Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. Nos. 162144-54 November 13, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. MA. THERESA L. DELA TORRE- YADAO, in her capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 81,
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, HON. MA. NATIVIDAD M. DIZON, in her capacity as Executive
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, PANFILO M. LACSON, JEWEL F. CANSON,
ROMEO M. ACOP, FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., MICHAEL RAY B. AQUINO, CEZAR O. MANCAO II,
ZOROBABEL S. LAURELES, GLENN G. DUMLAO, ALMARIO A. HILARIO, JOSE ERWIN T.
VILLACORTE, GIL C. MENESES, ROLANDO ANDUYAN, JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL, RICARDO G.
DANDAN, CEASAR TANNAGAN, VICENTE P. ARNADO, ROBERTO T. LANGCAUON, ANGELITO N.
CAISIP, ANTONIO FRIAS, CICERO S. BACOLOD, WILLY NUAS, JUANITO B. MANAOIS, VIRGILIO V.
PARAGAS, ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, CECILIO T. MORITO, REYNALDO C. LAS PINAS, WILFREDO G
CUARTERO, ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, OSMUNDO B. CARINO, NORBERTO LASAGA, LEONARDO
GLORIA, ALEJANDRO G LIWANAG, ELMER FERRER and ROMY CRUZ, Respondents.

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

This case, which involves the alleged summary execution of suspected members of the Kuratong Bale/eng
Gang, is once again before this Court this time questioning, among other things, the trial qmrt's determination
of the absence of probable cause and its dismissal of the criminal actions.1

The Facts and the Case

In the early morning of May 18, 1995, the combined forces of the Philippine National Police's Anti-Bank
Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (PNP ABRITG) composed of Task Force Habagat (then headed by Police
Chief Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson), Traffic Management Command ([TMC] led by then Police Senior
Superintendent Francisco G. Zubia, Jr.), Criminal Investigation Command (led by then Police Chief
Superintendent Romeo M. Acop ), and National Capital Region Command (headed by then Police Chief
Superintendent Jewel F. Canson) killed 11 suspected members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang2 along
Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City.

Subsequently, SPO2 Eduardo Delos Reyes of the Criminal Investigation Command told the press that it was a
summary execution, not a shoot-out between the police and those who were slain. After investigation, the
Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs absolved all the police officers involved, including respondents Panfilo
M. Lacson, Jewel F. Canson, Romeo M. Acop, Francisco G. Zubia, Jr., Michael Ray B. Aquino, Cezar O. Mancao
II, and 28 others (collectively, the respondents).3 On review, however, the Office of the Ombudsman reversed
the finding and filed charges of murder against the police officers involved before the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Cases 23047 to 57, except that in the cases of respondents Zubia, Acop, and Lacson, their liabilities
were downgraded to mere accessory. On arraignment, Lacson pleaded not guilty.

Upon respondents’ motion, the Sandiganbayan ordered the transfer of their cases to the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City on the ground that none of the principal accused had the rank of Chief Superintendent or
higher. Pending the resolution of the Office of the Special Prosecutor’s motion for reconsideration of the
transfer order, Congress passed Republic Act (R.A.) 8249 that expanded the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction by
deleting the word "principal" from the phrase "principal accused" to apply to all pending cases where trial had
not begun. As a result of this new law, the Sandiganbayan opted to retain and try the Kuratong Baleleng
murder cases.

Respondent Lacson challenged the constitutionality of R.A. 8249 in G.R. 1280964 but this Court upheld its
validity. Nonetheless, the Court ordered the transfer of the trial of the cases to the RTC of Quezon City since
the amended informations contained no allegations that respondents committed the offenses charged in
relation to, or in the discharge of, their official functions as required by R.A. 8249.

Before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 81, then presided over by Judge Wenceslao Agnir, Jr., could arraign
respondents in the re-docketed Criminal Cases Q-99-81679 to 89, however, SPO2 Delos Reyes and the other
prosecution witnesses recanted their affidavits. Some of the victims’ heirs also executed affidavits of
desistance. These prompted the respondents to file separate motions for the determination of probable cause
before the issuance of warrants of arrests.
On March 29, 1999 the RTC of Quezon City ordered the provisional dismissal of the cases for lack of probable
cause to hold the accused for trial following the recantation of the principal prosecution witnesses and the
desistance of the private complainants.

Two years later or on March 27, 2001 PNP Director Leandro R. Mendoza sought to revive the cases against
respondents by requesting the Department of Justice (DOJ) to conduct another preliminary investigation in
their cases on the strength of the affidavits of P/Insp. Ysmael S. Yu and P/S Insp. Abelardo Ramos. In
response, then DOJ Secretary Hernando B. Perez constituted a panel of prosecutors to conduct the requested
investigation.

Invoking their constitutional right against double jeopardy, Lacson and his co-accused filed a petition for
prohibition with application for temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction before the RTC of
Manila in Civil Case 01-100933. In an Order dated June 5, 2001, that court denied the plea for temporary
restraining order. Thus, on June 6, 2001 the panel of prosecutors found probable cause to hold Lacson and his
co-accused liable as principals for 11 counts of murder, resulting in the filing of separate informations against
them in Criminal Cases 01-101102 to 12 before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 81, now presided over by
respondent Judge Ma. Theresa L. Yadao.

On the same day, respondent Lacson filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA), assailing
the RTC of Manila’s order which allowed the renewed preliminary investigation of the murder charges against
him and his co-accused. Lacson also filed with the RTC of Quezon City a motion for judicial determination of
probable cause. But on June 13, 2001 he sought the suspension of the proceedings in that court.

In the meantime, the CA issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the RTC of Quezon City from issuing
warrants of arrest or conducting any proceeding in Criminal Cases 01-101102 to 12 before it. On August 24,
2001 the CA rendered a Decision, granting Lacson’s petition on the ground of double jeopardy since, although
the dismissal of Criminal Cases Q-99-81679 to 89 was provisional, such dismissal became permanent two years
after when they were not revived.

Upon the prosecution’s appeal to this Court in G.R. 149453,5 the Court ruled that, based on the record, Lacson
failed to prove compliance with the requirements of Section 8, Rule 117 governing provisional dismissals. The
records showed that the prosecution did not file a motion for provisional dismissal and, for his part, respondent
Lacson had merely filed a motion for judicial determination of probable cause. Nowhere did he agree to some
proposal for a provisional dismissal of the cases. Furthermore, the heirs of the victims had no notice of any
motion for such provisional dismissal.

The Court thus set aside the CA Decision of August 24, 2001 and directed the RTC of Quezon City to try the
cases with dispatch. On motion for reconsideration by respondent Lacson, the Court ordered the re-raffle of
the criminal cases to a heinous crimes court. Upon re-raffle, however, the cases still went to Branch 81, which
as already stated was now presided over by Judge Yadao.

On October 12, 2003 the parents of two of the victims submitted birth certificates showing that they were
minors. Apparently reacting to this, the prosecution amended the informations to show such minority and
asked respondent Executive Judge Ma. Natividad M. Dizon to recall the assignment of the cases to Branch 81
and re-raffle them to a family court. The request for recall was denied.

On October 20, 2003 the prosecution filed an omnibus motion before Branch 81, praying for the re-raffle of
Criminal Cases 01-101102 to12 to the family courts in view of the changes in the two informations. On October
24, 2003 the prosecution also filed its consolidated comment ex-abundanti cautela on the motions to
determine probable cause.

On November 12, 20036 Judge Yadao issued an order, denying the prosecution’s motion for re-raffle to a
family court on the ground that Section 5 of R.A. 8369 applied only to living minors. She also granted the
motions for determination of probable cause and dismissed the cases against the respondents since the
affidavits of the prosecution witnesses were inconsistent with those they submitted in the preliminary
investigations before the Ombudsman for the crime of robbery.

On November 25, 2003 the prosecution filed a verified motion to recuse or disqualify Judge Yadao and for
reconsideration of her order. It also filed an administrative complaint against her for dishonesty, conduct
prejudicial to the best interests of the service, manifest partiality, and knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment.7 On January 14, 2004, the prosecution filed an urgent supplemental motion for compulsory
disqualification with motion for cancellation of the hearing on motion for reconsideration.

On January 21, 2004 Judge Yadao issued an order, denying the motion to recuse her, prompting the
prosecution to appeal from that order. Further, on January 22, 2004 Judge Yadao issued another order,
denying the prosecution’s motion for reconsideration of the Order dated November 12, 2003 that dismissed the
action against the respondents. In response, the prosecution filed a notice of appeal from the same. Finally, on
January 26, 2004 Judge Yadao issued an order, denying the prosecution’s motion for reconsideration of its
January 16, 2004 Order not only for lack of merit but also for having become moot and academic.

On February 16, 2004 the prosecution withdrew ex-abundanti cautela the notices of appeal that it filed in the
cases. Subsequently, on March 3, 2004 it filed the present special civil action of certiorari.

The Issues Presented

The prosecution presents the following issues:

1. Whether or not Executive Judge Dizon gravely abused her discretion in allowing Criminal Cases 01-
101102 to 12 to be re-raffled to other than among the RTC of Quezon City’s family courts.

2. Whether or not Judge Yadao gravely abused her discretion when she took cognizance of Criminal
Cases 01-101102 to 12 contrary to the prosecution’s view that such cases fell under the jurisdiction of
family courts.

3. Whether or not Judge Yadao gravely abused her discretion when she did not inhibit and disqualify
herself from taking cognizance of the cases.

4. Whether or not Judge Yadao gravely abused her discretion when she dismissed the criminal actions
on the ground of lack of probable cause and barred the presentation of additional evidence in support
of the prosecution’s motion for reconsideration.

5. Whether or not Judge Yadao gravely abused her discretion when she adopted certain policies
concerning the conduct of hearings in her court.

The Court’s Rulings

Before addressing the above issues, the Court notes respondents’ contention that the prosecution’s resort to
special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 is improper. Since the trial court dismissed the criminal actions
against respondents, the prosecution’s remedy was to appeal to the CA from that order of dismissal.

Ordinarily, the proper remedy from an order dismissing an action is an appeal.8 Here, the prosecution in fact
filed a notice of appeal from such an order issued in the subject cases. But it reconsidered its action and
withdrew that notice, believing that appeal was not an effective, speedy, and adequate remedy. 9 In other
words, the prosecution’s move was not a case of forgotten remedy but a conscious resort to another based on
a belief that respondent Judge Yadao gravely abused her discretion in issuing her various orders and that
certiorari under Rule 65 was the proper and all-encompassing remedy for the prosecution. The Court is not
prepared to say that the remedy is altogether implausible as to throw out the petition outright.

Still, the Court notes that the prosecution skipped the CA and filed its action directly with this Court, ignoring
the principle of judicial hierarchy of courts. Although the Supreme Court, the CA, and the RTCs have
concurrent jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, such concurrence does not give the People the unrestricted
freedom of choice of forum.10 In any case, the immense public interest in these cases, the considerable length
of time that has passed since the crime took place, and the numerous times these cases have come before this
Court probably warrant a waiver of such procedural lapse.

1. Raffle of the Cases

The prosecution points out that the RTC of Quezon City Executive Judge gravely abused her discretion when
she placed Criminal Cases 01-101102 to 12 under a separate category which did not restrict their raffle to the
city’s special criminal and family courts in accordance with SC Administrative Order 36-96. Further, the
prosecution points out that she violated Administrative Order 19-98 when Branches 219 and 102 were left out
of the raffle. The presiding judges of these two branches, both heinous crimes courts eligible to receive cases
by raffle, had just been appointed to the CA.

The records of the cases show nothing irregular in the conduct of the raffle of the subject cases. The raffle
maintained a separate list for criminal and civil cases. Criminal cases cognizable by special criminal courts were
separately listed. Criminal Cases 01-101102 to 12 were given a separate heading, "Re-Raffle," but there was
nothing irregular in this since it merely indicated that the cases were not being raffled for the first time.

The Executive Judge did not err in leaving out Branches 219 and 102 from raffle since these branches
remained without regularly appointed judges. Although the pairing judges of these branches had authority to
act on incidental, interlocutory, and urgent matters, this did not mean that such branches should already be
included in the raffle of cases.
Parenthetically, the prosecution was represented during the raffle yet it did not then object to the manner by
which it was conducted. The prosecution raised the question only when it filed this petition, a clear
afterthought.

2. Jurisdiction of Family Courts

The prosecution points out that, although this Court’s October 7, 2003 Resolution directed a re-raffle of the
cases to a heinous crimes court, the prosecution in the meantime amended the informations to reflect the fact
that two of the murder victims were minors. For this reason, the Executive Judge should have raffled the cases
to a family court pursuant to Section 5 of R.A. 8369.

The Court is not impervious to the provisions of Section 5 of R.A. 8369, that vests in family courts jurisdiction
over violations of R.A. 7610, which in turn covers murder cases where the victim is a minor. Thus:

Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of Family Courts. – The Family Courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and
decide the following cases:

a) Criminal cases where one or more of the accused is below eighteen (18) years of age but not less than nine
(9) years of age, or where one or more of the victims is a minor at the time of the commission of the offense:
Provided, That if the minor is found guilty, the court shall promulgate sentence and ascertain any civil liability
which the respondent may have incurred. (Emphasis supplied)

Undoubtedly, in vesting in family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over criminal cases involving minors, the
law but seeks to protect their welfare and best interests. For this reason, when the need for such protection is
not compromised, the Court is able to relax the rule. In several cases,11 for instance, the Court has held that
the CA enjoys concurrent jurisdiction with the family courts in hearing petitions for habeas corpus involving
minors.

Here, the two minor victims, for whose interests the people wanted the murder cases moved to a family court,
are dead. As respondents aptly point out, there is no living minor in the murder cases that require the special
attention and protection of a family court. In fact, no minor would appear as party in those cases during trial
since the minor victims are represented by their parents who had become the real private offended parties.

3. Inhibition of Judge Yadao

The prosecution claims that Judge Yadao committed grave abuse of discretion in failing to inhibit herself from
hearing the cases against the respondents.

The rules governing the disqualification of judges are found, first, in Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court,
which provides:

Sec. 1. Disqualification of judges. – No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or
child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party
within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according
to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in
which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the
written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid
reasons other than those mentioned above.

and in Rule 3.12, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which states:

Rule 3.12. – A judge should take no part in a proceeding where the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be
questioned. These cases include among others, proceedings where:

(a) the judge has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;

xxxx

(e) the judge knows the judge’s spouse or child has a financial interest, as heir, legatee, creditor,
fiduciary, or otherwise, in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any
other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding. In every instance,
the judge shall indicate the legal reason for inhibition.

The first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 and Rule 3.12, Canon 3 provide for the compulsory disqualification
of a judge while the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 provides for his voluntary inhibition.
The matter of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and sound discretion on the part of the
judge since he is in a better position to determine whether a given situation would unfairly affect his attitude
towards the parties or their cases. The mere imputation of bias, partiality, and prejudgment is not enough
ground, absent clear and convincing evidence that can overcome the presumption that the judge will perform
his duties according to law without fear or favor. The Court will not disqualify a judge based on speculations
and surmises or the adverse nature of the judge’s rulings towards those who seek to inhibit him.12

Here, the prosecution contends that Judge Yadao should have inhibited herself for improperly submitting to a
public interview on the day following her dismissal of the criminal cases against the respondents. But the Court
finds nothing basically reprehensible in such interview. Judge Yadao’s dismissal of the multiple murder cases
aroused natural public interest and stirred the media into frenzy for correct information. Judge Yadao simply
accommodated, not sought, the requests for such an interview to clarify the basis of her order. There is no
allegation that she gave out false information. To be sure, the prosecution never once accused her of making
public disclosures regarding the merits of those cases prior to her order dismissing such cases.

The prosecution also assails as constituting bias Judge Yadao’s statement that a very close relative stood to be
promoted if she was to issue a warrant of arrest against the respondents. But this statement merely shows
that she cannot be dissuaded by some relative who is close to her. How can this constitute bias? Besides, there
is no evidence that the close relative she referred to was her spouse or child which would be a mandatory
ground for disqualification.

Further, the prosecution claims that Judge Yadao prejudged its motion for reconsideration when she said in
her comment to the administrative complaint against her that such motion was merely the prosecution’s
stubborn insistence on the existence of probable cause against the respondents. The comment could of course
not be regarded as a prejudgment of the issue since she had precisely already issued an order holding that the
complainant’s evidence failed to establish probable cause against the respondents. And there is nothing wrong
about characterizing a motion for reconsideration as a "stubborn" position taken by the party who filed it.
Judge Yadao did not characterize the motion as wholly unjustified at the time she filed her comment.

4. Dismissal of the Criminal Cases

The prosecution claims that Judge Yadao gravely abused her discretion when she set the motions for
determination of probable cause for hearing, deferred the issuance of warrants of arrest, and allowed the
defense to mark its evidence and argue its case. The prosecution stresses that under Section 6, Rule 112 of
the Rules of Court Judge Yadao’s duty was to determine probable cause for the purpose of issuing the arrest
warrants solely on the basis of the investigating prosecutor’s resolution as well as the informations and their
supporting documents. And, if she had some doubts as to the existence of probable cause, the rules required
her to order the investigating prosecutor to present additional evidence to support the finding of probable
cause within five days from notice.

Rather than take limited action, said the prosecution, Judge Yadao dug up and adopted the Ombudsman’s
findings when the latter conducted its preliminary investigation of the crime of robbery in 1996. Judge Yadao
gave weight to the affidavits submitted in that earlier preliminary investigation when such documents are
proper for presentation during the trial of the cases. The prosecution added that the affidavits of P/S Insp.
Abelardo Ramos and SPO1 Wilmor B. Medes reasonably explained the prior inconsistent affidavits they
submitted before the Ombudsman.

The general rule of course is that the judge is not required, when determining probable cause for the issuance
of warrants of arrests, to conduct a de novo hearing. The judge only needs to personally review the initial
determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is supported by substantial evidence. 13

But here, the prosecution conceded that their own witnesses tried to explain in their new affidavits the
inconsistent statements that they earlier submitted to the Office of the Ombudsman. Consequently, it was not
unreasonable for Judge Yadao, for the purpose of determining probable cause based on those affidavits, to
hold a hearing and examine the inconsistent statements and related documents that the witnesses themselves
brought up and were part of the records. Besides, she received no new evidence from the respondents.14

The public prosecutor submitted the following affidavits and documents along with the criminal informations to
enable Judge Yadao to determine the presence of probable cause against the respondents:

1. P/Insp. Ysmael S. Yu’s affidavit of March 24, 200115 in which he said that on May 17, 1995
respondent Canson, NCR Command Head, ordered him to form two teams that would go after
suspected Kuratong Baleleng Gang members who were seen at the Superville Subdivision in Parañaque
City. Yu headed the assault team while Marlon Sapla headed the perimeter defense. After the police
team apprehended eight men inside the safe house, it turned them over to their investigating unit. The
following day, Yu just learned that the men and three others were killed in a shoot-out with the police
in Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City.
 2. P/S Insp. Abelardo Ramos’ affidavit of March 24, 200116 in which he said that he was part of the
perimeter defense during the Superville operation. After the assault team apprehended eight male
suspects, it brought them to Camp Crame in two vans. Ramos then went to the office of respondent
Zubia, TMC Head, where he saw respondents Lacson, Acop, Laureles, Villacorte and other police
officers.

According to Ramos, Zubia said that the eight suspects were to be brought to Commonwealth Avenue
and killed in a supposed shoot-out and that this action had been cleared with higher authorities, to
which remark Lacson nodded as a sign of approval. Before Ramos left the meeting, Lacson supposedly
told him, "baka may mabuhay pa diyan." Ramos then boarded an L-300 van with his men and four
male suspects. In the early morning of May 18, 1995, they executed the plan and gunned down the
suspects. A few minutes later, P/S Insp. Glenn G. Dumlao and his men arrived and claimed
responsibility for the incident.

3. SPO1 Wilmor B. Medes’ affidavit of April 24, 200117 in which he corroborated Ramos’ statements.
Medes said that he belonged to the same team that arrested the eight male suspects. He drove the L-
300 van in going to Commonwealth Avenue where the suspects were killed.

4. Mario C. Enad’s affidavit of August 8, 199518 in which he claimed having served as TMC civilian
agent. At around noon of May 17, 1995, he went to Superville Subdivision together with respondents
Dumlao, Tannagan, and Nuas. Dumlao told Enad to stay in the car and observe what went on in the
house under surveillance. Later that night, other police officers arrived and apprehended the men in
the house. Enad went in and saw six men lying on the floor while the others were handcuffed. Enad
and his companions left Sucat in the early morning of May 18, 1995. He fell asleep along the way but
was awaken by gunshots. He saw Dumlao and other police officers fire their guns at the L-300 van
containing the apprehended suspects.

5. SPO2 Noel P. Seno’s affidavit of May 31, 200119 in which he corroborated what Ramos said. Seno
claimed that he was part of the advance party in Superville Subdivision and was also in Commonwealth
Avenue when the suspected members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang were killed.

6. The PNP ABRITG After Operations Report of May 31, 199520 which narrated the events that took
place on May 17 and 18, 1995. This report was submitted by Lacson, Zubia, Acop and Canson.

7. The PNP Medico-Legal Reports21 which stated that the suspected members of the Kuratong Baleleng
Gang tested negative for gunpowder nitrates.

The Court agrees with Judge Yadao that the above affidavits and reports, taken together with the other
documents of record, fail to establish probable cause against the respondents.

First. Evidently, the case against respondents rests on the testimony of Ramos, corroborated by those of
Medes, Enad, and Seno, who supposedly heard the commanders of the various units plan the killing of the
Kuratong Baleleng Gang members somewhere in Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City and actually execute
such plan. Yu’s testimony is limited to the capture of the gang members and goes no further. He did not see
them killed.

Second. Respecting the testimonies of Ramos, Medes, Enad, and Seno, the prosecution’s own evidence—the
PNP ABRITG’s After Operations Report of May 31, 1995—shows that these men took no part in the operations
against the Kuratong Baleleng Gang members. The report included a comprehensive list of police personnel
from Task Force Habagat (Lacson), Traffic Management Command (Zubia), Criminal Investigation Command
(Acop), and National Capital Region Command (Canson) who were involved. The names of Ramos, Medes,
Enad, and Seno were not on that list. Notably, only Yu’s name, among the new set of witnesses, was on that
list. Since an after-battle report usually serves as basis for commendations and promotions, any omitted name
would hardly have gone unchallenged.

Third. Ramos, whose story appeared to be the most significant evidence against the respondents, submitted in
the course of the preliminary investigation that the Office of the Ombudsman conducted in a related robbery
charge against the police officers involved a counter-affidavit. He claimed in that counter-affidavit that he was
neither in Superville Subdivision nor Commonwealth Avenue during the Kuratong Baleleng operations since he
was in Bulacan on May 17, 1995 and at his home on May 18.22 Notably, Medes claimed in a joint counter-
affidavit that he was on duty at the TMC headquarters at Camp Crame on May 17 and 18.23

Fourth. The Office of the Ombudsman, looking at the whole picture and giving credence to Ramos and Medes’
statements, dismissed the robbery case. More, it excluded Ramos from the group of officers that it charged
with the murder of the suspected members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang. Under the circumstances, the
Court cannot be less skeptical than Judge Yadao was in doubting the sudden reversal after six years of
testimony of these witnesses.
Of course, Yu may have taken part in the subject operation but, as he narrated, his role was limited to
cornering and arresting the suspected Kuratong Baleleng Gang members at their safe house in Superville
Subdivision. After his team turned the suspects over to an investigating unit, he no longer knew what
happened to them.

Fifth. True, the PNP Medico-Legal Reports showed that the Kuratong Baleleng Gang members tested negative
for gunpowder nitrates. But this finding cannot have any legal significance for the purpose of the preliminary
investigation of the murder cases against the respondents absent sufficient proof that they probably took part
in gunning those gang members down.

The prosecution points out that, rather than dismiss the criminal action outright, Judge Yadao should have
ordered the panel of prosecutors to present additional evidence pursuant to Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court which provides:

Sec. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. – (a) By the Regional Trial Court. – Within ten (10) days from the
filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and
its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish
probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the
accused has already been arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who conducted the preliminary
investigation or when the complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 7 of this Rule. In case of
doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence
within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the
filing of the complaint of information.

Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court gives the trial court three options upon the filing of the criminal
information: (1) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly failed to establish probable cause; (2) issue
a warrant of arrest if it finds probable cause; and (3) order the prosecutor to present additional evidence
within five days from notice in case of doubt as to the existence of probable cause. 24

But the option to order the prosecutor to present additional evidence is not mandatory. The court’s first option
under the above is for it to "immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish
probable cause." That is the situation here: the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause
against the respondents.

It is only "in case of doubt on the existence of probable cause" that the judge may order the prosecutor to
present additional evidence within five days from notice. But that is not the case here. Discounting the
affidavits of Ramos, Medes, Enad, and Seno, nothing is left in the record that presents some doubtful
probability that respondents committed the crime charged. PNP Director Leandro Mendoza sought the revival
of the cases in 2001, six years after it happened. It would have been ridiculous to entertain the belief that the
police could produce new witnesses in the five days required of the prosecution by the rules.

In the absence of probable cause to indict respondents for the crime of multiple murder, they should be
insulated from the tribulations, expenses and anxiety of a public trial.25

5. Policies Adopted for Conduct of Court Hearing

The prosecution claims that Judge Yadao arbitrarily recognized only one public prosecutor and one private
prosecutor for all the offended parties but allowed each of the counsels representing the individual
respondents to be heard during the proceedings before it. She also unjustifiably prohibited the prosecution’s
use of tape recorders.

But Section 5, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court gives the trial court ample inherent and administrative powers to
effectively control the conduct of its proceedings. Thus:

Sec. 5. Inherent powers of court. — Every court shall have power:

xxxx

(b) To enforce order in proceedings before it, or before a person or persons empowered to conduct a judicial
investigation under its authority;

xxxx

(d) To control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers, and of all other persons in any
manner connected with a case before it, in every manner appertaining thereto;

xxxx
(g) To amend and control its process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice;

xxxx

There is nothing arbitrary about Judge Yadao’s policy of allowing only one public prosecutor and one private
prosecutor to address the court during the hearing for determination of probable cause but permitting counsels
representing the individual accused to do so. A criminal action is prosecuted under the direction and control of
the public prosecutor.26 The burden of establishing probable cause against all the accused is upon him, not
upon the private prosecutors whose interests lie solely in their clients’ damages claim. Besides, the public and
the private prosecutors take a common position on the issue of probable cause. On the other hand, each of
the accused is entitled to adopt defenses that are personal to him.

As for the prohibition against the prosecution’s private recording of the proceedings, courts usually disallows
such recordings because they create an unnecessary distraction and if allowed, could prompt every lawyer,
party, witness, or reporter having some interest in the proceeding to insist on being given the same privilege.
Since the prosecution makes no claim that the official recording of the proceedings by the court’s stenographer
has been insufficient, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion in Judge Yadao’s policy against such
extraneous recordings.

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES this petition and AFFIRMS the following assailed Orders of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 81 in Criminal Cases 01-101102 to 12:

1. the Order dated November 12, 2003 which denied the prayer for re-raffle, granted the motions for
determination of probable cause, and dismissed the criminal cases;

2. the Order dated January 16, 2004 which granted the motion of the respondents for the immediate
resolution of the three pending incidents before the court;

3. the Order dated January 21, 2004 which denied the motion to recuse and the urgent supplemental
motion for compulsory disqualification;

4. the Order dated January 22, 2004 which denied the motion for reconsideration of the Order dated
November 12, 2003; and

5. the Order dated January 26, 2004 which denied the motion for reconsideration of the January 16,
2004 Order.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 191894 July 15, 2015

DANILO A. DUNCANO, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (2nd DIVISION), and HON. OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL
PROSECUTOR, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Rules) with prayer for issuance of preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order seeks to reverse and set aside the August 18, 2009
Resolution1 and February 8, 2010 Order2 of respondent Sandiganbayan Second Division in Criminal Case No.
SB-09-CRM-0080, which denied petitioner's Motion to Dismiss on the ground of la9k of jurisdiction.

The facts are plain and undisputed.

Petitioner Danilo A. Duncano is, at the time material to the case, the Regional Director of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) with Salary Grade 26 as classified under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6758.3 On March 24,
2009,4 the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), Office of the Ombudsman, filed a criminal case against him
for violation of Section 8, in relation to Section 11 of R.A. No. 6713,5 allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about April 15, 2003, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused DANILODUNCANO y ACIDO, a high ranking public
officer, being the Regional Director of Revenue Region No. 7, of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Quezon City,
and as such is under an obligation to accomplish and submit declarations under oath of his assets, liabilities
and net worth and financial and business interests, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and criminally fail to
disclose in his Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Networth (SALN) for the year 2002, his financial
and business interests/connection in Documail Provides Corporation and Don Plus Trading of which he and his
family are the registered owners thereof, and the 1993 Nissan Patrol motor vehicle registered in the name of
his son VINCENT LOUIS P. DUNCANO which are part of his assets, to the damage and prejudice of public
interest.

CONTRARY TO LAW.6

Prior to his arraignment, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss With Prayer to Defer the Issuance of Warrant of
Arrest7before respondent Sandiganbayan Second Division. As the OSP alleged, he admitted that he is a
Regional Director with Salary Grade 26. Citing Inding v. Sandiganbayan8 and Serana v. Sandiganbayan, et
al.,9 he asserted that under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606, as amended by Section 4 (A) (1) of R.A No.
8249,10 the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction to try and hear the case because he is an official of the executive
branch occupying the position of a Regional Director but with a compensation that is classified as below Salary
Grade 27.

In its Opposition,11 the OSP argued that a reading of Section 4 (A) (1) (a) to (g) of the subject law would clearly
show that the qualification as to Salary Grade 27 and higher applies only to officials of the executive branch
other than the Regional Director and those specifically enumerated. This is so since the term "Regional
Director" and "higher" are separated by the conjunction "and," which signifies that these two positions are
different, apart and distinct, words but are conjoined together "relating one to the other" to give effect to the
purpose of the law. The fact that the position of Regional Director was specifically mentioned without indication
as to its salary grade signifies the lawmakers’ intention that officials occupying such position, regardless of
salary grade, fall within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. This issue, it is claimed,
was already resolved in Inding. Finally, the OSP contended that the filing of the motion to dismiss is premature
considering that the Sandiganbayan has yet to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the accused.

Still not to be outdone, petitioner invoked the applicability of Cuyco v. Sandiganbayan12 and Organo v.
Sandiganbayan13 in his rejoinder.

On August 18, 2009, the Sandiganbayan Second Division promulgated its Resolution, disposing:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court hereby DENIES the instant Motion to Dismiss for being
devoid of merit. Let a Warrant of Arrest be therefore issued against the accused.

SO ORDERED.14
The respondent court ruled that the position of Regional Director is one of those exceptions where the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction even if such position is not Salary Grade 27. It was opined that Section 4 (A)
(1) of R.A No. 8249 unequivocally provides that respondent court has jurisdiction over officials of the executive
branch of the government occupying the position of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Salary
Grade 27 and higher, of R.A. No. 6758, including those officials who are expressly enumerated in
subparagraphs (a) to (g). In support of the ruling, this Court’s pronouncements in Indingand Binay v.
Sandiganbayan15 were cited.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied;16 Hence, this petition.

Instead of issuing a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction, the Court required respondents
to file a comment on the petition without necessarily giving due course thereto.17 Upon compliance of the OSP,
a Rejoinder (supposedly a Reply) was filed by petitioner.

At the heart of the controversy is the determination of whether, according to P.D. No. 1606, as amended by
Section 4 (A) (1) of R.A No. 8249, only Regional Directors with Salary Grade of 27 and higher, as classified
under R.A. No. 6758, fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Arguing that he is not included
among the public officials specifically enumerated in Section 4 (A) (1) (a) to (g) of the law and heavily relying as
well on Cuyco, petitioner insists that respondent court lacks jurisdiction over him, who is merely a Regional
Director with Salary Grade 26. On the contrary, the OSP maintains that a Regional Director, irrespective of
salary grade, falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. We find merit in the petition.

The creation of the Sandiganbayan was mandated by Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution.18 By virtue
of the powers vested in him by the Constitution and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081, dated September 21,
1972, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued P.D. No. 1486.19 The decree was later amended by P.D.
No. 1606,20Section 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,21 P.D. No. 1860,22 and P.D. No. 1861.23

With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, the special court was retained as provided for in Section 4, Article XI
thereof.24 Aside from Executive Order Nos. 1425 and 14-a,26 and R.A. 7080,27 which expanded the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan, P.D. No. 1606 was further modified by R.A. No. 7975,28 R.A. No. 8249,29 and just this year,
R.A. No. 10660.30

For the purpose of this case, the relevant provision is Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, which states: SEC. 4.
Section 4 of the same decree is hereby further amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 4. Jurisdiction.– The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

"A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one
or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:

"(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act
No. 6758), specifically including:

"(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads;

"(b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors,
engineers, and other city department heads;

"(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;

"(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;

"(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial director and
those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher;

"(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of
the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;

"(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations,

state universities or educational institutions or foundations.

"(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade ‘27’ and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;

"(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
 "(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commission, without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution; and

"(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher under the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989.

"B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials
and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office.

"C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A,
issued in 1986.

x x x"

Based on the afore-quoted, those that fall within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan are: (1) officials
of the executive branch with Salary Grade 27 or higher, and (2) officials specifically enumerated in Section 4
(A) (1) (a) to (g), regardless of their salary grades.31 While the first part of Section 4 (A) covers only officials of
the executive branch with Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part specifically includes other executive
officials whose positions may not be of Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by express provision of law
placed under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.32

That the phrase "otherwise classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher" qualifies "regional director and higher" is
apparent from the Sponsorship Speech of Senator Raul S. Roco on Senate Bill Nos. 1353and 844, which
eventually became R.A. Nos. 7975 and 8249, respectively:

As proposed by the Committee, the Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction over the cases assigned
to it only in instances where one or more of the principal accused are officials occupying the positions of
regional director and higher or are otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher by the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity at the time of the
commission of the offense. The jurisdiction, therefore, refers to a certain grade upwards, which shall remain
with the Sandiganbayan.33 (Emphasis supplied)

To speed up trial in the Sandiganbayan, Republic Act No. 7975 was enacted for that Court to concentrate on
the "larger fish" and leave the "small fry" to the lower courts. This law became effective on May 6, 1995 and it
provided a two-pronged solution to the clogging of the dockets of that court, to wit:

It divested the Sandiganbayan of jurisdiction over public officials whose salary grades were at Grade "26" or
lower, devolving thereby these cases to the lower courts, and retaining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
only over public officials whose salary grades were at Grade "27" or higher and over other specific public
officials holding important positions in government regardless of salary grade; x x x34 (Emphasis supplied)

The legislative intent is to allow the Sandiganbayan to devote its time and expertise to big-time cases involving
the so-called "big fishes" in the government rather than those accused who are of limited means who stand trial
for "petty crimes," the so-called "small fry," which, in turn, helps the court decongest its dockets.35

Yet, those that are classified as Salary Grade 26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, provided that they hold the positions enumerated by the law.36 In this category, it is the position
held, not the salary grade, which determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.37 The specific inclusion
constitutes an exception to the general qualification relating to "officials of the executive branch occupying the
positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher, of the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989."38 As ruled in Inding:

Following this disquisition, the paragraph of Section 4 which provides that if the accused is occupying a
position lower than SG 27, the proper trial court has jurisdiction, can only be properly interpreted as applying to
those cases where the principal accused is occupying a position lower than SG 27 and not among those
specifically included in the enumeration in Section 4 a. (1) (a) to (g). Stated otherwise, except for those officials
specifically included in Section 4 a. (1) (a) to (g), regardless of their salary grades, over whom the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction, all other public officials below SG 27 shall be under the jurisdiction of the
proper trial courts "where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to SG 27 or
higher." By this construction, the entire Section 4 is given effect. The cardinal rule, after all, in statutory
construction is that the particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated
expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its
parts and in order to produce a harmonious whole. And courts should adopt a construction that will give effect
to every part of a statute, if at all possible. Ut magis valeat quam pereat or that construction is to be sought
which gives effect to the whole of the statute – its every word.39

Thus, to cite a few, We have held that a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod,40 a department manager of
the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (Philhealth),41 a student regent of the University of the
Philippines,42 and a Head of the Legal Department and Chief of the Documentation with corresponding ranks of
Vice-Presidents and Assistant Vice-President of the Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and
Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS)43 fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

Petitioner is not an executive official with Salary Grade 27 or higher. Neither does he hold any position
particularly enumerated in Section 4 (A) (1) (a) to (g). As he correctly argues, his case is, in fact, on all fours
with Cuyco. Therein, the accused was the Regional Director of the Land Transportation Office, Region IX,
1avv phi 1

Zamboanga City, but at the time of the commission of the crime in 1992, his position was classified as Director
II with Salary Grade 26.44It was opined: Petitioner contends that at the time of the commission of the offense in
1992, he was occupying the position of Director II, Salary Grade 26, hence, jurisdiction over the cases falls with
the Regional Trial Court.

We sustain petitioner's contention.

The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over violations of Section 3(a) and (e), Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, unless committed by public officials and employees occupying positions of regional director and
higher with Salary Grade "27" or higher, under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989
(Republic Act No. 6758) in relation to their office.

In ruling in favor of its jurisdiction, even though petitioner admittedly occupied the position of Director II with
Salary Grade "26" under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758),
the Sandiganbayan incurred in serious error of jurisdiction, and acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction in suspending petitioner from office, entitling petitioner to the reliefs prayed for.45

In the same way, a certification issued by the OIC – Assistant Chief, Personnel Division of the BIR shows that,
although petitioner is a Regional Director of the BIR, his position is classified as Director II with Salary Grade
26.46

There is no merit in the OSP’s allegation that the petition was prematurely filed on the ground that respondent
court has not yet acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner. Records disclose that when a warrant of
arrest was issued by respondent court, petitioner voluntarily surrendered and posted a cash bond on
September 17, 2009.Also, he was arraigned on April 14, 2010,prior to the filing of the petition on April 30, 2010.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the instant petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The August 18, 2009
Resolution and February 8, 2010 Order of the Sandiganbayan Second Division, which denied petitioner's
Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 169004 September 15, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION) and ROLANDO PLAZA, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

For this Court's resolution is a petition1 dated September 2, 2005 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court that
seeks to reverse and set aside the Resolution2 of the Sandiganbayan (Third Division), dated July 20, 2005,
dismissing Criminal Case No. 27988, entitled People of the Philippines v. Rolando Plaza for lack of jurisdiction.

The facts follow.

Respondent Rolando Plaza, a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, Cebu, at the time
relevant to this case, with salary grade 25, had been charged in the Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 89
of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1445, or The Auditing Code of the Philippines for his failure to liquidate the
cash advances he received on December 19, 1995 in the amount of Thirty-Three Thousand Pesos
(₱33,000.00) . The Information reads:

That on or about December 19, 1995, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto at Toledo City, Province of
Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused ROLANDO
PLAZA, a high-ranking public officer, being a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, and
committing the offense, in relation to office, having obtained cash advances from the City Government of
Toledo in the total amount of THIRTY THREE THOUSAND PESOS (₱33,000.00), Philippine Currency, which
he received by reason of his office, for which he is duty bound to liquidate the same within the period required
by law, with deliberate intent and intent to gain, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally fail to
liquidate said cash advances of ₱33,000.00, Philippine Currency, despite demands to the damage and
prejudice of the government in the aforesaid amount.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Thereafter, respondent Plaza filed a Motion to Dismiss3 dated April 7, 2005 with the Sandiganbayan, to which
the latter issued an Order4 dated April 12, 2005 directing petitioner to submit its comment. Petitioner filed its
Opposition5 to the Motion to Dismiss on April 19, 2005. Eventually, the Sandiganbayan promulgated its
Resolution6on July 20, 2005 dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction, without prejudice to its filing before the
proper court. The dispositive portion of the said Resolution provides:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant case is hereby ordered dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
without prejudice to its filing in the proper court.

SO ORDERED.

Thus, the present petition.

Petitioner contends that the Sandiganbayan has criminal jurisdiction over cases involving public officials and
employees enumerated under Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606, (as amended by Republic Act [R.A.] Nos. 7975
and 8249), whether or not occupying a position classified under salary grade 27 and above, who are charged
not only for violation of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 or any of the felonies included in Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII,
Book II of the Revised Penal Code, but also for crimes committed in relation to office. Furthermore, petitioner
questioned the Sandiganbayan’s appreciation of this Court's decision in Inding v. Sandiganbayan,7 claiming
that the Inding case did not categorically nor implicitly constrict or confine the application of the enumeration
provided for under Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606, as amended, exclusively to cases where the offense charged
is either a violation of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code.
Petitioner adds that the enumeration in Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606, as amended by R.A. 7975 and R.A.
8249, which was made applicable to cases concerning violations of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 and Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, equally applies to offenses committed in relation to public office.

In his Comment8 dated November 30, 2005, respondent Plaza argued that, as phrased in Section 4 of P.D.
1606, as amended, it is apparent that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan was defined first, while the
exceptions to the general rule are provided in the rest of the paragraph and sub-paragraphs of Section 4;
hence, the Sandiganbayan was right in ruling that it has original jurisdiction only over the following cases: (a)
where the accused is a public official with salary grade 27 and higher; (b) in cases where the accused is a
public official below grade 27 but his position is one of those mentioned in the enumeration in Section 4 (a) (1)
(a) to (g) of P. D. 1606, as amended and his offense involves a violation of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 and Chapter
II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code; and (c) if the indictment involves offenses or felonies other
than the three aforementioned statutes, the general rule that a public official must occupy a position with salary
grade 27 and higher in order that the Sandiganbayan could exercise jurisdiction over him must apply.

In a nutshell, the core issue raised in the petition is whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a
member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod whose salary grade is below 27 and charged with violation of The
Auditing Code of the Philippines.

This Court has already resolved the above issue in the affirmative. People v. Sandiganbayan and Amante9 is a
case with uncanny similarities to the present one. In fact, the respondent in the earlier case, Victoria Amante
and herein respondent Plaza were both members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, Cebu at the
time pertinent to this case. The only difference is that, respondent Amante failed to liquidate the amount of
Seventy-One Thousand Ninety-Five Pesos (₱71,095.00) while respondent Plaza failed to liquidate the amount
of Thirty-Three Thousand Pesos (₱33,000.00).

In ruling that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod whose salary
grade is below 27 and charged with violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines, this Court cited the case
of Serana v. Sandiganbayan, et al.10 as a background on the conferment of jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,
thus:

x x x The Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No. 1486, promulgated by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos
on June 11, 1978. It was promulgated to attain the highest norms of official conduct required of public officers
and employees, based on the concept that public officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain at all times accountable to the people.11

P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No. 1606 which was promulgated on December 10, 1978. P.D.
No. 1606 expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.12

P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March 23, 1983, further altering the Sandiganbayan
jurisdiction. R.A. No. 7975 approved on March 30, 1995 made succeeding amendments to P.D. No. 1606,
which was again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 further modified
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. x x x .

Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. 7975 which took effect on May 16, 1995, which was
again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. 8249, is the law that should be applied in the present case, the
offense having been allegedly committed on or about December 19, 1995 and the Information having been
filed on March 25, 2004. As extensively explained in the earlier mentioned case,

The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution of the
action, not at the time of the commission of the offense.13 The exception contained in R. A. 7975, as
well as R. A. 8249, where it expressly provides that to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
in cases involving violations of R. A. No. 3019, as amended, R. A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable in the present case as the offense involved herein
is a violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines. The last clause of the opening sentence of
paragraph (a) of the said two provisions states:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or
more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent,
acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense: x x x.14

Like in the earlier case, the present case definitely falls under Section 4 (b) where other offenses and felonies
committed by public officials or employees in relation to their office are involved where the said provision,
contains no exception. Therefore, what applies in the present case is the general rule that jurisdiction of a court
to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution of the action, not at the time of the
commission of the offense. The present case having been instituted on March 25, 2004, the provisions of R.A.
8249 shall govern. P.D. 1606, as amended by R.A. 8249 states that:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code,
where one or more of the principal accused are officials occupying the following positions in the
government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the
offense:
 (1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:

(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan

and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;

(b) City mayors, vice mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department heads.

(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;

(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;

(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;

(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in
the Office of the Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor;

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled

corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;

(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade "27" and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;

(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions
of the Constitution; and

(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.

B. Other offenses or felonies, whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public
officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office.

C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and
14-A.

Again, the earlier case interpreted the above provisions, thus:

The above law is clear as to the composition of the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Under Section 4
(a), the following offenses are specifically enumerated: violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, R.A. No.
1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. In order for the Sandiganbayan to acquire
jurisdiction over the said offenses, the latter must be committed by, among others, officials of the executive
branch occupying positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. However, the law is not devoid of exceptions. Those
that are classified as Grade 26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
provided that they hold the positions thus enumerated by the same law. Particularly and exclusively
enumerated are provincial governors, vice-govenors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and
provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads; city mayors, vice-mayors,
members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department
heads; officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position as consul and higher; Philippine army and air
force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank; PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of
higher rank; City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of
the Ombudsman and special prosecutor; and presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-
owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations. In connection
therewith, Section 4 (b) of the same law provides that other offenses or felonies committed by public
officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) in relation to their office also fall under the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.15

Clearly, as decided in the earlier case and by simple application of the pertinent provisions of the law,
respondent Plaza, a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod during the alleged commission of an offense in
relation to his office, necessarily falls within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

Finally, as to the inapplicability of the Inding16 case wherein it was ruled that the officials enumerated in (a) to
(g) of Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606, as amended, are included within the original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan regardless of salary grade and which the Sandiganbayan relied upon in its assailed
Resolution, this Court enunciated, still in the earlier case of People v. Sandiganbayan and
Amante,17 that the Inding case did not categorically nor implicitly constrict or confine the application of
the enumeration provided for under Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606, as amended, exclusively to cases
where the offense charged is either a violation of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII
of the Revised Penal Code. As thoroughly discussed:

x x x In the Inding case, the public official involved was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod with Salary
Grade 25 and was charged with violation of R.A. No. 3019. In ruling that the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction
over the said public official, this Court concentrated its disquisition on the provisions contained in Section 4 (a)
(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, where the offenses involved are specifically enumerated and not on Section
4 (b) where offenses or felonies involved are those that are in relation to the public officials' office. Section 4 (b)
of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, provides that:

b. Other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this
section in relation to their office.

A simple analysis after a plain reading of the above provision shows that those public officials enumerated
in Sec. 4 (a) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, may not only be charged in the Sandiganbayan with
violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code,
but also with other offenses or felonies in relation to their office. The said other offenses and felonies are
broad in scope but are limited only to those that are committed in relation to the public official or employee's
office. This Court had ruled that as long as the offense charged in the information is intimately connected
with the office and is alleged to have been perpetrated while the accused was in the performance,
though improper or irregular, of his official functions, there being no personal motive to commit the
crime and had the accused not have committed it had he not held the aforesaid office, the accused is
held to have been indicted for "an offense committed in relation" to his office.18 Thus, in the case
of Lacson v. Executive Secretary, et al..,19 where the crime involved was murder, this Court held that:

The phrase "other offenses or felonies" is too broad as to include the crime of murder, provided it was
committed in relation to the accused’s official functions. Thus, under said paragraph b, what determines the
Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction is the official position or rank of the offender – that is, whether he is one of those
public officers or employees enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4. x x x

Also, in the case Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan,20 where the public official was charged with grave threats, this
Court ruled:

x x x In the case at bar, the amended information contained allegations that the accused, petitioner herein, took
advantage of his official functions as municipal mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan when he committed the crime
of grave threats as defined in Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code against complainant Simeon G. Legaspi, a
municipal councilor. The Office of the Special Prosecutor charged petitioner with aiming a gun at and
threatening to kill Legaspi during a public hearing, after the latter had rendered a privilege speech critical of
petitioner’s administration. Clearly, based on such allegations, the crime charged is intimately connected with
the discharge of petitioner’s official functions. This was elaborated upon by public respondent in its April 25,
1997 resolution wherein it held that the "accused was performing his official duty as municipal mayor when he
attended said public hearing" and that "accused’s violent act was precipitated by complainant’s criticism of his
administration as the mayor or chief executive of the municipality, during the latter’s privilege speech. It was his
response to private complainant’s attack to his office. If he was not the mayor, he would not have been irritated
or angered by whatever private complainant might have said during said privilege speech." Thus, based on the
allegations in the information, the Sandiganbayan correctly assumed jurisdiction over the case. 1avv phi1

Proceeding from the above rulings of this Court, a close reading of the Information filed against respondent
Amante for violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines reveals that the said offense was committed in
relation to her office, making her fall under Section 4 (b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended.

According to the assailed Resolution of the Sandiganbayan, if the intention of the law had been to extend the
application of the exceptions to the other cases over which the Sandiganbayan could assert jurisdiction, then
there would have been no need to distinguish between violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter
II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code on the one hand, and other offenses or felonies committed by
public officials and employees in relation to their office on the other. The said reasoning is misleading because
a distinction apparently exists. In the offenses involved in Section 4 (a), it is not disputed that public
office is essential as an element of the said offenses themselves, while in those offenses and felonies
involved in Section 4 (b), it is enough that the said offenses and felonies were committed in relation to
the public officials or employees' office. In expounding the meaning of offenses deemed to have been
committed in relation to office, this Court held:

In Sanchez v. Demetriou [227 SCRA 627 (1993)], the Court elaborated on the scope and reach of the term
"offense committed in relation to [an accused’s] office" by referring to the principle laid down in Montilla v.
Hilario [90 Phil 49 (1951)], and to an exception to that principle which was recognized in People v.
Montejo [108 Phil 613 (1960)]. The principle set out in Montilla v. Hilario is that an offense may be considered
as committed in relation to the accused’s office if "the offense cannot exist without the office" such that "the
office [is] a constituent element of the crime x x x." In People v. Montejo, the Court, through Chief Justice
Concepcion, said that "although public office is not an element of the crime of murder in [the] abstract," the
facts in a particular case may show that
x x x the offense therein charged is intimately connected with [the accused’s] respective offices and was
perpetrated while they were in the performance, though improper or irregular, of their official functions. Indeed,
[the accused] had no personal motive to commit the crime and they would not have committed it had they not
held their aforesaid offices. x x x"21

Moreover, it is beyond clarity that the same provisions of Section 4 (b) does not mention any qualification as to
the public officials involved. It simply stated, public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of the
same section. Therefore, it refers to those public officials with Salary Grade 27 and above, except those
specifically enumerated. It is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be
interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification,22 unless it is evident that the
legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words.23 The intention of the lawmakers - who
are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers - to use statutory phraseology in such a manner is
always presumed. (Italics supplied.)24

With the resolution of the present case and the earlier case of People v. Sandiganbayan and Amante,25 the
issue as to the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan has now attained clarity.

WHEREFORE, the Petition dated September 2, 2005 is hereby GRANTED and the Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan (Third Division) dated July 20, 2005 is hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Let the case
be REMANDED to the Sandiganbayan for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.