Araneta v Dinglasan

G.R. No. L-2044 August 26, 1949

Tuason, J.:

Facts:
1. The petitions challenged the validity of executive orders issued by virtue of CA No. 671 or the Emergency Powers Act. CA
671 declared a state of emergency as a result of war and authorized the President to promulgate rules and regulations to
meet such emergency. However, the Act did not fix the duration of its effectivity.

2. EO 62 regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings. The petitioner, Araneta, is under prosecution in the
CFI for violation of the provisions of this EO 62 and prays for the issuance of the writ of prohibition.

3. EO 192, aims to control exports from the Philippines. Leon Ma. Guerrero seeks a writ of mandamus to compel the
Administrator of the Sugar Quota Office and the Commissioner of Customs to permit the exportation of shoes. Both officials
refuse to issue the required export license on the ground that the exportation of shoes from the Philippines is forbidden by
this EO.

4. EO 225, which appropriates funds for the operation of the Government during the period from July 1, 1949 to June 30,
1950, and for other purposes was assailed by petitioner Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr., as a tax-payer, elector, and president of
the Nacionalista Party. He applied for a writ of prohibition to restrain the Treasurer of the Philippines from disbursing the
funds by virtue of this EO.

5. Finally, EO 226, which appropriated P6M to defray the expenses in connection with the national elections in 1949. was
questioned by Antonio Barredo, as a citizen, tax-payer and voter. He asked the Court to prevent "the respondents from
disbursing, spending or otherwise disposing of that amount or any part of it."

ISSUE: Whether or not CA 671 ceased to have any force and effect

YES.
1. The Act fixed a definite limited period. The Court held that it became inoperative when Congress met during
the opening of the regular session on May 1946 and that EOs 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without authority
of law . The session of the Congress is the point of expiration of the Act and not the first special session after it.
2. Executive Orders No. 62 (dated June 21, 1947) regulating house and lot rentals, No. 192 (dated December
24, 1948) regulating exports, Nos. 225 and 226 (dated June 15,1949) the first appropriation funds for the operation
of the Government from July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950, and the second appropriating funds for election expenses
in November 1949, were therefore declared null and void for having been issued after Act No. 671 had lapsed
and/or after the Congress had enacted legislation on the same subjects. This is based on the language of Act 671
that the National Assembly restricted the life of the emergency powers of the President to the time the Legislature
was prevented from holding sessions due to enemy action or other causes brought on by the war.

Rodriguez v Gella
G.R. No. L-6266 February 2, 1953
Paras, C.J.:

Facts:
1. Petitioners sought to invalidate Executive Orders (EO) 545 and 546 issued on November 10, 1952. EO 545 appropriated
the sum of P37,850,500 for urgent and essential public works, while EO 546 set aside the sum of P11,367,600 for relief in
the provinces and cities visited by typhoons, floods, droughts, earthquakes, volcanic action and other calamities.

2. Section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution provides that "in times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may
by law authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to promulgate rules
and regulations to carry out a declared national policy." Accordingly the National Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No.
671, declaring (in section 1) the national policy that "the existence of war between the United States and other countries of
Europe and Asia, which involves the Philippines makes it necessary to invest the President with extraordinary powers in
 order to meet the resulting emergency," and (in section 2) authorizing the President, "during the existence of the emergency,
to promulgate such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary to carry out the national policy declared in section 1."

3. House Bill No. 727 sought to repeal all Emergency Powers Acts but was vetoed by the President. HB 727 may at least be
considered as a concurrent resolution of the Congress to formally declare the termination of the emergency powers.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Executive Orders are still operative

NO.

1. EOs 545 and 546 must be declared as having no legal anchorage. The Congress has since liberation repeatedly been
approving acts appropriating funds for the operation of the Government, public works, and many others purposes, with the
result that as to such legislative task the Congress must be deemed to have long decided to assume the corresponding
power itself and to withdraw the same from the President.

2. CA 671 was in pursuance of the constitutional provision, it has to be assumed that the National Assembly intended it to be
only for a limited period. If it be contended that the Act has not yet been duly repealed, and such step is necessary to a
cessation of the emergency powers delegated to the President, the result would be obvious unconstitutionality, since it may
never be repealed by the Congress, or if the latter ever attempts to do so, the President may wield his veto.

3. If the President had ceased to have powers with regards to general appropriations, none can remain in respect of special
appropriations; otherwise he may accomplish indirectly what he cannot do directly. Besides, it is significant that Act No. 671
expressly limited the power of the President to that continuing "in force" appropriations which would lapse or otherwise
become inoperative, so that, even assuming that the Act is still effective, it is doubtful whether the President can by executive
orders make new appropriations.

4. The specific power "to continue in force laws and appropriations which would lapse or otherwise become inoperative" is a
limitation on the general power "to exercise such other powers as he may deem necessary to enable the Government to
fulfil its responsibilities and to maintain and enforce its authority." Indeed, to hold that although the Congress has, for about
seven years since liberation, been normally functioning and legislating on every conceivable field, the President still has
any residuary powers under the Act, would necessarily lead to confusion and overlapping, if not conflict.

5. The framers of the Constitution, however, had the vision of and were careful in allowing delegation of legislative powers to
the President for a limited period "in times of war or other national emergency." They had thus entrusted to the good
judgment of the Congress the duty of coping with any national emergency by a more efficient procedure; but it alone must
decide because emergency in itself cannot and should not create power. In our democracy the hope and survival of the
nation lie in the wisdom and unselfish patriotism of all officials and in their faithful adherence to the Constitution.

CASCO Philippine Chemical v Gimenez G.R. No. L-17931. February 28, 1963.

Facts: The main facts are not disputed. Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 2609, otherwise known as the
Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law, the Central Bank of the Philippines issued on July 1, 1959, its Circular No. 95, fixing a
uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions.

Prior thereto, petitioner had sought the refund of the first sum of P33,765.42, relying upon Resolution No. 1529 of the
Monetary Board of said Bank, dated November 3, 1959, declaring that the separate importation of urea and formaldehyde
is exempt from said fee. Soon after the last importation of these products, petitioner made a similar request for refund of
the sum of P6,345.72 paid as margin fee therefor. Although the Central Bank issued the corresponding margin fee vouchers
for the refund of said amounts, the Auditor of the Bank refused to pass in audit and approve said vouchers, upon the ground
that the exemption granted by the Monetary Board for petitioner's separate importations of urea and formaldehyde is not in
accord with the provisions of Section 2, paragraph XVIII of Republic Act No. 2069.

Issue: Whether or not "urea" and "formaldehyde" are exempt by law from the payment of the aforesaid margin fee.
Held: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.
Ratio: It is well settled that the enrolled bill — which uses the term "urea formaldehyde" instead of "urea and formaldehyde"
— is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President.

If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by
the Executive — on which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and undermining
one of the cornerstones of our democratic system — the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial
decree.

Arroyo v De Venecia G.R. No. 127255. August 14, 1997.

Facts: Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives. They brought this suit against respondents charging
violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are "constitutionally mandated" so that their violation is tantamount
to a violation of the Constitution.

In the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that he was going to raise a question on the quorum, although
until the end of his interpellation he never did.

On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate and
certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress as having been finally passed by the House of
Representatives and by the Senate on November 21, 1996. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Fidel V.
Ramos on November 22, 1996.

Issue: Whether R.A. No. 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House;
Whether the certification of Speaker De Venecia that the law was properly passed is false and spurious;
Whether the Chair, in the process of submitting and certifying the law violated House Rules; and
Whether a certiorari/prohibition will be granted.

Held: After considering the arguments of the parties, the Court finds no ground for holding that Congress committed a grave
abuse of discretion in enacting R.A. No. 8240. This case is therefore dismissed.

Ratio: To disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in such cases would be to disregard the respect due the other two departments
of our government. It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for this Court either to
set aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks the House has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to
allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find their remedy in
that department itself. The Court has not been invested with a roving commission to inquire into complaints, real or imagined,
of legislative skullduggery. It would be acting in excess of its power and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of its discretion
were it to do so. The suggestion made in a case may instead appropriately be made here: petitioners can seek the
enactment of a new law or the repeal or amendment of R.A. No. 8240. In the absence of anything to the contrary, the Court
must assume that Congress or any House thereof acted in the good faith belief that its conduct was permitted by its rules,
and deference rather than disrespect is due the judgment of that body.

In view of what is essential

Merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements for the enactment of a law, i.e., Art.
VI, §§26-27 are VIOLATED.

First, in Osmeña v. Pendatun, it was held: "At any rate, courts have declared that 'the rules adopted by deliberative bodies
are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.' And it has been said that
'Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern. They may be waived
or disregarded by the legislative body.' Consequently, 'mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate
the action (taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure.'"

Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing view is that they are subject to revocation, modification or waiver
at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their
observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them
does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular
measure.

In view of the Courts jurisdiction

This Court's function is merely to check whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the
constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of a showing . . . of grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power. . . . It has
no power to look into what it thinks is apparent error. If, then, the established rule is that courts cannot declare an act of the
legislature void on account merely of noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself, it follows that such a case
does not present a situation in which a branch of the government has "gone beyond the constitutional limits of its
jurisdiction".

In view of House Rules

No rule of the House of Representatives has been cited which specifically requires that in cases such as this involving
approval of a conference committee report, the Chair must restate the motion and conduct a viva voce or nominal voting.

Mr. TOLENTINO. The fact that nobody objects means a unanimous action of the House. Insofar as the matter of procedure
is concerned, this has been a precedent since I came here seven years ago, and it has been the procedure in this House
that if somebody objects, then a debate follows and after the debate, then the voting comes in.

Nor does the Constitution require that the yeas and the nays of the Members be taken every time a House has to vote,
except only in the following instances: upon the last and third readings of a bill, at the request of one-fifth of the
Members present, and in repassing a bill over the veto of the President.

In view of grave abuse

Indeed, the phrase "grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" has a settled meaning in the
jurisprudence of procedure. It means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment by a tribunal exercising judicial
or quasi judicial power as to amount to lack of power.

In view of the enrolled bill doctrine

Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate
and the certification by the secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed on November 21, 1996 are conclusive
of its due enactment.

This Court quoted from Wigmore on Evidence the following excerpt which embodies good, if old-fashioned democratic
theory: “Instead of trusting a faithful Judiciary to check an inefficient Legislature, they should turn to improve the Legislature.
The sensible solution is not to patch and mend casual errors by asking the Judiciary to violate legal principle and to do
impossibilities with the Constitution; but to represent ourselves with competent, careful, and honest legislators, the work of
whose hands on the statute-roll may come to reflect credit upon the name of popular government.”

(In view of justiciability according to PUNO, J.)

With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the petitioner are non-justiciable. Nor do I agree that we will
trivialize the principle of separation of power if we assume jurisdiction over the case at bar. Even in the United States, the
principle of separation of power is no longer an impregnable impediment against the interposition of judicial power on cases
involving breach of rules of procedure by legislators.

The Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional
restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of
proceedings established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained. But within these limitations all matters of
method are open to the determination of the House, and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would
be better, more accurate, or even more just.

Astorga vs. Villegas G.R. No. L-23475, April 30, 1974

Facts: House Bill No. 9266, a bill of local application filed in the House of Representatives, was passed on third reading
withoutamendments. But when the bill was discussed in the Senate, substantialamendments were introduced by Senator
Tolentino. Those amendmentswere approved in toto by the Senate. There was also an amendmentrecommended by
Senator Roxas but this does not appear in the journal of the Senate proceedings as having been acted upon. The House
of Representatives thereafter signified its approval of H.B.9266 containing the amendments recommended by Senator
Roxas and not the Tolentinoamendments which were the ones actually approved by the Senate. The printed copies of the
bill were then certified and attested by the Secretary of the House of Representatives, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Secretary of the Senate and the Senate President. Then the President affixed his signature thereto by
way of approval. The bill became RA 4065.
Senator Tolentino issued a press statement that the enrolled copy of H.B. 9266 signed into law by the Presi dent was a
wrong version of the bill actually passed by the Senate because it did not embody the amendmentsintroduced by him and
approved on the Senate floor. As a consequence, the Senate President invalidated his signature on the bill. Thereafter, the
President withdrew his signature on H.B. 9266.

Issue: Whether or not the enrolled bill doctrine should be adhered to

Held: The enrolled bill theory is based mainly on the respect due to coequal and independent departments, which requires
the judicial department to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticatedin the right manner.

Petitioner’s argument that the attestation of the presiding officers of Congress is conclusive proof of a bill’s due enactment,
required, it is said, by the respect due to a co-equal department of the government, is neutralized by the fact that the Senate
President declared his signature on the bill to be invalid and issued a subsequent clarification that the invalidation of his
signature meant that the bill he had signed had never been approved by the Senate. Absent such attestation as a result of
the disclaimer, and consequently there being no enrolled bill to speak of, the entries in the journal should be consulted.

The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate
but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by him. The Court declares that the bill was
not duly enacted and therefore did not become a law.

Lidasan vs COMELEC GR No L-28089 25 October 1967

Facts: Republic Act 4790, being disputed, reorganized the barrios in different municipalities of Province of Lanao del Sur.
It came to light later that 2 barrios in the statute are within the boundaries of other municipalities and that other 10 barr ios
are parts and parcel of another municipality, all in the Province of Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur. As the statute stood,
12 barrios are transferred to the province of Lanao del Sur. This brought about a change in the boundaries of the two
provinces.
Apprised of this development, the Office of the President, recommended to Comelec that the operation of the statute be
suspended until “clarified by correcting legislation.” Comelec, by resolution of September 20, 1967, stood by its own
interpretation, declared that the statute “should be implemented unless declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.”
This triggered the petition for certiorari and prohibition by Bara Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of the detached portion of
Parang, Cotabato, and a qualified voter for the 1967 elections. Petitioner requested that Republic Act 4790 be declared
unconstitutional; and that Comelec’s resolutions implementing the same for electoral purposes, be nullified.
Petitioner relies upon the constitutional requirement that “[n]o bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than
one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill.”
Issue: Whether or not Republic Act 4790 is null and void.
Decision: Republic Act 4790 is null and void. Constitutional provision contains dual limitations upon legislative power. First.
Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under one statute, of heterogeneous subjects. Second. The title of the bill is to
be couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those concerned of the import of the single
subject thereof.
Of relevance here is the second directive. The subject of the statute must be “expressed in the title” of the bill. Compliance
is imperative, given the fact that the Constitution does not exact of Congress the obligation to read during its deliberations
the entire text of the bill.
Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of such precision as
to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the
purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill, and t he
public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. And this, to lead them to inquire into
the body of the bill, study and discuss the same, take appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon
the legislators.
The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or not it is misleading; and, which technical accuracy is not essential, and the
subject need not be stated in express terms where it is clearly inferable from the details set forth, a title which is so uncertain
that the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents,
or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced in
the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act, is bad.
Since the petitioner is a qualified voter from the affected barrio, he has every right to become a suitor to challenge the
constitutionality of the Act as passed by Congress.

Tobias vs Abalos Gr No. L-114783. December 8, 1994

Facts:
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA 7675, “An Act Converting the municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly
Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong”.
Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the Munnicipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only
one legislative district. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, the incumbent congressional representative of this legislative district,
sponsored the bill which eventually became RA 7675, President Ramis signed it into law.
Pursuant to Local Government Code of 1991, a plebiscite was held. The people of Mandaluyong were asked whether
they approved the conversion. The turnout at the plebiscite was only 14.41% of the voting population. Nevertheless, 18,621
voted “yes” whereas 7, 911 voted “no”. By virtue of these results, RA 7675 was deemed ratified in effect.
Petitioners contention were that RA 7675, specifically Article VIII, Section 46 thereof, is unconstitutional. They
alleged that it contravenes the “one subject – one bill” rule. They also alleged that the subject law embraced two principal
subjects, namely: 1. the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city; and 2. the division of the congressional
district of San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts.
Petitioners argue that the division has resulted in an increase in the composition of the House of Representative
beyond that provided in the Constitution. Furthermore, petitioners contend that said division was not made pursuant to any
census showing that the subject municipalities have attained the minimum population requirements.

Issue:
1. Whether or not RA 7675 is unconstitutional.
2. Whether or not the number of the members of the House of Representative may increase.
3. Whether or not the subject law has resulted in gerrymandering.

Ruling:
1. No.
The conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city with a population of not less than 250, 000 indubitably
ordains compliance with the “one city – one representative” as provided in Article VI, Section 5, par.3 of the Constitution.
The creation of separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the
subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural ang logical consequence of its conversion into a highly
urbanized city. It should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. It should be sufficient compliance with
such requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all provisions are germane to that general subject. It suffices
if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the
subject of the bill and the public, of the nature, scope and consequence of the proposed law and its operation.

2. Yes.
The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250
members, unless otherwise provided by law. The present composition of the Congress may be increased, if Congress itself
so mandates through a legislative enactment.

3. No.
Gerrymandering is the practice of creating legislative districts to favor a particular candidate or party. It should be
noted that Rep. Zamora, the author of the assailed law, is the incumbent representative of the former San
Juan/Mandaluyong district, having consistently won in both localities. By dividing San Juan/Mandaluyong, Rep. Zamora’s
constituency has in fact been diminished, which development could hardly be considered as favorable to him.

Petition dismissed.

RODOLFO FARINAS VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY [G.R. No. 147387. December 10, 2003]

NATURE OF THE CASE:

Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, seeking to declare as unconstitutional Section 14 of Republic
Act No. 9006 (The Fair Election Act), insofar as it expressly repeals Section 67 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (The Omnibus
Election Code) which provides:

SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office. – Any elective official, whether national or local, running for any office other
than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for President and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso
facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

FACTS:
The petitioners now come to the Court alleging in the main that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, insofar as it repeals Section
67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is unconstitutional for being in violation of Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution,
requiring every law to have only one subject which should be expressed in its title.

According to the petitioners, the inclusion of Section 14 repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code in Rep. Act No.
9006 constitutes a proscribed rider.

They point out the dissimilarity in the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006, on the one hand, and Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code, on the other. Rep. Act No. 9006 primarily deals with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election
propaganda and the elimination of unfair election practices, while Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code imposes a
limitation on elective officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding in a permanent capacity by considering
them as ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing of the certificate of candidacy. The repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code is thus not embraced in the title, nor germane to the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006.
The petitioners also assert that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution
because it repeals Section 67 only of the Omnibus Election Code, leaving intact Section 66 thereof which imposes a similar
limitation to appointive officials, thus:

SEC. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position. – Any person holding a public appointive office or position,
including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in government-owned or
controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

They contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 discriminates against appointive officials. By the repeal of Section 67,
an elective official who runs for office other than the one which he is holding is no longer considered ipso facto resigned
therefrom upon filing his certificate of candidacy. Elective officials continue in public office even as they campaign for
reelection or election for another elective position. On the other hand, Section 66 has been retained; thus, the limitation on
appointive officials remains - they are still considered ipso facto resigned from their offices upon the filing of their certificates
of candidacy.

The petitioners assert that Rep. Act No. 9006 is null and void in its entirety as irregularities attended its enactment into law.
The law, not only Section 14 thereof, should be declared null and void. Even Section 16 of the law which provides that “[t]his
Act shall take effect upon its approval” is a violation of the due process clause of the Constitution, as well as jurisprudence,
which require publication of the law before it becomes effective.

Finally, the petitioners maintain that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is a good law; hence, should not have been
repealed. The petitioners cited the ruling of the Court in Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr.,[13] that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election
Code is based on the constitutional mandate on the “Accountability of Public Officers:”

Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve
them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.

Consequently, the respondents Speaker and Secretary General of the House of Representatives acted with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction for not considering those members of the House who ran for a seat
in the Senate during the May 14, 2001 elections as ipso facto resigned therefrom, upon the filing of their respective
certificates of candidacy.

ISSUES:
W/N Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is a Rider.

W/N Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is Violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.

W/N Section 16 of the law which provides that “[t]his Act shall take effect upon its approval” is a violation of the due process
clause of the Constitution, as well as jurisprudence, which require publication of the law before it becomes effective.

HELD:
To determine whether there has been compliance with the constitutional requirement that the subject of an act shall be
expressed in its title, the Court laid down the rule that –
Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple
or impede the power of legislation. The requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should receive
a reasonable and not a technical construction. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the
general object which a statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and every end and means necessary or convenient
for the accomplishing of that object. Mere details need not be set forth. The title need not be an abstract or index of the Act.
The title of Rep. Act No. 9006 reads: “An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible
Elections through Fair Election Practices.”
The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of Rep. Act No. 9006 are comprehensive enough to include the
repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code within its contemplation. To require that the said repeal of Section 67 of
the Code be expressed in the title is to insist that the title be a complete index of its content.

The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, which imposes a limitation on elective officials who
run for an office other than the one they are holding, to the other provisions of Rep. Act No. 9006, which deal with the lifting
of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda, does not violate the “one subject-one title” rule. This Court has held
that an act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how
diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in
furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general subject.

The legislators considered Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as a form of harassment or discrimination that had to
be done away with and repealed. The executive department found cause with Congress when the President of the
Philippines signed the measure into law. For sure, some sectors of society and in government may believe that the repeal
of Section 67 is bad policy as it would encourage political adventurism. But policy matters are not the concern of the Court.
Government policy is within the exclusive dominion of the political branches of the government. It is not for this Court to look
into the wisdom or propriety of legislative determination. Indeed, whether an enactment is wise or unwise, whether it is
based on sound economic theory, whether it is the best means to achieve the desired results, whether, in short, the
legislative discretion within its prescribed limits should be exercised in a particular manner are matters for the judgment of
the legislature, and the serious conflict of opinions does not suffice to bring them within the range of judicial
cognizance. Congress is not precluded from repealing Section 67 by the ruling of the Court in Dimaporo v. Mitra upholding
the validity of the provision and by its pronouncement in the same case that the provision has a laudable purpose. Over
time, Congress may find it imperative to repeal the law on its belief that the election process is thereby enhanced and the
paramount objective of election laws – the fair, honest and orderly election of truly deserving members of Congress – is
achieved.

Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy their office by
virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only
upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an
appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of
tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.

Finally, the “Effectivity” clause (Section 16) of Rep. Act No. 9006 which provides that it “shall take effect immediately upon
its approval,” is defective. However, the same does not render the entire law invalid. In Tañada v. Tuvera, this Court laid
down the rule:

... the clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself,
which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislator may make the law effective immediately
upon approval, or on any other date without its previous publication.

Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-period shall
be shortened or extended….

Following Article 2 of the Civil Code and the doctrine enunciated in Tañada, Rep. Act No. 9006, notwithstanding its express
statement, took effect fifteen days after its publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation.

In conclusion, it bears reiterating that one of the firmly entrenched principles in constitutional law is that the courts do not
involve themselves with nor delve into the policy or wisdom of a statute. That is the exclusive concern of the legislative
branch of the government. When the validity of a statute is challenged on constitutional grounds, the sole function of the
court is to determine whether it transcends constitutional limitations or the limits of legislative power. No such transgression
has been shown in this case.

Lorenzo M. Tañada, et al. vs. Hon. Juan C. Tuvera, et al. (G.R. No. L-63915, April 24, 1985)
FACTS:
Petitioners invoke due process in its petition to the Court for requiring the publication of a number of presidential issuance
(i.e. PD’s, LOI’s, General Orders, Proclamations, EO’s, Letters of Implementation and Administrative Orders) in the Official
Gazette.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the presidential issuance in question need to be published in the Official Gazette for its effectivity

RULINGS:
The presidential issuance in question need to be published in the Official Gazette to complete its effectivity. Article 2 of the
New Civil Code invokes publication as an indispensable requirement for laws to become effective. The clause in such
provision stating that “unless it is otherwise provided” pertains to the effective date but subject to the requirement of a
complete publication.
The Court ordered that unless these presidential issuance were published in the Official Gazette, these shall have no binding
force and effect.

PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK EMPLOYEES UNION VS JUDGE VEGA

Posted by kaye lee on 10:12 AM
G.R. No. 105364, 28 June 2001 [Effectivity and Application of Laws]

FACTS:
On January 2, 1992, the Congress enacted R.A. 7169 providing for the rehabilitation of Philippine Veterans Bank. It was
published in the Official Gazette in February 24, 1992. Thereafter, petitioners filed with the labor tribunals their residual
claims for benefits and for reinstatement upon reopening the bank.

In May 1992, the Central Bank issued a certificate of authority allowing the PVB to reopen despite the late mandate for
rehabilitation and reopening, Judge Vega continued with the liquidation proceedings of the bank alleging further that RA
7169 became effective only on March 10, 1992 or 15 days after its publication in the Official Gazette on February 24, 1992.

ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 7169 became effective on January 2, 1992.

RULING:
Yes. RA 7169 expressly provided that it should take effect upon its approval. Aquino signed it into law on January 2,
1992. Thereafter, said law became effective on said date. Its subsequent publication was not necessary for its effectivity.
RA 7169 is of internal nature and not have general application thus it took effect on the date provided for and hence was
rightfully invoked by the petitioners. The Supreme Court upheld that while as a rule laws take effect after 15 days following
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, the
legislature has the authority to provide for exceptions as indicated in the clause “unless otherwise provided”.

PEOPLE vs. MORILLA

G.R. No. 189883
February 5, 2014

FACTS:
During a checkpoint, Mayor Mitra, Willie Yang and Ruel Dequilla were caught illegally transporting methamphetamine
hydrochloride by means of two (2) motor vehicles, namely a Starex van with commemorative plate to read "Mayor" and a
municipal ambulance.

During the trial, Mayor Mitra argued that he was without any knowledge of the contents of the sacks and explained that he
only accommodated the request of a certain Ben Tan because the latter bought his fishing boat. Likewise, Morilla insisted
that he thought what he was transporting were wooden tiles and electronic spare parts together with Dequilla. The other
passenger of the ambulance, Yang, in his defense, did not bother to inquire about the contents of the vehicle as he was
merely an accommodated passenger of the ambulance.

ISSUES:
1) Whether or not intent or knowledge is material in determining the culpability of an accused in drug cases (NO)
2) Whether or not the finding of conspiracy is correct (YES)

HELD:
1) NO, intent or knowledge is not material in determining the culpability of an accused in drug cases.
The very act of transporting methamphetamine hydrochloride is malum prohibitum since it is punished as an offense under
a special law. Morilla and Mayor Mitra were caught in flagrante delicto in the act of transporting the dangerous drugs on
board their vehicles. "Transport" as used under the Dangerous Drugs Act means "to carry or convey from one place to
another." It was well established during trial that Morilla was driving the ambulance following the lead of Mayor Mitra, who
was driving a Starex van going to Manila. The fact of transportation of the sacks containing dangerous drugs need not be
accompanied by proof of criminal intent, motive or knowledge.

2) YES, the finding of conspiracy is correct.

The finding of conspiracy by both courts is correct. A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. To determine conspiracy, there must be a common design
to commit a felony.

Morilla’s argument that the mere act of driving the ambulance on the date he was apprehended is not sufficient to prove
that he was part of a syndicated group involved in the illegal transportation of dangerous drugs is misplaced.

In conspiracy, it need not be shown that the parties actually came together and agreed in express terms to enter into and
pursue a common design. The assent of the minds may be and, from the secrecy of the crime, usually inferred from proof
of facts and circumstances which, taken together, indicate that they are parts of some complete whole. In this case, the
totality of the factual circumstances leads to a conclusion that Morilla conspired with Mayor Mitra in a common desire to
transport the dangerous drugs. Both vehicles loaded with several sacks of dangerous drugs, were on convoy from Quezon
to Manila. If indeed he was not involved in conspiracy with Mayor Mitra, he would not have told the police officers that he
was with the mayor.

OPHELIA HERNAN v. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN

GR No. 217874 December 5, 2017
TOPIC: Reopening of case, malversation of public funds
PONENTE: Peralta
FACTS:
Petitioner Hernan worked as a Supervising Fiscal Clerk at DOTC-CAR in Baguio City. By virtue of his position, she was
designated as cashier, disbursement and collection officer.
As such, petitioner received cash and other collections from customers and clients for the payment of telegraphic transfers,
toll fees, and special message fees. The collections she received were deposited at the bank account of the DOTC at the
Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), Baguio City Branch.
 On December 17, 1996, a cash examination of accounts handled by Hernan was conducted. It was found out that the
deposit slips dated September 19, 1996 and November 29, 1996 bearing the amounts of P11,300.00 and P81,348.20,
respectively, did not bear a stamp receipt by LBP nor was it machine validated. Petitioner was then informed that the two
aforesaid remittances were not acknowledged by the bank. The auditors then found that petitioner duly accounted for the
P81,348.20 remittance but not for the P11,300.00.
Accused-petitioner was charged with malversation of public funds with the amount of P11,300.00. RTC found the accused
guilty. Petitioner appealed to CA which affirmed her conviction but modified the penalty imposed. Upon motion, however,
the CA set aside its decision on the finding that it has no appellate jurisdiction over the case.
Petitioner appealed the case to Sandiganbayan which affirmed RTC’s decision but modified the penalty imposed. Petitioner
filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied in a Resolution dated August 31, 2010. On June 26, 2013, the
Resolution denying petitioner’s MR became final and executory.
On July 26, 2013, accused filed an Urgent Motion to Reopen the Case with Leave of Court and with Prayer to Stay the
Execution. Sandiganbayan denied the same and directed the execution of the judgment of conviction.
Thereafter, petitioner filed her Petition for Reconsideration with Prayer for Recall of Entry of Judgment in lieu of the Prayer
for the Stay of Execution of Judgement on January 9, 2014 which was likewise denied.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of malversation of public funds.
2. Whether or not the case may be reopened for further reception of evidence.
HELD:
FIRST ISSUE: YES.
The Court affirmed the finding of guilt of accused for the crime of malversation of public funds.
The elements of malversation of public funds under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) are: (1) that the offender
is a public officer; (2) that he had the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office; (3) t hat
those funds or property were public funds or property for which he was accountable; and (4) that he appropriated, took,
misappropriated or consented or, through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take them. This article
establishes a presumption that when a public officer fails to have duly forthcoming any public funds with which he
is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, it shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing
funds to personal uses.
As duly found by the trial court, and affirmed by the Sandiganbayan, petitioner’s defense that she, together with her
supervisor Cecilia Paraiso, went to the LBP and handed the subject P11,300.00 deposit to the teller Ngaosi and, thereafter,
had no idea as to where the money went failed to overcome the presumption of law.
For one, Paraiso was never presented to corroborate her version. For another, when questioned about the subject deposit,
not only did petitioner fail to make the same readily available, she also could not satisfactorily explain its whereabouts.
Indeed, in the crime of malversation, all that is necessary for conviction is sufficient proof that the accountable officer had
received public funds, that she did not have them in her possession when demand therefor was made, and that she could
not satisfactorily explain her failure to do so. Thus, even if it is assumed that it was somebody else who
misappropriated the said amount, petitioner may still be held liable for malversation.
SECOND ISSUE: NO, but the instant case was nevertheless reopened ONLY to modify the penalty imposed in view of the
enactment of an amendatory law favorable to the accused.
The Court upheld Sandiganbayan’s ruling that the absence of the first requisite that the reopening must be before the
finality of a judgment of conviction already cripples the Motion to Reopen the Case. The records of the case clearly reveal
that the August 31, 2010 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration had already
become final and executory and, in fact, was already recorded in the Entry Book of Judgments on June 26, 2013.
Requirements for reopening of the case (Section 24, Rule 119 of Rules of Court)
1. The reopening must be before the finality of a judgment of conviction;
2. The order is issued by the judge on his own initiative or upon motion;
3. The order is issued only after a hearing is conducted;
4. The order intends to prevent a miscarriage of justice; and
5. The presentation of additional and/or further evidence should be terminated within thirty days from the issuance of the order
However, the Court held that it is still necessary to reopen the instant case and recall the Entry of Judgment dated
June 26, 2013 of the Sandiganbayan, not for further reception of evidence, however, as petitioner prays for, but in
order to modify the penalty imposed by said court.
The general rule is that a judgment that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be
modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will
be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land. When, however, circumstances transpire after the
finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable, the Court may sit en banc and give due regard to such
exceptional circumstancewarranting the relaxation of the doctrine of immutability.
To the Court, the recent passage of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10951 which accordingly reduced the penalty applicable to the
crime charged herein is an example of such exceptional circumstance.
Pursuant to the aforequoted provision, therefore, we have here a novel situation wherein the judgment convicting the
accused, petitioner herein, has already become final and executory and yet the penalty imposed thereon has been reduced
by virtue of the passage of said law. Because of this, not only must petitioner’s sentence be modified respecting the settled
rule on the retroactive effectivity of laws, the sentencing being favorable to the accused, she may even apply for probation,
as long as she does not possess any ground for disqualification, in view of recent legislation on probation, or R.A. No.
10707.
Thus, in order to effectively avoid any injustice that petitioner may suffer as well as a possible multiplicity of suits arising
therefrom, the Court deems it proper to reopen the instant case and recall the Entry of Judgment dated June 26, 2013 of
the Sandiganbayan, which imposed the penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to eleven
(11) years, six (6) months, and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor, as maximum. Instead, since the amount involved
herein is P11,300.00, which does not exceed P40,000.00, the new penalty that should be imposed is prision correccional
in its medium and maximum periods, which has a prison term of two (2) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day, to six (6)
years.
The Court also held that when exceptional circumstances exist, such as the passage of the instant amendatory law
imposing penalties more lenient and favorable to the accused, the Court shall not hesitate to direct the reopening
of a final and immutable judgment, the objective of which is to correct not so much the findings of guilt but the
applicable penalties to be imposed.

Resident Marine Mammals v. Reyes

RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF THE PROTECTED SEASCAPE TANON STRAIT v. SEC. ANGELO REYES, (G)
G.R. No. 180771, 21 April 2015

FACTS:
• June 13, 2002, the Government of the Philippines, acting through the DOE, entered into a Geophysical Survey and
Exploration Contract-102 (GSEC-102) with JAPEX. This contract involved geological and geophysical studies of the Tañon
Strait.
• May 9 to 18, 2005, JAPEX conducted seismic surveys in and around the Tañon Strait. A multi-channel sub-bottom
profiling covering approximately 751 kilometers was also done to determine the area's underwater composition.
• January 31, 2007, the Protected Area Management Board of the Tañon Strait (PAMB-Tañon Strait) issued
Resolution No. 2007-001, wherein it adopted the Initial Environmental Examination (IEE) commissioned by JAPEX, and
favorably recommended the approval of JAPEX's application for an ECC.
• March 6, 2007, the EMB of DENR Region VII granted an ECC to the DOE and JAPEX for the offshore oil and gas
exploration project in Tañon Strait. Months later, on November 16, 2007, JAPEX began to drill an exploratory well, with a
depth of 3,150 meters, near Pinamungajan town in the western Cebu Province. This drilling lasted until February 8, 2008.
• Petitioners then applied to this Court for redress, via two separate original petitions both dated December 17, 2007,
wherein they commonly seek that respondents be enjoined from implementing SC-46 for, among others, violation of the
1987 Constitution.

ISSUE:
• Whether or not the service contract is prohibited on the ground that there is no general law prescribing the standard
or uniform terms, conditions, and requirements for service contracts involving oil exploration and extraction.

HELD:
• No, the disposition, exploration, development, exploitation, and utilization of indigenous petroleum in the Philippines
are governed by Presidential Decree No. 87 or the Oil Exploration and Development Act of 1972. This was enacted by then
President Ferdinand Marcos to promote the discovery and production of indigenous petroleum through the utilization of
government and/or local or foreign private resources to yield the maximum benefit to the Filipino people and the revenues
to the Philippine Government.
• Contrary to the petitioners' argument, Presidential Decree No. 87, although enacted in 1972, before the adoption of
the 1987 Constitution, remains to be a valid law unless otherwise repealed.
• Moreover, in cases where the statute seems to be in conflict with the Constitution, but a construction that it is in
harmony with the Constitution is also possible, that construction should be preferred. This Court, in Pangandaman v.
Commission on Elections expounding on this point, pronounced: It is a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute
should be interpreted in harmony with the Constitution and that the spirit, rather than the letter of the law determines its
construction; for that reason, a statute must be read according to its spirit and intent.
• Note that while Presidential Decree No. 87 may serve as the general law upon which a service contract for
petroleum exploration and extraction may be authorized, as will be discussed below, the exploitation and utilization of this
energy resource in the present case may be allowed only through a law passed by Congress, since the Tañon Strait is a
NIPAS area.

People v. Lacson G.R. No. 149453. April 1, 2003 Criminal Procedure, Provisional Dismissal
FEBRUARY 7, 2019
FACTS:
Respondent and his co-accused were charged with multiple murder for the shooting and killing of eleven persons who were
claimed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang.
The said cases docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 were provisionally dismissed with the express
consent of the respondent as he himself moved for said provisional dismissal when he filed his motion for judicial
determination of probable cause and for examination of witnesses.
Respondent asserts that the new rule under Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure may be
applied retroactively since there is no substantive right of the State that may be impaired by its application to the crimina l
cases in question.
According to the respondent, penal laws, either procedural or substantive, may be retroactively applied so long as they favor
the accused. He asserts that the two-year period commenced to run on March 29, 1999 and lapsed two years thereafter
was more than reasonable opportunity for the State to fairly indict him.

ISSUE:
Whether or not procedural laws may be applied retroactively.

RULING:
The Court agrees with the respondent that procedural laws may be applied retroactively. As applied to criminal law,
procedural law provides or regulates the steps by which one who has committed a crime is to be punished.
In Tan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that:
Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the
time of their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The fact that procedural statutes may
somehow affect the litigants rights may not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive
application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. Nor is the
retroactive application of procedural statutes constitutionally objectionable. The reason is that as a general rule no vested
right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws. It has been held that a person has no vested right in any particular
remedy, and a litigant cannot insist on the application to the trial of his case, whether civil or criminal, of any other than the
existing rules of procedure.

*****Sec. 8. Provisional dismissal. A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express consent of the
accused and with notice to the offended party.
The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any amount, or
both, shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order without the case having been revived. With respect
to offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal shall become permanent two
(2) years after issuance of the order without the case having been revived.