ARTICLE III

BILL OF RIGHTS

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of the laws.

ICHONG VS HERNANDEZ G.R. No. L-7995 May 31, 1957

Facts:

Driven by aspirations for economic independence and national security, the Congress enacted Act No. 1180 entitled “An Act to
Regulate the Retail Business.” The main provisions of the Act, among others, are:

(1) Prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, among others, from engaging directly or
indirectly in the retail trade; and

(2) Prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores or
branches of retail business.

Lao H. Ichong, in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the
said Act, brought an action to obtain a judicial declaration, and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance, Jaime Hernandez, and all
other persons acting under him, particularly city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacked the
constitutionality of the Act, contending that:

 It denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due process
of law.
 The subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof.
 The Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines.

Issue/s:

Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted principles.]

Discussions:

A generally accepted principle of international law, should be observed by us in good faith. If a treaty would be in conflict with a
statute then the statute must be upheld because it represented an exercise of the police power which, being inherent could not
be bargained away or surrendered through the medium of a treaty.

Ruling/s:

Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, the Supreme Court saw no conflict between
the raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection of the law clause “does not demand absolute
equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions
both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced”; and, that the equal protection clause “is not infringed by legislation
which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and
reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.”

PHIL. PHOSPHATE FERTILIZER CORP. VS. TORRES [231 SCRA 335; G.R. NO.98050; 17 MAR 1994]

Facts: Philphos Movement for Progress, Inc. (PMPI for brevity), filed with the Department of Labor and Employment a petition
for certification election among the supervisory employees of petitioner, alleging that as a supervisory union duly registered
with the Department of Labor and Employment it was seeking to represent the supervisory employees of Philippine Phosphate
Fertilizer Corporation. Mediator-Arbiter Rodolfo S. Milado issued an order directing the holding of a
certification election among the supervisory employees of petitioner, excluding therefrom the superintendents and the
professional and technical employees. However, the PMPI filed an amended petition with the Mediator-Arbiter wherein it
sought to represent not only the supervisory employees of petitioner but also its professional/technical
and confidential employees. The parties therein agreed to submit their respective position papers and to consider the amended
petition submitted for decision on the basis thereof and related documents. Mediator-Arbiter Milado issued an order granting
the petition and directing the holding of a certification election among the "supervisory, professional (engineers, analysts,
mechanics, accountants, nurses, midwives, etc.), technical, and confidential employees. PHILPHOS appealed the order to the
Secretary of Labor and Employment who rendered a decision through Undersecretary Bienvenido Laguesma dismissing the
appeal. PHILPHOS moved for reconsideration but the same was denied; hence, the instant petition alleging denial of due
process on the part of the DOLE to which the mediator-arbiter was under.

Issue: WON there was a denial of due process..

Held: There was no denial of due process. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied
to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of petitioner PHILPHOS agreed to file its position paper with the Mediator-Arbiter and to consider the case
submitted for decision on the basis of the position papers filed by the parties, there was sufficient compliance with the
requirement of due process, as petitioner was afforded reasonable opportunity to present its side. Moreover, petitioner could
have, if it so desired, insisted on a hearing to confront and examine the witnesses of the other party. But it did not; instead it
opted to submit its position paper with the Mediator-Arbiter. Besides, petitioner had all the opportunity to ventilate
its arguments in its appeal to the Secretary of Labor.

Restituto Ynot vs IAC GR No. 74457

There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO 626). To strengthen the law, Marcos issued EO
626-A which not only banned the movement of carabaos from interprovinces but as well as the movement of carabeef. On 13
Jan 1984, Ynot was caught transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He was then charged in violation of EO 626-A. Ynot
averred EO 626-A as unconstitutional for it violated his right to be heard or his right to due process. He said that the authority
provided by EO 626-A to outrightly confiscate carabaos even without being heard is unconstitutional. The lower court ruled
against Ynot ruling that the EO is a valid exercise of police power in order to promote general welfare so as to curb down the
indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos.
ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process. EO 626-A ctreated a presumption based on the
judgment of the executive. The movement of carabaos from one area to the other does not mean a subsequent slaughter of the
same would ensue. Ynot should be given to defend himself and explain why the carabaos are being transferred before they can
be confiscated. The SC found that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method
employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due
process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately
condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed
offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally,
also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the
distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.

Alonte vs Savellano GR No. 131652

Alonte was accused of raping JuvieLyn Punongbayan with accomplice Buenaventura Concepcion. It was alleged that Concepcion
befriended Juvie and had later lured her into Alonete’s house who was then the mayor of Biňan, Laguna. The case was brought
before RTC Biňan. The counsel and the prosecutor later moved for a change of venue due to alleged intimidation. While the
change of venue was pending, Juvie executed an affidavit of desistance. The prosecutor continued on with the case and the
change of venue was done notwithstanding opposition from Alonte. The case was raffled to the Manila RTC under J Savellano.
Savellano later found probable cause and had ordered the arrest of Alonte and Concepcion. Thereafter, the prosecution
presented Juvie and had attested the voluntariness of her desistance the same being due to media pressure and that they would
rather establish new life elsewhere. Case was then submitted for decision and Savellano sentenced both accused to reclusion
perpetua. Savellano commented that Alonte waived his right to due process when he did not cross examine Juvie when
clarificatory questions were raised about the details of the rape and on the voluntariness of her desistance.
ISSUE: Whether or not Alonte has been denied criminal due process.
HELD: The SC ruled that Savellano should inhibit himself from further deciding on the case due to animosity between him and
the parties. There is no showing that Alonte waived his right. The standard of waiver requires that it “not only must be voluntary,
but must be knowing, intelligent, and done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.”
Mere silence of the holder of the right should not be so construed as a waiver of right, and the courts must indulge every
reasonable presumption against waiver. Savellano has not shown impartiality by repeatedly not acting on numerous petitions
filed by Alonte. The case is remanded to the lower court for retrial and the decision earlier promulgated is nullified.

Aniag vs COMELEC Gr no. 104961

FACTS:
In preparation for the scheduled synchronized elections, COMELEC issued a Gun Ban resolution. Ceding to the request of the
House of Representatives Sergeant-at-Arms to return the firearms issued to him, petitioner instructed his driver to pick up the
firearms from his house and to bring the same to Congress. The driver was then apprehended at a checkpoint after the
policemen found the firearms in a bag in the truck of the car.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not petitioner’s driver acquiesced to the warrantless search.

RULING:
NO. In the face of fourteen (14) armed policemen conducting the operation, driver Arellanobeing alone and a mere employee
of petitioner could not have marshalled the strength and the courage to protest against the extensive search conducted in the
vehicle. In such scenario, the “implied acquiescence,” if there was any, could not be more than a mere passive conformity on
Arellano’s part to the search, and “consent” given under intimidating or coercive circumstances is no consent within the
purview of the constitutional guaranty.

SPOUSES CARLOS S. ROMUALDEZ and ERLINDA R. ROMUALDEZ, petitioners, vs.COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS G.R. No. 167011 April 30, 2008

Facts:
Garay and Apostol filed a complaint against Sps. Romualdez for violation of the OEC and RA 8189 or Voter’s Registration
Act of 1996 for making false information as to their residence in their applications as new voters in Burauen, Leyte.
The Complaint-Affidavit contained a prayer that a preliminary investigation be conducted by the COMELEC, and if the
evidence so warrants, the corresponding Information against petitioners be filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for the
prosecution of the same.
Sps. Romualdez contend that they intend to reside in Burauen, Leyte since 1989. On May 2000, they took actual residence
in Burauen by leasing for 5 years the house of Renomeron.
The Complaint-Affidavit contained a prayer that a preliminary investigation be conducted by the COMELEC, and if the evidence
so warrants, the corresponding Information against petitioners be filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for the prosecution
of the same.

Issue: WON due process was violated.

Held: No.

First, the Complaint-Affidavit filed by private respondent with the COMELEC is couched in a language which embraces the
allegations necessary to support the charge for violation of Section 10(g) and (j), in relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act No.
8189.
Petitioners cannot be said to have been denied due process on the claim that the election offenses charged against them by
private respondent are entirely different from those for which they stand to be accused of before the RTC, as charged by the
COMELEC. In the first place, there appears to be no incongruity between the charges as contained in the Complaint-Affidavit and
the Informations filed before the RTC, notwithstanding the denomination by private respondent of the alleged violations to be
covered by Section 261(y)(2) and Section 261(y)(5) of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 12 of Republic Act No. 8189.
Evidently, the Informations directed to be filed by the COMELEC against petitioners, and which were, in fact, filed with the RTC,
were based on the same set of facts as originally alleged in the private respondent’s Complaint-Affidavit.
In Lacson, we underscored the elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in the Complaint
or Information, and not by the evidence presented by the parties at the trial. Indeed, in Lacson, we articulated that the real nature
of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the Information nor from the specification of the
provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the Complaint
or Information.

Petitioners’ reliance on Lacson, however, does not support their claim of lack of due process because, as we have said, the charges
contained in private respondent’s Complaint-Affidavit and the charges as directed by the COMELEC to be filed are based on the
same set of facts. In fact, the nature of the criminal charges in private respondent’s Complaint-Affidavit and that of the charges
contained in the Informations filed with the RTC, pursuant to the COMELEC Resolution En Banc are the same, such that,
petitioners cannot claim that they were not able to refute or submit documentary evidence against the charges that the COMELEC
filed with the RTC. Petitioners were afforded due process because they were granted the opportunity to refute the allegations in
private respondent’s Complaint-Affidavit. On 2 April 2001, in opposition to the Complaint-Affidavit, petitioners filed a Joint
Counter-Affidavit with Motion to Dismiss with the Law Department of the COMELEC. They similarly filed a Memorandum before
the said body. Finding that due process was not dispensed with under the circumstances in the case at bar, we agree with the
stance of the Office of the Solicitor General that petitioners were reasonably apprised of the nature and description of the charges
against them. It likewise bears stressing that preliminary investigations were conducted whereby petitioners were informed of
the complaint and of the evidence submitted against them. They were given the opportunity to adduce controverting evidence
for their defense. In all these stages, petitioners actively participated.

CASE DIGEST : PHILCOMSAT VS. ALCUAZ

G.R. No. 84818 December 18, 1989

Facts: The petition before us seeks to annul and set aside an Order 1 issued by respondent Commissioner Jose Luis Alcuaz of the
National Telecommunications Commission

Herein petitioner is engaged in providing for services involving telecommunications. Charging rates for certain specified lines
that were reduced by order of herein respondent Jose AlcuazCommissioner of the National Telecommunications Commission.
The rates were ordered to be reduced by fifteen percent (15%) due to Executive Order No. 546 which granted the NTC the
power to fix rates. Said order was issued without prior notice and hearing.

Under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5514, petitioner was exempt from the jurisdiction of the then Public Service Commission,
now respondent NTC. However, pursuant to Executive Order No. 196 issued on June 17, 1987, petitioner was placed under the
jurisdiction, control and regulation of respondent NTC

Issue: Whether or Not E.O. 546 is unconstitutional.

Held: In Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Public Service Commission the Supreme Court said that although the rule-making power
and even the power to fix rates- when such rules and/or rates are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout
the Philippines-may partake of a legislative character. Respondent Alcuaz no doubt contains all the attributes of a quasi-judicial
adjudication. Foremost is the fact that said order pertains exclusively to petitioner and to no other

The respondent admits that the questioned order was issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions. It, however, insists that
notice and hearing are not necessary since the assailed order is merely incidental to the entire proceedings and, therefore,
temporary in nature but the supreme court said that While respondents may fix a temporary rate pending final determination
of the application of petitioner, such rate-fixing order, temporary though it may be, is not exempt from the statutory
procedural requirements of notice and hearing

The Supreme Court Said that it is clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has no authority to make such order without
first giving petitioner a hearing, whether the order be temporary or permanent. In the Case at bar the NTC didn’t scheduled
hearing nor it did give any notice to the petitioner

Ang Tibay vs. CIR - GR No. 46496, February 27, 1940

Facts:

Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather company which supplies the Philippine Army. Due to alleged shortage
of leather, Toribio caused the lay off of a number of his employees. However, the National Labor Union, Inc. (NLU) questioned
the validity of said lay off as it averred that the said employees laid off were members of NLU while no members of the rival labor
union National Workers Brotherhood (NWB) were laid off. NLU claims that NWB is a company dominated union and Toribio was
merely busting NLU.

The case reached the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) where Toribio and NWB won. Eventually, NLU went to the Supreme Court
invoking its right for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. The Supreme Court agreed with NLU. The Solicitor
General, arguing for the CIR, filed a motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the National Labor Union, Inc. is entitled to a new trial.

HELD:

Yes. The records show that the newly discovered evidence or documents obtained by NLU, which they attached to their petition
with the SC, were evidence so inaccessible to them at the time of the trial that even with the exercise of due diligence they could
not be expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations. Further, the attached
documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the
modification and reversal of the judgment rendered (said newly obtained records include books of business/inventory accounts
by Ang Tibay which were not previously accessible but already existing).

ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY VS. HON. JUDGE IGNACIO CAPULONG [222 SCRA 644; G.R. 99327; 27
MAY 1993]

Facts: Leonardo H. Villa, a first year law student of Petitioner University, died of serious physical injuries at Chinese General
Hospital after the initiation rites of Aquila Legis. Bienvenido Marquez was also hospitalized at the Capitol Medical Center for acute
renal failure occasioned by the serious physical injuries inflicted upon him on the same occasion. Petitioner Dean Cynthia
del Castillo created a Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee which was tasked to investigate and submit
a report within 72 hours on the circumstances surrounding the death of Lennie Villa. Said notice also required respondent
students to submit their written statements within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt. Although respondent students received
a copy of the written notice, they failed to file a reply. In the meantime, they were placed on preventive suspension. The Joint
Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee, after receiving the written statements and hearing the testimonies of
several witness, found a prima facie case against respondent students for violation of Rule 3 of the Law School Catalogue entitled
"Discipline." Respondent students were then required to file their written answers to the formal charge. Petitioner Dean created
a Disciplinary Board to hear the charges against respondent students. The Board found respondent students guilty of violating
Rule No. 3 of the Ateneo Law School Rules on Discipline which prohibits participation in hazing activities. However, in view of the
lack of unanimity among the members of the Board on the penalty of dismissal, the Board left the imposition of the penalty to
the University Administration. Accordingly, Fr. Bernas imposed the penalty of dismissal on all respondent students. Respondent
students filed with RTC Makati a TRO since they are currently enrolled. This was granted. A TRO was also issued enjoining
petitioners from dismissing the respondents. A day after the expiration of the temporary restraining order, Dean
del Castillo created a Special Board to investigate the charges of hazing against respondent students Abas and Mendoza. This was
requested to be stricken out by the respondents and argued that the creation of the Special Board was totally unrelated to the
original petition which alleged lack of due process. This was granted and reinstatement of the students was ordered.

Issue: Was there denial of due process against the respondent students.

Held: There was no denial of due process, more particularly procedural due process. Dean of the Ateneo Law School, notified and
required respondent students to submit their written statement on the incident. Instead of filing a reply, respondent students
requested through their counsel, copies of the charges. The nature and cause of the accusation were adequately spelled out in
petitioners' notices. Present is the twin elements of notice and hearing.

Respondent students argue that petitioners are not in a position to filethe instant petition under Rule 65 considering that they
failed to file a motion for reconsideration first before the trial court, thereby by passing the latter and the Court of Appeals. It is
accepted legal doctrine that an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies is when the case involves a question of law,
as in this case, where the issue is whether or not respondent students have been afforded procedural due process prior to their
dismissal from Petitioner University.

Minimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic institutions, such as petitioner
university herein, thus:

(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them;
(2) that they shall have the right to answer the charges against them with the assistance of counsel, if desired:
(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them
(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and
(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear
and decide the case.

SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT NETWORK, INC., vs.ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL, et. al G.R. No.
178552 October 5, 2010

FACTS:

Petitioners assail for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad the definition of the crime of terrorism under RA 9372
(the Human Security Act of 2007) in that terms like “widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace” and
“coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand” are nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies with no standard to
measure the prohibited acts.

ISSUE: Can the Human Security Act of 2007 be facially challenged on the grounds of vagueness and overbreadh doctrines?

RULING: No. A facial invalidation of a statute is allowed only in free speech cases, wherein certain rules of constitutional
litigation are rightly excepted.

In Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan it was held that:

A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible”chilling effect”
upon protected speech. The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed
by the possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of
possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.

This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very
existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against
socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.