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POLITICAL LAW>Public Officers>Cancellation of CoC on the Basis of Perpetual Absolute

Disqualification

ROMEO G. JALOSJOS, Petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MARIA ISABELLE G.


CLIMACO-SALAZAR, ROEL B. NATIVIDAD, ARTURO N. ONRUBIA, AHMAD NARZAD K.
SAMPANG, JOSE L. LOBREGAT, ADELANTE ZAMBOANGA PARTY, AND ELBERT C. ATILANO,
Respondents.
G.R. NO. 205033; June 13, 2013

FACTS: On November 16, 2001, the Court promulgated its decision convicting the petitioner by final
judgment. He was sentenced to suffer the principal penalties of reclusion perpertua and reclusion
temporal for each count, respectively, which carried the accessory penalty of absolute perpetual
disqualification pursuant to Article 41 of the RPC. On April 30, 2007, President GMA issued an order
commuting his prison term to sixteen (16) years, three (3) months and three (3) days.

On April 26, 2012, petitioner applied to register as a voter in Zamboanga City. However, because of his
previous conviction, his application was denied by the Acting City Election Officer of the Election
Registration Board (ERB), prompting him to file a Petition for Inclusion in the Permanent List of Voters
before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Zamboanga City. Pending resolution of the same, he filed a
CoCon October 5, 2012, seeking to run as mayor for Zamboanga City in the local elections. In his CoC,
petitioner stated that he is eligible for the said office and that the is a registered voter of Barangay Tetuan,
Zamboanga City.

On October 18, 2012,the MTCC denied his Petition for Inclusion on account of his perpetual absolute
disqualification which in effect, deprived him of the right to vote in any election. Such denial was affirmed
by the Regional Trial Court in its Order which, pursuant to Section 138 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 881, as
amended, otherwise known as the "Omnibus Election Code" (OEC), was immediately final and executory.

The COMELEC En Banc issued motu proprio Resolution No. 9613 on January 15, 2013, resolving "to
CANCEL and DENY due course the Certificate of Candidacy filed by Romeo G. Jalosjos as Mayor of
Zamboanga City in the May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections" due to his perpetual absolute
disqualification as well as his failure to comply with the voter registration requirement.

ISSUE #1: Did the COMELEC En Banc act beyond its jurisdiction when it issued motu proprio Resolution
No. 9613 and in so doing, violated petitioner’s right to due process?

ISSUE #2: Had petitioner's perpetual absolute disqualification to run for elective office already been
removed by Section 40 (a) of the Local Government Code?

HELD #1: The COMELEC En Banc did not exercise its quasi-judicial functions when it issued Resolution
No. 9613 as it did not assume jurisdiction over any pending petition or resolve any election case before it
or any of its divisions. Rather, it merely performed its duty to enforce and administer election laws in
cancelling petitioner's CoC on the basis of his perpetual absolute disqualification, the fact of which had
already been established by his final conviction. In this regard, the COMELEC En Banc was exercising its
administrative functions, dispensing with the need for a motion for reconsideration of a division ruling
under Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution, the same being required only in quasi-judicial
proceedings.

The denial of due course to and/or cancellation of one's CoC generally necessitates the exercise of the
COMELEC's quasi-judicial functions commenced through a petition based on either Sections 12 or 78of
the OEC, or Section 40 of the LGC, when the grounds therefor are rendered conclusive on account of
final and executory judgments as when a candidate’s disqualification to run for public office is based on a
final conviction.

There is also no violation of procedural due process since the COMELEC En Banc would be acting in a
purely administrative manner.
HELD #2: he petitioner was sentenced to suffer the principal penalties of reclusion perpetua and
reclusion temporal which, pursuant to Article 41 of the RPC, carried with it the accessory penalty of
perpetual absolute disqualification and in turn, pursuant to Article 30 of the RPC, disqualified him to run
for elective office. As discussed, Section 40 (a) of the LGC would not apply to cases wherein a penal
provision such as Article 41 in this case directly and specifically prohibits the convict from running for
elective office. Hence, despite the lapse of two (2) years from petitioner's service of his commuted prison
term, he remains bound to suffer the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification which
consequently, disqualifies him to run as mayor for Zamboanga City.

It is well to note that the use of the word "perpetual" in the aforementioned accessory penalty connotes a
lifetime restriction and in this respect, does not depend on the length of the prison term, which is imposed
as its principal penalty. Instructive on this point is the Court's ruling in Lacuna v. Abes, where the Court
explained the meaning of the term "perpetual" as applied to the penalty of disqualification to run for public
office.

The accessory penalty of temporary absolute disqualification disqualified the convict for public office and
for the right to vote, such disqualification to last only during the term of the sentence (Article 27,
paragraph 3, & Article 30, Revised Penal Code) that, in the case of Abes, would have expired on 13
October 1961.

But this does not hold true with respect to the other accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification
for the exercise of the right of suffrage. This accessory penalty deprives the convict of the right to vote or
to be elected to or hold public office perpetually, as distinguished from temporary special disqualification,
which lasts during the term of the sentence.
POLITICAL LAW>Public Officers>Simple Misconduct

RIA PAMELA B. ABULENCIA and BLESSIE M. BURGONIO, Complainants, vs.


REGINO R. HERMOSISIMA, SECURITY GUARD II, SHERIFF AND SECURITY DIVISION,
SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondent.
A.M. SB-13-20-P; June 26, 2013

FACTS: On April 25, 2012, respondent inquired from the complainants about the status of the
computation of the loyalty differential of Sandiganbayan employees. The complainants replied that they
were still finalizing the computation based on the new directives of the Finance Division. Respondent then
said, "Bakit nyo pinapatagal?"2 to which complainant Burgonio replied, "Matalino ka naman, ikaw na
gumawa nyan!"3 Taken aback by the latter's response, respondent in a loud angry voice uttered, "Mga
putang-ina nyo, ang bobobo nyo! Ang ta-tanga nyo, ayusin nyo yang trabaho nyo!"

Complainants filed an administrative case for grave misconduct. In a Resolution7 dated October 22,
2012, Associate Justice Herrera, Jr. found the respondent guilty of simple misconduct only and
recommended the penalty of one (1) month and one (1) day suspension from office

ISSUE: WON respondent is guilty of simple misconduct?

HELD: Misconduct has been defined as an intentional wrongdoing or a deliberate violation of a rule of law
or standard of behavior, especially by a government official. A misconduct is grave where the elements of
corruption, a clear intent to violate the law, or a flagrant disregard of established rules are present.
Otherwise, a misconduct is only simple.9Accordingly, simple misconduct has been defined as an
unacceptable behavior which transgresses the established rules of conduct for public officers, work-
related or not.

In the case at bar, respondent's act of hurling invectives on the complainants during office hours and
within the court premises was correctly held to be a case of simple misconduct. Verily, respondent’s foul
and vulgar utterances, albeit not work related, constitute clear deviations from the established norms of
conduct which ought to be followed by public officers. For such infractions, it cannot be gainsaid that
respondent should be held administratively liable for the same.

The conduct and behavior of every official and employee of an agency involved in the administration of
justice, from the presiding judge to the most junior clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden
of responsibility. Their conduct must at all times be characterized by strict propriety and decorum so as to
earn and keep the public's respect for the judiciary. Any fighting or misunderstanding among court
employees becomes a disgraceful sight reflecting adversely on the good image of the judiciary.
Professionalism, respect for the rights of others, good manners, and right conduct are expected of all
judicial officers and employees. This standard is applied with respect to a court employee's dealings not
only with the public but also with his or her co-workers in the service. Conduct violative of this standard
quickly and surely corrodes respect for the courts.
POLITICAL LAW>Public Officers>Right to Speedy Trial

RAFAEL L. COSCOLLUELA, Petitioner, vs.


SANBIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
EDWIN N. NACIONALES, ERNESTO P. MALVAS, and JOSE MA. G. AMUGOD, Petitioners, vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the
OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Respondents.
G.R. No. 191411, G.R. No. 191871; July 15, 2013

FACTS: Coscolluela served as governor of the Province of Negros Occidental (Province) for three (3) full
terms until June 30, 2001. Nacionales served as his Special Projects Division Head, Amugod as
Nacionales’ subordinate, and Malvas as Provincial Health Officer. On November 9, 2001, the Office of the
Ombudsman received a letter-complaint6 dated November 7, 2001 from People’s Graftwatch, requesting
that the former investigate the anomalous purchase of medical and agricultural equipment for the
Province in the amount of ₱20M which allegedly happened around a month before Coscolluela stepped
down from office.

Acting on the letter-complaint, the Case Building Team of the Office of the Ombudsman conducted its
investigation, resulting in the issuance of a Final Evaluation Report7 dated April 16, 2002 which upgraded
the complaint into a criminal case against petitioners.8 Consequently, petitioners filed their respective
counter-affidavits. Graft Investigator found probable cause but the final approval of Acting Ombudsman
Orlando C. Casimiro (Casimiro), came only on May 21, 2009, and on June 19, 2009, the Information was
filed before the SB. On July 9, 2009, Coscolluela filed a Motion to Quash,12 arguing, among others, that
his constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases was violated as the criminal charges against him
were resolved only after almost eight (8) years since the complaint was instituted. Nacionales, Malvas,
and Amugod later adopted Coscolluela’s motion.

ISSUE: WON there was a violation of the petitioner’s right to speedy trial?

HELD: The petitions are meritorious.

SEC. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-
judicial, or administrative bodies.

Initially embodied in Section 16, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, the aforesaid constitutional provision
is one of three provisions mandating speedier dispensation of justice. It guarantees the right of all
persons to "a speedy disposition of their case"; includes within its contemplation the periods before,
during and after trial, and affords broader protection than Section 14(2), which guarantees just the right to
a speedy trial. It is more embracing than the protection under Article VII, Section 15, which covers only
the period after the submission of the case. The present constitutional provision applies to civil, criminal
and administrative cases. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)

Thus, in view of the unjustified length of time miring the Office of the Ombudsman’s resolution of the case
as well as the concomitant prejudice that the delay in this case has caused, it is undeniable that
petitioners’ constitutional right to due process and speedy disposition of cases had been violated. As the
institutional vanguard against corruption and bureaucracy, the Office of the Ombudsman should create a
system of accountability in order to ensure that cases before it are resolved with reasonable dispatch and
to equally expose those who are responsible for its delays, as it ought to determine in this case.

Corollarily, for the SB’s patent and utter disregard of the existing laws and jurisprudence surrounding the
matter, the Court finds that it gravely abused its discretion when it denied the quashal of the Information.
Perforce, the assailed resolutions must be set aside and the criminal case against petitioners be
dismissed.
POLITICAL LAW>Public Officers>Essence of Procedural Due Process: Right to notice and real
opportunity to be heard

HON. HERMOGENES E. EBDANE, JR., IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ACTING SECRETARY OF


THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS (DPWH), et. al., Petitioners, vs. ALVARO
Y. APURILLO, ERDA P. GABRIANA, JOCELYN S. JO, IRAIDA R. LASTIMADO, AND FRANCISCO B.
VINEGAS, JR., Respondents.
G.R. No. 204172; December 09, 2015

FACTS: An anonymous complaint was received by the DPWH BAC Assistant Head from an alleged
concerned employee of the DPWH, Tacloban City, claiming that R.M. Padillo Builders (RMPB), a local
contractor, won the bidding for the construction of the Lirang Revetment Project (subject project), despite
its non-inclusion in the list of Registered Construction Firms (RCF) which were qualified to bid. Said
complaint was forwarded to DPWH Head of Internal Affairs Office via an indorsement letter stating that
under Department Order No. 2, Series of 2001 (DPWH DO No. 2),only contractors duly registered in the
RCF and holding a valid Contractor's Registration Certificate issued by the BAC-TWG shall be allowed to
participate in any bidding, per the requirement in the Invitation to Apply for Eligibility and to Bid.

Subpoena was issued which directed Engr. Gervasio T. Baldos (Engr. Baldos), OIC District Engineer of
the DPWH Tacloban City Sub-District Engineering Office (DPWH Sub-District Office), to answer/comment
on the anonymous complaint and, accordingly, submit documents in relation to the award of the subject
project to the allegedly unregistered contractor.

Formal Charge served upon them did not state the nature and substance of the charge/s hurled against
them. For these reasons, respondents demanded that a formal investigation be conducted. petitioners
filed a Motion to Dismiss, claiming non-exhaustion of administrative remedies and failure to state a cause
of action, but was denied in an Order

ISSUE: WON basic requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be heard were complied with?

HELD: The essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a
real opportunity to be heard. In administrative proceedings, as in the case at bar, procedural due
process simply means the opportunity to explain one's side or the opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. "To be heard" does not mean only verbal
arguments in court; one may also be heard thru pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through
oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.

In Vivo v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, the Court ruled that any procedural defect in
the proceedings taken against the government employee therein was cured by his filing of a motion for
reconsideration and by his appealing the adverse result to the administrative agency (in that case, the
Civil Service Commission [CSC]). Also, in Gonzales v. CSC, it was held that any defect in the observance
of due process is cured by the filing of a motion for reconsideration, and that denial of due process cannot
be successfully invoked by a party who was afforded the opportunity to be heard. Similarly, in Autencio v.
Mañara,the Court observed that defects in procedural due process may be cured when the party has
been afforded the opportunity to appeal or to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.

In this case, the Court finds that while there were missteps in the proceedings conducted before the
DPWH, namely: (a) respondents were not made to file their initial comment on the anonymous complaint;
and (b) no preliminary investigation was conducted before the filing of the Formal Charge against them,
contrary to the sequential procedure under the URACCS,55 they were, nonetheless, accorded a fair
opportunity to be heard.
POLITICAL LAW>Public Officers>Strict Scrutiny Test; Right of Suffrage; Compelling State Interest

KABATAAN PARTY LIST, et. al., Petitioners, vs.


COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
G.R. No. 221318; December 16, 2015

FACTS: RA 10367 mandates the COMELEC to implement a mandatory biometrics registration system for
new voters in order to establish a clean, complete, permanent, and updated list of voters through the
adoption of biometric technology.

RA 10367 likewise directs that “registered voters whose biometrics have not been captured shall submit
themselves for validation.” “Voters who fail to submit for validation on or before the last day of filing
of application for registration for purposes of the May 2016 elections shall be deactivated x x x.”

COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9721 as amended by Resolutions No. 9863 and 10013. Among others,
the said Resolution provides that: “the registration records of voters without biometrics data who failed to
submit for validation on or before the last day of filing of applications for registration for the purpose of the
May 9, 2016 National and Local Elections shall be deactivated.

Herein petitioners filed the instant petition with application for temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction (WPI) assailing the constitutionality of the biometrics validation
requirement imposed under RA 10367, as well as COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863, and 10013, all
related thereto.

ISSUE #1: WON the statutory requirement of biometrics validation is an unconstitutional requirement of
literacy and property?

ISSUE #2: WON biometrics validation passes the strict scrutiny test.

ISSUE #3: WON Resolution No. 9863 which fixed the deadline for validation on October 31, 2015 violates
Section 8 of RA 8189.

HELD #1: NO. The Court held that biometrics validation is not a “qualification” to the exercise of the right
of suffrage, but a mere aspect of the registration procedure, of which the State has the right to reasonably
regulate.

The Court reiterated their ruling in several cases that registration regulates the exercise of the right of
suffrage. It is not a qualification for such right. The process of registration is a procedural limitation on the
right to vote.

Thus, although one is deemed to be a “qualified elector,” he must nonetheless still comply with the
registration procedure in order to vote.

Thus, unless it is shown that a registration requirement rises to the level of a literacy, property or other
substantive requirement as contemplated by the Framers of the Constitution -that is, one which
propagates a socio-economic standard which is bereft of any rational basis to a person’s ability to
intelligently cast his vote and to further the public good -the same cannot be struck down as
unconstitutional, as in this case.

HELD #2: In applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling, rather than substantial,
governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for achieving that interest, and the
burden befalls upon the State to prove the same.
Respondents have shown that the biometrics validation requirement under RA 10367 advances a
compelling state interest. It was precisely designed to facilitate the conduct of orderly, honest, and
credible elections by containing -if not eliminating, the perennial problem of having flying voters, as well
as dead and multiple registrants. The foregoing consideration is unquestionably a compelling state
interest.

Section 6 of Resolution No. 9721 sets the procedure for biometrics validation, whereby the registered
voter is only required to: (a) personally appear before the Office of the Election Officer; (b) present a
competent evidence of identity; and (c) have his photo, signature, and fingerprints recorded.

Moreover, RA 10367 and Resolution No. 9721 did not mandate registered voters to submit themselves to
validation every time there is an election. In fact, it only required the voter to undergo the validation
process one (1) time, which shall remain effective in succeeding elections, provided that he remains an
active voter.

Lastly, the failure to validate did not preclude deactivated voters from exercising their right to vote in the
succeeding elections. To rectify such status, they could still apply for reactivation.

HELD #3: Section 8 of RA 8189 provides that:

System of Continuing Registration of Voters. – x x x No registration shall, however, be conducted during


the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and ninety (90) days before a
special election.

The Court held that the 120-and 90-day periods stated therein refer to the prohibitive period beyond
which voter registration may no longer be conducted. The subject provision does not mandate COMELEC
to conduct voter registration up to such time; rather, it only provides a period which may not be reduced,
but may be extended depending on the administrative necessities and other exigencies.
POLITICAL LAW>Public Officers>Moonlighting

ANTONIO A. FERNANDEZ, Complainant, vs.


MILA A. ALERTA, Respondent.
A.M. No. P-15-3344 (Resolution); January 13, 2016

FACTS: Complainant engaged the services of respondent to cause the transfer to the former's name the
Original Certificate of Title (OCT), which covers the parcel of land he bought from one Arones.3 According
to complainant, he gave respondent original copies of the following documents to facilitate the transfer:
(a) deed of absolute sale; (b) capital gains tax certificate; (c) OCT; and (d) tax declaration,4 as evidenced
by an acknowledgment receipt,5 and paid respondent the amount of P15k for his services for which the
latter did not issue any receipt.6

After over nineteen (19) years, respondent still had not caused the transfer to complainant's name.7 Thus,
in 2 succeeding letters, complainant, through his counsel, demanded the return of the documents
previously transmitted to respondent, but to no avail. Hence, complainant instituted an administrative
case.

In her Comment, respondent admitted that she was engaged by complainant to process the transfer of
OCT in his name and received the documents, but denied receipt of Pl5k. She clarified that the sale from
Arones actually covered three (3) parcels of land, and that she was able to complete the transfer of two
(2) parcels of land. With respect to the third parcel of land, respondent explained that she could not
facilitate its transfer because the latter failed to pay the capital gains tax due thereon, and that, due to her
change of residence and the heavy workload at the RTC, she inadvertently forgot about it until she was
reminded of it by complainant sometime in 2013.

ISSUE: WON respondent should be held administratively liable?

HELD: In a number of administrative cases, officers and employees of the judiciary engaging in any
private business, vocation or profession without prior approval of the Court were adjudged guilty of
"moonlighting."

Under the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Services, "moonlighting" is denominated as
the light offense of "[t]he pursuit of a private business or vocation without the permission required under
Civil Service rules and regulations." It is punishable by reprimand for the first offense, suspension from
office for a period of one (1) to thirty (30) days for the second offense, and dismissal from service for the
third offense.

In this case, respondent's administrative liability for "moonlighting" remains undisputed as she, in fact,
readily admitted that she endeavored to process the transfer of OCT No. T-11566 in complainant's name
as agreed upon by them. On the other hand, respondent's engagement was clearly in pursuit of a private
business venture, akin to the services offered by real estate brokers.

Indeed, case law dictates that officials and employees of the judiciary must serve with the highest degree
of responsibility and integrity and are enjoined to conduct themselves with propriety even in private life, as
any reproach to them is bound to reflect adversely on their office. As such, they are prohibited from
engaging directly in any private business, vocation, or profession even outside office hours to ensure full-
time service so that there may be no undue delay in the administration of justice and in the disposition of
cases as required by prevailing rules.
POLITICAL LAW>Public Officers> Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service;
Dishonesty

JULIUS E. PADUGA, Complainant, vs. ROBERTO "BOBBY" R. DIMSON, SHERIFF IV, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF VALENZUELA CITY, BRANCH 171, Respondent.

FACTS: Complainant alleged that respondent personally attended to the execution proceedings in
connection with a decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 221, despite not
having been deputized by said court to do so. He also claimed that respondent is a sheriff of an entirely
different court, Br. 171, averring further that: (a) respondent personally went with the sheriff of Br. 221 to
complainant's address for the purpose of enforcing the aforesaid Br. 221 ruling; (b) respondent attended
the conference between the parties-litigants in the case decided by Br. 221; (c) respondent returned to
complainant's address to check if the latter's group already complied with the notice to vacate issued by
Br. 221, and even threatened them to call police; (d) respondent personally supervised the execution of
the ruling and even handed financial assistance to those who voluntarily vacated the property; and (e)
respondent returned to the property and supervised its fencing.

Complying with the OCA's directive, respondent submitted his Comment denying the charges. He
explained that as a brother-in-law of one of the counsels in the case ruled upon by Br. 221, he only
assisted in the implementation of the amicable settlement in order to prevent physical conflict. Finally,
respondent claimed that he never introduced himself as a sheriff of another court and that he did all these
things in his personal capacity and never during official time. In a Memorandum dated December 8, 2017,
the OCA recommended, inter alia, that respondent be found guilty of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service, Less Serious Dishonesty, and Simple Neglect of Duty

ISSUE: WON respondent should be held administratively liable for the acts complained of.

HELD: The Court adopts the findings and the recommendations of the OCA. Conduct Prejudicial to the
Best Interest of the Service involves the demeanor of a public officer which tends to tarnish the image and
integrity of his/her public office.

On the other hand, Dishonesty has been defined as the concealment or distortion of truth, which shows
lack of integrity or a disposition to defraud, cheat, deceive, or betray, or intent to violate the truth. Under
CSC, Resolution No. 06-0538, dishonesty may be classified as serious, less serious or simple.14 Section
4 of said Resolution states that Less Serious Dishonesty necessarily entails the presence of any one of
the following: circumstances: (a) the dishonest act caused damage and prejudice to the government
which is not so serious as to qualify under Serious Dishonesty; (b) the respondent did not take advantage
of his/her position in committing the dishonest act; and (c) other analogous circumstances.

Finally, Simple Neglect of Duty means the failure of an employee or official to give proper attention to a
task expected of him or her, signifying a disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or indifference

As correctly found by the OCA, respondent is guilty of all three (3) of these offenses, considering that: (a)
as a Sheriff in RTC-Valenzuela Br. 171, he encroached on the authority, duties, and functions of the
Sheriff of RTC-QC Br. 221 when he personally appeared at the property subject of a ruling in said court,
without being deputized to do so; (b) respondent lied when he claimed to have done so during his
personal time, when the truth of the matter is that he acted during official time, as evidenced by his
accomplished Daily Time Record showing his presence in his station in RTC-Valenzuela Br. 171 on those
instances; and (c) in attending to such matter extraneous to his duties as Sheriff of RTC-Valenzuela Br.
171, he neglected his own duties and functions in the same court. Clearly, respondent must be held
administratively liable for the aforesaid offenses.
POLITICAL LAW>Public Officers> Dropping from the Rolls

RE: DROPPING FROM THE ROLLS OF MR. ARNO D. DEL ROSARIO, COURT STENOGRAPHER II,
BRANCH 41, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT (METC), QUEZON CITY.

FACTS: The records of the Employees' Leave Division, Office of Administrative Services (OAS) of the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) show that Del Rosario has not submitted either his daily time
record from February 3, 2017 to the present or any application for leave covering such period, thus
making him absent without approved leave since said date.2 In addition, the records of Employees'
Welfare and Benefits Division, OAS of the OCA reveal that it received an application for retirement3 from
Del Rosario effective February 3, 2017; however, further verification showed that he has not submitted
the documents necessary for its approval.

In view of the foregoing, Del Rosario's name was excluded from the payroll starting April 2017. This
notwithstanding, the Personnel Division stated that he is still in the plantilla of personnel and is therefore
considered in active service.5 Thus, in a letter6 dated September 6, 2017, Presiding Judge Analie B.
Oga-Brual requested to drop Del Rosario from the rolls or declare his position vacant considering his
absences without official leave.

ISSUE: WON Del Rosario should be dropped from the rolls due to his absences without official leave.

HELD: Section 107, Rule 20 of the 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (2017
RACCS)9authorizes and provides the procedure for the dropping from the rolls of employees who, inter
alia, are absent without approved leave for an extended period of time. Pertinent portions of this provision
read:

Section 107. Grounds and Procedure for Dropping from the Rolls. Officers and employees who are
absent without approved leave, x x x may be dropped from the rolls within thirty (30) days from the time a
ground therefor arises subject to the following procedures:

a. Absence Without Approved Leave

1. An official or employee who is continuously absent without official leave (AWOL) for at least thirty
(30) working days may be dropped from the rolls without prior notice which shall take effect
immediately.

He/she shall, however, have the right to appeal his/her separation within fifteen (15) days from
receipt of the notice of separation which must be sent to his/her last known address.
xxxx

This provision is in consonance with Section 63, Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules on Leave, as amended
by Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 13, Series of 2007,10 which states:

Section 63. Effect of absences without approved leave. - An official or employee who is continuously
absent without approved leave for at least thirty (30) working days shall be considered on absence
without official leave (AWOL) and shall be separated from the service or dropped from the rolls without
prior notice. x x x x

In this case, it is undisputed that Del Rosario had been absent without official leave since February 3,
2017. Verily, his prolonged unauthorized absences. It contravened the duty of a public servant to serve
with the utmost degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency.It should be reiterated and
stressed that a court personnel's conduct is circumscribed with the heavy responsibility of upholding
public accountability and maintaining the people's faith in the judiciary.
POLITICAL LAW>CONSTI 2> Search and Seizure; Arrest without Warrant

LENIZA REYES Y CAPISTRANO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.


G.R. No. 229380; June 06, 2018

FACTS: Reyes was charged with Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs. Prosecution alleged that police
officers were patrolling hen two (2) teenagers approached and informed them that a woman with long hair
and a dragon tattoo on her left arm had just bought shabu in Barangay Mambog. The police officers
asked if she bought shabu and ordered her to bring it out. Reyes answered, "Di ba bawal kayong
magkapkap ng babae?" and at that point, turned her back, pulled something out from her breast area and
held a small plastic sachet on her right hand. The officers immediately confiscated the sachet and brought
it to the police station where he marked it with "LRC-1." Thereat, he prepared the necessary documents,
conducted the inventory and photography before Barangay Captain Manolito Angeles. Thereafter, PO1
Monteras proceeded to the Rizal Provincial Crime Laboratory and turned over the seized item for
examination to Police Senior Inspector Beaune Villaraza (PSI Villaraza), who confirmed that the
substance inside the sachet tested positive for 0.04 gram of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a
dangerous drug.For her part, Reyes denied the charges, claiming that the incident happened on
November 5, 2012 and not November 6. On said date, she came from a drinking spree and was about to
board a jeepney, when a man approached and asked if she knew a certain person. After answering in the
negative, she rode the jeepney until it was blocked by two (2) civilian men in motorcycles whom she
identified to be one PO1 Dimacali. RTC found her guilty. CA affirmed RTC’s decision.
ISSUE: WON Reyes's conviction for Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs under Section 11, Article II of
RA 9165 should be upheld.

HELD: "Section 2,24 Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be
carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of probable
cause, absent which, such search and seizure [become] 'unreasonable' within the meaning of said
constitutional provision. To protect the people from unreasonable searches and seizures, Section 3 (2),
Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and
seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. In other words, evidence
obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed
tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree.

One of the recognized exceptions to the need [of] a warrant before a search may be [e]ffected is a search
incidental to a lawful arrest.27In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a
search can be made – the process cannot be reversed.

A lawful arrest may be effected with or without a warrant. With respect to the latter, the parameters of
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should – as a general rule – be complied
with:

Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.
POLITICAL LAW>CONSTI 1> Inquiry in Aid of Legislation; Right to Counsel

PHILCOMSAT HOLDINGS CORPORATION, ENRIQUE L. LOCSIN AND MANUEL D.


ANDAL, Petitioners, vs. SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, SENATE COMMITTEE
ON GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS AND PUBLIC ENTERPRISES, SENATE COMMITTEE ON
PUBLIC SERVICES, SEN. GORDON AND SEN. ENRILE, Respondents.
GR 180308; June 19, 2012

FACTS: The government, through the PCGG, regularly received cash dividends from POTC. In 1998,
however, POTC suffered its first loss. Similarly, in 2004, PHC sustained a ₱7-million loss attributable to its
huge operating expenses. By 2005, PHC's operating expenses had ballooned tremendously. Likewise,
several PHC board members established Telecommunications Center, Inc. (TCI), a wholly-owned PHC
subsidiary to which PHC funds had been allegedly advanced without the appropriate accountability
reports given to PHC and PHILCOMSAT.

In order to protect its interests in POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago,
during the Second Regular Session of the Thirteenth Congress of the Philippines, introduced Proposed
Senate Resolution (PSR) No. 455 directing the conduct of an inquiry, in aid of legislation, on the
anomalous losses incurred by POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC and the mismanagement committed by
their respective board of directors. PSR No. 455 was referred to respondent Committee on Government
Corporations and Public Enterprises, which conducted eleven (11) public hearings on various dates.
Petitioners Locsin and Andal were invited to attend these hearings as "resource persons.

On November 15, 2007, petitioners filed the instant petition before the Court, questioning, in particular,
the haste with which the respondent Senate approved the challenged Committee Report No. 312. They
also claim that respondent Senator Richard Gordon acted with partiality and bias and denied them their
basic right to counsel, and that respondent Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, despite having voluntarily recused
himself from the proceedings in view of his personal interests in POTC, nonetheless continued to
participate actively in the hearings.

ISSUE: WON respondent Senate committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction in approving Committee Resolution No. 312

HELD: The respondents Senate Committees' power of inquiry relative to PSR No. 455 has been passed
upon and upheld in the consolidated cases of In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Camilo L.
Sabio,10 which cited Article VI, Section 21 of the Constitution, as follows:

"The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries
in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons
appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected."

The Court explained that such conferral of the legislative power of inquiry upon any committee of
Congress, in this case the respondents Senate Committees, must carry with it all powers necessary and
proper for its effective discharge.

On this score, the respondents Senate Committees cannot be said to have acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction when it submitted Committee Resolution No. 312,
given its constitutional mandate to conduct legislative inquiries. Hence, on the basis of the
pronouncements in the Sabio case, and as suggested by the parties in their respective pleadings, the
issues put forth in the petition have become academic.

The right to be assisted by counsel can only be invoked by a person under custodial investigation
suspected for the commission of a crime, and therefore attaches only during such custodial
investigation.16 Since petitioners Locsin and Andal were invited to the public hearings as resource
persons, they cannot therefore validly invoke their right to counsel.
POLITICAL LAW>ADMIN LAW> Issuance of Admin Rules and Regulations

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the BUREAU OF FOOD AND DRUGS (now FOOD
AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION), Petitioner, vs.
DRUGMAKER'S LABORATORIES, INC. and TERRAMEDIC, INC., Respondents.
GR 190837; March 5, 2014

FACTS: The FDA was created pursuant to RA 3720, otherwise known as the “Food, Drug and Cosmetics
Act” primarily in order to establish safety or efficacy standards and quality measure of foods, drugs and
devices and cosmetics products. On March 15, 1989, the Department of Health, thru then Secretary
Alfredo RA Bengzon issued AO 67 s. 1989, entitled Revised Rules and Regulations on Registration of
Pharmaceutical products. Among others, it required drug manufacturers to register certain drug and
medicine products with FDA before they may release the same to the market for sale. In this relation, a
satisfactory bioavailability/bioequivalence (BA/BE) test is needed for a manufacturer to secure a CPR for
these products. However, the implementation of the BA/BE testing requirement was put on hold because
there was no local facility capable of conducting the same. The issuance of circulars no. 1 s. of 1997
resumed the FDA’s implementation of the BA/BE testing requirement with the establishment of BA/BE
testing facilities in the country. Thereafter, the FDA issued circular no. 8 s. of 1997 which provided
additional implementation details concerning the BA/BE testing requirement on drug products.

ISSUE: WON the aforesaid circulars partake of administrative rules and regulations and, as such, must
comply with the requirements of the law for its issuance

HELD: Yes. Administrative agencies may exercise quasi-legislative or rule-making power only if there
exist a law which delegates these powers to them. Accordingly, the rules so promulgated must be within
the confines of the granting statutes and must not involve discretion as to what the law shall be, but
merely the authority to fix the details in the execution or enforcement of the policy set out in the law itself,
so as to conform with the doctrine of separation of powers and as an adjunct, the doctrine of non-
delegability of legislative powers.

An administrative regulation may be classified as a legislative rule, an interpretative rule or a contingent


rule. Legislative rules are in the nature of subordinate legislation a d designed to implement a primary
legislation by providing the details thereof. They usually implement existing law, imposing general, extra-
statutory obligations pursuant to authority properly delegated by the congress amd effect a change in
existing law or policy which affect individual rights and obligations. Meanwhile, interpretative rules are
intended to interpret, clarify or explain existing statutory regulations under which the administrative body
operates. Their purpose or objective is merely to construe the statue being administered and purpory to
do no more than interpret the statute. Simply, they try to say what the statute means and refer to no
single person or party in particular but concern all those belonging to the same class which may be
covered by the said rules. Finally, contingent rules are those issued by an administrative authority based
on the existence of certain facts or things upon which the enforcement of the law depends.

In general, an administrative regulation needs to comply with the requirements laid down by EO 292 s. of
1988 otherwise known as the administrative code of 1987 on prior notice, hearing and publication in order
to be valid and binding except when the same is merely an interpretative rule. This is because when an
administrative rule is merely intepretative in nature its applicability needs nothing further than its bare
issuance, for it gives no real consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed. When,
on the other hand, the administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the means that ca facilitate
or render least cumbersome the implementation of the law but substantially increases the burden of those
governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least to those directly affected a chance to be heard, and
thereafter to be duly informed before that new issuance is given the force and effect of law.
POLITICAL LAW>PUBLIC OFFICER> Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct

CONCEPCION C. DAPLAS, Petitioner,


vs. DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, et. al, Respondents
G.R. No. 229380; June 06, 2018

FACTS: Petitioner joined the government service as a casual clerk for the Municipal Treasurer of Kawit,
Cavite sometime in 1968, and had held various posts until she was appointed as the Pasay City with a
gross monthly salary of P28,722.00. At the time material to the complaints, petitioner was concurrently
holding the position of Officer-in-Charge, Regional Director of the Bureau of Local Government Finance
(BLGF) in Cebu City.
Two (2) separate complaints were filed against petitioner by the Department of Finance-Revenue Integrity
Protection Service (DOF-RIPS) and the Field Investigation Office (FIO) of the Office of the Ombudsman
(Ombudsman; respondents) for averred violations[6] of Sections 7 and 8 of RA 3019, and Section 8 (A) of
RA 6713, constituting Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
Service, arising out of her failure to disclose the true and detailed statement of her assets, liabilities, and
net worth, business interests, and financial connections, and those of her spouse in her Statements of
Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALNs).
In particular, petitioner: (1) failed to declare several real properties in Cavite (which had been the subject
of a previous administrative complaint against her that had been dismissed); and (2) traveled multiple
times abroad without securing a travel authority, which cast doubt on her real net worth and actual source
of income considering her modest salary.
ISSUE: WON petitioner liable for Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and violation of Section 8 (A) of RA
6713?

RULING: Records reveal that the element of intent to commit a wrong required under both the
administrative offenses of Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct39 are lacking to warrant petitioner's
dismissal from service.

Dishonesty is committed when an individual intentionally makes a false statement of any material
fact, practices or attempts to practice any deception or fraud in order to secure his examination,
registration, appointment, or promotion. It is understood to imply the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive,
betray or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; and
the lack of fairness and straightforwardness.

On the other hand, misconduct is intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or
standard of behavior.

To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected with the


performance of the official functions and duties of a public officer. In grave misconduct, as distinguished
from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of
an established rule must be manifest. Without any of these elements, the transgression of an established
rule is properly characterized as simple misconduct only. 42 Most importantly, without a nexus between
the act complained of and the discharge of duty, the charge of grave misconduct shall necessarily fail.

Indeed, the failure to file a truthful SALN puts in doubt the integrity of the public officer or employee, and
would normally amount to dishonesty. It should be emphasized, however, that mere non-declaration of
the required data in the SALN does not automatically amount to such an offense. Dishonesty requires
malicious intent to conceal the truth or to make false statements. In addition, a public officer or employee
becomes susceptible to dishonesty only when such non-declaration results in the accumulated wealth
becoming manifestly disproportionate to his/her income, and income from other sources, and he/she fails
to properly account or explain these sources of income and acquisitions.44