Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995
SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ESTER S. GARCIA, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the
latter's office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood" and
in a manner offensive to petitioner's dignity and personality," contrary to morals, good
customs and public policy."1
In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought
moral damages, attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation in the amount of
P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests and other reliefs awardable at the trial court's
discretion. The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording
of the confrontation made by petitioner.2 The transcript reads as follows:
Plaintiff Soccoro D. Ramirez (Chuchi) — Good Afternoon
M'am.
Defendant Ester S. Garcia (ESG) — Ano ba ang nangyari sa
'yo, nakalimot ka na kung paano ka napunta rito, porke
member ka na, magsumbong ka kung ano ang gagawin ko
sa 'yo.
CHUCHI — Kasi, naka duty ako noon.
ESG — Tapos iniwan no. (Sic)
CHUCHI — Hindi m'am, pero ilan beses na nila akong
binalikan, sabing ganoon —
ESG — Ito and (sic) masasabi ko sa 'yo, ayaw kung (sic)
mag explain ka, kasi hanggang 10:00 p.m., kinabukasan
hindi ka na pumasok. Ngayon ako ang babalik sa 'yo, nag-
aaply ka sa States, nag-aaply ka sa review mo, kung
kakailanganin ang certification mo, kalimutan mo na kasi
hindi ka sa akin makakahingi.
CHUCHI — Hindi M'am. Kasi ang ano ko talaga noon i-
cocontinue ko up to 10:00 p.m.
ESG — Bastos ka, nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka
pumasok dito sa hotel. Magsumbong ka sa Union kung
gusto mo. Nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka nakapasok
dito "Do you think that on your own makakapasok ka kung
hindi ako. Panunumbyoyan na kita (Sinusumbatan na kita).
CHUCHI — Itutuloy ko na M'am sana ang duty ko.
ESG — Kaso ilang beses na akong binabalikan doon ng
mga no (sic) ko.
ESG — Nakalimutan mo na ba kung paano ka pumasok sa
hotel, kung on your own merit alam ko naman kung gaano
ka "ka bobo" mo. Marami ang nag-aaply alam kong hindi ka
papasa.
CHUCHI — Kumuha kami ng exam noon.
ESG — Oo, pero hindi ka papasa.
CHUCHI — Eh, bakit ako ang nakuha ni Dr. Tamayo
ESG — Kukunin ka kasi ako.
CHUCHI — Eh, di sana —
ESG — Huwag mong ipagmalaki na may utak ka kasi wala
kang utak. Akala mo ba makukuha ka dito kung hindi ako.
CHUCHI — Mag-eexplain ako.
ESG — Huwag na, hindi ako mag-papa-explain sa 'yo,
makaalala ka kung paano ka puma-rito. "Putang-ina" sasabi-
sabihin mo kamag-anak ng nanay at tatay mo ang mga
magulang ko.
ESG — Wala na akong pakialam, dahil nandito ka sa loob,
nasa labas ka puwede ka ng hindi pumasok, okey yan
nasaloob ka umalis ka doon.
CHUCHI — Kasi M'am, binbalikan ako ng mga taga Union.
ESG — Nandiyan na rin ako, pero huwag mong kalimutan
na hindi ka makakapasok kung hindi ako. Kung hindi mo
kinikilala yan okey lang sa akin, dahil tapos ka na.
CHUCHI — Ina-ano ko m'am na utang na loob.
ESG — Huwag na lang, hindi mo utang na loob, kasi kung
baga sa no, nilapastangan mo ako.
CHUCHI — Paano kita nilapastanganan?
ESG — Mabuti pa lumabas ka na. Hindi na ako
makikipagusap sa 'yo. Lumabas ka na. Magsumbong ka.3
As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly
taping the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled "An Act to
prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of private communication, and
other purposes." An information charging petitioner of violation of the said Act, dated October
6, 1988 is quoted herewith:
INFORMATION
The Undersigned Assistant City Fiscal Accusses Socorro D. Ramirez of
Violation of Republic Act No. 4200, committed as follows:
 That on or about the 22nd day of February, 1988, in Pasay
City Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this honorable court, the above-named accused, Socorro D.
Ramirez not being authorized by Ester S. Garcia to record
the latter's conversation with said accused, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with the use of a
tape recorder secretly record the said conversation and
thereafter communicate in writing the contents of the said
recording to other person.
Contrary to law.
Pasay City, Metro Manila, September 16, 1988.
MARIANO
M.
CUNETA
Asst. City
Fiscal
Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the
ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R.A.
4200. In an order May 3, 1989, the trial court granted the Motion to Quash, agreeing with
petitioner that 1) the facts charged do not constitute an offense under R.A. 4200; and that 2)
the violation punished by R.A. 4200 refers to a the taping of a communication by a
person other than a participant to the communication.4
From the trial court's Order, the private respondent filed a Petition for Review
on Certiorari with this Court, which forthwith referred the case to the Court of Appeals in a
Resolution (by the First Division) of June 19, 1989.
On February 9, 1990, respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed Decision
declaring the trial court's order of May 3, 1989 null and void, and holding that:
[T]he allegations sufficiently constitute an offense punishable under Section 1
of R.A. 4200. In thus quashing the information based on the ground that the
facts alleged do not constitute an offense, the respondent judge acted in
grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari.5
Consequently, on February 21, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which
respondent Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution6 dated June 19, 1990. Hence, the
instant petition.
Petitioner vigorously argues, as her "main and principal issue"7 that the applicable provision
of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a private conversation by one of the
parties to the conversation. She contends that the provision merely refers to the unauthorized
taping of a private conversation by a party other than those involved in the
communication.8 In relation to this, petitioner avers that the substance or content of the
conversation must be alleged in the Information, otherwise the facts charged would not
constitute a violation of R.A. 4200.9 Finally, petitioner agues that R.A. 4200 penalizes the
taping of a "private communication," not a "private conversation" and that consequently, her
act of secretly taping her conversation with private respondent was not illegal under the said
act. 10
We disagree.
First, legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the
language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express
terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be
either impossible 11 or absurb or would lead to an injustice. 12
Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other
Related Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes," provides:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not being authorized by all the
parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or
cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear,
intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device
commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-
talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not
authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such
communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the
party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from
those involved in the private communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons
unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any".
Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, "even a (person) privy to
a communication who records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of
the latter (will) qualify as a violator" 13 under this provision of R.A. 4200.
A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the respondent court's
conclusion that in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal,
unauthorized tape recording of private conversations or communications taken either by the
parties themselves or by third persons. Thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Senator Tañada: That qualified only "overhear".
Senator Padilla: So that when it is intercepted or recorded, the element of
secrecy would not appear to be material. Now, suppose, Your Honor, the
recording is not made by all the parties but by some parties and involved not
criminal cases that would be mentioned under section 3 but would cover, for
example civil cases or special proceedings whereby a recording is made not
necessarily by all the parties but perhaps by some in an effort to show the
intent of the parties because the actuation of the parties prior, simultaneous
even subsequent to the contract or the act may be indicative of their
intention. Suppose there is such a recording, would you say, Your Honor,
that the intention is to cover it within the purview of this bill or outside?
Senator Tañada: That is covered by the purview of this bill, Your Honor.
Senator Padilla: Even if the record should be used not in the prosecution of
offense but as evidence to be used in Civil Cases or special proceedings?
 Senator Tañada: That is right. This is a complete ban on tape recorded
conversations taken without the authorization of all the parties.
Senator Padilla: Now, would that be reasonable, your Honor?
Senator Tañada: I believe it is reasonable because it is not sporting to record
the observation of one without his knowing it and then using it against him. It
is not fair, it is not sportsmanlike. If the purpose; Your honor, is to record the
intention of the parties. I believe that all the parties should know that the
observations are being recorded.
Senator Padilla: This might reduce the utility of recorders.
Senator Tañada: Well no. For example, I was to say that in meetings of the
board of directors where a tape recording is taken, there is no objection to
this if all the parties know. It is but fair that the people whose remarks and
observations are being made should know that the observations are being
recorded.
Senator Padilla: Now, I can understand.
Senator Tañada: That is why when we take statements of persons, we say:
"Please be informed that whatever you say here may be used against you."
That is fairness and that is what we demand. Now, in spite of that warning,
he makes damaging statements against his own interest, well, he cannot
complain any more. But if you are going to take a recording of the
observations and remarks of a person without him knowing that it is being
taped or recorded, without him knowing that what is being recorded may be
used against him, I think it is unfair.
xxx xxx xxx
(Congression Record, Vol. III, No. 31, p. 584, March 12, 1964)
Senator Diokno: Do you understand, Mr. Senator, that under Section 1 of the
bill as now worded, if a party secretly records a public speech, he would be
penalized under Section 1? Because the speech is public, but the recording
is done secretly.
Senator Tañada: Well, that particular aspect is not contemplated by the bill. It
is the communication between one person and another person — not
between a speaker and a public.
xxx xxx xxx
(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, p. 626, March 12, 1964)
xxx xxx xxx
The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with the above-quoted
deliberations from the Congressional Record, therefore plainly supports the view held by the
respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private
communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.
Second, the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The
substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200
penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private
communications by means of the devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an
individual made a secret recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder
would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General
pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court: "Nowhere (in the said law) is it
required that before one can be regarded as a violator, the nature of the conversation, as well
as its communication to a third person should be professed." 14
Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in Section 1 of R.A.
4200 does not include "private conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of the word
"communication" to a point of absurdity. The word communicate comes from the latin
word communicare, meaning "to share or to impart." In its ordinary signification,
communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting signification, communication
connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, 15 or signifies the "process by
which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a common system of
symbols (as language signs or gestures)" 16 These definitions are broad enough to include
verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive communications of "meanings or thoughts" which
are likely to include the emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1988, between
petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the latter's office. Any doubts about the
legislative body's meaning of the phrase "private communication" are, furthermore, put to rest
by the fact that the terms "conversation" and "communication" were interchangeably used by
Senator Tañada in his Explanatory Note to the bill quoted below:
It has been said that innocent people have nothing to fear from
their conversations being overheard. But this statement ignores the usual
nature of conversations as well the undeniable fact that most, if not all,
civilized people have some aspects of their lives they do not wish to expose.
Free conversationsare often characterized by exaggerations, obscenity,
agreeable falsehoods, and the expression of anti-social desires of views not
intended to be taken seriously. The right to the privacy of communication,
among others, has expressly been assured by our Constitution. Needless to
state here, the framers of our Constitution must have recognized the nature
of conversations between individuals and the significance of man's spiritual
nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They must have known that part of
the pleasures and satisfactions of life are to be found in the unaudited, and
free exchange of communication between individuals — free from every
unjustifiable intrusion by whatever means.17
In Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 18 a case which dealt with the issue of telephone
wiretapping, we held that the use of a telephone extension for the purpose of overhearing a
private conversation without authorization did not violate R.A. 4200 because a telephone
extension devise was neither among those "device(s) or arrangement(s)" enumerated
therein, 19 following the principle that "penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the
accused."20 The instant case turns on a different note, because the applicable facts and
circumstances pointing to a violation of R.A. 4200 suffer from no ambiguity, and the statute
itself explicitly mentions the unauthorized "recording" of private communications with the use
of tape-recorders as among the acts punishable.
WHEREFORE, because the law, as applied to the case at bench is clear and unambiguous
and leaves us with no discretion, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision
appealed from is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Davide, Jr. and Bellosillo JJ., concur.
Hermosisima, Jr., J., is on leave.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 82511 March 3, 1992
GLOBE-MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and IMELDA SALAZAR, respondents.
Castillo, Laman, Tan & Pantaleon for petitioner.
Gerardo S. Alansalon for private respondent.
ROMERO, J.:
For private respondent Imelda L. Salazar, it would seem that her close association with Delfin
Saldivar would mean the loss of her job. In May 1982, private respondent was employed by
Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation (GMCR) as general systems analyst. Also
employed by petitioner as manager for technical operations' support was Delfin Saldivar with
whom private respondent was allegedly very close.
Sometime in 1984, petitioner GMCR, prompted by reports that company equipment and
spare parts worth thousands of dollars under the custody of Saldivar were missing, caused
the investigation of the latter's activities. The report dated September 25, 1984 prepared by
the company's internal auditor, Mr. Agustin Maramara, indicated that Saldivar had entered
into a partnership styled Concave Commercial and Industrial Company with Richard A.
Yambao, owner and manager of Elecon Engineering Services (Elecon), a supplier of
petitioner often recommended by Saldivar. The report also disclosed that Saldivar had taken
petitioner's missing Fedders airconditioning unit for his own personal use without
authorization and also connived with Yambao to defraud petitioner of its property. The
airconditioner was recovered only after petitioner GMCR filed an action for replevin against
Saldivar.1
It likewise appeared in the course of Maramara's investigation that Imelda Salazar violated
company reglations by involving herself in transactions conflicting with the company's
interests. Evidence showed that she signed as a witness to the articles of partnership
between Yambao and Saldivar. It also appeared that she had full knowledge of the loss and
whereabouts of the Fedders airconditioner but failed to inform her employer.
Consequently, in a letter dated October 8, 1984, petitioner company placed private
respondent Salazar under preventive suspension for one (1) month, effective October 9,
1984, thus giving her thirty (30) days within which to, explain her side. But instead of
submitting an explanations three (3) days later or on October 12, 1984 private respondent
filed a complaint against petitioner for illegal suspension, which she subsequently amended
to include illegal dismissal, vacation and sick leave benefits, 13th month pay and damages,
after petitioner notified her in writing that effective November 8, 1984, she was considered
dismissed "in view of (her) inability to refute and disprove these findings. 2
After due hearing, the Labor Arbiter in a decision dated July 16, 1985, ordered petitioner
company to reinstate private respondent to her former or equivalent position and to pay her
full backwages and other benefits she would have received were it not for the illegal
dismissal. Petitioner was also ordered to pay private respondent moral damages of
P50,000.00. 3
On appeal, public respondent National Labor Relations, Commission in the questioned
resolution dated December 29, 1987 affirmed the aforesaid decision with respect to the
reinstatement of private respondent but limited the backwages to a period of two (2) years
and deleted the award for moral damages. 4
Hence, this petition assailing the Labor Tribunal for having committed grave abuse of
discretion in holding that the suspension and subsequent dismissal of private respondent
were illegal and in ordering her reinstatement with two (2) years' backwages.
On the matter of preventive suspension, we find for petitioner GMCR.
The inestigative findings of Mr. Maramara, which pointed to Delfin Saldivar's acts in conflict
with his position as technical operations manager, necessitated immediate and decisive
action on any employee closely, associated with Saldivar. The suspension of Salazar was
further impelled by th.e discovery of the missing Fedders airconditioning unit inside the
apartment private respondent shared with Saldivar. Under such circumstances, preventive
suspension was the proper remedial recourse available to the company pending Salazar's
investigation. By itself, preventive suspension does, not signify that the company has
adjudged the employee guilty of the charges she was asked to answer and explain. Such
disciplinary measure is resorted to for the protection of the company's property pending
investigation any alleged malfeasance or misfeasance committed by the employee.5
Thus, it is not correct to conclude that petitioner GMCR had violated Salazar's right to due
process when she was promptly suspended. If at all, the fault, lay with private respondent
when she ignored petitioner's memorandum of October 8, 1984 "giving her ample opportunity
to present (her) side to the Management." Instead, she went directly to the Labor Department
and filed her complaint for illegal suspension without giving her employer a chance to
evaluate her side of the controversy.
But while we agree with the propriety of Salazar's preventive suspension, we hold that her
eventual separation from employment was not for cause.
What is the remedy in law to rectify an unlawful dismissal so as to "make whole" the victim
who has not merely lost her job which, under settled Jurisprudence, is a property right of
which a person is not to be deprived without due process, but also the compensation that
should have accrued to her during the period when she was unemployed?
Art. 279 of the Labor Code, as amended, provides:
Security of Tenure. — In cases of regular employment, the employer shall
not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when
authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work
shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other
privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other
benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his
 compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual
reinstatement. 6 (Emphasis supplied)
Corollary thereto are the following provisions of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
the Labor Code:
Sec. 2. Security of Tenure. — In cases of regular employments, the employer
shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause as
provided in the Labor Code or when authorized by existing laws.
Sec. 3. Reinstatement. — An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work
shall by entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and to
backwages."7 (Emphasis supplied)
Before proceeding any furthers, it needs must be recalled that the present Constitution has
gone further than the 1973 Charter in guaranteeing vital social and economic rights to
marginalized groups of society, including labor. Given the pro-poor orientation of several
articulate Commissioners of the Constitutional Commission of 1986, it was not surprising that
a whole new Article emerged on Social Justice and Human Rights designed, among other
things, to "protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social,
economic and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing
wealth and political power for the common good." 8 Proof of the priority accorded to labor is
that it leads the other areas of concern in the Article on Social Justice, viz., Labor ranks
ahead of such topics as Agrarian and Natural Resources Reform, Urban Land Roform and
Housing, Health, Women, Role and Rights of Poople's Organizations and Human Rights.9
The opening paragraphs on Labor states
The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized
and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment
opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective
bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the
right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of
tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also
participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and
benefits is may be provided by law.10(Emphasis supplied)
Compare this with the sole.provision on Labor in the 1973 Constitution under the Article an
Declaration of Principles and State Policies that provides:
Sec. 9. The state shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment
and equality in employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of
sex, race, or creed, and regulate the relations between workers and
employers. The State shall ensure the rights of workers to self-organization,
collective baegaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of
work. The State may provide for compulsory arbitration. 11
To be sure, both Charters recognize "security of tenure" as one of the rights of labor which
the State is mandated to protect. But there is no gainsaying the fact that the intent of the
framers of the present Constitution was to give primacy to the rights of labor and afford the
sector "full protection," at least greater protection than heretofore accorded them, regardless
of the geographical location of the workers and whether they are organized or not.
It was then CONCOM Commissioner, now Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., who substantially
contributed to the present formulation of the protection to labor provision and proposed that
the same be incorporated in the Article on Social Justice and not just in the Article on
Declaration of Principles and State Policies "in the light of the special importance that we are
giving now to social justice and the necessity of emphasizing the scope and role of social
justice in national development." 12
If we have taken pains to delve into the background of the labor provisions in our Constitution
and the Labor Code, it is but to stress that the right of an employee not to be dismissed from
his job except for a just or authorized cause provided by law has assumed greater
importance under the 1987 Constitution with the singular prominence labor enjoys under the
article on Social Justice. And this transcendent policy has been translated into law in the
Labor Code. Under its terms, where a case of unlawful or unauthorized dismissal has been
proved by the aggrieved employee, or on the other hand, the employer whose duty it is to
prove the lawfulness or justness of his act of dismissal has failed to do so, then the remedies
provided in Article 279 should find, application. Consonant with this liberalized stance vis-a-
vis labor, the legislature even went further by enacting Republic Act No. 6715 which took
effect on March 2, 1989 that amended said Article to remove any possible ambiguity that
jurisprudence may have generated which watered down the constitutional intent to grant to
labor "full protection." 13
To go back to the instant case, there being no evidence to show an authorized, much less a
legal, cause for the dismissal of private respondent, she had every right, not only to be
entitled to reinstatement, but ay well, to full backwages." 14
The intendment of the law in prescribing the twin remedies of reinstatement and payment of
backwages is, in the former, to restore the dismissed employee to her status before she lost
her job, for the dictionary meaning of the word "reinstate" is "to restore to a state, conditione
positions etc. from which one had been removed"15 and in the latter, to give her back the
income lost during the period of unemployment. Both remedies, looking to the past, would
perforce make her "whole."
Sadly, the avowed intent of the law has at times been thwarted when reinstatement has not
been forthcoming and the hapless dismissed employee finds himself on the outside looking
in.
Over time, the following reasons have been advanced by the Court for denying reinstatement
under the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto; that reinstatement can no longer
be effected in view of the long passage of time (22 years of litigation) or because of the
realities of the situation; 16 or that it would be "inimical to the employer's interest; " 17 or that
reinstatement may no longer be feasible; 18 or, that it will not serve the best interests of the
parties involved; 19 or that the company would be prejudiced by the workers' continued
employment; 20 or that it will not serve any prudent purpose as when supervening facts have
transpired which make execution on that score unjust or inequitable 21 or, to an increasing
extent, due to the resultant atmosphere of "antipathy and antagonism" or "strained relations"
or "irretrievable estrangement" between the employer and the employee. 22
In lieu of reinstatement, the Court has variously ordered the payment of backwages and
separation pay 23 or solely separation pay. 24
In the case at bar, the law is on the side of private respondent. In the first place the wording
of the Labor Code is clear and unambiguous: "An employee who is unjustly dismissed from
work shall be entitled to reinstatement. . . . and to his full backwages. . . ." 25 Under the
principlesof statutory construction, if a statute is clears plain and free from ambiguity, it must
be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This plain-meaning
rule or verba legis derived from the maxim index animi sermo est (speech is the index of
intention) rests on the valid presumption that the words employed by, the legislature in a
statute correctly express its intent or will and preclude the court from construing it
differently. 26 The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to:have used
words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in
the statute.27 Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be
no departure. Neither does the provision admit of any qualification. If in the wisdom of the
Court, there may be a ground or grounds for non-application of the above-cited provision, this
should be by way of exception, such as when the reinstatement may be inadmissible due to
ensuing strained relations between the employer and the employee.
In such cases, it should be proved that the employee concerned occupies a position where
he enjoys the trust and confidence of his employer; and that it is likely that if reinstated, an
atmosphere of antipathy and antagonism may be generated as to adversely affect the
efficiency and productivity of the employee concerned.
A few examples, will suffice to illustrate the Court's application of the above principles: where
the employee is a Vice-President for Marketing and as such, enjoys the full trust and
confidence of top management; 28 or is the Officer-In-Charge of the extension office of the
bank where he works; 29 or is an organizer of a union who was in a position to sabotage the
union's efforts to organize the workers in commercial and industrial establishments; 30 or is a
warehouseman of a non-profit organization whose primary purpose is to facilitate and
maximize voluntary gifts. by foreign individuals and organizations to the Philippines; 31 or is a
manager of its Energy Equipment Sales. 32
Obviously, the principle of "strained relations" cannot be applied indiscriminately. Otherwisey
reinstatement can never be possible simply because some hostility is invariably engendered
between the parties as a result of litigation. That is human nature. 33
Besides, no strained relations should arise from a valid and legal act of asserting one's right;
otherwise an employee who shall assert his right could be easily separated from the service,
by merely paying his separation pay on the pretext that his relationship with his employer had
already become strained. 34
Here, it has not been proved that the position of private respondent as systems analyst is one
that may be characterized as a position of trust and confidence such that if reinstated, it may
well lead to strained relations between employer and employee. Hence, this does not
constitute an exception to the general rule mandating reinstatement for an employee who has
been unlawfully dismissed.
On the other hand, has she betrayed any confidence reposed in her by engaging in
transactions that may have created conflict of interest situations? Petitioner GMCR points out
that as a matter of company policy, it prohibits its employees from involving themselves with
any company that has business dealings with GMCR. Consequently, when private
respondent Salazar signed as a witness to the partnership papers of Concave (a supplier of
Ultra which in turn is also a supplier of GMCR), she was deemed to have placed. herself in
an untenable position as far as petitioner was concerned.
However, on close scrutiny, we agree with public respondent that such a circumstance did
not create a conflict of interests situation. As a systems analyst, Salazar was very far
removed from operations involving the procurement of supplies. Salazar's duties revolved
around the development of systems and analysis of designs on a continuing basis. In other
words, Salazar did not occupy a position of trust relative to the approval and purchase of
supplies and company assets.
In the instant case, petitioner has predicated its dismissal of Salazar on loss of confidence.
As we have held countless times, while loss of confidence or breach of trust is a valid ground
for terminations it must rest an some basis which must be convincingly established. 35 An
employee who not be dismissed on mere presumptions and suppositions. Petitioner's
allegation that since Salazar and Saldivar lived together in the same apartment, it "presumed
reasonably that complainant's sympathy would be with Saldivar" and its averment that
Saldivar's investigation although unverified, was probably true, do not pass this Court's
test. 36 While we should not condone the acts of disloyalty of an employee, neither should we
dismiss him on the basis of suspicion derived from speculative inferences.
To rely on the Maramara report as a basis for Salazar's dismissal would be most inequitous
because the bulk of the findings centered principally oh her friend's alleged thievery and
anomalous transactions as technical operations' support manager. Said report merely
insinuated that in view of Salazar's special relationship with Saldivar, Salazar might have had
direct knowledge of Saldivar's questionable activities. Direct evidence implicating private
respondent is wanting from the records.
It is also worth emphasizing that the Maramara report came out after Saldivar had already
resigned from GMCR on May 31, 1984. Since Saldivar did not have the opportunity to refute
management's findings, the report remained obviously one-sided. Since the main evidence
obtained by petitioner dealt principally on the alleged culpability of Saldivar, without his
having had a chance to voice his side in view of his prior resignation, stringent examination
should have been carried out to ascertain whether or not there existed independent legal
grounds to hold Salatar answerable as well and, thereby, justify her dismissal. Finding none,
from the records, we find her to have been unlawfully dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution of public respondent National Labor Relations
Commission dated December 29, 1987 is hereby AFFIRMED. Petitioner GMCR is ordered to
REINSTATE private respondent Imelda Salazar and to pay her backwages equivalent to her
salary for a period of two (2) years only.
This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Paras, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr. and Nocon, JJ., concur.
Cruz, J., concurs in the result.
Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Padilla, JJ., took no part