Conflicts of Laws Week 8: NATIONALITY THEORY (determination of Nationality)

Board of Immigration Commissioners vs. Go Callano

25 SCRA 890 , October 31, 1968

Facts:
The DFA informed the Commissioner of Immigration (CoI) that, on the basis of the
findings made by the National Bureau Investigation (NBI), the signatures of former Secretary of
Foreign Affairs, Serrano, on certain documents, amongst them cable authorization No. 2230-V
authorizing the documentation of Beato Go Callano and others, were not authentic. Thereupon,
the Department declared several documents—among them the cable authorization just
mentioned—to be null, void and of no effect, and the documentation made by the Philippine
Consulate General at Hongkong pursuant to said cable authorization consisting of the certificates
of registration and identity issued to Beato Go Callano and his brothers Manuel, Gonzalo and
Julio for travel to the Philippines were cancelled. All this was done without previous notice served
nor hearing granted to said parties.
The Board of Immigration Commissioners (BIC), exercising their power to review, issued, also
without any previous notice and hearing, an order reversing the decisions of the Board of Special
Inquiry admitting Beato Go Callano and his three brothers for entry as citizens; ordering their
exclusions as aliens not properly documented for admission, and ordering that they be returned
to the port whence they came or to the country of which they were nationals, upon the ground
that they had been able "to enter this country and gain admission as Filipino citizens by the
fraudulently secured authorization." The CoI issued a warrant of exclusion commanding the
deportation officer "to carry out the exclusion of the above-named applicants (the Go Callano
brothers) on the first available transportation and on the same class of accommodation in which
they arrived to the port whence they came or to the country of which they are nationals/'.
However, the warrant of exclusion was not served immediately upon the parties. Thus, the Court
of First Instance filed an action for injunction to restrain the BIC and CoI from executing the
order of exclusion or deportation.
They based their action on the following grounds: (1) that the Board had no jurisdiction to exclude
them from the Philippines because they were not aliens but Filipino citizens, and (2) that the order
of exclusion was issued by the Board without due process and in violation of the Constitution.
Months later, the CFI issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the respondents in the
case from deporting the petitioners. After trial, the Court rendered judgment finding, that
according to Go Callano’s undisputed evidence, "the Go Callano’s herein are the illegitimate
children of Emilia Callano, a Filipino citizen, with her common-law husband—a Chinese citizen,
and concluding that "until the petitioners left for China in 1947, they must be considered as
citizens of the Philippines as they were born of a Filipino mother and an alien father who, however,
was not married to their mother."

Notwithstanding the above finding and conclusion, however, the Court dismissed the case holding
that "Go Callanos’ are citizens of the Republic of China and not being properly documented for
entry into the Philippines as found by the Immigration Commissioner, the writ of preliminary
injunction heretofore issued by this Court shall be deemed dissolved upon finality of this
decision." The grounds upon which the Court based its decision were: (1) because Go Callanos’
stayed in China for a period of 15 years before returning to the Philippines, they must be
considered as citizens of the Chinese Republic; (2) Go Callanos’ were recognized by their alien
father as his children, they became Chinese citizens under the Chinese law of nationality. While
the Court also found that the cable authorization mentioned heretofore was a forgery, it held that,
for the purpose of the petition before it, "it was immaterial" to determine the genuineness or
falsity of the cable authorization.", "For if Go Callanos’ are Filipino citizens, they are entitled to
remain within the territorial jurisdiction of the Republic in whatever way they might have
entered." Go Callanos’ motion for reconsideration was denied, so they applied to the CA. In the
CA, it reversed the decision of the lower court. Hence this appeal.

Issue:
WON Go Callanos’ lose their Philippine citizenship upon the performance of certain acts
in China?

Held:
No. Go Callanos’ are admittedly Filipino citizens at birth, and their status must be governed by
the Philippine law wherever they may be, in conformity with Art 15 of the CC which provides as
follows: "Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, conditions and legal capacity
of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad." Under Article
IV, Section 2, of the Philippine Constitution, "Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in
the manner provided by law", which implies that the question of whether a Filipino has lost his
Philippine citizenship shall be determined by no other than the Philippine law. In this case, Go
Callanos’ are born in the Philippines of a Chinese mother and a Chinese father who. however, was
not married to their mother, are citizens of the Philippines, having acquired their Philippine
citizenship by birth and their blood relationship with their mother.

A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by (1) naturalization in a foreign country; (2) express
renunciation of citizenship; (3) subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or
laws of a foreign country; (4) rendering service to, or accepting a commission in, the armed forces
of a foreign country; (5) cancellation of the certificate of naturalization; (6) declaration by
competent authority that he is a deserter of the Philippine armed forces in time of war; (7) in the
case of a woman, by marriage to a foreigner if, by virtue of laws in force in her husband's country,
she acquires his nationality. Recognition of illegitimate children by their alien father is not among
the grounds for losing Philippine citizenship under the law. Hence, Recognition of the Go
Callanos’ by their alien father is not among the grounds for losing Philippine citizenship under
Philippine law, and it cannot be said that Go Callanos’ lost their former status by reason of such
recognition.

About the only mode of losing Philippine citizenship which closely bears on the petitioners' case
is renunciation. But even renunciation cannot be cited in support of the conclusion that Go
Callanos’ lost their Philippine citizenship because the law requires an express renunciation, which
means a renunciation of Philippine citizenship to be recognized as a ground for loss of citizenship
should be express and must be made known distinctly and explicitly and not left to inference or
implication; a renunciation, manifested by direct and appropriate language as distinguished from
that which is inferred from conduct. About the only mode of losing Philippine citizenship which
closely bears on Go Callanos' case is renunciation. But even renunciation cannot be cited in
support of the conclusion that petitioners lost their Philippine citizenship because the law requires
an express renunciation, which means a renunciation that is made known distinctly and explicitly
and not left to inference or implication; a renunciation manifested by direct and appropriate
language, as distinguished from that which is inferred from conduct.

The proceedings conducted by the Philippine Consul General in Hongkong and the Special Board
of Inquiry No. 2, both of which resulted in a definite finding that the Go Callano brothers are the
illegitimate children of Emilia Callano, a Filipino, and are therefore Filipino citizens entitled to
travel direct to the Philippines and to remain within the territorial jurisdiction of the Republic,
are in accordance with the norms and regulations followed in the conduct of like proceedings and
cannot be nullified by the Department of Foreign Affairs nor the Board of Immigration
Commissioners summarily and without giving the parties concerned an opportunity to be heard.
Topic: Three Kinds of Citizens of the PHilippines

Antonio Y. Co & Sixto T. Balanquit, Jr. vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of
Representatives & Jose Ong, Jr.
199 SCRA 692 , July 30, 1991

Facts:
The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a
resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes. The sole issue before us is whether or
not, in making that determination, the HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion.
The congressional election for the 2nd district of Northern Samar was held on May 11, 1987. The
candidates who also vied for the position of representative are Co, Balinquit and Ong. Ong was
proclaimed as the duly elected representative. Co et al filed an election protest against Ong
alleging that Ong is not a Filipino citizen and a resident of Samar. The HRET decided in favor of
Ong. A motion for reconsideration was filed yet was likewise denied. Hence, this certiorari.

Issue:
WON Ong is a Filipino citizen.

Held:
Yes.
The records show that Ong’s grandfather came to the Philippines in 1895 then Ong’s father , who
was born in China was brought to PH in 1915 where he spent his childhood in Laoang. Ong’s father
married a natural-born Filipina where they bore 8 children.
In the case of In Re: Florencio Mallare, the Court held that the exercise of the right of suffrage and
the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship.
In the exact pronouncement of the Court, we held: Esteban’s exercise of the right of suffrage when
he came of age, constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship”. The private
respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life here in
the Philippines. For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot be expected to
have elected citizenship as they were already citizens, we apply the In Re Mallare rule.

The respondent was born in an outlying rural town of Samar where there are no alien enclaves
and no racial distinctions. The respondent has lived the life of a Filipino since birth. His father
applied for naturalization when the child was still a small boy. He is a Roman Catholic. He has
worked for a sensitive government agency. His profession requires citizenship for taking the
examinations and getting a license. He has participated in political exercises as a Filipino and has
always considered himself a Filipino citizen. There is nothing in the records to show that he does
not embrace Philippine customs and values, nothing to indicate any tinge of alien-ness, no acts to
show that this country is not his natural homeland. The mass of voters of Northern Samar are
fully aware of Mr. Ong’s parentage. They should know him better than any member of this Court
will ever know him. They voted by overwhelming numbers to have him represent them in
Congress. Because of his acts since childhood, they have considered him as a Filipino. The filing
of a sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for those who still have to elect
citizenship. For those already Filipinos when the time to elect came up, there are acts of deliberate
choice which cannot be less binding. Entering a profession open only to Filipinos, serving in public
office where citizenship is a qualification, voting during election time, running for public office,
and other categorical acts of similar nature are themselves formal manifestations of choice for
these persons. An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person electing is an
alien. Or his status is doubtful because he is a national of two countries. There is no doubt in this
case about Mr. Ong’s being a Filipino when he turned twenty-one (21). We repeat that any election
of Philippine citizenship on the part of the private respondent would not only have been
superfluous but it would also have resulted in an absurdity. How can a Filipino citizen elect
Philippine citizenship? The respondent HRET has an interesting view as to how Mr. Ong elected
citizenship. It observed that “when protestee was only nine years of age, his father, Jose Ong
Chuan became a naturalized Filipino. Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Act squarely
applies its benefit to him for he was then a minor residing in this country. Concededly, it was the
law itself that had already elected Philippine citizenship for protestee by declaring him as such.”
(Emphasis supplied)

The petitioners question the citizenship of the father through a collateral approach. This can not
be done. In our jurisdiction, an attack on a person’s citizenship may only be done through a direct
action for its nullity. (See Queto v. Catolico, 31 SCRA 52 [1970]) To ask the Court to declare the
grant of Philippine citizenship to Jose Ong Chuan as null and void would run against the principle
of due process. Jose Ong Chuan has already been laid to rest. How can he be given a fair
opportunity to defend himself. A dead man cannot speak. To quote the words of the HRET: “Ong
Chuan’s lips have long been muted to perpetuity by his demise and obviously he could not rise
beyond where his mortal remains now lie to defend himself were this matter to be made a central
issue in this case.”

The petitioners lose sight of the meaning of “residence” under the Constitution. The term
“residence” has been understood as synonymous with domicile not only under the previous
Constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution. xxx The framers of the Constitution adhered
to the earlier definition given to the word “residence” which regarded it as having the same
meaning as domicile. The term “domicile” denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when
absent for business or pleasure, one intends to return. (Ong Huan Tin v. Republic, 19 SCRA 966
[1967]) The absence of a person from said permanent residence, no matter how long,
notwithstanding, it continues to be the domicile of that person. In other words, domicile is
characterized by animus revertendi. (Ujano v. Republic, 17 SCRA 147 [1966])

Even assuming that the private respondent does not own any property in Samar, the Supreme
Court in the case of De los Reyes v. Solidum (61 Phil. 893 [1935]) held that it is not required that
a person should have a house in order to establish his residence and domicile. It is enough that he
should live in the municipality or in a rented house or in that of a friend or relative. (Emphasis
supplied)

It has also been settled that absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or
registration as a voter other than in the place where one is elected, does not constitute loss of
residence. (Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294 [1954]) As previously stated, the private respondent
stayed in Manila for the purpose of finishing his studies and later to practice his profession. There
was no intention to abandon the residence in Laoang, Samar. On the contrary, the periodical
journeys made to his home province reveal that he always had the animus revertendi.