Global Environmental Change 29 (2014) 139–154

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Global Environmental Change

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/gloenvcha

The capacity of water governance to deal with the climate change

adaptation challenge: Using fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative
Analysis to distinguish between polycentric, fragmented and
centralized regimes
Claudia Pahl-Wostl *, Christian Knieper
Institute of Environmental Systems Research, University of Osnabrück, Barbarastrasse 12, 49069 Osnabrück, Germany

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

Article history: The notion of polycentric governance has become increasingly popular in recent years. Such
Received 26 December 2013 development may be attributed to expectations that polycentric governance systems have a higher
Received in revised form 13 August 2014 capacity to deal with complex challenges arising from global and climate change. Most often, employed
Accepted 13 September 2014
interpretations of polycentricity emphasize the presence of several independent centers of authority in a
Available online 6 October 2014
governance domain. A commonly neglected feature of polycentric governance, as introduced by Elinor
and Vincent Ostrom, is that this concept entails as well operation under one set of overall accepted rules.
Keywords:
This paper analyzes the underlying feature of effective polycentric governance and makes a distinction
Polycentric governance
Fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis
between polycentric, fragmented, and centralized governance regimes. An empirical analysis of water
Adaptive capacity governance systems in 27 national river basins using fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA)
Climate change adaptation shows that a set of factors associated with polycentricity has the highest explanatory power for high
Water governance systems performance regarding climate change adaptation. Factors associated with fragmented and centralized
regimes can be identified for paths leading to low performance. Furthermore, the analysis identifies the
effectiveness of formal institutions as important condition, in particular for paths leading toward low
performance. The paper elaborates on these findings and discusses as well the potential of fsQCA in such
comparative analyses.
ß 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction water governance and management systems in national river

Which characteristics render governance systems flexible and
adaptive and increase their ability to deal with emerging
challenges? This is a central question not only posed in the realm
of a sustainable governance of water resources. The environmental
and societal context in which governance has to operate and the
governance processes themselves have become more and more
complex and unpredictable. The emergence of and popularity in
science and policy communities of the notion of governance over
the past decade is itself recognition of such development. In this
paper, we focus on one structural feature of governance systems,
polycentricity, which is supposed to render governance more
flexible and adaptive (Ostrom, 2001, 2010a,b; Pahl-Wostl, 2009;
Silveira and Richards, 2013). The chosen focus is also motivated by
findings from a comprehensive comparative analysis of complex
* Corresponding author. Tel.: +49 541 969 2536; fax: +49 541 969 2599.
E-mail addresses: claudia.pahl-wostl@Uni-Osnabrueck.DE,
cpahlwos@Uni-Osnabrueck.DE (C. Pahl-Wostl).
basins, compiling insights from 29 case studies in developed and
developing/emerging countries (Pahl-Wostl et al., 2012a,b).
Results from statistical regression analyses provided evidence
that performance increased with increasing polycentricity of the
governance system defined as having a distribution of power along
with effective coordination structures. In this paper, we go one step
further and use a set-theoretic approach and ideal-typical
configurations with respect to decentralization and coordination
to analyze different paths toward good or poor performance,
respectively. Regarding performance, we focus on the ability of
water governance systems to deal with the climate change
adaptation challenge. The paper aims thus at both conceptual
and methodological contributions. In the following, we first review
developments in the use and meaning of the concept of
polycentricity in resource governance and introduce then our
analytical framework. The subsequent presentation of materials
and methods includes as well reflections on what needs to be
considered when using fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis
(fsQCA).

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2014.09.003
0959-3780/ß 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
140 C. Pahl-Wostl, C. Knieper / Global Environmental Change 29 (2014) 139–154
2. Review of concepts and analytical framework
2.1. Conceptual foundations
The development of water policy over the past decades reflects
an overall shift in understanding the role of government from
central actor toward being embedded in a more encompassing
notion of water governance (Ingram, 2011; Pahl-Wostl et al.,
2011). In the 1960s and 1970s, water policy was characterized by a
strong role of central government and central regulation, by a
hierarchical top-down command and control approach. In the late
1980s and 1990s, one could observe a shift toward the principles of
subsidiarity, decentralization as well as privatization, and markets
became key players. The late 1990s and 2000s saw an upsurge in
participatory approaches. Central roles were attributed to com-
munity groups and water user associations. The trends identified
are global and manifest themselves in quite a similar way in
numerous water policy frameworks in developed and developing
countries (Aubin and Varone, 2004). The dominant mode of water
governance shifted from bureaucratic hierarchies to markets and
subsequently to networks and community involvement with
increasing emergence of diverse hybrid forms of combinations of
governance modes.
In the 1990s, decentralization became the guiding principle of
water policy reform (e.g. World Bank, 1993). According to the
principle of subsidiarity, authority and responsibility for decision
making and operations were transferred from the central national
government to lower-level governmental organizations, commu-
nity organizations or the private sector. Neoliberal thinking led to
connecting decentralization with deregulation and privatization
(e.g. Achterhuis et al., 2010). Market-based approaches were
supposed to overcome the perceived lack of efficiency and
effectiveness of governmental command and control policies. In
many countries, governments had failed to deliver water services,
in particular drinking water. The huge costs for infrastructure
exceeded governmental financial budgets even in developed
countries. Expected costs for infrastructure for wastewater
treatment to meet the standards set by the European Urban
Wastewater Directive were for example a major driver for
privatization in many European countries (Aubin and Varone,
2004). Engaging the private sector was linked to expectations of
attracting other sources of financing infrastructure development.
Many countries underwent fundamental governance reform.
Decentralization of water governance to increase effectiveness
and efficiency has for example been a centerpiece of water
governance reform in many Latin American countries (Wilder and
Romero Lankao, 2006; OECD, 2012). Experience is quite varied
though with some striking failures – notably in developing
countries (Bakker, 2010). As discussed by the various contributions
in Boelens et al. (2010), such reform – if guided by neoliberal
thinking only – may have detrimental consequences and lead to
distortions in the power structure. Furthermore, such reform does
not solve a systemic governance problem (Brown and Cloke, 2004,
2005; Soliman and Cable, 2011) – high levels of corruption and the
dominance of informal institutions with goals that are often in
conflict with sustainable resource management.
The wave of decentralization reform around the turn of the
millennium emphasizing the superiority of one governance mode,
markets, over governmental regulation is not in the spirit of
polycentric governance. According to the definition chosen in this
paper, polycentric governance systems are characterized by
multiple centers of authority and distribution of power along
with effective coordination structures. Decentralization does not
imply that adequate coordination structures will automatically
come into being. Elinor Ostrom, one of the leading scholars
working on polycentric governance of social-ecological systems,
highlighted as well the importance of self-organized network
governance, the involvement of numerous and diverse actors, and
multiple paths toward polycentricity rejecting the reliance on
simplistic panaceas (Ostrom, 2001, 2010a,b).
The work of Elinor and Vincent Ostrom laid the foundations for
an increased recognition of the importance of polycentricity in the
governance of environmental resources. Their original point of
departure was to contradict conventional wisdom that public
administration and thus the governance of metropolitan areas
should be organized in a hierarchical and centralized way (Ostrom
et al., 1961; Ostrom, 1972). Studies of metropolitan areas provided
evidence that smaller units and the distribution of responsibilities
often outperformed larger centrally controlled structures in
delivering services to citizens (Ostrom et al., 1978). Ostrom
et al. (1961) highlighted from the beginning that the distribution of
responsibilities must be linked to coordination by a shared set of
rules: ‘‘Polycentric connotes many centers of decision making that
are formally independent of each other. [. . .] To the extent that they
take each other into account in competitive relationships, enter into
various contractual and cooperative undertakings or have recourse to
central mechanisms to resolve conflicts, the various political
jurisdictions in a metropolitan area may function in a coherent
manner with consistent and predictable patterns of interacting
behavior. To the extent that this is so, they may be said to function as
a system’’ (Ostrom et al., 1961, pp. 831–832, own emphasis). At
that time, this statement was quite revolutionary contradicting all
conventional theory. After more than half a century, benefits of a
distribution of authority are generally acknowledged. However,
despite numerous governance reforms supporting decentraliza-
tion, systematic analyses on conditions that affect their perfor-
mance are lacking. In particular the importance of coordination has
been neglected to some extent. Polycentric governance systems
must fulfill at least two criteria to function as systems: presence of
multiple centers of decision making and coordination by an
overarching system of rules (Ostrom, 2010a,b; McGinnis and
Ostrom, 2011; Aligica and Tarko, 2012). The comprehensive work
of Elinor Ostrom highlighted the importance of self-organization as
guiding principle in polycentric systems (Ostrom, 2010b). Coordi-
nation and rules emerge from interactions rather than being
imposed by one powerful actor. Elinor Ostrom’s work focused on
the governance of common-pool resources by local communities.
Such local communities require in general to be nested in a multi-
level governance structure where governmental arrangements
provide supporting conditions at higher governance levels (Mans-
bridge, 2014). Polycentricity may be described as a kind of
systemic logic characterizing many spheres of governance (Aligica
and Tarko, 2012). Further empirical studies support such kind of
systemic interdependency. Plummer et al. (2013) confirm from
their chronology of management in the Grand River watershed a
shift in governance toward a more polycentric and cooperative
nature. They emphasize the need to understand institutions more
broadly embedded in the social context. Blomquist and Schlager
(2005, p. 109) observe: ‘‘However complicated they are, polycentric
regimes may be seen as incorporating horizontal and vertical
elements, with communities of interest, place, or identity acting as
principals with respect to organizations or governments that represent
them, and those organized communities interacting with each other
horizontally to contest and coordinate over watershed governance and
management in something more nearly like a system of checks and
balances’’.
But developing effective polycentric watershed governance
that overcomes both fragmented bureaucracies and rigid central
coordination may take considerable time. In her comprehensive
account of the several decades of history of river basin manage-
ment in the Columbia river basin in the US launched already 1937,
Eve Vogel pointed out that organizing management in a river basin
 C. Pahl-Wostl, C. Knieper / Global Environmental Change 29 (2014) 139–154
territory did not lead to more holistic, balanced management
(Vogel, 2012). Management had for several decades been
disproportionately focused on hydropower production, while
responsibilities, benefits, and influence were distributed to please
the most powerful interests rather than to lead to a more
sustainable and equitable sharing of benefits. However, the
analysis showed as well that river managers being accountable
to a wide array of constituents from throughout their service area
led over time to the development of institutional capacity. Since
the 1990s, river basin benefits have started to diversify (e.g.
introduction of fish and wildlife funds) also as response to changes
in public opinion and other pressures but also profiting from
improved institutional capacity and experience with cooperation.
Nevertheless, polycentricity has been and is nowadays often
identified with decentralization only. A case in point is the article
of Lieberman (2011) addressing the problems associated with
what he identifies as polycentric governance of infectious disease
in South Africa. Lieberman (2011, p. 677) defines polycentric
governance as ‘‘the concurrent efforts of at least two governance
authorities exercising their powers over a common group of people
within a single sector or for a common problem’’. He concludes that
overlapping responsibilities and weak coordination lead to
duplication of efforts, to a lack of accountability, and the possibility
to free-ride on the efforts of others (Lieberman, 2011, pp. 681 and
683). The observations of the weaknesses of the governance
arrangements seem to be justified. They reveal the importance of
coordination mechanisms. The question to be posed is whether the
governance arrangement analyzed should be called polycentric. It
lacks an essential criterion characterizing polycentric governance
systems – coordination including a shared set of rules.
2.2. Introduction of a typology
We want to contribute to clarifying terminology and support
more systematic analyses by suggesting a categorization of
governance regimes based on their degrees of coordination and
centralization as shown in Fig. 1. Based on this two-dimensional
classification, one can distinguish four kinds of ideal-typical
configurations: polycentric, fragmented, centralized coordinated,
and centralized rent-seeking.
We use ideal types in the Weberian sense as analytical device
for distinguishing different configurations and associate perfor-
mance characteristics with them (cf. Table 1). This allows us to
derive hypotheses, which will be tested in subsequent analyses.
Cooperaon and
Centralized coordinaon
Polycentric
Coordinated
Centralizaon of Distribuon of
power power
Centralized
Fragmented
Rent-seeking
Lack of
coordinaon
Fig. 1. Categorization of governance regimes in a two-dimensional grid of
distribution of power and degree of coordination/cooperation. The shaded boxes
in the corners denote the ideal-typical configurations.
141
Polycentric regimes combine the distribution of power and
authority with effective coordination among various centers and
across spatial levels. The modular structure characterizing
polycentric systems increases resilience and the capacity for
dealing with shocks and disturbance. Coordinated centers of
decision making that have a certain degree of autonomy support
experimentation and learning. Therefore, polycentric regimes are
assumed to have high performance, in particular with respect to
adaptive capacity and to dealing with emerging challenges such as
climate change (Ostrom, 2001, 2010a; Folke et al., 2005; Pahl-
Wostl, 2009; Pahl-Wostl et al., 2012a,b). Fragmented regimes lack
coordination. Without coordination the distribution of power and
authority and overlapping responsibilities of the different decision
making centers may lead to uncoordinated and contradicting
actions with loss of effectiveness and efficiency as highlighted by
the study by Lieberman (2011) of the South African health system.
In a comparison of climate change adaptation strategies in large
river basins in Europe, Africa, and Asia, Krysanova et al. (2010)
identified a lack of horizontal (i.e. across sectoral and administra-
tive boundaries) cooperation as important barrier for climate
change adaptation.
Centralized regimes operate under a hierarchical governance
mode. A dominant governmental actor at the top national level
holds all power and authority. We argue that centralized regimes
lack response capacity and flexibility, which is associated with a
more modular and decentralized system configuration even when
top-down coordination is in place. The argument of increased
flexibility has been a core argument to support the decentraliza-
tion of government functions (Hooghe and Marks, 2003).
Regarding coordination, we make a distinction between central-
ized rent-seeking and centralized coordinated regimes. Central-
ized regimes without coordination are assumed to be
characterized by rent-seeking. A prevalence of rent-seeking
behavior impedes effective coordination, and the lack of
coordination encourages rent-seeking behavior. Rent-seeking
implies that governmental representatives and bureaucrats abuse
their power and role in the hierarchy to increase their own
benefits rather than caring for the provision of public goods
(Tullock, 2008). In centralized rent-seeking regimes, the reigning
elite has few incentives to deal with emerging problems, and
adaptive capacity is assumed to be low. In centralized coordinated
regimes, actors at lower levels may be consulted during the
decision making process. But sub-ordinate centers have little
autonomy and mainly implement decisions made at the top level.
This reduces the capacity to deal with complex, potentially
conflictual governance problems and to take into account regional
context. We hence argue that centralized regimes in general have
lower performance regarding adaptive capacity and their ability
to deal with emerging challenges is lower than in polycentric
regimes.
3. Materials and methods
Set-theoretic methods such as Qualitative Comparative Analy-
sis (QCA) are appropriate tools to analyze the empirical relevance
of and test hypotheses related to different regime configurations.
QCA is a powerful method to analyze causal relationships between
a set of conditions and an outcome (Ragin, 1987). It is based on set-
theoretic logic formalism where conditions are either TRUE or
FALSE. In contrast to statistical regression methods, QCA is
particularly powerful to analyzing multiple causation (equifin-
ality), i.e. the phenomenon that more than one path (=set of
conditions) may lead to a certain outcome.
The different governance regime ideal types and their assumed
performance properties can be expressed in a formal logical
notation as represented in Table 1. The hypotheses that link
142 C. Pahl-Wostl, C. Knieper / Global Environmental Change 29 (2014) 139–154
Table 1
Characteristics of different regime ideal types. Characteristics are described in both qualitative terms (high and low) and as conditions in Boolean logic. Uppercase letters
represent a Boolean TRUE value for a binary variable (e.g. COR). Lowercase letters represent a FALSE value for a binary variable (e.g. cor).
Characteristics Polycentric
Distribution of power = DIS High/DIS
Coordination = COR High/COR
Assumed adaptive capacity = ADAP High/ADAP
Hypotheses in logical termsa DIS * COR ! ADAP
a
The multiplication symbol [*] represents a logical ‘‘AND’’, whereas the addition [+] symbol (not used in this table but in subsequent tables) represents a logical ‘‘OR’’. The
arrow [!] represents the assumed association between conditions and outcome. Expression ‘‘X * Y ! Z’’ can be read as: the presence of condition X in combination with the
presence of condition Y is sufficient for the presence of outcome Z.
governance regime types to performance are shown in the last row
of Table 1.
As real cases hardly ever conform completely to an ideal type,
we use fuzzy sets in our analysis to determine the degree of
membership of real cases in the different ideal types identified. We
apply fsQCA (cf. Ragin, 2008) to test the hypotheses stated in
Table 1. We build on results from Pahl-Wostl et al. (2012a,b), who
show with statistical regression analyses that performance
increases with increasing polycentricity. In the analysis presented
in this paper, we use fsQCA to analyze in detail different paths
toward high and low performance, respectively, based on different
configurations of the governance system with respect to centrali-
zation and coordination.
3.1. Methodological considerations on using fsQCA
QCA identifies sets of conditions as potential paths that lead to
an outcome. Thereby, QCA makes the distinction between
sufficient and necessary conditions. A necessary condition implies
that an outcome requires the presence of this condition. A
sufficient condition implies that the presence of this condition is
always associated with the presence of the outcome. A measure of
strength for sufficiency and necessity of conditions, which are
identified based on a set of empirical cases, is given by
consistency. For binary crisp set Qualitative Comparative Analysis
(csQCA), the consistency of a necessary condition is defined by the
ratio of cases where both condition and outcome are TRUE to the
number of cases where the outcome is TRUE. The consistency of a
sufficient condition is defined by the ratio of cases where both
condition and outcome are TRUE to the number of cases where the
condition is TRUE. Both consistency measures are 1 for a perfect
match and decrease with the number of cases that contradict the
assumption for a condition to be necessary or sufficient,
respectively. Another important measure is coverage. Concerning
the analysis of sufficiency, this measure ‘‘expresses how much of
the outcome is covered by the sufficient condition’’ (Schneider
and Wagemann, 2012, p. 325). Consistency and coverage for
sufficient conditions are mainly calculated for a set of conditions,
since hardly ever a single condition is sufficient to generate an
outcome. For readers not familiar with QCA, we recommend
consulting Rihoux and Ragin (2009) or Schneider and Wagemann
(2012).
FsQCA allows representing conditions that cannot be easily
dichotomized. That is the case in many analytical considerations in
the context of water governance systems. In the end, formal
analysis in fsQCA is based on so-called truth tables, which list
configurations (combinations of conditions) and associated out-
comes in Boolean representation. Configurations are derived from
the assignment of case-specific sets of conditions according to the
respective most similar ideal-type. The derivation of ideal-typical
configurations is represented in Fig. 2 for the example of the
governance regime ideal types defined above.
Fragmented Centralized Centralized
rent-seeking coordinated
High/DIS Low/dis Low/dis
Low/cor Low/cor High/COR
Low/adap Low/adap Low/adap
DIS * cor ! adap dis * cor ! adap dis * COR ! adap
Since cases have in general partial membership in more than
one ideal type, they also contribute to more than one configuration.
For low membership scores, this may lead to situations where
cases contribute to both an outcome and its negation (Cooper and
Glaesser, 2011). The PRI (Proportional Reduction in Inconsistency)
consistency measure was developed by Ragin to eliminate the
influence of such paradoxical cases (Schneider and Wagemann,
2012, p. 240). We used the following thresholds to make
assignments of solutions to outcomes in the truth tables:
consistency (standard)  0.9 AND PRI consistency  0.7 (see
Appendix C for more detail). Given these criteria, we could have
used the threshold for PRI consistency as the only criterion in our
analyses. However, we report both measures to show that the use
of PRI consistency leads to different assignments than using the
standard consistency measure. More information about both
consistency measures is given in Appendix C. Analyses were made
with software fsQCA 2.0 (Ragin et al., 2008; http://www.u.ar-
izona.edu/cragin/fsQCA/software.shtml).
3.2. Dataset for analysis, selection of indicators for the dimensions of
major interest
The study presented in this paper makes use of case study data
from the European research project ‘Coordinating Twinning
partnerships towards more adaptive Governance in river basins’
(Twin2Go). During Twin2Go, researchers conducted a comparative
analysis by means of statistical and qualitative approaches to
detect associations between properties of water governance
systems and their performances in the light of different
0,1 1,1
c
C
O
R b
a
0,0 1,0
DIS
Fig. 2. Ideal types in a two-dimensional property space of distribution of power
(DIS) and coordination (COR). The corners of the square represent the ideal types
derived from these conditions: centralized rent-seeking (0,0), centralized
coordinated (0,1), fragmented (1,0), and polycentric (1,1). All empirical cases lie
within one of the quadrants of the square. Cases that lie in a certain quadrant are
assigned to the ideal type represented by its adjacent corner. Cases a and b would
both be allocated to the centralized rent-seeking ideal type. Whereas case a is very
close to the centralized rent-seeking ideal type due to its short distance to the
corner (0,0), case b represents only weak membership in this ideal type. Case c is
assigned to the polycentric ideal type.
 C. Pahl-Wostl, C. Knieper / Global Environmental Change 29 (2014) 139–154 143

environmental and socio-economic contexts (Pahl-Wostl et al.,
2012a,b). The original dataset included 29 case studies – domestic
river basins and national parts of transboundary basins – in Europe,
Latin America, Africa, as well as Central, South and Southeast Asia.
Case study data had been provided by regional experts by means of
a questionnaire comprising 81 indicators within the scope of a
Twin2Go workshop series with additional post-processing (cf.
Appendix A for more information on indicators from the original
Twin2Go survey).
Table 2 lists the indicators that were adopted from the Twin2Go
dataset to operationalize the dimensions ‘distribution of power’
and ‘coordination’ as well as the performance dimension ‘adaptive
capacity’. Coordination can be subdivided in horizontal and
vertical coordination. The measure for vertical coordination
reflects how far legal arrangements support coordination and
facilitate collaboration between governmental actors across
administrative levels in the water sector with special consideration
of the involvement of local governments. Horizontal coordination
deals with the coordination of water-related governmental
activities across sectoral and spatial borders as well as the
existence of a coherent piece of legislation that integrates water
policies. The power distribution dimension reflects how responsi-
bilities are allocated across levels, to what extent the development
and implementation of water policies are divided among actors,
and whether technical capacities and economies of scale are in line
with the level of power distribution. Climate change adaptation is
used as a measure for a governance regime’s adaptive capacity, i.e.
its ability to deal with emerging challenges. Climate change
adaptation is a comparatively recent challenge. Global awareness
in the water sector started rising sharply around 2006–2007 (Pahl-
Wostl et al., 2013). It was only during the fifteenth Conference of
the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) in Copenhagen in 2009 that climate change and water
were officially included in the UNFCCC process. Hence, activities in
most countries are at the level of plans rather than implementation
of measures on the ground. To account for this, the performance
measure for climate change adaptation takes climate change
awareness, adaptation plans, and operational implementation into
account. Furthermore, we assessed as well if climate change
adaptation policies addressed deficiencies in current water
management such as reliance on technical solutions only (Pahl-
Wostl, 2007).
3.3. Calibration of the dataset
The application of fsQCA on the Twin2Go dataset requires a
conversion of the original score-based dataset to fuzzy-set
membership values (calibration). The defining feature of fsQCA
as compared to the original, binary csQCA is that it allows
membership values in the continuous interval from 0 to 1 (Ragin,
2009). A value of 1 indicates full membership in a set, whereas a
value of 0 signifies non-membership. Fuzzy-set membership
values between 0 and 1 indicate partial membership.
Indicators from the original dataset are conducive to fuzzifica-
tion, because their respective data ranges allow identifying two
opposed qualitative states of a phenomenon of interest (e.g.
allocation of power to various levels vs. power concentration at one
level) as well as quantitative gradations in between. Therefore,
data from the original dataset were transformed to a scale from 0 to
1 for all indicators considered within the scope of this survey (cf.
Appendix B and Table A4 for more information on the calibration of
the original Twin2Go data). In a second step, values for the
dimensions DIS, COR, VCOR, HCOR, and ADAP were calculated by
aggregating the fuzzy-set membership values of their underlying
indicators (Table 2). Since the underlying indicators describe
similar aspects of a higher-ranking phenomenon, we applied
arithmetic means: for VCOR, HCOR, and ADAP, the fuzzy-set
membership values were calculated as unweighted arithmetic
means (Dubois and Prade, 1985; Klir and Folger, 1995, p. 91). In
case of the DIS dimension, indicator 40 was double-weighted,
because it was regarded as more important than the remaining
underlying indicators. More details on the calibration as well as the
resulting fuzzy-set membership values for the indicators and
dimensions are provided in Appendix B.
4. Results from analyses
4.1. Analysis of the role of coordination and distribution of power
The dataset with fuzzy-set membership values was used to test
the hypotheses based on ideal-typical configurations (cf. Table 1).
To this end, fsQCA was applied to search for paths toward high and
low adaptive capacity (measured by response to the climate
change challenge), respectively. Each analysis for sufficient
conditions is characterized by a model that relates an outcome

Table 2
Operationalization of ideal type dimensions.

Dimension Underlying indicators from the Twin2Go survey (cf. Pahl-Wostl and Lebel, 2010, updated 2011)

Distribution of power (DIS)  Distribution of legally institutionalized functions, responsibilities and power across levels (indicator 6)
 Degree of centralization of both policy development and implementation (indicator 40)
 Level of decentralization in accordance with the available technical capacity and taking into account of
economies of scale (indicator 41)

Coordination: vertical  Formal provisions to support coordination in the water sector among governmental organizations across
integration (VCOR) administrative levels (indicator 34) – cooperation and clear allocation of tasks and functions as highest score
 Involvement of local governments in the creation of water-related institutions at higher levels, if the institutions
affect the local level (indicator 36)

Coordination: horizontal  National water-related regulatory framework is coordinated/integrated under one single piece of legislation
integration (HCOR) (i.e. national water act) (indicator 5)
 Formal provisions to support coordination in the water sector among governmental organizations across sectoral or
provincial borders (indicator 35) – cooperation and clear allocation of tasks and functions as highest score

Coordination (COR)  All indicators underlying the dimensions VCOR and HCOR

Adaptive capacity: climate
change adaptation (ADAP)
 Strategy for adaptation to climate change in the water sector (indicator 81)
 Availability of specific knowledge enabling adaptation (indicator 82)
 Awareness of water managers regarding adaptation to climate change (indicator 83)
 Coordinated implementation process regarding adaptation to climate change: program/plan of activities and measures
(indicator 84)
 Operational activities (measures) combining hard and soft approaches (indicator 85)
 Ways to deal with climate variability (floods and droughts) (indicator 86)
144 C. Pahl-Wostl, C. Knieper / Global Environmental Change 29 (2014) 139–154

to a configuration of conditions: OUTCOME = f(COND1, . . ., CONDn).
We did not encounter problems with logical remainders (config-
urations without case memberships above 0.5) in our analyses,
because all potential configurations were represented by cases in
the available dataset. None of the individual conditions fulfilled the
requirement for necessity (=consistency higher than 0.9) as
recommended by Schneider and Wagemann (2007).
We conducted the analyses for using both one aggregated
condition for coordination (COR) and for resolving the condition
into vertical (VCOR) and horizontal coordination (HCOR). The
analyses gave identical results for the path identified toward high
adaptive capacity (COR was replaced by HCOR * VCOR in the
solution term), which confirms the importance of the strength of
coordination as major criterion for effective polycentric gover-
nance systems. Using two conditions for coordination provided
similar but refined insights and a higher consistency for paths
toward low adaptive capacity. Therefore, we discuss here only
the results from the analyses using two conditions for
coordination.
Table 3 lists all cases allocated to the four ideal types and the
eight 3-dimensional configurations, respectively. Only seven out of
27 cases (only developing and transition countries) have different
Boolean scores regarding vertical and horizontal integration. We
will still elaborate on that later on. Columns on the right show the
number of cases with positive (ADAP) and negative (adap)
outcome, respectively. Numbers in parentheses denote the
number of cases supporting the hypotheses stated. The overview
presented in this table gives already a first qualitative impression
on the degree of support for the hypotheses (cf. Table 1), which
seems to be quite good: 22 out of 27 cases correspond to
expectations. The categorization does not take into account the
strength of the membership of a case in a configuration or the
outcome type, though. All contradicting cases have only weak
fuzzy-set membership values (i.e., close to 0.5) in their respective
ideal types and/or the outcome term. A table with detailed
membership values for all cases is given in Table A5 in Appendix B.
The polycentric ideal type is well represented and includes
nearly all European case studies. The two contradicting cases
Catamayo (Peru) and Okavango have both a score of 0.55 for the
distribution of power but quite high scores regarding coordination
(0.7 and 0.78, respectively). Hence, they are actually located
between centrally coordinated and polycentric regimes. The Upper
Guadiana is a quite similar case but with a score of 0.48 for the
distribution of power. Hence, it was allocated to the centrally
coordinated ideal type. The much lower response capacities of
Catamayo (Peru) (0.4) and Okavango (0.37) compared the Upper
Guadiana (0.82) suggest that coordination mechanisms may not be
effective and that further conditions may be needed to explain this
result. The centralized rent-seeking ideal type is also well
represented by cases. It includes no contradicting case. The dataset
does not provide conclusive evidence for the centralized coordi-
nated ideal type. The fragmented ideal type is represented by four
cases, of which one is a case contradicting the hypothesis.
However, Lake Kyoga has a fuzzy membership value in the
outcome ADAP of 0.52, which is not a strong contradicting case.
Table 4 summarizes major results for analyzing sufficient
conditions for high adaptive capacity: ADAP = f(VCOR, HCOR, DIS).
The analysis confirms the presence of one dominant path (1,1,1)
comprising the presence of both coordination (vertical and
horizontal) and the distribution of power, which corresponds to
polycentric regimes. One should also note that the consideration of
PRI consistency (threshold 0.7) led to discarding the configurations
011 and 100 as paths toward high adaptive capacity despite high
values of the standard consistency measure. A look at Table 3
shows that the two cases allocated to the configuration 011 are the
Orange (South Africa) and the Lake Kyoga (Uganda). Both are not
very convincing cases for substantiating the path 011.
Let us have a closer look at the two South African cases, Olifants
and Orange, as examples for countries in transition. Their fuzzy
membership score for ADAP is similar (0.63 and 0.6, respectively).
They are allocated to different configurations when horizontal and
vertical coordinations are resolved due to their different fuzzy

Table 3
Cases allocated to the four ideal types and eight possible configurations.

2-Dimensional ideal types No. of casesa Case 3-Dimensional No. of cases No. of No. of
configuration ADAP adap

Polycentric (COR * DIS) 11 (9) Tisza (Hungary) VCOR * HCOR * DIS 10 8 2

Rhine (Netherlands)
Thames (United Kingdom)
Norrström (Sweden)
Olifants (South Africa)
Elbe (Germany)
Raidak (Bhutan)
Inner Niger Delta (Mali)
Okavango (Namibia)
Catamayo/Chira (Peru)
Orange (South Africa) vcor * HCOR * DIS 2 2 0
Fragmented (cor * DIS) 4 (3) Lake Kyoga (Uganda)
Brahmaputra (India) vcor * hcor * DIS 1 0 1
Upper Cauca (Colombia) VCOR * hcor * DIS 2 0 2
Cuareim/Quarai (Brazil)
Centralized coordinated 5 (3) Lake Cocibolca (Nicaragua) VCOR * HCOR * dis 3 1 2
(COR * dis) Volga (Russia)
Upper Guadiana (Spain)
Red River (Vietnam) VCOR * hcor * dis 1 1 0
Kosi (Nepal) vcor * HCOR * dis 2 0 2
Centralized rent-seeking 7 (7) Amudarya (Uzbekistan)
(cor * dis) Baker (Chile) vcor * hcor * dis 6 0 6
Biobio (Chile)
Bang Pakong (Thailand)
Catamayo/Chira (Ecuador)
Guayas (Ecuador)
Nura (Kazakhstan)
a
Numbers in parentheses denote the number of cases supporting the hypotheses stated.
 C. Pahl-Wostl, C. Knieper / Global Environmental Change 29 (2014) 139–154 145

Table 4 for analyzing sufficient conditions for low adaptive capacity:

Results for model ADAP = f(VCOR, HCOR, DIS).
configurations 100 and 011 have standard consistencies of
Truth table 0.951 and 0.897, respectively. Furthermore, both the Red River
VCOR HCOR DIS No. of cases ADAP Consist. PRI consist. and Lake Kyoga are inconsistent for both the outcome and its
negation, which is a further argument to not code these
1 1 1 10 1 0.935 0.849
0 1 1 2 0 0.963 0.640
configurations as valid solution terms (Schneider and Wagemann,
1 1 0 3 0 0.873 0.492 2012, p. 240).
1 0 0 1 0 0.901 0.317 Table 5 summarizes major results for analyzing paths toward
1 0 1 2 0 0.877 0.125 low adaptive capacity: adap = f(VCOR, HCOR, DIS). Two solution
0 1 0 2 0 0.843 0.060
paths are distinguished, which correspond to fragmented (hcor * -
0 0 1 1 0 0.845 0.000
0 0 0 6 0 0.775 0.000 DIS) and centralized rent-seeking regimes (vcor * dis). The solution
hcor * DIS (-01) suggests that a lack of horizontal coordination is
Solution term
more decisive for fragmentation than a lack of vertical coordina-
Consistency Coverage tion. The solution vcor * dis (0-0) suggests that a lack of vertical
VCOR * HCOR * DIS ! ADAP 0.935 0.693 coordination is more decisive in combination with centralization
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term VCOR * HCOR * DIS
than a lack of horizontal coordination. Again, one should also note
Tisza (Hungary) (0.9, 0.65), Rhine (Netherlands) (0.8, 1), Thames (United that the consideration of PRI consistency led to discarding the
Kingdom) (0.8, 0.77), Inner Niger Delta (Mali) (0.8, 0.85), Norrström (Sweden) configuration 100 as path toward low adaptive capacity despite a
(0.75, 0.7), Olifants (South Africa) (0.6, 0.63), Raidak (Bhutan), (0.55, 0.68), quite high value of the standard consistency measure.
Catamayo/Chira (Peru) (0.55, 0.4), Elbe (Germany) (0.55, 0.7), Okavango
(Namibia) (0.55, 0.37)
4.2. Taking societal context and the presence of regulatory
frameworks into account

memberships for vertical integration (Olifants 0.6, Orange 0.45). Results from linear regression analyses within the scope of the
This difference derives from expert judgment on the degree of original Twin2Go survey provided evidence that polycentric
involvement of local governments in decision making in the two governance regimes have higher performance (Pahl-Wostl et al.,
basins. South Africa is a transition country, and regional differences 2012a,b). This result was found to be valid for diverse contexts. The
exist. However, it would not be well grounded to infer from these results showed a weaker and more context-dependent influence of
differences that horizontal without vertical coordination is a legal frameworks on performance (ibid.). FsQCA analyses provided
sufficient condition for a positive outcome. We were careful to a relatively high necessity score of 0.94 for the condition ‘presence
avoid any over-interpretation of results that depend on individual of integrative legislative frameworks in the water sector’ (LEG,
cases, which can easily happen when using QCA, which is case- Table A3). One might suspect that the state of socio-economic
sensitive. development has a major influence on the performance of
Regarding the configuration 100, only one case – the Red River – polycentric governance systems with respect to their ability to
is allocated to this configuration with a score of 0.58 for ADAP. The deal with the climate change challenge even when linear
low PRI consistency values of configurations 100 and 011 tell us regression provided no evidence on that. The presence of
that the respective set of cases provides only ambiguous support contradictory cases in the fsQCA analyses suggests that the
for sufficiency. This is also evident from Table 5, which lists results inclusion of further conditions improves the analysis. However, the
nature of influence may be more complex than what is captured by
linear regression analyses. Furthermore, context may have major
Table 5 influence on low performance. The presence of rent-seeking, for
Results for model: adap = f(VCOR, HCOR, DIS). example, which is assumed to have a major influence on
coordination, is hardly limited to the water sector but more likely
Truth table
a characteristic of the society as a whole.
VCOR HCOR DIS No. of adap Consist. PRI Therefore, we analyzed systematically the influence of adding
cases consist.
further conditions, which refer to legal frameworks (LEG) and the
0 0 1 1 1 1.000 1.000 national state of socio-economic development, respectively (cf.
0 1 0 2 1 0.990 0.940
Appendix B for information on their calculation). Since the focus of
0 0 0 6 1 0.953 0.792
1 0 1 2 1 0.968 0.775 these analyses was to analyze the influence of context, we used an
1 0 0 1 0 0.951 0.659 aggregated measure for coordination to reduce problems associ-
1 1 0 3 0 0.864 0.458 ated with limited diversity, i.e. the presence of logical remainders.
1 1 1 10 0 0.603 0.076 However, given the larger number of conditions in the extended
0 1 1 2 0 0.897 0.000
fsQCA analyses, logical remainders cannot be avoided anymore,
Solution term and we had to work with counterfactuals to receive meaningful
Consistency Coverage results. Counterfactuals refer to assumptions made about the
vcor * dis ! adap 0.924 0.588
outcomes of configurations that are not represented by observed
hcor * DIS ! adap 0.960 0.543 cases (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). We followed the
vcor * dis + hcor * DIS ! adap 0.916 0.771 suggestion of Ragin and Fiss (2008) to make a distinction between
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term vcor * dis core and contributing conditions. Core conditions are conditions
Amudarya (Uzbekistan) (0.9, 0.63), Catamayo/Chira (Ecuador) (0.67, 0.52), that are retained in the parsimonious solution. Contributing
Guayas (Ecuador) (0.67, 0.52), Baker (Chile) (0.62, 0.78), Nura (Kazakhstan) conditions are conditions that are included in the intermediate
(0.55, 0.53), Bang Pakong (Thailand) (0.52, 0.75), Biobio (Chile) (0.52, 0.83), Kosi solution but not in the parsimonious solution. The parsimonious
(Nepal) (0.52, 0.68)
and the intermediate solution terms result from different
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term hcor * DIS strategies concerning logical remainders. To achieve the parsimo-
Upper Cauca (Colombia) (0.8, 0.68), Brahmaputra (India) (0.75, 0.78), Cuareim/ nious solution, the guiding principle for determining the outcomes
Quarai (Brazil) (0.75, 0.67)
of counterfactuals is to arrive at a solution term that contains as
146 C. Pahl-Wostl, C. Knieper / Global Environmental Change 29 (2014) 139–154
few conditions and logical operators as possible. It represents a
superset of the intermediate solution, for which assumptions
about logical remainders are made on the basis of theoretical
considerations (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). Using an
aggregated measure for societal context (SOC) identified context
as neither core nor contributing condition for high performance.
The analyses for low performance showed an influence of the
societal context as contributing condition. To analyze the influence
of societal context in more depth, we used less aggregated
measures to capture economic development and institutional
effectiveness separately. The power purchase corrected national
gross domestic product (GDP) was used as a condition for the state
of economic development. The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)
was used to capture the effectiveness of formal institutions.
Table 6 summarizes results for analyzing paths toward high
adaptive capacity: ADAP = f(COR, DIS, LEG, CPI, GDP). The
intermediate solution identifies now two paths: Path 1 identifies
COR and DIS as core conditions and LEG as contributing condition.
Path 2 represents largely an alternative path for cases in European
countries with a high state of economic and institutional
development. However, one can note that unique coverage of
path 2 is very low. Only the Upper Guadiana (Spain) is not included
in the first path as well. The Guadiana is quite a difficult case, since
it is just located in between a centralized and decentralized state
with a score of 0.48 for DIS. However, due to the sensitivity of QCA
to individual cases, DIS drops out of the solution term. When the
calculations are repeated without the Guadiana case or with
including the Guadiana case with a score of 0.52 for DIS, path
2 disappears and only path 1 remains. Hence, one can conclude
that only path 1 is a robust result. This path confirms the central
role of a polycentric regime configuration (cf. Table 4). The
presence of regulatory frameworks (LEG) is a necessary but not
sufficient condition.
Table 7 summarizes major results for analyzing paths toward
low adaptive capacity: adap = f(COR, DIS, LEG, CPI, GDP). The
intermediate solution identifies now three paths: Path 1 dis * cpi
includes cases with a centralized governance regime and a low
efficiency of formal institutions. A comparison with Table 3 shows
that apart from the Chilean basins and the Upper Guadiana the
group of cases identified for this path comprises all cases with low
performance assigned to the centralized rent-seeking and to the
Table 6
Solutions for model ADAP = f(COR, DIS, LEG, CPI, GDP). 1 refers to core conditions, (1)
to contributing conditions. The Upper Guadiana is italicized, because it is the only
case in path 2 that does not follow path 1 as well.
Path 1 Path 2 Solution term
(intermediate solution)
COR 1 (1) COR * DIS * LEG + COR * LEG *
DIS 1 – CPI * GDP ! ADAP
LEG (1) 1
CPI – 1
GDP – (1)
Raw coveragea 0.766 0.433 0.811
Unique coveragea 0.378 0.045
Consistencya 0.926 0.921 0.894
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term COR * DIS * LEG (path 1)
Tisza (Hungary) (0.95, 0.65), Inner Niger Delta (Mali) (0.8, 0.85), Rhine
(Netherlands) (0.8, 1), Thames (United Kingdom) (0.8, 0.77), Olifants (South
Africa) (0.65, 0.63), Norrström (Sweden) (0.64, 0.7), Orange (South Africa) (0.58,
0.6), Raidak (Bhutan) (0.55, 0.68), Catamayo/Chira (Peru) (0.55, 0.4), Elbe
(Germany) (0.55, 0.7), Okavango (Namibia) (0.55, 0.37)
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term COR * LEG * CPI * GDP (path 2)
Thames (United Kingdom) (1, 0.77), Rhine (Netherlands) (0.95, 1), Elbe
(Germany) (0.73, 0.7), Upper Guadiana (Spain) (0.7, 0.82), Norrström (Sweden)
(0.64, 0.7)
a
Given for intermediate solution, which was derived using as assumptions that
all conditions are present.
centralized coordinated regimes. Paths 2 and 3 identify the lack of
coordination as core condition. Path 2 includes those cases where
this is combined with high centralization and weak regulatory
frameworks in the water sector. This path includes a number of
cases of the first group. It represents the unique path for the
Chilean cases. Path 3 combines weak coordination with a low state
of economic and institutional development. This group of cases
represents the unique path for those cases that can be allocated to
the fragmented governance regime ideal type (cf. Table 3). These
results suggest that the societal context and in particular the state
of institutional development measured by the effectiveness of
formal institutions constitute a central condition to explain poor
performance with respect to adaptive capacity measured by the
capacity to respond to the climate change adaptation challenge.
This explains as well why coordination is not effective despite
quite high scores in some cases.
5. Discussion
The analyses confirm the hypothesis that polycentric gover-
nance regimes defined as combining decentralization of power
with effective coordination are characterized by high adaptive
capacity. In our study, adaptive capacity refers to the ability of a
water governance system to respond to challenges arising from
and triggered by climate change. Given the fact that this measure
captures more the planning and policy development than the
implementation phase, conclusions need to be drawn with caution.
Advanced planning may be expected to be a necessary but not
sufficient condition for effective implementation. We find poly-
centric regimes predominantly in European countries with high
institutional development and high material standard of living.
Furthermore, the presence of integrative regulatory frameworks in
the water sector proved to be a necessary but not sufficient
condition. Even when the state of economic and institutional
development was not identified as necessary condition, it is helpful
to explain the performance characteristics of countries that are in a
transition phase. Two African countries can also be found in this
group of polycentric regimes: South Africa and Mali. South Africa
has one of the most progressive water legislations in the world.
However, it encounters considerable problems in implementation,
in particular due to lack of institutional capacity and human
resources (Schreiner, 2013). Hence, one might suspect that policies
developed for climate change adaptation may encounter obstacles
in the implementation phase. Mali was perceived as a model for
democratic societal development in Africa but has been shattered
in recent years by societal turmoil and conflicts. These examples
indicate that resource governance needs to be entwined with
capacity development in developing countries, and the implemen-
tation of ambitious policies needs to proceed in a realistic and
stepwise process. We argue that a polycentric governance
structure offers the potential for doing so, but leadership is
required to drive such development. Polycentricity requires a fine-
tuned and dynamic balance between top-down and bottom-up
governance (Huntjens et al., 2011).
Centralization and lack of coordination are associated with low
adaptive capacity. Furthermore, the state of institutional develop-
ment measured in our analyses by the effectiveness of formal
institutions (Corruption Perceptions Index) was identified as a
central condition to explain poor performance. Our findings
support claims that water governance reform aiming at decentral-
ization does not tackle this systemic governance problem (Brown
and Cloke, 2004, 2005; Soliman and Cable, 2011). This becomes
apparent for the cases from Latin America. Most of these countries
have been characterized by centralized governance. The water
governance systems in Latin American countries in our survey
belong to the centralized rent-seeking (Ecuador, Chile), the
 C. Pahl-Wostl, C. Knieper / Global Environmental Change 29 (2014) 139–154 147

Table 7
Solutions for model adap = f(COR, DIS, LEG, CPI, GDP). 0 refers to core conditions, (0) to contributing conditions. Cases in paths 2 and 3 that do not follow path 1 as well are
italicized.

Path 1 Path 2 Path 3 Solution term (intermediate solution)

COR – 0 0 dis * cpi cor * dis * leg cor * cpi * gdp ! adap
DIS 0 (0) –
LEG – (0) –
CPI 0 – (0)
GDP – – (0)
Raw coveragea 0.651 0.506 0.664 0.859
Unique coveragea 0.135 0.059 0.149
Consistencya 0.849 0.954 0.914 0.86

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term dis * cpi (path 1)
Amudarya (Uzbekistan) (0.92, 0.63), Kosi (Nepal) (0.75, 0.68), Nura (Kazakhstan) (0.75, 0.53), Volga (Russian Federation) (0.75, 0.68), Bang Pakong (Thailand) (0.7, 0.75),
Catamayo/Chira (Ecuador) (0.67, 0.52), Guayas (Ecuador) (0.67, 0.52), Lake Cocibolca (Nicaragua) (0.62, 0.53), Red River (Vietnam) (0.62, 0.42)

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term cor * dis * leg (path 2)
Catamayo/Chira (Ecuador) (0.67, 0.52), Guayas (Ecuador) (0.67, 0.52), Amudarya (Uzbekistan) (0.65, 0.63), Bang Pakong (Thailand) (0.65, 0.75), Baker (Chile) (0.58, 0.78),
Biobio (Chile) (0.55, 0.83)

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term cor * cpi * gdp (path 3)
Brahmaputra (India) (0.95, 0.78), Catamayo/Chira (Ecuador) (0.7, 0.52), Guayas (Ecuador) (0.7, 0.52), Nura (Kazakhstan) (0.7, 0.53), Amudarya (Uzbekistan) (0.65, 0.63),
Bang Pakong (Thailand) (0.65, 0.75), Upper Cauca (Colombia) (0.62, 0.68), Cuareim/Quarai (Brazil) (0.6, 0.67), Lake Kyoga (Uganda) (0.55, 0.48)
a
Given for intermediate solution, which was derived using as assumptions that all conditions are absent.

fragmented (Colombia, Brazil) or the centralized coordinated
(Nicaragua) regime type and have all low adaptive capacity. Efforts
toward decentralization seem not to have increased effectiveness
or supported the development of more polycentric regimes. Our
results confirm findings from a recent OECD study on ‘‘Water
Governance in Latin America and the Caribbean’’ (OECD, 2012).
Most of the 13 countries participating in this survey identified
over-fragmentation of roles and responsibilities as well as gaps in
horizontal and vertical integration as main obstacles to effective
water policy. Our results suggest a different role for vertical and
horizontal integration, respectively. In centralized rent-seeking
regimes, the lack of vertical coordination seems to be the essential
bottleneck, whereas a lack of horizontal integration seems to be
the essential bottleneck in fragmented regimes. Vertical coordina-
tion integrates across levels from strategic policy formulation,
development of operational measures to implementation and is of
particular importance for effective policy implementation (Hoorn-
beek, 2004). As operationalized in this study, vertical coordination
addresses explicitly the involvement of lower-level actors in the
whole policy process. The lack of transparent processes of
involvement and control of those in power reduces accountability,
effectiveness and efficiency. Regarding decentralization, one might
expect that decentralization is connected to some provisions for
exchange across levels. The gaps identified in horizontal coordi-
nation, which embraces integration across diverse issues and
provincial borders, suggest that coordination is ineffective in
general and that a lack of accountability, transparency and
effectiveness prevails.
The analyses did not provide clear results for centralized
coordinated regimes. Three cases were assigned to this regime
type: Lake Cocibolca (Nicaragua), Upper Guadiana (Spain), and
Volga (Russia). The Nicaraguan and the Russian basins fall in the
group where centralization is combined with ineffective formal
institutions (cf. Table 7). This suggests that coordination is not very
effective. The Guadiana case contradicts expectations, since the
value for climate change adaptation is quite high (0.82). However,
one should note though that despite advanced planning regarding
climate change adaptation, the performance of the Upper
Guadiana in managing current water problems is poor (Lopez
Sanz, 1999; Martı́nez-Santos et al., 2008a). Groundwater resources
are heavily overexploited, and long-lasting conflicts have not been
solved (Martı́nez-Santos et al., 2008b). This casts doubt on the
effectiveness of the implementation of advanced climate change
adaptation planning.
What are paths that lead toward polycentric systems rather
than fragmentation? Essential elements of polycentric governance
are a balance between bottom-up and top-down influence and the
capacity of actors to self-organize (Andersson and Ostrom, 2008;
Pahl-Wostl, 2009; Huntjens et al., 2011; Marshall et al., 2013;
Plummer et al., 2013). To function as a system, polycentric
governance systems require coordination by an overarching
system of rules. To realize such governance and respect good
governance principles is demanding. According to UNDP (1997),
good governance is participatory, consensus-oriented, account-
able, transparent, responsive, effective and efficient, equitable and
inclusive, and follows the rule of law. In our previous analysis
(Pahl-Wostl et al., 2012a,b), we found a strong correlation between
polycentricity of the water governance system and the realization
of good governance principles. One may argue about what is the
dependent and what is the independent variable. Such argument
may be futile though if polycentricity and good governance are
mutually reinforcing characteristics of the governance system. The
path toward polycentricity may be essential to build capacity for
good governance, in particular when the point of departure is a
governance system that does not comply with good governance
principles. Polycentric regimes result from emergence and self-
organization in combination with purposeful design. Such kind of
dynamics requires the combination and interactions of different
governance modes – networks, bureaucratic hierarchies, and
markets need to act in concert (Pahl-Wostl, 2009). In bureaucratic
hierarchies, regulatory processes are mainly based on formal
institutions, governmental actors play the dominant role, and
coordination is mainly achieved by top-down control. Markets are
based on a combination of formal and informal institutions, non-
state actors dominate, and interactions among actors are mainly
characterized by competitive relationships. Networks are largely
governed by informal institutions, both state and non-state actors
may participate, and coordination is mainly based on trust and
cooperation. If bureaucratic hierarchies are dysfunctional, since
the rule of law is not respected and rent-seeking behavior of
governmental actors prevails, network governance and strength-
ening the capacity of local communities to claim their rights and to
call governmental officials to be accountable may be an essential
element for improving governmental performance. Development
148 C. Pahl-Wostl, C. Knieper / Global Environmental Change 29 (2014) 139–154
that is sustainable implies not only economic growth but also
strengthening of civil society as essential force in a governance
system. Development cooperation could and should play a
stronger role in supporting the establishment of a strong civil
society with due respect for the sovereignty of countries.
Research on the interaction of governance modes in general
and in relation to polycentric governance is largely absent. The
analyses reported in this paper do not address these aspects
due to the limitations of the data available. Nevertheless, the
general approach chosen can serve as base for more in-depth
follow-up studies that focus on types of paths toward and
types of polycentric regimes and the role of governance modes
and their dynamic interaction in this respect. The work of
Basurto (2013) is one of the few examples moving in such a
direction. He applied an fsQCA approach to examine which
combinations of institutional arrangements at different jurisdic-
tional levels enable the autonomy of local biodiversity gover-
nance in the context of decentralization and maintain it in later
recentralization.
Set-theoretic approaches are a powerful tool for the identifica-
tion of causal configurations. Using fsQCA, we could go beyond the
analyses based on statistical regression analyses, which could not
identify different paths toward high and low performance,
respectively. However, the recent popularity of QCA seems not
to have kept pace with efforts to adopt standards of good practice
in method application and documentation (Schneider and
Wagemann, 2010). QCA and in particular fsQCA are by no means
trivial methods. Results may be strongly influenced by the rules for
fuzzy-set membership values or by the interpretation of consis-
tency measures. Using fsQCA avoids dichotomization, which is
particularly problematic for conditions that represent a gradient
from high to low rather than presence or absence. At the same
time, the possibility of paradoxical cases may lead to inappropriate
conclusions. Application of the new PRI consistency measure
proved to be very helpful in this respect. We strongly encourage
more applications and sharing of experiences in a wider
community of practice.
6. Conclusions
The analyses presented in this paper confirmed the hypothesis
that polycentric water governance regimes have a higher capacity
to respond to emerging challenges viz. climate change. Systematic
and more in-depth analyses are required on how horizontal and
vertical integration may be achieved, on the role of governance
modes and the role of governmental versus non-governmental
actors. Such analyses need to take into account the influence of
societal and environmental context as well as historical develop-
ment in different countries. This will finally lead to a more
differentiated theory of polycentric systems – realized kinds of
polycentric regimes and paths how to get there.
Acknowledgements
The research leading to these results has received funding
from the European Community’s Seventh Framework Programme
(FP7/2007–2013) under grant agreement n8 226571. The case
study data were collected within the scope of the FP7 project
Twin2Go, which was endorsed by the Global Water System Project
(www.gwsp.org). We thank all Twin2Go project partners and case
study experts who were involved in data collection for their
invaluable contributions.
We thank Mike McGinnis and Nadine Methner for their
insightful comments on earlier versions of the paper and Charles
Ragin for providing information on and discussions about the PRI
consistency measure. We also thank three anonymous reviewers
for their constructive comments, which helped to improve the
article.
Appendix A. Original case study data
The survey makes use of case study data from the European
research project ‘Coordinating Twinning partnerships towards more
adaptive Governance in river basins’ (Twin2Go), which ran from
2009 to 2011. During Twin2Go, researchers conducted a compar-
ative analysis by means of statistical and qualitative approaches to
detect associations between properties of water governance
regimes and their performances in the light of different
environmental and socio-economic contexts (Pahl-Wostl et al.,
2012a,b). The dataset, which is the basis of the original survey and
the re-analysis presented in this article, includes 29 case studies –
domestic river basins as well as national parts of transboundary
basins – in Europe, Latin America, Africa, as well as Central, South,
and Southeast Asia. Case study data were provided by regional
experts by means of a questionnaire within the scope of a Twin2Go
workshop series with additional post-processing.
The final version of the questionnaire applied during Twin2Go
comprises 81 indicators in three sections. The water governance
regime section (40 indicators) addresses institutional arrange-
ments and the nature of interactions between actors involved in
water management. External factors supposed to influence a water
governance regime’s performance are addressed in the context
section. Its 14 indicators deal with environmental and socio-
economic conditions. The performance section (27 indicators)
serves to appraise the success of water governance regimes
regarding the achievement of water-related Millennium Develop-
ment Goals, the realization of good governance principles,
stakeholder participation, response to climate change, the state
of the environment, and the sophistication of water management
practice.
Most indicators of the questionnaire require expert
judgment. For each of these indicators, a set of predefined answer
options exists, which describe how a phenomenon of interest may
be characterized. Regional experts chose the option that they
regarded as most appropriate for a given case study. Every answer
option is assigned to a score (e.g. A, B, or C). The score range of a
given indicator reflects an ascending order from assumed most to
least favorable manifestation. In addition to choosing an adequate
score, case study experts were asked to add a comment to explain
and justify their judgment. Some indicators are based on numerical
data from standardized sources, such as databases, maps, and data
tables from reports. Indicators were case study-specific wherever
appropriate and available. Some indicators refer to the total
catchment or the national level. Table A1 provides an example of
two indicators based on expert judgment.
The questionnaire is documented in detail by Pahl-Wostl and
Lebel (2010, updated 2011). D’Haeyer (2011) documents the
process of data collection during Twin2Go, and Pahl-Wostl et al.
(2011, updated 2012a) describe data post-processing. The
corresponding case study data have been made publicly available
in a web database (http://www.watergovernance.uni-osnab-
rueck.de/).
Two cases from the original dataset were not included in the
analyses presented in this paper: Cuareim/Quarai (Uruguay) and
Paute (Ecuador). Cuareim/Quarai (Uruguay) had bad scores in all
conditions and belonged to the centralized type. At the same time,
this case had quite a good score for climate change adaptation.
Since individual cases may have a strong influence in QCA analyses,
we wanted to avoid an over-interpretation of the changes
introduced by this single case. We do not consider this case to
 C. Pahl-Wostl, C. Knieper / Global Environmental Change 29 (2014) 139–154 149

Table A1
Example of indicators based on expert judgment.

Ind. No. Indicator Definition Answer options/data range

6 Multilevel structure of domestic water Allocation of responsibilities and
legislation and subsidiarity dependencies across administrative
levels (e.g. local, regional, national)
34 Vertical coordination (governmental) Formal provisions to support
coordination in water sector among
governmental organizations across
administrative levels
a
Cooperation means joint elaboration of strategies, plans etc. By contrast, coordination means that different actors (organizations) develop strategies, plans etc. separately,
but take into account the work and interests of other relevant actors, e.g. by consulting them.
A: Functions, responsibilities and authority are allocated
to various levels
B: Functions and responsibilities are distributed, but no authority
C: Legislation only at one level, no distribution at all
A: Cooperation and clear allocation of tasks
B: Clear allocation of tasks, and coordinationa
C: Task overlap, but coordination
D: Clear allocation of tasks, but no coordination
E: No coordination, much overlap

be strong evidence for a high adaptive capacity of centralized
regimes. Paute (Ecuador) was excluded, because it lacks data on
environmental performance measures (which are not addressed in
this article). This hampered early analyses with the fsQCA software
and led to the removal from the dataset.
The original questionnaire allowed regional experts to specify
another answer than the pre-defined options for indicators 3 and
4. Within the scope of this re-analysis, we recoded such individual
answers to the score of the most similar pre-defined option
according to comments specified by the regional experts. Table A2
documents the recoded scores.
Appendix B. Calibration: generation of fuzzy-set data
To generate an fsQCA dataset from the original Twin2Go data,
we converted the scores from expert judgment as well as the
numerical values based on standardized data sources to a data
range from 0 to 1. In the case of indicators relying on expert
judgment, we generally assigned a membership value of 1 to score
‘A’, whereas the highest score received a fuzzy-set membership
value of 0 (for indicators 1, 4, 5, and 7, two scores were converted to
0). Intermediary scores were assigned values between 0 and 1. We
did not define universal rules across all indicators concerning
which partial membership values to assign to certain intermediary
scores. Instead, we assessed separately for each indicator to which
extent the answer options underlying the scores were closer to
non-membership or full membership. Regarding indicators based
on numerical data from standardized sources, we divided the
respective data range into classes and assigned a fuzzy-set
membership value to each class, with a value of 1 indicating the
assumed most favorable manifestation of the indicator. Following
advice by Schneider and Wagemann (2007), we avoided fuzzy-set
membership values of 0.5, which do not allow determining
whether a case is more regarded as a set member or a non-
member. Such cases cannot be dealt with in fsQCA analyses.
Conversion rules for all indicators included in the fsQCA analysis
are documented in Table A3. These rules reflect careful consider-
ations by the authors. Other researchers’ judgments may deviate to
a certain extent from values that the authors regard as appropriate
within the scope of this survey. We agree with Skaaning (2011, p.
394) who argues that the calibration of data may ‘‘introduce some
degree of arbitrariness’’ to a QCA survey. We address this issue by
the disclosure of the conversion rules in Table A3. Fuzzy-set
membership values resulting from the calibration are shown in
Table A4.
Composite dimensions were calculated through the aggrega-
tion of fuzzy-set conditions. A wide range of aggregation operators
exists for fuzzy-set data (e.g. Dubois and Prade, 1985). Klir and
Folger (1988, 1995) distinguish three kinds of aggregation
operations: intersection operations, union operations, and averag-
ing operations. We applied the arithmetic mean to calculate all
composite dimensions. The reason lies in the data: Even though
data collection within the scope of the original Twin2Go survey
(Pahl-Wostl et al., 2012a,b) involved on average 3–4 experts per
case study, the qualitative assessments could not completely avoid
subjective influence that is inherent in individual judgments. This
applies to the calibration process as well. Determining an
aggregation’s value by taking the minimum value across all
included conditions, which is common in fsQCA surveys, would
mean that it reflects the value of a single indicator. To limit the
influence of single indicator values and increase the robustness of
the aggregation, we applied the arithmetic mean. Our approach is
similar to the one chosen by Basurto (2013), who averages fuzzy-
set conditions to calculate the membership value of an aggregated
outcome.
The composite aggregations are based on the following fuzzy-
set conditions:
 Distribution of power (DIS): based on conditions 6, 40, and 41
 Coordination (COR): based on conditions 5 and 34–36

Table A2
Recoded scores for indicators 3 and 4.

Ind. Casea New score Justification

3 Rhine (NL)
3 Amudarya (UZ)
4 Bang Pakong (TH)
4 Amudarya (UZ)
a
Country names in Tables A2, A4, and A5 are coded according to ISO 3166-1 alpha-2.
A Even though no indigenous use exists, traditional rights are respected for a transition period, which implies that it
remains possible to impose appropriate regulations.
– Impossible to recode, because according to the questionnaire comment, no indigenous use exists anymore. No
information about traditional use.
B The questionnaire comment highlights that domestic water law does not explicitly consider environmental impacts
(protection of the aquatic environment).
D The questionnaire comment highlights that water allocation is not well regulated, but existing water use is protected in
case the user has been given the user right.
150 C. Pahl-Wostl, C. Knieper / Global Environmental Change 29 (2014) 139–154

Table A3
Rules for the conversion of original data to fuzzy-set membership values for those indicators that were adopted in the survey (see Pahl-Wostl and Lebel (2010, updated 2011)
for more information about the indicators).

Dim. Indicator (no.) Original score/data range Fuzzy

value

DIS Distribution of legally institutionalized functions, A: Functions, responsibilities and authority are allocated to 1
responsibilities and power across levels (6) various levels
B: Functions and responsibilities are distributed, but no authority 0.3
C: Legislation only at one level, no distribution at all 0
Degree of centralization of both policy A: Not centralized system 1
development and implementation (40) B: Policy development is centralized, but implementation is 0.6
decentralized
C: Both policy development and implementation are controlled 0
by one central actor
Level of decentralization in accordance with the A: Yes 1
available technical capacity and taking into account B: No 0
of economies of scale (41)

COR, VCOR Formal provisions to support coordination in the
water sector among governmental organizations
across administrative levels (34)
Involvement of local governments in the creation of
water-related institutions at higher levels, if the
institutions affect the local level (36)
A: Cooperation and clear allocation of tasks 1
B: Clear allocation of tasks, and coordination 0.8
C: Task overlap, but coordination 0.4
D: Clear allocation of tasks, but no coordination 0.2
E: No coordination, much overlap 0
A: Local governments are involved in the creation of institutions 1
at higher levels and participate in decision-making, if they will be
affected by these institutions
B: Local governments are consulted in the creation of institutions 0.7
at higher levels, if they will be affected by these institutions
C: The role of local governments is basically restricted to the 0
implementation of institutions from higher levels

COR, HCOR National water-related regulatory framework is A: One single piece of legislation exists to coordinate/integrate 1
coordinated/integrated under one single piece of the water-related framework
legislation (5) B: A single piece of legislation does not exist, but is under 0
formation
C: A single piece of legislation does not exist 0
Formal provisions to support coordination in the A: Cooperation and clear allocation of tasks 1
water sector among governmental organizations B: Clear allocation of tasks, and coordination 0.8
across sectoral or provincial borders (35) C: Task overlap, but coordination 0.4
D: Clear allocation of tasks, but no coordination 0.2
E: No coordination, much overlap 0

ADAP Strategy for adaptation to climate change in the A: Adaptation strategy is part of a river basin plan 1
water sector (81) B: Adaptation strategy is adopted (on the national scale), and 0.7
water is explicitly mentioned
C: Adaptation strategy in development, but with no specific 0.3
reference to water
D: Nothing is going on regarding an adaptation strategy 0
Availability of specific knowledge enabling A: Specific adaptation options are identified 1
adaptation (82) B: Vulnerability assessment conducted 0.8
C: Impact assessment in the water resource sector conducted 0.6
D: Downscaled climate change scenarios are available 0.4
E: No assessment of climate change at the basin level has been 0
conducted at all
Awareness of water managers regarding adaptation A: There is a shared vision at basin level of needs to deal with 1
to climate change (83) climate change
B: Broad awareness at basin scale about the needs to deal with 0.7
water management in the context of climate change
C: Limited or no awareness about the needs to deal with water 0
management in the context of climate change
Coordinated implementation process regarding A: National water sector adaptation program under 1
adaptation to climate change: Program/Plan of implementation (donor funded initiatives, nationally owned
activities and measures (84) programs, etc.)
B: Activities are coordinated but without a national overall 0.7
program/approach
C: Activities are in place, but not coordinated 0.2
D: No activities are going on at all 0
Operational activities combining hard and soft A: Comprehensive activities (measures packages) in terms of soft 1
approaches (85) (education, public awareness programs, etc.) and hard measures
(infrastructure) are in place
B: Comprehensive activities only either in terms of soft or hard 0.7
measures are in place
C: Single activities in terms of soft and hard measures are in place 0.4
D: Single activities in terms of only either soft or hard measures 0.2
are in place
E: No measures take place at all 0
Ways to deal with climate variability (floods and A: Both reactive (like disaster response) and anticipative (e.g. 1
droughts) (86) early warning) measures are in place
B: Only either reactive or anticipative measures are in place 0.2
C: No measures are in place 0
 C. Pahl-Wostl, C. Knieper / Global Environmental Change 29 (2014) 139–154 151

Table A3 (Continued )

Dim. Indicator (no.) Original score/data range Fuzzy

value

LEG Existence of domestic water legislation (1)
Recognition of water as public good and protection
of water (2)
Recognition of traditional/indigenous water uses
(3)
Criteria for the allocation of water rights (4)
Existence of an autonomous structure for water
governance (7)
A: Domestic water legislation in place that has been implemented 1
for at least 10 years
B: Domestic water legislation in place that has been implemented 0.7
for less than 10 years
C: Domestic water legislation exists, but has not been 0.1
implemented
D: Domestic water legislation is under formation 0
E: No domestic water legislation 0
A: Water is recognized in the Domestic Water Law as being a 1
public good; adequate provisions are foreseen to protect private
water use rights; the law allows for the exercise of these
provisions to be generally regulated as needed for ecological and
social sustainability, and in the public interest
B: Water is recognized in the Domestic Water Law as being a 0.2
public good; adequate provisions are foreseen to protect private
water use rights; the law does not allow for the exercise of these
provisions to be generally regulated as needed for ecological and
social sustainability, and in the public interest
C: Water is recognized in the Domestic Water Law as being a 0.1
public good; no adequate provisions are foreseen to protect
private water use rights
D: Adequate provisions are foreseen to protect private water use 0
rights; water is not explicitly recognized as being a public good
and the law does not provide for regulations as needed to
guarantee ecological and social sustainability, in the public
interest
A: Provisions are foreseen to protect traditional and indigenous 1
water uses, while maintaining the possibility of imposing
appropriate regulations
B: Provisions are foreseen to protect traditional and indigenous 0.6
water uses, but these affect the possibility of imposing
appropriate regulations in the general public interest
C: No provisions are foreseen to protect traditional and 0
indigenous water uses
A: Due consideration is given to: availability of the resource, 1
interests of existing third party rights, protection of the aquatic
ecosystems’ ecological integrity
B: Due consideration is given to: availability of the resource and 0.3
interests of existing third party rights
C: Due consideration is given to availability of the resource 0
D: Due consideration is given to interests of existing third party 0
rights
A: Autonomous administration existing for development and/or 1
implementation
B: Autonomous administration existing for development and/or 0
implementation is planned
C: No autonomous administration in place 0

SOC Proportion of rural population (43) 0–9.9% 1

10–19.9% 0.8
20–39.9% 0.6
40–59.9% 0.4
60–79.9% 0.2
80–100% 0
Human Development Index (44) 0.900–1.000 1
0.800–0.899 0.7
0.600–0.799 0.3
0.000–0.599 0
Gini index (45) 0.0–29.9 1
30.0–39.9 0.7
40.0–49.9 0.3
50.0–100 0

SOC, GDP Gross domestic product (46) >24,000 $ per capita, PPP corrected 1
12,001–24,000 $ per capita, PPP corrected 0.7
6001–12,000 $ per capita, PPP corrected 0.3
0–6000 $ per capita, PPP corrected 0

SOC, CPI Corruption Perceptions Index (47) 7.6–10 1

5.6–7.5 0.7
3.6–5.5 0.3
0–3.5 0
152 C. Pahl-Wostl, C. Knieper / Global Environmental Change 29 (2014) 139–154

Table A4
Fuzzy-set membership values of the conditions. Conditions 46 (GDP) and 47 (CPI) have been included in Table A5.

Case study 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 34 35 36 40 41 43 44 45 81 82 83 84 85 86

Biobio (CL) 1 0.2 0.6 0.3 0 0.3 0 1 0.8 0 0 0 0.8 0.7 0 0 0.4 0 0.2 0.2 0.2
Catamayo/Chira 0.7 0.2 1 1 1 1 1 0.4 0.4 1 0.6 0 0.6 0.7 0.3 0.7 0.4 0 0.7 0.4 0.2
(PE)
Catamayo/Chira 1 0.2 0 0 0 0.3 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.6 0.7 0 0.3 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.4 0.2
(EC)
Upper Cauca 1 1 0 0.3 0 1 1 0.4 0.4 0.7 0.6 1 0.6 0.7 0 0.7 0.4 0 0.2 0.4 0.2
(CO)
Cuareim/Quarai 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0.4a 0.2 1 1 0 0.8 0.7 0 0 0.4 0 0.2 0.4 1
(BR)
Lake Cocibolca 0.1 1 1 0.3 1 0.3 0 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.6 0 0.2 0.3 0 0.3 0.4 1 0.7 0.2 0.2
(NI)
Baker (CL) 1 0.2 0.6 0.3 0 0.3 0 0.4 0.4 0 0.6 0 0.8 0.7 0 0.3 0.4 0 0.2 0.2 0.2
Guayas (EC) 1 0.2 0 0 0 0.3 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.6 0.7 0 0.3 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.4 0.2
Norrström (SE) 1 0.2 0 1 1 1 1 0.8 1 0.7 0.6 1 0.8 1 1 0.7 0.4 0.7 1 0.4 1
Nura (KZ) 0.7 1 0 1 0 1 0 0.2 0.2 0.7 0 0 0.4 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.2 0.2 0.2
Okavango (NA) 1 1 0.6 1 1 1 1 1 0.4 0.7 0.6 0 0.2 0.3 0 0.3 0.8 0.7 0.2 0 0.2
Thames (GB) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.6 1 0.8 1 0.7 1 1 1 0.7 0.7 0.2
Lake Kyoga (UG) 1 1 1 0.3 1 1 1 0.4 0.4 0 0.6 1 0 0 0.3 0.7 0.8 0 1 0.4 0.2
Inner Niger 0.7 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.6 1 0.2 0 0.7 0.7 1 1 0.7 0.7 1
Delta (ML)
Bang Pakong (TH) 0 0.1 0 0.3 0 0 1 1 0.4 0 0.6 0 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0 0 0 0.2 1
Volga (RU) 1 0.2 1 1 1 1 1 0.4 0.4 0.7 0 0 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.3 0.8 0 0.2 0.4 0.2
Raidak (BT) 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.4 1 0.6 0 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.7 0 0.7 1 0.7 1
Brahmaputra 0.7 0 0 0 0 1 0 0.2 0 0 1 0 0.2 0.3 0.7 0.3 0.4 0 0.2 0.2 0.2
(IN)
Kosi (NP) 1 0.2 0.6 0 1 1 0 1 0.4 0 0 0 0 0 0.3 0.7 0 0 1 0 0.2
Tisza (HU) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.8 1 1 1 0.6 0.7 0.7 1 0.6 1 0.7 0.4 0.2
Upper Guadiana 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.8 0.7 0 1 0.6 1 0.7 0.7 0.8 1 1 0.4 1
(ES)
Elbe (DE) 1 1 1 0.3 1 1 1 0.8 0.4 0.7 0.6 0 0.6 1 1 0.3 0.8 0.7 1 0.4 1
Rhine (NL) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.8 1 0.6 1 0.8 1 0.7 1 1 1 1 1 1
Amudarya (UZ) 1 0.1 - 0 1 0.3 0 0.2 0.2 0 0 0 0.2 0.3 0.7 0.3 0.6 0.7 0.2 0.2 0.2
Orange (ZA) 0.7 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.2 0.4 0.7 0.6 1 0.4 0.3 0 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.2 0.4 1
Red River (VN) 1 0.1 0 0.3 0 0.3 1 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.6 0 0.2 0.3 0.7 0.7 0.4 0 1 0.4 1
Olifants (ZA) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.2 0.4 1 0.6 1 0.4 0.3 0 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.2 0.4 1
a
For Cuareim/Quarai (BR), the original score of indicator 34 was transformed to a value of 1 according to the conversion rules in Table A3. But as OECD (2012) reports
problems related to vertical coordination in Brazil, the membership value was changed to 0.4.

 Coordination – vertical integration (VCOR): based on conditions
34 and 36
 Coordination – horizontal integration (HCOR): based on condi-
tions 5 and 35
 Presence of integrative regulatory frameworks in the water
sector (LEG): based on conditions 1–4 and 7
 Socio-economic development (SOC): based on conditions 43–47
 Adaptive capacity: climate change adaptation (ADAP): based on
conditions 81–86
Except for condition 40, all conditions contributed to the
calculations without weighting factors. Condition 40 was double
weighted in the calculation of the DIS dimension, because it
represents a key aspect with regard to centralization. Calculated
fuzzy-set membership values of 0.5 were recoded to 0.48. Regard-
ing VCOR, this was done for the cases Biobio, Bang Pakong, and
Kosi. With regard to DIS, the value for the Upper Guadiana was
changed. The dimensions gross domestic product (GDP) and
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) were based on the single
indicators 46 and 47, respectively. The resulting fuzzy-set
membership values of the dimensions are shown in Table A5.
Appendix C. PRI consistency
The standard consistency measure for a sufficient condition in
fsQCA reads (Ragin, 2008, p. 52):
P analyzed outcome (Yi > Yi). As a consequence of this kind of
minðX i ; Y i Þ
Consistency ¼ P (A1)
Xi
where Xi denotes the fuzzy-set membership value of case i in the
solution term X, and Yi denotes the fuzzy-set membership value of
case i in outcome Y.
Available software (fsQCA 2.0, Ragin et al., 2008) makes use of
all cases to calculate the consistency of a solution term even when
their membership in a solution term may be smaller than 0.5. As
recognized by Cooper and Glaesser (2011), this may lead to the
paradoxical result that a configuration X is regarded as sufficient
for both the outcome (X  Y) and its negation (X  Y) according to
this kind of consistency calculation. This is only possible for
X  0.5.
To avoid such problems, Ragin introduced a new PRI
consistency measure in the fsQCA software. The PRI measure is
calculated as represented in Eq. (A2) (personal communication C.
Ragin):
P P
minðX i ; Y i Þ  minðX i ; Y i ;  Y i Þ
PRI consistency ¼ P P (A2)
X i  minðX i ; Y i ;  Y i Þ
Table A6 summarizes the contribution of different kinds of
cases to the PRI consistency measure (Eq. (A2)) in comparison to
the standard consistency measure (Eq. (A1)). PRI consistency
eliminates the contribution of paradoxical cases (B). It reduces the
contribution of cases inconsistent with sufficiency for Y (Xi > Yi)
and eliminates entirely inconsistent cases where the membership
value of the negative outcome exceeds the membership of the
behavior, PRI consistency is lower for a given set of cases than the
standard consistency measure.
 C. Pahl-Wostl, C. Knieper / Global Environmental Change 29 (2014) 139–154 153

Table A5
Fuzzy-set membership values of the dimensions.

Case study DIS COR VCOR HCOR COR LEG SOC GDP (46) CPI (47) ADAP

Biobio (CL) 0.08 0.45 0.48 0.4 0.45 0.42 0.58 0.7 0.7 0.17
Catamayo/Chira (PE) 0.55 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.78 0.44 0.3 0.3 0.4
Catamayo/Chira (EC) 0.33 0 0 0 0 0.24 0.36 0.3 0 0.48
Upper Cauca (CO) 0.8 0.38 0.55 0.2 0.38 0.66 0.38 0.3 0.3 0.32
Cuareim/Quarai (BR) 0.75 0.4 0.7 0.1 0.4 0.6 0.42 0.3 0.3 0.33
Lake Cocibolca (NI) 0.38 0.83 0.75 0.9 0.83 0.48 0.1 0 0 0.47
Baker (CL) 0.38 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.42 0.58 0.7 0.7 0.22
Guayas (EC) 0.33 0 0 0 0 0.24 0.32 0.3 0 0.48
Norrström (SE) 0.8 0.88 0.75 1 0.88 0.64 0.96 1 1 0.7
Nura (KZ) 0.25 0.28 0.45 0.1 0.28 0.54 0.42 0.3 0 0.47
Okavango (NA) 0.55 0.78 0.85 0.7 0.78 0.92 0.16 0 0.3 0.37
Thames (GB) 0.8 1 1 1 1 1 0.9 1 1 0.77
Lake Kyoga (UG) 0.8 0.45 0.2 0.7 0.45 0.86 0.06 0 0 0.52
Inner Niger Delta (ML) 0.8 0.83 0.75 0.9 0.83 0.94 0.18 0 0 0.85
Bang Pakong (TH) 0.3 0.35 0.48 0.2 0.35 0.28 0.22 0.3 0 0.25
Volga (RU) 0.25 0.63 0.55 0.7 0.63 0.84 0.54 0.7 0 0.32
Raidak (BT) 0.55 0.85 1 0.7 0.85 0.8 0.22 0 0.3 0.68
Brahmaputra (IN) 0.75 0.05 0.1 0 0.05 0.14 0.24 0 0 0.22
Kosi (NP) 0.25 0.6 0.48 0.7 0.6 0.36 0.06 0 0 0.32
Tisza (HU) 1 0.95 1 0.9 0.95 1 0.6 0.7 0.3 0.65
Upper Guadiana (ES) 0.48 0.88 0.85 0.9 0.88 1 0.8 1 0.7 0.82
Elbe (DE) 0.55 0.73 0.75 0.7 0.73 0.86 0.92 1 1 0.7
Rhine (NL) 0.8 0.95 1 0.9 0.95 1 0.9 1 1 1
Amudarya (UZ) 0.08 0.35 0.1 0.6 0.35 0.28 0.24 0 0 0.37
Orange (ZA) 0.8 0.58 0.45 0.7 0.58 0.94 0.26 0.3 0.3 0.6
Red River (VN) 0.38 0.58 0.75 0.4 0.58 0.48 0.24 0 0 0.58
Olifants (ZA) 0.8 0.65 0.6 0.7 0.65 1 0.26 0.3 0.3 0.63

Table A6
Contribution of different kinds of cases to PRI consistency compared to the standard consistency measure.

Kind of case Characterized as PRI consistencya Consistencyb

(A) Consistent with sufficiency for Y, non-paradoxical Xi  Yi ðX i   Y i Þ þ N PRI (Xi + N)/(Xi + D)

Yi  Xi > Yi ðX i   Y i Þ þ DPRI
(B) Consistent with sufficiency for Y, paradoxical Xi  Yi
ðX i  X i Þ þ N PRI
Xi  Yi (Xi + N)/(Xi + D)
ðX i  X i Þ þ DPRI
(C) Inconsistent with sufficiency for Y Xi > Yi
(C1): Xi > Yi > Yi C1: (Yi + N)/(Xi + D)

ðY i   Y i Þ þ N PRI
ðX i   Y i Þ þ DPRI

(C2): Xi > Yi > Yi C2:

ðY i  Y i Þ þ N PRI
ðX i  Y i Þ þ DPRI
a P P P P
NPRI = j6¼imin(Xj, Yj)  j6¼imin(Xj, Yj,  Yj) and DPRI = DPRI = j6¼iXj  j6¼imin(Xj, Yj,  Yj).
b P P
N = j6¼imin(Xj, Yj) and D = j6¼iXj.

To avoid erroneous conclusions due to paradoxical cases, we
used consistency as defined in Eq. (A1) and PRI consistency as
defined in Eq. (A2) for determining associations between config-
urations and outcome in the truth tables. Since PRI consistency is
quite a new measure, little experience and guidelines exist on
thresholds for consistency cut-off. We used the following thresh-
olds to assign individual configurations of conditions as a path for a
certain outcome: consistency  0.9 and PRI consistency  0.7.
References
Achterhuis, H., Boelens, R.A., Zwarteveen, M.Z., 2010. Water property relations and
modern policy regimes: neoliberal utopia and the disempowerment of collec-
tive action. In: Boelens, R.A., Getches, D., Guevara-Gil, A. (Eds.), Out of the
Mainstream. Water Rights, Politics and Identity. Earthscan, London, UK, pp. 27–
55.
Aligica, P., Tarko, V., 2012. Polycentricity: from Polanyi to Ostrom, and beyond.
Governance 25, 237–262.
Andersson, K.P., Ostrom, E., 2008. Analyzing decentralized resource regimes from a
polycentric perspective. Policy Sci. 41, 71–93.
Aubin, D., Varone, F., 2004. The evolution of European water policy: towards
integrated resource management at EU level. In: Kissling-Näf, I., Kuks, S.
(Eds.), The Evolution of National Water Regimes in Europe. Transitions in Water
Rights and Water Policies. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht/Boston/
London, UK, pp. 49–86.
Bakker, K.J., 2010. Privatizing Water: Governance Failure and the World’s Urban
Water Crisis. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY.
Basurto, X., 2013. Linking multi-level governance to local common-pool resource
theory using fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis: insights from twenty
years of biodiversity conservation in Costa Rica. Global Environ. Change 23,
573–587.
Blomquist, W., Schlager, E., 2005. Political pitfalls of integrated watershed manage-
ment. Soc. Nat. Resour. 18, 101–117.
Boelens, R.A., Getches, D., Guevara-Gil, A. (Eds.), 2010. Out of the Mainstream.
Water Rights, Politics and Identity. Earthscan, London, UK.
Brown, E., Cloke, J., 2004. Neoliberal reform, governance and corruption in the
south: assessing the international anti-corruption crusade. Antipode 36, 272–
294.
Brown, E., Cloke, J., 2005. Neoliberal reform, governance and corruption in Central
America: exploring the Nicaraguan case. Polit. Geogr. 24, 601–630.
Cooper, B., Glaesser, J., 2011. Paradoxes and pitfalls in using fuzzy set QCA:
illustrations from a critical review of a study of educational inequality. Sociol.
Res. Online 16 (3), 8.
D’Haeyer, T. (Ed.), 2011. Assembled Report on the Case Study Review Workshops. .
(online). Available from: http://www.twin2go.uos.de/downloads/deliverables/
168-d2-1-report-case-study-review-workshops [=Twin2Go Deliverable No. 2.1]
Dubois, D., Prade, H., 1985. A review of fuzzy set aggregation connectives. Inf. Sci.
36, 85–121.
Folke, C., Hahn, T., Olsson, P., Norberg, J., 2005. Adaptive governance of social–
ecological systems. Annu. Rev. Environ. Resour. 30, 441–473.
154 C. Pahl-Wostl, C. Knieper / Global Environmental Change 29 (2014) 139–154
Hooghe, L., Marks, G., 2003. Unraveling the central state but how? Types of multi-
level governance. APSR 97, 233–243.
Hoornbeek, J., 2004. Policy-making institutions and water policy outputs in the
European Union and the United States: a comparative analysis. J. Eur. Public
Policy 11 (3), 461–496.
Huntjens, P., Pahl-Wostl, C., Rihoux, B., Flachner, Z., Neto, S., Koskova, R., Schlueter,
M., Nabide Kiti, I., Dickens, C., 2011. Adaptive water management and policy
learning in a changing climate. EPG 21, 145–163.
Ingram, H., 2011. Beyond universal remedies for good water governance. In:
Garrido, A., Ingram, H. (Eds.), Water for Food in a Changing World. Routledge,
Miltorn Park, UK, pp. 241–261.
Klir, G.J., Folger, T.A., 1988. Fuzzy Sets, Uncertainty, and Information. Prentice Hall,
Englewood Cliffs, USA.
Klir, G.J., Folger, T.A., 1995. Fuzzy Sets and Fuzzy Logic: Theory and Applications.
Prentice Hall PTR, Upper Saddle River, USA.
Krysanova, V., Dickens, C., Timmerman, J., Varela-Ortega, C., Schlüter, M., Roest,
K., Huntjens, P., Jaspers, F., Buiteveld, H., Moreno, E., Pedraza Carrera, J.,
Slámová, R., Martı́nková, M., Blanco, I., Esteve, P., Pringle, K., Pahl-Wostl, C.,
Kabat, P., 2010. Cross-comparison of climate change adaptation strategies
across large river basins in Europe, Africa and Asia. Water Resour. Manage.
24, 4121–4160.
Lieberman, E.S., 2011. The perils of polycentric governance for infectious disease in
South Africa. Soc. Sci. Med. 73, 676–684.
Lopez Sanz, G., 1999. Irrigated agriculture in the Guadiana river high basin (Castilla-
la Mancha, Spain): environmental and socioeconomic impacts. Agric. Water
Manage. 40, 171–181.
Mansbridge, J., 2014. The role of the state in governing the commons. Environ. Sci.
Policy 36, 8–10.
Marshall, G., Conell, D., Taylor, B., 2013. Australia’s Murray–Darling basin: a century
of polycentric experiments in cross-border integration of water resources
management. Int. J. Water Gov. 1, 197–218.
Martı́nez-Santos, P., de Stefano, L., Llamas, R., Martı́nez-Alfaro, P., 2008a. Wetland
restoration in the Mancha Occidental aquifer, Spain: a critical perspective on
water, agricultural and environmental policies. Restor. Ecol. 16, 511–521.
Martı́nez-Santos, P., Llamas, R., Martı́nez-Alfaro, P.E., 2008b. Vulnerability assess-
ment of groundwater resources: a modelling-based approach to the Mancha
Occidental aquifer, Spain. Environ. Model. Softw. 23, 1145–1162.
McGinnis, M., Ostrom, E., 2011. Reflections on Vincent Ostrom, public administra-
tion and polycentricity. Public Adm. Rev. 72, 15–25.
OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development), 2012. Water
Governance in Latin America and the Caribbean: A Multi-level Approach.
OECD Studies on Water. OECD Publishing, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/
9789264174542- en.
Ostrom, E., 1972. Metropolitan Reform: Propositions Derived from Two Traditions.
Soc. Sci. Q. 53, 474–493.
Ostrom, E., 2001. Vulnerability and polycentric governance systems IHDP (Interna-
tional Human Dimensions Programme on Global Environmental Change) News-
letter UPDATE no. 3, 1. , pp. 3–4.
Ostrom, E., 2010a. Polycentric systems for coping with collective action and global
environmental change. Global Environ. Change 20, 550–557.
Ostrom, E., 2010b. Beyond markets and states: polycentric governance of complex
economic systems. Am. Econ. Rev. 100, 641–672.
Ostrom, E., Parks, R.B., Whitaker, G.P., 1978. Patterns of Metropolitan Policing.
Ballinger, Cambridge, MA, USA.
Ostrom, V., Tiebout, C.M., Warren, R., 1961. The organization of government in
metropolitan areas: a theoretical inquiry. APSR 55, 831–842.
Pahl-Wostl, C., 2007. Transition towards adaptive management of water facing
climate and global change. Water Resour. Manage. 21, 49–62.
Pahl-Wostl, C., 2009. A conceptual framework for analysing adaptive capacity and
multi-level learning processes in resource governance regimes. Global Environ.
Change 19, 354–365.
Pahl-Wostl, C., Conca, K., Kramer, A., Maestu, J., Schmidt, F., 2013. Missing links in
global water governance: a processes-oriented analysis. Ecol. Soc. 18, 33.
Pahl-Wostl, C., Jeffrey, P., Isendahl, I., Brugnach, M., 2011. Maturing the new water
management paradigm: progressing from aspiration to practice. Water Resour.
Manage. 25, 837–856.
Pahl-Wostl, C., Lebel, L. (Eds.), 2010, updated 2011 Report on Methodological Frame-
work for Comparing Project Results as well as for Deriving and Evaluating Best
Practices. . (online). Available from: http://www.twin2go.uos.de/downloads/deli-
verables/167-d1-3-comparative-methods-v2 [= Twin2Go Deliverable No. 1.3]
Pahl-Wostl, C., Lebel, L., Knieper, C., D’Haeyer, T. (Eds.), 2011, updated 2012
Synthesis Report. Context-Sensitive Comparative Analysis of Associations be-
tween Water Governance Properties and Performance in Water Management. .
(online). Available from: http://www.twin2go.uos.de/downloads/deliverables/
170-d2-3-synthesis-report-v2 [= Twin2Go Deliverable No. 2.3]
Pahl-Wostl, C., Lebel, L., Knieper, C., Nikitina, E., 2012b. From applying simplistic
panaceas to mastering complexity: towards adaptive governance in river
basins. Environ. Sci. Policy 23, 24–34.
Plummer, R., Spiert, A., FitzGibbon, J., Imhof, J., 2013. The expanding institutional
context for water resources management: the case of the Grand River water-
shed. Can. Water Resour. J. 30, 227–244.
Ragin, C.C., 1987. The Comparative Method. Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quan-
titative Strategies. University of California Press, Berkeley/Los Angeles/London.
Ragin, C.C., 2008. Redesigning Social Inquiry: Fuzzy Sets and Beyond. University of
Chicago Press, Chicago, USA.
Ragin, C.C., 2009. Qualitative comparative analysis using fuzzy sets (fsQCA). In:
Rihoux, B., Ragin, C.C. (Eds.), Configurational Comparative Methods. Qualitative
Comparative Analysis (QCA) and Related Techniques. SAGE Publications.
Ragin, C.C., Strand, I., Rubinson, C., 2008. User’s Guide to Fuzzy Sets/Qualitative
Comparative Analysis. Department of Sociology, University of Arizona, In:
http://www.u.arizona.edu/cragin/fsQCA/download/fsQCAManual.pdf.
Ragin, C., Fiss, P., 2008. Net effects versus configurations: an empirical demonstra-
tion. In: Ragin, C. (Ed.), Redesigning Social Inquiry: Fuzzy Sets and Beyond. The
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, USA, pp. 190–212.
Rihoux, B., Ragin, C. (Eds.), 2009. Configurational Comparative Methods: Qualitative
Comparative Analysis (QCA) and Related Techniques. Applied Social Research
Methods Series, 51. Sage, Los Angeles, USA.
Skaaning, S.-E., 2011. Assessing the robustness of crisp-set and fuzzy-set QCA
results. Sociol. Methods Res. 40 (2), 391–408.
Schneider, C., Wagemann, C., 2007. Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) und
Fuzzy Sets. Ein Lehrbuch für Anwender und alle, die es werden wollen. Verlag
Barbara Budrich, Opladen/Farmington Hills.
Schneider, C., Wagemann, C., 2010. Standards of good practice in Qualitative
Comparative Analysis (QCA) and fuzzy-sets. Comp. Sociol. 9, 1–22.
Schneider, C., Wagemann, C., 2012. Set-Theoretic Methods for the Social Sciences: A
Guide to Qualitative Comparative Analysis. Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge, UK.
Schreiner, B., 2013. Viewpoint – why has the South African national water act been
so difficult to implement? Water Altern. 6 (2), 239–245.
Silveira, A., Richards, K.E., 2013. The link between polycentrism and adaptive
capacity in river basin governance systems: insights from the River Rhine
and Zhujiang (Pearl River) basin. Ann. Assoc. Am. Geogr. 103, 319–329.
Soliman, H., Cable, S., 2011. Sinking under the weight of corruption: neoliberal
reform, political accountability and justice. Curr. Sociol. 59, 735–753.
Tullock, G., 2008. Public Goods, Redistribution and Rent Seeking. Edward Elgar
Publishing.
UNDP (United Nations Development Programme), 1997. Governance for Sustain-
able Human Development UNDP Policy Document, In: http://mirror.undp.org/
magnet/policy/.
Vogel, E., 2012. Parcelling out the watershed: the recurring consequences of
organising Columbia River management within a basin-based territory. Water
Altern. 5, 161–190.
Wilder, M., Romero Lankao, P., 2006. Paradoxes of decentralization: water reform
and social implications in Mexico. World Dev. 34, 1977–1995.
World Bank, 1993. Water Resources Management: A World Bank Policy Paper. The
World Bank, Washington, D.C., USA.