CHAPTER IV- THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE PROVISION searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath
s, in writing and under oath the
Frank Uy & Unifish Packing Corp. vs Bureau of Internal Revenue et al
November 15, 2010
Search and Seizure – Requisites of a Valid Search Warrant
In Sept 1993, Rodrigo Abos, a former employee of UPC reported to
the BIR that Uy Chin Ho aka Frank Uy, manager of UPC, was selling
thousands of cartons of canned cartons without issuing a report.
This is a violation of Sec 253 & 263 of the Internal Revenue Code. In
Oct 1993, the BIR requested before RTC Cebu to issue a search
warrant. Judge Gozo-Dadole issued a warrant on the same day. A
second warrant was issued which contains the same substance but
has only one page, the same was dated Oct 1st 2003. These
warrants were issued for the alleged violation by Uy of Sec 253. A
third warrant was issued on the same day for the alleged violation of
Uy of Sec 238 in relation to sec 263. On the strength of these
warrants, agents of the BIR, accompanied by members of the PNP,
on 2 Oct 1993, searched the premises of the UPC. They seized,
among other things, the records and documents of UPC. A return of
said search was duly made by Labaria with the RTC of Cebu. UPC
filed a motion to quash the warrants which was denied by the RTC.
They appealed before the CA via certiorari. The CA dismissed the
appeal for a certiorari is not the proper remedy.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid search warrant issued.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of UPC and Uy in a way for it ordered the
return of the seized items but sustained the validity of the warrant.
The SC ruled that the search warrant issued has not met some basic
requisites of validity. A search warrant must conform strictly to the
requirements of the foregoing constitutional and statutory
provisions. These requirements, in outline form, are:
(1) the warrant must be issued upon probable cause;
(2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and
not by the applicant or any other person;
(3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine,
under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as
the latter may produce; and
(4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be
searched and persons or things to be seized.
The SC noted that there has been inconsistencies in the description
of the place to be searched as indicated in the said warrants. Also
the thing to be seized was not clearly defined by the judge. He used
generic itineraries. The warrants were also inconsistent as to who
should be searched. One warrant was directed only against Uy and
the other was against Uy and UPC. The SC however noted that the
inconsistencies wered cured by the issuance of the latter warrant as
it has revoked the two others.
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution guarantees the right of the
people against unreasonable searches and seizures:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and
the persons or things to be seized.
NOTES
Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 3. Requisite for issuing search warrant. – A search warrant shall
not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific
offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the things to be seized.
SEC. 4. Examination of complainant; record. – The judge must,
before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of
complainant and any witnesses he may produce on facts personally
known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements
together with any affidavits submitted.
May an MTC Judge issue a search warrant in connection with
crimes w/n the jurisdiction of the RTC?
People vs. Judge Castillo
A search warrant is merely a process, generally issued by a court in
the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction, and not a criminal action to
be entertained by a court pursuant to its original jurisdiction. Thus,
in certain cases when no criminal action has yet been filed, any court
may issue a search warrant even though it has no jurisdiction over
the offense allegedly committed, provided that all the requirements
for the issuance of such warrant are present.
Facts:
Judge Cabalbag of the MTC of Gattaran, Cagayan issued a search
warrant against the premises of Rabino for violation of RA 9165. A
search was conducted wherein the PDEA and PNP found 1 sachet of
shabu inside the house of Rabino in Aparri, Cagayan. Rabino was
charged with violation of Section 11 of RA 9165. The case was raffled
to RTC, Branch 6, Aparri, Cagayan, presided by Judge Castillo.
Before arraignment, Rabino filed a Motion to Quash Search Warrant
and for Suppression of Illegally Acquired Evidence, citing lack of
probable cause among other grounds. Judge Castillo granted the
motion to quash, holding that because the minimum penalty for
illegal possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu is
imprisonment of 12 years and 1 day to 20 years, which penalty is
way beyond imprisonment of 6 years, MTC Gattaran did not have
jurisdiction to entertain the application for and to issue the search
warrant. As such, the search warrant is null and void and all
proceedings had in virtue thereof are likewise null and void.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied.
Issue:
May a municipal trial court issue a search warrant involving an
offense in which it has no jurisdiction?
Held:
The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are: (1) probable
cause is present; (2) such probable cause must be determined
personally by the judge; (3) the judge must examine, in writing and
under oatn or affirmation, the complainant and the witnesses he or
she may produce; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on the
facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically
describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
Necessarily, a motion to quash a search warrant may be based on
grounds extrinsic of the search warrant, such as (1) the place
searched or the property seized are not those specified or described
in the search warrant; and (2) there is no probable cause for the
issuance of the search warrant.
The respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in quashing the
search warrant on a basis other than the accepted grounds. It must
be remembered that a search warrant is valid for as long as it has all
the requisites set forth by the Constitution and must only be
quashed when any of its elements are found to be wanting.
This Court has provided rules to be followed in the application for a
search warrant. Rule 126 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides
Sec. 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be filed. - An
application for search warrant shall be filed with the following:
(a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was
committed.
(b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within
the judicial region where the crime was committed if the place of
the commission of the crime is known, or any court within the
judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced.
However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the
application shall only be made in the court where the criminal action
is pending.
Apparently, in this case, the application for a search warrant was
filed within the same judicial region where the crime was allegedly
committed. For compelling reasons, the Municipal Trial Court of
Gattaran, Cagayan has the authority to issue a search warrant to
search and seize the dangerous drugs stated in the application
thereof in Aparri, Cagayan, a place that is within the same judicial
region. The fact that the search warrant was issued means that the
MTC judge found probable cause to grant the said application after
the latter was found by the same judge to have been filed for
compelling reasons. Therefore, Sec. 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court
was duly complied with.
It must be noted that nothing in the above-quoted rule does it say
that the court issuing a search warrant must also have jurisdiction
over the offense. A search warrant may be issued by any court
pursuant to Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and the
resultant case may be filed in another court that has jurisdiction
over the offense committed. What controls here is that a search
warrant is merely a process, generally issued by a court in the
exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction, and not a criminal action to be
entertained by a court pursuant to its original jurisdiction. Thus, in
certain cases when no criminal action has yet been filed, any court
may issue a search warrant even though it has no jurisdiction over
the offense allegedly committed, provided that all the requirements
for the issuance of such warrant are present. (People vs. Judge
Castillo, G.R. No. 204419, November 07, 2016)
The place to be search in the warrant is controlling
People vs. C.A., 291 SCRA 400
Search warrants. Place to be searched. People vs. C.A., 291 SCRA
400
G.R. No. 126379 June 26, 1998
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by Provincial Prosecutor
FAUSTINO T.
CHIONG, petitioner,
COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE CAESAR CASANOVA, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial
Court, Branch 80, Malolos, Bulacan, AZFAR HUSSAIN, MOHAMMAD
SAGED,
MUJAHID KHAN, MOHAMMAD ASLAM, and MEHMOOD ALI,
respondents.
FACTS:
– A petition for certiorari has been filed to invalidate the order of
Judge Casanova which quashed search warrant issued by Judge
Bacalla and declared inadmissible for any purpose the items seized
under the warrant.
– An application for a search warrant was made by S/Insp Brillantes
against Mr. Azfar Hussain who had allegedly in his possession
firearms and explosives at Abigail Variety Store, Apt 1207 Area F.
Bagon Buhay Avenue, Sarang Palay, San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan.
– The following day Search Warrant No. 1068 was issued but was
served not at Abigail Variety Store but at Apt. No. 1, immediately
adjacent to Abigail Variety Store resulting in the arrest of 4 Pakistani
nationals and the seizure of a number of different explosives and
firearms.
ISSUE:
WON a search warrant was validly issued as regard the apartment in
which private respondents were then actually residing, or more
explicitly, WON that particular apartment had been specifically
described in the warrant.
HELD:
In applying for a search warrant, the police officers had in their mind
the first four (4) separate apartment units at the rear of ABIGAIL
VARIETY STORE in Quezon City to be the subject of their search.
The same was not, however, what the Judge who issued the warrant
had in mind, AND WAS NOT WHAT WAS ULTIMATELY DESCRIBED IN
THE SEARCH WARRANT.
As such, any evidence obtained from the place searched which is
different from that indicated in the search warrant is inadmissible in
evidence for any purpose and in any proceeding.
The ambiguity lies outside the instrument, arising from the absence
of a meeting of minds as to the place to be searched between the
applicants for the warrant and the Judge issuing the same; and what
was done was to substitute for the place that the Judge had written
down in the warrant, the premises that the executing officers had in
their mind. This should not have been done.
It is neither fair nor licit to allow police officers to search a place
different from that stated in the warrant on the claim that the place
actually searched — although not that specified in the warrant — is
exactly what they had in view when they applied for the warrant and
had demarcated in their supporting evidence. What is material in
determining the validity of a search is the place stated in the warrant
itself, not what the applicants had in their thoughts, or had
represented in the proofs they submitted to the court issuing the
warrant.
The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be
amplified or modified by the officers’ own personal knowledge of
the premises, or the evidence they adduced in support of their
application for the warrant. Such a change is proscribed by the
Constitution which requires inter alia the search warrant to
particularly describe the place to be searched as well as the persons
or things to be seized.
It would concede to police officers the power of choosing the place
to be searched, even if it not be that delineated in the warrant. It
would open wide the door to abuse of the search process, and grant
to officers executing a search warrant that discretion which the
Constitution has precisely removed from them. The particularization
of the description of the place to be searched may properly be done
only by the Judge, and only in the warrant itself; it cannot be left to
the discretion of the police officers conducting the search.
Validity of a warrantless search and seizure as a result of an
informer’s tip.
People of the Philippines vs Rosa Aruta y Menguin
November 16, 2010
Search and Seizure – Informer’s Tip
In the morning of 13 Dec 1988, the law enforcement officers
received information from an informant named “Benjie” that a
certain “Aling Rosa” would be leaving for Baguio City on 14 Dec 1988
and would be back in the afternoon of the same day carrying with
her a large volume of marijuana; At 6:30 in the evening of 14 Dec
1988, Aruta alighted from a Victory Liner Bus carrying a travelling
bag even as the informant pointed her out to the law enforcement
officers; NARCOM officers approached her and introduced
themselves as NARCOM agents; When asked by Lt. Abello about the
contents of her travelling bag, she gave the same to him; When they
opened the same, they found dried marijuana leaves; Aruta was
then brought to the NARCOM office for investigation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the conducted search and seizure is
constitutional.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Aruta and has noted that some drug
traffickers are being freed due to technicalities. Aruta cannot be said
to be committing a crime. Neither was she about to commit one nor
had she just committed a crime. Aruta was merely crossing the
street and was not acting in any manner that would engender a
reasonable ground for the NARCOM agents to suspect and conclude
that she was committing a crime. It was only when the informant
pointed to Aruta and identified her to the agents as the carrier of
the marijuana that she was singled out as the suspect. The NARCOM
agents would not have apprehended Aruta were it not for the furtive
finger of the informant because, as clearly illustrated by the
evidence on record, there was no reason whatsoever for them to
suspect that accused-appellant was committing a crime, except for
the pointing finger of the informant. The SC could neither sanction
nor tolerate as it is a clear violation of the constitutional guarantee
against unreasonable search and seizure. Neither was there any
semblance of any compliance with the rigid requirements of
probable cause and warrantless arrests. Consequently, there was no
legal basis for the NARCOM agents to effect a warrantless search of
Aruta’s bag, there being no probable cause and the accused-
appellant not having been lawfully arrested. Stated otherwise, the
arrest being incipiently illegal, it logically follows that the subsequent
search was similarly illegal, it being not incidental to a lawful arrest.
The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and
seizure must perforce operate in favor of accused-appellant. As
such, the articles seized could not be used as evidence against
accused-appellant for these are “fruits of a poisoned tree” and,
therefore, must be rejected, pursuant to Article III, Sec. 3(2) of the
Constitution.
NOTES:
When is a warrantless search allowed?
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under
Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court 8 and by prevailing
jurisprudence;
2. Seizure of evidence in “plain view,” the elements of which are:
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in
which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official
duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had
the right to be where they are;
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and
(d) “plain view” justified mere seizure of evidence without further
search;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government,
the vehicle’s inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy
especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly
reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the
occupant committed a criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.
The People of the Philippines vs Ruben Montilla y Gatdula
November 16, 2010
Political Law – Search and Seizure – Informer’s Tip – Warrantless
Arrest
On 19 June 1994 at about 2pm, police officers Talingting and Clarin
were informed by an asset that a drug courier would be arriving
from Baguio to Dasmariňas carrying an undetermined amount of
marijuana. The next day, the informant pointed at Montilla as the
courier who was waiting in a waiting shed Brgy Salitran, Dasmariňas.
Montilla was then apprehended and he was caught in possession of
a bag and a carton worth 28 kilos of marijuana. Montilla denied the
allegation and he said he came to Cavite from Baguio for work and
he does not have any effects with him at that time except for some
pocket money. He was sentenced to death thereafter. He averred
that the search and seizure conducted was illegal for there was no
warrant and that he should have been given the opportunity to cross
examine the informant. He said that if the informant has given the
cops the information about his arrival as early as the day before his
apprehension, the cops should have ample time to secure a search
warrant.
ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless arrest conducted is legal.
HELD: The SC ruled that the warrantless arrest is legal and so was
the warrantless search. Sec 2 Art 3 of the Constitution has its
exception when it comes to warrantless searches, they are:
(1) customs searches;
(2) searches of moving vehicles,
(3) seizure of evidence in plain view;
(4) consented searches;
(5) searches incidental to a lawful arrest;
(6) “stop and frisk” measures have been invariably recognized as the
traditional exceptions.
In the case at bar, it should be noted that the information relayed by
informant to the cops was that there would be delivery of marijuana
at Barangay Salitran by a courier coming from Baguio in the “early
morning” of June 20, 1994. Even assuming that the policemen were
not pressed for time, this would be beside the point for, under these
circumstances, the information relayed was too sketchy and not
detailed enough for the obtention of the corresponding arrest or
search warrant. While there is an indication that the informant knew
the courier, the records do not reveal that he knew him by name.
On such bare information, the police authorities could not have
properly applied for a warrant, assuming that they could readily
have access to a judge or a court that was still open by the time they
could make preparations for applying therefor, and on which there is
no evidence presented by the defense. In determining the
opportunity for obtaining warrants, not only the intervening time is
controlling but all the coincident and ambient circumstances should
be considered, especially in rural areas.
A legitimate warrantless arrest, as above contemplated, necessarily
cloaks the arresting police officer with authority to validly search and
seize from the offender
(1) dangerous weapons, and
(2) those that may be used as proof of the commission of an offense.
G.R. No. 186529 August 3, 2010
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Appellee,
vs.
JACK RACHO Y RAQUERO,
Appellant.
A confidential agent of the police transacted through cellular phone
with appellant for the purchase
of shabu. Appellant called up the agent and informed him that he
was on board a Genesis bus and
would arrive in Baler, Aurora. Having alighted from the bus,
appellant was about to board a tricycle
when the team of police authorities approached him and invited him
to the police station. As he
pulled out his hands from his pants’ pocket, a white envelope
slipped therefrom which, when opened, yielded a small sachet
containing the suspected drug.
Appellant was charged in two separate Information’s, one for
violation of section 5 of R.A.9165, for transporting or delivering&
and the second, of section 11 of the same law for possessing,
dangerous drugs.
ISSUE
1. Whether the warrant of arrest was violated.
2.Wether the evidence was admissible in evidence.
RULING: No. Reliable information alone is not sufficient probable
cause to effect a valid
warrantless arrest. The SC required the showing of some overt act
indicative of the criminal design.
This is an instance of seizure of the fruit of the poisonous tree.2
Hence, the confiscated item is inadmissible in evidence.
The 1978 Constitution states that a search and consequent seizure
must be carried out with a
judicial warrant& otherwise, it becomes unreasonable and any
evidence obtained therefrom shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. said proscription,
however, admits of exceptions,
namely:
1. warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest&
2.search of evidence in; plain view&;
3.Search of a moving vehicle&
4.Consented warrantless search&
5. Customs search&
6.stop and frisk& and
7. exigent and emergency circumstances.
G.R. No. 72564 April 15, 1988
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANITA CLAUDIO Y BAGTANG, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Romeo C. Alinea for accused-appellant.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Olongapo City, Branch 73 finding the accused Anita Claudio y
Bagtang guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sec. 4, Rep. Act
No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as amended) and sentencing
her to serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to pay a fine of P
20,000.00, and to pay the costs.
The information filed against the accused alleged:
That on or about the 21st day of July 1981, in the City of Olongapo,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named ACCUSED without being lawfully authorized, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly transport 1.1 kilos of
Marijuana dried leaves, which are prohibited drugs for the purpose
of selling the same from Baguio City to Olongapo City. (Rollo, p. 13)
The lower court established her guilt beyond reasonable doubt on
the basis of the prosecution's evidence as follows:
To prove the guilt of the accused, the prosecution offered the
following document and testimonial evidence as follows: Exhibit "A"
Letter request for Examination of suspected marijuana dried leaves
weighing approximately 1.1 kilos dated July 25, 1981; "B" plastic
container; "B- 1"-marijuana contained in the plastic container; "B-1-
a"—another plastic container; "C"—Chemistry Report No. D-668-
81;"C-1" Findings: Positive for marijuana; "D,","D-1," "D-2"and "D-3;
"E" and "E-1" photographs of accused with Pat. Daniel Obiña and
Pauline Tiongco showing the marijuana, "F"—Victory Liner Ticket No.
84977;"G"—Sworn Statement of Pat. Daniel Obiña, "H" Request for
Field Test on suspected marijuana from accused by P/Lt. Antonio V.
Galindo;"H-1"—date of of the request; "L"—Certificate of Field Test
dated July 22, 1981; "B-2" and "B-2a" additional Wrapping paper;
and the testimonies of witnesses of the prosecution, Theresa Ann
Bugayong; Pat. Daniel Obiño, Cpl. Paulino Tiongco, Cpl. Ernesto
Abello and Sgt. Leoncio Bagang.
Theresa Ann Bugayong—22 years old, single, Forensic Chemist and a
resident of 1150 Sampaloc, Metro Manila testified that she received
a request from the Task Force Bagong Buhay, Olongapo City, dated
July 25, 1981, on specimen marijuana submitted for examination.
The specimen consisted of 900 grams of suspected dried marijuana
flowering tops wrapped in a newspaper placed in a plastic bag with a
marking "MB Store" (Exh. "B").
The examination conducted by her proved to be positive for
marijuana. After her examination, she prepared Chemistry Report
No. D-668-81 dated July 29,1981 (Exhs. "C" and "C-l"). She
conducted three eliminations; microscopic examination, the
duguenoi levine test and thirdly, the confirmatory examination of
thin layer chromatographic test. The said specimen was submitted
to them by OIC Danilo Santiago, a representative of the CANU,
Olongapo City.
The second witness for the prosecution was Daniel Obiña, 37 years
old, married, policeman and residing at 34 Corpuz St., East Tapinac,
Olongapo City. Obiña testified that he has been a member of the
INP, since 1970 up to the present. He was assigned in June, 1972 at
the Investigation Division as operative. His job then was among
other things to follow up reports in their office, recover stolen items
and apprehend suspects. On July 21,1981, he was on Detached
Service with the ANTI-NARCOTICS Unit; and that on that date, he
came from Baguio City and arrived in Olongapo City at about 1:30
o'clock in the afternoon having left Baguio at about 8:30 o'clock in
the morning. He took the Victory Liner in going back to Olongapo
City. His family lives in Baguio City. On board the Victory Liner, he
was seated on the second seat at the back. While he was thus
seated, suspect Anita Claudio boarded the same bus and took the
seat in front of him after putting a bag which she was carrying at the
back of the seat of Obiña. The bag placed by suspect behind his seat
was a wooven buri bag made of plastic containing some vegetables.
The act of the accused putting her bag behind Pat. Obiña's seat
aroused his suspicion and made him felt (sic) nervous. With the
feeling that there was some unusual, he had the urge to search the
woven plastic bag. But it was only at San Fernando, Pampanga when
he was able to go to the bag. He inserted one of his fingers in a
plastic bag located at the bottom of the woven bag and smelt
marijuana. The plastic woven bag appearing to contain camote tops
on the top has a big bundle of plastic of marijuana at the bottom. He
could recognize the smell of marijuana because he was assigned at
that time at the ANTI-NARCOTICS Unit. He did not, however, do
anything after he discovered that there was marijuana inside the
plastic bag of the accused until they reached Olongapo City and the
accused alighted from the bus in front of the Caltex Gasoline Station
in Sta. Rita. Right after the accused alighted from the bus, policeman
Obina intercepted her and showed her his Id Identifying himself as a
policeman and told her he will search her bag because of the
suspicion that she was carrying marijuana inside said bag. In reply,
accused told him, "Please go with me, let us settle this at home."
However, the witness did not heed her plea and instead handcuffed
her right hand and with her, boarded a tricycle right away and
brought the suspect to the police headquarters with her bag
appearing to contain vegetables.
At the police headquarters Investigation Section, the bag was
searched in the presence of Investigator Cpl. Tiongco; Pat. Obiña,
the accused and Sgt. Leoncio Bagang. Inside the plastic bag was
found a big bundle of plastic containing marijuana weighing about
one kilo. Witness stated that he could detect marijuana even before
the application of chemicals because of one year and a half
assignment with the CANU. After the marijuana was taken from the
bag of the accused, photographs were taken of the accused and the
marijuana confiscated from her possession with Pat. Obiña and that
of Investigator Tiongco, accused and himself Identified photographs
shown to him in open Court. (Exhs. "D," "D-l," "D-2" and "D-3").
Witness was likewise shown a plastic bag of marijuana contained in
a plastic container (Exhs. "B," "B-1" and "B-1 -a") and Identified it as
the one confiscated from the accused and pointed to his initials on
the newspaper wrapping which also shows the date and time,
although the wrapper at the time he testified appeared to be soiled
already. The marijuana was allegedly still fresh when confiscated.
To prove further that the accused transported the confiscated
marijuana from Baguio City to Olongapo City, witness Identified
Victory Liner Ticket No. 684977 which was confiscated from the
accused and for Identification purposes, the witness presented the
body number of the bus he wrote at the back of the ticket which is
"309" (Exhs. "F" and "F-l"). Regarding himself, he did not pay his fare
from Baguio City because as a policeman, he used his badge and a
free ride.
On cross-examination, witness stated that he went to Baguio City on
July 15,1981 and underwent treatment of his heart while he was
there. He was given a furlough for medical treatment. He stayed in
Baguio City for about five days and returned to Olongapo City on July
21, 1981. Prior to July 21, 1981, witness never knew the accused,
and the first time he saw her was in Baguio when she boarded the
same Victory Liner he took. When the accused who was bringing
with her a woven plastic bag placed the bag right behind his seat
instead of placing it in front of her or beside her seat. Witness Obiña
became suspicious and his suspicion was confirmed when they
reached San Fernando, Pampanga, after he checked the buri bag.
The bus stopped at said town to load some gasoline. Witness
inserted one of his fingers inside the buri bag and thereafter smelt
marijuana. He confirmed his testimony on direct that when witness
confronted accused he was invited to go with her in order to settle
the matter to which he refused. Accused further testified that from
the time the accused placed her bag behind his seat from Baguio
City, he felt so nervous and had to take his medicine at the Tarlac
Station. It was only after having taken his medicine that his
apprehension was contained and thus was able to insert his right
hand inside the buri bag in San Fernando, Pampanga. His fingers
reached the very bottom of the bag. He Identified his sworn
statement regarding this incident given on July 21, 1981 which is
Exhibit "G." Witness likewise Identified accused Anita Claudio in
open court.
Paulino Tiongco, 52 years old, married and resident of 31 Canada St.,
East Bajac Bajac, Olongapo City, testified that as a policeman on the
afternoon of July 21, 1981, he was inside the Investigation Division
of the Police Station, Olongapo City. As Duty Investigator, between
1:45 and 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day, Pat. Daniel
Obiña arrived at the Police Station with a woman and Identified her
in the courtroom as Anita Claudio. Pat. Obiña reported to him that
he apprehended Anita Claudio inside the Victory Liner bus for
possession of marijuana dried leaves. The marijuana leaves were
contained in a buri bag with some vegetables such as camote tops,
bananas and some other vegetables. The marijuana was placed in a
plastic wrapper with the name National Book Store colored black
and white. Witness Identified the wrapper (Exh. "B-2"). The bag
contained the markings of Pat. Obiña which are his initials, (Exhs. "B-
2-a"), and numbers 210781 representing the date which was placed
by Pat. Obiña after Cpl. Tiongco examined the suspected marijuana.
After examining and seeing the marijuana together with the
vegetables, he interviewed apprehending officer Obiña and reduced
his statements in writing. Cpl. Tiongco Identifled the sworn
statement of Obiña (Exh. "G"). He also interviewed accused Anita
Claudio who was all the while inside the Investigation room seated
on a chair. After appraising her of her constitutional rights, he asked
the accused whether she was willing to give her written statements
to which the accused refused. Hence, no statements were taken of
her. However, pictures were taken inside the investigation room.
Exhs. "D" and "E," series which were already previously Identified by
Pat. Obiña, Witness Identified the persons appearing in the pictures
as that of Pat. Obiña and the accused and also of himself.
Thereafter, the marijuana contained in the plastic bag were turned
over to Lt. Galindo and Anita Claudio was detained.
Ernesto Abello, 41 years old, married and residing at No. 29 Alba
Street, East Tapinac, Olongapo City, testified he was since March
1972 a policeman and was stationed at Police Station 21, Olongapo
City, Metrodiscom. However, in 1981, he was already assigned to
the CANU General Anti-NARCOTICS Unit. On July 22, 1981, he
reported for work at the CANU and received from Lt. Galindo more
than a kilo of suspected marijuana dried leaves. As requested by Lt.
Galindo he conducted a field test on this marijuana which he
received from Lt. Galindo, as evidenced by a request signed by him
dated July 22,1981 (Exh. "H").
In connection with the field test conducted by him on the specimen,
he prepared a Certificate of Fleld Test dated July 22,1981 (Exhs. "I").
The Certificate of Field Test indicated the presence of tetra-
hydrocannabinol (THC), an active substance that can be only be
found in marijuana, a prohibited drug. Cpl. Abello Identified a plastic
bag of marijuana received from Lt. Galindo which he later give to CIC
Danilo Santiago, the Evidence Custodian, for the latter to bring the
specimen to the PC Crime Laboratory.
The last witness for the prosecution was Leoncio Bagang, 40 years
old, married, residing at No. 27 Jones St., East Tapinac, Olongapo
City, a policeman of Olongapo City, assigned with Police Station
"21." He has been a policeman since 1966 up to the present. In July,
1981, he was then assigned at the Patrol Division and his duty was to
patrol the city proper from Magsaysay Drive up to east Bajac Bajac.
He narrated that on July 21,1981, between the hours of 1:00 and
2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, he was at the Caltex Gasoline Station,
East Bajac Bajac, Olongapo City along Rizal Avenue. He was then on
duty patrol using a motorcycle. While he was at the said place, he
saw Pat. Obiña alighted from the Victory Liner bus ordering
somebody to alight from the same bus. When he heard Pat. Obiña
he approached him and asked him what was happening. Pat. Obiña
told him he apprehended a certain woman possessing dried
marijuana. The woman was still then inside the bus. Pat. Obiña then
brought the woman to the police department who was bringing with
her a buri bag. They boarded a tricycle, the woman riding inside the
tricycle while Pat. Obiña sat behind the driver. He then followed in
his motorcycle the said tricycle to police station. He went inside the
Investigation Section of the Police Station and he was there when
Pat. Obiña reported to Cpl. Tiongco his apprehension of the woman
possessing marijuana. He saw the marijuana for the first time inside
the Investigation Section placed in a buri bag covered with
newspaper. He witnessed the taking out of the marijuana from
inside the bag by Pat. Obiña in the presence of Cpl. Tiongco and the
woman or the accused in this case, and himself. Policeman Bagang
Identified the accused in open Court. When asked about the nature
of the marijuana when it was brought out from the bag, he said that
the marijuana was dried but not well dried. Aside from the
marijuana inside the buri bag, there were vegetables and bananas,
Witness Identified in open Court, the marijuana he saw found in the
buri bag of the accused. His means of Identification was the
signature of Pat. Obiña, (Exh. "B-1"). He likewise Identified a
newspaper wrapping which was already torn.
While in the Investigation Division, witness Bagang heard the
accused's answer to Cpl. Tiongco's questions that she was going to
deliver the marijuana to Sta. Rita. He, however, did not linger long at
the investigation Division. After he saw the marijuana and heard the
answer of the accused to Cpl. Tiongcos question the place of delivery
of the marijuana, he left the police station. Witness likewise
Identified an initial DO-21-07-81 already marked as Exhibit "B-2." DO
which is an initial, and not a signature, stands for Daniel Obiña. After
the testimony of Leoncio Bagang, the prosecution rested its case.
(Rollo, pp. 42-47)
Accused Claudio raised the following assignments of errors in this
appeal:
I
CONVICTION UNDER SECTION 4, ART. II OF R.A. 6425 IS IMPROPER IF
ONE OR SOME OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE IS OR ARE
ABSENT.
II
CONVICTION CAN NOT BE HAD UNDER SECTION 4, ART. II OF R.A.
6425 IF THE ALLEGED BUYMAN WAS NOT PRESENTED TO TESTIFY.
III
APPELLANTS CONVICTION FOR DELIVERY (SEC. 4, ART II, OF R.A.
6424) IS WRONG BECAUSE SOME MATERIAL FACTS WERE
OVERLOOKED AND NOT CONSIDERED IN FAVOR OF APPELLANT.
(Rollo, p. 91)
The accused alleges that she is only liable, at the most, for
possession under Sec. 8, Art. II of Rep. Act No. 6425 and not for
violating Sec. 4 of the same Act.
The latter section, Sec. 4 provides:
Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery Distribution and Transportation
of Prohibited Drugs.—The penalty of life imprisonment to death and
a fine ranging from twenty thousand to thirty thousand pesos shall
be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall
sell, administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in
transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in
any of such transactions. If the victim of the offense is a minor, or
should a prohibited drug involved in any offense under this Section
be the proximate cause of the death of a victim thereof, the
maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed.
Claudio contends that there was no delivery as there was no
recipient of the prohibited drugs. Therefore, she may not be
convicted under Sec. 4 of Rep. Act No. 6425.
The contention is without merit. A closer perusal of the subject
provision shows that it is not only delivery which is penalized but
also the sale, administration, distribution and transportation of
probihited drugs. Claudio was caught transporting 1.1 kilos of
marijuana, thus the lower court did not err in finding her guilty of
violating Sec. 4.
The accused also alleges that before the completion of delivery, the
intention of the possessor is unknown.
This allegation is also unavailing. It is undisputed that Claudio had in
her possession 1.1 kilos of marijuana. This is a considerable quantity.
As held in the case of People v. Toledo, (140 SCRA 259, 267) "the
possession of such considerable quantity as three plastic bags of
marijuana leaves and seeds coupled with the fact that he is not a
user of prohibited drugs cannot indicate anything except the
intention of the accused to sell, distribute and deliver said
marijuana.
The accused next contends the warrantless search, seizure and
apprehension as unlawful.
The applicable provisions on this issue are found in the 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure.
Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) of the said Rules provides:
.. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest
a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
xxx xxx xxx
Meanwhile, its Rule 126, Sec. 12 provides:
Section 12. Search incident to lawful arrest.— A person lawfully
arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which
may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a
search warrant. (12a)
Appellant Claudio was caught transporting prohibited drugs. Pat.
Daniel Obiña did not need a warrant to arrest Claudio as the latter
was caught in flagrante delicto. The warrantless search being an
incident to a lawful arrest is in itself lawful. (Nolasco v. Pano, 147
SCRA 509). Therefore, there was no infirmity in the seizure of the 1.1
kilos of marijuana.
The accused takes inconsistent positions in her appellant's brief. At
first, she does not deny having had with her marijuana at the time of
her arrest. Instead, she claims that she should just be guilty of
possession. In a complete turnabout, in the latter portion of said
brief, she claims that the evidence against her were mere
fabrications and the marijuana allegedly found in her possession was
only planted.
We have carefully examined the records of the case and we find no
ground to alter the trial court's findings and appreciation of the
evidence presented.
Credence is accorded to the prosecution's evidence, more so as it
consisted mainly of testimonies of policemen. Law enforcers are
presumed to have regularly performed their duty in the absence of
proof to the contrary (People v. De Jesus, 145 SCRA 521). We also
find no reason from the records why the prosecution witnesses
should fabricate their testimonies and implicate appellant in such a
serious crime (See People v. Bautista, 147 SCRA 500).
The accused testified that she was not on that bus that came from
Baguio City but rather she was in Olongapo City all that time. She
alleged that she was arrested by Pat. Obiña for no reason at all.
In the case at bar, alibi does not deserve much credit as it was
established only by the accused herself (People v. De la Cruz, 148
SCRA 582).
Moreover, it is a well-established rule that alibi cannot prevail over
positive testimony (People v. De La Cruz, supra).
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. IDEL AMINNUDIN y AHNI
G.R.No. 74869 July 6, 1988
Facts:
The PC (Philippine Constabulary) officer received a tip from
one of their informers that the accused was on board a vessel bound
for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana. He was identified by
name. Acting on this tip, they waited for him in the evening and
approached him as he descended from the gangplank after the
informer pointed at him. They detained him and inspected the bag
he was carrying. It was found to contained three kilos of what were
later analyzed as marijuana leaves by the NBI forensic examiner. On
the basis of the finding, the corresponding charge was then filed
against Aminnudin.
Issue:
Whether or not accused constitutional right against
unreasonable serach and seizure is violated
Ruling:
The Supreme Court Held that warrantless arrest allowed
under Rule 113 of the rules of court not justified unless the accused
was caught in flagrante or a crime was about to be committed or
had just been committed.
A vessels and aircraft are subject to warrantless searches and
seizures for violation of the customs law because these vehicles may
be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction before the
warrant can be secured.
In the present case, from the conflicting declarations of the
PC witnesses, it is clear that they had at least two days within which
they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin
who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was
known. The vehicle was identified. The date of his arrival was
certain. And from the information they have received, they could
have persuaded a judge that there was a probable cause, indeed, to
justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. The Bill of
Rights was ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who was
the head of the arresting team had determined on his own authority
that a search warrant was not necessary.
The evidence of probable cause should be determined by a
judge and not law enforcement agents.
ACQUITTED
The People of the Philippines vs Mikael Malmstedt
“The Swedish National with Hashish Case”
Facts:
Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, was found, via a routine
NARCOM inspection at Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay Mountain
Province, carrying Hashish, a derivative of Marijuana. RTC La
Trinidad found him guilty for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
The accused filed a petition to the Supreme Court for the reversal of
the decision arguing that the search and the arrest made was illegal
because there was no search warrant.
Issue:
Whether or not the decision of the trial court should be reversed (or
affirmed) because the accused argues that the search and arrest was
made without a warrant
Held:
The RTC decision is affirmed.
Ratio:
The constitution states that a peace officer or a private person may
arrest a person
without a warrant when in his presence the person to be arrested
has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. The
offense was recognized
with the warrantless search conducted by NARCOM prompted by
probable cause: (1) the
receipt of information by NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from
Sagada had
 prohibited drugs in his possession and (2) failure of the accused to
immediately present
his passport.
c.) GENERAL OR ROVING WARRANTS
Harry Stonehill et al vs DOJ Secretary Jose Diokno et al
November 16, 2010
Search and Seizure – General Warrants – Abandonment of the
Moncado Doctrine
Stonehill et al and the corporation they form were alleged to have
committed acts in “violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and
Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code.” By
the strength of this allegation a search warrant was issued against
their persons and their corporation. The warrant provides authority
to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their
offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take
possession of the following personal property to wit:
“Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence,
receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters,
and other documents and/or papers showing all business
transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and
profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).”
The documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged
authority of the warrants in question may be split into (2) major
groups, namely:
(a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned
corporations and
(b) those found seized in the residences of petitioners
herein.Stonehill averred that the warrant is illegal for:
(1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and
things to be seized;
(2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually
seized;
(3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the
aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them;
(4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and
(5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not
delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in
accordance with law.
The prosecution counters, invoking the Moncado doctrine, that the
defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners’ consent;
and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in
evidence against them. In short, the criminal cannot be set free just
because the government blunders.
ISSUE: Whether or not the search warrant issued is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Stonehill et al. The SC emphasized
however that Stonehill et al cannot assail the validity of the search
warrant issued against their corporation for Stonehill are not the
proper party hence has no cause of action. It should be raised by the
officers or board members of the corporation. The constitution
protects the people’s right against unreasonable search and seizure.
It provides; (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause,
to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said
provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the
things to be seized. In the case at bar, none of these are met. The
warrant was issued from mere allegation that Stonehill et al
committed a “violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs
Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code.” In other
words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The
averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were
abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who
issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause,
for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that
the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or
committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our
criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this
case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners.
It would be a legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody
of a “violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws,
Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code,” — as alleged in
the aforementioned applications — without reference to any
determinate provision of said laws or codes.
The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for
the contested search warrants was compounded by the description
therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit:
“Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals,
correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit journals,
typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all
business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance
sheets and related profit and loss statements.”
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records
pertaining to all business transactions of Stonehill et al, regardless of
whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants
sanctioned the seizure of all records of Stonehill et al and the
aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly
contravening the explicit command of the Bill of Rights — that the
things to be seized be particularly described — as well as tending to
defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants. The
Moncado doctrine is likewise abandoned and the right of the
accused against a defective search warrant is emphasized.
Bache & Co. Inc. et al vs BIR Commissioner Vivencio Ruiz et al
November 16, 2010
Search and Seizure – Personal Examination of the Judge
On 24 Feb 1970, Commissioner Vera of Internal Revenue, wrote a
letter addressed to J Ruiz requesting the issuance of a search
warrant against petitioners for violation of Sec 46(a) of the NIRC, in
relation to all other pertinent provisions thereof, particularly Sects
53, 72, 73, 208 and 209, and authorizing Revenue Examiner de Leon
make and file the application for search warrant which was attached
to the letter. The next day, de Leon and his witnesses went to CFI
Rizal to obtain the search warrant. At that time J Ruiz was hearing a
certain case; so, by means of a note, he instructed his Deputy Clerk
of Court to take the depositions of De Leon and Logronio. After the
session had adjourned, J Ruiz was informed that the depositions had
already been taken. The stenographer read to him her stenographic
notes; and thereafter, J Ruiz asked respondent Logronio to take the
oath and warned him that if his deposition was found to be false and
without legal basis, he could be charged for perjury. J Ruiz signed de
Leon’s application for search warrant and Logronio’s deposition. The
search was subsequently conducted.
ISSUE: Whether or not there had been a valid search warrant.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Bache on three grounds.
1. J Ruiz failed to personally examine the complainant and his
witness.
Personal examination by the judge of the complainant and his
witnesses is necessary to enable him to determine the existence or
non-existence of a probable cause.
2. The search warrant was issued for more than one specific
offense.
The search warrant in question was issued for at least four distinct
offenses under the Tax Code. As ruled in Stonehill “Such is the
seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the
disputed search warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend
Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court that ‘a search
warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with
one specific offense.’ Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court
added thereto a paragraph, directing that ‘no search warrant shall
issue for more than one specific offense.
3. The search warrant does not particularly describe the things to be
seized.
The documents, papers and effects sought to be seized are
described in the Search Warrant
“Unregistered and private books of accounts (ledgers, journals,
columnars, receipts and disbursements books, customers ledgers);
receipts for payments received; certificates of stocks and securities;
contracts, promissory notes and deeds of sale; telex and coded
messages; business communications, accounting and business
records; checks and check stubs; records of bank deposits and
withdrawals; and records of foreign remittances, covering the years
1966 to 1970.”
The description does not meet the requirement in Art III, Sec. 1, of
the Constitution, and of Sec. 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of
Court, that the warrant should particularly describe the things to be
seized.
A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to
be seized when the description therein is as specific as the
circumstances will ordinarily allow or when the description
expresses a conclusion of fact not of law by which the warrant
officer may be guided in making the search and seizure or when the
things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to
the offense for which the warrant is being issued.
DOJ Sec Vicente Abad Santos vs CFI Benguet Judge Pio Marcos
November 16, 2010
Search and Seizure
On March 31, 1971, Amansec went to Baguio and passed by a house
at 47 Ledesma Street, Baguio; he was attracted by the sight of
several persons inside the house; he peeped from outside the house
and when the curtain was moved he saw a Buddha that was inside
the house; he observed what was going on inside the house and he
heard someone say that the golden Buddha was actually for sale and
when he observed them closer he overheard that it was being
offered for sale for 100,000 pesos by Rogelio Roxas; he saw the
Buddha and firearms and some bullets inside the house. By these
facts, Colonel Calano requested for a warrant from J Marcos at
about 12 midnight on Apr 4, 1971. Due to the urgency he issued the
warrant. And eventually the golden Buddha and some firearms were
seized from Roxas’s house. Santos assailed the warrant averring that
the search warrant was not limited to one offense covering both
illegal possession of firearms and violation of Central Bank rules and
regulations; that it did not particularly describe the property to be
seized; that he did not carefully examine under oath the applicant
and his witnesses; that articles not mentioned were taken; and that
thereafter the return and the inventory although appearing to have
been prepared on said date were not actually submitted to
respondent Judge until April 13, 1971 and the objects seized
delivered only about a week later on April 19.
ISSUE: Whether or not the search warrant issued by Judge Marcos is
valid.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor Judge Marcos and had basically affirmed
the decision of appellate Judge Gatamaitan. Taking into
consideration to nature of “the articles so described, it is clear that
no other more adequate and detailed description could be given,
particularly because it is difficult to give a particular description of
the contents thereof, The description so made substantially
complies with the legal provisions because the officer of the law
who executed the warrant was thereby placed in a position enabling
him to Identify the articles in question, which he did,’ … so that here,
since certainly, no one would be mistaken in Identifying the Buddha,
whose image is well known, and even the firearms and ammunition
because these were those without permit to possess, and all located
at 47 Ledesma St., Baguio City, so far as description was concerned,
the search warrant perhaps could not be said to have suffered fatal
defects.
Castro vs Pabalan
Facts: Judge Pabalan ordered the issuance of a search warrant
despite failure of the application of Lumang or the warrant itself to
specify the offense, to examine the applicant as well as his witnesses
on the part of the Judge, and to describe with particularity the place
to be searched and the things to be seized. Judge never refuted the
assertions when required to answer. Application alleged that
applicants were informed and claimed that they verifed the report
that Maria Castro and Co Ling are in possession of narcotics and
other contraband in Barrio Padasil, Bangar, La Union without
specifying the particular place in the Barrio. No complete description
of the goods and inquiry was brief. upon actual search, it turned out
that it was in barrio Ma. Cristina and not in Padasil.
Issue: Whether the search warrant issued by respondent Judge was
tainted by illegality because it does not comply with the
constitutional requirements
Held: The Constitution requires, for the validity of a search warrant,
that there be a particular description of the place to be searched and
the persons or things to be seized."as was admitted by the Judge in
the challenged resolution, there was a mistake concerning the
residence of petitioners, which was set forth in the search warrant
as being in Barrio Padasil when in fact it is in Barrio Maria Cristina.
He would gloss over such inaccuracy by saying that they were,
anyway, adjoining barrios. As to the premises to be searched, it may
be admitted that the deficiency in the writ is not of sufficient gravity
to call for its invalidation. That requisite was not complied with in
this case. That would explain why the searching party felt it had a
free hand and did take possession of various kinds of goods,
including personal effects, which respondent Judge himself would
have them return. What was aptly characterized as a major
objective” of this constitutional provision, the elimination of general
warrants, was thus frustrated. It need not be stressed anew that this
court is resolutely committed to the doctrine that this constitutional
provision is of a mandatory character and therefore must be strictly
complied with. Another infirmity was the failure to comply with the
basic procedural requisite that a search warrant “shall not issue but
upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense. “Here
reference was made to “an illegal tra1c of narcotics and contraband.
“The latter is a generic term covering all goods exported from or
imported into the country contrary to applicable statutes.
G.R. No. L-25232 December 20, 1973
ASIAN SURETY and INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. JOSE HERRERA, as Judge, City Court of Manila, NBI Agent
CELSO J. ZOLETA, JR. and MANUEL CUARESMA, respondents.
Astraquillo, Laquio, Brillantes and Associates, Tañada, Carmon and
Tañada and Alidio, Elegir, Anchete and Catipon petitioner.
Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro and Solicitor Augusto
M. Amores for respondent Celso J. Zoleta, Jr.
Antonio Barredo for respondent Manuel Cuaresma.
ESGUERRA, J.:
Petition to quash and annul a search warrant issued by respondent
Judge Jose Herrera of the City Court of Manila, and to command
respondents to return immediately the documents, papers, receipts
and records alleged to have been illegally seized thereunder by
agents of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) led by
respondent Celso Zoleta, Jr.
On October 27, 1965, respondent Judge Herrera, upon the sworn
application of NBI agent Celso Zoleta, Jr. supported by the
deposition of his witness, Manuel Cuaresma, issued a search warrant
in connection with an undocketed criminal case for estafa,
falsification, insurance fraud, and tax evasion, against the Asian
Surety and Insurance Co., a corporation duly organized and existing
under the laws of the Philippines, with principal office at Room 200
Republic Supermarket Bldg., Rizal Avenue, Manila. The search
warrant is couched in the following language:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned, after examining
under oath NBI Agent Celso J. Zoleta, Jr. and his witness Manuel
Cuaresma that there are good and sufficient reasons to believe that
Mr. William Li Yao or his employees has/have in his/their control in
premises No. 2nd Floor Republic Supermarket Building, in Rizal
Avenue district of Sta. Cruz, Manila, property (Subject of the offense;
stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense used or
intended to be used as the means of committing the offense) should
be seized and brought to the undersigned.
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any
time in the ----- of the premises above-described and forthwith seize
and take possession of the following personal property to wit: Fire
Registers, Loss Bordereau, Adjusters Report including subrogation
receipt and proof of loss, Loss Registers, Books of Accounts,
including cash receipts and disbursements and general ledger, check
vouchers, income tax returns, and other papers connected
therewith ... for the years 1961 to 1964 to be dealt with as the law
directs.
Armed with the search warrant Zoleta and other agents assigned to
the Anti-graft Division of the NBI entered the premises of the
Republic Supermarket Building and served the search warrant upon
Atty. Alidio of the insurance company, in the presence of Mr.
William Li Yao, president and chairman of the board of directors of
the insurance firm. After the search they seized and carried away
two (2) carloads of documents, papers and receipts.
Petitioner assails the validity of the search warrant, claiming that it
was issued in contravention of the explicit provisions of the
Constitution and the Rules of Court, particularly Section 1, of Art. III
of the 1935 Constitution, now Section 3, of Art. IV of the new
Constitution, and Sections 3, 5, 8 and 10 of Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court, hereunder quoted for convenience of reference, viz:
Sec. 3 — The rights of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated, and no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause to be determined by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnessed he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons, or things to be seized." (Art. IV, Section 3, New
Constitution)
Sec. 3 — Requisites for issuing search warrant — A search warrant
shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one
specific offense to be determined by the judge or justice of the
peace after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.
No search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense.
(Sec. 3, Rule 126, Rules of Court)
Sec. 5 — Issuance and form of search warrant — If the judge or
justice of the peace is thereupon satisfied of the existence of facts
upon which the application is based, or that there is probable cause
to believe that they exist, he must issue the warrant in the form
prescribed by these rules. (Sec. 5, Rule 126)
Sec. 8 — Time of making search — The warrant must direct that it be
served in the day time, unless the affidavit asserts that the property
is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched, in which
case a direction may be inserted that it be served at any time of the
night or day. (Sec. 8, Rule 126)
Sec. 10 Receipt for property seized. — The officer seizing property
under the warrant must give a detailed receipt for the same to the
person on whom or in whose possession it was found, or in the
absence of any person, must, in the presence of at least one witness,
leave a receipt in the place in which he found the seized property.
(Sec. 10, Rule 126) .
"Of all the rights of a citizen, few are of greater importance or more
essential to his peace and happiness than the right of personal
security, and that involves the exemption of his private affairs,
books, and papers from the inspection and scrutiny of others.1
While the power to search and seize is necessary to the public
welfare, still it must be exercised and the law enforced without
transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the
enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify
indifference to the basic principles of government (People v. Elias,
147 N.E. 472)."
I.
In the case at bar, the search warrant was issued for four separate
and distinct offenses of : (1) estafa, (2) falsification, (3) tax evasion
and (4) insurance fraud, in contravention of the explicit command of
Section 3, Rule 126, of the Rules providing that: "no search warrant
shall issue for more than one specific offense." The aforequoted
provision, which is found in the last paragraph of the same section,
is something new. "There is no precedent on this amendment —
prohibition against the issuance of a search warrant for more than
one specific offense — either in the American books on Criminal
procedure or in American decisions."2 It was applied in the
celebrated case of Harry S. Stonehill v. Secretary of Justice3 where
this Court said:
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe
out completely one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in
our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and
the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of
the whims, caprice or passion of peace officers. This is precisely the
evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision
abovequoted — to outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is not
difficult to imagine what would happen in times of keen political
strife, when the party in power feels that the minority is likely to
wrest it, even though by legal means.
Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection
with the disputed search warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to
amend section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court by
providing in its counterpart, under the Revised Rules of Court, that a
search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in
connection with one specific offense. Not satisfied with this
qualification, the court added thereto a paragraph, directing that no
search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense.
II.
Petitioner likewise contests the validity of the search warrant on the
ground that it authorized the search and seizures of personal
properties so vaguely described and not particularized, thereby
infringing the constitutional mandate requiring particular description
of the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. It
also assails the noncompliance with the above-requirement as
likewise openly violative of Section 2 of Rule 126 which provides:
SEC. 2. A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of
the following personal property:
(a) Property subject of the offense;
(b) Property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the
offense; and
(c) Property used or intended to be used as the means of committing
an offense.
The search warrant herein involved reads in part: "... property
(Subject of the offense, stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits
of the offense used or intended to be used as the means of
committing the offense) should be seized and brought to the
undersigned." The claim of respondents that by not cancelling the
description of one or two of the classes of property contained in the
form when not applicable to the properties sought to be seized, the
respondent judge intended the search to apply to all the three
classes of property. This is a patent impossibility because the
description of the property to be searched and seized, viz: Fire
Registers, Loss Bordereau, Adjusters Report, including subrogation
receipts and proof of loss, Loss Registers, Books of Accounts
including cash receipts and disbursements and general ledger, etc.
and the offenses alleged to have been committed by the corporation
to wit: estafa, falsification, tax evasion and insurance fraud, render it
impossible for Us to see how the above-described property can
simultaneously be contraband goods, stolen or embezzled and other
proceeds or fruits of one and the same offense. What is plain and
clear is the fact that the respondent Judge made no attempt to
determine whether the property he authorized to be searched and
seized pertains specifically to any one of the three classes of
personal property that may be searched and seized under a search
warrant under Rule 126, Sec. 2 of the Rules. The respondent Judge
simply authorized search and seizure under an omnibus description
of the personal properties to be seized. Because of this all embracing
description which includes all conceivable records of petitioner
corporation, which if seized (as it was really seized in the case at
bar), could possibly paralyze its business,4 petitioner in several
motions, filed for early resolution of this case, manifested that the
seizure of TWO carloads of their papers has paralyzed their business
to the grave prejudice of not only the company, its workers, agents,
employees but also of its numerous insured and beneficiaries of
bonds issued by it, including the government itself, and of the
general public.5 And correlating the same to the charges for which
the warrant was issued, We have before Us the infamous general
warrants of old. In the case of Uy Kheytin, et al., v. Villareal, 42 Phil.
896, cited with approval in the Bache case, supra, We had occasion
to explain the purpose of the requirement that the warrant should
particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be
seized, to wit:
"... Both the Jones Law (sec. 3) and General Orders No. 58 (sec. 97)
specifically require that a search warrant should particularly describe
the place to be searched and the things to be seized. The evident
purpose and intent of this requirement is to limit the things to be
seized to those, and only those, particularly described in the search
warrant — to leave the officers of the law with no discretion
regarding what articles they shall seize, to the end that
"unreasonable searches and seizures" may not be made. That this is
the correct interpretation of this constitutional provision is borne
out by American authorities."
The purpose as thus explained could, surely and effectively, be
defeated under the search warrant issued in this case.
III.
Moreover, as contended by petitioner, respondents in like manner
transgressed Section 10 of Rule 126 of the Rules for failure to give a
detailed receipt of the things seized. Going over the receipts
(Annexes "B", "B-1", B-2", "B-3" and "B-4" of the Petition) issued, We
found the following: one bordereau of reinsurance, 8 fire registers, 1
marine register, four annual statements, folders described only as
Bundle gm-1 red folders; bundle 17-22 big carton folders; folders of
various sizes, etc., without stating therein the nature and kind of
documents contained in the folders of which there were about a
thousand of them that were seized. In the seizure of two carloads of
documents and other papers, the possibility that the respondents
took away private papers of the petitioner, in violation of his
constitutional rights, is not remote, for the NBI agents virtually had a
field day with the broad and unlimited search warrant issued by
respondent Judge as their passport.
IV.
The search warrant violated the specific injunctions of Section 8 of
Rule 126.6 Annex "A" of the Petition which is the search warrant in
question left blank the "time" for making search, while actual search
was conducted in the evening of October 27, 1965, at 7:30 p.m.,
until the wee hours of the morning of October 28, 1965, thus
causing untold inconveniences to petitioners herein. Authorities7
are of the view that where a search is to be made during the night
time, the authority for executing the same at that time should
appear in the directive on the face of the warrant.
In their Memorandum8 respondents, relying on the case of
Moncado v. Peoples Court (80 Phil. 1), argued:
Even assuming that the search warrant in question is null and void,
the illegality thereof would not render the incriminating documents
inadmissible in evidence.
This Court has reverted to the old rule and abandoned the Moncado
ruling (Stonehill case, supra). Most common law jurisdictions have
already given up this approach and eventually adopted the
exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical means of
enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable
searches and seizures. Thus the Supreme Court of the United States
declared:9
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and
used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense the
protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring his right to be secured
against such searches and seizures is of no value, and so far as those
thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the
Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the
guilty to punishment, praise-worthy as they are, are not to be aided
by the sacrifice of those great principles established by years of
endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in
the fundamental law of the land.
Moreover, the criminal charges filed by the NBI have all been
dismissed and/or dropped by the Court or by the office of the City
Fiscal of Manila in 1968, as manifested in the petition filed by
petitioner dated October 24, 1972, for early resolution of this case.
V.
It has likewise been observed that the offenses alleged took place
from 1961 to 1964, and the application for search warrant was made
on October 27, 1965. The time of the application is so far remote in
time as to make the probable cause of doubtful veracity and the
warrant vitally defective. Thus Mr. Joseph Varon, an eminent
authority on Searches, Seizures and Immunities, has this to say on
this point:
From the examination of the several cases touching upon this
subject, the following general rules are said to apply to affidavits for
search warrants:
(1) xxx xxx xxx
(2) Such statement as to the time of the alleged offense must be
clear and definite and must not be too remote from the time of the
making of the affidavit and issuance of the search warrant.
(3) There is no rigid rule for determining whether the stated time of
observation of the offense is too remote from the time when the
affidavit is made or the search warrant issued, but, generally
speaking, a lapse of time of more than three weeks will be held not
to invalidate the search warrant while a lapse of four weeks will be
held to be so.
A good and practical rule of thumb to measure the nearness of time
given in the affidavit as to the date of the alleged offense, and the
time of making the affidavit is thus expressed: The nearer the time
at which the observation of the offense is alleged to have been
made, the more reasonable the conclusion of establishment of
probable cause. [Emphasis Ours]
PREMISES CONSIDERED, petition is hereby granted; the search
warrant of October 27, 1965, is nullified and set aside, and the
respondents are hereby ordered to return immediately all
documents, papers and other objects seized or taken thereunder.
Without costs.
Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Fernandez * and Muñoz Palma, JJ., concur.
Makasiar, J., concurs in the result.
Viduya vs. Berdiago
73 SCRA 553 (1976)
Except in the case of the search of a dwelling house, persons
exercising police authority under the customs law may effect search
and seizure without a search warrant in the enforcement of customs
laws.
FACTS:
Respondent Berdiago is the owner of a Rolls Royce car, Model 1966,
which arrived in the Port of Manila on January 8, 1968. However, the
petitioner, Jose Viduya, then Collector of Customs of Manila,
obtained reliable intelligence that fraudulent documents were used
by Berdiago in securing the release of the car from the Bureau of
Customs, making it appear therein that the car was a 1961 model
instead of a 1966 one, thus enabling respondent to pay a much
lower customs duty.
There was, accordingly, a formal demand for the payment of the
sum to cover the deficiency, respondent manifesting his willingness
to do so but failing to live up to his promise. As the car was kept in a
dwelling house at the Yabut Compound, two officials of the Customs
Police Service as duly authorized agents of petitioner, applied to
respondent Judge for a warrant to search said dwelling house and to
seize the Rolls Royce car found therein.
Berdiago filed a motion to quash the search warrant issued by the
court based on lack of probable cause to issue the warrant. Collector
Viduya opposed, alleging that Berdiago could not rely on the
constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure because
it was not shown that he owned the dwelling house which was
searched. Nonetheless, respondent Judge in the challenged order
quashed such search warrant.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in
quashing the warrant
HELD:

The Court opined that except in the case of the search of a dwelling
house, persons exercising police authority under the customs law
may effect search and seizure without a search warrant in the
enforcement of customs laws. There is justification then for the
insistence on the part of private respondent that probable cause be
shown. So respondent Judge found in issuing the search warrant.

Apparently, he was persuaded to quash it when he noted that the

warrant for seizure and detention came later than its issuance. In
thus acting, respondent Judge apparently overlooked that long
before the search warrant was applied for, to be specific on April 15,
1968, the misdeclaration and underpayment was already noted and
that thereafter on April 24, 1968, private respondent himself agreed
to make good the further amount due but not in the sum
demanded.

As the car was kept in a dwelling house, petitioner through two of

his officers in the Customs Police Service applied for and was able to
obtain the search warrant. Had there been no such move on the part
of petitioner, the duties expressly enjoined on him by law assess and
collect all lawful revenues, to prevent and suppress smuggling and
other frauds and to enforce tariff and customs law would not have
been performed.

While therefore, it is to be admitted that his warrant of seizure and

detention came later than the search warrant, there were
indubitable facts in existence at that time to call for its issuance.
Certainly there was probable cause. There was evidently need for
the issuance of a search warrant. It ought not to have been
thereafter quashed.