the firing of the
guns was sudden and unexpected. We find, however, that treachery was
not sufficiently established.
For the qualifying circumstance of treachery to be present,
two conditions must concur: (a) the employment of means of execution
that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to
retaliate; and (b) that said means of execution was deliberately or
consciously adopted (People v. Dela Cruz, 207 SCRA 632 [1992]).
There is no showing that appellants deliberately and
consciously adopted their mode of attack. Neither is there any showing
that they planned to ambush the lawmen, much less that they knew that
the lawmen were coming. What is apparent is that appellants were
caught by surprise by the lawmen, hence, acting on the spur of the
moment, they fired back.
Absent the qualifying circumstance of treachery, appellants
can only be convicted of homicide for the death of Sgt. Norcio and
frustrated homicide for the wounding of Cpl. Noora.
55. PEOPLE VS. BAELLO (UNLAWFUL ENTRY)
Nature: Appeal from the judgment of the RTC of Pasi convicting Baello
of Robbery with Homicide and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua.
Facts: On October 10, 1990, at around 4am, JOHN AMMET BAELLO
together with a certain JERRY unlawfully entered, through the 2 nd floor
window, the house of BRGY. CAPT. EUSTAQUIO BORJA and stole 1
colored TV, 1 stereo cassette player, 1 camera plus assorted jewelry,
over all amounting to P64, 000+.
Borja woke up at around 5 AM to discover that the front door of their
house was open and their TV was missing. He informed his wife and
together they checked on their daughter, VERONICA (22) upstairs and
discovered that she was dead due to multiple stab wounds.
At 6 PM of the same day, the police were able to recover the TV set at
the house of Eugenio Tagipa, Baello’s brother-in-law. Tagipa pointed to
the accused as the one responsible for placing the TV under the stairs of
his house. On Oct. 13, at around 5:30 pm, accused was arrested by the
Intelligence and Special Operations Unit of Pasig Police. He made an
oral admission to the robbery but denied having any knowledge of the
killing of Veronica as he was already downstairs stealing the TV while
“Jerry” remained upstairs.
Issue: W o N the accused is guilty of robbery with homicide even if he
had no knowledge of the killing.
Held: Judgment affirmed. (Art. 4- under the doctrine of proximate
cause)
Even though Baello had no knowledge or participation in the killing of
Veronica, he is not absolved from any liability of her death. The rule is
likewise settled that when homicide takes place as a consequence, or on
the occasion of a robbery, all those who took part in the robbery are
guilty as principals of the crime of robbery with homicide unless there
is proof that the accused tried to prevent the killing.
There was (implied) conspiracy between “Jerry” and Baello when they
went together to the house to rob it These acts as a whole are more than
sufficient to establish common design, joint purpose and a community
of interest.
(RE: UNLAWFUL ENTRY) The aggravating circumstance of unlawful
entry was appreciated because the accused, using the 2 nd floor window
for entry, used an opening not intended for ingress or egress, therefore
unlawful entry.
56. PEOPLE VS. RENEJANE (INTOXICATION)
Nature: Appeal from the decision of the RTC of Cebu finding Beniano
Renejane guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of double murder
sentencing him to reclusion perpetua in both cases.
Facts: On Nov. 1, 1981, Reynoso and Regino Mara-asin, Pablo
Sumandig, Patrolman Mario de Jesus and his wife, Violeta, and
Michael Madrigal were in the house of Artemio Ripdos in Brgy.
Lamesa, balamban, Cebu. At around 5pm, BENIANO RENEJANE,
NICK LABORTE, PAULINO LABORTE and PURISIMA arrived and
invited the Mara-asins, Sumandig, de Jesus and Madrigal to the accused
home to partake some food. From Renejano’s house, they then
proceeded to Nick Laborte’s house and then to his mom’s house and
finally to Paulino’s home. Reynoso, however, did not join them at
Paulino’s house but went instead to his parents’ house to inform them
of his whereabouts. Upon reaching Paulino Laborte’s house (at around
11 pm), an altercation between de Jesus and Renejane broke out
regarding the appellant’s apprehension by de Jesus for illegal
possession of marijuana last Oct. 21, 1981. (Regino was suspected as
the informer) While the patrolman was arguing with the accused,
Paulino Laborte pulled out a knife and stabbed him. The accused
stabbed the victim the 2nd time. Regino was killed too.
The lower court appreciated abuse of strength, outraging the victim’s
corpses, disregard of rank and drunkenness against the accused.
Held: Decision modified with regard to penalties. In each case, a
minimum of reclusion temporal in its maximum to reclusion perpetua.
Only the disregard of rank can be appreciated. Drunkenness or
intoxication is aggravating if it is habitual or intentional. It can neither
be considered mitigating in the absence of proof that the intake of
alcoholic drinks was of such quantity as to blur the appellant’s reason
and deprive him of a certain degree of control. As to abuse of strength,
28
it is inherent in treachery and therefore deemed absorbed. Outraging the
victim’s corpses should not be appreciated as assailants were carried
away by the intensity of their attack as attested by the nature of the
wounds inflicted but had no desire to add ignominy to the offense.
57. PEOPLE VS. CAMANO
115 SCRA 258 (1982)
Nature: A review of the death sentence imposed upon the accused
Filomeno Camano by the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, for
the killing of Godofredo Pascua and Mariano Buenaflor.
Facts: In 1967, the two victims had a misunderstanding with the
accused while fishing along Sagnay River. During this occasion it
appears that the accused requested Godofredo Pascua to low his fishing
boat with due motor boat owned by Mariano Buenaflor but the request
was refused by both. This refusal greatly offended and embittered the
accused against the victims. From this time on, the accused begrudged
the two, and entertained personal resentment against them. It was
noticed that defendant when intoxicated or drunk, used to challenged
Mariano Buenaflor to a fight, and announce his evil intention to kill
them.
On February 17, 1970, after the accused had been drinking liquor,
he stabbed twice the victim Godofredo Pascua with a bolo while the
latter was walking alone along the barrio street almost in front of the
store of one Socorro Buates. The victim, Godofredo Pascua, sustained
two mortal wounds for which he died instantaneously.
After hacking and stabbing to death Godofredo Pascua, the accused
proceeded to the seashore of the barrio, and on finding Mariano
Buenaflor leaning at the gate of the fence of his house, in a kneeling
position, with both arms on top of the fence, and his head stooping
down hacked the latter with the same bolo, first on the head, and after
the victim fell and rolled to the ground, after said blow, he continued
hacking him, until he lay prostrate on the ground, face up, when the
accused gave him a final thrust of the bolo at the left side of the chest
causing instant death.
The trial court found the accused guilty of two counts of murder
with the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation and
intoxication.
Issued: Can intoxication be an aggravating circumstance to the case?
Held: The judgment is modified because of attending mitigating
circumstance of intoxication.
It is respectfully submitted that there was no proof that the
accused was intoxicated at the time of the killing other than the bare
testimony of Payago that from his house he allegedly saw the accused
drinking in his house which is about 30 meters away. The prosecution
did not present any police report or doctor's certification that accused
was found to be intoxicated at the time of the killing. Moreover, it was
not shown by competent evidence that accused purposely became drunk
to facilitate the commission of the offense.
"If at all, intoxication should be properly appreciated as a mitigating
circumstance because it affected accused mental faculties such that it
diminished his capacity to know the injustice of his acts and to
comprehend fully the consequences of his acts."14
There is merit in the contention. Drunkenness or intoxication is
mitigating if accidental, not habitual nor intentional, that is, not
subsequent to the plan to commit the crime. It is aggravating if habitual
or intentional.1 To be mitigating, it must be indubitably proved.1 A
habitual drunkard is one given to intoxication by excessive use of
intoxicating drinks. The habit should be actual and confirmed. It is
unnecessary that it be a matter of daily occurrence. It lessens individual
resistance to evil thought and undermines will-power making its victim
a potential evildoer.1
The records of these cases do not show that the appellant was given to
excessive use of intoxicating drinks although he used to get drunk every
now and then.
58. ATTY. AQUILINA R. ARANETA VS. COURT OF APPEALS
NATURE: A petition to review the decision of the then Court of
Appeals finding the accused-appellant guilty of the crime of bribery.
FACTS: Gertrudes Yoyongco is a widow of Antonio, an employee of
the National Irrigation Administration (NIA). When Antonio died, she
approached the appellant, a hearing officer of the Workmen’s
Compensation Unit, to inquire on the procedure for filing a claim for
death compensation, which upon learning prepared and filed them.
After a few days, she went back to ask about the status of her claim.
When she saw the appellant, she was told she needed to pay P100 for
her claim to be acted upon. She then complained to her brother-in-law,
Col. Yoyongco. The former then instructed Carlito Carlos to entrap the
accused. Two 50 peso bills were dusted with ultra-violet powder. The
two, with Balos, then went to the appellant, with Carlos posting as the
nephew of the widow. When the appellant asked for the money, Balos
grabbed Araneta and arrested her.
ISSUE: W o N it is entrapment or instigation.
Held: Decision of the lower court affirmed. Petition dismissed for lack
of merit.
The petitioner confuses entrapment with instigation. There is
entrapment when law officers employ ruses and schemes to ensure the
apprehension of the criminal while in the actual commission of the
crime. There is instigation when the accused was induced to commit the
crime. The difference in the nature of the two lies in the origin of
criminal intent. In entrapment, the mens rea originates from the mind of
the criminal. The idea and the resolve to commit the crime comes from
him. In instigation, the law officer conceives the commission of the
crime and suggest to the accused who adopts the idea and carries it into
execution.
59. CABRERA VS. PAJARES
142 SCRA 127 (1986)
Nature: ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS in the Supreme Court.
Facts: "On January 16, 1985, the complainant Enrico Cabrera gave a
sworn statement to the National Bureau of Investigation in Naga City,
denouncing the respondent Judge James B. Pajares for having allegedly
asked money from him in connection with his case. Cabrera said that in
September, 1984 Judge Pajares intimated to him that he needed money.
Cabrera said he gave P1, 000.00 to the respondent judge because the
latter had been unduly strict, preventing him from making statements
during the trial of his case.
It appears that the complainant is the defendant in Civil Case
No. R-751 which the respondent judge was trying. The case was filed
by the complainant's father, Juan Cabrera, and by his half brothers and
sisters, for the annulment of the sale made to the complainant of about
28 hectares of land in San Juan, Canaman, Camarines Sur. (See Exhs. 6
and 7-B) Cabrera said he had been advised by his counsel, Atty.
Roberto Verdadero, to accommodate any request for money from the
respondent so that he would not be unduly hard on the complainant. In
September, 1984, according to the complainant, Judge Pajares
intimated to him that he needed money. Following his counsel's advice,
Cabrera said he expressed willingness to help the judge financially and,
the following day after their meeting, gave him P1, 000.00. However,
according to Cabrera, after two months (i.e., before Christmas of 1984),
Judge Pajares again told him that he needed money. Cabrera said the
29
judge saw him in front of the Hall of Justice in Naga City and called
him. It was then, according to him, that he decided to denounce the
judge to the authorities; Cabrera asked the assistance of the NBI in
entrapping Judge Pajares.
Issue: Whether or not the accused I guilty of the crime of indirect
bribery.
Held: ACCORDINGLY, respondent Judge is hereby dismissed from
the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and pay and with
prejudice to reinstatement in any branch of the government or any of its
agencies or instrumentalities. The Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to
return the ten P100, 00 bills (Exhibits D-1 to D-10) to the complainant
Atty. Enrico M. Cabrera. This decision is immediately executory.
60. PEOPLE VS. VENERACION (ACTS NOT COVERED BY
LAW)
249 SCRA 244 (1995)
Nature: Petition for certiorari to review a decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Br. 47
Facts: Two criminal cases were consolidated to Branch 47 of RTC of
Manila and presided over by respondent Judge Lorenzo Veneracion
regarding the brutal rape and killing of Angel Alquiza, a 7 year old girl
on August 2, 1994. After trial and presentation of the evidence of the
prosecution and defense, the trial court rendered the decision on
January 31, 1995 finding the defendants Henry Lagarto and Ernesto
Cordero guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with
Homicide and sentenced both accused with the penalty of reclusion
perpetua instead of imposing the penalty of death as provided for in RA
7659, Sec. 11.
Issue: W o N the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion
and in excess of jurisdiction when he failed and/or refused to impose
the mandatory penalty of death after finding the accused guilty of the
crime rape with homicide.
Held: The petition is granted and the case is remanded to the RTC for
the imposition of the penalty of death.
The Rules of Court mandates that after an adjudication of guilt, the
judge should impose the “proper penalty and civil liability provided for
by the law on the accused.” In the case at bar, a judge fully aware of the
appropriate provisions of the law, refuses to impose a penalty to which
he disagrees. In so doing, he acted without or in excess of his
jurisdiction with grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack of
jurisdiction.
The law plainly and unequivocably provides that “when by reason or on
the occasion of rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be
death.” The provision leaves no room for the exercise of discretion on
the part of the trial judge to impose a penalty under the circumstances
described, other than the penalty of death. As long as the death penalty
remains in the statute books, and as long as our criminal law provides
for its imposition in certain cases, it is the duty of judicial officers to
respect and apply the law regardless of their private opinions. The only
function of the judiciary is to interpret the laws and, if not in
disharmony with the Constitution, to apply them.
61. PEOPLE VS. NUNAG
173 SCRA 274 (1989)
Nature: An appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga, Branch I
Facts: On May 1978 at about 7:30 pm, Lorenza Lopez, then about
fifteen and a half years old, was watching a television program in the
house of her neighbor, Carmen Laxaniana. She stood outside the house
and peeped through the open window. As she was standing there, she
saw the accused Mario Nunag, one of her neighbors, coming towards
her Mario Nunag was staggering and appeared to be drunk. The moon
was bright and she really recognized him.
Mario Nunag came to her and asked her to go with him. But
she refused, so that Nunag held her by the hand and poked a knife at
her stomach and threatened to kill her. Nunag then placed something in
her month and led her to a nearby rice field, about 15 meters behind the
house of Carmen Laxamana. 1 Very soon thereafter, they were joined
by the other accused Arnel Mandap, Efren Salangsang, Danio Carpio
and Diosdado Manalili, who were also very well known to her. After
conferring in whispers, Arnel Mandap and Efren Salangsang held her
hands, while Danilo Carpio and Diosdado Manalili held her feet, and
forced her to be on the ground. She struggled to free herself, but the
accused held her tightly.
Mario Nunag then undressed her and had sexual intercourse
with her, at the same time fondling her breasts. She felt pain in her
vagina. After Mario Nunag had finished, Arnel Mandap followed.
After Arnel Mandap had finished, she lost consciousness and regained
it while Diosdado Manalili was abusing her.
Then, the five accused left, after warning her not to report the
incident to anybody. Otherwise, they would kill her, her parents and
brothers. The complainant felt pains and aches all over her body,
especially in her breasts and vagina. She rested for a while and when
the pains had somewhat subsided, she went home. She did not report
the incident to anybody for fear of what the accused might do to her
and her family.
Issue: W o N the accused should be guilty of 5 counts of rape by virtue
of conspiracy existing among them.
Held: Judgment modified.
It would appear, however, that there is no conclusive
evidence that the accused-appellants Danilo Carpio and Efren
Salangsang had sexual intercourse with the complainant, since the
complainant said that she lost consciousness after the second man
(Arnel Mandap) the first being Mario Nunag-had sexually abused her
and she regained consciousness while Diosdado Manalili was abusing
her sexually, and that she merely assumed that Danilo Carpio, and
Efren Salangsang had also sexually abused her. Consequently, each of
the five (5) accused-appellants must be found guilty of three (3) district
and separate crimes of rape, the first three, namely, Mario Nunag, Arnel
Mandap and Diosdado Manalili, by direct act and participation and the
other two, namely Danilo Carpio and Efren Salangsang, by
indispensable cooperation.
62. PEOPLE VS. DELA CERNA
21 SCRA 569 (1967)
Nature: An appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of
Cotabato finding the accused guilty for double murder.
FACTS: Early in the morning of February 3, 1958, Rafael Cabizares,
accompanied by his wife, Hospicia, his brothers Margarito and
Romualdo, and his sons Gumercindo, Marcelo, Casiano, Juan and
Lamberto, left Barrio Cebuano headed for the poblacion of Tupi,
Cotabato, bringing five sacks of corn loaded on a bull cart to be milled
in Tupi, Juan, Marcelo and Lamberto, who were all minors, were then
going to school. Upon approaching a hilly part, they had to stop since
the carabao could not pull the bull cart uphill. Rafael then requested his
two brothers and his son Gumercindo to accompany him up the hill and
carry on their backs the sacks of corn. With Rafael leading, the four
proceeded uphill.
30
As the four approached Sulpicio de la Cerna's house oiltop of
the hill and were about to put down the sacks of corn, appellant
Sulpicio, who was in the house, fired at and hit Rafael, who fell down.
Sulpicio then ordered his companions to burn his house so that they
would have an excuse. Meanwhile, Casiano, Gumercindo, Marcelo and
Romualdo brought the wounded Rafael Cabizares to the house of the
latter's father, Demetrio, 100 meters away. Felisa Bastismo, Rafael's
mother, Ursula Cabizares and Segundino Cabizares were there at the
time.
After the group reached the house, Rafael's wounds were
washed with hot water and then he was brought inside the third room of
the house. Subsequently, appellant Sulpicio and the other accused
arrived at the premises, armed with firearms, bolos and canes. They
stoned the house and thrust their bolos thru the bamboo walls and
flooring. Finding that there were women inside the house, the accused
ordered them to get out or else they would be killed also. As Felisa
Bastismo and Ursula Cabizares alighted from the besieged house,
Marcelo Cabizares followed them, and although held by accused
Conrado Pardillo and boxed by Serapio Maquiling, he was able to
escape to the nearby forest.
Serapio Maquiling then climbed up the window of the
kitchen, and with the carbine which he got from appellant Sulpicio de la
Cerna, shot at Rafael Cabizares who was sitting in the third room. At
this moment, Casiano Cabizares jumped down from the house thru the
kitchen door and ran away. Serapio Maquiling followed him and shot
the latter at the back, killing him a few meters away from Demetrio's
house. Appellant Sulpicio de la Cerna then got back the carbine,
climbed up the house and fired once more at Rafael, who was now
lying down on the floor, killing him finally. Thereafter, the cadaver of
Casiano Cabizares was tied to a bamboo pole, carried by accused
Ramon Alquizar and one Wilfredo Malias (at large) and placed near the
burned house of Sulpicio de la Cerna, as some of the accused followed
while the rest proceeded to Rafael's house.
ISSUE: Whether the five appellants are all guilty as principals?
Held: The five appellants guilty as co-principals in the murder of
Rafael Cabizares.
The positive identification of the several prosecution
witnesses must prevail over the alibis proffered by these appellants.
Their presence and active participation in the meeting in Abapo's house
make them actual conspirators in the killing of Rafael. They were also
present and zealously participating in the execution of their criminal
design, giving a carbine magazine and instructionns to appellant Rotor,
threatening Rafael and giving encouragement to Sulpicio to shoot at the
latter. They were among those who laid siege to Demetrio's house and
left together with the others after finally accomplishing their criminal
deeds as agreed upon. Appellants Bautista and Matchoca, are therefore
also liable as co-principals in Rafael's murder. Regarding motive, it was
proved that both were among those involved in the land conflict with
Rafael Cabizares and were among the respondents in the case before
the Agrarian Court
The aggravating circumstance of treachery, applicable against
appellant Sulpicio de la Cerna only, is offset by his voluntary surrender
after the incident. This mitigating circumstance however cannot benefit
the remaining appellant who did not voluntary surrender. For all the
appellants, therefore, the penalty for Rafael Cabizares' murder must be
imposed in the medium period. For the killing of Casiano Cabizares
appellant Sulpicio de la Cerna must be acquitted.
63. PEOPLE VS. DELA CRUZ
97 SCRA 385 (1980)
Nature: Automatic review of the decision of the Court of First Instance
of Basilan City.
Facts: Antonio Yu owned 200 hectares of rubber and coconut land in
Lantawan, Isabela, Basilan City. The victim, Yu Chi Chong, is his
brother. The accused Agapito dela Cruz was an overseen of Antonio Yu
for no less than 10 years.
Eleven were charged for kidnapping and slaying of Yu Chi
Chong but only Agapito dela Cruz, Jamas Jumaidi and Oyong Asidin
were apprehended. The rest have remained at large.
On September 24, 1968, the city fiscal asked for the
discharged of Jamas Jumaidi and Oyong Asidin to be utilized as state
witness. The Trial Court granted the motion.
The evidence of the prosecution mainly rested on the
testimonies of the two discharged witnesses and that on Mohammad
Sagip who all pointed to Agapito as mastermind in the kidnapping of
Yu Chi Chong.
Mohammad Sagip testified that sometimes in October, 1967,
the accused Agapito met with him, Alih Itum and a certain Asmad at
which he proposed to them the killing of Antonio Yu and the
kidnapping of the younger brother. Yu Chi Chong for a ransom.
Apparently, Asmad contacted some people in Jolo, Sulu, for the
purpose the accused herein among them.
The two discharged witness narrated what transpired
thereafter. In Isabela, the group waited in the ambush spot for the truck
that would carry sacks of copra and supposed to be the two brothers but
only Yu Chi Chong was in the truck because Antonio Yu had to go
Tairan on some other business Isabelo Mancenido accompanied YU Chi
Chong in the truck. When the truck came to a half near the ambush
spot, the ambushers approached it and dragged Yu Chi Chong and
Isabelo Mancenido there from. Shortly after, the group released
Mancenido upon the latter's please of mercy. Upon reaching Bancao
Sapa they found that the tide was low, rendering impossible for them to
reach their boat. While waiting, Yu Chi Chong, in an attempt to escape,
struck Angih with a piece of wood and tried to grab the gun of the latter
but failed. Angih, in anger, fired at Yu Chi Chong several times, killing
him. They dumped the body in the middle of the sea and it was never
recovered.
As a defense. Agapito claimed that on March 5, 1968 he
reported for work in the land of Antonio Yu and that in the evening he
had dinner in the house of Alfonso Flores and slept there that night. He
strongly asserted that he never left that house from 7:30 in the evening
until 6:00 in the morning.
Issue: Whether or not the accused be held principally liable for the
death of Yu Chi Chong.
Held: Appellant is guilty as principal by inducement due to the fact that
he was the one who lays down the strategy of the crime, he knew the
route that the truck would take and approximate time that it was to pass
by. He even selected the ambush place. He also presented the strongest
temptation, a pecuniary gain in the form ransom, which was the
determining factor of the commission of the crime by his co-accused.
Without him, the crime would not have been conceived, much less
committed.
64. PEOPLE VS. MONTELEAGRE
161 SCRA 700 (1988)
Nature: Appeal from judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cavite
City.
Facts: At about 11:30 in the evening of March 11, 1983, while
Edmundo Abadilla was eating at the Meding's Restaurant in Cavite
City, he detected the smell of marijuana smoke coming from the nearby
table. He then went outside to report the matter of Pfc. Renato
Camantigue a policeman Camantigue joined Abadilla in the restaurant.
He approached the two and collard both of them, saying
"namamarijuana kayo, ano?"
31
While Camantigue was holding the two, Montealegre with
his right hand and Capalad with his left hand, Capalad suddenly pulled
out the knife tucked in his waist and started stabbing Camantigue.
Camantigue let loose Montealegre to draw the gun from his holster but
Montealegre thus released restrained Camantigue's hand to prevent the
latter in defending himself Montealegre used both his hands for this
purpose as Capalad continued stabbing the victim.
Capalad fled into the dark alley, while the accused escaped
during the confusion Capalad was late found slumped in an alley with a
bullet wound in his chest. Neither Camantigue nor Capalad survived,
both expiring the next day.
Issue: Whether or not Montealegre be held liable for the death of Pfc.
Renato Camantigue
Held: The accused-appellant was correctly considered a co-principal
for having collaborated- with Capalad in the killing of the police
officer. The two acted in concert, with Capalad actually stabbing
Camantigue seven times and the accused-appellant holding on to the
victim's hands to prevent him from drawing his pistol and defending
himself. While it is true that the accused-appellant did not himself
commit the act of stabbing, he was nonetheless equally guilty thereof
for having prevented Camantigue from resisting the attack against him.
The accused-appellant was a principal by indispensable cooperation
under Article 17, par. 3, of the Revised Penal Code.
As correctly interpreted, the requisites of this provision are: "(1)
participating in the criminal resolution, that is, there is either anterior
conspiracy or unity of criminal purpose and intention immediately
before the commission of the crime charged; and (2) cooperation in the
commission of the offense by performing another act without which it
would not have been accomplished."
65. PEOPLE VS. MANDOLADO
123 SCRA 133 91983)
66. PEOPLE VS. DOCTOLERO
193 SCRA 632 (1991)
Nature: Appeal from the decision of the then Court of First Instance of
Lingayen, Pangasinan, Br. 2, convicting Ludovico Doctolero, Conrado
Doctolero and Virgilio Doctolero of the crime multiple murder and
unspecified physical injuries.
Facts: At about 6:30 pm of Nov. 8, 1970, Marcial Sagun and his wife,
Maria Oviedo-Sagun and Lolita de Guzman-Oviedo were on their way
home to Barrio Binday. They came from the field where they bundled
their harvest. Upon reaching a crossing of the road in bo. Binday they
met the accused Ludovico Doctolero who, without warning and without
cause or reason, held the left shoulder of Marcial Sagun with his left
hand and struck her with a bolo.
Paciencia Sagun-Diamoy testified that while she was cleaning palay in
the yard of her uncle, the deceased Marcelo Doctolero, she saw the
accused, Ludovico. Conrado and Virgilio throw stones at the house of
Marcial Sagun. While throwing stones, Ludovico allegedly shouted for
the men in the house to come out. Paciencia Sagun-Diamoy went
towards the house of Marcial Sagun and saw the three accused,
Ludovico, Conrado, and virgilio, coming down from the house going
towards her. At about that time, Marcelo Doctolero, the half-brother of
Antonio, and the uncle of the three accused was going towards the
house of Marcial. The accused struck Marcelo several times with their
bolo.
Maria Oviedo-Sagun corroborated the testimony of Paciencia. As she
was about to go to their house to get their children, she saw the three
accused going up the house then she heard Epifania, her adopted
mother, shouting at her “Enieng, your children!” then she saw the three
accused coming down the house.
The lower court held that Conrado and his brother Viregilio
participated as accomplices in the slaying of the women and the
infliction of injuries on the child.
Held: The decision of the trial court is modified regarding the penalties
rendered.
The Trial Court correctly ruled that Conrado participated as
an accomplice. It is impossible that the appellant did not know or were
not aware that his brother, Ludovico, was brutally killing the two
women and wounding the child. It is, therefore, reasonable to believe
that Conrado merely stood by as his brother was murdering deceased
women, ready to lend assistance. Indeed, there is no question that his
presence gave his brother the encouragement and the reliance to
proceed as he did proceed in committing the heinous crimes.
Whatever doubt the court a quo entertained in the criminal
responsibility of Conrado did not refer to whether or not he was liable
but only with regard to the extent of his participation. There being
ample evidence of their criminal participation but a doubt exists on the
nature of their liability and so the court should favor the milder form or
responsibility, which is that of being a mere accomplice.
*note: Virgilio died while case was pending appeal
67. PEOPLE VS. TALINGDAN
84 SCRA 19 (1978)
NATURE: APPEAL from the judgment of the Court of First Instance
of Abra.
FACTS: Prior to the violent death of Bernardo Bagabag on the night of
June 24, 1967, he and appellant Teresa Domogma and their children,
lived together in their house at Sobosob, Salapadan. For sometime,
however, their relationship had been strained and beset with troubles,
for Teresa had deserted their family home a couple of tunes and each
time Bernardo took time out to look for her. Bernardo had gotten wind
that illicit relationship was going on between Talingdan and Teresa, and
during a quarrel between him and Teresa, he directly charged the latter
that should she get pregnant, the child would not be his. between 10:00
and 11:00 o'clock the following Friday morning, Bernardo's daughter,
Corazon, who was then in a creek to wash clothes saw her mother,
Teresa, meeting with Talingdan and their co-appellants Magellan
Tobias, Augusto Berras and Pedro Bides in a small hut owned by
Bernardo. Teresa Domogma noticed the presence of her daughter; she
shoved her away saying "You tell your father that we will kill him".
Saturday, June 24, 1967, while the same 12-year old daughter of
Bernardo was cooking food for supper in the kitchen of their house, she
saw her mother go down the house through the stairs and go to the yard
where she again met with the other appellants. She noted that the
appellants had long guns at the time. His time, she informed her father
about the presence of persons downstairs, but Bernardo paid no head to
what she said. At that moment, he was suddenly fired upon from below
the stairs of the "batalan". The four accused then climbed the stairs of
the "batalan" carrying their long guns and seeing that Bernardo was still
alive, Talingdan and Tobias fired at him again.
Issue: Whether or not Teresita is guilty for being an accessory to the
offense committed by her co-accused.
HELD: True it is that the proof of her direct participation in the
conspiracy is not beyond reasonable doubt, for which reason, she
cannot have the same liability as her co-appellants. Indeed, she had no
hand at all in the actual shooting of her husband. Neither is it clear that
she helped directly in the planning and preparation thereof, albeit the
32
SC was convinced that she knew it was going to be done and did not
object.
But this is not saying that she is entirely free from criminal
liability. There is in the record morally convincing proof that she is at
the very least an accessory to the offense committed by her co-accused.
She was inside the room when her husband was shot. As she came out
after the shooting, she inquired from Corazon if she was able to
recognize the assailants of her father. When Corazon identified
appellants Talingdan, Tobias, Berras and Bides as the culprits, Teresa
did not only enjoin her daughter not to reveal what she knew to anyone,
she went to the extent of warning her, "Don't tell it to anyone. I will kill
you if you tell this to somebody." Later, when the peace officers who
repaired to their house to investigate what happened, instead of helping
them with the information given to her by Corazon, she claimed she
had no suspects in mind. In other words, whereas, before the actual
shooting of her husband, she was more or less passive in her attitude
regarding her coappellants' conspiracy, known to her, to do away with
him, after Bernardo was killed, she became active in her cooperation
with them. These subsequent acts of her constitute "Concealing or
assisting in the escape of the principal in the crime" which makes her
liable as an accessory after the fact under paragraph 3 of Article 19 of
the Revised Penal Code.
68. PEOPLE VS. FERRER
48 SCRA 382 (1972)
NATURE: Special civil action in the Supreme Court to review on
certiorari the constitutionality of the Anti-Subversion Act (RA 1700)
FACTS: On March 5, 1970, a criminal complaint for violation of
section 4 of RA 1700 was filed against Felicaino Co in the CFI of
Tarlac. Co moved to quash on the ground that the said RA was a bill of
attainder. Meanwhile, Nilo Tagay, et al. had been charged for the
violation of RA 1700. On July 21, 1970, he moved to quash the charges
on the grounds that the said RA was a bill of attainder, and that it was
vague and embraced more than one subject not expressed in its title.
Resolving the constitutional issues raised, the trial court declared the
stature void on the grounds that it is vague and overboard, and
dismissed the informations against the two accused.
Issue: W o N RA 1700 is a bill of attainder.
Held: The questioned resolution of the lower court is set aside, and the
two cases are remanded to the court for trial on the merits.
It is not a bill of attainder. A bill of attainder is a legislative
act which inflicts punishment without trial. Its essence is the
substitution of a legislative for a judicial determination of guilt. When
the act is viewed in its actual operation, it will be seen that it does not
specify the Communist Party of the Philippines or the members thereof
for the purpose of punishment. The term ‘Communist Party of the
Philippines’ is used solely for definitional purposes. Its focus is not on
the individuals but on conduct.
As to the membership, the act does not punish nominal
membership but membership that is knowing or active, with specific
intent to further the illegal objectives of the Party. It is only when a
statute applies either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable
members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them
without judicial trial does it become a bill of attainder.
A bill of attainder is similar to an ex post facto law. RA 1700
is not such because it punishes only acts committed after the approval
of such act. Only those who “knowingly, willfully and by over acts
affiliate themselves with, become or remain members after June 20,
1957 are punished.

69. GUMABON, et al. VS. DIRECTOR OF BUREAU OF
PRISONS (PROSPECTIVITY)
Nature: Original petition in the Supreme Court for Habeas Corpus
Facts: The CFI of Manila sentenced Mario Gumabon on May 5, 1953 to
reclusion perpetua for the complex crime of rebellion with multiple
murder, robbery, arson and kidnapping. Gumabon, together with
Agapito, Palmares, Padua and Bagobagol are invoking habeas corpus,
citing the case of People vs. Hernandez that no such complex crime of
rebellion exist under Art. 13 of RPC. According to the case of
Hernandez, rebellion cannot be complexed with other common crimes
since such common crimes assume political complexion of the main
crime of which they are mere ingredients and consequently cannot be
punished separately from the principal offense. They cite the ruling of
Hernandez to be retroactively applied to them by virtue of Art. 22 of
RPC. (People vs. Lava- the leaders of the rebellion have been freed
while their followers, the petitioners, suffer life imprisonment)
Issue: W o N the ruling in the Hernandez case should retroact to the
case at bar.
Held: Petition for habeas corpus granted and the petitioners are set free.
The actual case of the petitioners is that at the time of their conviction,
it was believed that the crime committed by them was punishable by
life imprisonment, but the court has subsequently judicially determined
it not be so and that the maximum penalty imposable is prision mayor
or 12 years. Petitioners-convicts are entitled to the benefits of this later
judicial declaration, just as if a statutory amendment had been enacted.
The writ prayed for should be issued since it is the only means of
giving retroactive effect to a penal provision favorable to the accused
where the trial judge has lost jurisdiction over the case. Furthermore art.
22 of the RPC extends its benefits even to convicts serving sentence,
and the only legal remedy open to them is the writ of habeas corpus.
70. PEOPLE VS. GATWARD
267 SCRA 785 (1997)
Nature: Appeal from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay
City, Branch.
Facts: Gatward was charged with violating Section 4 of the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972 for having transported hereon contained in separate
carton envelopes with a total weight of 5237 70 grams which is legally
considered as a prohibited drug on or about the 31 st day of August 1994,
in the vicinity of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport, Pasay City.
Meanwhile, U Aung Win was indicted for transgressing
Section 3 of the Dangerous Drug Act 1972 for having imported and
brought in the Philippines 5570 80 grams of herein which is legally
considered as a prohibited drug.
Gatward pleaded not guilty of the charge when arranged
while U Aung Win pleaded guilty.
Both were convicted of the offense charged. The penalty to
de imposed under the Dangerous Drug Act shall range from reclusion
perpetua to death. In imposing the proper penalty, the trial court
declared that the penalty of "reclusion perpetua to death" shall have the
following periods Death as the maximum thirty (30) years and one (1)
day to forty (40) years as the medium and twenty (20) years and one (1)
day to thirty (30) years as the maximum it regarded reclusion perpetua
as an indivisible penalty.
Thus Gatward was sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for thirty five (35) years of reclusion perpetua and to pay
a fine of Five Million Pesos (5,000,000.00) in view of the presence of
33
one (1) mutilating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty, without any
aggravating circumstance.
Issue: Whether or not reclusion perpetua a divisible penalty.
Held: The trial court had by considering reclusion perpetua as a
divisible penalty imposed an unauthorized penalty on both accused
which would remain uncorrected if the appeal had been allowed to be
withdrawn. In fact it would stamp a mlul obstantient on a penalty that
in law does not exist and which error initially committed by the Court
in another case on which the trial court held had already been set aright
by these.
The penalty of reclusion perpetua is now accorded a "defined
duration" ranging from twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty (40)
years, through the amendment introduced by RA 7659 to Article 27 of
the Revised Penal Code. The Court held that in spite of the amendment
putting the duration of reclusion perpetua at 20 years and 1 day to 40
years; it should remain as an indivisible penalty since there was never
any intent on the part of Congress to reclassify it into a division penalty.
The judgment of the court a quo, specifically with regard to
the penalty imposed on accused-appellant Nigel Richard Gatward and
that of accused U Aung Win was MODIFIED in the sense that both
accused were sentenced to serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua in its
entire duration and full extent.
71. PEOPLE VS. FORMIGONES
87 PHIL 658 (1950)
Nature: An appeal from the decision of the CFI Camarines Sur finding
the appellant guilty of parricide, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua.
Facts: On Nov. 1946, defendant Abelardo Formigones lived on his
farm in Bahao, Libmanan, Sipocot, Camarines Sur w/ wife Julia
Agricola and 5 children. Sometime later they went to Binahian, Sipocot
to seek employment as harvesters of palay, lived w/ his half-brother,
Zacarias Formigones
On Dec. 28, 1946, while Julia was sitting on top of the stairs of the
house, w/o any previous quarrel or provocation, Abelardo stabbed his
wife w/ a bolo blade punctured Julia's back and right lung, caused a
severe hemorrhage resulting in her death. Julia toppled down the stairs.
Abelardo followed and carried and laid her on the floor of the living
room and he had down beside her. Their eldest daughter Irene, who
witnesses the incident, shouted for help, people came in response. The
accused suspected them that they are maintaining illicit relations with
his half-brother.
Held: Appellant is guilty of parricide. Judgment of the lower court
affirmed w/ modification, appellant will be credited with ½ of any
preventive imprisonment he has undergone.
The SC convinced that the appellant is not imbecile. During
his marriage of 16 years, he had not done anything to warrant an
opinion that he was an imbecile. Killing his wife whom he suspect of
being unfaithful to him in the belief that he was vindicating his honor
could not be regarded as an imbecile. His feeling of jealousy may or
may not be true bee in is statement, observed that the his half brother
who was living in his grandmother not only frequented his house after
they have transferred, but also sleep there during the night – this
aroused or partly confirmed Abelardo's suspicions. It was an act of
remorse: lying beside his wife for hours after he killing her, he made no
effect to flee and compel the police to hunt him down and arrest him, he
readily admitted that he killed his wife in his statement
72. LACANILAO VS. CA
62 SCRA 563 (1988)
Nature: A petition which calls for our exercise of the power of Judicial
Review- question of Law.
Facts: The court Of First Instance of Manila finding the petitioner
guilty of homicide for the death of one Ceferino Erese, and was
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of
prision mayor as minimum to fourteen years and one day of reclusion
temporal as the maximum.
The petitioner appealed to the CA which modified the decision of the
CFI changing the maximum penalty from fourteen years and one day to
twelve years and one day respectively.
The court of appeals that Bernardo Lacanilao acted in the performance
of his duty but that the shooting of the victim was not the necessary
consequence of the due performance thereof, therefore, crediting to him
the mitigating circumstance of incomplete fulfillment of duty. In the
words of the respondent court saying “while the appellant should be
commended for responding to the call of duty when he tried to stop the
victim and the latter’s companions from their drunken and disorderly
conduct, nevertheless he cannot be exonerated from overdoing his
fulfillment of duty to the extent of admittedly shooting and thereby
killing said victim. Thus, the respondent court lowered the penalty
merely by one period applying Art. 64 par. 2 of the RPC.
The two conditions that must be met to justify fulfillment of duty are
the ff: 1) that the accused acted in the performance of a duty or in the
lawful exercise of a right or office, and 2) that the injury or offense
committed be necessary consequence of the due performance of such
duty or the lawful exercise of such right of office. In the case at bar,
only the first condition was met.
Issue: W o N art. 69 of the RPC is applicable to the case at bar.
Held: Yes. Art. 69 is applicable, for the requirement of having a
majority of the conditions be present to lower the penalty by one or two
degrees is immaterial because there are only two conditions in order
that the circumstance in no. 5 of art. 11 may be taken into account. The
petition is granted in so far as it seeks to the modification of the penalty
pursuant to art. 69 of the RPC and the ruling in Oanis. The petitioner is
hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from two years, four
months and one day of prision correctional to eight years and one day
of prision mayor.
73. PEOPLE VS. GERONIMO
100 PHIL 99 (1956)
Nature: Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Sur
Facts: In information filed by the provincial Fiscal in the CFI of
Camarines Sur, appellant Federico Geronimo and many others were
charged with the complex crime of rebellion with murder, robberies and
kidnapping.
Accused Federico Geronimo first entered a plea of not guilty
to the information. When the case was called for trial, he asked the
information of the court to substitute his original plea with one of
guilty, and was allowed to change his plea. On the basis of the plea of
guilt, the fiscal recommended that the penalty of life imprisonment be
imposed upon the accused, his voluntary plea of guilt being considered
as a mitigating circumstance. Geronimo’s counsel argued that the
penalty imposable upon the accused was only prision mayor, for the
reason that there is no such complex crime as rebellion with murder,
robberies and kidnapping, because the crimes of murder, robbery and
kidnapping being the natural consequences of the crime of rebellion,
34
the crime charged against the accused should be considered only as
simple rebellion.
The trial court rendered judgment finding the accused guilty
of the complex crime of rebellion with murder, robbery and kidnapping
and giving him the benefit of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
plea of guilt, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.
Issue: Whether the crime committed is the complex crime of rebellion
with murder, robbery and kidnapping, or simple rebellion.
Ruling: The decision appealed from was modified and the accused
convicted for the simple crime of rebellion and considering the
mitigating effect of his plea of guilt, accused-appellant Federico
Geronimo was sentenced to suffer 8 years of prision mayor.
The acts when committed as a means to or in furtherance of
the subversive ends become absorbed in the crime of rebellion, and
cannot be regarded or penalized as distinct crimes in themselves. In law
they are part and parcel of the rebellion itself, and cannot be considered
as giving rise to a separate crime that would constitute a complex one
with that of rebellion.
If the killing, robbing and kidnapping were done for private
purposes or profit, without any political motivation, the crime would be
separately punishable and would not be absorbed by the rebellion. But
even then, the individual misdeed could not be taken with the rebellion
to constitute a complex crime, for the constitutive acts and intent would
be unrelated to each other; and the individual crime would be a means
necessary for committing the rebellion as it would not be done in
preparation or in furtherance of the latter.
74. PONCE ENRILE VS. SALAZAR
86 SCRA 217 (1990)
Nature: An appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Sur.
Facts: In the afternoon of February 27, 1990, Senate Minority Floor
Leader Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested by law enforcement officers led
by Director Alfredo Lim of the National Bureau of Investigation on the
strength of a warrant issued by Hon. Jaime Salazar of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City Branch 103, in Criminal Case No. 9010941. The
warrant had issued on an information signed and earlier that day filed
by a panel of prosecutors composed of Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio
C. Trampe, State Prosecutor Ferdinand R. Abesamis and Assistant City
Prosecutor Eulogio Mananquil, Jr., charging Senator Enrile, the spouses
Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan with the crime of
rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder allegedly
committed during the period of the failed coup attempt from November
29 to December 10, 1990. Senator Enrile was taken to and held
overnight at the NBI headquarters on Taft Avenue, Manila, without bail,
none having been recommended in the information and none fixed in
the arrest warrant. The following morning, February 28, 1990, he was
brought to Camp Tomas Karingal in Quezon City where he was given
over to the custody of the Superintendent of the Northern Police
District, Brig. Gen. Edgardo Dula Torres.
On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator Enrile,
through counsel, filed the petition for habeas corpus herein (which was
followed by a supplemental petition filed on March 2, 1990), alleging
that he was deprived of his constitutional rights.
Issue: Whether or not there is a complex crime of rebellion
Held: The petitioners' case does not fall within the Hernandez ruling
because-and this is putting it very simply-the information in Hernandez
charged murders and other common crimes committed as a necessary
means for the commission of rebellion, whereas the information against
Sen. Enrile et al. charged murder and frustrated murder committed on
the occasion, but not in furtherance, of rebellion. Stated otherwise, the
Solicitor General would distinguish between the complex crime ("delito
complejo") arising from an offense being a necessary means for
committing another, which is referred to in the second clause of Article
48, Revised Penal Code, and is the subject of the Hernandez ruling, and
the compound crime ("delito compuesto") arising from a single act
constituting two or more grave or less grave offenses referred to in the
first clause of the same paragraph, with which Hernandez was not
concerned and to which, therefore, it should not apply.
75. PEOPLE VS. ESCOBAR
157 SCRA 541 (1988)
Nature: APPEAL from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Br. 97. Leviste, J.
Facts: One of the alleged co-conspirator Amadeo Abuyen alias Roberto
Alorte, was formerly a co-security guard of appellant Juan Escober at
the Bee Seng Electrical
Supply, Inc., a family corporation owned by the couple Vicente Chua
and Lina Chua. About 4 months prior to the incident, Abuyen was
relieved by Domingo Rocero for being always absent and found
sleeping while on duty. "At the time of the incident on December 3,
1982, Rocero's tour of duty was from 7:00 in the morning to 7:00 in the
evening. He left his post at about 7:30 P.M. that evening after he was
relieved by appellant Juan Escober. On his way home, he passed by
Barangay Balingasa in Balintawak, where he saw Amadeo Abuyen in
the store of Colonel Samson drinking beer with three companions, one
of whom he later identified as the appellant Macario Punzalan, Jr.
"After Rocero had left his point, Vicente Chua went to his office at the
Bee Seng Electrical Supply as he usually does after office hours,
accompanied by his 13-year old son Irvin and 6-year old daughter
Tiffany. On their way, he saw appellant Escober at his post. At the
office, the two children watched a television program, as their father
proceeded to the bathroom to take a bath "Meanwhile, Abuyen and his
three companions rode a tricycle and proceeded to the Bee Seng
Electrical Supply. Upon alighting thereat, Abuyen knocked at the little
door of the gate. Appellant Escober peeped thru the hole and opened the
door. Then after Abuyen had talked with Escober, the former asked
Punzalan to wait outside, while he (Abuyen) and his two other
companions went inside
"At this juncture, the victims 'mother, Mrs. Lina B. Chua, left
their residence to join her husband and two children. On her way, she
noticed that the pedestrian gate was wide open with the appellant
Punzalan standing there. She shouted why the gate was opened, but
nobody answered. Suddenly, she heard of shot coming from the
direction of the garage; and when she looked thereat, she saw Abuyen
and the appellant Escober walking towards the gate. So, she rushed
back inside the house to contact her husband through the intercom. But
since the intercom was out of order, she hurriedly went outside and met
appellant Escober who volunteered the information that he was not hit'
'Upon the other hand, Vicente Chua was inside the bathroom, when he
heard the gunshot. He hurriedly went out and saw her son Irvin lying on
the sofa while Tiffany was lying on the floor, both mortally wounded.
Beside her daughter, he saw a scissor blade [full of blood. He also
observed that everything was scattered in his office, with all his
drawers opened. Later, he found out that the P5, 000.00 cash he kept in
one of the drawers was lost
Juan Escober, together with four unidentified persons designated as
John Doe, Peter Doe, Richard Doe and Juan Doe, were charged with
the crime of Robbery with Homicide before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City in Information dated December 9, 1982. He entered a plea
of "Not Guilty" with the assistance of counsel Atty. Hipolito de Peralta
upon arraignment on March 2, 1983. Punzalan was later included in the
charges.
35
Issue: Whether or not the accused participated in a complex crime.
Held: Decision reversed and set aside. The accused is acquitted.
The act of opening a gate upon hearing a knock is by itself an
innocent gesture. One who imputes an evil motive or purpose thereto
must prove his allegations convincingly. In the case at bar, even if the
version of Macario Punzalan, Jr, that Escober opened the gate at the
knock of the alleged mastermind Amadeo Abuyen/Roberto Alorte were
to be believed, the same would not constitute sufficient and convincing
proof that Escober had knowledge of the nefarious plan. The worse that
could be attributed to him is lack of better judgment or laxity in the
performance of his duties as a security guard in having failed to
exercise the minimum precaution dictated by his occupation to exclude
from the premises being guarded persons who have not demonstrated
any legitimate reason for getting in.
76. MEJORADA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
51 SCRA 339 (1987)
Nature: A petition for certiorari seeks to reverse the May 23, 1979
decision of the Sandiganbayan finding the accused Arturo A. Mejorada
in Criminal Cases Nos. 002-009 guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating Section 3(E) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
Facts: Arturo A. Mejorada was a public officer who was first employed
as a temporary skilled laborer in the Bureau of Public Works on March
16, 1947, and then as right-of-way agent in the Office of the Highway
District Engineer, Pasig, Metro Manila, from February, 1974 up to
December 31, 1978. As a right-of-way agent, his main duty was to
negotiate with property owners affected by highway constructions or
improvements for the purpose of compensating them for the damages
incurred by said owners.
Among those whose lots and improvements were affected by
the widening of the proposed Pasig-Sta. Cruz-Calamba Road. 2nd
IBRD Project, at Binangonan, Rizal was Isagani de Leon, Isaac Carlos,
Napoleon Maybituin, Dominga Villaroza, Florentino de la Cruz,
Cipriano Aran, Celestina S. Mallari and Rodolfo Rivera, all residents of
Mambog, Binangonan, Rizal.
Sometime in October or November 1977, petitioner contacted
the forenamed persons and informed them that he could work out their
claims for payment of the values of their lots and/or improvements
affected by the widening of said highway. In the process, Mejorada
required the claimants to sign blank copies of the "Sworn Statement on
the Correct and Fair Market Value of Real Properties" and "Agreement
to Demolish, Remove and Reconstruct improvements" pertinent to their
claims. The claimants complied without bothering to find out what the
documents were all about as they were only interested in the payment
of damages.
In said "Sworn Statements" and "Agreements to Demolish",
the value of the respective properties of the claimants was made to
appear very much higher than the actual value claimed by them.
Likewise, the said "Agreements to Demolish" reflected the value of the
improvements as per assessor" which on the average was only P2,
000.00 lower than the value declared by the owners in their sworn
statements. The value as per assessor was, in turn, supported by the
Declarations of Real Property in the names of the claimants containing
an assessed value exactly the same as that stated in the Agreements to
Demolish "as per assessor", except the claims of De la Cruz and Aran
where there is only a difference of P400.00 and P200.00, respectively.
It turned out, however, that said Declarations of Property are not really
intended for the claimants as they were registered in the names of other
persons, thus showing that they were all falsified.
A few months after processing the claims, accused
accompanied the claimants to the Office of the Highway District
Engineer at the provincial capitol of Pasig, Metro Manila, to receive
payments and personally assisted the claimants in signing the vouchers
and encashing the checks by certifying as to their Identities and
guaranteeing payment.
Right after the claimants had received the proceeds of their
checks, accused accompanied them to his car which was parked nearby
where they were divested of the amounts paid to them leaving only the
sum of P1, 000.00 to each, except Isaac Carlos to whom P5, 000.00 was
left, explaining to them that there were many who would share in said
amounts. All the claimants were helpless to complaint because they
were afraid of the accused and his armed companion.
Issue:
I. Whether or not the essential elements constituting the offense
penalized by section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known
as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act have been clearly and
convincingly proven by the prosecution;
II. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan is a court of competent
jurisdiction duly constituted in accordance with Pres. Dec. No. 1606;
III. Whether or not the penalty imposed upon the petitioner is excessive
and contrary to the three-fold rule as provided for by Article 70 of the
Revised Penal Code;
IV. Whether or not there is a variance between the offense charged in
the information and the offense proved;
V. Whether or not the conclusion drawn from the record of the
Sandiganbayan in arriving at a verdict of conviction of petitioner is
correct is a question of law which this Honorable Court is authorized to
pass upon.
Held: The argument is devoid of merit. The Sandiganbayan established
the fact that the petitioner took advantage of his position as a right-of-
way-agent by making the claimants sign the aforementioned
agreements to demolish and sworn statements which contained falsified
declarations of the value of the improvements and lots. There was
evident bad faith on the part of the petitioner when he inflated the
values of the true claims and when he divested the claimants of a large
share of the amounts due them.
We also dispose of the fourth issue which relates to the
allegation that petitioner cannot be convicted for a violation of the Anti-
Graft Law because the evidence adduced by the prosecution is not the
violation of Section 3 (e) but the crime of robbery. Contrary to the
petitioner averment. We find no variance between the offense charged
in the information and the offense proved. The prosecution was able to
establish through the corroborating testimonies of the witnesses
presented how through evident bad faith, petitioner caused damage to
the claimants and the Government. The manner by which the petitioner
divested the private parties of the compensation they received was part
of' the scheme which commenced when the petitioner approached the
claimants and informed them that he could work out their claims for
payment of the values of their lots and/or improvements affected by the
widening of the Pasig-Sta. Cruz-Calamba Road. The evidence
presented by the prosecution clearly establishes a violation of Section
3(e).
The judgment convicting petitioner was a unanimous
Decision of the First Division duly constituted. It thus met the
requirement for the pronouncement of a judgment as required by
Section 5 of P.D. 1606 supra.
Petitioner is mistaken in his application of the three-fold rule as set
forth in Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code. This article is to be taken
into account not in the imposition of the penalty but in connection with
the service of the sentence imposed (People v. Escares, 102 Phil. 677
[1957]). Article 70 speaks of "service" of sentence, "duration" of
penalty and penalty "to be inflicted". Nowhere in the article is anything
mentioned about the "imposition of penalty". It merely provides that the
prisoner cannot be made to serve more than three times the most severe
of these penalties the maximum of which is 40 yrs.
36
77. BALA VS. MARTINEZ
181 SCRA 459 (1990)
Nature: This is petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order seeks reversal of the order
dated April 2, 1984 of the CFI of the RTC of Manila Branch XX
Facts: The petitioner had been indicted for removing and substituting
the picture of Maria Eloisa Criss Drazen which had been attached to her
United States of America passport, with that of Florencia Notarte, in
effect falsifying a genuine public or official document. On January 3,
1978, the trial court adjudged petitioner Manuel Bata in Criminal Case
No. 24443, guilty of the crime of falsification of a public document.
The petitioner seasonably appealed, but the Court of Appeals, on April
9, 1980, affirmed in toto the lower court's decision. The petitioner
applied for and was granted probation by the respondent judge in his
order dated August 11, 1982. The petitioner was then placed under
probation for a period of one (1) year, subject to the terms and
conditions enumerated therein. By the terms of the petitioner's
probation, it should have expired on August 10, 1983; one year after the
order granting the same was issued. But, the order of final discharge
could not be issued because the respondent probation officer had not
yet submitted his final report on the conduct of his charge. On
December 8, 1983, the respondent People of the Philippines, through
Assistant City Fiscal Jose D. Cajucom of Manila, filed a motion to
revoke the probation of the petitioner before Branch XX of the
Regional Trial court (RTC) of Manila, presided over by the respondent
judge. The motion alleged that the petitioner had violated the terms and
conditions of his probation. On January 4, 1984, the petitioner filed his
opposition to the motion on the ground that he was no longer under
probation, his probation period having terminated on August 10, 1983,
as previously adverted to. As such, no valid reason existed to revoke
the same, he contended. As if to confirm the Manila Assistant City
Fiscals motion to revoke the petitioner's probation, the respondent
probation, the respondent probation officer filed on January 5, 1984.
the same motion, however, became the subject of a "Manifestation,"
dated January 10, 1984, which stated that the probation officer was not
pursuing the motion to terminate dated January 6, 1984, instead, he was
submitting a supplemental report which recommended the revocation of
probation "in the light of new facts, information, and evidences," As
stated at the outset, the respondent judge denied the motion to dismiss
for lack of merit.
Held: The Court finds no merit in the petition. Probation is revocable
before the final discharge of the probationer by the court, contrary to
the petitioner's submission. It is worthy to note, that what was actually
resolved and denied was the motion to dismiss and/or strike out the
motion to revoke probation, which disposed of only the issue of the
petitioner's transfer of residence. The motion did not touch on the issue
of the timeliness to revoke probation. The respondent judge has not yet
heard and received evidence, much less acted on the matter.
Rule of Law:
PD 968 is clear on this score:
See, 16, Termination of Probation – After the period of
probation and upon consideration of the report and
recommendation of the probation officer, the court may order the final
discharge of the probationer upon findings that he had fulfilled the
terms and conditions of his probation and thereupon the case in deemed
terminated.
Thus, the expiration of the probation period along does not
automatically terminate probation. Nowhere is the ipso facto
termination of probation found in the previsions of the probation law.
Probation is not coterminous with its period. There must first be
issued by the court of an order of an order of final discharge based
on the report and recommendation of the probation officer. Only
from such issuance can the case of the probationer be deemed
terminated.
78. SALGADO VS. CA
189 SCRA 304 (1990)
Nature: This petition for review on certiorari seeks to set aside the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 15493 entitled,
"Agustin Salgado v. Hon. Antonio P. Solano, et. Al," who affirmed the
Order dated December 22, 1987 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City (Branch 86) sustaining its previous order dated November 18,
1987 directing the issuance of a writ execution to enforce the civil
liability of herein petitioner in Criminal Case No. 0-33798.
Facts: Petitioner was charged with the crime of serious physical
injuries in Criminal Case No. 0-33798 entitled. "People of the
Philippines v. Agustin Salgado," before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City (Branch 86). After trial, judgment was rendered on
October 16, 1987 finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged. On October 17, 1986, petitioner filed an application
was granted in an Order dated April 15, 1987. For the months of May,
June, July, August, September and October, 1987, petitioner complied
with the above condition by paying in checks the said sum of P2,
000.00 monthly, through the City Probation Officer, Perla Diaz Alonzo.
Private respondent Francisco Lukban, Jr. voluntarily accepted the
checks and subsequently encashed them. On September 19, 1987,
private respondents Francisco Lukban, Jr. filed a motion for the
issuance of a write of execution for the enforcement of the civil liability
adjudged in his favor in the criminal case. The motion was opposed by
the petitioner. On November 18, 1987, the trial court issued an order
granting the motion for issuance of a write of execution. A motion for
reconsideration was filed by petitioner but it was denied on December
22, 1987. After the denial of his motion for reconsideration, the
petitioner filed directly with this Court a petition for review of the trial
court's order granting the motion for issuance of a writ of execution.
We referred the petition to the Court of Appeals in the resolution dated
April 13, 1988. On March 16, 1989 the petitioner went to this Court
via a petition for review which was filed on September 26, 1989.
Issue: Whether or not the probation extinguishes civil liability.
Whether or not the trial court may impose as a condition of probation
the manner in which a probationer may settle his civil liability against
the offended party during the period of probation.
Held: The decision of respondent Court of Appeals affirming the order
of the trial court granting the motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution as well as the resolution dated August 3, 1989 of the same
court are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Probation affects only the criminal aspect of the case.
Interpreting the phrase within the context of that case, it means that
although the execution of sentence is suspended by the grant of
probation, it does not follow that the civil liability of the offender, if
any, is extinguished.
The conditions which trial courts may impose on a
probationer may be classified into general or mandatory and special or
discretionary. The mandatory conditions, enumerated in Section 10 of
the Probation Law, require that probationer should a) present himself to
the probation officer designated to undertake his supervision at such
place as may be specified in the order within 72 hours from receipt of
said order, and b) report to the probation officer at least once a month at
such time and place as specified by said officer. Special or discretionary
conditions are those additional conditions, listed in the same Section 10
of the Probation Law, which the courts may additionally impose on the
probationer towards his correction and rehabilitation outside of prison.
The enumeration, however, is not inclusive. Probation statutes are
37
liberal in character and enable courts to designate practically any term it
chooses as long as the probationer's constitutional rights are not
jeopardized. There are innumerable conditions, which may be relevant
to the rehabilitation of the probationer when viewed in their specific
individual context. It should, however, be borne in mind that the special
or discretionary conditions of probation should be realistic, purposive
and geared to help the probationer develop into a law-abiding and self-
respecting individual, Conditions should be interpreted with flexibility
in their application, and each case should be judged on its own merits-
on the basis of the problems, needs and capacity of the probationer.
*This is an exception because there was a CLEAR condition in the
probation, therefore, when the decision of the SC came out, the period
had already lapsed.
79. MONSANTO VS. FACTORAN
170 SCRA 190 (1989)
Facts: March 25, 1983, the Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner
Salvacion A. Monsanto (then assistant treasurer of Calbayog City) and
three other accused, of the complex crime of estafa thru falsification of
public documents and sentenced them t imprisonment of four (4) years,
two (2) months and one (1) day of prison correctional as minimum, to
ten (10) years and one (1) day of prison mayor as maximum, and to pay
a fine of P3, 500. They were further ordered to jointly and severally
indemnify the government in the sum of P4, 892.50 representing the
balance of the amount defrauded and to pay the costs proportionately
Petitioner Monsanto appealed her conviction to this Court which
subsequently affirmed the same. She then filed a motion for
reconsideration but while said motion was pending, she was extended
on December 17, 1984 by then President Marcos absolute pardon which
she accepted on December 21, 1984. By reason of said pardon
petitioner wrote the Calbayog City treasurer requesting that she be
restored to her former post as assistant city treasurer since the same was
still vacant.
Issue: Whether or not a public officer, who has been granted an
absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, is entitled to reinstatement to
her former position without need of a new appointment.
Held: The absolute disqualification or ineligibility from public
office forms part of the punishment prescribed by the Revised Penal
Code for estafa thru falsification of public documents. It is clear from
authorities referred to that when her guilt and punishment were
expunged by her pardon; this particular disability was likewise
removed. Henceforth, petitioner may apply for reappointment to the
office, which was forfeited by reason of her conviction. And in
considering her qualifications and suitability for the public post, the
facts constituting her offense must be and should be evaluated and
taken the account with public funds. Stated differently, the pardon to
petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from holding
public employment but it cannot go beyond that, to regain her former
pose as assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual
procedure required for a new appointment.
Ruling: It is well too remember that petitioner had been convicted of
the complex crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents and
sentenced to imprisonment of four years, two months and one day of
prision correccional as minimum, to ten years and one day of prision
mayor as maximum. The penalty of prision mayor carries the accessory
penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special
disqualification from the right of suffrage, enforceable during the term
of the principal penalty, the accessory penalties remain unless the same
have been expressly remitted by the pardon. The penalty of prision
correccional carried, as one of its accessory penalties, suspension from
public office.
 The propositions earlier advanced by petitioner reveal her
inadequate understanding of the nature of pardon and its legal
consequences. This is not totally unexpected considering that the
authorities on the subject have not been wholly consistent particularly
in describing the effects of pardon.
A pardon looks to the future, it is not retrospective. It makes
no amends for the past, it affords no relief for what has been suffered
by the offender, it does not impose upon the government any obligation
to make reparation for what has been suffered” since the offense has
been established by judicial proceedings, that which has been rightfully
done and justly suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be required.”
This would explain why petitioner, though pardoned cannot be entitled
to receive back pay for lost earnings and benefits.
The better considered cases regard full pardon (at least one
not based on the offender’s innocence) as relieving the party from all
the punitive consequences of his criminal act, including the
disqualifications or disabilities based on the of guilt. But it relieves him
from nothing more. “To say, however, that the offender is a “new man”
and “as innocent as if he had never committed the offense.” Is to ignore
the difference between as if he had never committed the offense.” is to
ignore the difference between the crime and the criminal. A person
adjudged guilty of an offense is a convicted criminal, though pardoned;
he may be deserving of punishment, though left unpunished; and the
law may regard him as more dangerous to society than one never guilty
of crime, though it places no restraints upon him following his
conviction.”
Pardons cannot mask the acts constituting the crime. These
are “historical” facts which despite the public manifestation of mercy
and forgiveness implicit in pardon, “ordinary, prudent men will take
into account in their subsequent dealings with the actor.”
80. DOROJA VS. CARPIO
Held: compelling the owner-operator to pay on the basis of his
subsidiary liability does not constitute an amendment of the judgment
because in an action under Art, 103 of the Revised Penal Code, once all
the requisites as earlier discussed are met, the employer becomes ipso
facto subsidiary liable, without need of a separate action. Such being
the case, the subsidiary liability can be enforced in the same case where
the award was given, and this does not constitute an act of amending
the decision. It becomes incumbent upon the court to grant a motion for
subsidiary writ of execution (but only after the employer has been
heard), upon conviction of the employee and after execution is returned
unsatisfied due to the employee’s insolvency.
Wherefore, the order of the respondent court disallowing the
motion for subsidiary writ of execution is hereby set aside, the Court a
qou is directed to hear and decide in the same proceeding the subsidiary
liability of the alleged owner-operator of the passenger jeepney. Cost
against private respondent.
Ruling: Art. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. The
subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article shall apply
to employers, teacher, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of
industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupil, workmen,
apprentices, or employees in t. In order that an employer may be held
subsidiarily liable for the employee’s civil liability in the criminal
action, it should be shown (1) that the employer, etc. is engaged in any
kind of industry, (2) that the employee committed the offense in the
discharge of his duties and (3) that he is insolvent (Basa Marketing
Corp. vs. Bolinao, 117 SCRA 156). The subsidiary liability of the
employer, however, arises only after conviction of the employee in the
criminal action. All these requisite present the employer becomes ipso
facto subsidiarily liable upon the employee’s conviction and upon proof
of the latter’s insolvency. Needles to say, the case at bar satisfies all
these requirements.

Nature: A petition by certiorari the decision of the Municipal Trial

Court of Zamboanga City, Branch IV, which denied petitioner’s motion
for subsidiary writ of execution against the owner of the vehicle which
figured in the accident.

Facts: October 23, 1985, accused-respondent Edwin Ramirez, while

driving a passenger Fuso Jeepney owned and operated by Eduardo
Toribio, bumped Dionisio Carpio, a pedestrian crossing the street, as a
consequence of which the latter suffered from fractured left clavicle as
reflected in the medico-legal certificate and sustained injuries which
required medical attention for a period of (3) three months. Finding the
accused Edwin Ramirez y Wee guilty as a principal beyond reasonable
doubt of the Amended |Information to which he voluntarily pleaded
guilty and appreciating the mitigating circumstance in his favor, hereby
sentences him to suffer the penalty of one (1) month and one (1) day to
two (2) months of arresto mayor in its minimum period. The accused
filed an application for probation. A writ of execution dated Mach 10,
1988 was duly served upon the accused but was, however, returned
unsatisfied due to the insolvency of the accused as shown by the
sheriff’s return. Thus, complaint moved for a subsidiary writ of
execution against the subsidiary liability of the owner-operator of the
vehicle. The same was denied by the trail court. A motion for
reconsideration of the said order was disallowed for the reason that
complaint having failed to raise the matter of subsidiary liability with
the appellate court, said court rendered its decision which has become
final and executory and the trial court has no power to alter or modify
such decision.

Issue: Whether or not the subsidiary liability of the owner-operator

may be enforced in the same criminal proceeding against the driver
where the award was given or in a separate civil action?

38