ANGARA v. ELECTORAL COMMISSION (July 15, 1936 | Laurel) c.
c. The Electoral Commission can regulate its proceedings only if the National
FACTS
1. In the elections of September 17, 1935, Jose Angara (petitioner), Pedro Ynsua, Miguel
Castillo and Dionisio Mayor (respondents), were candidates for the position of member
of the National Assembly for the first district of the province of Tayabas.
2. The provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as the member-elect, for having
received the most number of votes.
a. He then took his oath of office.
3. On December 3, 1935, the National Assembly in session assembled, and passed
Resolution No. 8.
a. Resolution No. 8 confirmed the election of the members of the National
Assembly against whom no protest had been filed thus far.
4. On December 8, 1935, Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a motion of protest
against Angara’s election.
a. It was the only protest filed after the passage of Resolution No. 8.
b. In his protest, Ynsua prayed that he be the one declared as the elected
member of the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas, or that
Angara’s election be nullified.
5. On December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted Resolution No. 9.
a. Paragraph 6 of Resolution No. 9 fixes December 9, 1935 as the last date for the
presentation of protests against the election of any member of the National
Assembly.
6. On December 20, 1935, Angara filed before the Electoral Commission a motion to
dismiss the protest, alleging that:
a. Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly was adopted in the legitimate
exercise of its constitutional prerogative to prescribe the period during which
protests against the election of its members should be presented.
b. Resolution No. 8 has for its object, and is the accepted formula for, the
limitation of said period.
c. Ynsua’s protest against him was filed out of the prescribed period.
7. Ynsua then filed an answer, alleging that there is no legal or constitutional provision
barring the presentation of a protest against the election of a member of the National
Assembly after confirmation.
8. On January 23, 1936, the Electoral Commission ruled in favor of Ynsua, and it dismissed
Angara’s petition.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTIONS
1. Angara then filed an action for the issuance of a writ of prohibition to restrain and
prohibit the Electoral Commission from taking further cognizance of Ynsua’s protest. He
contended that:
a. The Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the Electoral Commission
solely regarding the merits of contested elections to the National Assembly.
b. The Constitution excludes from the Electoral Commission’s jurisdiction the
power to regulate the proceedings of said election contests, as this power has
been reserved to the Legislative Department of the Government, which is the
National Assembly.
Assembly has not availed of its primary power to so regulate such proceedings.
d. Therefore, Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly is valid and should be
respected and obeyed.
e. Under Section 1, Paragraph 13 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution,
Article 7, Paragraph 6 of the Tydings-McDuffie Law, and Sections 1 and 2 of
Article VIII of the Constitution, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to pass upon
the fundamental question raised in this case, because it involves an
interpretation of the Constitution of the Philippines.
RESPONDENTS’ CONTENTIONS
1. The Solicitor-General filed an answer in behalf of the Electoral Commission, interposing
the following special defenses:
a. The Electoral Commission has been created by the Constitution as an
instrumentality of the Legislative Department, invested with the jurisdiction to
decide “all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly.”
b. In adopting Resolution No. 9, the Electoral Commission acted within its
jurisdiction and in the legitimate exercise of the implied powers granted to it
by the Constitution, to adopt the rules and regulations essential to carry out
the powers and functions conferred upon it.
c. When the Electoral Commission overruled Angara’s motion to dismiss Ynsua’s
protest, it acted in the legitimate exercise of its quasi-judicial functions as an
instrumentality of the Legislative Department of the Commonwealth
Government.
i. Thus, this said act is beyond the judicial cognizance or control of the
Supreme Court.
d. Resolution No. 8 could not and did not deprive the Electoral Commission of its
jurisdiction to take cognizance of election protests that are filed within the
time that might be set by its own rules.
e. The Electoral Commission is a body invested with quasi-judicial functions,
created by the Constitution as an instrumentality of the Legislative
Department.
i. It is not an “inferior tribunal, or corporation, or board, or person”
within the purview of Sections 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil
Procedure.
2. On the other, Ynsua also filed an answer of his own. He argued that:
a. At the time of the approval of the rules of the Electoral Commission on
December 9, 1935, there was no existing law fixing the period within which
protests against the election of members of the National Assembly could be
filed.
b. The Electoral Commission was exercising a power impliedly conferred upon it
by the Constitution, by reason of its quasi-judicial attributes.
c. Ynsua presented his motion of protest before the Electoral Commission on
December 9, 1935, and this is the last day fixed by Resolution No. 9.
d. Thus, the Electoral Commission acquired jurisdiction over his protest and over
the parties thereto.
e. The Electoral Commission’s denial of Angara’s motion to dismiss was an act
within its jurisdiction.
 i. Thus, it is not reviewable by the Supreme Court by means of a writ of
prohibition.
f. Neither the law nor the Constitution requires confirmation by the National
Assembly of the election of its members.
i. Such confirmation does not operate to limit the period within which
protests should be filed as to deprive the Electoral Commission of
jurisdiction over protests filed subsequent thereto.
g. The Electoral Commission is an independent entity created by the
Constitution, endowed with quasi-judicial functions, whose decisions are final
and unappealable.
h. The Electoral Commission, as a constitutional creation, is not an “inferior
tribunal, corporation, board or person,” within the terms of Sections 226 and
516 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
i. In the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions, the Electoral Commission cannot
be subjected to a writ of prohibition from the Supreme Court.
j. Article 7, Paragraph 6 of the Tydings-McDuffie Law has no application to the
case at bar.
ISSUES
1. WON the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject
matter of the controversy
2. WON the Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming
to take cognizance of Ynsua’s protest filed against Angara’s election, notwithstanding the
previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly
RULING FOR ISSUE 1: YES, THE SUPREME COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE ELECTORAL
COMMISSION AND THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CONTROVERSY.
1. The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government.
a. It obtains not through express provision, but by actual division in our
Constitution.
2. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its
jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere.
a. However, the three powers should not be kept separate and distinct, that the
Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of
each other.
b. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances
to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the
government.
3. The judiciary, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other
departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence, to declare
executive and legislative acts as void if violative of the Constitution.
4. In the main, the Constitution has blocked out allotment of power to the executive, the
legislative and the judicial departments of the government.
a. However, the overlapping and interlacing of functions and duties between the
several departments sometimes makes it hard to say just where the one leaves
off and the other begins.
b. In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of
the Constitution are often forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated.
5. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be
called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several
departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.
6. Like any human production, our Constitution lacks perfection and perfectibility.
a. However, it is the instrument which is the expression of the people’s
sovereignty.
b. It has established a republican government intended to operate and function
as a harmonious whole, under a system of checks and balances, and subject to
specific limitations and restrictions.
c. The Constitution sets forth in certain language the restrictions and limitations
upon governmental powers and agencies.
d. Certainly, the limitations and restrictions embodied in our Constitution are
real, as they should be in any living constitution.
7. The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government.
a. The Constitution provided for the judiciary to be the one to determine the
nature, scope and extent of such powers.
b. When the judiciary allocates constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any
superiority over the other departments.
c. It only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the
Constitution, which is to determine conflicting claims of authority and to
establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which the
Constitution secures and guarantees to them.
8. This is all that is involved in what is termed “judicial supremacy,” which is the power of
judicial review under the Constitution.
a. It is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the
government transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority.
b. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and
controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties,
and is limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota
presented.
9. More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative
enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution
but also because the judiciary, in the determination of actual cases and controversies,
must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their
representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the government.
10. Although there are internal checks of powers provided in the Constitution, it must be
remembered that the system itself is not the chief palladium of constitutional liberty – it
is the people.
a. According to James Madison, the people who are authors of this blessing must
also be its guardians.
b. Their eyes must be ever ready to mark, and their voice to pronounce,
aggression on the authority of their constitution.
11. In the case at bar, the National Assembly’s Resolution No. 8 confirmed the election of
Angara to the said body.
a. On the other hand, the Electoral Commission’s Resolution No. 9 fixed
December 9, 1935 as the last day for the filing of protests against the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly,
notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by the National Assembly.
12. In this case, there is an actual controversy involving a conflict of a grave constitutional
nature between the National Assembly on the one hand, and the Electoral Commission
on the other.
a. Upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation
of interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional boundaries.
b. The nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of a final
constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of authority between two
agencies created by the Constitution.
13. Upon principle, reason and authority, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the
Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose
of determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the
Electoral Commission as “the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly.”
RULING FOR ISSUE 2: NO, THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION DID NOT ACT IN EXCESS OF ITS
JURISDICTION. IT ACTED WITHIN THE LEGITIMATE EXERCISE OF ITS CONSTITUTIONAL
PREROGATIVE TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF YNSUA’S MOTION OF PROTEST.
1. Section 4, Article 6 of the 1935 Constitution provides: “SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral
Commission composed of three Justices of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief
Justice, and of six Members chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom shall be
nominated by the party having the largest number of votes, and three by the party
having the second largest number of votes herein. The senior Justice in the Commission
shall be its Chairman. The Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly.”
2. The transfer of the power of determining the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the legislature long lodged in the legislative body, to an independent,
impartial and non-partisan tribunal, is by no means a mere experiment in the science of
government.
a. The members of the Constitutional Convention who framed our fundamental
law were men mature in years and experience.
b. Many of them were familiar with the history and political development of
other countries of the world.
c. Therefore, when they deemed it wise to create an Electoral Commission as a
constitutional organ and invested it with the exclusive function of passing upon
and determining the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the
National Assembly, they must have done so not only in the light of their own
experience, but also having in view the experience of other enlightened
peoples of the world.
d. The creation of the Electoral Commission was designed to remedy certain evils
of which the framers of our Constitution were aware of.
3. There was vigorous opposition of some members of the Constitutional Convention to the
creation of the Electoral Commission, as the plan was approved by the body by a vote of
98 against 58.
a. However, all that can be said now is that, upon the approval of the
Constitution, the creation of the Electoral Commission is the expression of the
wisdom and “ultimate justice of the people.”
4. Under the organic law prevailing before the 1935 Constitution went into effect, each
house of the legislature was respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns, and
qualifications of their elective members.
5. The purpose of the creation of the Electoral Commission was to transfer all the powers
previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its
members, to an independent and impartial tribunal.
a. A composite body in which both the majority and minority parties are equally
represented to off-set partisan influence in its deliberations was created.
b. It was further endowed with judicial temper by including in its membership
three justices of the Supreme Court.
6. The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation, invested with the necessary
authority in the performance and execution of the limited and specific function assigned
to it by the Constitution.
a. When acting within the limits of its authority, the Electoral Commission is an
independent organ.
7. To be sure, it is closer to the legislative department than to any other.
a. The location of the provision creating the Electoral Commission under Article 6
entitled “Legislative Department” of our Constitution is very indicative.
b. Its composition is also significant in that it is constituted by a majority of
members of the legislature.
c. However, it is a body separate from and independent of the legislature.
8. The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to
be as complete and as unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature.
a. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied
denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly.
9. If the National Assembly may regulate the proceedings of the Electoral Commission and
cut off the power of the commission to lay down the period within which protests
should be filed, the grant of power to the Electoral Commission would be ineffective.
a. The Electoral Commission would become subject, at all times, to the regulative
power of the National Assembly.
b. Not only would the purpose of the framers of our Constitution be frustrated,
but a dual authority would be created.
c. There would be an inevitable clash of powers between the National Assembly
and Electoral Commission from time to time.
d. The power to regulate on the part of the National Assembly in procedural
matters will inevitably lead to the ultimate control by the National Assembly of
the entire proceedings of the Electoral Commission.
e. This results in the entire abrogation of the constitutional grant to the Electoral
Commission.
10. The Supreme Court knows the importance and necessity of respecting the dignity and
independence of the National Assembly as a coordinate department of the government
and of according validity to its acts.
a. This is in order to avoid what would be practically an unlimited power of the
Electoral Commission in the admission of protests against members of the
National Assembly.
11. However, the creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it the power regulative
in character to limit the time within which protests should be filed.
 a. It is a settled rule of construction that where a general power is conferred or a. This result was not and could not have been contemplated, and it should be
duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or avoided.
the performance of the other is also conferred. b. While there might have been good reason for the legislative practice of
b. Therefore, the incidental power to promulgate rules necessary for the proper confirmation of the election of members of the legislature, said confirmation
exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, alone cannot be construed as depriving the Electoral Commission of its
returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be authority.
deemed to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission by necessary c. Confirmation by the National Assembly of the returns of its members is, to all
implication. legal purposes, unnecessary.
12. It is possible that the Electoral Commission may abuse its regulative authority by 19. Section 4, Article 6 of the 1935 Constitution repealed Section 18 of the Jones Law and
admitting protests beyond any reasonable time. Section 478 of Act No. 3387.
a. However, the possibility of abuse is not an argument against the concession of a. Section 18 of the Jones Law makes each house of the Philippine Legislature
the power to the Electoral Commission, as there is no power that is not respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of its
susceptible of abuse. elective members.
13. If any mistake has been committed in the creation of an Electoral Commission and in b. Section 478 of Act No. 3387 empowers each house to prescribe the time and
investing it with its exclusive jurisdiction, the remedy is political, not judicial. manner of filing contests against the election of its members, the time and
a. It must be sought through the ordinary processes of democracy. manner of notifying the adverse party, and bond or bonds, to be required, if
b. All the possible abuses of the government are not intended to be corrected by any, and to fix the costs and expenses of contest.
the judiciary. 20. Thus, there was no law nor constitutional provision which authorized the National
14. All the agencies of the government were designed by the Constitution to achieve specific Assembly to fix the time for the filing of contests against the election of its members.
purposes. a. Furthermore, what the National Assembly could not do directly, it could not do
a. Each constitutional organ working within its own particular sphere of indirectly through the confirmation of its members.
discretionary action must be deemed to be animated with zeal and honesty.
15. From the fact that the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with in the exercise
of its legitimate power, it does not means that its acts, however illegal or
unconstitutional, may not be challenged in appropriate cases over which the courts may
exercise jurisdiction.
16. Pertinent dates in the case at bar:
a. November 25, 1935 – National Assembly convened
b. December 3, 1935 – National Assembly passed Resolution No. 8, confirming
the election of Angara as member-elect of the National Assembly
c. December 4 and 6, 1935 – the three justices of the Supreme Court and the six
members of the National Assembly who will form the Electoral Commission
were respectively designated
d. December 9, 1935 – Ynsua filed his motion of protest, contesting the election
of Angara
e. December 9, 1935 – Electoral Commission met for the first time, and they
passed Resolution No. 9, which fixes the same date as the last date for the
filing of election protests
17. Therefore, when the National Assembly passed its resolution confirming the election of
Angara to the National Assembly, the Electoral Commission had not yet met.
a. It also appears that the Electoral Commission has not actually been organized
yet.
18. If Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming non-protested elections of
members of the National Assembly had the effect of limiting or tolling the time for the
presentation of protests, the result would be that the National Assembly had already
barred the presentation of protests before the Electoral Commission had time to
organize itself and deliberate on the mode and method to be followed in a matter
entrusted to is exclusive jurisdiction by the Constitution.