Labor Law 08,15,16 Bar Q&A

LABOR LAW 2008
Rights of the Employer; Management
Prerogative; Weight Policy (2008)
No. X. Pepe Santos was an international flight steward of Flysafe Airlines. Under FSA's Cabin Crew
Administration Manual, Santos must maintain, given his height and body frame, a weight of 150 to 170
pounds. After 5 years as a flight steward, Santos began struggling with his weight; he weighed 200 lbs., 30
pounds over the prescribed maximum weight. The Airline gave him a one-year period to attain the
prescribed weight, and enrolled him in several weight reduction programs. He consistently failed to meet
his target. He was given a 6-month grace period, after which he still failed to meet the weight limit. FSC
thus sent him a Notice of Administrative Charge for violation of company standards on weight
requirements. He stated in his answer that, for medical reasons, he cannot have a rapid weight loss. A
clarificatory hearing was held where Santos fully explained his predicament. The explanation did not
satisfy FSA and so it decided to terminate Santos's service for violation of company standards.Santos filed
a complaint for illegal dismissal, arguing that the company's weight requirement policy is unreasonable
and that his case is not a disciplinary but a medical issue (as one gets older, the natural tendency is to
grow heavier). FSA defended its policy as a valid exercise of management prerogative and from the point
of view of passenger safety and extraordinarydiligence required by law of common carriers; it also posited
that Santos failure to achieve his ideal weight constituted gross and habitual neglect of duty, as well as
willful disobedience to lawful employer orders. The Labor Arbiter found the dismissal illegal for there was
neither gross and habitual neglect of duty nor willful disobedience.Is the Labor Arbiter correct? Why or
why not? Explain fully. (6%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the Labor Arbiter is correct.
The exercise of management prerogatives may be availed of for as long as they are reasonable, exercised
in good faith and do not infringed upon the employee‘s security of tenure. It is circumscribed by limitations
found in law, collective bargaining agreement, or the general principles of fair play and justice (PAL v.
NLRC, G.R. No. 85985, August 13, 1993). The weight policy clearly has repercussions on Pepe Santo‘s right
to security of tenure. After Pepe established that his inability to lose weight despite earnest effort was a
medical problem, it cannot be said that he acted with gross habitual neglect of duty.
DOLE Regional Director; Visitorial and
Enforcement Power; Compliance Order
(2008)
No. III. c. Savoy Department Store (SDS) adopted a policy of hiring salesladies on five-month cycles. At the
end of a saleslady's five-month term, another person is hired as replacement. Salesladies attend to store
customers, were SDS uniforms, report at specified hours, and are subject to SDS workplace rules and
regulations. Those who refuse the 5-month employment contract are not hired.The day after expiration
of her 5-month engagement, Lina wore her SDS white and blue uniform and reported for work but was
denied entry into the store premises. Agitated, she went on a hunger strike and stationed herself in front
of one of the gates of SDS. Soon thereafter, other employees whose 5-month term had also elapsed,
joined Lina's hunger strike.Assume that no fixed-term worker complained, yet in a routine inspection a
labor inspector of the Regional Office of the Labor Code's security of tenure provisions and recommended
to the Regional Director the issuance a compliance order. The Regional Director adopted the
recommendation and issued a compliance order. Is the compliance order valid? Explain your answer. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the compliance order is not valid.The Regional Director exercises only visitorial and enforcement
power over the labor standard cases, and the power to adjudicate uncontested money claims of
employees. The Regional Director has no power to rule on SDS‘s 5-month term policy.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Yes, the Compliance Order is valid because the Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized
representatives has the power to issue compliance orders to give effect to the labor standards based on
the findings of labor employment and enforcement officers or industrial safety engineers made during
inspection. The Secretary ot his duly authorized representatives may issue writs of execution to the
appropriate authority for the enforcement of their orders (Art. 128, Labor Code; V.L. Enterprises and/or
Visitacion v. CA, G.R. No. 167512, March 12, 2007).
Labor Arbiter; Voluntary Arbitration
(2008)
No. II. b. Can a dispute falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter be submitted to
voluntary arbitration? Why or why not? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, provided that the parties to the dispute falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter
states in unequivocal language that they conform to the submission of said dispute to the voluntary
arbitration (Vivero v. CA, G.R. No . 138938, October 24, 2000).
Sec. of Labor; Assumption over Labor
Dispute (2008)
No. VI. b. On the day that the Union could validly declare a strike, the Secretary of Labor issued an order
assuming jurisdiction over the dispute and enjoining the strike, or if one has commenced, ordering the
striking workers to immediately return to work. The return-to-work order required the employees to
return to work within twenty-four hours and was served at 8 a.m. of the day thestrike was to start. The
order at the same time directed the Company to accept all employees under the same terms and
conditions of employment prior to the work stoppage. The Union members did not return to work on the
day the Secretary's assumption order was served nor on the next day; instead, they held a continuing
protest rally against the company's alleged unfair labor practices. Because of the accompanying picket,
some of the employees who wanted to return to work failed to do so. On the 3rd day, the workers
reported for work, claiming that they do so in compliance with the Secretary's return-to-work order that
binds them as well as the Company. The Company, however, refused to admit them back since they had
violated the Secretary's return-to-work order and are now considered to have lost their employment
status. The Union officers and members filed a complaint for illegal dismissal arguing that there was no
strike but a protest rally which is a valid exercise of the workers constitutional right to peaceable assembly
and freedom of expression. Hence, there was no basis for the termination of their employment. You are
the Labor Arbiter to whom the case was raffled. Decide, ruling on the following issues: Were the
employees simply exercising their constitutional right to petition for redness of their grievances? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, there was a defiance of the assumption order of the Secretary of Labor by the union. The assumption
order is immediately executor. Following an assumption order by the strikers is not a matter of option or
voluntarinesss but of obligation on their part (Marcopper Mining Corporation v. Brillantes, G.R. No.
119381, March 11, 1996; Art. 264[a], Labor Code).
Sec. of Labor; Assumption over Labor
Dispute; National Interest (2008)
No. III. b. Savoy Department Store (SDS) adopted a policy of hiring salesladies on five-month cycles. At the
joined Lina's hunger strike.The owner of SDS considered the hunger strike staged by Lina, et al.., an
eyesore and disruptive of SDS business. He wrote the Secretary of Labor a letter asking him to assume
jurisdiction over the dispute and enjoin the hunger "strike". What answer will you give if you were the
Secretary of Labor? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Although the Secretary of Labor has wide discretion in exercising jurisdiction over labor dispute, he may
not enjoin the strike because SDS‘s is not indispensable to the national interest (Art. 263[g], Labor Code).
Voluntary Arbitrator; Labor Disputes;
Voluntary Arbitration (2008)
No. II. a. What issues or disputes may be the subject of voluntary arbitration under the Labor Code? (4%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Disputes that may be subject of voluntary arbitration are:
(1) Distortion of the wage structure within an establishment arising from any prescribed wage increase
because of a law or wage order which any Regional Board issues (Art. 124, Labor Code); and
(2) Interpretation and implementation of the parties‘ collective bargaining agreement and those arising
from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies (Art. 217, as amended by R.A.
6715; Art. 260, Labor Code; Navarro III v. Damasco, G.R. No. 101875, July 14, 1995).
Voluntary Arbitrator; Voluntary
Arbitration; Compulsory Arbitration
(2008)
No. II. c. Can a dispute falling within the jurisdiction of a voluntary arbitrator be submitted to compulsory
arbitration? Why or why not? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, jurisdiction in compulsory arbitration is conferred by law, not by agreement of the parties (Veneracion
v. Moncilla, G.R. No. 158238, July 20, 2006).The law mandated that all grievances submitted to the
grievance machinery which are not settled shall be referred to the voluntary arbitration prescribed in the
CBA Art. 260, Labor Code). This procedure providing for a conclusive arbitration clause in the CBA must
be strictly adhered to and respected if theends are to be achieved (Liberal Labor Union v. Phil. Can Co.,
G.R. No. L-4834, March 28, 1952, cited in San Miguel Corporation v, NLRC, G.R. No. 99266, March 02,
1999). Hence, to submit a dispute falling within the jurisdiction of a voluntary arbitration to compulsory
arbitration would be to trifle faith the express mandate of the law.
CBA; Automatic Renewal Clause (2008)
No. I. a. Explain the automatic renewal clause of collective bargaining agreements. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The automatic renewal clause of Collective Bargaining Agreements requires that the parties maintain the
status quo and continue the term and condition of an expired CBA until a new agreement is reached (Pier
8 Arrastre & Stevedoring Services, Inc v. Roldan-Confessor, G.R. No. 110854, February 13, 199; Art. 23,
Labor Code).
CBA; Codetermination (2008)
No. I. b. Explain the extent of the workers right to participate in policy and decision-making process as
provided under Article XIII, Section 3 of the Philippine Constitution. Does it include membershipin the
Board of Directors of a corporation? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Under Art. XIII, Sec. 3 of the Constitution, the workers shall participate in policy and decision-making
affecting their rights, duties, welfare and benefits, through labor-management councils (See, Art. 211[g]
and 255 of the Labor Code). The workers‘ rights do not include membership in the Board of Directors of a
Corporation (See Meralco v. Meralco Employees, G.R. No. 127598, January 27, 1999)
Right to Strike; Stoppage of Work (2008)
No. VI. a. On the day that the Union could validly declare a strike, the Secretary of Labor issued an order
return to work within twenty-four hours and was served at 8 a.m. of the day the strike was to start. The
conditions of employment prior to the work stoppage. The Union members did not return to work on the
status.The Union officers and members filed a complaint for illegal dismissal arguing that there was no
and freedom of expression. Hence, there was no basis for the termination of their employment.You are
the Labor Arbiter to whom the case was raffled. Decide, ruling on the following issues:Was there a strike?
(4%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, there was a strike because of the concerted stoppage of work by the union members (Art. 212[o],
Labor Code).
Self Organization; Unions; Voluntary
Cancellation of Registration (2008)
No. XIV. "Puwersa", a labor federation, after having won in a certification election held in the company
premises, sent a letter to respondent company reminding it of its obligation to recognize the local union.
Respondent company replied that through it is willing, the rank-and-file employeeshad already lost
interest in joining the local union as they had dissolved it. "Puwersa" argued that since it won in a
certification election, it can validly perform its function as a bargaining agent and represent the rank-and-
file employees despite the union's dissolution.Is the argument of "Puwersa" tenable? Decide with reasons.
(6%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A new provisions, Art. 239-A, was inserted into the Labor Code by R.A. 9481, as follows:―Art. 239-A.
Voluntary Cancellation of Registration. – the registration of a legitimate labor organization may be
cancelled by the organization itself: Provided, That at least two-thirds of its general membership votes, in
a meeting duly called for that purpose to dissolve the organization: provided, further That an application
to cancel registration is thereafter submitted by the board of the organization, attested to by the president
thereof.‖If indeed the local union was dissolves in accordance with the above provision of law, the
argument of ―Puwersa‖ is not tenable. This is so because ―Puwersa‖ only had the status of an agent,
while the local union remained the basic unitof the association (liberty Cotton Mills Workers Union v.
Liberty Mills, Inc., G.R. No. L-33987, September 4, 1975; cited in Filipino Pipe and Foundry Corp. v. NLRC,
G.R. No. 115180, November 16, 1999).
E-E Relationship; Effective Control or
Supervision; Waitresses (2008)
No. XI. Complaints had worked five (5) years as waitresses in a cocktail lounge owned by the respondent.
They did not receive any salary directly from the respondent but shared in all service charges collected for
food and drinks to the extent of 75%. With respondent's prior permission, they could sit with and entertain
guest inside the establishment and appropriate for themselves the tips given by guests. After five (5) years,
the complaints individual shares in the collected service charges dipped to below minimum wage level as
a consequence of the lounge's marked business decline. Thereupon, complaints asked respondent to
increase their share in the collected service charges to 85% or the minimum wage level, whichever is
higher.Respondent terminated the services of the complainants who countered by filing a consolidated
complaint for unlawful dismissal, with prayer for 85% of the collected services or the minimum wage for
the appropriate periods, whichever is higher. Decide. (6%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Art. 138 of the Labor Code provides as follows:
―art. 138. Classification of certain women workers. – any woman who is permitted or suffered to work,
with or without compensation, in any night club, cocktail lounge, massage clinic, bar or similar
establishment, under the effective control or supervision of the employer for a substantial period of time
as determined by the Secretary of Labor, shall be considered as an employee of such establishment for
purposes of labor and social legislation.‖ Since complainants are under the effective control and
supervision of respondent, they are therefore considered as employees and entitled to full backwages
based on the minimum wage for the appropriate period plus 85% of the collected service charges.
E-E Relationship; Four-Fold Test (2008)
No. V. b. The Pizza Corporation (PizCorp) and Ready Supply Cooperative (RSC) entered into a "service
agreement" where RSC in consideration of service fees to be paid by PizCorp's will exclusively supply
PizCorp with a group of RSC motorcycle-owning cooperative members who will henceforth perform
PizCorp's pizza delivery service. RSC assumes under the agreement --- full obligation for the payment of
the salaries and other statutory monetary benefits of its members deployed to PizCorp. The parties also
stipulated that there shall be no employer-employee relationship between PizCorp and the RSC members.
However, if PizCorp is materially prejudiced by any act of the delivery impose disciplinary sanctions on,
including the power to dismiss, the erring RSC member/s.Based on the test/s for employer-employee
relationship, determine the issue of who is the employer of the RSC members. (4%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The employer of the RSC is PizCorp.The four-fold test in determining employer-employee relationship is
as follows:
(1) The selection and engagement of the employees;
(2) The payment of wages;
(3) The power of dismissal; and
(4) The power of control the employee‘s conduct.
Of the above, the power of control over the employees‘ conduct is the most crucial and determinative
indicator of the presence or absence of an employer-employee relationship.Applying the Control Test,
PizCorp is the employer of RSC members because ―if PizCorp is materially prejudices by any act of the
delivery crew that violated PizCorp‘s directives and orders, Piz Corp can directly impose disciplinary
sanctions on, including the power to dismiss, the erring RSC member/s.― clearly, PizCorop controls the
RSC members‘ conduct not only as to the end to be achived but also as to the means of achieving the ends
(Manaya v. Alabang Country Club, G.R. No. 168988, June 19, 2007).
Employment; Employment Contract;
Fixed Period of Employment (2008)
No. III. a. Savoy Department Store (SDS) adopted a policy of hiring salesladies on five-month cycles. At the
joined Lina's hunger strike.Lina and 20 other saleladies filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, contending
that they are SDS regular employees as they performed activities usually necessary or desirable in the
usual business or trade of SDS and thus, their constitutional right to security of tenure was violated when
they were dismissed without valid, just or authorized cause. SDS, in defense, argued that Lina, et al.
Agreed - prior to engagement - to a fixed period employment and thus waived their right to a full-term
tenure. Decide the dispute. (4%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
I will decide the case in favor of Lina, et al. In the case of PNOC-Energy Development Corporation v. NLRC,
G.R. No. 97747, March 31, 1993, the Supreme Court set down the criteria under which fixed contracts of
employment do not circumvent the security of tenure, to wit:
(1) The fixed period of employment was knowingly and voluntarily agreed upon, without any force, duress
or improper pressure upon the employee and absent any other circumstances vitiating his consent; or
(2) It satisfactorily appears that the employer and employees dealt with each other on more or less equal
terms with no moral dominance over the employee.Lina, et. al., are not on equal terms with their
employers and did not agree to a 5-month contract. The scheme of SDS to prevent workers from acquiring
regular employment, violates security of tenure and contrary to public policy. (Pure Foods Corporation v.
NLRC, G.R. No. 122653, December 12, 1997; cited in Philips Semiconductors [Phil.], Inc. v. Fadriquela, G.R.
No. 141717, April 14, 2004).
Labor-Only Contractor (2008)
No. V. c. The Pizza Corporation (PizCorp) and Ready Supply Cooperative (RSC) entered into a "service
including the power to dismiss, the erring RSC member/s.Assume that RSC has a paid-up capitalization of
P1,000.000.00 Is RSC engaged in "labor only" contracting, permissible job contracting or simply,
recruitment? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
RSC is engaged in ‖labor-only contracting.Apart from the substantial capitalization or investment in the
form of tools, equipment, machinery and work premises, the following factors need be considered.
(A) whether the contractor is carrying on an independent business;
(B) the nature and extent of the work;
(C) the skill required;
(D) the term and duration of the relationship;
(E) the right to assign the performance of specific pieces of work;
(F) the control and supervision of the workers;
(G) the power of the employer with respect to the hiring, firing and payment of workers of the contractor;
(H) the control of the premises;

(I) the duty to supply premises, tools, appliances, materials, and labor; and
(J) the mode, manner and terms of payment.
(Alexander Vinoya v. NLRC, Regent Food Corporation and/or Ricky See, G.R. No. 126586, February 02,
2000; Rolando E. Escario, et. al. v. NLRC, et. al., G.R. No. 124055, June 08, 2000; Osias I. Corporal, Sr., et.
al. v. NLRC, Lao Enteng Company, Inc. and/or Trinidad Lao Ong, G.R. No. 129315, October 02,
2000)Consider also the following circumstances:
(1) the workers placed by RSC are performing activities which are directly related to the principal business
of PizCorp. (Baguio v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 79004-08, October 04, 1991);
(2) RSC is not free from the control and direction of PizCorp in all matters connected with the performance
of the work (ibid).
Labor-Only Contractor; Remittance of SSS Premium (2008)No. IX. Assume that in Problem 5, Mario, an
RSC member disgusted with the non-payment of his night shift differential and overtime pay, filed a
complaint with the DOLE Regional Office against RSC and PizCorp. After inspection, it was found that
indeed Mario was not getting his correct differential and overtime pay and that he was declared an SSS
member (so that no premiums for SSS membership were ever remitted). On this basis, the Regional
Director issued a compliance order holding PizCorp and RSC solidarily liable for the payment of the correct
differential and overtime pay and ordering PizCorp to report Mario for membership with SSS and remit
overdue SSS premiums.Who has the obligation to report the RSC members for membership with the SSS,
with the concomitant obligation to remit SSS premiums? Why? (6%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Since RSC is a ―labor-Only‖ contractor and, therefore, considered a mere agent of PizCorp. PizCorp, as
the real employer, has the legal obligation to report the RSC members as its employees for membership
with the SSS and remit its premium.
Wages; No Work No Pay Principle XIII (2008)
No. XIII. The rank-and-file union staged a strike in the company premises which caused the disruption of
business operations. The supervisors union of the same company filed a money claim for unpaid salaries
for the duration of the strike, arguing that the supervisors' failure to report for work was not attributable
to them. The company contended that it was equally faultless, for the strike was not the direct
consequence of any lockout or unfair labor practice. May the company be held liable for the salaries of
the supervisor? Decide (6%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, following the ―No work No Pay‖ principle, the supervisors are not entitled to their money claim for
unpaid salaries. They should not be compensated for services skipped during the strike. The age-old rule
governing the relation between labor and capital, or management and employee of a ―fair day‘s wage
for a fair day‘s labor‖ remains as the basic factor in determining employees‘ wage (Aklan Electric
Cooperative, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 121439, January 25, 2000).
Dismissal; Defiance of Return to Work Order (2008)
No. VI. c. On the day that the Union could validly declare a strike, the Secretary of Labor issued an order
return to work within twenty-four hours and was served at 8 a.m. of the day the strike was to start. The
conditions of employment prior to the workstoppage. The Union members did not return to work on the
status. The Union officers and members filed a complaint for illegal dismissal arguing that there was no
and freedom of expression. Hence, there was no basis for the termination of their employment.You are
the Labor Arbiter to whom the case was raffled. Decide, ruling on the following issues: What are the
consequences, if any, of the acts of the employees? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Defiance of the return-to-work order of the Secretary of Labor after he has assumed jurisdiction is a
ground for loss of the employment status of any striking officers or member (Telefunken Semiconductors
Employees Union-FFW v. CA, G.R. Nos. 143013-14, December 18, 2000). However, this rule should not
apply to the employees who failed to return because of the accompanyingpicket that blocked free egress
& ingress to and from company premises.
Dismissal; Just Cause; Willful Disobedience (2008)
No. XII. Arnaldo, President of "Bisig" Union in Femwear Company, readied himself to leave exactly at 5:00
p.m. which was the end of his normal shift to be able to send off his wife who was scheduled to leave for
overseas. However, the General Manager required him to render overtime work to meet the company's
export quota. Arnaldo begged off, explaining to the General Manager that he had to see off his wife who
was leaving to work abroad. The company dismissed Arnaldo for insubordination. He filed a case for illegal
dismissal. Decide (6%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Compulsory overtime work may be required when the completion or continuation of work started before
the 8thhour is necessary to prevent serious obstruction or prejudice to the business or operations of the
employer (Art. 89, Par. E, Labor Code; Section 10, Rule I, Book III, Implementing Rules).On the other hand,
dismissal for willful disobedience of the employer‘s lawful orders, requires that: (a) the assailed conduct
must have been willful or intentional, characterized by a ―wrongful and perverse attitude;‖ and (b) the
order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee and must pertain to his
duties (Dimabayao v. NLRC, G.R. No. 122178, February 25, 1999; Alcantara, Jr. v. CA, G.R. No. 143397,
August 06, 2002).Although the order to rendr overtime is valid. Arlando should not be dismissed because
he was motivated by his honest belief that the order unreasonably prevented him from sending off his
wife who was leaving for overseas.While the circumstances do not justify his violation of the order to
render overtime, they do not justify Arnaldo‘s dismissal either (Alcantara, Jr. v. CA, G.R. No. 143397,
August 06, 2002)
Employee; Employment Contract Impressed with Public Interest (2008)
No. V. a. The Pizza Corporation (PizCorp) and Ready Supply Cooperative (RSC) entered into a "service
including the power to dismiss, the erring RSC member/s.Is the contractual stipulation that there is no
employer-employee relationship binding on labor officials? Why? Explain fully. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, a contract of employment is impressed with public interest. The provisions of the applicable statutes
are deemed written into the contract, and the parties are not at liberty to insulate themselves and their
relationships from the impact of labor laws and regulations by simply contracting with each other
(Magsalin v. National Organization of Working Men, G.R. No. 148492, May 09, 2003).
Employee; Regular Employee; (2008)
No. IV. Super Comfort Hotel employed a regular pool of "extra waiters" who are called or asked to report
for duty when the Hotel's volume of business is beyond the capacity of the regularly employed waiters to
undertake. Pedro has been an "extra waiter" for more than 10 years. He is also called upon to work on
weekends, on holidays and when there are big affairs at the hotel.What is Pedro's status as an employee
under the Labor Code? Why? Explain your answer fully. (6%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Pedro has acquired the status of a regular employee.Pedro has engaged to perform activities which are
necessary or desirable to the usual business or trade of the employer.Moreover, Pedro has been an
―extra waiter‖ for more than 10 years. Any employer who has rendered service forone year, whether
continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activities of which he is
employed and his employment shall continue while such activity exists (Art. 280, Labor Code).
SSS; Money Claims (2008)
No. VIII. Carol de la Cruz is the secretary of the proprietor of an auto dealership in Quezon City. She resides
in Caloocan City. Her office hours start at 8 a.m. and end at 5 p.m. On July 30, 2008, at 7 a.m. while waiting
for public transport at Rizal Avenue Extension as has been her routine, she was sideswiped by a speeding
taxicab resulting in her death. The father of Carol filed a claim for employee's compensation with the
Social Security System. Will the claim prosper? Why? (6%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, under the ―Going-To-And-Coming-From-Rule,‖ the injuries (or death, as in this case) sustained by an
employee ―going to and coming from‖ his place of work are compensable (Bael v. Workmen‘s
Compensation Commission, G.R. No. L-42255, January 31, 1977).
SSS; Monthly Contribution (2008)
No. VII. Tito Paciencioso is an employee of a foundry shop in Malabon, Metro Manila. He is barely able to
make ends meet with his salary of P4,000.00 a month. One day, heasked his employer to stop deducting
from his salary his SSS monthly contribution,reasoning out that he is waiving his social security coverage.If
you were Tito's employer, would you grant his request? Why? (6%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, payment of SSS monthly contribution is compulsory and cannot be waived. To grant Tito‘s request
will violate the SSS law and expose me to the risk of punishment of fine or imprisonment or both at the
discretion of the Court (Sec. 9, Social Security Act, R.A. 8282).
LABOR LAW BAR QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 2015
A. Rocket Corporation is a domestic corporation registered with the SEC, with 30% of its
authorized capital stock owned by foreigners and 70% of its authorized capital stock owned by Filipinos.
Is Rocket Corporation allowed to engage in the recruitment and placement of workers, locally and
overseas? Briefly state the basis for your answer. (2015 Bar Question)
B. When does the recruitment of workers become an act of economic sabotage? (2015 Bar
Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A. No. Article 27 of the Labor Code mandates that pertinently, for a Corporation to validly
engage in recruitment and placement of workers, locally and overseas, at least seventy-five percent (75%)
of its authorized and voting capital stock must be owned and controlled by Filipino citizens. Since only
70% of its authorized capital stock is owned by Filipinos, it consequently cannot validly engage in
recruitment and placement of workers, locally and overseas.
B. Under Section 6(m) of RA 8042, illegal recruitment is considered economic sabotage if it
is committed by a syndicate or is large scale in scope. It is syndicated illegal recruitment if the illegal
recruitment is carried out by three (3) or more conspirators; and it is large scale in scope when it is
committed against three (3) more persons, individually or as a group.
Q: LKG Garments Inc. makes baby clothes for export. As part of its measures to meet its orders, LKG
requires its employees to work beyond eight (8) hours everyday, from Monday to Saturday. It pays its
employees an additional 35% of their regular hourly wage for work rendered in excess of eight (8) hours
per day. Because of additional orders, LKG now requires two (2) shifts of workers with both shifts
working beyond eight (8) hours but only up to a maximum of four (4) hours. Carding is an employee
who used to render up to six (6) hours of overtime work before the change in schedule. He complains
that the change adversely affected him because now he can only earn up to a maximum of four (4)
hours worth of overtime pay. Does Carding have a cause of action against the company? (2015 Bar
Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
NO. A change in work schedule is a management prerogative of LKG. Thus, Carding has no cause
of action against LKG if, as a result of its change to two (2) shifts, he now can only expect a maximum of
four (4) hours overtime work. Besides, Art. 97 of the Labor Code does not guarantee Carding a certain
number of hours of overtime work. In Manila Jockey Employees’ Union v. Manila Jockey Club (517 SCRA
707), the Supreme Court held that the basis of overtime claim is an employee’s having been “permitted
to work”. Otherwise, as in this case, such is not demandable.
Q: Benito is the owner of an eponymous clothing brand that is a top seller. He employs a number of
male and female models who wear Benito's clothes in promotional shoots and videos. His deal with
the models is that Benito will pay them with 3 sets of free clothes per week. Is this arrangement
allowed? (2015 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. the arrangement is not allowed.
The models are Benito’s employees. As such, their services require compensation in legal tender
(Art. 102, Labor Code). The three sets of clothes, regardless of value, are in kind; hence, the former’s
compensation is not in the form prescribed by law.
ANOTHER SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Under Article 102 of the Labor Code, wages of an employee are to be paid only in legal tender, even
when expressly requested bv the employee. Hence, no lawful deal in this regard can be entered into
by and between Benito and his models.
SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The models are not employees. Therefore, Art. 102 of the Labor Code applies. The payment does
not have to be in legal tender.
But even if they are employees, the wage arrangement between Benito and the models is allowed
by Art. 97(f) of the Labor Code which defines wage as the remuneration or earning paid to an employee,
however designated, capable of being expressed in terms of money, whether fixed or ascertained on a
time, task, piece, or commission basis, or other method of calculating the same, which is payable by an
employer to an employee under a written or unwritten contract of employment for work done or to be
done, or for services rendered or to be rendered. It includes the fair and reasonable value, as determined
by the Secretary of Labor, of board, lodging or other facilities customarily furnished by the employer to
the employee.
Q: Soledad, a widowed school teacher, takes under her wing one of her students, Kiko, 13 years old,
who was abandoned by his parents and has to do odd jobs in order to study. She allows Kiko to live in
her house, provides him with clean clothes, food, and a daily allowance of 200 pesos. In exchange, Kiko
does routine housework, consisting of cleaning the house and doing errands for Soledad. One day, a
representative of the DOLE and the DSWD came to Soledad's house and charged her with violating the
law that prohibits work by minors. Soledad objects and offers as a defense that she was not requiring
Kiko to work as the chores were not hazardous. Further, she did not give him chores regularly but only
intermittently as the need may arise. Is Soledad's defense meritorious? (2015 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Soledad’s defense is meritorious. Sec. 4(d) of the Kasambahay Law (RA 10361) provides that the
term “Domestic Worker” shall not include children who are under foster family arrangement, and are
provided access to education and given an allowance incidental to education, i.e. “baon”, transportation,
school projects and school activities.
Q: Ador is a student working on his master's degree in horticulture. To make ends meet, he takes on
jobs to come up with flower arrangements for friends. His neighbor, Nico, is about to get married to
Lucia and needs a floral arranger. Ador offers his services and Nico agrees. They shake hands on it,
agreeing that Nico will pay Ador :P20,000.00 for his services but that Ador will take care of everything.
As Ador sets about to decorate the venue, Nico changes all of Ador's plans and ends up designing the
arrangements himself with Ador simply executing Nico's instructions.
(a) Is there an employer-employee relationship between Nico and Ador? (2015 Bar
Question)
(b) Will Nico need to register Ador with the Social Security System (SSS)? (2015 Bar
Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) Yes. With Ador’s simply executing Nico’s instruction, Nico, who now has control over
Ador’s work, has become the employer of Ador. In Royale Homes Marketing Corp. v. Fidel Alcantara (G.R.
No. 195190, July 28, 2014) the Supreme Court held that control is the most important determinant of
employer-employee relationship.
(b) Yes, as under Section 9 of the Social Security Law (Art. 1161 as amended), coverage in the
SSS shall be compulsory upon all employees not over sixty (60) years of age and their employers.
ANOTHER SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(b) If Ador is a purely casual employee:
No. Casual employees are not subject to the compulsory coverage of the SSS by express provision
of law. (Section 8(5) (3), RA 1161, as amended)
(a) There is no employer-employee relationship. The case at hand pertains to a civil law
arrangement. There is no business undertaken by Lucia; what the parties have is a contract for a specific
service.
Q: Don Don is hired as a contractual employee of CALLHELP, a call center. His contract is expressly for a
term of 4 months. Don Don is hired for 3 straight contracts of 4 months each but at 2-week intervals
between contracts. After the third contract ended, Don Don is told that he will no longer be given
another contract because of "poor performance." Don Don files a suit for "regularization" and for illegal
dismissal, claiming that he is a regular employee of CALLHELP and that he was dismissed without cause.
You are the Labor Arbiter. How would you decide the case? (2015 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
As Labor Arbiter, I will decide the case in favor of Don Don. Given the nature of Don Don’s work,
which consist of activities usually or desirable in the usual business of CALLHELP, Don Don should be
considered a regular employee.
CALLHELP’s termination of Don Don’s service in the guise of “poor performance” is not valid.
Whether for a probationary or regular employee, the requisites of dismissal on that ground do not appear
to have been complied with by the employer here.
Q: Star Crafts is a lantern maker based in Pampanga. It supplies Christmas lanterns to stores in Luzon,
Metro Manila, and parts of Visayas, with the months of August to November being the busiest months.
Its factory employs a workforce of 2,000 workers who make different lanterns daily for the whole year.
Because of increased demand, Star Crafts entered into a contractual arrangement with People Plus, a
service contractor, to supply the former with I 00 workers for only 4 months, August to November, at a
rate different from what they pay their regular employees. The contract with People Plus stipulates that
all equipment and raw materials will be supplied by Star Crafts with the express condition that the
workers cannot take any of the designs home and must complete their tasks within the premises of Star
Crafts.
Is there an employer-employee relationship between Star Crafts and the 100 workers from
People Plus? Explain. (2015 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes. People Plus is a labor-only-contractor because it is not substantially capitalized. Neither does
it carry on an independent business in
which it uses its own investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries or work premises. Hence,
it is just an agent or recruiter of workers who perform work directly related to the trade of Star Crafts.
Since both the essential element and the conforming element of labor-only contracting are present, Star
Crafts becomes the employer of the supplied worker.
As principal, Star Crafts will always be an employer in relation to the workers supplied by its
contractor. Its status as employer is either direct or indirect depending on whether the contractor is
legitimate or not. Thus even if People Plus were a legitimate job contractor, still Star Crafts will be treated
as a statutory employer for purposes of paying the workers’ unpaid wages and benefits.
Q: Rico has a temper and, in his work as Division Manager of Mata tag Insurance, frequently loses his
temper with his staff. One day, he physically assaults his staff member by slapping him. The staff
member sues him for physical injuries. Matatag Insurance decides to terminate Rico, after notice and
hearing, on the ground of loss of trust and confidence. Rico claims that he is entitled to the presumption
of innocence because he has not yet been convicted. Comment on Matatag's action in relation to Rico's
argument. (2015 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Matatag Insurance does not have to await the result of the criminal case before exercising its
prerogative to dismiss. Dismissal is not affected by a criminal case. Under the Three-fold Liability Rule, a
single act may result in three liabilities, two of which are criminal and administrative. To establish them,
the evidence of the crime must amount to proof beyond reasonable
doubt; whereas, the evidence of the ground for dismissal is substantial evidence only. In this regard, the
company has some basis already for withholding the trust it has reposed on its manager. Hence, Rico’s
conviction need not precede the employee’s dismissal.
Q: Karina Santos is a famous news anchor appearing nightly in the country's most watched newscast.
She is surprised, after one newscast, to receive a notice of hearing before the station's Vice-President
for Human Resources and calls the VP immediately to ask what was wrong. Karina is told over the phone
that one of her crew filed a complaint against her for verbal abuse and that management is duty bound
to investigate and give her a chance to air her side. Karina objects and denies that she had ever verbally
assaulted her crew. The VP then informed her that pending the investigation she will be placed on a 30-
day preventive suspension without pay and that she will not be allowed to appear in the newscast
during this time.
Is the preventive suspension of Karina valid? Discuss the reasons for your answer. (2015 Bar
Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. The preventive suspension of Karina is not valid.

The employer may place an employee under preventive suspension if his/her continued
employment would pose a serious and immientn threat to the life or property of the employer or of
his/her co-employees. These requirements are not present here.
Q: Din Din is a single mother with one child. She is employed as a sales executive at a prominent
supermarket. She and her child live in Quezon City and her residence and workplace are a 15-minute
drive apart. One day, Din Din is informed by her boss that she is being promoted to a managerial
position but she is now being transferred to the Visayas. Din Din does not want to uproot her family
and refuses the offer. Her boss is so humiliated by Din Din's refusal of the offer that she gives Din Din
successive unsatisfactory evaluations that result in Din Din being removed from the supermarket.
Din Din approaches you, as counsel, for legal advice. What would you advise her? (2015 Bar
Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
I will advise Din Din to sue her boss and the supermarket for illegal dismissal. Din Din cannot be
compelled to accept the promotion. Her unsatisfactory evaluations as well as her boss’ insistence that she
should agree to the intended transfer to Visayas are badges of an abuse of management prerogative. In
Pfizer Inc. v. Velasco (645 SCRA 135), the Supreme Court held that the managerial prerogative to transfer
personnel must be exercised without abuse of discretion, bearing in mind the basic elements of justice
and fair play. Hence, Din Din’s dismissal is illegal.
Q: Far East Bank (FEB) is one of the leading banks in the country. Its compensation and bonus packages
are top of the industry. For the last 6 years, FEB had been providing the following bonuses across-the-
board to all its employees:
(a) 13th month pay;
(b) 14th to 18th month pay;
(c) Christmas basket worth P6,000;
(d) Gift check worth P4,000; and

(e) Productivity-based incentive ranging from a 20o/o to 40% increase in gross monthly
salary for all employees who would receive an evaluation of "Excellent" for 3 straight
quarters in the same year.
Because of its poor performance over-all, FEB decided to cut back on the bonuses this year and
limited itself to the following:
(a) 13th month pay;
(b) 14th month pay;
(c) Christmas basket worth P4,000; and
(d) Gift check worth P2,000
Katrina, an employee of FEB, who had gotten a rating of "Excellent" for the last 3 quarters was
looking forward to the bonuses plus the productivity incentive bonus. After learning that FEB had
modified the bonus scheme, she objected. Is Katrina's objection justified? Explain. (2015 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Katrina’s objection is justified.
Having enjoyed the across-the-board bonuses, Katrina has earned a vested right. Hence, none
of them can be withheld or reduced. In the problem, the company has not proven its alleged losses to
be substantial. Permitting reduction of pay at the slightest indication of losses is contrary to the policy
of the State to afford full protection to labor and promote full employment. (Linton Commercial Co. v.
Hellera, 535 SCRA 434)
As to the withheld productivity-based bonuses, Katrina is deemed to have earned them

because of her excellent performance ratings for three quarters. On this basis, they cannot be withheld
without violating the Principle of Non-Diminution of Benefits.
Moreover, it is evident from the facts of the case that what was withdrawn by FEB was a productivity
bonus. Protected by RA 6791 which mandates that the monetary value of the productivity improvement
be shared with the employees, the “productivity-based incentive” scheme of FEB cannot just be
withdrawn without the consent of its affected employees.
Q: Luisa is an unwed mother with 3 children from different fathers. In 2004, she became a member of
the Social Security System (SSS). That same year, she suffered a miscarriage of a baby out of wedlock
from the father of her third child. She wants to claim maternity benefits under the SSS Act. Is she
entitled to claim? (2015 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes.
Provided Luisa has reported to her employer her pregnancy and date of expected delivery and
paid at least three monthly contributions during the 12-month period immediately preceding her
miscarriage then she is entitled to maternity benefits up to four deliveries. As to the fact that she got
pregnant outside wedlock, as in her past three pregnancies, this will not bar her claim because the SSS is
non-discriminatory.
Q: Luis, a PNP officer, was off duty and resting at home when he heard a scuffle outside his house. He
saw two of his neighbors fighting and he rushed out to pacify them. One of the neighbors shot Luis by
mistake, which resulted in Luis's death. Marian, Luis's widow, filed a claim with the GSIS seeking death
benefits. The GSIS denied the claim on the ground that the death of Luis was not service related as he
was off duty when the incident happened. Is the GSIS correct? (2015 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No.
The GSIS is not correct. Luis, a policeman, just like a soldier, is covered by the 24-Hour Duty Rule.
He is deemed on round-the-clock duty unless on official leave, in which case his death outside
performance of official peace-keeping mission will bar death claim. In this case, Luis was not on official
leave and he died in the performance of a peace-keeping mission. Therefore, his death is compensable.
Q: Victor was hired by a local manning agency as a seafarer cook on board a luxury vessel for an eight-
month cruise. While on board, Victor complained of chronic coughing, intermittent fever, and joint
pains. He was advised by the ship's doctor to take complete bed rest but was not given any other
medication. His condition persisted but the degree varied from day to day. At the end of the cruise,
Victor went home to Iloilo and there had himself examined. The examination revealed that he had
tuberculosis.
(a) Victor sued for medical reimbursement, damages and attorney's fees, claiming that
tuberculosis was a compensable illness. Do you agree with Victor? Why or why not? (2015 Bar Question)
(b) Due to his prolonged illness, Victor was unable to work for more than 120 days. Will this
entitle him to claim total permanent disability benefits? (2015 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) TB is listed under Sec. 32-A of the POEA-SEC as a work-related disease. It was also either
contracted or aggravated during the effectivity of Victor’s contract. Having shown its manifestations on
board, Victor should have been medically repatriated for further examination and treatment in the
Philippines. This obligation was entirely omitted in bad faith by the company when it waited for his
contract to expire on him before signing him off. On this basis, Victor is entitled to medical
reimbursement, damages and attorney’s fees.
(b) No. Victor’s TB is work-related and it developed on board, thereby satisfying the twin
requisites of compensability. However, despite his knowledge of his medical condition, he failed to report
to his manning agent within three days from his arrival as required by Sec. 20-B(3) of the POEA-SEC. Since
he already felt the manifestations of TB before his sign-off, he should have submitted to post-employment
medical examination (Jebsens Maritime Inc. v. Enrique Undag, 662 SCRA 670). The effect of his omission
is forfeiture by him of disability benefits (Coastal Safeway Marine Services, Inc. v. Elmer T. Esguerra, 655
SCRA 300). In effect, the 120-day rule has no application at all.
Q: What is the rule on the "equity of the incumbent"? (2015 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The Equity of the Incumbent rule has it that all existing federations or national unions, possessing all
qualifications of an LLO and none of the grounds for CR cancellation, shall continue to maintain their
existing affiliates regardless of their location or industry to which they belong. In case of dissociation,
affiliates are not required to observe the one union-one industry rule.
Q: George is an American who is working as a consultant for a local IT company. The company has a
union and George wants to support the union. How far can George go in terms of his support for the
union? (2015 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
George, as a general rule, is prohibited by Art. 270(a) of the Labor Code from giving any donation,
grant or other form of assistance, in cash or in kind, directly or indirectly to the Union. He can give a
support only upon prior permission from the Secretary of Labor relative to “Trade Union activities” as
defined in said law.
George, in addition to his alien employment permit, must first prove that the country whereof he
is a national recognizes the right of Filipinos working therein to organize. Under these conditions, he is
allowed to support the existing union by joining it as to increase its membership.
Q: A. XYZ Company and Mr. AB, a terminated employee who also happens to be the President of XYZ
Employees Union, agree in writing to submit Mr. AB's illegal dismissal case to voluntary arbitration. Is
this agreement a valid one? (2015 Bar Question)
B. XYZ Company and XYZ Employees Union (XYZEU) reach a deadlock in their negotiation for a new
collective bargaining agreement (CBA). XYZEU files a notice of strike; XYZ Company proposes to XYZEU
that the deadlock be submitted instead to voluntary arbitration. If you are counsel for XYZEU, what
advice would you give the union as to the: (1) propriety of the request of XYZ Company, and (2) the
relative advantages/disadvantages between voluntary arbitration and compulsory arbitration? (2015
Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The agreement is valid because the preferred mode of settling labor disputes is through voluntary modes,
like voluntary arbitration. The agreement is consistent with Sec. 3, Art. XIII of the Constitution. Moreover,
Art. 262 of the Labor Code authorizes a voluntary arbitrator to hear and decide by agreement of the
parties, all other labor disputes.
(1) As counsel, I will advise the union to accede to the request of the company. Besides being the
constitutionally preferred mode of dispute settlement, voluntary arbitration is less adversarial and more
expeditious.
(2) The advantages of voluntary arbitration are:
(a) the parties’ dispute is heard and resolved by a person whom both parties have
chosen as their judge; hence, likely to be impartial.
(b) if both parties are willing to submit their dispute, the decision is final and
binding on them in general by reason of their submission agreement; and
(c) in the event of a challenge, the decision is elevated to the CA and then to the SC,
i.e., less one layer of appeal because the NLRC is out of the way.
The disadvantages of voluntary arbitration are:
(a) in case of appeal by the employer to the CA, the monetary award will not be secured with an
appeal bond which Rule 43 of the Rules of Court does not require; and
(b) in case of enforcement of judgment, the Voluntary Arbitrator has no sheriff to

enforce it.
The advantages of compulsory arbitration are:
(a) subject to pre-litigation mediation, a case can be initiated through the filing of a
verified complaint by a union member, unlike in voluntary arbitration where the Voluntary
Arbitrator acquires jurisdiction primarily through a submission agreement. In a case where the company
is unwilling, the EBR (and only the EBR) may serve a notice to arbitrate; hence, a union member may be
left out in the process if the EBR does not serve that notice;
(b) a monetary award is secured with the employer’s appeal bond; and;
(c) there is a system of restitution in compulsory arbitration.
The disadvantages of compulsory arbitration are:
(a) State interference with the affairs of labor and

management is maximized, disregarding the inter-party nature of the
relationship; and
(b) The system of appeals entails a longer process.

Q: The Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between Libra Films and its union, Libra Films Employees'
Union (LFEU), contains the following standard clauses:
1. Maintenance of membership;
2. Check off for union dues and agency fees; and
3. No strike, no lock-out.
While Libra Films and LFEU are in re-negotiations for an extension of the CBA, LFEU discovers that some
of its members have resigned from the union, citing their constitutional right to organize (which
includes the right NOT to organize). LFEU demands that Libra Films institute administrative proceedings
to terminate those union members who resigned in violation of the CBA's maintenance of membership
clause. Libra Films refuses, citing its obligation to remain a neutral party. As a result, LFEU declares a
strike and after filing a notice of strike and taking a strike vote, goes on strike. The union claims that
Libra Films grossly violated the terms of the CBA and engaged in unfair labor practice.
(a) xxxxxxx
(b) Distinguish between a "closed shop" clause and a "maintenance of
membership" clause. (2015 Bar Question)
(c) Distinguish between "union dues" and "agency fees." (2015 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWERS:
(b) In a “closed shop” clause, all employees are required to be members of the union at the time
of hiring. They too must remain members of good standing during the period of employment as a
condition of continued employment. Maintenance of membership clause, on the other hand, requires all
employees who are union members at the time of the execution of the CBA to maintain their membership
of good standing, as a condition of continued employment.
(c) Union dues are union funds paid by union members, normally through check-off by the
employer on the basis of an individual written authorization duly signed by the employees pursuant to
Art. 241 (o) of the Labor Code. Agency fee, on the other hand, is a reasonable fee equivalent to the dues
and other fees paid by members of the recognized collective bargaining agent. Art. 248(e) of the Labor
Code mandates that only non-union members who accept the benefits under the CBA may be assessed
agency fees. Their check-off authorization is not required.
b) Check-off; union dues, agency fees
Q: The Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between Libra Films and its union, Libra Films Employees'
Union (LFEU), contains the following standard clauses:
1. Maintenance of membership;
2. Check off for union dues and agency fees; and
3. No strike, no lock-out.
While Libra Films and LFEU are in re-negotiations for an extension of the CBA, LFEU discovers that some
of its members have resigned from the union, citing their constitutional right to organize (which
includes the right NOT to organize). LFEU demands that Libra Films institute administrative proceedings
to terminate those union members who resigned in violation of the CBA's maintenance of membership
clause. Libra Films refuses, citing its obligation to remain a neutral party. As a result, LFEU declares a
strike and after filing a notice of strike and taking a strike vote, goes on strike. The union claims that
Libra Films grossly violated the terms of the CBA and engaged in unfair labor practice.
(a) Are LFEU's claims correct? Explain. (2015 Bar Question)
(b) xxxxxxx
(c) xxxxxxx
SUGGESTED ANSWERS:
(a) LFEU’s claim that Libra Films committed ULP based on its violation of the CBA is not correct.
For violation of a CBA to constitute ULP, the violation must be violation of its economic provisions.
Moreover, said violation must be gross and flagrant. Based on the allegation of the union, what was
violated was the maintenance of membership clause which was a political or representational provision;
hence, no ULP was committed. (BPI Employees Union-Davao City v. BPI, 702 SCRA 42).
Q: The Alliance of Independent Labor Unions (AILU) is a legitimate labor federation which represents a
majority of the appropriate bargaining unit at the Lumens Brewery (LB). While negotiations were
ongoing for a renewal of the collective bargaining agreement (CBA), LB handed down a decision in a
disciplinary case that was pending which resulted in the termination of the AILU's treasurer and two
other members for cause. AILU protested the decision, claiming that LB acted in bad faith and asked
that LB reconsider. LB refused to reconsider. AILU then walked out of the negotiation and declared a
strike without a notice of strike or a vote. AILU members locked in the LB management panel by
barricading the doors and possible exits (including windows and fire escapes). LB requested the DOLE
to assume jurisdiction over the dispute and to certify it for compulsory arbitration.
The Secretary of Labor declined to assume jurisdiction, finding that the dispute was not one
that involved national interest. LB then proceeds to terminate all of the members of the bargaining
agent on the ground that it was unlawful to: (1) barricade the management panel in the building, and
(2) participate in an illegal
strike.
(a) Was AILU justified in declaring a strike without a strike vote and a notice of strike? Why
or why not? (2015 Bar Question)
(b) Was the Secretary of Labor correct in declining to assume jurisdiction over the dispute?
(2015 Bar Question)
(c) Was LB justified in terminating all those who were members of AILU on the two grounds
cited? (2015 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWERS:
(a) No. Firstly, a Notice of Strike is always required by Art. 263(c) of the Labor Code before a
strike may be staged – be it grounded on bargaining deadlock or unfair Labor Practice. Secondly, the
Supreme Court already held in Sukothai that while AILU may not exhaust the 15-day cooling-off period in
case of dismissal from employment of its officers who were duly elected in accordance with the Union
constitution and by-laws and the dismissal constitutes union busting and a threat to AILU’s existence, still,
Art. 263 (f) requires that a strike vote be undertaken through a secret ballot and approved by a majority
of the total union membership in the bargaining unit. Devoid of a notice of strike and a strike vote, AILU’s
strike is therefore illegal.
(b) The refusal of the Secretary to assume jurisdiction is valid. Par. (g) of Art. 263 (old) of the
Labor Code leaves it to his sound discretion to determine if national interest is involved. Assumption
power is full and complete. It is also plenary and discretionary (Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc. v.
Philtranco Workers Union-AGLO, G.R. No. 180962, February 26, 2014). Thus, if in his opinion national
interest is not involved, then the company cannot insist that he assume jurisdiction.
(c) If dismissal is based on illegal strike:
The company has to file a complaint for illegal strike first. Once the strike is declared by final
judgment to be illegal, it can dismiss the union officers. As to members, their dismissal must be based on
their having committed illegalities on the occasion of their illegal strike. Since the company prematurely
and indiscriminately dismissed the AILU members then their dismissal is illegal.
If dismissal is based on the unlawful acts of barricading to lock the AILU members:
Yes. Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code authorizes the employer to declare the loss of employment
status of “ANY WORKER” or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts
during a strike.
Q: Mario comes from a family of coffee bean growers. Deciding to incorporate his fledgling coffee
venture, he invites his best friend, Carlo, to join him. Carlo is hesitant because he does not have money
to invest but Mario suggests a scheme where Carlo can be the Chief Marketing Agent of the company,
earning a salary and commissions. Carlo agrees and the venture is formed. After one year, the business
is so successful that they were able to declare dividends. Mario is so happy with Carlo's work that he
assigns 100 shares of stock to Carlo as part of the latter's bonus.
Much later on, it is discovered that Carlo had engaged in unethical conduct which caused
embarrassment to the company. Mario is forced to terminate Carlo but he does so without giving Carlo
the opportunity to explain.
Carlo filed a case against Mario and the company for illegal dismissal. Mario objected on the
ground that the Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over the case as it would properly be considered as
an intra-corporate controversy cognizable by the RTC. Further, Mario claimed that because Carlo's
dismissal was a corporate act, he cannot be held personally liable.
(a) As the Labor Arbiter assigned to this case, how would you resolve the jurisdiction question.
(2015 Bar Question)
(b) What is the rule on personal liability of corporate officers for a corporate act declared to be
unlawful? (2015 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) The Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over Carlo’s illegal dismissal complaint as he was hired
by Mario on a “salary and commission” basis. In Grepalife v. Judico (180 SCRA 445) it was held that a
worker who is paid on a salary plus commission basis is an employee. While regular courts have
jurisdiction over Mario’s corporate act of severing ties with Carlo, the Labor Arbiter, pursuant to Art. 217
A-(2) of the Labor Code, has jurisdiction over Carlo’s illegal dismissal complaint.
(b) Corporate officers are not, as a general rule, personally liable for the corporate acts they
performed in behalf of the corporation they represent. They are, however, personally liable for their
corporate acts if they acted with malice or bad faith (Girly Ico v. Systems Technology Institute, Inc., G.R.
No. 185100, July 9, 2014).
(a) Carlo is party to a joint-venture. Hence, he is not related to Mario as an employee. As a

business organization, the affairs of that joint-venture are not governed by Labor Law, except in relation
to its employees. Any issue arising from that affair, therefore, must be brought to the RTC. Thus, the
NLRC has no jurisdiction because the matter did not arise from employer-employee relationship and the
issue between the disputants is not resolvable solely through the application of Labor Law.
Q: Philippine News Network (PNN) engages the services of Anya, a prominent news anchor from a rival
station, National News Network (NNN). NNN objects to the transfer of Anya claiming that she is barred
from working in a competing company for a period of three years from the expiration of her contract.
Anya proceeds to sign with PNN which then asks her to anchor their nightly newscast. NNN sues Anya
and PNN before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), asking for a labor injunction. Anya
and PNN object claiming that it is a matter cognizable by a regular court and not the NLRC.
(a) Is NNN's remedy correct? Why or why not? (2015 Bar Question)
(b) What are the grounds for a labor injunction to issue? (2015 Bar Question)
(c) Distinguish the jurisdiction of a Labor Arbiter from that of the NLRC. (2015 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) The NLRC has no jurisdiction.

As to PNN, there is no employer-employee relationship between itself and NNN; hence, the NLRC
cannot hear and resolve their dispute (Reasonable Causal Connection Rule). As to Anya, the injunctive
power of the NLRC is ancillary in nature; hence, it requires a principal case, which is absent. Besides, the
dispute between her and PNN is not resolvable solely through the application of the Labor Code, other
labor statutes, CBA or employment contract. (Reference to Labor Law Rule)
(b) The NLRC may issue an injunctive writ to enjoin an illegal activity under Art. 264 (old) of
the Labor Code; as an ancillary remedy to avoid irreparable injury to the rights of a party in an ordinary
labor dispute pursuant to Rule X, 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure, as amended; and to correct the Labor
Arbiter’s grave abuse of discretion pursuant to Rule XII of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure, as amended.
Moreover, for labor injunction to issue, it must be proven under Art. 218 (e). Labor Code:
i. That the prohibited or unlawful acts have been threatened and will be committed
and will be continued unless restrained;
ii. That substantial and irreparable injury to the complainant’s property will follow;
iii. That greater injury will be inflicted upon complainant by the denial of relief than will
be inflicted upon defendants by the granting of relief;
iv. That complainant has no adequate remedy at law; and
v. That public officers charged with the duty to protect complainant’s property are
unable or unwilling to furnish adequate protection
(c) As to jurisdiction, the LA can hear and resolve cases under Art. 217 (old) of the Labor
Code, money claims under Sec. 7 of R.A. 10022; and referred wage distortion disputes in unorganized
establishments, as well as the enforcement of compromise agreements pursuant to the 2011 NLRC Rules
of Procedure, as amended. On the other hand, the NLRC reviews decisions rendered by the LA; decisions
or orders rendered by the RD under Art. 129 of the Labor Code; and conducts compulsory arbitration in
certified cases.
As to the power to issue a labor injunction, the NLRC can issue an injunctive writ. On the other
hand, the Labor Arbiter cannot issue an injunctive writ.
2016 BAR EXAMINATIONS
POLITICAL LAW
November 6, 2016 8:00 A.M. - 12:00 N.N.
INSTRUCTIONS
1. This Questionnaire contains ten (10) pages. Check the number of pages and make sure it has the correct
number of pages and their proper numbers.
All the items have to be answered within/our (4) hours. Since there are twenty (20) questions, you have 12
minutes to answer each question, and 6 minutes to answer · each sub-question. You may write on the
Questionnaire for notes relating to the questions.
Read each question very carefully and write your answers in your Bar Examination Notebook in the same
order the questions are posed. Write your answers only on the front of every sheet in your Notebook. If not
sufficient then start with the back page of the first sheet and thereafter. Note well the allocated percentage
points for each number, question, or sub-question. In your answers, use the numbering system in the
questionnaire.
2. Answer the Essay questions legibly, clearly, and concisely. Start each number on a separate page. An
answer to a sub-question under the same number may be written continuously on the same page and the
immediately succeeding pages until completed.
Your answer should demonstrate your ability to analyze the facts, apply the pertinent . laws and
jurisprudence, and arrive at a sound or logical conclusion. Always support your answer with the pertinent
laws, rules, jurisprudence, and the facts.
A mere "Yes" or "No" answer without any corresponding explanation or discussion will not be given full
credit. Thus, always briefly but fully explain your answers although the question does not expressly ask for an
explanation. You do not need to re-write or repeat the question in your Notebook.
3. Make sure you do not write your name or any extraneous note/s or distinctive markingls on your Notebook
that can serve as an identifying mark/s (such as names that are not in the given questions, prayers, or private
notes to the Examiner).
Writing, leaving, or making any distinguishing or identifying mark in the exam Notebook is considered
cheating and can disqualify you.
YOU CAN BRING HOME THE QUESTIONNAIRE.
JUSTICE PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Chairman
2016 Bar Examinations
-I-
The contents of the vault of ABC company consisting of cash and documents were stolen. Paulyn, the
treasurer of ABC, was invited by the Makati City Police Department to shed light on the amount of cash
stolen and the details of the missing documents. Paulyn obliged and volunteered the information asked. Later,
Paulyn was charged with qualified theft together with other suspects. Paulyn claims her rights under the
Constitution and pertinent laws were blatantly violated. The police explained that they were just gathering
evidence when Paulyn was invited for a conference and she was not a suspect at that time. Rule on her
defense. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Her defense is bereft with merit.
Custodial investigation begins to operate at once as soon as the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry
into an unsolved crime, and direction is then aimed upon a particular suspect who has been taken into custody
and to whom the police would then direct interrogatory questions which tend to illicit incriminating
statements. (People v. Dela Cruz, GR No. 118866-68, Sept. 17, 1997)
As Paulyn was not taken into custody but only invited and that there was no particular suspect yet and no
questions propounded that will possibly incriminate her, Paulyn's constitutional rights were not violated.
-II-
Sec. 11, Art. XII of the Constitution, provides: "No franchise, certificate or any other form of authorization
for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or
associations organized under the laws of the Philippines at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned
by such citizens xx x." Does the term "capital" mentioned in the cited section refer to the total common shares
only, or to the total outstanding capital stock, or to both or "separately to each class of shares, whether
common, preferred non-voting, preferred voting or any class of shares?" Explain your answer. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
It refers only to shares of stock entitled to vote in the election of directors thus, only to common shares. To
construe broadly the term "capital" as the total outstanding capital stock, including both common and non-
voting preferred shares, grossly contravenes the intent and letter of the Constitution that the State shall
develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos. A broad
definition unjustifiably disregards who owns the all-important voting stock, which necessarily equates to
control of the public utility. (Gamboa v. Teves, GR No. 176579, June 28, 2011)
-III-
A law converted the component city of Malumanay, Laguna into a highly urbanized city. The Local
Government Code (LGC) provides that the conversion "shall take effect only after it is approved by the
majority of votes cast in a plebiscite to be held in the political units directly affected."
Before the COMELEC, Mayor Xenon of Malumanay City insists that only the registered voters of the city
should vote in the plebiscite because the city is the only political unit directly affected by the conversion.
Governor Yuri asserts that all the registered voters of the entire province of Laguna should participate in the
plebiscite, because when the LGC speaks of the "qualified voters therein," it means all the voters of all the
political units affected by such conversion, and that includes all the voters of the entire province. He argues
that the income, population and area of Laguna will be reduced. Who, between Mayor Xenon and Governor
Yuri, is correct? Explain your answer. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Gov. Yuri is correct.
In the conversion of a component city into a highly urbanized city, the registered voters of the entire province
should participate in the plebiscite, not just the residents of the concerned city. In converting a city into a
highly urbanized city, Sec. 453 of the LGC calls for the conduct of a plebiscite by the "qualified voters
therein." Meanwhile, Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution mandates that no LGU shall be created, divided,
merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered without approval by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite in the "political units directly affected." Construing the law in harmony with the Constitution, the
phrase "by the qualified voters therein" in Sec. 453 of LGC means the qualified voters not only in the city
proposed to be converted to a highly urbanized city but also the voters of the political units directly affected
by such conversion. (Umali v. COMELEC, GR No. 203974, April 22, 2014)
As the income, population and area of Laguna will be reduced, it will certainly be directly affected by the
conversion of Malumanay into a highly urbanized area. Therefore, the province of Laguna as well as the
qualified voters in Malumanay should participate in the plebiscite called for its conversion.
-IV-
Several concerned residents of the areas fronting Manila Bay, among them a group of students who are
minors, filed a suit against the Metro Manila Development · Authority (MMDA), the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), the Department of Health (DOH), the Department of
Agriculture (DA), the Department of Education (DepEd), the Department of Interior and Local Government
(DILG), and a number of other executive agencies, asking the court to order them to perform their duties
relating to the cleanup, rehabilitation and protection of Manila Bay. The complaint alleges that the continued
neglect by defendants and their failure to prevent and abate pollution in Manila Bay constitute a violation of
the petitioners' constitutional right to life, health and a balanced ecology.
[a] If the defendants assert that the students/petitioners who are minors do not have locus standi to
file the action, is the assertion correct? Explain your answer. (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, it is not correct.
The liberalization of standing first enunciated in Oposa v. Factoran, insofar as it refers to minors and
generations yet unborn, is now enshrined in Part II, Rule 2, Sec. 5 of the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases (RPEC) which allows the filing of a citizen suit in environmental cases. The
provision on citizen suits in the Rules collapses the traditional rule on personal and direct interest, on
the principle that humans are stewards of nature. (Arigo v. Swift, GR No. 206510, Sept. 16, 2014)
[b] In its decision which attained finality, the Court ordered the defendants to clean up, rehabilitate
and sanitize Manila Bay within eighteen (18) months, and to submit to the Court periodic reports of
their accomplishment, so that the Court can monitor and oversee the activities undertaken by the
agencies in compliance with the Court's directives. Subsequently, a resolution was issued extending
the time periods within which the agencies should comply with the directives covered by the final
decision. A view was raised that the Court's continued intervention after the case has been decided
violates the doctrine of separation of powers considering that the government agencies all belong to
the Executive Department and are under the control of the President. Is this contention correct? Why
or why not? (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, it is not correct.
The issuance of subsequent resolutions by the Court is simply an exercise of judicial power under
Art. VIII of the Constitution, because the execution of the Decision is but an integral part of the
adjudicative function of the Court. (MMDA v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay, GR No. 171947,
Feb. 15, 2011)
-V-
Section 8 of P.D. No. 910, entitled "Creating an Energy Development Board, defining its powers and
functions, providing funds therefor and for other purposes," provides that: "All fees, revenues and receipts of
the Board from any and all sources x x x shall form part of a Special Fund to be used to finance energy
resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government and for such other purposes
as may be hereafter directed by the President."
The Malampaya NGO contends that the provision constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power since
the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" gives the President
unbridled discretion to determine the purpose for which the funds will be used. On the other hand, the
government urges the application of ejusdem generis.
[a] Explain the "completeness test" and "sufficient standard test." (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Under the "completeness test," the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it
leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to
enforce it. The "sufficient standard test" mandates adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to
determine the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.
(Disini v. Secretary of Justice, GR No. 203335, Feb. 11, 2014)
[b] Does the assailed portion of section 8 of PD 910 hurdle the two (2) tests? (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
While the said Section 8 may pass the "completeness test," it should nevertheless be stricken down as
unconstitutional because it lies independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating
law. This notwithstanding, the rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows for the use of the Malampaya
Funds "to finance energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the
government," remains legally effective and subsisting. (Belgica v. Ochoa, GR No. 208566, Nov. 11,
2013)
-VI-
Pornographic materials in the form of tabloids, magazines and other printed materials, proliferate and are
being sold openly in the streets of Masaya City. The City Mayor organized a task force which confiscated
these materials. He then ordered that the materials be burned in public. Dominador, publisher of the
magazine, "Plaything", filed a suit, raising the following constitutional issues: (a) the confiscation of the
materials constituted an illegal search and seizure, because the same was done without a valid search warrant;
and (b) the confiscation, as well as the proposed destruction of the materials, is a denial of the right to
disseminate information, and thus, violates the constitutional right to freedom of expression. Is either or both
contentions proper? Explain your answer. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Only the first contention is proper.
(a) In Pita v. CA (GR No. 80806, Oct. 5, 1989), the Court outlined the procedure to be followed, thus: (1) a
criminal charge must be brought against the person/s for purveying the pornographic materials; (2) an
application for a search and seizure warrant obtained from the judge who shall determine the existence of
probable cause before issuing such warrant; (3) the materials confiscated brought to court in the prosecution
of the accused for the crime charged; (4) the court will determine whether the confiscated items are really
pornographic, and (5) the judgment of acquittal or conviction rendered by the court accordingly.
In the instant case, the authorities were not possessed of a lawful court order finding the materials to be
pornographic and authorizing them to carry out a search and seizure. Also, no party has been charged, neither
is any charge being pressed against any party. Thus, the authorities has not shown the required proof to justify
a ban and to warrant confiscation of the magazines.
(b) Pornographic materials in violation of Art. 201 of the RPC are mandated by law [PD 969] to be forfeited
and destroyed, even if the accused was acquitted. (Nograles v. People, GR No. 191080, Nov. 21, 2011)
The destruction of the said materials is a valid exercise of police power to prevent the dissemination of
pornographic materials and not to curtail the freedom of expression.
-VII-
Ernesto, a minor, while driving a motor vehicle, was stopped at a mobile checkpoint. Noticing that Ernesto is
a minor, SPOl Jojo asked Ernesto to exhibit his driver's license but Ernesto failed to produce it. SPOI Jojo
requested Ernesto to alight from the vehicle and the latter acceded. Upon observing a bulge in the pants of
Ernesto, the policeman frisked him and found an unlicensed .22-caliber pistol inside Ernesto's right pocket.
Ernesto was arrested, detained and charged. At the trial, Ernesto, through his lawyer, argued that, policemen
at mobile checkpoints are empowered to conduct nothing more than a ''visual search". They cannot order the
persons riding the vehicle to alight. They cannot frisk, or conduct a body search of the driver or the
passengers of the vehicle.
Ernesto's lawyer thus posited that:
[a] The search conducted in violation of the Constitution and established jurisprudence was an illegal
search; thus, the gun which was seized in the course of an illegal search is the "fruit of the poisonous
tree" and is inadmissible in evidence. (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
This is correct.
The search is not incidental to a lawful arrest since such arrest was made without Ernesto being
informed of his Miranda rights. Also, there is nothing that would have allowed the policeman to
conduct the search for he had no probable cause to believe, before the search that either Ernesto is a
law offender or he will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime in the motor vehicle
to be searched. (Caballes v. CA, GR No. 136292, Jan. 15, 2002) Here, Ernesto was flagged down
because he was a minor, not a felon.
[b] The arrest made as a consequence of the invalid search was likewise illegal, because an unlawful
act (the search) cannot be made the basis of a lawful arrest. (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
This is correct.
Under the Rules of Court, a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or
anything, which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant.
(Rule 126, Sec. 12). Thus, as a rule, the arrest must precede the search; the process cannot be
reversed.
The arrest in this case is unlawful for not having complied with the constitutional requirements. At
the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform the latter of the
reason for the arrest and must show that person the warrant of arrest, if any. Persons shall be
informed of their constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement they
might make could be used against them. (Luz v. People, GR No. 197788, Feb. 29, 2012) Here, there
is no showing that Ernesto was informed of his Miranda rights as mandated by the Constitution
hence, the arrest is clearly illegal from which a lawful search may follow.
Rule on the correctness of the foregoing arguments, with reasons.
-VIII-
A law is passed intended to protect women and children from all forms of violence. When a woman perceives
an act to be an act of violence or a threat of violence against her, she may apply for a Barangay Protection
Order (BPO) to be issued by the Barangay Chairman, which shall have the force and effect of law. Conrado,
against whom a BPO had been issued on petition of his wife, went to court to challenge the constitutionality
of the law. He raises the following grounds:
[a] The law violates the equal protection clause, because while it extends protection to women who
may be victims of violence by their husbands, it does not extend the same protection to husbands
who may be battered by their wives. (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Conrado's contention is incorrect.
The requisites for a valid classifications are as follows, to wit: (1) substantial distinctions which make
for real differences; (2) germane to the purpose of the law; (3) not limited to existing conditions only;
and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.
In this case, the assailed law does not violate the equal protection clause. First, the law rests on
substantial distinctions. The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that
women are more likely than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias and
prejudice against women, all make for real differences justifying the classification. Second, the
classification is germane to the purpose of the assailed law, which is to address violence committed
against women and children, as spelled out in its declared policy. Third, the classification is not
limited to existing conditions only, and the law applies equally to all members. The application of the
challenged law is not limited to existing conditions when it was promulgated, but to future conditions
as well, for as long as the safety and security of women and their children are threatened by violence
and abuse. And the law applied equally to all women and children who suffer violence and abuse.
(Garcia v. Drilon, GR No. 179267, June 25, 2013)
[b] The grant of authority to the Barangay Chairman to issue a Barangay Protection Order (BPO)
constitutes an undue delegation of judicial power, because obviously, the issuance of the BPO entails
the exercise of judicial power. (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
He is not correct.
Such function of the Barangay Chairman is purely executive in nature, consistent with his duty under
the LGC "to enforce all laws and ordinances" and "to maintain public order in the barangay." (Garcia
v. Drilon, supra.)
Rule on the validity of the grounds raised by Conrado, with reasons.
-IX-
The Government, through Secretary Toogoody of the Department of Transportation (DOTr), filed a complaint
for eminent domain to acquire a 1,000- hectare property in Bulacan, owned by Baldomero. The court granted
the expropriation, fixed the amount of just compensation, and installed the Government in full possession of
the property.
[a] If the Government does not immediately pay the amount fixed by the court as just compensation,
can Baldomero successfully demand the return of the property to him? Explain your answer. (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, he cannot.
As a rule, non-payment of just compensation in an expropriation proceeding does not entitle the
private landowners to recover possession of the expropriated lots but only to demand payment of the
FMV of the property plus interest. (Republic v. CA, GR No. 146587, July 2, 2002; Reyes v. NHA, GR
No. 147511, Jan. 20, 2003) Nevertheless, where the government fails to pay just compensation
within five (5) years from the finality of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the owners
concerned shall have the right to recover possession of their property. (Republic v. Lim, GR No.
161656, June 29, 2005)
In this case, there is no showing that the judgment in the expropriation proceeding has attained
finality from which the five (5) year period may be reckoned so as to determine whether or not
Baldomero already has the right to demand the return of his property.
[b] If the Government paid full compensation but after two years it abandoned its plan to build an
airport on the property, can Baldomero compel the Government to re-sell the property back to him?
Explain your answer. (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, he cannot.
The property owner's right to repurchase the property depends upon the character of the title acquired
by the expropriator, i.e. if land is expropriated for a particular purpose with the condition that when
that purpose is ended or abandoned, the property shall revert to the former owner, then the former
owner can re-acquire the property.
In this case, the terms of the judgment in the expropriation case were very clear and unequivocal,
granting title over the lot in fee simple to the Government. No condition on the right to repurchase
was imposed. (Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. CA, GR No. 139495, Nov. 27, 2000)
-X-
The Philippines entered into an international agreement with members of the international community
creating the International Economic Organization (IEO) which will serve as a forum to address economic
issues between States, create standards, encourage greater volume of trade between its members, and settle
economic disputes. After the Philippine President signed the agreement, the Philippine Senate demanded that
the international agreement be submitted to it for its ratification. The President refused, arguing that it is an
executive agreement that merely created an international organization and it dwells mainly on addressing
economic issues among States.
Is the international agreement creating the IEO a treaty or an executive agreement? Explain. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
It is an executive agreement.
Treaties differ from executive agreements, to wit: (1) international agreements which involve political issues
or changes of national policy and those involving international arrangements of a permanent character take
the form of a treaty; while international agreements involving adjustment of details carrying out well
established national policies and traditions and involving arrangements of a more or less temporary nature
take the form of executive agreements; and (2) in treaties, formal documents require ratification, while
executive agreements become binding through executive action. (Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea
Trading, G.R. No. L-14279, Oct. 31, 1961)
Here, the agreement does not change the economic policy of the Philippines. Instead, it merely involves
adjustment of details carrying out such economic policy by creating the IEO wherein States may address
certain economic issues and disputes.
-XI-
The USS Liberty, a warship of the United States (U.S.), entered Philippine archipelagic waters on its way to
Australia. Because of the negligence of the naval officials on board, the vessel ran aground off the island of
Palawan, damaging coral reefs and other marine resources in the area. Officials of Palawan filed a suit for
damages against the naval officials for their negligence, and against the U.S., based on Articles 30 and 31 of
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Article 31 provides that the Flag State
shall bear international responsibility for any loss or damage to the Coastal State resulting from
noncompliance by a warship with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning passage through
the territorial sea. The U. S. Government raised the defenses that:
[a] The Philippine courts cannot exercise jurisdiction over another sovereign State, including its
warship and naval officials. (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The contention is correct.
Considering that the satisfaction of a judgment against the naval officials will require remedial
actions and appropriation of funds by the US Government, the suit is deemed to be one against the
US itself. The Doctrine of State Immunity bars the exercise of jurisdiction by the Philippine courts
over the persons of said officials. (Arigo v. Swift, GR No. 206510, Sept. 16, 2014) Furthermore,
warships and other government ships of other States operated for non-commercial purposes, enjoy
immunity from the jurisdiction of local courts and administrative tribunals, subject to the provisions
of Arts. 30 and 31 of UNCLOS. (Nachura)
[b] The United States is not a signatory to UN CLOS and thus cannot be bound by its provisions.
(2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
This is incorrect.
Non-membership in the UNCLOS does not mean that the US will disregard the rights of the
Philippines as a Coastal State over its internal waters and territorial sea. As a world leader, the US is
expected to bear "international responsibility" under Art. 31 in connection with the USS Liberty
grounding which adversely affected the coral reefs and other marine resources in Palawan. Moreover,
although the said treaty upholds the immunity of warships from the jurisdiction of Coastal States
while navigating the latter's territorial sea, the flag States shall be required to leave the territorial sea
immediately if they flout the laws and regulations of the Coastal State, and they will be liable for
damages caused by their warships or any other government vessel operated for non-commercial
purposes under Article 31. (Arigo v. Swift, supra.)
Rule on the validity of the defenses raised by the U.S., with reasons.
-XII-
Paragraphs c, d and f of Section 36 of Republic Act No. 9165 provide:
"Sec. 36. Authorized drug testing. xx x The following shall be subjected to undergo drug testing: xx x
c. Students of secondary and tertiary schools x x x;
d. Officers and employees of public and private offices x x x;

f. All persons charged before the prosecutor's office with a criminal offense having an imposable
imprisonment of not less than 6 years and 1 day;"
Petitioners contend that the assailed portions of Sec. 36 are unconstitutional for violating the right to privacy,
the right against unreasonable searches and seizures and the equal protection clause. Decide if the assailed
provisions are unconstitutional. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Only Sec. 36(f) is unconstitutional.
In the case of students, the constitutional viability of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing
for students emanates primarily from the waiver by the students of their right to privacy when they seek entry
to the school, and from their voluntarily submitting their persons to the parental authority of school
authorities. In the case of private and public employees, the constitutional soundness of the mandatory,
random, and suspicionless drug testing proceeds from the reasonableness of the drug test policy and
requirement.
The situation is entirely different in the case of persons charged before the public prosecutor's office with
criminal offenses punishable with six (6) years and one (1) day imprisonment. The operative concepts in the
mandatory drug testing are "randomness" and "suspicionless." In the case of persons charged with a crime
before the prosecutor's office, a mandatory drug testing can never be random or suspicionless. To impose
mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal
prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a persons'
right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. (Social Justice Society v. Dangerous
Drugs Board, GR No. 157870, Nov. 3, 2008)
-XIII-
While Congress was not in session, the President appointed Antero as Secretary of the Department of
Tourism (DOT), Benito as Commissioner of the Bureau of Immigration (BI), Clodualdo as Chairman of the
Civil Service Commission (CSC), Dexter as Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR), and
Emmanuel as Philippine Ambassador to Cameroon. The following day, all the appointees took their oath
before the President, and commenced to perform the functions of their respective offices.
[a] Characterize the appointments, whether permanent or temporary; and whether regular or interim,
with reasons. (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Antero, Clodualdo and Emmanuel's appointments are permanent and interim appointments. On the
other hand, the appointments of Benito and Dexter may only be classified either as permanent or
temporary, not regular or interim.
Since Antero, Clodualdo and Emmanuel were appointed by the President while the Congress is not in
session and such appointments require the consent of the Commission on Appointments (Art. VII,
Sec. 16, first sentence; Art. IX-B, Sec. 1[2]), their appointments are considered as ad interim.
(Nachura) Being so, such appointments are permanent in nature following the rule that an ad interim
appointment is a permanent appointment. (PLM v. IAC, 140 SCRA 22)
In the case of Benito and Dexter, their appointments do not need the consent and confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments because the Commissioner of the BI and the Chairman of the CHR are
not among the officers mentioned in the first sentence of Art. VII, Sec. 16 of the Constitution.
(Sarmiento v. Mison, 156 SCRA 549; Bautista v. Salonga, 172 SCRA 16). Nonetheless, their
appointment may be permanent or temporary depending upon the discretion of the appointing
authority because appointment is discretionary hence, it includes the determination of the nature or
character of the appointment, i.e., whether the appointment is temporary or permanent. (Nachura;
Luego v. CSC, 143 SCRA 327; Lapinid v. CSC, 197 SCRA 106; Pobre v. Mendieta, 224 SCRA 738))
[b] A civil society group, the Volunteers Against Misguided Politics (VAMP), files suit, contesting
the legality of the acts of the appointees and claiming that the appointees should not have entered into
the performance of the functions of their respective offices, because their appointments had not yet
been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. Is this claim of VAMP correct? Why or why
not? (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the claim is not correct.
The acts of Antero, Clodualdo and Emmanuel are valid for the reason that ad interim appointments
take effect immediately pending confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. (Nachura) The
acts of Benito and Dexter are likewise valid even in the absence of a confirmation from the
Commission on Appointments because their appointments are not in fact subject to such
confirmation.
-XIV-
Onofre, a natural born Filipino citizen, arrived in the United States in 1985. In 1990, he married Salvacion, a
Mexican, and together they applied for and obtained American citizenship in 2001. In 2015, the couple and
their children --Alfred, 21 years of age, Robert, 16, and Marie, 14, who were all born in the U.S. -- returned to
the Philippines on June 1, 2015. On June 15, 2015, informed that he could reacquire Philippine citizenship
without losing his American citizenship, Onofre went home to the Philippines and took the oath of allegiance
prescribed under R.A. No. 9225. On October 28, 2015, he filed a Certificate of Candidacy to run in the May
9, 2016 elections for the position of Congressman in his home province of Palawan, running against re-
electionist Congressman Profundo.
[a] Did Onofre's reacquisition of Philippine citizenship benefit his wife, Salvacion, and their minor
children and confer upon them Filipino citizenship? Explain your answer. (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, such reacquisition only confers upon his minor children Filipino citizenship.
Derivative citizenship covers only the unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted,
below eighteen (18) years of age, of those who re-acquire Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of
RA 9225. (Sec. 4, RA 9225)
Thus, Salvacion may not be granted derivative citizenship as the wife is not covered by the law.
[b] Before the May 9, 2016 elections, Profundo's lawyer filed a Petition to Deny Due Course or to
Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy against Onofre. What grounds can he raise in his Petition to
support it? Explain your answer. (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
I will raise his dual citizenship and residency as grounds for the Petition. For his dual citizenship, in
view of Sec. 5(2) of RA 9225, Onofre should have stated in clear and unequivocal terms that he is
renouncing all foreign citizenship. (Lopez v. COMELEC, GR No. 182701, July 23, 2008). For his
residency, reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under RA 9225 has no automatic impact or effect
on residence/domicile. Such reacquisition did not automatically make him regain his residence in
Palawan. He must still prove that after becoming a Philippine citizen, he had re-established Palawan
as his new domicile of choice which is reckoned from the time he made it such. (Caballero v.
COMELEC, GR No. 209835, Sept. 22, 2015)
Since the Constitution requires that a member of the House of Representatives must, among others,
be a natural born citizen and a resident of the district in which he shall be elected for not less than 1
year immediately preceding the day of election, Onofre deliberately deceived the electorate by
making a false material representation as to his citizenship and residency.
-XV-
Congress passed a bill appropriating PlOO-billion. Part of the money is to be used for the purchase of a 200-
hectare property in Antipolo. The rest shall be spent for the development of the area and the construction of
the Universal Temple for All the World's Faiths (UTAW-F). When completed, the site will be open, free of
charge, to all religions, beliefs, and faiths, where each devotee or believer shall be accommodated and treated
in a fair and equal manner, without distinction, favor, or prejudice. There will also be individual segments or
zones in the area which can be used for the conduct of whatever rituals, services, sacraments, or ceremonials
that may be required by the customs or practices of each particular religion. The President approved the bill,
happy in the thought that this could start the healing process of our wounded country and encourage people of
varied and often conflicting faiths to live together in harmony and in peace.
If the law is questioned on the ground that it violates Sec. 5, Article III of the Constitution that "no law shall
be made respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof," how will you resolve
the challenge? Explain. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The argument is correct.
The non-establishment clause is supported by several provisions under the present Constitution, one of which
is the prohibition against the use of public money or property for the benefit of any religion, or of any priest,
minister, or ecclesiastic. (Art. VI, Sec. 29[2]) The non-establishment clause means that the State cannot
among others pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religion, or prefer one religion over another. (Everson
v. Board of Education, 30 US 1)
By appropriating fund for the establishment of the UTAW-F for the purpose of aiding all religion, Congress
in effect violated the non-establishment clause.
-XVI-
Jojo filed a criminal complaint against Art for theft of a backpack worth P150.00 with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Manila. The crime is punishable with arresto mayor to prision correccional in its minimum
period, or not to exceed 4 years and 2 months. The case was assigned to Prosecutor Tristan and he applied
Sec. 8(a) of Rule 112 which reads: "(a) If filed with the prosecutor. - If the complaint is filed directly with the
prosecutor involving an offense punishable by imprisonment of less than four (4) years, two (2) months and
one (1) day, the procedure outlined in Sec. 3(a) of this Rule shall be observed. The Prosecutor shall act on the
complaint within ten (10) days from its filing."
On the other hand, Sec. 3(a) of Rule 112 provides: "(a) The complaint shall state the address of the
respondent and shall be accompanied by affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses as well as other
supporting documents to establish probable cause. x x x"
Since Sec. 8(a) authorizes the Prosecutor to decide the complaint on the basis of the affidavits and other
supporting documents submitted by the complainant, Prosecutor Tristan did not notify Art nor require him to
submit a counter-affidavit. He proceeded to file the Information against Art with the Metropolitan Trial Court.
Art vehemently assails Sec. 8(a) of Rule 112 as unconstitutional and violative of due process and his rights as
an accused under the Constitution for he was not informed of the complaint nor was he given the opportunity
to raise his defenses thereto before the Information was filed. Rule on the constitutionality of Sec. 8(a) of
Rule 112. Explain. (5%)
-XVII-
[a] Define the archipelagic doctrine of national territory, state its rationale; and explain how it is
implemented through the straight baseline method. (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Under the Archipelagic Doctrine, the waters around, between and connecting the islands of the
archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the
Philippines. (2nd sentence, Art. I)
This Doctrine is based on the principle that an archipelago, which consists of a number of islands
separated by bodies of water, should be treated as one integral unit, and the waters inside the
baselines are considered internal waters. (Nachura)
Using the straight baseline method, imaginary lines are drawn joining the outermost points of the
outermost islands of the archipelago, enclosing an area the ratio of which should not be more than 9:1
(water to land); provided that the drawing of baselines shall not depart to any appreciable extent,
from the general configuration of the archipelago. The waters within the baselines shall be
considered internal waters; while the breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive
economic zone and the continental shelf shall then be measured from the baselines. (Art. 48,
UNCLOS)
[b] Section 2 of RA 9522 declared the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and Scarborough Shoal as
"Regimes of Islands." Professor Agaton contends that since the law did not enclose said islands, then
the Philippines lost its sovereignty and jurisdiction over them. Is his contention correct? Explain.
(2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The use of the Framework of Regime of Islands to determine the maritime zone of the KIG and the
Scarborough Shoal is not inconsistent with the Philippine claim of sovereignty. Section 2 of the law
commits to text the Philippines’ continued claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over the KIG and the
Scarborough Shoal when it affirmatively states that both KIG and the Scarborough Shoal are areas
over which the Philippines likewise exercises sovereignty and jurisdiction.
Had Congress in RA 9522 enclosed the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as part of the Philippine
archipelago, the Philippines would have committed a breach of two provisions of UNCLOS III.
Although the Philippines has consistently claimed sovereignty over the KIG and the Scarborough
Shoal for several decades, these outlying areas are located at an appreciable distance from the nearest
shoreline of the Philippine archipelago, such that any straight baseline loped around them from the
nearest basepoint will inevitably "depart to an appreciable extent from the general configuration of
the archipelago" hence, will exceed 100 nautical miles. These will constitute violations of Article
47(3) and Article 47(2) of UNCLOS III. (Magallona v. Ermita, GR No. 187167, Aug. 16, 2011)
-XVIII-
Sec. 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides that no elective official shall serve for more than three (3)
consecutive terms. Rule and explain briefly the reason if the official is prohibited to run for another term in
each of the following situations: (a) if the official is a Vice-Mayor who assumed the position of Mayor for the
unexpired term under the Local Government Code; (b) if the official has served for three consecutive terms
and did not seek a 4th term but who won in a recall election; (c) if the position of Mayor of a town is
abolished due to conversion of the town to a city; (d) if the official is preventively suspended during his term
but was exonerated; and (e) if the official is proclaimed as winner and assumes office but loses in an election
protest. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) The Vice Mayor who assumed the position of Mayor may still be eligible to run for the position of Mayor
because when he occupied the post of the mayor upon the incumbent’s death and served for the remainder of
the term, he cannot be construed as having served a full term as contemplated under the subject constitutional
provision. The term "served" must be one "for which [the official concerned] was elected." (Borja v.
COMELEC, GR No. 133495, Sept. 3, 1998)
(b) The official may still run for another term since the principle behind the three-term limit rule is to prevent
consecutiveness of the service of terms, and that there was in his case a break in such consecutiveness after
the end of his third term and before the recall election. (Socrates v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 154512-84, Nov.
12, 2002)
(c) The official may no longer run for another term because the framers of the Constitution specifically
included an exception to the people's freedom to choose those who will govern them in order to avoid the evil
of a single person accumulating excessive power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of
prolonged stay in the same office. For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply,
two conditions must concur: (1) the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the
same local government post; and (2) he has served three consecutive terms.
In this case, while the new city acquired a new corporate existence separate and distinct from that of the
municipality, this does not mean, however, that for the purpose of applying the subject Constitutional
provision, the office of the municipal mayor would now be construed as a different local government post as
that of the office of the city mayor. The territorial jurisdiction of the city is the same as that of the
municipality. Consequently, the inhabitants of the municipality are the same as those in the city. These
inhabitants are the same group of voters who elected the official concerned to be their municipal mayor for
three consecutive terms. These are also the same inhabitants over whom he held power and authority as their
chief executive for nine years. (Latasa v. COMELEC, GR No. 154829, Dec. 10, 2003)
(d) The official concerned cannot anymore run for another term in violation of the prohibited fourth term as
preventive suspension does not interrupt an elective official’s term because the suspended official continues
to stay in office although he is barred from exercising the functions and prerogatives of the office within the
suspension period. (Aldovino v. COMELEC, GR No. 184836, Dec. 23, 2009)
(e) The official may still run for another term because he cannot be considered as having been duly elected to
the supposed third term, and that he did not fully serve such term by reason of involuntary relinquishment of
office. (Lonzanida v. COMELEC, GR No. 135150, July 28, 1999)
-XIX-
Fernando filed an administrative complaint against his co-teacher, Amelia, claiming that the latter is living
with a married man who is not her husband. Fernando charged Amelia with committing "disgraceful and
immoral conduct" in violation of the Revised Administrative Code and, thus, should not be allowed to remain
employed in the government. Amelia, on the other hand, claims that she and her partner are members of a
religious sect that allows members of the congregation who have been abandoned by their respective spouses
to enter marital relations under a "Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness." Having made such Declaration, she
argues that she cannot be charged with committing immoral conduct for she is entitled to free exercise of
religion under the Constitution.
[a] Is Amelia administratively liable? State your reasons briefly. (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, she is not.
Although the morality contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for
accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interest.
In applying the compelling state interest test, the first inquiry is whether her right to religious
freedom has been burdened. The second step is to ascertain her sincerity in her religious belief.
In this case, there is no doubt that between keeping her employment and abandoning her religious
belief and practice and family on the one hand, and giving up her employment and keeping her
religious belief and practice and family on the other, puts a burden on her free exercise of religion.
Also, she appears to be sincere in her religious belief and practice, and is not merely using the
"Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness" to avoid punishment for immorality. Thus, there is nothing
that demonstrates how the interest is so compelling that it should override her plea of religious
freedom, nor is it shown that the means employed by the government in pursuing its interest is the
least restrictive to her religious exercise. (Estrada v. Escritur, AM No. P-02-1651, Aug. 4, 2003)
[b] Briefly explain the concept of "benevolent neutrality." (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its secular goals and interests, but at
the same time, strive to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent possible within flexible
constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent
neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend
compelling state interest. (supra.)
-XX-
Under Sec. 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, the Supreme Court shall have the power to "promulgate rules
concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all
courts xxx." Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 provides that
"any person charged under any provision of this Act regardless of the imposable penalty shall not be allowed
to avail of the provision on plea-bargaining." Patricio, a user who was charged with alleged sale of shabu but
who wants to enter a plea of guilt to a charge of possession, questions the constitutionality of Sec. 23 on the
ground that Congress encroached on the rule-making power of the Supreme Court under Sec. 5, Article VIII.
He argues that plea-bargaining is procedural in nature and is within the exclusive constitutional power of the
Court. Is Patricio correct? Explain your answer. (5%)
-END-

Labor Law 08,15,16 Bar Q&amp;A

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LABOR LAW 2008

Rights of the Employer; Management

Prerogative; Weight Policy (2008)

Yes, the Labor Arbiter is correct.

DOLE Regional Director; Visitorial and

Enforcement Power; Compliance Order

Labor Arbiter; Voluntary Arbitration

Sec. of Labor; Assumption over Labor

Sec. of Labor; Assumption over Labor

Dispute; National Interest (2008)

Voluntary Arbitrator; Labor Disputes;

Voluntary Arbitration (2008)

Voluntary Arbitrator; Voluntary

Arbitration; Compulsory Arbitration

CBA; Automatic Renewal Clause (2008)

CBA; Codetermination (2008)

Right to Strike; Stoppage of Work (2008)

Self Organization; Unions; Voluntary

Cancellation of Registration (2008)

E-E Relationship; Effective Control or

Supervision; Waitresses (2008)

Art. 138 of the Labor Code provides as follows:

E-E Relationship; Four-Fold Test (2008)

(1) The selection and engagement of the employees;

(2) The payment of wages;

(3) The power of dismissal; and

(4) The power of control the employee‘s conduct.

Employment; Employment Contract;

Fixed Period of Employment (2008)

Labor-Only Contractor (2008)

(A) whether the contractor is carrying on an independent business;

(B) the nature and extent of the work;

(C) the skill required;

(D) the term and duration of the relationship;

(E) the right to assign the performance of specific pieces of work;

(F) the control and supervision of the workers;

(H) the control of the premises;

(J) the mode, manner and terms of payment.

Wages; No Work No Pay Principle XIII (2008)

Dismissal; Just Cause; Willful Disobedience (2008)

Employee; Employment Contract Impressed with Public Interest (2008)

Employee; Regular Employee; (2008)

SSS; Monthly Contribution (2008)

No. the arrangement is not allowed.

ANOTHER SUGGESTED ANSWER:

SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

ANOTHER SUGGESTED ANSWER:

(b) If Ador is a purely casual employee:

SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

No. The preventive suspension of Karina is not valid.

(a) 13th month pay;

(b) 14th to 18th month pay;

(c) Christmas basket worth P6,000;

(d) Gift check worth P4,000; and

(a) 13th month pay;

(b) 14th month pay;

(c) Christmas basket worth P4,000; and

(d) Gift check worth P2,000

Katrina’s objection is justified.

As to the withheld productivity-based bonuses, Katrina is deemed to have earned them

(2) The advantages of voluntary arbitration are:

The disadvantages of voluntary arbitration are:

(b) in case of enforcement of judgment, the Voluntary Arbitrator has no sheriff to

Labor Law 08,15,16 Bar Q&A

Labor Law 08,15,16 Bar Q&A