Article VI ii.

The framers of 1987 Consti realized the value of initiative

and referendum as an ultimate weapon of the people to
SECTION 1 negate government and malfeasance and misfeasance and
they put in place an overarching system (didn’t want
1. Legislative Power Marcosian rule to happen again)
i.Bicameralism vs. Unicameralism iii. Local Gov’t code of 1991 (basis of respondents) merely
ii.Original legislative power vs. Derivative legislative powe generally defined what a local initiative is (mentioned
iii.Constituent vs. Ordinary ordinance only) and does not deal with the subjects that can
iv.Substantive limits vs. Procedural limits be taken up by a local initiative.

2. Initiative and Referendum

Garcia v. Commission on Elections

3. Non-delegability of legislative power
Preliminaries:
Petitioner: A. Garcia with other residents of Morong Eastern Shipping Lanes v. Philippine Overseas Employmente
Respondent: Commission on Elections Administration
Accusation: Petitioner accused Comelec of rejecting their
petition to invoke their right/power of initiative Preliminaries:
Petitioner: A. Eastern Shipping Lanes
Facts: Respondent: POEA
i. In its Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, 1993, the Accusation: Petitioner accuses POEIA of violating the
Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong agreed to the inclusion of constitutional mandate on the non-delegability of legislative
Morong as part of the Subic Special Economic Zone (R.A. power. Contends than no authority had been given to POEA
7227) to promulgate Memorandum Circular No.2, and the regulation
ii. represents an exercise of legislative discretion which should belong
Petitioners filed petition to annul P.K. Blg. 10 but since the
municipality of Morong didn’t take any action within 30 to the Congress alone.
days, petitioners invoked their power of initiative.
iii. Solicited required number of signatures to repeal resolution Facts:
iv. Unknown to petitioners, Hon. De Leon (Vice Mayor and i. Vitaliano Saco, Chief Officer of the M/V Easter Polaris was
Presiding officer of SB ng Morong wrote a letter to the killed in an accident in Japan. His widow sued for damages
Comelec (17 days after petition was filed) requesting the under E.O 797 and Memorandum Circular 2
denial of the petition for a local initiative and/or ii. Petitioner argued that complaint should be dealt by SSS
referendum because it’ll just promote divisiveness, futility against State Insurance Fund and not by POEIA.
counter productivity. iii. POEA still assumes jurisdiction and ruled in favor of the
v. Decision of Comelec: Deny petition for local initiative complainant (widow)
because it’s merely a resolution (Pambayang Kapasyahan) iv. Award: P180,000(death benefits) and P12,000(burial)
and not an ordinance
Issues:
Issues: i. WON POEA has the authority to promulgate Memorandum
WON PK Blg. 10, 1993 is the proper subject of an initiative Circular No.2
ii. WON the non-delegability of legislative power was violated
Held/Ratio:
PK Blg. 10, 1993 is a proper subject of an initiative (in favor Held/Ratio:
of petitioners). Petition granted and PK Blg. 10 1993 annulled and Petition dismissed with costs against the petitioner.
set aside.
Ratio:
Ratio: i. The authority to issue regulation is provided in EO 797: The
i. Reject the respondent’s narrow and literal reading of the governing board of the Admin (POEA) as hereunder
provision for it will collide with the constitution and will provided shall promulgate necessary rules and regulations
subvert intent of the lawmakers in enacting the provisions to govern exercise of adjudicatory functions of the Admin.
of Local Gov’t Code 1991 on initiative and referendum i. 2 tests to determine WON there is a valid deligation of
ii. The constitution clearly includes not only ordinances but legislative power
also resolutions as appropriate subjects of local initiative. a. Completeness Test – complete (terms in
iii. Article 32: Initiative covers an act (includes a resolution) conditions) in the sense that when it reaches the
iv. R.A. 6735: An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and delegate, he would only have to enforce it.
Referendum and Appropriating Funds therefor. b. Insufficient Standard Test – guidelines and
Sec 3a Definition of Initiative. 3 types: limitations in the law to map out boundaries of
a. Initiative on the Constitution delegate’s authority and prevent delegation from
b. Initiative on Statutes abusing power
c. Initiative on Local legislation – includes ii. Principle of non-delegation of powers more commonly
regional, provincial, city, municipal or applied in legislative power. Hence the observation that
barangay law, resolution, or ordinance. delegation of legislative power has become the rule and its
non-delegation the exception: Increasing complexity of
Notes: gov’t tasks, growth of society, and sophistication of
i. Issue of First impression: Delineating the extent of all problems = SPECIALIZATION “Power of subordinate
important original power of the people to legislate legislation” to administrative bodies
 iii. Admin bodies may implement broad policies laid down in a
statute by filling in the details which congress may not have
the opportunity or competence to provide. = have the force
and effect of law
ii. The power of POEA in requiring the model contract
(Memorandum Circular 2) is not unlimited since there’s a
sufficient standard (mandate to protect rights of OFWs to
fair and equitable employment practices) guiding the
delegate in the exercise of authority
Notes:
iv. Memorandum Circular 2: prescribed a standard contract to
be adopted by both foreign and domestic shipping
companies in hiring Fil seamen for overseas employment
v. What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how
the law may be enforced not what the law shall be
C. Free Telephone Workers Union v. Minister of Labor
Preliminaries:
Petitioner: Free Telephone Workers Union
Respondent: Minister of Labor
Accusation: Petitioner accuses Minister of Labor for
violating the non-delegability of the Legislative body by enforcing
rigid and inflexible rules that would be an obstacle to national efforts
at development and progress.
Facts:
i. Only contains arguments of the petitioner against strict and
rigid rules
Issues:
i. WON it was in the jurisdiction of the Minister of Labor to
handle labor disputes
Held/Ratio:
Decision in favor of the respondent.
Ratio:
i. Insofar as the Batas Pambansa Blg 130 empowers the
Minister of Labor to assume jurisdiction over labor disputes
causing or likely to cause strikes or lockouts adversely
affecting the national interest and thereafter decide it or
certif. the same to the national labor relations commission
is not on its face unconstitutional for ciolating the doctrine
of non-delegation of legislative power
ii. Doctrine of non-delegation has been made to adopt itself o
the complexities of modern governments, giving rise to
adoption within certain limits of the principle of
subordinate legislation in modern gov’ts
Employees Confederation v. National Wages Commission
Preliminaries:
Petitioner: Employees Confederation of the Philippines
Respondent: National Wages Commission
Accusation: Employees Confederation of the Phils is
questioning the validity of Wage order No. NCR-01-A pursuant to
the Wage Rationalization Act
Facts:
i. Wage Rationalization act provides new wage rates
ii. Various regional tripartite wages and productivity boards in
charge of prescribing minimum wage rates for all workers
in various regions
iii. National wages and productivity commission to review
wage levels determined by the boards
iv. 2 ways of determining wages
a. Floor wage method – Fix determinate amount to
add to prevailing statutory minimum wage
b. Salary ceiling method - adjustment applied to
employees receiving a certain denominated salary
ceiling
v. Change from floor wage to salary ceiling method caused by
labor disputes from wage distortions
vi. RA 6727: Rationalize wages by
a. Providing full time boards to police wages round
the clock
b. Give boards enough powers to achieve objective
Issues:
ii. WON the regional tripartite wages and productivity board
of the NCR performed an unlawful act of legislation through
wage order NCR 01-A
Held/Ratio:
Decision in favor of the National Wages Commission.
Ratio:
i. Congress provided sufficient standards in Article 124 of RA
6727:
a. Demand for living wages, wage adjustment vis-aà -
vis CPI, Cost of living and changes or increases
therein, needs of workers and their families, need
to induce industries to invest in country side,
improvements in standards of living, prevailing
wage levels, fair return of capital invested and
capacity to pay of employers, effects of
employment generation and family income,
equitable distribution of income and wealth along
the imperatives of economic and social
development
Section 2: Senate=24 senators
Section 3: Qualifications for senatorial candidates
i. Natural born citizen of the Phils
ii. At least 35 y.o on the day of election
iii. Able to read and write
iv. Registered voter
v. Resident of the Phils for not less than 2 years
immediately preceding the day of election
Social Justice Society vs. Dangerous Drugs Board
i. RA 9165 Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002
ii. Section 36 requires mandatory drug testing of candidates
for public office among others
iii. Comelec issued resolution No. 6486 prescribing the rules
and regulations on the mandatory drug testing of the
candidates for public office
Issue: WON the RA and resolution imposing an additional
qualification on candidates for senator is constitutional
Held/Ratio: RA and resolution are unconstitutional
Ratio:
i. Section 3, Article VI prescribe the qualifications for senator
 ii. Congress cannot validly amend or modify these standards
for qualification as it cannot disregard, evade, or weaken
the force of a constitutional mandate or alter or enlarge the
constitution
Party list:
4 inviolable parameters:
i. 20% of all members of house of reps
ii. 2% threshold (of all votes cast)
iii. 3 seat limit
iv. Proportional representation (for add’l seats)
Veterans Federation Party v. Comelec
Issues:
i. Is the 20% allocation mandatory or merely a ceiling?
ii. Are the 2% threshold and 3 seat limit constitutional
iii. If yes, how should the additional seats be allocated
Held/Ratio:
i. Not mandatory, merely a ceiling.
ii. 2% threshold – congress wanted to make sure that only
those parties having a sufficient number of constituents
deserving of representation are actually represented in
congress; 3 seat limit ensures the entry of various interest-
representations into the legislature, thus no single group
would dominate the party list seats (After party lists were
created because they wanted to open up the political system
to a pluralistic society through a multiparty system
iii. Additional seats of concerned party = (# of votes of
concerned party/# of votes of 1st party) x Additional seats
of first party  First party system following the 6%
benchmark (2-4-6)
Ang Bagong Bayani v. Comelec
Issues:
i. WON political parties may participate in the party list
elections
ii. WON the party list system is exclusive to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors and organizations
iii. WON the comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in
promulgating Omnibus resolution No 3785 (approval of the
participation of the 154 organizations)
Held/Ratio:
i. Cannot be disqualified on the mere ground that they are
political parties because in section 5 art VI, ..”party list
system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties
or organizations” and section 3 of RA 7941: Party is either a
political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties
ii. Party list organization or party must factually and truly
represent the marginalized and underrepresented persons; Mr. Ople:
nominated must be Fil citizens belonging to marginalized
and underrepresented sectors: labor, peasant, women,
youth, etc)
iii. Court cannot allow the party list system to be sullied and
prostituted by those who are neither marginalized nor
underrepresented.
Guidelines for screening party list participants:
a. Party must represent the marginalized and
underrepresented
b. Political parties must show that they represent the interests
of marginalized and underrepresented
c. Must not be disqualified
d. Party must be independent of the government
e. Nominees must comply with the requirements of the law
f. Nominees must be Filipino citizens who belong to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors; must
represent the M&U sectors
g. Must be able to contribute to the formulation and
enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the
nation as a whole
Ang Bagong Bayani OFW Labor party et al v. Comelec et al
i. Party lists were disqualified
ii. Other party lists (Buhay, COCOfed, Sanlakas, etc) argue that
they have now made the 2% threshold
Issue: WON the votes tallied for the disqualified candidates be
deducted to determine the total votes cast for the party list system
Held/Ratio: yes, they are to be deducted because
i. RA 7941 Section 10: A vote cast for a party not entitled to
be voted for shall not be counted
ii. Declared elected: Buhay, Amin, Aba, Cocofed, PM, Sanlakas,
Abanse Pinay
*Labo and Grego not applicable (talks about the ineligibility of a
candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle next
candidate=ineligible votes as stray) because for local offices only and
involve single elective posts
Banat v. Comelec
i. Petition for certiorari and mandamus against Comelec's
Resolution NBC No. 0741 which approved recommendation
to deny the petition of Banat for being moot
ii. Resolution NBC No. 07-60 implemented the first party rule
in the allocation of seats to qualified party list organizations
Issues:
i. Is the 20% allocation mandatory or merely a ceiling?
ii. Is the 3-seat limit constitutional?
iii. Is the 2% threshold constitutional?
iv. How shall the party list seats be allocated?
v. Does the constitution prohibit the major political parties
from participating in the party list elections? If not, can the
major political parties be barred?
Held/Ratio:
i. 20% allocations – constitution left manner of allocating the
seats available to the wisdom of the legislature
ii. 3 seat limit constitutional
iii. 2% threshold unconstitutional only in relation to the
distribution of the additional seats
iv. First party rule is mathematically impossible (always 50 in
2% threshold considered in allocating additional seats)
Guaranteed seats = (votes garnered/total # of votes) x (max
# of seats – guaranteed seats)
v. Major political parties are disallowed from participating in
the party-list elections directly or indirectly (followed
ruling of veterans)
Conversation among Mr. Monsod Mr. Tadeo and Mr. Villacorta…plus
i. Mr. Monsod asked if political parties can run under party
list system. Mr. Villacorta and Tadeo says yes as long as they
will be fielding only sectoral candidates
ii. Mr. Ople adds that this will create the stimulus for political
parties and mass organizations to seek common ground
Apportionment:
Tobias v. Abalos
i. Petitioners attack the constitutionality of RA 7675: an act
converting the municipality of Mandaluyong into a highly
urbanized city
ii. Plebiscite was held (14.41% of voting population, majority
voted yes)
Issues:
i. WON RA 7675 violates the “one subject one bill rule”
ii. WON the division is constitutional because there is an
increase in the composition of the house of reps
 iii. WON the division is valid as there was no census showing a. Municipal corporations
that the municipalities have attained the minimum b. Provinces, cities, municipalities, barangays
population requirements c. Article 10 sec 10
iv. WON the right of congress to reapportion legislative d. Requires the criteria established in the local gov’t
districts was preempted code and the approval by a majority of votes cast
Held/Ratio: in a plebiscite
i. It does not violate it – creation of a separate district Held/Ratio: The situation at hand is a legislative apportionment and
(Mandaluyong and San Juan) is a natural and logical does not require a plebiscite
consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city;
Should be given a practical rather than a technical Section 6:
construction. Should be sufficient if the title expresses the To be a member of house of representative:
general subject and all provisions are germane to that i. Natural born citizen of the Phils
general subject) ii. At least 25 y.o on the day of election
ii. Present composition of congress may be increased if iii. Able to read and write
congress itself so mandates through a legislative enactment iv. A registered voter in the district where he shall be
iii. RA enjoys presumption of having due consideration of the elected and a resident thereof for not less than 1
minimum requirements (population requirement, etc.) year immediately preceding the day of election
iv. Congress cannot preempt itself on a right which pertains to (except for party list reps)
itself (Congress drafted, deliberated, and enacted on the RA)
Natural born citizens – Those who are citizens of the Philippines
Mariano Jr. v. Comelec without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect Philippine
i. RA no. 7854: An act converting the municipality of Makati citizenship
into a highly urbanized city
Issues: - Resident requirement: Residence as synonymous to
i. WON section 2 is constitutional as it does not properly domicile
identify the territorial jurisdiction (metes and bounds)
ii. WON section 51 is constitutional as it attempts to alter or Domicile – imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place but
restart the 3 consecutive term limit for local elective also personal presence in that place coupled with conduct indicative
officials of such intention
iii. WON section 52 is constitutional
Held/Ratio: Acquiring Domicile by choice:
i. The territory did not change – no need to be technical i. Residence or bodily presence in new locality
(purpose was to empower local govt units and to give them ii. Intention to remain there
what they’re due) iii. Intention to abandon old domicile
ii. Reapportionment may be made through a special law
iii. Legislative district is increased since it has met the min *Animus non revertendi and animus manendi
population requirement of 250,000 (450,000) - Sectoral representatives were temporary; later on replaced by party
iv. Sufficient compliance if the title expresses the general list reps
subject and all the provisions are germane to such general
subject Qualifications of Party list nominees:
i. Natural born citizen of the Phils
Montejo v. Comelec ii. Registered voter
i. Petitioner pleads for the annulment of section 1 of Res No. iii. Resident of the Phils for not less than 1 year immediately
2736 of the comelec redistricting certain municipalities in preceding day of election
Leyte iv. Able to read and write
Issue: WON it is constitutional for Comelec to transfer municipalities v. Bona fide member of party or organization he wants to
from one legislative district to another legislative district in the represent for at least 90 days preceding day of electon
province of Leyte vi. At least 25 y.o on day of election
- Ordinance empowered comelec to make minor adjustments
of the reapportionment herein made (section 3) Youth sector: At least 25 but not more than 30
Held/Ratio: It is unconstitutional as section 3 of the ordinance did
not give comelec any authority to transfer municipalities from one RESIDENCE QUALIFICATION CASES:
district to another
Gallego v. Verra
Bagabuyo v. Comelec i. Pedro Gallego files a petition for certiorari to review
i. RA # 9371 provided for legislative apportionment decision of Court of appeals affirming that of court of first
Issue: WON R.A No. 9371 is constitutional as it converts and divides instance which declared illegal the petitioner’s election to
the City of Cagayan de Oro as a local government unit and does not the office of municipal mayor of Abuyog, Leyte during
merely provide for city’s legislative apportionment general elections of Dec. 1940 on the ground that he has
already lost his domicile of origin in Abuyog.
ii. Legislative apportionment: Issue: WON Pedro Gallego had been a resident of Abuyog for at least
a. Determination of the # of representatives 1 year prior to Dec 10 1940, day of election
b. Allocation of seats in a legislative body Held/Ratio: In favor of the petitioner. Judgment of Court of appeals
c. Drawing of voting district lines reversed with costs against respondent.
iii. Reapportionment Ratio: Residence synonymous to domicile
a. Realignment or change in legislative districts a. Got employed in Malaybay Bukidnon, registered as an
b. Article 6 section 5 elector, voted there, and has a residence which he lived in
iv. Division of local government units for 1 ½ years.  does not mean he has acquired residence
 or domicile in Malaybay and had lost his domicile of origin
in Abuyog Leyte
b. Acquiring Domicile by choice:
i. Residence or bodily presence in new locality
ii. Intention to remain there
iii. Intention to abandon old domicile
*Animus non revertendi and animus manendi.
c. He didn’t reside in Malaybalay with the intention of
remaining there indefinitely and of not returning to Abuyog
i. Gallego is a native of Abuyog
ii. Despite his employment in other municipalities,
he always returned in Abuyog
iii. Bought a piece of land in Abuyog and didn’t avail
of the offer of gov’t of 10 hectares of land in
Malaybalay
iv. During the 2 years he stayed in Malaybalay as a
gov’t employee, he visited hometown and his
family no less than 3x despite the great distance
Romualdez-Marcos v. Comelec
i. Romualdez-Marcos files a petition for reconsideration of
her certificate of candidacy (Representative of the first
district of Leyte) which was denied because of her failure to
meet the 1 year residency requirement
Issue: WON petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the
First District of Leyte for a period of 1 year at the time of the May
1995 elections
Held/Ratio: In favor of the petitioner, having determined that
petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for
a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte
Ratio:
a. Petitioner established domicile in Tacloban Leyte when she
was 8 y.o; follows domicile of parents
b. Petitioner held various residences for diff purposes during
past 4 decades (work, marrying marcos, marcos becoming
senator, president, etc.)
c. None of these point to an intention to abandon her domicile
of origin in Tacloban, leyte
d. Even when marcos was president, petitioner kept her close
ties to her domicile of origin by establishing residences in
Tacloban, celebrating bday there, instituting well publicized
projects to benefit hometown, establish political power
base (relatives held positions of power)
*Residence is one of fact while in domicile, it is legal or juridical,
independent of the necessity of physical presence
Aquino v. Commission on Elections
Issue: WON petitioner has established not just a residence but a
domicile of choice to qualify as a candidate for representative of the
2nd district of Makati
Held/Ratio: Petitioner has only established a residence and not a
domicile of choice
Ratio:
i. Birthplace, registered voter, and lived for 52 years in
Conception, Tarlac Bengzon v. Cruz
ii. Domicile of origin until his most recent filing of candidacy
was Tarlac
iii. Merely leased a condo in Makati instead of buying one –
does not indicate permanency required to prove Issues:
abandonment of original domicile (2 years lease, Aquino
testified that his intention was to live there for just 1 year)
iv. 3 conditions in establishing new domicile
ii. WON Congressman Cruz should be disqualified from being
Domino v. Commission on Elections
i. Juan Domino filed a petition for certiorari because of his Held/Ratio:
disqualification as a candidate for rep of the Lone legislative
district of the province of Sarangani
Issues:
i. WON judgment of the Metropolitan Trial court of QC
declaring petitioner as resident of Sarangani is final
ii. WON Domino was a resident of Sarangani for at least one
year immediately preceding the May 11 1998 election to
qualify as a candidate
iii. WON Comelec as jurisdiction over the petition for
disqualification of petitioner
Held/Ratio: Hold the negative (i and ii); it is within the jurisdiction of
comelec to determine false representations regarding certificate of
candidacy including residence (Omnibus Election Code)
Ratio:
i. Voter’s registration and address in Ayala Heights, QC
ii. Ran for 3rd legislative district of QC in 1995
iii. Petitioner’s domicile of origin was Candon Ilocos Sur, but in
1991 acquired a domicile of choice in QC
iv. A person’s domicile once established is considered to
continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is
established: animus manendi, animus non revertendi
a. Actual removal from old domicile
b. Bona fide intention of abandoning former
residence and establishing a new one
c. Definite acts corresponding to purpose –
permanent and fixed place of abode
v. Lease of a house in sarangani not enough
vi. Even if he cancelled registration of house in QC, it fell short
of the 1 year requirement
Co v. House Electoral Tribunal
i. Jose Ong Jr born from a natural born Filipina mother and a
naturalized Chinese Father who established residence in
Laoag
ii. Jose Ong Jr ran for rep in the 2nd district of northern samar
iii. Article VI section 1 paragraph 3 which makes those citizens
electing Filipino citizenship prior to the 1973 constitution
and after (born of Fil mothers) natural born citizens, was
intended to correct an unfair position which discriminated
against Filipino women
iv. Retroactive effect: curative nature
Issue:
i. WON HRET declaring that respondent Jose ong Jr. is a
natural born Filipino citizen, the HRET acted with grave
abuse of discretion
ii. WON Jose Ong Jr. elected Filipino citizenship
Held/Ratio:
i. He is a natural born citizen of the Phils
ii. He was already a citizen prior to election since his mom is a
natural born citizen and dad a naturalized citizen (9 y.o-
minor)
iii. Moreover the exercise of the right of suffrage and
participation in election exercises constitute a positive act
of election of Philippine citizenship
iv. Couldn’t have chosen any other foreign nationality since
both parents were Filipinos
i. Respondent Cruz enlisted in the US Marine Corps and
without consent of the RP took an oath of allegiance to the
US. As a consequence lost his Filipino citizenship
i. WON Cruz, a natural born Filipino citizen who became
American citizen can still be considered natural born upon
his reacquisition of Phil citizenship
elected as the rep of the second district of Pangaasinan
i. Cruz is eligible as a congressman and a natural born citizen
because upon repatriation (taking an oath of allegiance to
 the republic of the Phils and registering said oath in the
Local registry), he recovered his original nationality.
ii. Dissent: Natural born citizens are those citizens of the Phils
from birth without having to perform any act or acquire or
perfect his Phil citizenship. Since he had to take an oath, he
essentially had to perform an act before acquiring
citizenship
Valles v. Comelec
i. Rosalind Lopez was born in Australia from Filipino father
and Australian mother.
ii. Lopez allegedly renounced Fil citizenship by applying for an
alien certificate of registration and immigrant cert of
residence and issuance of Australian passport
Issue: WON Rosalind Lopez is a natural born citizen of the Phils even Codilla v. De Venecia
when she is a holder of an Australian passport and had alien
certificate of registration (hence eligible to run)
Held/Ratio:
i. Holding an Australian passport and an alien cert of
registration does not constitute an effective renunciation of
citizenship and do not militate against her claim of Filipino
citizenship – at most merely dual citizenship not dual
allegiance
ii. Moreover, filing of cert of candidacy for public office is
enough to terminate status as persons with dual citizenship
Dimaporo v. Mitra
i. Term of office prescribed by the Constitution may not be
extended or shortened by legislature
ii. Tenure – but the period during which an officer actually
holds the office (tenure) may be affected by circumstances
within or beyong the power of said officer
Farinas et al v. Executive Secretary
i. Sec 14 of RA 9006 repeals sec 67: any elective official
whether national or local running for any office than the
one which he is holding in permanent capacity except for
president and vice president shall be considered ipso facto
resigned from office upon filing of his cert of candidacy
ii. Sec 66 relating to appointive officials not repealed
Issues:
i. WON Sec 14 of RA 9006 violated the One subject rule
ii. WON Sec 14 of the RA 9006 (Fair Election Act) is
constitutional insofar as it repeals Sec 67 (Accountability of
Public Officers) of Batas Pambansa Blg 881 (Omnibus
Election Code)
iii. WON Sec 14 violates the Equal Protection Clause
iv. WON the irregularities of the law renders entire law
nullified (technicalities)
v. WON the effectivity clause is defective (take effect upon
approval)
Held/Ratio:
i. Constitutional provisions relating to subject matter and
titles of statutes should not be so narrowly construed as to
cripple or impede the power of legislation. It’s sufficient
that the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to
include general object which a statute seeks to effect
without expressing every detail
ii. Over time, congress may find it imperative to repeal the law
on its belief that the election process is thereby enhanced
and the paramount objective of election laws – fair, honest,
and orderly election of truly deserving members of
congress
iii. Equal protection clause in the constitution is not absolute
but is subject to reasonable classification. If groupings are
characterized by substantial distinctions, one class may be
regulated differently. Moreover, elective officials occupy
their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate with a
definite term; On the other hand, appointive officials are by
virtue of their designation, and may hold it in a permanent
capacity and are entitled to security of tenure, so the latter
is more open to abuse.
iv. Court can’t go behind the enrolled copy of the bill because
parliamentary rules are merely procedural and with their
observance the courts have no concern. Mere failure to
conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate action
taken by a deliberative body when requisite number of
members have agreed to a particular measure
v. No because “….unless it is otherwise provided”
i. Codilla really won against Locsin, but the latter still wants
to hold position
ii. Petition for mandamus and quo warranto to administer
oath of petitioner as duly-elected representative and
register the name of the petitioner in roll of members in HR,
and against Locsin for usurping and unlawfully holding said
public office on basis of void proclamation
Issue: WON Codilla should be proclaimed winner
Held/Ratio:
i. Petition granted
ii. Rule of law demands that its decision be obeyed by all
officials of the land. There is no alternative to the rule of law
except reign of chaos and confusion
SEC 9: IN CASE OF VACANCY IN THE SENATE OR IN THE HR, A
SPECIAL ELECTION MAY BE CALLED TO FILL SUCH VACANCY IN
THE MANNER PRESCRIBED BY LAW BUT THE SENATOR OR
MEMBERS OF THE HR THUS ELECTED SHALL SERVE ONLY FOR
UNEXPIRED TERM
Tolentino v. Comelec
i. Teofisto Guingona became vice president hence a vacancy in
the senate
ii. Special elections to be held with May 14 2001 regular
elections: Senatorial candidate garnering 13th highest
number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of
former senator Guingona. Honasan won.
iii. Petitioners question validity of special elections because of
lack of call for such election and for lack of formal notice to
the public as to the office to be filled and the manner by
which the winner in the special election is to be determine
Issues:
i. WON special election to fill a vacant three-year term Senate
seat was validly held on may 14 2001.
Held/Ratio:
i. It was validly held. According to RA no. 6645 Section 2: “…
Provided however, that if within the said period, a general
election is scheduled to be held, the special election shall be
held simultaneously with such general election”
ii. In a general election, where the law fixes the date of the
election, the election is valid without any call by the body
charged to administer election.
iii. Right and duty to hold the election emanate from the
statute. The law charges the voters with knowledge of this
statutory notice and comelec’s failure to give add’l notice
did not negate the calling of such special election, much less
invalidate it.
iv. The test in determining validity of a special election in
relation to the failure to give notice of the special election is
whether the want of notice has resulted in misleading a
sufficient number of voters as would change the result of
 special elections – petitioners didn’t prove such was the
case
SECTION 10: THE SALARIES OF SENATORS AND MEMBERS OF
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SHALL BE DETERMINED BY
LAW, NO INCREASE IN SAID COMPENSATION SHALL TAKE EFFECT Jimenez v. Cabangbang
UNTIL AFTER THE EXPIRATION OF THE FULL TERM OF ALL THE
MEMBERS OF THE SEMATE AND THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES APPROVING SUCH INCREASE
i. Purpose is to place a legal bar to the legislators’ yielding to
temptation to increase their salaries
ii. Office and necessary travel allowance not part of salary
SECTION 11: A SENATOR OR MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENATIVES SHALL, IN ALL OFFENSES PUNISHABLE BY NOT
MORE THAN SIX YEARS IMPRISONMENT, BE PRIVILEGED FROM
ARREST WHILE THE CONGRESS IS IN SESSION. NO MEMBER
SHALL BE QUESTIONED NOR BE HELD LIABLE IN ANY OTHER
PLACE FOR ANY SPEECH OR DEBATE IN THE CONGRESS OR ANY
COMMITTEE THEREOF
i. Under 1935 constitution, privilege was only from civil
arrest. Under 1973 constitution, a legislator is privileged
from arrest even for a criminal offense provided that the
offense was not punishable by a penalty of more than 6
years imprisonment
ii. Privilege only available while congress is in session since
purpose is to protect legislator against harassment which
will keep him away from legislative sessions
People v. Jalosjos
i. Congressman Jalosjos now confined at the national
penitentiary while his conviction on statutory rape on 2
counts and acts of lasciviousness on 6 counts is pending
appeal.
ii. Petition asking that he be allowed to fully discharge duties
of a congressman including attendance at legislative
sessions and committee meetings (mandate of the
sovereign will as primary argument)
Issue: WON membership in congress exempt an accused from
statutes and rules which apply to validly incarcerated persons in
general
Held/Ratio:
i. Held in the negative. All top officials of gov’t are still subject
to the majesty of the law. Privilege has to be granted by law,
not inferred from duties of a position. History of the
provision on immunity from arrest shows that the privilege Issue: WON press release qualify as a privilege communication
has always been granted in a restrictive sense
ii. Recalled that when Jalosjos’ arrest was issued, he fled and
evaded capture despite a call from his colleagues in the HR
and to surrender voluntarily to authorities – ironic
iii. Allowing Jalosjos to attend congressional sessions and
committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will
virtually make him a free man with all the privileges that go
with his position – not only elevates him to special class but
makes a movkery of the purpose fo correction system
iv. Constitutional equal protection: All persons similarly
situated shall be treated alike. Organs of gov’t shall not
show partiality
SCOPE OF THE PRIVILEGE OF SPEECH
i. Privilege of speech does not protect assembly men against
the disciplinary authority of the congress but it is an
absolute protection against suits for libel.
ii. Utterance must constitute legislative action. Must be part of SECTION 13: NO SENATOR OR MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF
the deliberative and communicative process by which
legislators participate in committee or congressional
proceedings in the consideration of proposed legislation or
of other matters which the constitution has placed within
the jurisdiction of the congress
i. Petitioner filed against Cabangbang for money because of
damages due to publication of an allegedly libelous letter of
defendant
ii. Defendant said that letter in question is a privileged
communication
Issues: WON Cabangbang’s letter is a privileged communication
Held/Ratio:
i. No. Letter was an open letter to the president of the Phils
when congress was presumably not in session and
defendant cased letter to be published in several
newspapers of general circulation. He was not performing
his official duty either as a member of congress or as officer
of any committee thereof
ii. Privilege letter – utterances made by congressmen in the
performance of their official functions such as speeches
delivered, statements made, votes cast in the halls of
congress, while the same is in session, as well as bills
introduced in congress, whether the same is in session or
not, and other acts performed by congressmen, either in
congress or outside the premises housing its offices in the
official discharge of their duties as members of congress
and of congressional committees duly authorized to
perform functions
Antonino v. Valencia
i. Candidate of LP for governor of Davao lost against NP, and
Congressman Antonino (head of LP) attributed loss to
support given by Valencia (then sec of public works and
communications) to Maglana (independent LP) which
divided LP votes.
ii. In public statements quoted in metropolitan newspapers he
said had not valencia sabotaged LP, candidate would’ve won
iii. Antonino filed administrative charges with Senate Blue
Ribbon committee and a formal request to investigate
actions of defendant as Sec of Public works and
communications in connection with alleged anomalous
acquisitions of supplies and equipment – charges carried by
press (Bulletin and Newsday)
iv. Valencia then issued a press release “…for certain selfish
reasons, Antonino has taken advantage of his position as
member of monetary board and as senator…”
Held/Ratio:
i. By virtue of the defamatory and libelous nature against the
honor, integrity and reputation of Antonino, malice in law
was presumed.
ii. Only defensive libel against Antonino’s libel: Letter sent by
plaintiff was privileged communication (sent to Blue
ribbon); “sabotage and double crossing” comment not
tantamount to libel
SECTION 12: ALL MEMBERS OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES SHALL, UPON ASSUMPTION OF OFFICE, MAKE A
FULL DISCLOSURE OF THEIR FINANCIAL AND BUSINESS
INTERESTS. THEY SHALL NOTIFY THE HOUSE CONCERNED OF A
POTENTIAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST THAT MAY ARISE FROM THE
FILING OF A PROPOSED LEGISLATION OF WHICH THEY ARE
AUTHORS.
REPRESENTATIVES MAY HOLD ANY OTHER OFFICE OR
EMPLOYMENT IN THE GOVERNMENT, OR ANY SUBDIVISION,
AGENCY, OR INSTRUMENTALITY THEREOF, INCLUDING
GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS OR THEIR
SUBSIDIARIES, DURING HIS TERM WITHOUT FORFEITING HIS SEAT. Avelino v. Cuenco
NEITHER SHALL HE BE APPOINTED TO ANY OFFICE WHICH MAY
HAVE BEEN CREATED OR THE EMOLUMENTS THEREOF INCREASED
DURING THE TERMS FOR WHICH HE WAS ELECTED.
Liban v. Gordon
i. Petition to declare Sen. Gordon as having forfeited his seat
in the senate
Issue: WON the office of the PNRC (Philippine National Red Cross)
Chairman is a government office or an office in a government-owned
or controlled corporation for the purposes of the prohibition in Sec
13 Article VI of the constitution
Held/Ratio:
i. The PNRC is not government-owned but privately owned
hence sec 13 of Article VI does not apply. The PNRC (not
controlled by the gov’t) is a private organization performing
public functions; donor-funded voluntary, humanitarian
organization
SECTION 14: NO SENATOR OR MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES MAY PERSONALLY APPEAR AS COUNSEL
BEFORE ANY COURT OF JUSTICE OR BEFORE THE ELECTORAL
TRIBUNALS, OR QUASI-JUDICIAL AND OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE
BODIES. NEITHER SHALL HE, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BE
INTERESTED FINANCIALLY IN ANY CONTRACT WITH, OR IN ANY
FRANCHISE OR SPECIAL PRIVILEGE GRANTED BY THE
GOVERNMENT, OR ANY SUBDIVISION, AGENCY OR
INSTRUMENTALITY THEREOF, INCUDING ANY GOVERNMENT-
OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPORATION OR ITS SUBSIDIARY,
DURING HIS TERM OF OFFICE, HE SHALL NOT INTERVENE IN ANY
MATTER BEFORE ANY OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT FOR HIS
PECUNIARY BENEFIT OR WHERE HE MAY BE CALLED UPON TO ACT
ON ACCOUNT OF HIS OFFICE
Prohibitions
Puyat v. De Guzman
i. SEC Commissioner De Guzman and Justice Fernandez were
supposed to appear as counsel for Acero. Puyat group
objected because Sec 11 Article VIII of 1973 consti says that
no assembly man could appear as counsel before any admin
body. Fernandez didn’t continue.
ii. Fernandez had purchased 10 shares of stock of IPI for P200
upon request of Acero to qualify him to run for election as
director
iii. Fernandez filed motion to intervene in SEC case alleging
legal interest since he owns 10 shares. SEC granted. Hence
the petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction
Issue: WON Assemblyman Fernandez as a then stock holder of IPI
may intervene in the SEC case without violating section 11 Art VIII of
the Constitution
Held/Ratio:
i. De Guzman had acquired the 10 shares one day before the
scheduled hearing with the SEC
ii. Before he moved to intervene, he has signified his intention
to appear as counsel for respondent Acero but which was
objected by petitioner (so used intervention as legal
grounds)
iii. Appeared as counsel for Excelsior, co-defendant of Acero in
the court of first instance
iv. Because of the facts and circumstances, find that there has
been an indirect “appearance as counsel before an admin
body”  circumvention of constitution. Allowing
intervention would be tantamount to allowing him to
appear as counsel indirectly
i. Tanada wanted to make his privilege speech about the
charges against Senate President Avelino, but the latter and
his followers kept on ignoring his motion and request
during the session. David requested for the session to be
adjourned and Sanidad registered his opposition and
suggested it be put to vote
ii. Avelino walked out followed by his followers, and the rest
remained and continued with session. Resolution 68 and
Resolution No. 67 making Mariano Cuenco the new acting
president of the senate, were approved. Petitioner filed a
petition for quo warranto.
Issues:
i. WON the court has jurisdiction over matter
ii. WON Resolutions 68 and 67 were validly approved (in the
“rump senate”)
Held/Ratio:
i. No because of the separation of powers and the
constitutional grant to the senate of the power to elect its
own president
ii. Unanimity in the view that the session under senator arranz
(acting chair) was a continuation of the morning session
and that a minority of 10 senators may not, by leaving the
hall, prevent the other 12 senators from passing a
resolution that met with their unanimous endorsement
iii. Since Sen Confesor was absent, 12 senators constitute the
majority “…each house shall constitute a quorum” ; house
does not mean all members. And even if 12 did not
constitute quorum, they could’ve ordered the arrest of 1
and Cuenco would still have won. (12-11)
Santiago v. Guingona
i. During election, Sen. Fernan and Sen. Tatad were nominated
to the position of senate president. By a vote of 20-2, Fernan
won and Tatad assumed the role of the minority leader
ii. LAKAS NUCD UMDP senators voted Sen Guingona as the
minority leader, and Fernan formally recognized him as the
minority leader
iii. Santiago and Tatad filed petition for quo warranto (under
which authority) against Guingona for unlawfully holding
position
Issues:
i. WON the court has jurisdiction over the petition
ii. WON there was an actual violation of the constitution
iii. WON Guingona usurped or unlawfully held position of
Senate minority leader
Held/Ratio:
i. The court has jurisdiction over petition because judicial
power includes the duty to determine if there was a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch of gov’t
ii. There was no actual violation of the constitution because
the consti doesn’t prescribe a procedure on how minority
leaders should be elected, hence the court vests the power
on the house of congress to determine rules on the
proceeding.
iii. Since there was no prescription on how to elect minority
leader, the alleged illegality of Guingona’s hold of the
position is groundless. No grave abuse of discretion has
been founded as well.
Terms:
Usurpation – unauthorized arbitrary assumption and exercise of
power by one without color of title or who is not entitled by law
thereto
Quo warranto proceding – proper legal remedy to determine right or i. No. Parliamentary immunity guarantees the legislator
title to the contested public offie and to oust holder from its complete freedom of expression without fear of being made
enjoyment. responsible in criminal or civil acts before courts or any
Political question – questions which under the consti, are to be forum outside of congress BUT it does not protect him from
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity or in regard to responsibility before legislative body when his
which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the words/conduct are considered disorderly
legislative or exec branch ii. Assault upon the dignity of the office of the president which
is the symbol of the Phil sovereignty
Arroyo et al v. De Venecia iii. Rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to
i. Petition for certiorari challenging validity of R.A.. 8240 revocation, modification, or waiver at the pleasure of the
which amends certain provisions of the National Internal body adopting them
Revenue Code by imposing sin taxes (specific taxes) on iv. Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their
manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes. observance, the court has no concern
ii. Petitioners charge violation of the rules of the house which
they believe to be constitutionally mandated so that their Paredes v. Sandiganbayan
violation is tantamount to a violation of the constitution i. Before Paredes became a congressman (governor), he was
Issues: charged of violations against anti graft law.
i. WON the court as jurisdiction over rules of the House Issue: WON it was constitutional for the Sandiganbayan to impose a
ii. WON violation of rules of the House tantamount to a preventive suspension on Paredes pursuant to anti-graft law
violation of the constitution Held/Ratio: Yes it is constitutional because petitioner’s invocation of
iii. WON the law was illegally passed by congress by a mere Sec 16 (3) Article 6 only applies to misbehavior as a Member of the
approval of motion in order to prevent petitioner Arroyo House of representatives, different from the suspension spoken of in
from questioning presence of quorum Section 13 of RA3019 (Anti graft law) which is more of a preventive
Held measure
i. As the rules of the house are internal matters, the court has
no jurisdiction by virtue of the separation of powers United States v. Pons
ii. Internal conflict within the congress or senate is in no way i. The defendant appellant Juan Pons et.al were charged with
violative of the constitution because such rules are left to the crime of illegal importation of opium. Pon's counsel
the congress’ discretion: House rules are merely procedural alleged and offered to prove that the last day of the special
and the courts have no concern. session of the Philippine Legislature for 1914 was the 28th
iii. Consequently, mere failure to conform to parliamentary day of February; that Act No. 2381, under which Pons must
usage and procedure will not invalidate the action taken by be punished if found guilty, was not passed or approved on
the deliberative body when the requisite number of the 28th of February but on March 1 of that year; and that,
members have agreed to a particular measure therefore, the same is null and void.
iv. The manner in which the committee report on H No. 7198 Issues:
was by no means a unique one. It has a basis in legal i. WON the court can take notice of the journals
practice. Quorums are only done when a significant number ii. WON legislative journals (conclusive evidence) or
of dissenting opinions exist extraneous evidence (witness) should be used
Held/Ratio:
2. Internal Discipline i. Credibility found in legislative journals
ii. To inquire into the authenticity of the journals of Phil
Osmena v. Pendatun legislature would violate letter and spirit of organic laws ;
i. Petition for declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition and interfere with legitimate powers and functions of
with preliminary injunction on the ground of infringement Legislature
of of petitioner Osmena’s parliamentary immunity
ii. Osmena, during his speech to the president, charged the Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez
latter’s administration of corruption and injustice (“…free Issue: WON WON Congresswoman Coseteng is qualified to sit in the
things they used to get from the gov’t are now for sale at Commission on Appointments as a representative of the Minority
premium prices” because she has the support of 9 other congressmen and
iii. Deemed as an assault upon the dignity and prestige of the congresswomen of the minority and formaldehyde are exempt by the
office of the president exposing it to contempt and law from payment of the aforesaid margin fee
disrepute, the house of rep formed a committee of 15 Held/Ratio:
members to investigate the case, summon Osmena to i. No they are not because Sec2 of RA no. 2609 exempts,
substantiate and authorize subpoena to require attendance among others, urea formaldehyde, the synthetic resin (used
of witnesses and production of papers.(House resolution as an adhesive for plywood) of urea and formaldehyde 
59) Failure to do so: suspended from office for 15 mos. the finished product and not the raw materials.
Issues: ii. Law is conclusive upon the courts as regards to tenor and
i. WON Osmena’s parliamentary immunity was violated measure passed by congress and approved by president
ii. WON Osmena committed disorderly behavior to be iii. Remedy by amendment or curative legislation not by
punished judicial decree.
iii. WON House had lost its power to question and discipline
for attending to another business before approving House Astorga v. Villegas
resol 59
iv. WON House has no power to suspend members under i. About passage of House bill 9266 (became R.A 4065): An
constitution act defining the powers, rights and duties of the vice mayor
Held/Ratio: of the city of manila
 ii. Before the bill’s passage, Senator Roxas made minor
amendments before approval (president pro tempore
instead of city engineer to succeed vicemayor). During bill’s
second reading, major amendments by Senator Tolentino
were made. Those major amendments were approved by
the senate. The minor amendments didn’t appear in the
journal of senate proceedings
iii. When the bill was passed with amendments, the
amendments included were those made by Roxas. Senators
signed. President signed.
iv. Tolentino issued press statement that wrong version was
passed. Senate president considers his signature on
enrolled bill invalid and of no effect. President takes back
his signature too
v. Villegas issued circulars to disregard provisions of Act no
4065. Astorga then filed a petition for mandamus injuction
and/or prohibition with preliminary mandatory and
prohibitory injuction to compel respondents to comply with
RA 4065
Issue: WON House bill no. 9266 was passed and enacted as a law
Held/Ratio:
i. No because the enrolled bill theory (says that statutes and
resolutions certified by journals, signature of presiding
officers and secs, be considered conclusive proof of
provisions and due enactment) is based mainly on the
respect due to coequal and independent departments which
required the judicial dept to accept as having passed
congress all bills authenticated in the manner stated.
ii. Therefore, by virtue of the senate president and president
withdrawing their signatures, and since housebill 9266
signed by chief exec is not the same text passed by both
houses of congress, the bill is not valid.
*Note: Court can look into journals because it’s merely tasked to
inquire if bill passed and signed by both houses are the same.
Section 17: Electoral Tribune
Each house be composed of electoral tribunal (to be sole judge
of contests on election, returns, and qualification of members).
Electoral tribunal will have 9 members (3 justices designated by
chief justice and 6 senators/members of house of reps AS THE
CASE MAY BE) chosen through proportional rep from political
parties and party list system. Senior justice is the chairman
Angara v. Electoral Commission
Issue: WON the Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of
its jurisdiction in adopting its resolution of Dec 9 1935 and in
assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed against the election
of herein petitioner despite the previous confirmation by the
National Assembly
Held/Ratio:
i. Electoral commission acted within its jurisdiction because
section 17 of Article VI reads: “ ..Electoral tribunal as the Issue:
sole judge of all contests RELATING TO the election, returns,
and qualifications….”
ii. By tracing the origin and history of the Electoral
commission, it can be seen that despite the vigorous
opposition of some members (Roxas v. ventura Labrador
pelayo cinco conversation), the original intention of the
convention was effectuated by the Style Committee through
President Recto: Inserted “all contests relating to” between Held/Ratio:
“judge of” and “the election”
Abbas et al. v. Senate
i. Abbas filed an election contest before the Senate against 22
candidates of the LABAN coalition
ii. Petitioners said that the 6 senators included in the Electoral
Commission should be disqualified from the hearing and
resolution of the said SET case because all are interested
parties
iii. Abbas proposal: Tribunal’s rules (sec24): if more than 4
members are disqualified, remaining shall form a quorum if
not less than 3 including 1 judge. This would mean only the
3 judges would remain in the senate electoral commission
Issue: WON Abbas’ proposal is valid
Held
i. It is not valid because the constitution intended that both
judicial and legislative components commonly share the
duty and authority of deciding all contests relating to
election returns and qualifications of senators.
ii. The fact that the ratio of legislative to judicial components is
2:1 means that the legislative component cannot be totally
excluded from participation in the resolution of electoral
contests without doing violence to spirit and intent of the
constitution Tribunal cannot legally function without
legislative component
iii. Whether substitutes are resorted to or not overriding
consideration is that the tribunal be not prevented from
discharging a duty which it alone has the power to perform
Bondoc v. Pineda
i. In the local and congressional elections held between
Pineda (Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino) and Bondoc
(Nacionalista party), Pineda won. Bondoc filed a protest in
the House of Rep Electoral tribunal
ii. After reviewing the ballots, it was found out that Bondoc
garnered 107 more votes than Pineda
iii. 3 justices, Cerilles and Congressman Camasura voted to
proclaim Bondoc the winner of contest. Camasura was a
member of the LDP party.
iv. He told his chief, cojuanco..Camasura was expelled from
Davao del sur LDP chapter for allegedly helping to organize
partido Pilipino of danding cojuanco and encourage LDP
members to join it unethical immoral and complete
betrayal to party
v. House of Rep decided to withdraw the nomination and
rescind election of Congressman Camasura because of the
above-mentioned reason
vi. Because the vote (for Bondoc’s proclamation as winner)
was 5-4, and camasura was part of the 5, the promulgation
of the decision regarding Bondoc case was aborted.
vii. House of rep plan to replace camasura with Palacol
viii. 3 justices (Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano) asked to be relieved
from membership in the tribunal because the events
undermine the independence of the Tribunal. Congressmen
Aquino, Ponce de leon, Garcia jr., Calingasan manifest
similar intention.
ix. Bondoc filed petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus
i. WON the House of Reps can change the party’s
representation which would change the decision freely
made by the electoral tribune regarding an election contest
ii. WON it was constitutional for the HR to withdraw
nomination and rescind election of Camasura
iii. WON term in electoral tribute coextensive with
corresponding legislative term
i. The HR committed a grave abuse of discretion, injustice and
violation of the constitution. The purpose of the electoral
tribune was to provide an independent and impartial
tribunal for the determination of contests to legislative
office, devoid of partisan consideration and to transfer to
that tribunal all the powers previously exercised by the
legislative with regard to election contests.
 ii. Electoral tribunal is a non-political body in a sea of
politicians. The judges must discharge functions detached
and independent from the political party they belong to. HR
violated Camasura’s right to security of tenure because he
cannot be terminated except for a JUST CAUSE. Disloyalty to
party and breach of party discipline are not valid grounds
for a member’s expulsion in the tribunal.
iii. Electoral tribune is not coextensive with corresponding
legis term because if congressman changes party, the consti
mandate about representation based on pol affiliation is
nullified
iv. Supreme court: Reinstate Camasura in Electoral tribunal
and Bondoc declared winner of the election.
Guerrero v. Comelec
i. Ruiz filed a petition to disqualify Farinas as a candidate for
the position of congressman. Comelec dismissed the case
because it had already lost its jurisdiction in the case
ii. Farinas defense: qualifications only referred to those
qualifications given in the constitution
iii. Petitioner Guerero filed against Comelec for grave abuse of
discretion on its part and failure to do its constitutional
duty to uphold and enforce laws in elections
Issue: WON Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion for saying
that the case is in the jurisdiction of the HRET
Held/Ratio:
i. No it did not because since respondent Farinas had already
taken his oath and assumed office as a member of the
congress, comelec has already lost its jurisdiction.
ii. Comelec is only tasked to declare valid or invalid cert of
candidacy. Once candidate has been declared a winner,
contests about it is under HRET’s jurisdiction  avoids
duplicity and respects jurisdiction
iii. Qualifications does not mean constitutional qualifications:
should not make own interpretations of requirements
provided
Garcia et al v. HRET
i. Registered voters of 3rd district of manila filed a quo
warranto petition for the disqualification of Harry Angping
in holding public office because he’s not a natural born
citizen of the Phils
ii. Upon filing petition, petitioners paid 5000 filing fee, but was
unable to pay the other 5000 cash deposit. Upon notice,
they paid the 5000 cash deposit, but their motion for recon
was denied because of rule32 of 1998 HRET rules which
required 5000 cash deposit in addition to filing fee (too
late)
Issue: WON HRET committed a grave abuse of discretion in applying
its rules strictly and in dismissing the petition for quo warranto.
Held/Ratio:
i. The HRET did not commit a grave abuse of discretion
because HRET rules of procedure must be taken seriously if
they are to attain their objective: speedy and orderly
determination of the true will of the electorate
ii. Imperative justice requires the proper observance of
technicalities precisely designed to ensure its proper and
swift dispensation
Pimentel et al v. HRET
Issues:
i. WON the present composition of the house electoral
tribunal violates the constitutional requirements of
proportional representation because there are no party list
representatives in the HRET
ii. WON the present membership of the house in the
commission on appointments violates the constitutional
requirement of proportional representation because there
are no party list representatives in the CA
iii. WON the refusal of the HRET and CA to reconstitute
themselves to include party list representatives constitutes
grave abuse of discretion
Held/Ratio:
i. No the present composition of HRET does not violate consti
requirements because under section 17 article VI of the
consti, each member of congress exercises the power to
choose within constitutionally defined limits, who among
their members would occupy the allotted 6 seats in the
electoral tribunal (elected based on proportional
representation)
ii. Under sec 17 and 18, article VI, party list reps must first
show to the house that they possess the required numerical
strength to be entitled to seats in the HRET and CA. Only if
house fails to comply with directive of consti on
proportional representation can petitioners seek recourse
to court under power of judicial review.
iii. No because it appears from the available facts that the party
list groups in the house at that time simply refrained from
participating in the election process. They didn’t even
designate their nominees even up to the time they filed this
petition. Primary recourse of the party-list reps lies with
house of rep. court can’t interfere (separation of powers)
iv. Requirements for court to entertain judicial questions:
a. Actual controversy
b. Person raising the consti issue must have personal
and substantial interest in the resolution of
controversy (locus standi)  petitioners don’t
fulfill this requirement
c. Controversy must be raised at earliest reasonable
opportunity
d. Resolution of the constitutional issue
indispensable to the final determination of
controversy
Vinzons-Chato v. Comelec
Issue: WON Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion when it
assailed a resolution holding that it had lost its jurisdiction upon
respondent Unico’s proclamation and oath taking as a Member of the
HR
Held/Ratio:
i. No it didn’t because once a winning candidate has been
proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a member
of the HR, the comelec’s jurisdiction ends, and the HRET’s
own jurisdiction begins.
ii. Avoids duplicity of proceedings and a clash of jurisdiction
between constitutional bodies
iii. If the court takes cognizance of case: usurp constitutionally
mandated functions of the HRET
iv. Petition for certiorari only if:
a. Tribunal, board, officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions has acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction
b. There is no appeal or any plain speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law to
annul or modify the proceeding.
Limkaichong v. Comelec
Issues:
i. WON the proclamation of Limkaichong by the Provincial
Board of Canvassers of Negros Oriental is valid
ii. WON said proclamation divested the Comelec of jurisdiction
to resolve the issue of Limkaichong’s citizenship
iii. WON the HRET shall resume jurisdiction, in lieu of the
comelec, over the issue of Limkaichong’s citizenship
 iv. WON the Comelec 2nd division correctly ruled that
Limkaichong is disqualified from running as a Member of
the House of representatives on the ground that she is not a
natural born citizen
v. WON the Comelec’s disqualification of Limkaichong is final
and executory
vi. WON the speaker of the HR may be compelled to prohibit
Limkaichong from assuming her duties as a member of the
house of representatives
Held/Ratio:
i. The proclamation was valid because the Limkaichong’s
filing of the motion for reconsideration effectively
suspended the execution of the may 17 2007 Joint
resolution (which would suspend proclamation)
ii. No it did not because once a winning candidate has been
proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a member
of the house of representatives, the comelec’s jurisdiction
ends and the HRET’s own begins. (even those matters
pending under comelec before proclamation)
iii. See ii
iv. Based on OSG records of naturalization proceeding, since
Limkaichong’s dad wasn’t able to acquire Phil citizenship
through prescribed naturalization, Limkaichong remains a
Chinese national and is disqualified to run as candidate and
be elected as a member of the HR. However they cannot
resolve matter; outside of their jurisdiction already
v. See iv
vi. No because De Venecia argued that he’s only honoring the
proclamation of Limkaichong because it had the hallmarks
of regularity and he had no power to exclude any member
of the HR motu proprio until the proclamation is canceled,
revoked or nullified (against due process of law). His
recognition as a member of the HR is a ministerial duty.
Daza v. Singson
i. During congressional elections, seats were apportioned in
the commission on appointments. However, LDP was
reorganized. 24 members of the Liberal party formally
resigned and transferred to LDP swelling its number to 159,
and LP reduced to 17.
ii. Chamber elected a new set of representatives and petitioner
was removed, and was replaced by Singson. Petitioner
challenged his removal from the Commission on
Appointments and the assumption of his seat by the
respondents
Issue:
i. WON the change in the representation of the CA was
constitutional
ii. WON the removal of the petitioner from the Commission on
Appointments was constitutional
iii. WON the reorganization is based on a permanent political
realignment (since LDP is not registered)
Held/Ratio:
i. Resolve the issue in favor of the authority of the HR to
change its representation in the CA to reflect at any time the
changes that may transpire in the political alignments of its
membership
ii. Yes it was constitutional because the constitution mandates
proportional representation in the CA and with the
increased number of the LDP party to 159 and the
consequent decrease of LP to 17, the withdrawal of 1 seat is SEC 21 – Inquiries in aid of legislation
constitutional
iii. The Cunanan v. Tan case cannot be applied because as
opposed to the former, the party it formed (Allied Majority)
was only temporary. The creation of the LDP constituting
the bulk of the former PDP-Laban and to which no less than
24 liberal congressmen have transferred was a permanent
change. LDP, aside from the fact that its petition for
registration as a political party has been granted, has been
in existence for more than a year now, has 157 members in
the HR and 6 members in the senate.
Coseteng v. Mitra
Issue: WON Congresswoman Coseteng is qualified to sit in the
Commission on Appointments as a representative of the Minority
because she has the support of 9 other congressmen and
congresswomen of the minority
Held/Ratio: The endorsements of the 9 congressmen in favor of the
petitioner’s election are inconsequential because they are not
members of her party and they signed identical endorsements in
favor of her rival, Verano-Yap
C. Guingona Jr. v. Gonzales
i. Based on the national elections, each party gets a
proportional membership that includes a fractional half
(LDP:7.5, NPC:2.5, LAKAS-NUCD:1.5, LP-PDP-LABAN:.5)
ii. It was decided that seat be given to Senator Tanada of LP
and Sen Romulo of LDP. Guingona and Osmena objected and
filed this petition for prohibition
Issue: WON the election of Senators Alberto Romulo and Wigberto E.
Tanada as members of the Commission on Appointments is in
accordance with the provision of Sec 18 Article VI of the constitution
Held/Ratio:
i. The election violates sec 18 Art VI of the constitution
because it is not in compliance with the requirement that in
the CA, 12 senators shall be elected on the basis of
proportional representation of the political parties
represented therein
ii. In granting the LDP and the LP party an additional seat by
converting their fractional half to a whole membership of 1
senator, one other party’s fractional membership was
reduced: less than their proportional representation in the
senate
iii. In Coseteng v. Mitra: there should be at least 2 senators in
the political party to have a representative in the CA;
Invocation of Senator Tanada of the ruling on Enrile and
Tanada Sr. cannot be applied because
a. Tanada: Lone opposition then (23 all from NP him
from Citizen’s party) If more than 2 parties, party
with a single senator can’t claim a seat in CA
b. Senator Enrile: In Enrile’s case, they were 2 along
with Estrada elected in the opposition party. The
opposition was entitled to 1 full member hence
Enrile was legally nominated and elected.
iv. Provision in sec 18 is mandatory in character and does not
leave discretion to majority party in the senate otherwise
party with majority rep in senate or house of rep will confer
it power to impose its will on the minority (sec 18 to
balance power)
v. It is not mandatory to elect 12 senators to the Commission
on Appointments. What the constitution requires is that
there be at least a majority of the entire membership (10
members, at least 4 come from either house)
SEC. 19 – HRET and CA constituted within 30 days
SEC. 20 – Records and Books of Accounts of Congress
1. Legislative Investigations
Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
i. There was an alleged sale of the equity of Benjamin
Romualdez to the Lopa group (Ricardo Lopa is president
 aquino’s brother in law) in 36 or 39 corporations without
PCGG approval (presidential commission on good
governance)
ii. PCGG: Complaint filed in the Sandiganbayan: The
Romualdez couple, acting by themselves or in concert with
the Marcos couple, engaged in devices, schemes, and
strategems to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense of
the Fil people
iii. Sen Enrile brought case up in his privilege speech:
a. Sec 5 of RA 3019 (Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act): It shall be unlawful for spouse or any relative
of the Pres of the Phils, VP, Pres of the senate,
Speaker of the HR, to intervene directly or
indirectly in any business, transaction, contract, or
application with the gov’t….”
iv. Blue Ribbon committee conducted investigation: Lopa and
Bengzon refused to testify.
v. Hence this petition to request a temporary restraining
order (TRO) against the respondent
Issue: WON the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee can conduct an
inquiry in aid of legislation, and require petitioners to testify and
produce evidence regarding alleged sale of the equity of Benjamin
“Kokoy” Romualdez to the Lopa group in 36 or 39 corporations
Held/Ratio:
i. No they cannot.
a. It seems that the inquiry was requested by
Senator Enrile in order to vindicate his reputation
as a Member of the Senate of the Phils, considering
the claim of Mr. Lopa that Enrile’s charges that
Lopa had taken over the FMMC Group of
Companies are baseless and malicious
b. The purpose of the inquiry to be conducted by
respondent was to find out whether or not the
relatives of President Aquino, particularly Mr.
Lopa, had violated the law in connection with the
alleged sale of 36 or 39 companies. No intended
legislation is involved
c. Although the power of inquiry is broad, it is not
unlimited. There is no general authority to expose
private affairs of individuals without justification
in terms of the functions of congress
d. Moreover, before the investigation, the complaint
about same matter has already been filed in the
Sandiganbayan. To allow the respondent to
continue will not only pose possibility of
conflicting judgments but if the committees’
judgment are made first, the judgment of the
Sandiganbayan will be influenced. = encroachment
into the exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction.
e. Petitioners’ rights to due process must also be
respected
*Dissenting: The court has no power to second guess the
motives behind an act of the House of Congress
Sabio v. Gordon
i. Senator Miriam Santiago introduced Phil Senate Resol No.
455: Directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on anomalous
losses incurred by Phil Overseas Telecommunications
Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite
Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings
Corporation (PHC) due to alleged improprieties in their
operations by their Board of Directors
ii. Senator Gordon issued an invitation, later on a subpoena
requiring Chairman Sabio of PCGG, Commissionrs Abcede,
Conti, Javier, and Nario to appear in a public hearing and
testify about Resol 455. Not complying thrice, Gordon
issued an order requiring to show cause why they should
not be cited in contempt
iii. Sabio’s reason: Sec 4(b) of E.O. No. 1: No member or staff of
the Commission shall be required to testify…..in any judicial
legis or admin proceeding,…within its official cognizance”
Issue: WON Sec 4 (b) of E.O no. 1 is repealed by the 1987
constitution, article VI sec 21
Held/Ratio:
i. Yes it is. A mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to
the broad power of Congress in the absence of any
constitutional basis.
ii. The 1987 constitution recognizes the power of investigation
not just of Congress, but also of “any of its committee”. This
means that the mechanisms which the houses can take in
order to effectively perform its investigative function are
also available to the committees.
iii. Moreover, the Congress’ power of inquiry has gained more
solid existence and expansive construal, broad enough to
cover officials of the executive branch.
iv. Nowhere in the constitution is any provision granting
exemption to Sec 4 (b) of E.O no. 1. The congress’ power of
inquiry, being broad, encompasses everything that concerns
the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or
possibly needed statutes. It even extends to government
agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions
are within the power of congress to regulate or even
abolish: PCGG belongs to this class
Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate Committee
i. Senator Enrile delivered a privilege speech urging senate to
immediately conduct an inquiry in aid of legislation based
on the letter by Atty Bacobo, denouncing SCB-Philippines
for selling unregistered foreign securities in violation of
Securities Regulation Code
ii. Petitioners argue that respondents has no jurisdiction to
conduct inquiry because of pending cases in other courts
about same subject: hence this petition to seek issuance of
temporary restraining order (TRO) against respondents
Issues:
i. WON the Senate has jurisdiction to proceed with its inquiry
in aid of legislation pursuant to Resol No. 166 when there
are already cases pending in court involving the same issues
subject of the legislative inquiry
ii. WON petitioners’ being held in contempt was without legal
basis
Held/Ratio:
i. Yes they still have jurisdiction to proceed with its inquiry in
aid of legislation.
a. The ruling in Bengzon Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee cannot be invoked because their only
similarity is that there are already pending cases
in court involving the same subject of the leg
inquiry. However, as opposed to Bengzon case
whose intended inquiry was not in aid of
legislation (merely called upon senate to look into
possible violations), in the case at bar, the inquiry
is explicit on how its intention is in aid of
legislation: Investigate into the allegedly
inadequate existing laws and regulation under the
Securities regulation code to prevent the sale of
unregistered rules intended to protect public from
fraud
b. Mere filing of a criminal or admin complaint
should not automatically bar conduct of legislative
investigation, otherwise it’ll be easy to subvert
intended leg inquiry.
c. The power of inquiry is essential to legislative
function. To legislate wisely and effectively, info
 regarding conditions which legislation is intended
to change is needed.
ii. No it was not without legal basis
a. Petitioners insist that the inquiry conducted by
respondent was in “aid of collection” (that Atty
Bacobo just sought to recover investments from
SCB Phils). This isn’t true because he didn’t file a
complaint to recover his investment but merely
asked the senate to conduct an inquiry regarding
the SCB’s illegal activities.
b. Outraged by petitioners’ imputation that it was
conducting investigation “in aid of collection,
respondents held petitioners and their counsel
Atty Geronimo, in contempt and detained them for
6 hours.
c. The principle that Congress or any of its bodies
has the power to punish disobedient witnesses is
founded upon reason and policy. Legislative body
cannot obtain knowledge and info if it cannot
require and compel disclosure of such knowledge,
and punish defiance of its power and authority.
d. Congress’ power to punish contempt based on the
principle of self preservation: sui generis –
attaches not to discharge of legislative functions
perse but to sovereign character of legislature as
one of the 3 branches
e. Petitioners’ imputation that the investigation was
in aid of collection is a direct challenge against
authority of Senate committee as it ascribes ill
motive to the latter – justified contempt situation
against petitioners
Senate Blue Ribbon v. Judge Majaducon
i. Senator Ople directed Committee on National Defense and
Security to conduct an inquiry in aid of legislation into the
charges of then defense secretary Mercado that a group of
retired military officers were organizing a coup d’etat to
prevent admin from probing into alleged fund irregularities
in the AFP
ii. Senator Sotto III also filed a resolution to direct an inquiry
in aid of legis on the alleged mismanagement of the funds
and investment portfolio of the Armed forces retirement
and separation benefits system (AFP-RSBS)
iii. Both referred to Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
iv. During public hearings conducted, it appeared that the AFP-
RSBS purchased a lot in Gen San designated as Lot X,
MR1160, for 10, 500php per sqm from Atty Flaviano, but
deed of sale filed with register of deeds indicated that purch
price was only 3,000php per sqm.
v. Committee caused service of a subpoena to Atty. Flaviano
directing him to appear and testify. He refused to appear at
the hearing, and even filed a petition for prohibition and
preliminary injunction with prayer for TRO with RTC of
GenSan branch 23.
vi. RTC issued a TRO to cease and desist from proceeding with
inquiry and from issuing subpoena
vii. Committee filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack
of jurisdiction and failure to state a valid cause of action.
viii. Trial court denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss. Hence this
petition for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and
preliminary injunction.
Issues:
i. WON Judge Majaducon committed grave abuse of discretion
and/or acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in denying
respondent’s petition to dismiss petition for prohibition and
preliminary injunction filed by Atty. Flaviano
ii. WON respondent judge erred in convicting petitioner
Pimentel of indirect contempt of court
Held/Ratio:
i. Yes he did.
a. Courts have no jurisdiction to restrain congress
from performing its constitutionally vested
function to conduct investigations in aid of
legislation, following the principle of separation of
powers.
b. Legislative inquiry did not deal with the issuance
of the patent and title to Lot X, MR-1160D in the
name of AFP-RSBS which is under court’s
jurisdiction. Inquiry was about the anomaly in the
purchase thereof, at the reported misuse and
mismanagement of the AFP-RSBS funds, with the
intention of enacting appropriate legislation to
protect rights and interests of officers and
members of AFP (Bengzon ruling can’t be applied)
c. Moreover Bengzon ruling cannot be applied
because in the former, the case was already
pending under the sandiganbayan (sandiganbayan
acquired case jurisdiction already) in the case at
bar, the complaint is still pending in the office of
the ombudsman when subpoena was served,
therefore no court had acquired jurisdiction over
the matter.
ii. Yes respondent judge erred in convicting Pimentel (for
making derogatory remarks in the petition itself which
affected the honor and integrity of the respondent judge
and degraded the admin of justice)
a. “Gross ignorance of the rules of law and
procedure” is merely a description of normal
usage in petitions where acts of lower courts are
challenged before higher judicial bodies.
b. Pimentel did not cause the publication in the
Philippine star of the fact of filing of the petition
for certiorari by the committee and the
reproduction of excerpts thereof: freedom of the
press
c. Judge Majaducon’s allegation that petitioner made
it appear that an admin complaint was filed
against him is without basis: no formal admin
complaint was instituted separately other than
petition for certiorari
d. Punish for contempt should be exercised for
purposes that are impersonal, because that power
is intended as a safeguard not for judges as
persons but for the functions they exercise.
1. Executive Privilege
Senate v. Ermita
i. Committee of the senate issued invitations to various
officials of the Exec dept for them to appear in a public
hearing on the North Rail Project sparked by privilege
speech of Sen Enrile
ii. Senate Committee on national Defense and Security also
issued invites to officials of the AFP for them to attend as
resource persons in a public hearing on the ff:
a. Pimentel: “Bunye has provided Smoking gun or
has opened a can of worms that show massive
electoral fraud in the Presidential Election 2005”
b. Estrada: “The Phils as the wire-tapping capital of
the world”
c. Biazon: “Clear and present Danger”
 d. Madrigal: Resolution directing the committee on
national defense and sec to conduct an inquiry in
aid of legislation and in the national interest on
role of military in the so-called “Gloriagate
scandal”
e. Biazon: Resolution directing committee on
national defense and security to conduct an
inquiry in aid of legislation on the wire-tapping of
the president of the Phils
iii. Letter to Drilon from Exec Sec Eduardo Ermita requesting
postponement to afford officials time to prepare. Drilon
didn’t agree.
iv. Cortes, president of North Luzon Railways Corp sent letter
to drilon requesting that the hearing on Northrail proj be
postponed until a copy of the report of UP law center on
contract agreements had been secured
v. President GMA issued E.O 464: Ensuring Observance of the
Adherence to the rule on executive privilege and respect for
the rights of public officials appearing in legislative
inquiries in aid of legislation under the constitution and for
other purposes:
Issues:
WON EO 464 is constitutional
i. WON the EO 464 contravenes with the power of inquiry
vested in Congress
ii. WON EO 464 violates the right of people to info on matters
of public concern
iii. WON respondents have committed grave abuse of
discretion when implemented EO 464 prior to its
publication in a newspaper of gen circulation
Held/Ratio:
i. The oversight function in sec22 is different from the inquiry
in aid of legislation in sec21. The latter is mandatory in
character and appearance in which is not discretionary.
Moreover, although sec21 also respects executive privilege,
executive privilege may not be invoked just because they
are department heads (has to have a valid claim of
privilege) The privilege is invoked not in relation to specific Issues:
categories of people but to specific categories of
information. (in the conversation, sec21 and 22 are
differentiated by davide maambog and guingona) – Letter
does not explicitly invoke executive privilege/mention how
info falls under recognized grounds
ii. Necessity to keep info confidential must outweigh the
public interest. To the extent that investigations in aid of
legislation are generally conducted in public, any executive
issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures of info
necessarily deprives the people of info which, being
presumed to be in aid of legislation, is presumed to be a
matter of public concern. Citizens deprived of info which
they can use in formulating own opinions on the matter
before congress (opinions which they can communicate to
their reps). Open dialogue on political discussions can be
effective only to the extent that citizenry is informed and is
able to formulate will intelligently
iii. While EO 464 only applies to officials of the exec branch, it
does not follow that the same is exempt from the need for
publication. (especially when the subject of such a
law/statute is a matter of public interest)
Terms:
Executive privilege – power of gov’t to withhold info from the public,
the courts, and the congress (shwartz); right of the president and
high level executive branch officers to withhold info from congress,
courts, and ultimately the public(rozell); The privilege based on
separation of powers, exempts the exec from disclosure requirements
applicable to the ordinary citizen or organization where such
exemption is necessary to the discharge of highly impt exec
responsibilities (black)
3 kinds of considerations:
a. State secrets privilege – disclosure might subvert crucial
military or diplomatic obj
b. Informer’s privilege – not to disclosure identity of
informant
c. Generic privilege – internal deliberations with opinions,
recommendations, and delibs comprising part of a process
by which gov’tal decisions and policies are formulated
Question hour – period of confrontation initiated by parliament to
hold prime minister accountable for their acts and the operation of
the gov’t corresponding to what is known in Britain as question
period
Neri v. Senate Committee
i. Petitioner appeared before respondent committees and
testified on matters concerning the National Broadband
Project (NBN Project), which was awarded by DOTC to
Zhong Xing Telecommunications (ZTE).
ii. Petitioner disclosed that Comelec Chairman Abalos offered
him P200 million in exchange for his approval of the NBN
proj
iii. He informed PGMA of the bribery attempt and she told him
not to accept bribe
iv. When petitioner was probed further on PGMA and the
petitioner’s discussions relating to the NBN project,
petitioner refused to ans and invoked “executive privilege”
He refused to ans:
a. WON PGMA followed up on NBN proj
b. WON she directed him to prioritize it
c. WON she directed him to approve it
v. Respondent committees persisted in knowing answers by
requiring him to appear and testify again. Petitioner didn’t
appear. Respondent committees declared him in contempt
and directed his arrest and detention
vi. Hence his petition for certiorari
i. WON there is a recognized presumptive presidential
communications privilege in our legal system
ii. WON there is a factual or legal basis to hold that the
communications elicited by the three questions are covered
by executive privilege
iii. WON respondent Committees have shown that the
communications elicited by the 3 questions are critical to
the exercise of their functions
iv. WON respondent committees committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the contempt order
Held/Ratio:
i. Yes there is. There are certain types of info that the gov’t
may withhold from the public. The right to info does not
extend to matters recognized as “privileged information”
(Presidential conversations, correspondences, and
discussions in closed-door cabinet meetings”. Although
respondents argue that a blanket authorization of such
privilege can be abused, the constitutional infirmity is not
found in this case because it was the president herself
through the executive secretary Ermita who invoked
executive privilege on a specific matter involving an
executive agreement between the Phils and China.
ii. Yes there is:
a. Respondents argue that there’s none because the
power to enter into an executive agreement is a
quintessential and non-delegable presidential
power. And the fact that the president has to
secure prior concurrence of the Monetary board
which would report it to the senate before
 contracting, does not diminish the executive
nature of the power. Separation of powers does
not mean absolute autonomy. There is the
corollary doctrine of checks and balances carefully
calibrated by the constitution to temper the three
branches.
b. Respondents say that the doctrine of operational
proximity may be misconstrued to expand scope
of presidential communications privilege to
communications between those who are
operationally proximate but who may have no
direct communications with her. However, in this
case, petitioner is a member of the cabinet, thus
properly within the term of “advisor” of the
president. In fact, her alter-ego and a member of
her official family.
c. Respondents say that the president’s claim of exec
privilege is merely based on a generalized interest
in confidentiality and go against constitutional
provisions regarding gov’t transparency,
accountability, and disclosure of info. However, it
should be noted that the presidential
communications privilege are related to
diplomatic and economic relations with another
sovereign nation, and it is impossible to provide
any further details of these conversations without
disclosing the very thing the privilege is designed
to protect. Disclosure could adversely affect the
Philippines’ diplomatic and economic relations
with China. Moreover, upholding exec privilege
with respect to the 3 questions,did not in any way
curb public’s right to info nor diminish importance
of public accountability and transparency
iii. According to the respondents the answers to the 3
questions are needed in discharge of their legislative
functions to consider the 3 pending senate bills, and to curb
graft and corruption. However these are general assertions
as they fail to demonstrate how the communications
elicited by the 3 questions are critical to enable them to
craft legislation. Moreover, during the oral argument before
the court, the respondent committees impliedly admitted
that the senate could still come up with legislations even
without the answers to the 3 questions
iv. Yes respondent committees committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuing contempt order. Witnesses have their
constitutional rights to due process. They should be
adequately informed what matters are to be covered by the
inquiry. It will also allow them to prepare the pertinent info
and docs. The petitioner’s request to be furnished an
advance copy of questions is a reasonable demand that
should’ve been granted. Unfortunately, the subpoena made
no specific reference to any senate bill nor inform the
petitioner of the questions. It merely commanded him to
testify on what he knows relative to subject matter under
inquiry
SEC 23
SEC 24
SEC 25
1. Riders
‘ connected therewith” is constitutional in that:
Garcia v. Mata
i. Petition for certiorari to review decision of court of first
instance declaring par11 as unconstitutional
Issue: WON par 11 of the “Special Provisions for the AFP” is
unconstitutional therefore invalid and inoperative
Held/Ratio:
i. Petition denied. Yes it is unconstitutional because par 11,
whose first clause states that “After the approval of this
act….no reserve officer of the AFP may be called to tour of
active duty…during any period of 5 consecutive yrs” fails to
disclose its relevance or relation to any appropriation item
therein, or to the appropriation act as a whole
ii. It was a rider to the general appropriation act, a new and
completely unrelated provision attached to
2. Transfer of funds
Demetria v. Alba
i. Petition for prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction against Presidential Dec. 1177
Issue: WON the transfer of public funds in the Budget Reform Decree
of 1977 (Presidential Decree No. 1177) is constitutional
Held/Ratio:
i. Petition granted. Presidential decree is unconstitutional.
ii. Par 1 of sec 44 of Presidential decree states that the
president shall have the authority to transfer any funds
appropriated to diff depts…..to any program, proj…”
iii. Sec 16 Article VIII of consti states that “No law shall be
passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations…” Only
allowed to augment an item and such transfer made only
when there are savings from another item in the
appropriation of the gov’t branch or consti body.
Presidential decree allows indiscriminate transfer
iv. TPresidential decree opens floodgates for enactment of
unfunded appropriations, results in uncontrolled exec
expenditures, entrenches pork barrel system as ruling
party: expands public money not on basis of dev’t priorities
but on political and personal expediency
SEC 26
i. Subject and title of bills
Tio v. Videogram Regulatory Board
Issue: WON Presidential decree 1987 “An Act creating the videogram
regulating board” is constitutional as it violates the one subject-one
title rule.
Held/Ratio:
i. Presidential decree is constitutional and does not go against
the one subject-one title rule. It is not necessary that the
title express each and every end that the statute wishes to
accomplish. The requirement is satisfied if all the parts of
the statute are related and are germane to the subject
matter expressed in the title, or as long as they are not
inconsistent with or foreign to the gen subject and title.
ii. The provision regarding tax on sale, lease, or disposition of
videograms (30% tax=50% province, 50% municipality) is
allied and germane to and is reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of, the gen obj of the decree which is the
regulation of the video industry through the videogram
regulatory board as expressed in the title
Phil. Judges Ass’n v. Prado
Issue: WON sec 35 of RA No. 7354 “An act creating the Philippine
postal corporation, defining its power, functions and responsibilities,
Providing for regulation of the industry and for other purposes
i. Violates one-subj-one-rule and does not express its purpose
ii. Did not pass required readings in both houses
 iii. Discriminatory and encroaches on independence of
judiciary (Repealing clause removes franking privilege of
the judiciary with a few exceptions)
Held/Ratio:
i. No it does not. It has been held that if the title fairly
indicates the general subject, and reasonably covers all
provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the
legislature or the people, there is sufficient compliance with
the constitutional requirement
ii. No merit. Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the
court may not inquire beyond the certification of the
approval of a bill from the presiding officers of congress.
The enrolled bill is conclusive upon the judiciary (except in
matters that have to be entered in the journals like the yeas
and nays on the final reading of bill) The journals are
themselves also binding on the SC/
iii. Yes it is. The repealing clause is discriminatory and denies
the Judiciary equal protection of the laws guaranteed for all
persons or things similarly situated. The distinction made is
not based on substantial distinctions that make real diffs
between the Judiciary and the grantees of franking
privilege: matter of arbitrariness
Tan v. Del Rosario
Issues:
WON RA 7496 (Simplified Net Income Tax Scheme or SNIT) is
constitutional
i. WON SNIT violates the one title-one subject rule
ii. WON SNIT violates equal protection clause
Held/Ratio
RA 7496 is constitutional
i. The objectives of the one subject-one title rule are met. (a.
prevent log-rolling legislation b. avoid surprises and fraud c.
fairly apprise people through publications)
ii. Petitioners say that the RA desecrates consti requirement
that taxation should be uniform and equitable as the law
would now tax single proprietorships and professionals
differently from how it taxes corporations and partnerships.
No merit, since the system of income taxation has been the
prevailing rule even before this RA.
iii. Moreover, equal protection concept merely requires that all
subjects or objects of taxation, similarly situated, are to be
treated alike in privileges and liabilities.
iv. Fair classification uniformity:
a. Standards used are substantial not arbitrary
b. Categorization is germane to achieve legislative
purpose
c. Law applies, all things being equal, to both present
and future conditions
d. Classification applies equally well to all those
belonging to same class
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance
Issues:
WON RA 7716 “Expanded Value Added Tax Law” is constitutional
Formal/Procedural Issues:
i. On the ground that RA 7716 did not exclusively originate
from the HR (H bill was only considered and RA 7716 is
only a consolidation of H bill 11197 and S bill1630)
ii. On the ground that RA 7716 did not pass through 3
readings
iii. On the ground that RA7716 was substantially changed by
Conference Committee
iv. On the validity of enrolled copy of the bill
v. On the ground that RA 7716 violates the one title-one
subject rule
Substantive Issues:
i. On the ground that RA 7716 is regressive (it will hit the
poor and middle income group harder than it will the rich)
ii. On the ground that RA 7716 violates equal protection
clause
iii. On the ground that RA 7716 violates Contract Clause
Held/Ratio:
Petitions dismissed.
Formal/Procedural Issues:
i. It is not the law but the revenue bill which is required by the
Constitution to originate exclusively in the HR. To insist that
this applies to the revenue statute and not just the bill
would be to violate the coequality of legislative power of the
two houses of congress. What the consti simply means is
that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff, etc; must come
from the HR (more sensitive to local problems and needs)
ii. The president has certified S. No. 1630 (senate’s version) as
urgent hence the second and third reading were done on
the same day. The unless clause regarding President’s
certification not only refers to printing and distribution
prior to its enactment, but also to requirement of 3 readings
on separate days
iii. The house rules (Jefferson’s manual as a supplement) was
modified by the legislative practice where it’s a common
place in congress that conference committee reports
include new matters, which though germane, have not been
committed to committee. Such action was necessitated by
the fact that the 2 versions (necessary because of difficult
provision to enforce concerning 2 diff versions from senate
and HR) = amendment in the nature of a substitute (3 rd
version)
iv. Enrolled copy of a bill is conclusive not only of its provisions
but also of its due enactment. To disregard the enrolled bill
rule in such cases would be to disregard the respect due to
the other depts. of gov’t
v. No it does not since the title states that the purpose of the
statute is to expand the VAT system, and one way of doing
this is to widen its base by withdrawing some of the
exemptions granted before. (o.w it’d be a complete index of
its content)
Substantive Issues:
i. It is on the contrary equitable because it distributes the tax
burden to as many goods and services as possible
particularly those which are within the reach of the higher
income groups.
a. Real properties held for sale or for lease
b. Right or privilege to use industrial commercial or
scientific equipment, hotels restaurants, etc
c. Small businesses with annual gross sales less than
500,000php are exempted
d. NEDA study: additional expenditure of lowest
income class is P301 (1.49% a year) while for
family earning 500,000 or more: P8340 (2.2%)
e. Other allegations do not have any evidence/basis
i. Chamber of Real estate and Builders
Association – reduce mark up of
members to 85-90%
ii. Philippine Press Institute – drive some of
members out of circulation because
profits will not be enough to pay tax
liability
ii. No it’s not against the equal protection clause. The
legislature is not required to adhere to a policy of “all or
none” in choosing the subject of taxation
iii. No it does not go against it. Not only are existing laws read
into contracts in order to fic obligation between parties, but
the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is
also read into contracts as a basic postulate of legal order.

SEC 27
1. Legislation
2. Item Veto
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Tax Appeals
i. CIR v. Manila Hotel Corp; Court of Tax appeals: declared
collection of caterer’s tax under Sec 191 A of RA 6110 illegal
because sec 42 of House bill 17839 which carries that
proviso was vetoed by Marcos
a. In this case, private respondent was Manila Golf &
Country Club Inc. which claims that the
assessment (percentage tax/caterer’s tax) is
without basis since sec42 was vetoed by the
president
b. CTA held in favor of Manila hotel Corp
ii. Hence this new trial: CIR v. Court of Tax Appeals
Issue: WON the presidential veto on sec 42 of Housebill 1739 (RA
6110) referred to the entire section or merely to an item (the
imposition of 20% tax on gross receipts of operators or proprietors
of restaurants, refreshments, parlors, bars, and other eating places
which are maintained within the premises or compound of a hotel,
motel, or resthouses)
Held/Ratio:
i. Sec 42 was not entirely vetoed but merely the words
“hotels, motels, resthouses” on the ground that it might
restrain the dev’t of hotels which is essential to the tourism
industry (also due to the general reason that this sort of tax
is passed on to the consuming public)
ii. To interpret veto message otherwise would result in the
exemption of entities already subject to tax (caterer’s tax).
While the president may veto any item or items in a revenue
bill, the consti does not give him the power to repeal an
existing tax.
iii. An item in a revenue bill does not refer to an entire section
imposing a particular kind of tax but rather to the subj of
the tax and the tax rate. Otherwise, the evil sought to be
avoided (approving section at the expense of what he
doesn’t agree with or veto entire section at the expense of
foregoing the collection of the kind of tax altogether)
through this provision will be rendered futile.
Gonzales v. Macaraig
i. Congress passed HB No. 19186: General Appropriations Bill
for fiscal year 1989
ii. 7 special provisions and sec55 vetoed by president
a. Sec 55 (FY 89) which was substantially similar to
Sec 16 (FY 90) = difference: in FY 89, use of
savings (sec 12) separate from vetoed 55; in FY
90, they’re combined in sec 16
b. Basically talks about the prohibition against the
restoration or increase of recommended
appropriations disapproved and/or reduced by
congress
iii. Hence the petition for prohibition/mandamus with
injunction and restraining order assailing constitutionality
of veto
Issue: WON the president exceeded the item-veto power accorded by
the constitution/ WON the president has the power to veto
provisions of an Appropriations Bill
Held/Ratio:
The constitutionality of the assailed presidential veto is upheld.
i. The restrictive interpretation of the petitioners that the
president may not veto a provision without vetoing the
entire bill not only disregards the basic principle that a
distinct and severable part of a bill may be the subject of a
separate veto but also overlooks the constitutional mandate
that any provision in the general appropriations bill
shall relate specifically to some particular
appropriation therein and that any such provision shall
be limited in its operation to the appropriation to
which it relates.
ii. Inappropriate provisions
a. Assuming that provisions are beyond the power to
veto, Sec 55 (FY 89) and Sec 16 (FY 90) are not
provisions in the budgetary sense of the term.
b. The vetoed sections are more of an expression of
Congressional policy in respect of augmentation
from savings rather than a budgetary
appropriation
iii. The legislature cannot by location of a bill give it immunity
from executive veto. Nor can it circumvent veto power over
substantive legis by artfully drafting general law measures
so that they appear to be conditions or limitations on an
item of appropriation.
a. Otherwise the legis will be permitted to impair
constitutional responsibilities and functions of a
co-equal branch of gov’t in contravention of
separation of powers doctrine in the interest of
expediency and efficiency: Inability of the
president, senate pres, speaker of the house, chief
justice of SC to augment any item of
appropriations even in cases of calamity or in the
event of urgent need to accelerate the
implementation of essential public services and
infrastructures
iv. Legislative control cannot be exercised in such a manner as
to encumber the general appropriation bill with veto-proof
“logrolling measure” (riders)
v. Inappropriate conditions
a. Although it is true that executive is not allowed to
veto a condition or proviso of an appropriation
while allowing the appropriation itself to stand,
the restrictions or conditions must exhibit a
connection with money items in a budgetary
sense in the schedule of expenditures: Test is
one of appropriateness. Tested by these critieria,
sec 55 and 16 must be held as inappropriate
conditions.
b. Artfully crafted to appear as true conditions or
limitations when in actuality they are general law
measures more appropriate for substantive
therefore separate legislation: more of a
substantive expression of a legislative objective to
restrict power of augmentation granted to the
president and other key officials
vi. If the legislature believed that veto was unconstitutional,
they should’ve resorted to the 2/3 votation to override veto
Philconsa v. Enriquez
Issues:
WON the vetoed provisions of the president is constitutional
Held/Ratio:
i. GAB of 1994
a. Passed and approved by congress
1. imposed conditions and limitations on
certain items of appropriations in the
proposed budget previously submitted
by the president
2. Also authorized members of congress to
propose and identify projects in the pork
 barrels allotted to them and to realign
their respective operating budgets
b. Signed bill into law and vetoed some provisions
ii. 4 cases filed challenging the constitutionality of the
presidential vetoes and provisions of GAB of 1994
1. Philippine Constitution Association (Philconsa): writ
of prohibition
a. On passed:
a. CDF (countrywide dev’t fund) fund of
27,977,000,000 to be used in
infrastructiures, …to qualified
benificiaries”  to propose and identify
proj is an encroachment to executive
power
b. Realignment of allocation for operating
expense by a member of congress  only
congress as a whole is allowed
c. Appropriation for debt service (86
billion for debt service and 37 billion
only for education) should be more for
educ
b. Presidential veto
a. President vetoed special provision on
debt service appropriation (use of fund:
fund used to pay principal and interest of
foreign debt…”  can’t veto a provision
without vetoing entire appropriation bill
(86billion appropriation allowed by
president – VETO UPHELD (only the
“subj to the approval of the pres with the
concurrence of congress” because
inappropriate but VETO VOID for “…
principal and interest..”
2. 16 senators led by Sen. Pres. Angara, Sen. Gonzales,
Sen. Roco: certiorari, prohibition, mandamus
a. On passed:
a. Constitutionality of the conditions
imposed by the president in GAB of 1994
i. Supreme court, Commission on
audit, Ombudsman,
Commission on Human rights –
augmentation and use of
savings in the appropriation of
the respective offices (Pres:
constitution: no public officer
shall receive add’l
compensation unless
authorized by law) 
petitioners say president
violates independence and
autonomy of the offices – VETO
UPHELD because provisions
against the constitution
ii. Citizen Armed Forces
Geographical units
iii. State Universities and Colleges
*SUCs: *vetoed use of agency
income and the creation,
operation, maintenance of
revolving funds(already part of
National expenditure program)
b. Presidential veto
a. President vetoed special provision on
debt service appropriation (use of fund:
fund used to pay principal and interest of
foreign debt…” (not the ans but
innovative proj) can’t veto a provision
without vetoing entire appropriation bill
(86billion appropriation allowed by
president) – VETO UPHELD on “…subject
to approval of the president and…”
because inappropriate provision but
VETO VOID for “…principal and interest..”
3. Sen. Romulo & Sen Tanada: prohibition and
mandamus
a. On Passed
a. Conditions imposed by the president in
the implementation of certain
appropriations for:
i. CAFGU’s payment and
separation benefit - said subject
to presidential approval – VETO
UPHELD because of
inappropriate provision
(impounding: appropriations
bill not the right vehicle)
ii. DPWH – admin and eng OH
subject to admin guidelines
iii. National Housing Authority
(NHA) – appropriation
disbursed in accordance with
housing program of gov’t
b. Presidential veto
a. 4 provisions on AFP and DPWH in the
GAB of 1994
i. 70% admin and 30% contract
ratio for road maintenance (not
flexible enough) – VETO VOID
because it’s not an
inappropriate provision related
to appropriation
ii. On purchase of medicines by
AFP: standard formulary
(transition period needed) –
VETO VOID because it’s related
to appropriation item on
purchase of meds by AFP
iii. On prior approval of congress
for purchase of military
equipment( against consti
mandate of contractual
obligation of AFP
modernization fund) – VETO
UPHELD because it’s an
inappropriate provision and
against contractual obligation
iv. On use of savings to augment
AFP pension funds (should be
covered by direct
appropriations made by law) –
VETO UPHELD because
provision is unconstitutional
and against sec 25 and 29
4. Same as 3: with temporary restraining order
Held/Ratio: DISMISSED with exceptions (provisions on debt service,
no. 2 of DPWH, no. 12 of medicines for AFP)
Court dismissed all petitions that challenged the validity of the
presidential vetoes that were vetoed properly. This
means that those “inappropriate provisions” and items that were
vetoed were rightly done. On the other hand,
those that the Court granted were not properly vetoed for the reason
that the part the president vetoed is
intimately connected to the entire provision. Removing such item
would entail removing the provision altogether
VETO UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
i. On debt service: “..principal and interest to be used for
payment for foreign and domestic debt…” and prohibiting
use of funds to pay for liabilities of the Central Bank Board
of Liquidators
ii. DPWH: Fund for the maintenance of roads and bridges:
30% to be contracted out
iii. AFP: Purchase of medicines
SEC 28
The power to tax
- Should be for public purpose
- Concept of Uniformity
o All duties, imposts, and exercises shall be uniform
throughout the US (Phils: applies to taxation in
general vs. US which applies to indirect taxes)
o A tax is uniform within the Constitutional
requirement when it operates with the same force
and effect in every place where the subject of it is
found
o Under equal protection clause
- A tax system is progressive when
o the rate increases as the tax base increases (more
equitable distribution of wealth
Purposes
1. To raise revenue
2. Instrument of national and social policy – power to destroy
(extermination of undesirable activities and enterprises)
3. Tool for regulation (of property etc)
4. The power to keep alive – protectionism (imposition of
tariffs)
Gerochi v. Department of Energy
i. Petition to declare Sec 34 of RA 9136 “Electric Power
Industry Reform Act of 2001” which imposes the Universal
Charge and Rule 18 of the rules and regulations (IRR) which
seeks to implement said imposition be declared unconsti
ii. Universal Charge – non by passable tax to be determined,
fixed, and approved by ERC which is to be collected from all Held/Ratio:
electric end-users and self-generating entities for
a. Payment for stranded debts by the national gov’t
b. Missionary electrification
c. Equalization of taxes
d. Environmental charge to accrue to an
environmental fund (watershed rehab and
management)
e. To account for all forms of cross subsidies
Issues:
WON Sec 34 of RA 9136 “Electric Power Industry Reform Act of
2001” is constitutional
i. WON the universal charge imposed under Sec 34 of the
EPIRA is a tax
Held/Ratio:
i. The imposition is not a tax. It is important to differentiate
the state’s power of taxation from the police power. Police
power is the power of the state to promote public welfare
by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and
property. Taxing power however may be used as an
implement of police power
a. Power to regulate – power to protect, foster,
promote, preserve, control with due regard for
interests of the public
ii. If generation of revenue is the primary purpose and
regulation is merely incidental, the imposition is a tax. But if
regulation is the primary purpose, the fact that regulation is
incidentally raised does not make imposition a tax
a. If you look at the purposes of EPIRA, they are
regulatory in character
i. To ensure and accelerate total
electrification of the country
ii. To ensure quality reliability security and
affordability of the supply of electric
powe
iii. To ensure transparent and reasonable
prices
iv. To protect public interest
v. Etc.
b. The trust fund (excess amount in case of
overrecovery shall be remitted to the Special Trust
Fund) it established within the power and
responsibility of the gov’t to secure physical and
economic survival and well-being of the
community = police power of state
 Not a tax but an exaction in the exercise of
State’s police power (public welfare is
promoted): to ensure viability of the
country’s electric power
Garcia v. Executive Secretary
i. EO 438 issued which imposed in addition to any other
duties, taxes, and charges imposed by law on all articles
imported into the Phils, and additional of dut5% ad
valorem (all imported including crude oil and oil products).
ii. EO 443 issued which increased 5% to 9%
iii. Public hearing set to give interested parties a chance to be
heard – in line with Tariff and Customs Code
iv. EO 475 issued which reduced 9% to 5% except in cases of
crude oil and oil prods
v. EO 478 which levied and additional special duty of P.95 per
litter or P151.05 per barrel of imported crude oil and P1
per liter of imported oil prods
vi. Assails validity/constitutionality of EO 475 and 478 which
violated Seec 24 Article VI (all revenue or tariff
bills,,,,originate exclusively in the HR..”)
Issue: WON the president can issue EO 475 and 478 which are in the
nature of revenue-generating measures
Yes she can enact them.
i. Sec 28 (2) Article VI – “The congress may by law authorize
the president to fix…subj to such limitations and
restrictions…tariff rates, import export quotas....or imposts
within the framework of the national dev’t program of the
gov’t”
ii. Tariff and Customs Code of the Phils (sec 104 and 401)
a. 104: “All tariff sections, chapters, subheadings and
rates of import duty under sec 104 of Presidential
decree 34 and all subsequent amendments issued
under EO and PD are adopted and form part of this
code”
b. 401; “Rates of duty or subsequently fixed
pursuant to sec 401…shall be subj to periodic
investigation by tariff commission and may be
revised by the president upon recommendation of
NEDA”
 i. Increase reduce or remove existing
protective rate of import duty
ii. Establish import quota or ban imports of
any commodity
iii. Impose additional duty on all imports
not exceeding 10% ad valorem when
necessary
iii. CONTENTION OF PETITIONERS: can’t use Tariff and
Commissions code bec president is authorized only under
the code to protect local industries and prods for the sake of
national economy, gen welfare and or national security. EO
475 and 478 acts in reverse and do not protect local
industries since we have scarce resources of crude oil and
oil so we’ve to import. EOs merely want to raise gov’t funds
a. Nothing in the code that limits power to just
protection.
b. Custom duties (taxes on the importation and
exportation of commodities, tariff or tax assessed
upon merchandize imported from or exported to a
foreign country) are imposed for both revenue
raising and regulatory purposes = levied and
collected upon articles and goods not found at all
nor produced in the Phils)
i. Imposition of tariff rates and a special
duty on crude oil have some protective
impact upon indigenous oil prod (Phils
produces 10-15% of crude oil consumed
here) since effective price of imported
crude oil increased
ii. Protection of local industries such a
limited view of legislative standards and
policies for national economy, general
welfare, and national security.= protects
consumers from high prices that tariff
protected local industries impose
Systems Plus Computer College v. Caloocan City
i. SPCC is a non-stock and non-profit educational institution.
It enjoys property tax exemption from local gov’t on its
buildings but not on its parcels of land (rents it for P5000
monthly from its sister companies, Consolidated Assembly
and Pair Management)
ii. Petitioner requested respondent city government of
Caloocan through City Assessor and admin Mamerto
Manahan to extend tax exemption to parcels of land
pursuant to Article VI Sec 28 (3).
a. Denied (recomm of respondent Atty Francisco,
city legal officer) on the ground that parcels of
land were owned by Consolidated assembly and
pair management which derived income from it in
the form of rentals and local taxes
iii. SPCC entered into a separate agreement with sister
companies which converted lease to donations. SPCC sought
for a recon which was again denied.
Issue: WON Systems Plus Computer College should be allowed to
extend their tax exemption to the parcels of land aside from its
buildings
Held/Ratio:
No.
i. SPCC is an agency for its sister corporations (Pair
Management& Dev’t Corporation and Consolidated
Assembly Inc.) to evade payment of real property taxes
a. Immediately after the denial of SPCC’s first
request for real property tax exemption, the sister
companies donated the beneficial use of the subj
properties to the former
b. Grant for exemption is meant to benefit the body
of people and not lessen burden of individual or
corporate owners
ii. There is no showing that the parcels of land are actually,
directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable and
educational purposes
iii. Petitioners’ filing of mandamus can’t be honored because
they still have to provide evidence as basis for classification
of properties for taxation (for them to be exempted) before
the City Assessor. Petitioner cannot bypass authority of
admin agencies by directly seeking redress from the courts
a. Moreover, with regard to mandamus: While its
duty to conduct assessments is a ministerial
function, the actual exercise thereof is necessarily
discretionary.
Central Mindanao University v. Department of Agrarian Reform
i. Petition for certiorari to nullify proceedings and decision of
the Dept of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB)
and set aside decision of COA affirming decision which
ordered the segregation of 400 hectares of suitable compact
and contiguous portions of the CMU land and their inclusion
in the CARP for distribution to qualified beneficiaries, on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction
ii. According to Adjudication Board and COA, the CMU land is
not directly actually and exclusively used for school sites
because the same was leased to Phil Packing Corporation
(Now Del Monte Phils). No showing too that said lands are
indispensable for educ purposes
Issue: WON CMU land should be exempt from coverage of CARP (Sec
10 RA 6657)
Held/Ratio
Yes CMU land should be exempted.
i. Respondents missed true meaning of Sec 10 RA 6657 as to
what lands are exempted from CARP
a. Sec 10: “….school sites, and campuses including
experimental farm stations operated by public of
private schools for educational purposes, seeds
and seedlings research and pilot production
centers….”
ii. By the nature of CMU, which is a school established to
promote agri and industry, the need for a vast tract of land
of agri land for future programs of expansion is obvious.
iii. Like Michigan State Univ, Penn State Univ, Illinois State univ
which were given extensive tracts of agri and forest land to
be developed to support their numerous expanding
activities in the fields of agricultural tech and scientific
research, it was in this same spirit that Pres Garcia
withdrew from sale or settlement of CMU (Mindanao Agri
College before) a land reservation of 3,080 hectares as its
future campus.
a. So that it can have enough resources and wide
open spaces to grow as an agri educational
institution to develop and train future farmers of
Mindanao and help attract settlers to that part of
the country
iv. Hence they should be exempt because lands are actually
directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for
school site and campus, including experimental farm
stations for educ purposes and for establishing seed and
seedling research and pilot prod centers
Commissioner of BIR v. Court of Appeals
i. Young Men’s Christian Association of the Phils Inc. (YMCA)
is a non-stock, non-profit institution which conducts
 various programs pursuant to its religious, educational and conversion into alternative productive uses of the former
charitable objectives. military bases under Phils-US Military Bases Agreement
ii. Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued an assessment to (Clark and subic military reservation and John Hay
private respondent: P415,615 including surcharge and station/Camp john hay )
interest, for deficiency income tax, deficiency with iii. RA 7227 created Bases Conversion and Development
expanded withholding taxes on rentals and prof fees and Authority (BCDA) to carry out objective of utilizing base
deficiency withholding tax on wages areas in accordance with declared gov’t policy
iii. YMCA filed a protest and CIR denied claims of the former. iv. RA 7227 also created the Subic Special Economic Zone
YMCA brought case before Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) which was granted incentives: tax and duty free
Issue: WON YMCA should be be exempted from income tax pursuant importation, exemption of businesses from local and
to Article VI Sec 28 (3) national taxes, etc.
Held/Ratio: v. BCDA entered into a MOA with Tuntex and Asiaworld to put
YMCA is exempt from the payment of property tax, but not income up a joint venture company (Baguio Int’l Dev’t and
tax on the rentals from its property. Management Corp) which would lease areas within Camp
i. Petitioner’s contention that the phrase “actually, directly John Hay and Poro Point for the purpose of turning them
and exclusively used for religious, charitable or educ into principal tourist and recreation spots.
purposes” refers not only to all lands buildings and vi. Sangguniang panlungsod of Baguio City officially asked
improvements but also to “charitable institutions….” With BCDA to exclude all barangays partly or totally located (9)
regard to exemption is without merit within camp john hay from the reach of any plan or
a. What is exempted is not the institution itself but program for its development. Sangu passed a resolution
those exempted from real estate taxes are lands, which included conditions regarding the development of
buildings and improvements actually, directly, and john hay. BCDA tuntex and Asiaworld agreed to some and
exclusively used for religious…” = pertained only rejected others.
to property taxes not on income tax on rentals vii. Sangu then requested the mayor to determine realty taxes
from its property of Camp John Hay
viii. In response to vii, President Ramos issued Proclamation No.
ii. Moreover, YMCA is not an educational institution within the
420 which established a SEZ on a portion of Camp John Hay
purview of the Consti because and educational
a. The zone shall have all the applicable incentives of
institution/institution of learning refers to schools. (school
the Special Economic Zone under Sec 12 of RA
seminary, college, educational establishment)
7227 and those applicable incentives granted in
iii. Assuming YMCA is an educational institution, YMCA has not
the Export processing zones, Omnibus Investment
submitted proof of the proportionate amount of the subject
Code 1987, Foreign Investment Act 1991 and new
income that was actually, directly, and exclusively used for
investment laws that may be enacted
educational purposes.
ix. Hence this petition assailing that proclamation 420 is
invalid because
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Santos
a. It is an unconstitutional exercise by the president
i. Petition against pronouncement that certain provisions of
of a power (to grant tax exemptions) granted only
Tariff and Customs Code and the National Internal revenue
to the legislature
Code are unconstitutional
b. It interfered with the autonomy of the city of
ii. In a case, the public respondent in addressing an issue,
baguio
ruled that the laws in question are confiscatory and
c. Violates “All taxes should be uniform and
oppressive
equitable”
a. That taxation policies in the Phils with regard to
d. Didn’t undergo environmental assessment
jewelries are oppressive (10% vat and 20%
custom duties) compared to HK, Thailand,
Issues:
Malaysia and Singapore (duty free)
i. WON Proclamation 420 is constitutional by providing for
Issue: WON the RTC can declare a tax law unconstitutional/
national and local tax exemption within and granting other
inoperative and without force and effect
eco incentives to Johnn Hay Special Economic Zone
Held/Ratio:
ii. WON Proclamation 420 is constitutional for limiting or
No it cannot.
interfering with local autonomy of baguio
i. Respondent Judge encroached upon matters properly
Held/Ratio
falling within the province of legislative functions
i. Grant by proclamation 420 of tax exemption and other
ii. IIn citing a basis for his decision unproven comparative data
privileges to Camp john hay void and unconstitutional
on tax rates of Asian countries and concluding that the
a. Under sec 12 of RA 7227, it is only the Subic SEZ
jewelry industry in the Phils suffers as a result, the
which was granted by congress with tax
respondent judge took upon himself to supplant legislative
exemption, investment incentives, and the like.
policy regarding jewelry taxation
There is no express extension of these benefits to
iii. Questioning wisdom of the laws is not within RTC’s
other SEZs still to be created at the time via
jurisdiction.
presidential proclamation. The senate confirms
exclusivity to subic SEZ
John Hay Peoples Alternative Coalition v. Victor Lim
b. Moreover, the nature of most of the assailed
i. Petition for prohibition, mandamus and declaratory relief
privileges is one of tax exemption. It is the
with prayer for a TRO on the constitutionality of
legislature, unless limited by a provision of the
Presidential Proclamation 420 “Creating and Designating a
state consti, that has full power to exempt any
portion of the area covered by the former camp john hay as
person or corporation or class of property from
the john hay special economic zone pursuant to RA 7227”
taxation, its power to exempt being as broad as its
ii. RA 7227 – Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992:
power to tax. A law granting any tax exemption
policy of the gov’t to accelerate the sound and balanced
 must have a concurrence of a majority of all the
members of congress
ii. It does not interfere with local autonomy nor give the
president power of control over the local gov’t instead of
mere supervision. With such broad rights of ownership and
administration vested in BCDA over Camp John Hay, BCDA
virtually has control over it subject to limitations provided
for by law. (to own hold and/or administer the military
reservations of…) The law merely emphasizes or reiterates
the statutory role or functions it has been granted
iii. The unconstitutionality of the grant of tax immunity and
incentives does not make the entire proclamation void
(separable). Therefore, the declaration of a portion covered
by John Hay as a SEX is still valid
SEC 29
1. Expenditure of Public Funds
Guingona Jr. v. Carague
i. 1990 budget consist of P98.4 Billion in automatic
appropriation (with 86.8 billion for debt service) and 155.3
Billion appropriated under RA 6831 (total of 233.5 Billion)
while appropriations for DECS amount to P27,017,813,000
(around 27 billion)
a. Automatic appropriation authorized by PD 81
(Amending Certain Provisions of RA 4860 re
Foreign borrowing Act), PD 1177 (revising the
Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize
Budgetary Innov of the new society) PD 1967 (An
act strengthening the guarantee and payment
positions of the Rep of the Phils on its contingent
liabilities arising out of relent and guaranteed
loans by appropriating funds for the purpose)
ii. Petition seeks to declare PDs unconstitutional and to
restrain disbursement for debt service under 1990 budget
Issue: WON the automatic appropriation for debt service in the 1990
Budget is constitutional
i. WON the appropriation of 86 billion in the 233 billion 1990
budget violative of sec5 Art XIV of the constitution
ii. WON PDs are still operative under the constitution
iii. WON PDs are violative of sec 29 (1) Article VI of consti
Held/Ratio:
i. No it’s not. While it is true that under Sec 5(5) Article XVI of
the constitution, congress is mandated to assign the highest
budgetary priority to education, it does not follow that the
hands of congress are so hamstrung as to deprive it the
power to respond to the imperatives of the national interest
and for the attainment of other state policies
a. Since 1985, the budget for educ has tripled to
upgrade and improve facility of pub school system.
Compensation of teachers doubled. Amount set for
DECS under General appropriations act (RA 6831)
highest among all departments = clear compliance
already with constitutional mandate
b. Debt service: survival of our economy is at stake
ii. Yes they are.
a. Petitioners say that the automatic appropriations
under decrees of Marcos rest on no law and
cannot be enforced. That upon expiration of this
one-man legislature, the legislative power was
restored to the congress hence a need for a new
legislation by congress providing for automatic
appropriation but up to now congress has not
approved such law. Moreover, assuming it didn’t
expire, they are still inoperative because Sec 3 Art
XVIII says that “all existing laws….not inconsistent
with this consti shall remain operative…” and sec
24 of Art VI says “All appropriation, ….shall
originate exclusively from HR…”
b. BUT, the transitory provision of the constitution
(“all existing…remain operative”) has precisely
been adopted by its framers to preserve the social
order so that legislation by the then Pres Marcos
may be recognized. The purpose is foreseen to
subsist with or without the person of Marcos
i. The automatic appropriation provides
the flexibility for the effective execution
of debt management policies.(allows
responsiveness to drastic changes in
conditions)
1. It enables the gov’t to take
advantage of a favorable turn of
market conditions by
redeeming high interest
securities and borrowing at
lower rates or to shift from
short term to longterm
instruments or to enter into
arrangements that could
lighten our outstanding debt
burden
2. It prevents difficulties in debt
servicing arising from any
deviation from what has been
previously programmed.
c. Moreover, application of law is generally applied
prospectively and not retrospectively
d. The court finds that the questioned laws are
complete in all their essential terms and
conditions: Purpose is to enable the gov’t to make
prompt payment and/or advances for all loans to
protect and maintain the credit standing of he
country
iii. No they are not.
a. Sec 29(1): “No money shall be paid out of the
treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation
made by law”
b. Our constitution does not require a definite,
certain, exact or specific appropriation made by
law. An appropriation measure is sufficient if the
legislative intention clearly and certainly appears
from the language employed.
c. In terms of time horizons, appropriations may be
made impliedly (as by past but subsisting
legislations) as well as expressly for the current
fiscal year (as by enactment of laws by the present
congress)
2. Public purpose
- An important limitation on use of public money: for public purpose
only
3. Special Fund
Osmena v. Orbos
i. Marcos issued PD 1956 creating a special account in the
general fund, designated as the Oil Price Stabilization Fund
(OPSF)
ii. OPSF designed to reimburse oil companies for cost
increases in crude oil and imported petroleum products
resulting from exchange rate adjustments and from
increases in the world market prices of crude oil 
classified into a “trust liability account”
 iii. Pres Corazon Aquino amended PD 1956 and promulgated
EO 137 expanding grounds for reimbursement to oil
companies for possible cost under recovery incurred as a
result of the reduction of domestic prices of petroleum
prods the amount of the under recovery being left for
determination by Ministry of Finance
iv. When OPSF status showed a terminal fund balance deficit of
some P12.877 billion, the Energy Regulating Board issued
an order to approve the increase in pump prices of
petroleum products
v. Petitioners say that the creation of trust fund violates Sec
29 Article VI: All money collected on any tax levied for a
special purpose shall be treated as a special fund and paid
out for such purposes only…balance shall be transferred to
general funds of gov’t” – balance should not be channeled to
other gov’t objectives
Issue:
WON the OPSF or the trust fund created is unconstitutional, being
violative of Sec 29 Article VI of the constitution
Held/Ratio:
No it is not.
i. The OPSF was established precisely to protect local
consumer from the adverse consequences that such
frequent oil price adjustments may have upon the economy
(because of the ever-changing world market prices of oil).
The OPSF is a buffer mechanism through which the
domestic consumer prices of oil and petroleum products
are stabilized instead of fluctuating every so often, and oil
companies are allowed to recover those portions of their
costs which they would not otherwise recover given the
level of domestic prices existing at any given time.
(domestic prods are subsidized in part)
ii. Therefore the tax collected is not in a pure exercise of taxing
power: levied with a regulatory purpose, exacted in the
exercise of police power of the state
iii. Stabilization Fund as a special kind of fund is emphasized
by the fact that the funds are deposited in the Philippine
National Bank and not in the Phil Treasury; segregated from
the general fund
SEC 30
Fabian v. Desierto
i. Teresita Fabian was a major stockholder and president of
PROMAT. Nestor V. Agustin was the incumbent District
Engineer of the First MM Engineering District. PROMAT
participated in the bidding for gov’t construction projects
including those under FMED. Agustin, taking advantage of
his position, compelled Fabian to an amorous rel’p.
ii. Misunderstandings developed and Fabian tried to terminate
relationship. Agustin refused and resisted to the extent of
employing harassment, intimidation, and threats.
iii. Fabian filed admin case against him. Agustin was found
guilty of misconduct: penalty of suspension without pay for
1 year
iv. Agustin moved for recon and respondent ombudsman
discovered that the former’s new cousel had been his
classmate and close associate. He inhibited himself and the
case was transferred to Deputy Ombudsman Guerero who
exonerated Agustin from the admin charges
v. Fabian points out that under sec 7 rule III of Admin Order
No. 07(Rules and Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman): when a respondent is absolved of the charges
in an admin proceeding, the decision of the ombudsman is
final and unappealable.
a. BUT under Sec 27 RA 6770: “In all admin
disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions
of the office of Ombudsman may be appealed to
the SC by filing a petition for certiorari,,,,,,”
b. Accdg to petitioner Ombudsman has no authority
to restrict right of appeal allowed by RA 6770
Issue: WON the provision in Sec 27 of RA 6770 which authorizes an
appeal by certiorari to this court of the aforementioned adjudications
of the Office of the Ombudsman is violative of Sec 30 Art VI of the
constitution (No law shall be passed increasing the appellate
jurisdiction of the supreme court as provided in this constitution w/o
its advice and consent)
Held/Ratio:
Yes it violates it.
i. Sec 27 of RA 6770 ombudsman act of 1989 “all admin
disciplinary cases….appealed to SC…in accordance with rule
45” is not valid because it expands the appellate jurisdiction
of the SC without its advice and consent.
ii. Consequently, and in line with the regulatory philosophy
adopted in appeals from quasi-judicial agencies in the 1997
Revised Rule of Civil Procedure, appeals from decisions of
the Office of the Ombudsman in admin cases should be
taken to the COA under the provision of rule 43.
ARTICLE VII – The Executive Department
Sec 1
1. Executive Power
Marcos v. Manglapus, et al
i. At the advent of People power I and the fall of the Marcos
Regime, the country was plagued with numerous problems:
1. Political
i. Threats of a military occupation
ii. Conflict in the government
iii. Threat of communist insurgency and
secessionist movement in Mindanao
2. Economic
i. Accumulated foreign debt and the
plunder of the nation attributed to
Marcos and his cronies
ii. Marcos in his deathbed has signified his wish to return to
the Philippines to die
iii. President Aquino, taking into account the current state of
the country, stayed firm in his decision to bar return of
Marcos and his family.
iv. Hence this petition to enjoin implementation of Presidents
decision to bar their return to the Phils
Issue: WON in the exercise of the powers granted by the constitution,
the president may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Phils.
Held/Ratio:
Yes she may.
i. The Constitution not only establishes separation of power,
but it also grants plenary power to the executive, legislative
and judiciary.
ii. Contrary to what petitioners say that powers not
enumerated in the consti are impliedly denied to the
president, executive power is more than the sum of the
specific powers enumerated.
iii. Corwin says (referring to US presidencies) that “what
presidency is at any particular moment depends in
important measure on who is president.”
iv. It would not be accurate to state that executive power is the
power to enforce laws since the president is head of state as
well as head of government and whatever powers inhere in
such positions pertain to the office unless the constitution
itself withholds it. (other powers: over foreign relations)
 v. Petitioner: Service and protection of the people,
maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life
liberty and property, and the promotion of general welfare
are essential ideals of gov’t action (sovereignty resides in
the people and all gov’tal authority emanates from them)
As president, she is under the constitution, constrained to
consider these basic principles in arriving at a decision
vi. However, considering that the persons who seek to return,
are the deposed dictator and his family at whose door the
travails of the country are laid and from whom billions of
dollars believed to be ill-gotten wealth are sought to be
recovered, the constitutional guarantees must be adjusted
to the requirements of equally important public interests.
vii. Balancing general welfare and the common good against
exercise of rights of certain individuals
viii. Case calls for the exercise of the President’s powers as
protector of peace: not only in exercising commander of
peace powers in times of emergency but also with attending
to day to day problems of maintaining peace and order and
ensuring domestic tranquility
ix. Power of president recognized by the legislature as shown
by their request to allow Marcos to return
x. Demand of Marcos can’t be considered in the light solely of
the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode
and right to travel.
xi. It must be treated as a matter addressed to those residual
powers f the president which are implicit in and correlative
to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard
and protect general welfare
2. Executive Immunity
Estrada v. Desierto
i. Petitioner makes 2 submissions
1. The cases filed against him before respondent
ombudsman should be prohibited because he has
not been convicted in the impeachment
proceedings against him
2. He enjoys immunity from all kinds of suit whether
criminal or civil
Issue: WON the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit. Assuming he
enjoys immunity, the extent of the immunity
Held/Ratio:
No he does not.
i. The principle of non-liability mean that the chief executive
may not be personally sued at all in relation to acts which
he claims to perform as such official.
ii. What is held here is that he will be protected from personal
liability for damages not only when he acts within his
authority but also when he is without authority, provided
that he actually used discretion and judgment, that is, the
judicial faculty, in determining whether he had authority to 5. The Cainet – as an institution is extra-constitutionally created,
act or not.
iii. He is not protected if the lack of authority to act is so plain formed a body of presidential advisers who meet regularly with the
that two reasonable men could not honestly differ over its
determination
iv. On Estrada’s submissions:
1. Untenable for the petitioner to demand that he
should first be impeached and then convicted
before he can be prosecuted. The plea if granted,
would put a perpetual bar against his prosecution. 1. Citizenship Qualification
When impeachment proceedings have become
moot due to the resignation of the president, the
proper criminal and civil cases may already be
filed against him
2. When the president resigns prior to the
impeachment decision, his resignation would
render the case moot and academic. However, as
the provision says, the criminal and civil aspects of
it may continue in ordinary courts.
Sec 17 Article VII: “The president shall be immune
from suit during his tenure. Thereafter, no suit
whatsoever shall lie for official acts done by him or
by others pursuant to his specific orders during
his tenure.”
v. The cases filed against Estrada are criminal in character:
plunder, bribery, graft, and corruption. By no means can
these crimes especially plunder which carries the death
penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a
non-sitting president.
vi. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts
of the state and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as
such but stands in the same footing as any other trespasser.
Soliven v. Makasiar
i. President Corazon Aquino sued Beltran for libel for having
written that the president hid under the bed during an
attempted coup.
ii. Beltran says that the president may not sue her because
1. The reasons which necessitate presidential
immunity from suit impose a correlative disability
to file suit,
2. If criminal proceedings ensue, the president would
have to be a witness for prosecution, indirectly
defeating her privilege from immunity from suit as
she would be exposing herself to possible
contempt of court or perjury.
Issue: WON the president of the Philippines, under the constitution,
may initiate criminal proceedings against the petitioners through the
filing of a complaint affidavit
Held/Ratio:
i. The rationale of the immunity from suit is to assure the
exercise of presidential duties and functions free from any
hindrance or distraction considering that being the chief
executive of the gov’t, aside from requiring all of her time,
also demands undivided attention.
ii. Moreover, the privilege of immunity from suit pertains to
the president by virtue of the office and may be invoked
only by the holder of the office, hence Beltran cannot raise
privilege as a defense.
iii. There are no laws prohibiting the president from waiving
the privilege. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege
or to waive it is solely the president’s prerogative.
3. Head of State – ceremonial head of gov’t
4. Chief Executive – he is THE executive, and no one else is. All heads
of executive departments are subject to the direction of the president
essentially consists of heads of depts. who through usage have
president.
6. Executive Privilege
Sec 2
Tecson v. Comelec
i. Fernando Poe Jr. filed his certificate of candidacy for the
position of president of the Philippines under the Koalisyon
ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP)
ii. Victorino X. Fornier, filed a petition in the Comelec to
disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his
 certificate of candidacy because FPJ made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by
claiming to be a natural born Filipino citizen when in truth,
his parents were foreigners: mother Bessie Kelley Po
(American) and father Allan Poe (Spanish since son of
Lorenzo Pau a Spanish subject).
iii. And even if Allan Poe were a Filipino, FPJ is an illegitimate
child of an alien mother.
a. Allan Poe contracted a prior marriage with Paulita
Gomez
b. And even if no prior marriage existed, Allan Poe
married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of
FPJ.
iv. Comelec dismissed case for lack of merit. Petitioner filed for
recon which was again denied. Hence petitioner brought
case to the supreme court.
v. Other petitions followed challenging the jurisdiction of the
comelec saying that only the Supreme court had original
and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve basic issue on the case
(Article VII Sec4)  denied because “..all CONTESTS related
to…”
Issue: WON FPJ is a natural born Filipino citizen
Held/Ratio:
i. After tracing the history on what how “Filipino citizen”
should be qualified, it was proven that since Fornier
couldn’t show any evidence proving that Lorenzo Pou
(grandfather of FPJ, dad of Allan Poe) was outside the
country during 1898-1902, it should be sound to conclude
or at least to presume, that the place of residence of a
person at the time of his death (proven by death certificate)
was also his residence before death (San Carlos,
Pangasinan).
ii. And under the Philippine Bill of 1902 commonly referred to
as the Philippine Organic Act of 1902, a citizen of the
Philippine islands was one who was an inhabitant of the
Philippines and a Spanish subject on the 11th day of April
1899. Inhabitant taken to include
1. Native born inhabitants
2. Inhabitant who was a native of peninsular Spain
3. Inhabitant who obtained Spanish papers on or
before 11 April 1898
iii. Clearly, the common law principle that time was jus soli,
hence Lorenzo Pou was a citizen of the Philippines, making
Allan Poe a natural born citizen of the Philippines
iv. Even if the petitioner contends on the ground that FPJ is
illegitimate, it was held that the 1935 Constitution during
which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers
citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens
regardless of whether such children are legitimate or
illegitimate.
1. Legitimacy is not relevant to elective public office
2. Violates equal protection clause of the constitution
3. Not the fault of the child that his parents had illicit
liazon
Sec 3
Sec 4
Macalintal v. Comelec
Issue: WON Sec 18.5 of RA 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act
of 2003) empowering Comelec to proclaim the winning candidates
for national offices and party list representatives including the
president and the vice president is unconstitutional
Held/Ratio:
Yes it violates the constitutional mandate.
i. Sec 18.4 which says “…immediately upon completion of the
canvass, special board of canvassers shall transmit….the
certificates of canvass and statements of votes to the
commission…” clashes with par 4 Sec 4 Article VII which
provides that the returns of every election for president and
vice president shall be certified by the board of canvassers
to congress.
ii. Provision encroaches on the power of congress to canvass
the votes for president and vice president and power to
proclaim the winners for said positions.
Congressman Lopez v. Senate and House
i. Petition seeking to nullify Sec 13 Rule VIII of the Rules of
the Joint Public Session of Congress, creating a Joint
Committee, which shall preliminary canvass the votes of the
candidates for President and Vice President during the May
10, 2004 Elections
Issue: WON Sec 13 Rule VIII which created a Joint Committee which
shall preliminary canvass votes of candidates of President and VP
violated Art VII Sec 4 par 3 of the constitution
Held/Ratio:
It did not.
i. Sec 4, Article VII of the constitution expressly empowers
congress to promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the
certificates.
ii. The court ruled that it had no power to review the internal
proceedings of Congress, unless there is a clear violation of
the constitution: court has no authority to restrict exercise
of congressional prerogative granted by the constitution.
iii. The creation of the joint committee does not constitute
grave abuse and cannot be said to have deprived petition
and the other members of congress of their congressional
prerogative, because under the very rules under attack, the
decisions and final report of said committee shall be subject
to the approval of the joint session of both houses of
congress, voting separately.
Pimentel v. Joint Canvassing Committee
i. Petition prays for the issuance of a writ of prohibition
directing Joint Committee to cease and desist from
conducting any further proceedings pursuant to the rules of
the Joint Public Session of Congress on Canvassing.
ii. Petitioner contends that with the adjournment of the 12 th
Congress of its last regular session, its term terminated and
expired on said day and the said 12th Congress passed out of
legal existence. Therefore, all pending matters and
proceedings terminate upon the expiration of congress.
(relies on legislative procedure, precedent or practice as
borne out by rules of both houses)
Issue: WON there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the party of any branch or
instrumentality of government under Sec 1 of Article VIII of the
constitution and its original jurisdiction over petitions for prohibition
under Sec 5 Article VII
Held/Ratio:
No basis under the constitution, therefore dismissed.
i. Sec 42 Rule XIV of the rules adopted by the senate clearly
provides that the “Senate shall convene in joint session
during any voluntary or compulsory recess to canvass the
votes for president and vice president….” In accordance
with Sec 4 Art VII of the Constitution.
ii. Precedents set by the 1992 and 1998 presidential elections
do not support the move to stop ongoing canvassing by
Joint committee
iii. The term of the present 12th Congress did not terminate and
expire upon the adkoirnment sine die of the regular session
of both Houses. Sec 13 Article VI of the Consti cited by
petitioner does not pertain to the term of congress by to its
regular annual legislative sessions, but this does not affect
 its non-legislative functions, such as that of being the
National Board of Canvassers.
iv. In fact, the joint public session of both houses of congress
convened by express directive of Sec 4 Article VII of the
Constitution to canvass votes for and to proclaim the newly
elected president and vice president has not, and cannot,
adjourn sine die until it has accomplished its
constitutionally mandated tasks. For only when a board of
canvassers has completed its functions is it rendered
functus officio.
v. Since 12th congress has not yet completed its non-legislative
duty to canvass votes and proclaim duly elected Pres and
VP, its existence as the National Board of Canvassers as well
as that of the Joint committee to which it refered as the
preliminary tasks of authenticating and canvassing
certificates of canvass, have not become functus officio.
Fernando Poe Jr. v. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
Issue: WON the widow substitute or intervene for the protestant who
died during the pendency of the latter’s protest case
Held/Ratio:
No she cannot.
i. Under rule 14 of Presidential Electoral Tribunal rules “..only
the registered candidate for president or vice president of
the Philippines who received second or third highest
number of votes may contest the election of the president
or vice president as the case may be…..”
ii. Public office is personal to the public officer and not a
property transmissible to the heirs upon death.
iii. Although has allowed substitution and intervention, only by
a real party in interest.
iv. Real party in interest is the party who would be benefited
or injured by the judgment, and the party who is entitles to
the avails of the suit.
v. Since Mrs. FPJ herself denies any claim to the august office
of President, we can conclude that protestant’s widow is not xviii.
a real party in interest.
Note: 2 aspects in a contest before election tribunals
1. In pursuit of one’s right to a public office
2. Imbued with public interest
Sec 5
Estrada v. Desierto
i. Estrada elected president on May 11 1998
ii. In October 2000, Ilocos Sur governor Chavit Singson went
on air and accused petitioner, his family and friends of
receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords
iii. Representatives Heherson Alvarez, Ernesto Herrera and
Michael Defensor spearheaded move to impeach petitioner
iv. Calls for resignation of the president filled air
1. Cardinal Sin issued a pastoral statement asking
petitioner to step down
2. Catholic Bishops Conference joined cry
3. Corazon Aquino and Fidel Ramos joined
v. Petitioner still held on to his position so government
officials started to resign:
1. Council of Members of the Senior Economic
Advisers
2. Secretary Mar Roxas III of the Dept of Trade and
Industry
3. Senate Pres Franklin Drilon and House Speaker
Manuel Villar, together with 47 representatives
vi. On Dec 7, 1998, the impeachment trial started.
vii. Testimony of Clarissa Ocampo, VP of Equittble PCI Bank: 1
foot away when Estrada affixed signature of Jose Velarde on
docs involving a P500 million investment agreement
viii. Edgardo Espiritu, Secretary of Finance alleged that
petitioner jointly owned BW resources corporation
ix. Vote of 11-10: Senaror-judges ruled against opening of 2 nd
envelope which allegedly contained evidence showing that
petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank under name
Jose Velarde. In disgust, Senator Pimentel resigned as
Senate president. Public and private prosecutors walked
out.
x. General Reyes declared that AFP is withdrawing support to
the gov’t
xi. Panfilo Lacson gave same announcement
xii. Petitioner announced he was ordering his lawyers to agree
to opening 2nd envelop
xiii. January 20: Day of surrender. First round of negotiations for
peaceful and orderly transfer of powers started at
Malacanang, office of the executive secretary.
xiv. 12 nn Chief Justice Davide administered oath to GMA
xv. Petitioner issued press statement: “ …for this reason that I
now leave Malacanang Palace, the seat of presidency of this
country for the sake of peace…”
xvi. Also appears that on same day Jan 20, 2001, he signed the ff
letter: “…by virtue of Sec 11 Art VII, …unable to exercise
powers and duties of my office….VP shall be acting
president..”  sent to former speaker Fuentabella and to
Senate President Pimentel
xvii. GMA began to discharge powers and duties of presidency.
1. Recognition of respondent Arroyo’s government
by foreign governments
2. House of Representatives passed Resol 175 and
176 expressing full support of House of Rep to
administration of GMA and to her assumption into
The office of presidency.
3. Senator Teofisto Guingona became VP
4. Senate passed a resolution confirming the
nomination of Senator Guingona.
Senate passed resolution declaring that the impeachment
court is functus officio and has been terminated
xix. Petitioner’s legal problems appeared in clusters: 6 cases on
bribery, graft and corruption, plunder, perjury, grave
misconduct, etc.
xx. Special panel of investigators was created by Ombudsman
to investigate charges against the petitioner.
xxi. Petitioner then filed petition for prohibition with a prayer
for writ of preliminary injunction
1. To enjoin respondent Ombudsman from
conducting any further proceedings in any
criminal complaint that may be filed in his office
until after the term of the petitioner as president
is over and only if legally warranted
2. Prayed for judgment confirming petitioner to be
the lawful and incumbent president of the Phils
temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his
office, and declaring respondent to have taken her
oath as and to be holding the Office of the
President only in an acting capacity pursuant to
the provisions of the Constitution
Issues:
i. WON the cases at bar involve political questions
ii. WON conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a
condition precedent for the criminal prosecution of
petitioner Estrada. In the negative and on the assumption
that petitioner is still president, WON he is immune from
criminal prosecution
iii. WON petitioner Estrada is a president on leave while
respondent Arroyo is an acting president
iv. WON the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit and if he
does, the extent of the immunity
 v. WON the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be
enjoined on the ground of prejudicial publicity
Held/Ratio:
i. No case does not involve political, but legal questions
a. Edsa I involves the exercise of people power
revolution which overthrew whole gov’t. Edsa II is
an exercise of people power of freedom of speech
and freedom of assembly to petition gov’t for
redress of grievances which only affected office of
the president.
b. Edsa I is extra constitutional and the legitimacy of
the new government that resulted from it cannot
be the subject of judicial review but Edsa II is intra
constitutional and the resignation of the sitting
president that it cause and the succession of the
VP as president are subject to judicial review.
ii. Petitioner’s resignation was confirmed by his leaving
Malacanang.
a. “It is for this reason that I now leave Malacanang
Palace, the seat of the presidency of this country
for the sake of peace and order…”
b. Strange that the letter, despite its legal value was
never referred to by the petitioner during the
weak long crisis. Under any circumstance however,
the letter cannot negate petitioner’s resignation.
c. Petitioner’s contention: Sec 12 of RA 3019: “ No
public officer shall be allowed to resign retire
pending an investigation, criminal or admin,
pending a prosecution against him, for any offense
under this act under the provisions of the RPC on
bribery.
i. Intent of the law was to prevent act of
resignation or retirement from being
used by a public official as a protective
shield to stop investigation of a pending
criminal or admin case and to prevent
his prosecution for bribery under the
RPC.
ii. Moreover, technically, the said cases
cannot be considered as pending for the
Ombudsman lacked jurisdiction to act on
them (refrained from conducting
preliminary investigation)
iii. Moreover, impeachment, assuming it was
an administrative investigation, broke
down when the 2nd envelop chaos
happened technically no impeachment
case pending when he resigned
iii. No he is not.
a. Senate and Congress passed resolutions
recognizing and affirming GMA and her
administration, as well as Guingona’s nomination
b. Both houses of congress have begun sending bills
to be signed into law by respondent Arroyo as
president
c. Recognition from foreign governments
d. Despite the lapse of time and still without any
functioning cabinet, without any recognition from SEC 17
any sector of government, and without any
support from the AFP and PNP, it’s implicitly clear
that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer
temporary. Congress has clearly rejected
petitioner’s claim of inability.
iv. No he does not.
1. The principle of non-liability mean that the chief
executive may not be personally sued at all in
relation to acts which he claims to perform as such
official.
2. What is held here is that he will be protected from
personal liability for damages not only when he
acts within his authority but also when he is
without authority, provided that he actually used
discretion and judgment, that is, the judicial
faculty, in determining whether he had authority
to act or not.
3. He is not protected if the lack of authority to act is
so plain that two reasonable men could not
honestly differ over its determination
4. On Estrada’s submissions:
i. Untenable for the petitioner to demand
that he should first be impeached and
then convicted before he can be
prosecuted. The plea if granted, would
put a perpetual bar against his
prosecution. When impeachment
proceedings have become moot due to
the resignation of the president, the
proper criminal and civil cases may
already be filed against him
ii. When the president resigns prior to the
impeachment decision, his resignation
would render the case moot and
academic. However, as the provision
says, the criminal and civil aspects of it
may continue in ordinary courts.
Sec 17 Article VII: “The president shall be
immune from suit during his tenure.
Thereafter, no suit whatsoever shall lie for
official acts done by him or by others
pursuant to his specific orders during his
tenure.”
5. The cases filed against Estrada are criminal in
character: plunder, bribery, graft, and corruption.
By no means can these crimes especially plunder
which carries the death penalty, be covered by the
alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting
president.
6. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are
not acts of the state and the officer who acts
illegally is not acting as such but stands in the
same footing as any other trespasser.
v. No merit with regard to prejudicial publicity.
a. The right of an accused to a fair trial is not
incompatible to a free press.
b. Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the
right of an accused to a fair trial. The mere fact
that the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day,
coverage does not by itself prove that the publicity
so permeated the mind of the trial judge and
impaired his impartiality.
c. To warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there
must be allegation and proof that the judges have
been unduly influenced not simply that they might
be, by the barrage of publicity.
1. Power of control – power of an officer to alter or modify or
nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in
the performance of his duties and to substitute judgement
of the former for that of the latter.
2. Doctrine of Qualified political agency – All acts performed
by the head/secretaries of the executive departments and
promulgated in the regular course of business, are unless
disapproved or reprobated by the chief executive, are acts of
the Chief executive (“alter-egos”)
 3. Power of supervision – Power of superior officer to ensure
that laws are faithfully executed by inferiors.
Lacson – Magallanes Co., Inc. v. Pano
i. The executive secretary, acting by authority of the
president, reversed a decision of the director of lands that
had been affirmed by the secretary of agriculture and
natural resources
ii. Assails that it’s undue delegation of power because it’s the
constitutional duty of the president to act personally upon
the matter.
Issue: WON the president/chief executive may delegate to his
executive secretary acts which the constitution does not demand that
he perform in person
Held/Ratio:
Yes he can.
i. The Executive secretary who acts for and in behalf, and by
authority of the president, has an undisputed jurisdiction to
affirm, modify, or even reverse any order that the secretary
of agriculture and natural resources, including the director
of lands may issue.
ii. Doctrine of qualified political agency
iii. As the president’s alter ego, only the president may
rightfully say that the executive secretary is not authorized.
Ang-Angco v. Castillo
Issue: WON the president, acting through the executive secretary or
directly, may take disciplinary action against a Civil Service Officer
bypassing the procedure prescribed by the Civil Service Law
Held/Ratio:
No he cannot.
i. Although the president has the power of control over
executive departments (like Civil Service Office), this power
applies to the exercise of control over the acts of the
subordinate and not over the actor or agent himself of the
act. It only refers to matters of general policy
ii. Moreover, sec IV Article XII of the constitution states that no Dadole, et al. v. COA
officer or employee in the civil service shall be removed or
suspended except for causes provided in the law. (if not,
demoralize undermine and destroy whole civil service
system at the mercy of the president)
iii. Lastly, under Sec 16 Article VII, the congress may by law
vest appointment of inferior officers in the President,
courts, or in heads of departments: power to remove is
inherent in the power to appoint.
iv. In taking direct action on admin case of petitioner without
submitting the same to commissioner of civil service =
contrary to law.
Namarco v. Arca
Issue: WON the president had authority to reverse decision of the
Board of Directors of the NAMARCO aand to order reinstatement of
Juan T, Arive
Held/Ratio:
i. Contrary to what the petitioners say that the offices refer to
those performing governmental functions which have no
juridical personality, government owned and controlled
corporations like NAMARCO falls within the constitutional
power of the president pursuant to Sec 17 Article VII
ii. Government owned and controlled corporations partake of
the nature of gov’t bureaus or offices which are
administratively supervised by Admin of the Office of
Economic Coordination, whose compensation and rank
shall be that of a head of an Executive Department,
therefore responsible to the President.
De Leon v. Carpio
i. Director Carpio of the National Bureau of Investigation has
refused to reinstate the petitioners in defiance to the orders
of the Civil Service Commission as referred to him by the
Secretary of Justice for implementation
Issue: WON the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation can
disobey and explicit and direct order issued to him by the Secretary
of Justice
Held/Ratio:
No he cannot.
i. The president’s power of control is directly exercised by
him over the members of the cabinet who, in turn and by
his authority, control the bureaus and other offices under
their respective jurisdictions in the executive department:
Doctrine of qualified political agency
ii. In the case at bar, when he directed the respondent to
reinstate petitioners, secretary Ordonez was acting in the
regular discharge of his functions as an alter ego of the
president. As a subordinate in this department, the
respondent was bound to obey the secretary’s directives,
which are presumptively the acts of the president of the
Philippines.
Balaquera, et al. v. Alcasid
Issue: WON the president has the power to issue AO 29 limiting the
amount of incentive benefits, enjoining heads of government
agencies from granting incentive benefits without prior approval
from him and directing the refund of the excess over the prescribed
amount.
Held/Ratio:
Yes he has the authority.
i. By virtue of his power of control, the president can review,
modify, alter, or nullify any action or decision of his
subordinate in the executive departments, bureaus, or
offices under him.
ii. By issuing AO 29, he was merely exercising his power of
control.
i. Judges of Mandaue city files a petition for certiorari
annulling the decision and resolution of COA (commission
on Audit) affirming notices of Mandaue City Auditor which
diminished the monthly additional allowances received by
the petitioner judges of the regional trial court and
municipal trial court.
Issue: WON the LBC 55 of the DBM is void for going beyond the
supervisory powers of the president
Held/Ratio:
i. First establish that the exercise of local autonomy of local
gov’t units remains subject to the power of control by
congress and the power of supervision (authority to see that
subordinate performs duties) by the president.: Sec 4
Article X of Constitution: “President shall exercise general
supervision over local govt’s”
ii. Therefore, the president or any of his alter egos cannot
interfere in local affairs as long as the concerned local
government unit acts within the parameters of the law and
the constitution.
iii. Any directive by president or his alteregos seeking to alter
the wisdom of a law conforming judgment on local affairs of
a local gov’t violates principle of local autonomy and
separation of powers between exec and legis
iv. By setting a uniform amount for the grant of additional
allowances, DBM overstepped its power of supervision by
imposing a prohibition that did not correspond with law it
sought to implement: RA 7160 which says that finances of a
 city gov’t may allow grant of additional allowances higher
than P1000 if revenues of city gov’t exceed annual
expenditures.
DENR v. DENR Employees
Issue: WON the DENR Secretary has the authority to organize the
DENR
Held/Ratio:
Yes he can.
i. Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora: court upheld that the
continuing authority of the president to carry out the
reorganization in any branch or agency of the executinve
department, including creation, alteration, or abolition of
public offices
a. Sec 20 of Administrative code of 1987: Residual
powers – “…president shall exercise powers and
functions vested in the president as provided in
other laws and which is not specifically
enumerated above…”
ii. Larin v. Executive secretary: Rule that gives him power to
reorganize: PD 1772 which amended PD 1416
a. These decrees expressly grant president the
continuing authority to reorganize the national
gov’t which includes power to group, consolidate
bureaus and agencies, abolish offices, transfer
functions, create and classify functions, services
and activities, and to standardize salaries and
materials
b. Consti: “all laws, decrees…..not inconsistent with
this consti shall remain operative unless…” so far,
not yet amended or repealed.
iii. Doctrine of qualified political agency: The power of the
president to reorganize national government may be
delegated to his cabinet members exercising control over a
particular executive department.
SEC 18
1. Commander in chief
a. Civilian president holds supreme military
authority and is the ceremonial, legal , and admin
head of the armed forces: power to direct military
operations and determine military strategy
b. As commander in chief, president is authorized to:
i. Call out such armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion
ii. Suspend privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus
iii. To place the Philippines or any part
thereof under martial law
2. Martial Law
a. Martial law is essentially a police power.
b. Under martial law, police power is exercised by
the executive with the aid of military and in place
of certain governmental agencies which for the
time being are unable to cope with existing
conditions in a locality which remains subject to
the sovereignty.
c. Depends on 2 factual bases:
i. Existence of actual invasion
ii. Requirement of public safety.
d. Present constitution: compared to Marcos’ martial
law…
i. State of martial law does not suspend
operation of the constitution
ii. Nor supplant the functioning of the civil
courts or legislatives assemblies
iii. Nor authorize the conferment of
jurisdiction on military courts and
agencies over civilians where civil courts
are able to function
iv. Nor automatically suspend privilege of
the writ. (needs confirmation by national
assembly/congress and Supreme court)
v. That the validity of imposition of martial
law or suspension of writ not anymore
political question
IBP v. Zamora
i. Petition to nullify order of President Estrada commanding
the deployment of the Philippine Marines to join the PNP in
visibility patrols around the metropolis
ii. Pursuant to the president’s crime prevention program, the
president, through a verbal directive and later on through a
memorandum ordered deployment of the marines.
Issue: WON President Estrada had the authority to deploy the
Philippine Marines to join the PNP in visibility patrols around the
metropolis
Held/Ratio:
Yes the president had the authority.
i. The deployment of the military personnel falls under the
Commander in chief powers of the president as stated in
Sec 18, Article VII of the Constitution, specifically the power
to call out the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion, or rebellion.
ii. Deployment merely for the maintenance of peace and order
and promotion of general welfare.
iii. Sec 18 Article VII clearly shows that constitution bestows
on the president, full discretionary power to call out the
armed forces and to determine necessity for the exercise of
such power.
a. Because lesser and more benign power compared
to the power to suspend writ and declare martial
law (subject to review by Supreme Court and
concurrence of National Assembly)
iv. Decision to call out the military to prevent or suppress
lawless violence must be done swiftly and decisively if it
were to have any effect at all (especial
v.
vi. ly with the insurgents in Mindanao) = full discretion to call
forth military
Lacson v. Perez
i. May 1 2001: GMA was faced by angry and violent mob
armed with explosives, firearms, bladed weapons, clubs,
stones and other deadly weapons assaulting and attempting
to break into malacanang
ii. So PGMA issued proclamation 38 declaring that there was a
state of rebellion in the NCR
iii. Issued General Order 1 directing AFP and PNP to suppress
rebellion in the NCR
iv. Warrantless arrests ensued in the name of G.O No.1
v. May 6: lifted declaration
Issue: WON the declaration of “state of rebellion” is violative of the
doctrine of separation of powers, being an encroachment on the
domain of the judiciary (consti prerogative to determine and
interpret what took place on May 1)
Held/Ratio:
No it is not.
i. Under Sec 18, Article VII, the president as commander in
chief may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.
ii. In the exercise of the power to call, on the spot decisions
may be imperatively necessary in emergency situations to
 avert great loss of human lives and mass destruction of
property
Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary
i. July 27, 2003: In the wake of Oakwood occupation which
demanded resignation of president, secretary of defense,
and chief of PNP among others, the president issued
proclamation 427 and G.O no.4 both declaring “state of
rebellion” and calling out the armed forces to suppress the
rebellion
ii. Lifted state of rebellion on Aug 1 2003
Issue: WON proclamation no. 427 and G.O No. 4 are valid
Held/Ratio:
Yes they are.
i. Under Sec 18, Article VII, the president as commander in
chief may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.
ii. The constitution does not expressly prohibit president from
declaring a state of rebellion, worth nothing the fact that the
consti vests the president not only with commander in chief
powers but first and foremost, with executive powers: “…
shall ensure that laws be faithfully executed”
iii. Mere declaration of state of rebellion cannot diminish or
violate constitutionally protected rights
iv. A person may be subjected to a warrantless arrest for the
crime of rebellion WON the president has declared state of
rebellion so long as requisites for a valid warrantless arrest
are present.
v. No illustration that the president has attempted to exercise
or has exercise of martial law powers.
Randolf David v. Ermita
i. Petitioners contend that respondent officials of the
government in their professed efforts to defend and
preserve democratic institutions, are actually trampling
upon very freedom guaranteed and protected by
constitution
ii. On Feb 24, 2006, 20th anniversary of Edsa I, PGMA issued PP infirmities and for mitigating whatever harshness might be generated
1017 declaring a state of national emergency (which was
lifted on March 3, 2006)
iii. On the same day, president issued G.O No. 5 calling upon the Various forms:
AFP and PNP to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism and
lawless violence in the country to carry out necessary and
appropriate actions and measures.
iv. Events that led to the declaration:
a. Conspiracy between extreme right and extreme
left (NDF-CPP-NPA) to bring down government
and assassinate GMA
b. Recklessly magnified by national media
c. Series of actions affect economy, confidence of
public in the gov’t, as well as endanger their safety
d. Members of the Magdalo group indicted in
Oakwood mutiny were able to escape: in a public
statement: even avowed to remain defiant and
encourage others to join their cause
e. Oplan Hackle I document – plot to assassinate
selected targets including some cabinet members
and PGMA during PMA Alumni Homecoming
f. Lt. San Juan (Magdalo Group) and Ka Roger Rosal’s
(NPA) rebellious statements
g. Business men and mid level gov’t officials plotting
moves to bring down Arroyo admin in Peping
Cojuanco’s house
h. Bombing of telecommunications towers and cell
sites in Bulacan and Bataan
v. GMA cancelled all programs and activities related to 20 th
anniv celeb of Edsa I and revoked permits to hold rallies
issued earlier by local gov’ts = riot in edsa shrine!
vi. Policemen broke up edsa celeb rally in Makati and arrested
without warrant in the name of PP1017
vii. Operatives of the Criminal investigation and Detection
Group (CIDG) of PNP raided Daily Tribune offices in Manila,
then Abante: imposed “balanced reporting”
viii. Police arrests: Congressman Beltran using warrant dated
1985, Retired Major General Ramon Montano arrested
while in Orchard, et al
Issue: WON PP 1017 and G.O 5 are constitutional
Held/Ratio:
i. PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by
the president for the AFP to prevent or suppress violence:
PGMA could validly declare the existence of state of national
emergency even in the absence of Congressional enactment
ii. However, PP 1017’s extraneous provisions giving the
president express or implied power
a. To issue decrees
b. To direct AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even
those not related to lawless violence as well as
decrees promulgated by the president
c. To impose standards on media or in any form of
prior restraint on the press,
ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL because as opposed to Marcos,
the consti does not grant her those powers.
iii. The court also rules that under Sec 17, Article CII of the
constitution, the president, in the absence of a legislation,
cannot take over privately owned public utility and private
business affected with public interest.
iv. G.O No. 5 is valid because it provides a valid standard: that
military and police should only take means necessary and
appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent
acts of lawless violence
SEC 19:
1. Executive clemency in general
Executive Clemency – power exists as an instrument for correcting
by a too strict application of law
1. Reprieve – postpones execution of an offense
2. Commutation – substitution of a less penalty for the
originally imposed
3. Remission of fines and forfeitures
4. Pardon – an act of grace which exempts the individual
whom it is bestowed from the punishment the law inflicts
for a crime he has committed; deed, to the validity of which
delivery is essential, and delivery is not complete without
acceptance
a. Absolute pardon – complete even without
acceptance
b. Conditional pardon – no force until accepted by
condemned.
Note: Grant of executive clemency terminates a pending appeal
 iii. President cancelled petition and ordered arrest and
recommitment against petitioner
iv. Now petitioner assails validity of order of arrest and
recommitment: right to due process
Issue: WON conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is
necessary before the petitioner can be validly rearrested and
recommitted for violation of terms of his conditional pardon and
accordingly serve balance of original sentence
Held/Ratio:
Yes.
i. By accepting the terms under which pardon has been
granted, petitioner had in effect agreed to the president’s
determination (rather than that of the regular courts of law)
that he had breached the conditions of his pardon.
ii. 2 Basis:
a. Sec 64 of the Revised administrative code: “…to
authorize arrest and recommitment of any such
person who, in his judgment, shall fail to comply
with the condition or conditions of his pardon,
parole or suspension of sentence.”
b. Article 159 of RPC: “….prision correccional min
period upon a convict who having been granted
conditional pardon, shall violate terms of
conditions”
iii. Moreover, the petitioner was a convict who had already
been accorded judicial due process in his trial and
conviction; not anymore constitutionally entitled for
another judicial determination

2. Pardon
Monsato v. Factoran
In re: Torres v. Director of Bureau of Prison
i. Monsato committed estafa through falsification of public
Same as preceding case.
documents
Additional notes:
ii. After conviction, he was granted pardon
i. The grant of pardon, the determination of the terms and
iii. Now demanding that he’s entitled to receive backpay for
conditions of pardon, the determination of the occurrence
lost earnings and benefits, aside from reinstatement as
of the breach thereof, and the proper sanctions for such
assistant city treasurer.
breach are purely executive acts and thus are not subject to
Issue: WON grant of pardon to a public official means reinstatement
judicial scrutiny
to public office?
ii. By the pardonee’s consent to the terms stipulated in this
Held/Ratio:
contract, the pardonee has thereby placed himself under
No it does not.
the supervision of the chief executive or his delegate who is
i. The very essence of pardon is forgiveness or remission of
duty bound to see to it that the pardonee complies with the
guilt. It does not erase the fact of the commission of the
terms and conditions of the pardon
crime and the conviction thereof.
ii. Pardons may relieve from the disability of fines and
Garcia v. Commission on Audit
forfeitures attendant upon a conviction but cannot erase
i. Petition for certiorari of the decision of COA denying his
stain of bad character.
claim for payment of back wages after he was reinstated to
iii. Pardon does not ipso facto restore a convicted felon to
the service pursuant to an executive clemency: prays for
public office necessarily relinquished or forfeited by reason
mandamus
of conviction.
ii. Petitioner was a supervising lineman and was dismissed
iv. She must reapply and undergo usual procedure required to
from service on ground of dishonesty in accordance with
get back old position
decision of then Ministry of Public Works, Transportation
and Communications for the loss of several telegraph poles
*Separate opinion by Padilla: “…unless the same shall have been
expressly remitted by the pardon (referring to right to hold public iii. RTC acquitted Garcia. Petitioner sought reinstatement, and
office, vote, etc.) was denied by the Bureau of Telecommunations. So
petitioner pleaded to for executive clemency.
Torres v. Gonzales Issue: WON Garcia should be reinstated after executive pardon has
i. Torres was granted condition pardon on condition that he been granted to him
would not again violate any of the penal laws of the Phils or Held/Ratio:
else he will be proceeded against in the manner prescribed Yes he should be reinstated.
by law i. While it is a rule that an administrative case is separate and
ii. Board of Pardons and Parole resolved to recommend to the distinct from a criminal case and an acquittal in the latter
president cancellation of conditional pardon because of case does not ipso facto result in the exoneration in the
violation of condition: 20 counts of estafa, sedition, former case, yet an exception could arise if the basis for the
swindling, illegal possession of firearms, etc. acquittal was the innocence of the accused as in the case of
petitioner Garcia
 ii. When a person is given pardon because he did not commit i. President Marcos commuted Ganzon’s imprisonment to 6
the offense, the pardon relieves the party from all punitive years with the condition that he shall remain under house
consequences of his criminal act, thereby restoring to him arrest.
his clean name, good reputation and unstained character ii. Since the sentence has been commuted, Ganzon has served
prior to the finding of guilt. his sentence fully: can no longer be reinvestigated/made to
iii. Aside from finding him innocent of the charge, the trial compete service of sentence
court commended petitioner for his concern and dedication iii. The fact that Ganzon might have gotten off too lightly is
as a public servant. His reinstatement to the government immaterial.
service entitles him to back wages 3. Amnesty
Amnesty – commonly denotes the general pardon to rebels for their
Llamas v. Orbos treason and other high political offenses; the forgiveness which one
i. Petitioner Rodolfo Llamas is the incumbent vice-governor sovereign grants to the subjects of another, who have offended by
of Tarlac. When Governor Mariano Ocampo III was some breach of the law of nations.
suspended from office for 90 days because of violations Pardon VS. Amnesty
afainst the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Llamas
replaced him and became acting governor. Pardon Amnesty
ii. Ocampo appealed to the DLG and to the Office of the Granted by the Chief executive, Proclamation of the Chief
President=denied and is a private act executive with the
iii. Ocampo asked for a 30 day reduction of his suspension, concurrence of Congress
saying that he did not really personally benefit from the hence a public act
loan contract with the Lingkod Tarlac Foundation Inc. Must be pleaded and proved by The courts should take
(LTFI), and even proved the relatie success of his livelihood person pardoned because judicial notice of
loan program through the LTFI. Executive clemency granted courts take no notice thereof
and reduced to period already served (more than 60 days Granted to one after conviction Granted to classes of
already persons or communities
iv. Ocampo signified intention to reassume position. Llamas who may be guilty of
complained that he wasn’t given notice, the issuance of political offense generally
executive clemency was whimsical, and that executive after
clemency can be granted only in criminal cases “…after final Looks forward and relieves Looks backward and
conviction…” offender from consequences of abolishes and puts into
Issue: WON the president of the Philippines has the power to grant an offense which he has been oblivion the offense itself, it
executive clemency in administrative cases convicted: won’t give back right so overlooks and
Held/Ratio: to hold public office, to vote, etc. obliterated the offense with
Yes he can. unless expressly stated. which he is charged that
i. The constitution does not distinguish between which cases the person stands before
executive clemency may be exercised by the president, with the law as if he has not
the sole exclusion of impeachment cases: Sec 19 Art VII (if committed any offense
not wouldn’t need to single out impeachment)
ii. If the president can grant reprieves, commutations and 4. Limits on Executive Clemency:
pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, a. Reprieves, commutations, pardons and remission
with much more reason can she grant executive clemency in of fines and forfeitures can only be granted after
admin cases which are clearly less serious than criminal conviction by final judgment
offenses. b. Cannot be exercised over cases of impeachment
iii. Moreover, under the president’s power of control and c. Grant of amnesty must be with the concurrence of
supervision, he can reduce, if circumstances so warrant, the a majority of congress
imposable penalty or modify the suspension or removal d. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of
order even in the sense of granting executive clemency. sentence for violation of election laws, rules,
regulations shall be granted without favorable
Drilon v. Court of Appeals recommendation of the commission on elections
i. Brought suit to annul decision of the court of appeals
prohibiting the government from pursuing criminal actions People v. Salle
against the private respondents for the death of Ireneo Issue: WON a pardon granted to an accused can be enforced during
Longno and Lonely Chavez during early martial law. the pendency of his appeal from a judgment of conviction by a trial
ii. Sometime in 1973, Paredes and Ganzon were charged of court
double murder before the military commission. Paredes Held/Ratio:
was acquitted and Ganzon was sentenced to life
imprisonment and hard labor. Ganzon was released and i. After tracing the history of the changes in the provision
placed under house arrest in 1978. regarding when executive clemency may be granted, the
iii. Secretary of Justice ordered state prosecutor to conduct 1987 constitution states that no pardon may be extended
preliminary investigation against Paredes and Ganzon for before a judgment of conviction becomes FINAL.
the double murder. Private respondents moved for ii. A judgment of conviction becomes final:
dismissal President already. Motion denied. They brought it a. When no appeal is seasonably perfected
to COA, denied again. Hence this petition b. When the accused commences to serve the
Issue: WON Ganzon can still be reinvestigated or made to complete sentence
the service of his sentence c. When the right to appeal is expressly waived in
Held/Ratio: writing, except where death penalty was imposed
No he can’t. by trial court
 d. When accused applies for probation thereby denying the power of courts to control the enforcement
Executive Agreements – Treaties – permanent and of their decisions after their finality.
temporary and mere original v. The suspension of such a death sentence is an exercise
implementation of judicial power and not an usurpation of presidential
International agreements International agreements power of reprieve though its effect is the same:
embodying adjustments of involving political issues or temporary suspension of execution of death penality
detail carrying out well- changes of national policy and
established national Those involving international SEC 20
policies and traditions and arrangements of a permanent SEC21
those involving character 1. Foreign Relations Powers
arrangements of a more or i. Power to negotiate treaties and international agreements
less temporary nature. ii. Power to appoint ambassadors and other public ministers
Does not require Require concurrence of senate and consuls
concurrence of senate iii. Power to receive ambassadors and other public ministers
(mere implementation of accredited to the Phils
treaties or of statutes or of iv. Power to contract and guarantee foreign loans on behalf of
well established policy or the republic
are of a transitory v. The power to deport aliens
effectivity do not require
concurrence Executive agreements VS. Treaties
waiving his right to appeal
iii. Therefore, where the judgment of conviction is still pending
appeal and has not yet therefore attained finality, as in the Pimental v. Ermita
instant case, executive clemency may not yet be granted to Issue: WON the executive secretary and the department of Foreign
the appellant. affairs have a ministerial duty to transmit to the senate the copy of
iv. Contention: how about “…grant of pardon during pendency the Roma Statute of the ICC signed by a member of the Philippine
of appeal serves to put an end to appeal..”? Mission to the United Nations even without the signature of the
a. Before an appellant may be validly granted president
pardon, he must first ask for the withdrawal of his Held/Ratio:
appeal, i.e. the appealed conviction must first be No.
brought to a finality. i. The signature does not signify the final consent of the state
v. Declare therefore that the conviction by final judgment to the treaty. It is the ratification that binds the state to the
limitation under sec 19 of the present constitution prohibits provisions thereof.
grant of pardon whether full or conditional, to an accused ii. After the treaty is signed by the state’s representative, the
during the pendency of his appeal from his conviction by president, being accountable to the people, is burdened
the trial court. with the responsibility and the duty to carefully study the
vi. Considering that appellant Ricky Mengote has not filed a contents of the treaty and ensure that they are not inimical
motion to withdraw his appeal up to this date, the to the interest of the state and its people.
conditional pardon extended to him should not have been iii. The role of the senate is limited only to giving or
enforced. But since he stands in equal footing with Hinlo withholding its consent or concurrence to the ratification. It
(wrong application of the law), he’s given 30 days from is within the authority of the president to refuse to submit a
notice hereof within which to secure withdrawal of appeal. treaty to the senate, or, having secured its consent for
Only after withdrawal will the conditional pardon be ratification, refuse to ratify it.
deemed to take effect. iv. Court has no jurisdiction over actions seeking to enjoin
president in the performance of his official duties.
Echagaray v. Secretary of Justice
Issue: WON the issuance of the TRO by the judiciary after giving a Lim v. Executive Secretary
final decision is an encroachment on the executive department i. Petition for injunction and prohibition against deployment
Held/Ratio: of US troops in Basilan and Mindanao (Balikatan 02-1) for
i. Yes. The court did not change its decision. The finality being illegal and in violation of the constitution.
of a judgment does not mean that the court has lost all ii. Balikatan is a simulation of joint military maneuvers
its powers not the case. By the finality of judgment, pursuant to Mutual Defense Treaty, a bilateral defense
what the court loses is its jurisdiction to amend, agreement entered into by the Phils and US in 1951
modify, or alter the same. Even after final judgment, it iii. Entry of American troops rooted in Sept 11 2001 bombing
retains its jurisdiction to execute and enforce it. For iv. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the joint exercise
after judgment, circumstances may transpire which Issue: WON the joint exercise is covered by the VFA and if it’s
may render execution unjust or impossible constitutional
ii. There is an imperative duty to investigate emergency Held/Ratio
and to order a postponement if a circumstance arises i. Looking into the VFA itself and to the Vienna Convention on
that ought to delay the execution the Law of Treaties, the terms of reference fall within the
iii. Courts have the power to promulgate rules of pleading, context of the VFA (ambiguity of “activities” to give leeway
practice, and procedure to enhance its independence. It in negotiation: US forces can visit other than for military
then has jurisdiction to control the process of reasons. In this case, training on new techniques of patrol
execution of its decisions, even retraining temporarily an surveillance to protect nation  VFA gives legitimacy to
the execution. the Balikatan exercises: mutual antiterrorism advising,
iv. Sec 19 is simply the source of the president to grant assisting and training exercise
executive clemency, but it cannot be interpreted as
 ii. However US exercise participants may not engage in
combat except in self-defense: all other treaties and
international agreements to which the Phils is a party must
be read in the context of the 1987 constitution.
iii. Our constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty not
only when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but also
when it runs counter to an act of congress: US forces are
prohibited from engaging in an offensive war on Philippine
territory.
iv. However, with the absence of concrete proof that the Arroyo
government is engaged in doublespeak in trying to pass off
as a mere training exercise an offensive effort by foreign
troops on native soil, petition is untenable.
Bayan v. Executive Secretary
i. The 1947 Military Bases Agreement which formalized
among others, the use of installations in the Philippine
territory by the United States Military personnel was
renewed its treaty through the VFA which provides for the
mechanism for regulating the circumstances and conditions
under which US Armed Forces and defense personnel may
be present in the Philippines.
ii. Resolution 443 was approved by senate by a 2/3 vote of its
members which recommended concurrence of senate to the
VFA and creation of a legislative oversight committee to
oversee its implementation. VFA officially entered into force
on June 1 1999.
Issue: WON the VFA should be considered as a valid treaty
Held/Ratio:
Yes it should.
i. Under Article VII sec 21 and under section 25 Article XVIII,
the concurrence of the Senate is indispensable to render the
treaty or international agreement valid and effective.
a. Sec 21: “…no treaty or international agreement
shall be valid….at least 2/3 of all members of
senate”
b. Sec 25: “…foreign military bases, troops or
facilities shall not be allowed except under a treaty
duly concurred in by senate and when congress
requires, ratified by a majority of votes in national
referendum, and recognized as a treaty by other
contracting state”
 Sec 25 should be applied more because it’s more specific
ii. It’s inconsequential whether the United States treats the
VFA only as an executive agreement because under
international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a
treaty.
a. Under Vienna convention: Treaty – an
international instrument concluded between
States in written form and governed by
international law, whether embodied in a single
instrument or in two or more related instruments,
and whatever its particular designation”
b. International law continues to make no distinction
between treaties and executive agreements:
equally binding upon nations
iii. The records also reveal that the US government through
Ambassador Thomas C. Hubbard, has stated that the United
States Government has fully committed to living up to the
terms of the VFA. For as long as the US accepts or
acknowledges the VFA as a treaty, and binds itself further to
comply with its obligations under the treaty, there is indeed
marked compliance with the mandate of the constitution.
iv. As a member of the family of nations, the Phils agrees to be
bound by generally accepted rules for the conduct of its
international relations. We cannot readily plead the
constitution as a convenient excuse for non-compliance
with our obligations, duties, and responsibilities under the
international law.
Secretary of Justice v. Judge Lantion
i. Request was made by US for extradition of Mark Jimenez
ii. While petition is being evaluated by Dept of Justice, a
request was made by Jimenez that documents related to
extradition request be made available to him. Judge Lantion
granted request
iii. Secretary of Justice asked court to reverse lower court’s
order
Issue: WON the private respondent is entitled to the die process right
to notice and hearing during the extradition process
Held/Ratio
No.
i. PD No. 1069 which implements the RP-US Extradition
Treaty Provides the time when an extradite shall be
furnished a copy of the petition for extradition as well as its
supporting papers: After the filing og the petition for
extradition in the extradition court.
ii. There is no provision in the RP-US Extradition treaty which
gives an extradite the right to demand from the petitioner
Secretary of Justice copies of the extradition request from
the US gov’t and its supporting documents and to comment
thereon while the request is still undergoing evaluation.
iii. The court cannot alter amend or add a treaty.
iv. All treaties, including RP-US Extradition should be
interpreted in light of their intent. Extradition treaties
provide the assurance that the punishment of these crimes
will not be frustrated by the frontiers of territorial
sovereignty. Implicit in the treaties should be the unbending
commitment that the perpetrators of these crimes will not
be coddled by any signatory state
a. The submission of the private respondent that as a
probable extraditee he should be furnished a copy
of the US gov’t request for his extradition and its
supporting documents even while they are still
under evaluation by petitioner sec of justice is
untenable.
b. Fear of secretary of justice that the demanded
notice is equivalent to a notice to flee must be
rooted on the experience of the executive branch.
v. As it comes from the branch of our gov’t in charge of the
faithful execution of our laws, it deserves the careful
consideration of this court.