Cases not available

• Aquilar v Siasat 121

• Perla v Baring 124
• In the Matter of Tinitigan v Republic 126
• Gotardo v Buling 131
• Del Soccorro v Brinkman Van Wilsem 134
• Basilio Gan v Republic 141

Paternity and Filiation

 Kinds/Status of Children-Legitimate Children, Art. 164 and Art. 54 and 43(1),
FC ▪ Presumption of legitimacy
Aguilar v. Siasat, G.R. No. 200169, January 28, 2015
 Action to Claim legitimacy Proof of legitimacy, Art. 172, FC

Eugenio San Juan Geronimo v. Karen Santos #122

G.R. No. 197099, September 28, 2015
DIVISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

DOCTRINE: The mere registration of a child in his or her birth certificate as the child of
the supposed parents is not a valid adoption, does not confer upon the child the status
of an adopted child and the legal rights of such child, and even amounts to simulation of
the child's birth or falsification of his or her birth certificate, which is a public document.
Furthermore, it is well-settled that a record of birth is merely a prima facie evidence of
the facts contained therein. It is not conclusive evidence of the truthfulness of the
statements made there by the interested parties.

FACTS: On April 17, 2001, plaintiff Karen Santos, claiming to be the only child of
deceased Rufino and Caridad Geronimo filed a complaint for annulment of document
and recovery of possession against the defendants Eugenio and Emiliano Geronimo
who are the brothers of her father. She alleged that with the death of her parents, the
property consisting of one-half of the parcel of land located at San Jose, Paombong,
Bulacan with Tax Declaration No. 99-02017-00219 and belonging to her parents was
passed on to her by the law on intestacy; that lately, she discovered that defendants
executed a document entitled Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman declaring themselves
as the only heirs of spouses Rufino and Caridad and adjudicating to themselves the
property in question; and that consequently they took possession and were able to
transfer the tax declaration of the subject property to their names. She prayed that the
document be annulled and the tax declaration of the land transferred to her, and that the
defendants vacate the property and pay her damages. The defendants denied the
allegation that plaintiff was the only child and sole heir of their brother. They disclosed
that the deceased Rufino and Caridad Geronimo were childless and took in as their
ward the plaintiff who was in truth, the child of Caridad's sister. They claimed that the
birth certificate of the plaintiff was a simulated document. It was allegedly impossible for
Rufino and Caridad to have registered the plaintiff in Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur because
they had never lived or sojourned in the place and Caridad, who was an elementary
teacher in Bulacan never filed any maternity leave during the period of her service from
August 1963 until October 1984. The trial court ruled in favor of respondent. The trial
court ruled that respondent is the legal heir - being the legitimate child - of the deceased
spouses Rufino and Caridad Geronimo (spouses Rufino and Caridad). It found that
respondent's filiation was duly established by the certificate of live birth which was
presented in evidence. On appeal, petitioner raised the issue on the alterations in the
birth certificate of respondent and the offered evidence of a mere certification from the
Office of the Civil Registry instead of the birth certificate itself. According to petitioner,
respondent's open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child is only
secondary evidence to the birth certificate itself. Respondent questioned if it was legally
permissible for petitioner to question her filiation as a legitimate child of the spouses
Rufino and Caridad in the same action for annulment of document and recovery of
possession that she herself filed against petitioner and his then co-defendant.
Respondent argued that the conditions enumerated under Articles 170 and 171 of
the Family Code, giving the putative father and his heirs the right to bring an action to
impugn the legitimacy of the child, are not present in the instant case. She further
asserted that the Family Code contemplates a direct action, thus her civil status may not
be assailed indirectly or collaterally in this suit.The CA ruled in favor of the respondent.
ISSUE: Whether the respondent is the child of the deceased spouses?

RULING: No. Petition is granted. Despite its finding that the birth certificate which
respondent offered in evidence is questionable, the trial court ruled that respondent is a
legitimate child and the sole heir of deceased spouses Rufino and Caridad. The RTC
based this conclusion on secondary evidence that is similar to proof admissible under
the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code to prove the filiation of
legitimate children. A mere cursory reading of the birth certificate of respondent would
show that it was tampered specifically on the entries pertaining to the date of birth of
respondent and the name of the informant. Using pentel ink, the date of birth of
respondent - April 6, 1972 - and the name of the informant -Emma Daño - were both
superimposed on the document. Despite these glaring erasures, the trial court still relied
on the prima facie presumption of the veracity and regularity of the birth certificate for
failure of petitioner to explain how the erasures were done and if the alterations were
due to the fault of respondent. It thus ruled that respondent's filiation was duly
established by the birth certificate. The appellate court did not agree with this finding
and instead ruled that the birth certificate presented does not qualify as the valid
registration of birth in the civil register as envisioned by the law.

 Action to Claim legitimacy Proof of legitimacy, Art. 172, FC

HEIRS OF GILBERTO ROLDAN vs. HEIRS OF SILVELA ROLDAN AND HEIRS OF

LEOPOLDO MAGTULIS
G.R. No. 202578, September 27, 2017
FIRST DIVISION
SERENO, C.J.:

DOCTRINE:
Baptismal certificate has evidentiary value to prove kinship if considered alongside other
evidence of filiation, such as testimonial evidence, family pictures, as well as family
books or charts.

FACTS:
Gilberto Roldan, Silvela Roldan, and Leopolda Magtulis are the heirs of Natalia Magtulis
who owned an agricultural land in Kalibo, Aklan. After Natalia's death, she left the lot to
her children. However, Gilberto and his heirs took possession of the property to the
exclusion of respondents.
Respondents then filed before the RTC a Complaint for Partition and Damages against
petitioners. The latter refused to yield the property on these grounds: (1) respondent
heirs of Silvela had already sold her share to Gilberto; and (2) respondent heirs of
Leopolda had no cause of action, given that he was not a child of Natalia.
During trial, petitioners failed to show any document evidencing the sale of Silvela's
share to Gilberto. Thus the RTC ruled that the heirs of Silvela remained co-owners of
the property they had inherited from Natalia. As regards Leopoldo Magtulis, the trial
court concluded that he was a son of Natalia based on his Certificate of Baptism and
Marriage Contract.
Considering that Gilberta, Silvela, and Leopolda were all descendants of Natalia, the
RTC declared each set of their respective heirs entitled to one-third share of the
property.
Petitioners appealed to the CA. They reiterated that Silvela had sold her share of the
property to her brother Gilberta. They asserted that the RTC could not have considered
Leopolda the son of Natalia on the mere basis of his Certificate of Baptism.
The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC that Gilberto, Silvela, and Leopoldo remained co-
owners of the Lot.
ISSUE:
Whether or not filiation of Leopoldo had been proven through Baptismal and Marriage
Certificate?

RULING:
Jurisprudence has already assessed the probative value of baptismal certificates.
In Fernandez v. Court of Appeals, the Court explained that because the putative parent
has no hand in the preparation of a baptismal certificate, that document has scant
evidentiary value. The canonical certificate is simply a proof of the act to which the
priest may certify, i.e., the administration of the sacrament. In other words, a baptismal
certificate is "no proof of the declarations in the record with respect to the parentage of
the child baptized, or of prior and distinct facts which require separate and concrete
evidence."
In cases that followed Fernandez, the Court reiterated that a baptismal certificate is
insufficient to prove filiation. But in Makati Shangri-La Hotel and Resort, Inc. v.
Harper,this Court clarified that a baptismal certificate has evidentiary value to prove
kinship "if considered alongside other evidence of filiation. Therefore, to resolve one's
lineage, courts must peruse other pieces of evidence instead of relying only on a
canonical record. By way of example, we have considered the combination of
testimonial evidence, family pictures, as well as family books or charts,alongside the
baptismal certificates of the claimants, in proving kinship.

In this case, the courts below did not appreciate any other material proof related to the
baptismal certificate of Leopoldo that would establish his filiation with Natalia, whether
as a legitimate or as an illegitimate son.
The only other document considered by the RTC and the CA was the Marriage Contract
of Leopoldo. But, like his baptismal certificate, his Marriage Contract also lacks
probative value as the latter was prepared without the participation of Natalia.
 Illegitimate Children, Art. 165 and 54, FC Distinctions between legitimate
and illegitimate children - Proof of illegitimacy, Art. 172, FC
Perla v. Baring, G.R. No. 172471, November 12, 2012
 Illegitimate Children, Art. 165 and 54, FC - Rights of Illegitimate children,
Art. 176, FC Republic Act No. 9255

Grace M. Grande v Patricio T. Antonio

G.R. No. 206248, February 18, 2014, En Banc
Velasco, Jr.,J:
Doctrine: Art. 176 give illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the
surname of their father or not. It is not the father or the mother who is granted by law the
right to dictate the surname of their illegitimate children.

Facts: Patricio Antonio ( Patricio) and Grace Grande (Grace) have an illicit relationship
where they bore two sons. The children were not expressly recognized by Patricio. After
the separation, Grace left for United States with their children. This prompted Patricio to
file a Petition for Judicial Approval of Recognition with Prayer to take Parenal Authority,
Parental Physicla Custody, Correction/Change of Surname of Minors and for the
Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction

Issue: Whether or not Patricio has the right to compel the use of his surname by his
illegitimate children upon his recognition of their filiation?

Ruling: No.
Art. 176 of the Family Code, originally phrased as follows:
Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental
authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in
conformity with this Code.

This provision was later amended on March 19, 2004 by RA 925514 which now
reads:
Art. 176. – Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental
authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code.
However, illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if their filiation has
been expressly recognized by their father through the record of birth appearing in the
civil register, or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten
instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an action
before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each
illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child.
From the foregoing provisions, it is clear that the general rule is that an
illegitimate child shall use the surname of his or her mother. The exception provided by
RA 9255 is, in case his or her filiation is expressly recognized by the father through the
record of birth appearing in the civil register or when an admission in a public document
or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. In such a situation, the
illegitimate child may use the surname of the father.

In the case at bar, respondent filed a petition for judicial approval of recognition
of the filiation of the two children with the prayer for the correction or change of the
surname of the minors from Grande to Antonio when a public document acknowledged
before a notary public under Sec. 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court is enough to
establish the paternity of his children. But he wanted more: a judicial conferment of
parental authority, parental custody, and an official declaration of his children’s surname
as Antonio.

Parental authority over minor children is lodged by Art. 176 on the mother;
hence, respondent’s prayer has no legal mooring. Since parental authority is given to
the mother, then custody over the minor children also goes to the mother, unless she is
shown to be unfit.

There is no legal basis for the court a quo to order the change of the surname to
that of respondent.Otherwise, the order or ruling will contravene the explicit and
unequivocal provision of Art. 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255.

Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the
surname of their father or not. It is not the father (herein respondent) or the mother
(herein petitioner) who is granted by law the right to dictate the surname of their
illegitimate children.

Nothing is more settled than that when the law is clear and free from ambiguity, it
must be taken to mean what it says and it must be given its literal meaning free from
any interpretation.Respondent’s position that the court can order the minors to use his
surname, therefore, has no legal basis.

On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free from ambiguity. And where there is no
ambiguity, one must abide by its words. The use of the word "may" in the provision
readily shows that an acknowledged illegitimate child is under no compulsion to use the
surname of his illegitimate father. The word "may" is permissive and operates to confer
discretion upon the illegitimate children.

 Rights of Illegitimate children, Art. 176, FC -Republic Act No. 9255

In the matter of the petition for cancellation of certificate of live birth of Tinitigan
v. Republic, G.R. No. 222095, August 7, 2017

 Adopted Children ▪ Republic Act No.8552/ Domestic Adoption Act of 1998

Who may adopt Who May Be Adopted Requirements for adoption

ROSARIO MATA CASTRO and JOANNE BENEDICTA CHARISSIMA M. CASTRO,

A.K.A. "MARIA SOCORRO M. CASTRO" and "JAYROSE M. CASTRO" vs. JOSE
MARIA JED LEMUEL GREGORIO and ANA MARIA REGINA GREGORIO
G.R. No. 188801, October 15, 2014, SECOND Division
LEONEN, J.

DOCTRINE:
The consent of the adopter’s other children is necessary as it ensures harmony
among the prospective siblings. It also sufficiently puts the other children on notice that
they will have to share their parent’s love and care, as well as their future legitimes, with
another person.

FACTS:
 The case originally stemmed from the adoption of Jose Maria Jed Lemuel
Gregorio and Ana Maria Regina Gregorio by Atty. Jose G. Castro. Jose is the estranged
husband of Rosario Mata Castro and the father of Joanne Benedicta Charissima M.
Castro.
Jose filed a petition for adoption. He alleged that Jed and Regina were his
illegitimate children with Lilibeth Gregorio, whom Rosario alleged was his erstwhile
housekeeper. At the time of the filing of the petition, Jose was 70 years old. The trial
court approved the adoption. Rosario and Joanne filed a petition for annulment of
judgment with the CA. The CA denied it ratiocinating that while admittedly, no notice
was given by the trial court to Rosario and Joanne of the adoption, the appellate court
ruled that there is "no explicit provision in the rules that the spouse and legitimate child
of the adopter should be personally notified of the hearing."
Respondents argue that there was constructive notice through publication for
three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation, which constitutes not
only notice to them but also notice to the world of the adoption proceedings.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners should have been given notice by the trial court of the
adoption, as adoption laws require their consent as a requisite in the proceedings?

RULING:
YES. It is settled that "the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in
force at the time of the commencement of the action." As Jose filed the petition for
adoption on August 1, 2000, it is Republic Act No. 855256 which applies over the
proceedings. The law on adoption requires that the adoption by the father of a child
born out of wedlock obtain not only the consent of his wife but also the consent of his
legitimate children. Under Article III, Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8552, the husband
must first obtain the consent of his wife if he seeks to adopt his own children born out of
wedlock.
The provision is mandatory. As a general rule, the husband and wife must file a
joint petition for adoption. The rationale for this is stated in In Re: Petition for Adoption of
Michelle P. Lim:
The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision means that joint
adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the
concept of joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal situation. As the child
to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the
spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses.
The law provides for several exceptions to the general rule, as in a situation
where a spouse seeks to adopt his or her own children born out of wedlock. In this
instance, joint adoption is not necessary. However, the spouse seeking to adopt must
first obtain the consent of his or her spouse.
In the absence of any decree of legal separation or annulment, Jose and Rosario
remained legally married despite their de facto separation. For Jose to be eligible to
adopt Jed and Regina, Rosario must first signify her consent to the adoption. Jose,
however, did not validly obtain Rosario’s consent. His submission of a fraudulent
affidavit of consent in her name cannot be considered compliance of the requisites of
 the law. Had Rosario been given notice by the trial court of the proceedings, she would
have had a reasonable opportunity to contest the validity of the affidavit. Since her
consent was not obtained, Jose was ineligible to adopt.
The law also requires the written consent of the adopter’s children if they are 10
years old or older under Article III, Section 9 of Republic Act No. 8552. It is undisputed
that Joanne was Jose and Rosario’s legitimate child and that she was over 10 years old
at the time of the adoption proceedings. Her written consent, therefore, was necessary
for the adoption to be valid.
To circumvent this requirement, however, Jose manifested to the trial court that
he and Rosario were childless, thereby preventing Joanne from being notified of the
proceedings. As her written consent was never obtained, the adoption was not valid.
For the adoption to be valid, petitioners’ consent was required by Republic Act
No. 8552. Personal service of summons should have been effected on the spouse and
all legitimate children to ensure that their substantive rights are protected. It is not
enough to rely on constructive notice as in this case. Surreptitious use of procedural
technicalities cannot be privileged over substantive statutory rights.

 Adopted Children - Republic Act No.8552/ Domestic Adoption Act of 1998-

Nature and effects of adoption

BERNARDINA P. BARTOLOME v
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and SCANMAR MARITIME SERVICES
G.R. No. 192531 November 12, 2014
DIVISION
DOCTRINE: In case of the death of an adopted child, leaving no children or
descendants, his parents and relatives by consanguinity and not by adoption, shall be
his legal heirs.

FACTS: John Colcol was employed as electrician by Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc.
He was enrolled under the government’s Employees’ Compensation Program (ECP).
He died due to an accident while on board the vessel. John was, at the time of his
death, childless and unmarried. Thus, petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome,
John’s biological mother and, allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a claim
for death benefits.
SSS denied the claim on the ground that Bernardina was no longer considered as the
parent of John since the latter was legally adopted by Cornelio Colcol. As such, it is
Cornelio who qualifies as John’s primary beneficiary, not petitioner.
According to the records, Cornelio died during John’s minority.

ISSUES:
• Whether or not the death of the adopter during the adoptee’s minority results to the
restoration of the parental authority to the biological parents of the latter.
• Whether or not Bernardina is considered as a legal beneficiary of John.

RULING
FIRST ISSUE: Yes.
The Court ruled that John’s minority at the time of his adopter’s death is a
significant factor in the case at bar. Under such circumstance, parental authority should
be deemed to have reverted in favor of the biological parents. Otherwise, taking into
account Our consistent ruling that adoption is a personal relationship and that there are
no collateral relatives by virtue of adoption, who was then left to care for the minor
adopted child if the adopter passed away?
The Court also applied by analogy, insofar as the restoration of custody is
concerned, the provisions of law on rescission of adoption wherein if said petition is
granted, the parental authority of the adoptee’s biological parents shall be restored if the
adoptee is still a minor or incapacitated.
The manner herein of terminating the adopter’s parental authority, unlike the
grounds for rescission, justifies the retention of vested rights and obligations between
the adopter and the adoptee, while the consequent restoration of parental authority in
favor of the biological parents, simultaneously, ensures that the adoptee, who is still a
minor, is not left to fend for himself at such a tender age.
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the biological parents retain their rights
of succession tothe estate of their child who was the subject of adoption. While the
benefits arising from the death of an SSS covered employee do not form part of the
estate of the adopted child, the pertinent provision on legal or intestate succession at
least reveals the policy on the rights of the biological parents and those by adoption vis-
à-vis the right to receive benefits from the adopted. In the same way that certain rights
still attach by virtue of the blood relation, so too should certain obligations, which, the
Court ruled, include the exercise of parental authority, in the event of the untimely
passing of their minor offspring’s adoptive parent.
SECOND ISSUE: Yes.
The Court held that Cornelio’s adoption of John, without more, does not
deprive petitioner of the right to receive the benefits stemming from John’s death as a
dependent parent given Cornelio’s untimely demise during John’s minority. Since the
parent by adoption already died, then the death benefits under the Employees’
Compensation Program shall accrue solely to herein petitioner, John’s sole
remaining beneficiary.

 Adopted Children- Republic Act No.8552/ Domestic Adoption Act of 1998-

Nature and effects of adoption
EUGENIO SAN JUAN GERONIMO v. KAREN SANTOS 129
G.R. No. 197099, September 28, 2015, Third Division (Villarama, J.)
DOCTRINE:
It is well-settled that a record of birth is merely a prima facie evidence of the facts
contained therein. It is not conclusive evidence of the truthfulness of the statements
made there by the interested parties.

FACTS:
Karen Santos, claiming to be the only child of deceased Rufino and Caridad
Geronimo, filed a complaint for annulment of document and recovery of possession
against the defendants Eugenio and Emiliano who are the brothers of her father. She
alleged that with the death of her parents, the property consisting of one half of the
parcel of land belonging to her parents was passed on to her by the law on intestacy.
She discovered that defendants executed a document entitled Pagmamana sa Labas
ng Hukuman declaring themselves as the only heirs of spouses Rufino and Caridad and
adjudicating to themselves the property in question, and consequently took possession
and were able to transfer the tax declaration of the subject property to their names.

Eugenio and Emliano denied the allegation that Karen was the only child and
sole heir of their brother. They disclosed that the deceased Rufino and Caridad
Geronimo were childless and took in as their ward Karen who was in truth, the child of
Caridad’s sister. They claimed that the birth certificate of Karen was a simulated
document. Eugenio disputes the allegation that Karen is the only child and legal heir of
his brother Rufino. Eugenio was able to obtain a copy of Karen’s alleged birth
certificate. It had irregular features, such as that it was written in pentel pen, the entry in
the box date of birth was erased and the word and figure April 6, 1972 written and the
name Emma Daño was superimposed on the entry in the box intended for the
informant’s signature. A representative of the NSO, confirmed that there was an
alteration in the date of birth and signature of the informant. The trial court ruled in favor
of Karen.

ISSUE:
Is Karen a legitimate child of the deceased spouses Rufino and Caridad?

RULING:
No. The Supreme Court does not agree with the conclusion of both courts a quo.
The appellate court itself ruled that the irregularities consisting of the superimposed
entries on the date of birth and the name of the informant made the document
questionable. The corroborating testimony of Arturo Reyes, a representative of the
NSO, further confirmed that the entries on the date of birth and the signature of the
informant are alterations on the birth certificate which rendered the document
questionable. To be sure, even the respondent herself did not offer any evidence to
explain such irregularities on her own birth certificate. These irregularities and the
totality of the following circumstances surrounding the alleged birth of respondent are
sufficient to overthrow the presumption of regularity attached to respondent’s birth
certificate.
 The Supreme Court also finds that the concurrence of the secondary evidence
relied upon by both courts a quo does not sufficiently establish the one crucial fact in
this case: that respondent is indeed a child of the deceased spouses. Both the RTC and
the CA ruled that respondent is a legitimate child of her putative parents because she
was allowed to bear their family name "Geronimo", they supported her and her
education, she was the beneficiary of the burial benefits of Caridad in her GSIS policy,
Caridad applied for and was appointed as her legal guardian in relation to the estate left
by Rufino, and she and Caridad executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of
Rufino as his legal heirs.

Of great significance to this controversy was the following pronouncement in

Benitez-Badua v. Court of Appeals where the Supreme Court ruled that the mere
registration of a child in his or her birth certificate as the child of the supposed parents is
not a valid adoption, does not confer upon the child the status of an adopted child and
the legal rights of such child, and even amounts to simulation of the child's birth or
falsification of his or her birth certificate, which is a public document.

Furthermore, it is well-settled that a record of birth is merely a prima

facie evidence of the facts contained therein. It is not conclusive evidence of the
truthfulness of the statements made there by the interested parties. Following the logic
of Benitez, respondent Karen should have adduced evidence of her adoption, in view of
the contents of her birth certificate. The records, however, are bereft of any such
evidence.

Support
 Concept, Art. 194, FC
SUSAN LIM LUA VS. DANILO LUA 130
G.R. No. 175279-80 JUNE 5, 2013 FIRST DIVISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J

DOCTRINE:
The amount of support which those related by marriage and family relationship is
generally obliged to give each other shall be in proportion to the resources or means of
the giver and to the needs of the recipient.

FACTS:
On September 3, 2003, petitioner Susan Lim-Lua filed an action for
the declaration of nullity of her marriage with respondent Danilo Y. Lua

In her prayer for support pendente lite for herself and her two children, petitioner
sought the amount of P500,000.00 as monthly support, citing respondent's huge
earnings from salaries and dividends in several companies and businesses here and
abroad.
 After due hearing, the petition for support pendente lite was granted.
From the evidence already adduced by the parties, the amount of P250,000.00 would
be sufficient to take care of the needs of the plaintiff. This amount excludes
P135,000.00 for medical attendance expenses needed by plaintiff for the operation of
both her eyes which is demandable upon the conduct of such operation.

Danilo asserted that Susan is not entitled to spousal support considering that she
does not maintain for herself a separate dwelling from their children and respondent has
continued to support the family for their sustenance and well-being in accordance with
family's social and financial standing. However the court denied his motion for
reconsideration.

ISSUE
Whether Susan is entitled to support from Danilo?

RULING
Yes.
The amount of support which those related by marriage and family relationship is
generally obliged to give each other shall be in proportion to the resources or means of
the giver and to the needs of the recipient. Such support comprises everything
indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and
transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family.

Upon receipt of a verified petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void

marriage or for annulment of voidable marriage, or for legal separation, and at any time
during the proceeding, the court, motu proprio or upon verified application of any of the
parties, guardian or designated custodian, may temporarily grant support pendente lite
prior to the rendition of judgment or final order.

In this case, the amount of monthly support pendente lite for petitioner and her
two children was determined after due hearing and submission of documentary
evidence by the parties. Although the amount fixed by the trial court was reduced on
appeal, it is clear that the monthly support pendente lite of P115,000.00 ordered by the
CA was intended primarily for the sustenance of petitioner and her children, e.g., food,
clothing, salaries of drivers and house helpers, and other household expenses.
Petitioner's testimony also mentioned the cost of regular therapy for her scoliosis and
vitamins/medicines.

As to the financial capacity of the respondent, it is beyond doubt that he can

solely provide for the subsistence, education, transportation, health/medical needs and
recreational activities of his children, as well as those of petitioner who was then
unemployed and a full-time housewife.

Since the amount of monthly support pendente lite as fixed by the CA was not
appealed by either party, there is no controversy as to its sufficiency and
reasonableness. The dispute concerns the deductions made by respondent in settling
the support in arrears.

 Who is entitled to support, Art. 195-197, FC

Gotardo v. Buling, G.R. No. 165166, August 15, 2012

# 132 Mabugay-Otamias v. Republic of the Philippines
G.R. No. 189516, June 8, 2016
SECOND DIVISION
LEONEN, J.:

DOCTRINE: A writ of execution lies against the pension benefits of a retired officer of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, which is the subject of a deed of assignment
drawn by him granting support to his wife and five (5) children. The benefit of exemption
from execution of pension benefits is a statutory right that may be waived, especially in
order to comply with a husband's duty to provide support under Article XV of the 1987
Constitution and the Family Code.

FACTS: On September 2000, Edna and Colonel Otamias separated due to his alleged
infidelity. Their children remained with Edna. On August 2002, Edna filed a Complaint-
Affidavit against Colonel Otamias before the Provost Marshall Division of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines. Edna demanded monthly support equivalent to 75% of
Colonel Otamias' retirement benefits. On February 26, 2003, Colonel Otamias
executed a Deed of Assignment where he waived 50% of his salary and pension
benefits in favor of Edna and their children. The Deed of Assignment was considered by
the parties as a compromise agreement. The agreement was honored until January 6,
2006. Colonel Otamias retired on April 1, 2003. Edna alleged that the Armed Forces of
the Philippines suddenly decided not to honor the agreement" between Colonel Otamias
and his legitimate family. In a letter dated April 3, 2006, the Armed Forces of the
Philippines Pension and Gratuity Management Center (AFP PGMC) informed Edna that
a court order was required for the AFP PGMC to recognize the Deed of Assignment.
Heeding the advice of the AFP PGMC, Edna, on behalf of herself and Jeffren M.
Otamias and Jemwel M. Otamias (Edna, et al.), filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Cagayan de Oro, Misamis Oriental an action for support. The trial court ruled in favor of
Edna, et al. and ordered the automatic deduction of the amount of support from the
monthly pension of Colonel Otamias. The Court of Appeals reversed the Decision of the
RTC.
ISSUE: Whether Colonel Otamias' pension benefits can be executed upon for the
financial support of his legitimate family?
RULING: Yes. The right to receive support is provided under the Family Code. Article
194 of the Family Code defines support as follows:

Art. 194. Support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling,

clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the
financial capacity of the family.

The education of the person entitled to be supported referred to in the preceding

paragraph shall include his schooling or training for some profession, trade or
vocation, even beyond the age of majority. Transportation shall include expenses
in going to and from school, or to and from place of work.cralawred

The provisions of the Family Code also state who are obliged to give support,
thus:

Art. 195. Subject to the provisions of the succeeding articles, the following are
obliged to support each other to the whole extent set forth in the preceding
article:

(1) The spouses;

(2) Legitimate ascendants and descendants;
(3) Parents and their legitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate
children of the latter;
(4) Parents and their illegitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate
children of the latter; and
(5) Legitimate brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half- blood.

Art. 196. Brothers and sisters not legitimately related, whether of the full or half-
blood, are likewise bound to support each other to the full extent set forth in
Article 194 except only when the need for support of the brother or sister, being
of age, is due to a cause imputable to the claimant's fault or negligence.

Art. 197. For the support of legitimate ascendants; descendants, whether

legitimate or illegitimate; and brothers and sisters, whether legitimately or
illegitimately related, only the separate property of the person obliged to give
support shall be answerable provided that in case the obligor has no separate
property, the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, if financially
capable, shall advance the support, which shall be deducted from the share of
the spouses obliged upon the liquidation of the absolute community or of the
conjugal partnership.
Based on the Family Code, Colonel Otamias is obliged to give support to his family,
petitioners in this case. However, he retired in 2003, and his sole source of income is
his pension. Judgments in actions for support are immediately executory, yet under
Section 31 of Presidential Decree No. 1638, his pension cannot be executed upon.
However, considering that Colonel Otamias has waived a portion of his retirement
benefits through his Deed of Assignment, resolution on the conflict between the civil
code provisions on support and Section 31 of Presidential Decree No. 1638 should be
resolved in a more appropriate case.
 Who must pay support, Arts. 195-197, 199-200

EDNA MABUGAY-OTAMIAS et. al. v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES et. al.

G.R. No. 189516, June 08, 2016
SECOND DIVISION
LEONEN, J.:
DOCTRINE: Under the law and existing jurisprudence, the "right to support" is
practically equivalent to the "right to life." The "right to life" always takes precedence
over "property rights." The "right to support/life" is also a substantive right which always
takes precedence over technicalities/procedural rules. It being so, technical rules must
yield to substantive justice.

FACTS: Edna Otamias and retired Colnel Francisco Otamias were married and had five
children. When the got separated due to alleged infidelity, Edna filed a Complaint
affidavit against Colonel Otamias before the Provost Marshall Division of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and demanded monthly support equivalent to 75% of Colonel
Otamias' retirement benefits. However, Colonel Otamias only committed to 50% of his
retirement benefits in an Affidavit he had executed. He then executed a Deed of
Assignment where he waived 50% of his salary and pension benefits in favor of Edna
and their children.
The Deed was considered by them as a compromise agreement. The Agreement
was then honored until January 6, 2006. The AFP PGMC informed Edna that a Court
order was required for the AFP PFMC to recognize the Deed of Assignment. Edna then
filed with the RTC of Cagayan de Oro an action for support. The court ruled in favor of
Edna and oredered automatic deduction of the amount of support from the monthly
pension of Colonel Otamias. Edna then filedd a motion for the issuance of Writ of
Execution which was granted. A notice of Garnishment then was issued and received
by the AFP PGMC. The latter then filed before the CA a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition.
The CA granted the petition ruling that the monthly pension of retired military
personnel is exempt from execution and attachment.

ISSUE: Is Colonel Otamias obliged to give support to his family?

RULING: Yes.
The provisions of the Family Code state who are obliged to give support, thus:
Art. 195. Subject to the provisions of the succeeding articles, the following are obliged to
support each other to the whole extent set forth in the preceding article:

(1)The spouses;
(2) Legitimate ascendants and descendants;
(3) Parents and their legitimate children and the legitimate and
illegitimate children of the latter;
(4) Parents and their illegitimate children and the legitimate and
illegitimate children of the latter; and
(5) Legitimate brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half- blood.

Art. 197. For the support of legitimate ascendants; descendants, whether legitimate or
illegitimate; and brothers and sisters, whether legitimately or illegitimately related, only
the separate property of the person obliged to give support shall be answerable
provided that in case the obligor has no separate property, the absolute community or
the conjugal partnership, if financially capable, shall advance the support, which shall be
deducted from the share of the spouses obliged upon the liquidation of the absolute
community or of the conjugal partnership.
Thus, based on the Family Code, Colonel Otamias is obliged to give support to his
family.
Del Socorro v. Brinkman Van Wilsem, G.R. No. 193707, December 10, 2014

Parental Authority and Custody Art. XV, Sec. 3 (1) and (2) of 1987 Constitution;
Art. 20, FC Patria Potestas
 Characteristics of Parental Authority, Art. 210, FC

James and Lovely-Ann C. Imbong et.al. v Hon. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr. et. al.
G.r. No. 204819 April 8, 2014 En Banc

Facts: Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354 or Responsive Parenthood and Reproductive
Health Act of 2012 (RH Law) was enacted. The law tackles the issues on population
growth control, abortion and contraception making it a very controversial law. Shortly
after the president placed his imprimatur, challengers from various sectors of our
society began. Among those assailed is that Sec. 23(a), 2(i) of RH Law which violates
the Constitution by intruding into marital privacy and autonomy. It argued that it
cultivates disunity and fosters animosity in the family rather than promote its solidarity
and total development.

Section 23(a),2(i) of RH law provides:

The following acts are prohibited:
(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall: ...
 (2) refuse to perform legal and medically-safe reproductive health procedures on
any person of legal age on the ground of lack of consent or authorization of the
following persons in the following instances:

(i) Spousal consent in case of married persons: provided, That in case of

disagreement, the decision of the one undergoing the procedures shall prevail.
They claimed that RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one’s family
protected by the Constitution. It is contended that the RH Law providing for mandatory
reproductive health education intrudes upon their constitutional right to raise their
children in accordance with their beliefs.
It is claimed that , by giving absolute authority to the person who will undergo
reproductive health procedure, the RH Law forsake any real dialogue between the
spouses and impedes the right of spouses to mututally decide on matters pertaining to
the overall well-being of their family. Also, parents of a child who has suffered a
miscarriage are deprived of parental authority to determine whether their child should
use contraceptives.
Issue: Whether or not parental authority under Art. 210 of FC is depleted by Section
23(a),2(i) of RH law?
Ruling: Yes.
Section 3 of Article XV of the Constitution provides
the State shall defend:
The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and
the demands of responsible parenthood;

In this case, the RH Law, in its not-so-hidden desire to control population growth,
contains provisions which tend to wreck the family as a solid social institution. It bars the
husband and/or the father from participating in the decision making process regarding
their common future progeny. It likewise deprives the parents of their authority over their
minor daughter simply because she is already a parent or had suffered a miscarriage.

Section 23 (b) 2(i) of the RH Law refers to reproductive health procedures like
tubal litigation and vasectomy which, by their very nature, should require mutual
consent and decision between the husband and the wife as they affect issues intimately
related to the founding of a family. Section 3, Art. XV of the Constitution espouses that
the State shall defend the "right of the spouses to found a family." One person cannot
found a family. The right, therefore, is shared by both spouses. In the same Section 3,
their right "to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs
that affect them " is equally recognized.

The RH Law cannot be allowed to infringe upon this mutual decision-making. By

giving absolute authority to the spouse who would undergo a procedure, and barring the
other spouse from participating in the decision would drive a wedge between the
husband and wife, possibly result in bitter animosity, and endanger the marriage and
the family, all for the sake of reducing the population. This would be a marked departure
from the policy of the State to protect marriage as an inviolable social institution.

Decision-making involving a reproductive health procedure is a private matter

which belongs to the couple, not just one of them. Any decision they would reach would
affect their future as a family because the size of the family or the number of their
children significantly matters. The decision whether or not to undergo the procedure
belongs exclusively to, and shared by, both spouses as one cohesive unit as they chart
their own destiny. It is a constitutionally guaranteed private right. Unless it prejudices
the State, which has not shown any compelling interest, the State should see to it that
they chart their destiny together as one family.

We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights -older than our political
parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a coming together for better or for
worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an
association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political
faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as
noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.

Equally deplorable is the debarment of parental consent in cases where the

minor, who will be undergoing a procedure, is already a parent or has had a
miscarriage. Section 7 of the RH law provides:

SEC. 7. Access to Family Planning. –

No person shall be denied information and access to family planning services, whether
natural or artificial: Provided, That minors will not be allowed access to modern methods
of family planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s except when
the minor is already a parent or has had a miscarriage.

There can be no other interpretation of this provision except that when a minor is
already a parent or has had a miscarriage, the parents are excluded from the decision
making process of the minor with regard to family planning. Even if she is not yet
emancipated, the parental authority is already cut off just because there is a need to
tame population growth.

It is precisely in such situations when a minor parent needs the comfort, care,
advice, and guidance of her own parents. The State cannot replace her natural mother
and father when it comes to providing her needs and comfort. To say that their consent
is no longer relevant is clearly anti-family. It does not promote unity in the family. It is an
affront to the constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family as an
inviolable social institution.

More alarmingly, it disregards and disobeys the constitutional mandate that "the
natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic
efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government." In this regard, Commissioner Bernas wrote:
The 1987 provision has added the adjective "primary" to modify the right of parents. It
imports the assertion that the right of parents is superior to that of the State.

To insist on a rule that interferes with the right of parents to exercise
parental control over their minor-child or the right of the spouses to mutually
decide on matters which very well affect the very purpose of marriage, that is, the
establishment of conjugal and family life, would result in the violation of one's
privacy with respect to his family. It would be dismissive of the unique and
strongly-held Filipino tradition of maintaining close family ties and violative of the
recognition that the State affords couples entering into the special contract of
marriage to as one unit in forming the foundation of the family and society.

The State cannot, without a compelling state interest, take over the role of
parents in the care and custody of a minor child, whether or not the latter is
already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Only a compelling state interest can
justify a state substitution of their parental authority.

First Exception: Access to Information

Whether with respect to the minor referred to under the exception
provided in the second paragraph of Section 7 or with respect to the consenting
spouse under Section 23(a)(2)(i), a distinction must be made. There must be a
differentiation between access to information about family planning services, on
one hand, and access to the reproductive health procedures and modern family
planning methods themselves, on the other. Insofar as access to information is
concerned, the Court finds no constitutional objection to the acquisition of
information by the minor referred to under the exception in the second paragraph
of Section 7 that would enable her to take proper care of her own body and that
of her unborn child. After all, Section 12, Article II of the Constitution mandates
the State to protect both the life of the mother as that of the unborn child.
Considering that information to enable a person to make informed decisions is
essential in the protection and maintenance of ones' health, access to such
information with respect to reproductive health must be allowed. In this situation,
the fear that parents might be deprived of their parental control is unfounded
because they are not prohibited to exercise parental guidance and control over
their minor child and assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject the
information received.

Second Exception: Life Threatening Cases

As in the case of the conscientious objector, an exception must be made
in life-threatening cases that require the performance of emergency procedures.
In such cases, the life of the minor who has already suffered a miscarriage and
that of the spouse should not be put at grave risk simply for lack of consent. It
should be emphasized that no person should be denied the appropriate medical
care urgently needed to preserve the primordial right, that is, the right to life.

In this connection, the second sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii) should be

 struck down. By effectively limiting the requirement of parental consent to "only in
elective surgical procedures," it denies the parents their right of parental authority
in cases where what is involved are "non-surgical procedures." Save for the two
exceptions discussed above, and in the case of an abused child as provided in
the first sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii), the parents should not be deprived of
their constitutional right of parental authority. To deny them of this right would be
an affront to the constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family.

 Who exercises parental authority and custody, Art. 211, FC

Recto v. Trocino, A.M. No. RTJ-17-2508, Nov. 7, 2017 (En Banc)

RENALYN A. MASBATE AND SPOUSES RENATO MASBATE AND MARLYN

MASBATE v. RICKY JAMES RELUCIO
G.R. No. 235498, July 30, 2018, SECOND DIVISION (PERLAS-BERNABE, J.)

DOCTRINE:
As a general rule, the father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental
authority over the persons of their common children. However, insofar as illegitimate
children are concerned, Article 176 of the Family Code states that illegitimate children
shall be under the parental authority of their mother.

FACTS:
Queenie was born to Renalyn and Ricky James, who had been living together
with Renalyn's parents without the benefit of marriage. Three years later, the
relationship ended. Renalyn went to Manila leaving Queenie behind in the care and
custody of her father, Ricky James. Ricky James alleged that on November 7, 2015,
Spouses Renata and Marlyn Masbate (Renalyn's parents) took Queenie from the school
where he had enrolled her. When asked to give Queenie back, Renalyn's parents
refused and instead showed a copy of a Special Power of Attorney executed by
Renalyn granting full parental rights, authority, and custody over Queenie to them.
Consequently, Ricky James filed a petition for habeas corpus and child custody.
A hearing was conducted, where Renalyn brought Queenie and expressed the desire
for her daughter to remain in her custody. The RTC ruled that the custody of three year-
old Queenie rightfully belongs to Renalyn.
The CA set aside the assailed RTC Orders and remanded the case to the lower
court for determination of who should exercise custody over Queenie. The CA found
that the RTC hastily dismissed the petition a quo upon Queenie's production in court,
when the objective of the case was to establish the allegation that Renalyn had been
neglecting Queenie, which was a question of fact that must be resolved by trial.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA correctly remanded the case a quo for determination of
who should exercise custody over Queenie?
RULING: Accordingly, mothers (such as Renalyn) are entitled to the sole parental
authority of their illegitimate children (such as Queenie), notwithstanding the father's
recognition of the child. In the exercise of that authority, mothers are consequently
entitled to keep their illegitimate children in their company, and the Court will not deprive
them of custody, absent any imperative cause showing the mother's unfitness to
exercise such authority and care.
Article 213 of the same Code provides for the so-called tender-age presumption,
stating that "no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother
unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise." According to
jurisprudence, the following instances may constitute "compelling reasons" to wrest
away custody from a mother over her child although under seven years of age: neglect,
abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction,
maltreatment of the child, insanity or affliction with a communicable disease.
In the event that Renalyn is found unfit or unsuitable to care for her daughter,
Article 214 of the Family Code mandates that substitute parental authority shall be
exercised by the surviving grandparent. However, the same Code further provides in
Article 216 that "in default of parents or judicially appointed guardian, the following
persons shall exercise substitute parental authority over the child in the order indicated:"
Article 216. x x x
• The surviving grandparent as provided in Art. 214;
• The oldest brother or sister, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or
disqualified; and
• The child's actual custodian, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or
disqualified.
It was not disputed that Ricky James was in actual physical custody of Queenie
when Renalyn left for Manila to pursue her studies until the instant controversy took
place. As such, Ricky James had already assumed obligations and enjoyed privileges of
a custodial character, giving him a cause of action to file a case of habeas corpus to
regain custody of Queenie as her actual custodian.
The Court found that Queenie's best interest demands that a proper trial be
conducted to determine if she had, indeed, been neglected and abandoned by her
mother, rendering the latter unfit to exercise parental authority over her, and in the event
that Renalyn is found unsuitable, whether it is in Queenie's best interest that she be in
the custody of her father rather than her grandparents upon whom the law accords a far
superior right to exercise substitute parental authority.
While the appellate court correctly remanded the case for trial, the Court, however,
held that it erred in granting Ricky James temporary custody for a limited period of
twenty-four consecutive hours once every month, in addition to visitation rights, invoking
"humane and practical considerations," which were based solely on Ricky James'
allegations. By granting temporary albeit limited custody ahead of trial, the appellate
court overturned the tender-age presumption with nothing but Ricky James' bare
allegations, to which the Court cannot give its imprimatur. As earlier intimated, the issue
surrounding Renalyn's fitness as a mother must be properly threshed out in the trial
court before she can be denied custody, even for the briefest of periods, over Queenie.
  Substitute Parental Authority - Extent of Authority, Art. 233, FC
CARAVAN TRAVEL AND TOURS INTERNATIONAL, INC v ERMILINDA R. ABEJAR
G.R. No. 170631, February 10, 2016
SECOND DIVISION
DOCTRINE: The appropriate approach is that in cases where both the registered-owner
rule and Article 2180 apply, the plaintiff must first establish that the employer is the
registered owner of the vehicle in question. Once the plaintiff successfully proves
ownership, there arises a disputable presumption that the requirements of Article 2180
have been proven. As a consequence, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to
show that no liability under Article 2180 has arisen.
On July 13, 2000, Jesmariane R. Reyes (Reyes) was walking along the west-bound
lane of Sampaguita Street, United Parañaque Subdivision IV, Parañaque City. A
Mitsubishi L-300 van with plate number PKM 195 was travelling along the east-bound
lane, opposite Reyes. To avoid an incoming vehicle, the van swerved to its left and hit
Reyes. Alex Espinosa (Espinosa), a witness to the accident, went to her aid and loaded
her in the back of the van. Espinosa told the driver of the van, Jimmy Bautista
(Bautista), to bring Reyes to the hospital. Instead of doing so, Bautista appeared to
have left the van parked inside a nearby subdivision with Reyes still in the van.
Fortunately for Reyes, an unidentified civilian came to help and drove Reyes to the
hospital.
Upon investigation, it was found that the registered owner of the van was Caravan.
Caravan is a corporation engaged in the business of organizing travels and
tours.Bautista was Caravan's employee assigned to drive the van as its service driver.
Caravan shouldered the hospitalization expenses of Reyes.Despite medical attendance,
Reyes died two (2) days after the accident.
Issues:
First, whether respondent Ermilinda R. Abejar is a real party in interest who may bring
an action for damages against petitioner Caravan Travel and Tours International, Inc.
on account of Jesmariane R. Reyes' death
Second, whether petitioner should be held liable as an employer, pursuant to Article
2180 of the Civil Code.
Ruling:
Having exercised substitute parental authority, respondent suffered actual loss and is,
thus, a real party in interest in this case.
It is particularly noticeable that Article 1902 stresses the passive subject of the
obligation to pay damages caused by his fault or negligence. The article does not limit
or specify the active subjects, much less the relation that must exist between the victim
of the culpa aquiliana and the person who may recover damages, thus warranting the
inference that, in principle, anybody who suffers any damage from culpa aquiliana,
whether a relative or not of the victim, may recover damages from the person
responsible therefor
II
Respondent's Complaint is anchored on an employer's liability for quasi-delict provided
in Article 2180, in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not
engaged in any business or industry.
The resolution of this case must consider two (2) rules. First, Article 2180's specification
that "[e]mployers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees . . . acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks[.
Second, the operation of the registered-owner rule that registered owners are liable for
death or injuries caused by the operation of their vehicles.
These rules appear to be in conflict when it comes to cases in which the employer is
also the registered owner of a vehicle. Article 2180 requires proof of two things: first, an
employment relationship between the driver and the owner; and second, that the driver
acted within the scope of his or her assigned tasks. On the other hand, applying the
registered-owner rule only requires the plaintiff to prove that the defendant-employer is
the registered owner of the vehicle.
Thus, it is imperative to apply the registered-owner rule in a manner that harmonizes it
with Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code.
In light of this, the words used in Del Carmen are particularly notable. There, this court
stated that Article 2180 "should defer to"the registered-owner rule. It never stated that
Article 2180 should be totally abandoned.
Therefore, the appropriate approach is that in cases where both the registered-owner
rule and Article 2180 apply, the plaintiff must first establish that the employer is the
registered owner of the vehicle in question. Once the plaintiff successfully proves
ownership, there arises a disputable presumption that the requirements of Article 2180
have been proven. As a consequence, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to
show that no liability under Article 2180 has arisen.
This disputable presumption, insofar as the registered owner of the vehicle in relation to
the actual driver is concerned, recognizes that between the owner and the victim, it is
the former that should carry the costs of moving forward with the evidence.
The registration of the vehicle, on the other hand, is accessible to the public.
Here, respondent presented a copy of the Certificate of Registration of the van that hit
Reyes. The Certificate attests to petitioner's ownership of the van.
Petitioner itself did not dispute its ownership of the van.
Consistent with the rule we have just stated, a presumption that the requirements of
Article 2180 have been satisfied arises.
It is now up to petitioner to establish that it incurred no liability under Article 2180. This it
can do by presenting proof of any of the following: first, that it had no employment
relationship with Bautista; second, that Bautista acted outside the scope of his assigned
tasks; or third, that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
and supervision of Bautista.
On the first, petitioner admitted that Bautista was its employee at the time of the
accident.
On the second, petitioner was unable to prove that Bautista was not acting within the
scope of his assigned tasks at the time of the accident.
On the third, petitioner likewise failed to prove that it exercised the requisite diligence in
the selection and supervision of Bautista.
Employing a person holding a non-professional driver's license to operate another's
motor vehicle violates Section 24 of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code
Evidently, petitioner did not only fail to exercise due diligence when it selected Bautista
as service driver; it also committed an actual violation of law.
III
Petitioner's argument that it should be excused from liability because Bautista was
already dropped as a party is equally unmeritorious. The liability imposed on the
registered owner is direct and primary.
It does not depend on the inclusion of the negligent driver in the action.
Instead of insisting that Bautista—who was nothing more than a necessary party—
should not have been dropped as a defendant, or that petitioner, along with Bautista,
should have been dropped, petitioner (as a co-defendant insisting that the action must
proceed with Bautista as party) could have opted to file a cross-claim against Bautista
as its remedy.
IV
The Court of Appeals committed no reversible error when it awarded actual damages to
respondent.
Respondent had personal knowledge of the facts sought to be proved by the Certificate,
i.e. that she spent P35,000.00 for the funeral expenses of Reyes. Thus, the Certificate
that she identified and testified to is not hearsay.
Both the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court found Bautista grossly negligent
in driving the van and concluded that Bautista's gross negligence was the proximate
cause of Reyes' death.
As such, petitioner must pay the exemplary damages arising from the negligence of its
driver.
 Special parental authority- Extent of responsibility/liability, Art. 219, FC
ST. LUKE'S COLLEGE OF MEDICINE-WILLIAM H. QUASHA MEMORIAL
FOUNDATION v. SPOUSES MANUEL AND ESMERALDA PEREZ AND SPOUSES
ERIC AND JURISITA QUINTOS 139
G.R. No. 222740, September 28, 2016, Third Division
(Perez, J.)

DOCTRINE: Institutions of learning have the "built-in" obligation of providing a

conducive atmosphere for learning, an atmosphere where there are no constant threats
to life and limb, and one where peace and order are maintained.

FACTS: St. Luke's sent four of its 4th year medical students to the clinic. They were
tasked to complete a four-week clerkship rotation at the clinic and like the previous
batches, they were housed in the second floor of the clinic. According to Ramos he was
awakened sometime between 3 o'clock and 3:30 in the morning of February 9, 2010
when he heard Murillo shouting from the other side of the room that there was a fire.
Unfortunately, the fire resulted in the deaths of the female medical students, including
the daughters of plaintiffs-appellants due to smoke inhalation resulting to asphyxia. As a
result of the deaths, St. Luke's compensated the parents of the three deceased students
in the amount of PhP300,000.00 each from insurance proceeds.

The Bureau of Fire Protection conducted an investigation on the incident, and it

certified that the fire was purely accidental in nature due to unattended cooking.
Convinced that there was a cover-up, the parents of the students sought the help of the
NBI. In its Resolution, the NBI declared that the construction of the Cabiao Community
Clinic building was in violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 9514 (R.A. No.
9514) or the Revised Fire Code of the Philippines, that the cause of the fire was due to
faulty electrical wiring, and that St. Luke's negligence is criminal in nature. Respondents
then filed a Complaint for damages against petitioners claiming that their negligence
caused the deaths of respondents' daughters. Respondents maintained that, as a
learning institution which sends out its medical students to rural areas to comply with its
curriculum requirement, St. Luke's has the contractual duty and legal responsibility to
see to it that the premises to where it sends its students are safe and that, in the case at
bar, St. Luke's refused to recognize its obligations/liabilities. The RTC dismissed the
complaint for lack of merit. Upon appeal, the CA reversed the RTC Decision and
remanded the case to the RTC for reception of evidence on the amount of damages to
be awarded.

ISSUE: Is St. Lukes negligent and, thus, liable?

RULING: Yes. When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is
established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties
are bound to comply with. For its part, the school undertakes to provide the student with
an education that would presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and
skills to pursue higher education or a profession. On the other hand, the student
covenants to abide by the school's academic requirements and observe its rules and
regulations. In the case at bar, it is well to remember that the victims were in the Cabiao
Community Clinic because it was a requirement of petitioners. The students were
complying with an obligation under the enrollment contract — they were rendering
medical services in a community center as required by petitioners. It was thus
incumbent upon petitioners to comply with their own obligations under the enrollment
contract - to ensure that the community center where they would designate their
students is safe and secure, among others.

Petitioners failed to take the necessary precautions to guard their students

against foreseeable harm. As correctly found by the CA, petitioners were remiss in
inspecting the premises of the Cabiao Community Clinic and in ensuring that the
necessary permits were in order. These precautions could have minimized the risk to
the safety of the victims. Indeed, the CA had basis in making the following
pronouncement:
In the instant case, as previously emphasized, defendants-appellees were
aware that its medical students were residing at the second floor of the clinic. At
the very least, during inspection, they should have thoroughly inspected the
building's physical appearance and the documents pertinent to the premises to
make sure that the same minimized the risk to the safety of the students. There
is no record that any inquiry on the condition of the premises was even made by
defendants-appellees prior to the implementation of the program. In addition to
such failure, defendants-appellees would have this Court believe that their
participation in the clinic was limited to providing the same with medical
personnel without considering that such personnel also included its students
which St. Luke's was obliged to protect from unnecessary danger.

The petitioners were obviously negligent in detailing their students to a virtual fire
trap. As found by the NBI, the Clinic was unsafe and was constructed in violation of
numerous provisions of the Revised Fire Code of the Philippines. It had no emergency
facilities, no fire exits, and had no permits or clearances from the appropriate
government offices.

Names and Surnames Arts. 364-380 of the Civil Code; Art. 178 of the Revised
Penal Code
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MICHELLE SORIANO GALLO 140
G.R. No. 2017074 JANUARY 17, 2018THIRD DIVISION LEONEN, J.
DOCTRINE: Names are labels for one's identity. They facilitate social interaction,
including the allocation of rights and determination of liabilities. It is for this reason that
the State has an interest in one's name. The name through which one is known is
generally, however, not chosen by the individual who bears it. Rather, it is chosen by
one's parents. In this sense, the choice of one's name is not a product of the exercise of
autonomy of the individual to whom it refers.

FACTS: Michelle Soriano Gallo filed a Petition for Correction of Entry of her Certificate
of Live Birth which indicated “Michael Soriano Gallo" instead of Michelle.

She has always been female and for her, she was not changing the name that
was given to her; she was merely correcting its entry. To accurately reflect these facts in
her documents, Gallo prayed before the RTC for the correction of her name from
"Michael" to "Michelle" and of her biological sex from "Male" to "Female" under Rule 108
of the Rules of Court.

In addition, Gallo asked for the inclusion of her middle name, "Soriano"; her
mother's middle name, "Angangan"; her father's middle name, "Balingao"; and her
parent's marriage date, May 23, 1981, in her Certificate of Live Birth, as these were not
recorded.

As proof, she attached to her petition copies of her diploma, voter's certification,
official transcript of records, medical certificate, mother's birth certificate, and parents'
marriage certificate.

RTC granted the petition. CA affirmed.

ISSUE: Whether the change sought is substantive or a mere correction of error.

RULING: It is a mere correction of error.

By qualifying the definition of a clerical, typographical error as a mistake "visible

to the eyes or obvious to the understanding," the law recognizes that there is a factual
determination made after reference to and evaluation of existing documents presented.
Thus, corrections may be made even though the error is not typographical if it is
"obvious to the understanding," even if there is no proof that the name or circumstance
in the birth certificate was ever used.

The Supreme Court agrees with the RTC’s determination, concurred in by the
CA, that this case involves the correction of a mere error. As these are findings of fact,
this Court is bound by the lower courts' findings.

In any case, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court does not apply to the case at bar.
The change in the entry of Gallo's biological sex is governed by Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court while Republic Act No. 9048 applies to all other corrections sought.
 Gallo is not attempting to replace her current appellation. She is merely
correcting the misspelling of her given name. "Michelle" could easily be misspelled as
"Michael," especially since the first 4 letters of these 2 names are exactly the same. The
differences only pertain to an additional letter "a" in "Michael," and "le" at the end of
"Michelle." "Michelle" and "Michael" may also be vocalized similarly, considering the
possibility of different accents or intonations of different people.

In any case, Gallo does not seek to be known by a different appellation. The
lower courts have determined that she has been known as "Michelle" all throughout her
life. She is merely seeking to correct her records to conform to her true given name.

However, Rule 108 does not apply in this case either. The applicable law for the
correction of Gallo's name is Republic Act No. 9048 which dispensed with the need for
judicial proceedings in case of any clerical or typographical mistakes in the civil register,
or changes of first name or nickname.

 Change of Name, Art. 376, Civil Code; RA 9048; RA 1017

Basilio Gan v. Republic, G.R. No. 207147, September 14, 2016

Civil Register, Arts. 407-413, Civil Code Republic Act 3753 and Republic Act 9048
(Clerical Error Law), as amended by Republic Act 10172

Yasuo Iwasawa v. Felisa Custodio Gangan #142

G.R. No. 204169, September 11, 2013
FIRST DIVISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

DOCTRINE: This Court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of nullity is
required before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted.

FACTS: Petitioner, a Japanese national, met private respondent sometime in 2002 in

one of his visits to the Philippines. Private respondent introduced herself as “single” and
“has never married before.” Since then, the two became close to each other. Later that
year, petitioner came back to the Philippines and married private respondent on
November 28, 2002 in Pasay City. After the wedding, the couple resided in Japan. rIn
July 2009, petitioner noticed his wife become depressed. Suspecting that something
might have happened in the Philippines, he confronted his wife about it. To his shock,
private respondent confessed to him that she received news that her previous husband
passed away. Petitioner sought to confirm the truth of his wife’s confession and
discovered that indeed, she was married to one Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo and that
their marriage took place on June 20, 1994. This prompted petitioner to file a petition for
the declaration of his marriage to private respondent as null and void on the ground that
their marriage is a bigamous one, based on Article 35(4) in relation to Article 41 of
the Family Code of the Philippines. On September 4, 2012, the RTC rendered the
assailed decision. It ruled that there was insufficient evidence to prove private
respondent’s prior existing valid marriage to another man. It held that while petitioner
offered the certificate of marriage of private respondent to Arambulo, it was only
petitioner who testified about said marriage. It further ruled that petitioner’s testimony
about the NSO certification is likewise unreliable since he is a stranger to the
preparation of said document.
ISSUE: Whether the testimony of the NSO records custodian certifying the authenticity
and due execution of the public documents issued by said office was necessary before
they could be accorded evidentiary weight?
RULING: Yes. Petition is granted. The marriage of petitioner Yasuo Iwasawa and
private respondent Felisa Custodio Gangan is declared null and void. There is no
question that the documentary evidence submitted by petitioner are all public
documents. As provided in the Civil Code:
ART. 410. The books making up the civil register and all documents relating
thereto shall be considered public documents and shall be prima facie evidence
of the facts therein contained.
As public documents, they are admissible in evidence even without further proof of their
due execution and genuineness. Thus, the RTC erred when it disregarded said
documents on the sole ground that the petitioner did not present the records custodian
of the NSO who issued them to testify on their authenticity and due execution since
proof of authenticity and due execution was not anymore necessary. Moreover, not only
are said documents admissible, they deserve to be given evidentiary weight because
they constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. And in the instant case,
the facts stated therein remain unrebutted since neither the private respondent nor the
public prosecutor presented evidence to the contrary.
 Amendments/Correction of Entries, Art. 412 and 376, Civil Code
Republic v. Lugsanay Uy, G.R. No. 198010, August 12, 2013
Chua v. Republic, G.R. No. 231998. November 20, 2017

Republic of the Philippines v Virgie (Virgel) L. Tipay

G.R. No. 209527, February 14, 2018 , Division
Reyes,Jr.,J.:

Doctrine: In the enactment of R.A. No. 9048 in 2001, the local civil registrars, or the
consul general as the case may be, are now authorized to correct clerical or
typographical errors in the civil registry, or make changes in the first name or nickname ,
without need of a judicial order. This law provided an administrative recourse for the
correction of clerical or typographical errors, essentially leaving the substantial
corrections in the civil registry to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. In 2011, R.A. No.
10172 expand the authority of local civil registrars and the consul general to make
changes in the day and month in the date of birth, as well as in the recorded sex of a
person when it is patently clear that there was a typographical error or mistake in the
entry.

Facts: Virgie (Virgel) Tipay sought the correction of several entries in his birth
certificate. In the birth certificate issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar and the National
Statistics Office (NSO), it reflects in his gender to be a female while his first name as
Virgie. The month and day of his birth in the certificate issued by the Municipality was
blank while in the NSO, it was May 12, 1976. Virgie alleged that these entries are
erroneous and sought the correction of his birth certificate, that is, as to his gender, from
female to male, as to his first name, from Virgie to Virgel and as to the month and date
of his birth to February 25, 1976.

Virgel’s mother testified that she gave birth to a son on February 25, 1976 who
was baptized as Virgel. Evidence presented is Certificate of Baptism, including other
documentary evidence such as a medical certificate stating that Virgel is phenotypically
male.

The RTC granted the petition but was objected by the Republic claiming that the
change of name from Virgie to Virgel should have been made under Rule 103 and not
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Such was because Rule 108 is confined to the
correction of clerical or innocuous errors, which excludes one’s name or date of birth.
Since the petition lodged with the RTC was not filed pursuant to Rule 103 of the Rules
of Court, the Republic asserted that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
case.

Issue: Whether or not the argument of the Republic is tenable considering R.A. 9048
and 10172?

Ruling: As to the correction of the gender and first name, R.A. No. 9048 is applicable.
The law provides that local civil registrars, or the consul general as the case may be,
are now authorized to correct clerical or typographical errors in the civil registry, or
make changes in the first name or nickname , without need of a judicial order. This law
provided an administrative recourse for the correction of clerical or typographical errors,
essentially leaving the substantial corrections in the civil registry to Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court. Thus Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can be applied.

As to the correction of the entry of the month and year, it can not be granted.
R.A. No. 10172 which expanded the authority of local civil registrars and the consul
general to make changes in the day and month in the date of birth, as well as in the
recorded sex of a person when it is patently clear that there was a typographical error or
mistake in the entry is effective on 2011. Virgel filed the petition on 2009.
 The NSO copy of Virgel’s birth certificate indicates that he was born on May 12,
1976, a date obviously different from that alleged in the petition for correction. As a
public document, the date of birth appearing in the NSO copy is presumed valid and
prima facie evidence of the facts stated in it. Virgel bore the burden of proving its
supposed falsity of which he failed to discharge. The police clearance, BIR I.D. and
Member Data Record from Philhealth Insurance Corp. do not suffice to overcome
presumption since the data are supplied by Virgel.