Faubion,
James
D.
2011.
An
Anthropology
of
Ethics.
Cambridge:
Cambridge
University
Press.
By:
Anna
Strhan
(University
of
Kent)
How
do
people
engage
with
questions
about
the
good
and
how
we
ought
to
live
in
everyday
social
encounters?
What
role
do
particular
moral
logics
play
in
the
constitution
of
human
subjects,
and
how,
when
and
where
does
the
formation
of
ethical
subjectivities
happen?
Such
questions
might
seem
basic
to
any
study
of
the
nature
of
social
and
cultural
life,
and
Michael
Lambek
notes
in
his
introduction
to
Ordinary
Ethics
that
ethnographers
often
find
that
the
people
they
meet
‘are
trying
to
do
what
they
consider
right
or
good,
are
being
evaluated
according
to
criteria
of
what
is
right
or
good,
or
are
in
some
debate
about
what
constitutes
the
human
good’
(2010:
1).
Yet
specific
attention
to
‘the
ethical’
has
arguably
been
historically
something
of
a
blindspot
within
anthropological
and
other
social
scientific
theorizing.
The
early
canonical
texts
of
both
anthropology
and
sociology
were
preoccupied
with
‘moral
facts’
and
the
nature
of
cultural
values
and
obligations,
thus
this
lacuna
may
seem
surprising.
In
the
past
decade,
however,
there
has
been
a
proliferation
of
anthropological
writings
focusing
on
ethics,
values,
and
morality.1
James
Laidlaw,
an
influential
early
advocate
for
developing
an
anthropology
of
ethics,
argued
that
it
was
in
part
precisely
the
Durkheimian
origins
of
anthropology
and
Durkheim’s
identification
of
the
moral
law
with
the
social
collective
that
inhibited
anthropological
examination
of
the
ethical
dimensions
of
social
life
(Laidlaw
2002:
312).
Jarrett
Zigon
also
argues,
‘in
replacing
Kant’s
moral
law
with
society,
Durkheim
also
negated
morality
as
a
particular
topic
of
study
...
For
when
morality
is
equated
with
society
(or
culture),
it
is
quite
difficult,
if
not
impossible,
to
analytically
separate
a
moral
realm
for
study’
(2007:
132).
Thus
the
idea
of
an
anthropology
of
morality
or
of
ethics
seems
at
first
glance
somehow
odd,
since
most
anthropologists
might
have
felt
that
in
studying
social
and
cultural
practices,
they
were
studying
morality
all
along
(Robbins
2012).2
Why
then
has
there
been
such
rapidly
growing
interest
in
focusing
specifically
on
‘the
moral’
and
‘ethical’
as
modalities
of
social
life?
Robbins
(2012)
suggests
that
it
is
precisely
because
the
ethical
is
a
ubiquitous
element
of
society
and
culture
that
once
questions
about
the
interrelations
of
ethics,
culture
and
social
interaction
are
brought
to
the
fore,
most
anthropologists
are
able
to
relate
this
to
their
own
intellectual
projects.
Interest
in
ethics
might
also
be
seen
as
part
of
a
broader
turn
towards
conceptualizing
social
life
in
terms
of
relationalities,
processes
and
flows,
and
away
from
metaphors
of
structures.3
Michel
Foucault’s
interest
in
ethics
in
his
later
work
can
be
seen
as
a
forerunner
of
this
move.
In
‘Technologies
of
the
Self’,
he
stated,
‘Perhaps
I’ve
insisted
too
much
on
the
technology
of
domination
and
power.
I
am
more
and
more
interested
in
the
interaction
between
oneself
and
others
and
in
the
technologies
of
individual
domination,
the
history
of
how
an
individual
acts
upon
himself,
in
the
technology
of
self’
(1988:
19).
Much
of
the
work
within
the
‘ethical
turn’
in
anthropology
has
been
influenced
by
Foucault’s
later
work
on
ethics,
and,
as
Lambek
suggests,
follows
from
a
sense
that
exploring
the
complex
textures
of
ethical
life
can
‘shift
or
deepen
our
understanding
of
social
life
more
generally’
(Lambek
2010:
7).
This
growing
literature
has
often
been
in
conversation
not
only
with
Foucault’s
later
work
but
also
with
other
philosophical
texts,
most
notably
those
within
the
Aristotelian
tradition
of
virtue
ethics.
This
new
anthropological
interest
in
ethics
is
opening
up
exciting
avenues
for
attending
empirically
to
fundamental
existential
questions
about
what
it
is
to
live
a
good
life,
and
how
this
is
negotiated
within
the
concrete
limits
of
everyday
social
existence.
Several
important
contributions
to
this
field
have
emerged
from
within
the
anthropology
of
Christianity,
for
example,
Webb
Keane’s
analysis
(2007)
of
Protestantism
and
‘the
moral
narrative
of
modernity’,
and
Robbins’
work
on
Pentecostal
conversion
and
moral
fragmentation
(2004).
It
is
perhaps
not
surprising
that
anthropologists
working
not
only
Christianities
but
on
religion
more
broadly
have
helped
stimulate
these
discussions
about
ethics.
As
Lambek
notes,
historically,
questions
concerning
morality
and
ethics
have
been
closely
bound
up
with
religion
and
questions
of
theodicy
and
the
problem
of
suffering,
so
that
‘through
religion,
the
ordinary
is
transcended
and
ethics
intellectualized,
materialized,
or
transcendentalized’
(2010:
3).
Keane
argues
that
in
the
contemporary
world,
religious
institutions
have
become
particularly
identified
with
morality,
as
part
of
the
functional
differentiation
that
Durkheim
and
Weber
saw
as
a
fundamental
process
of
modernization,
so
that
today
‘morality
is
often
treated
as
the
special
concern
of
religion’
(Keane
2010:
79).
Anthropologists
of
religion
have
thus
explored
how
forms
of
religious
life
can
justify,
inculcate
and
resist
particular
moral
norms
(e.g.
Mahmood
2005;
Hirschkind
2006),
whilst
anthropologists
of
Christianity
in
particular
have
demonstrated
how
the
moral
logics
implicated
in
Christian
(and
especially
Protestant)
practices
can
have
agency
in
effecting
the
cultural
changes
such
as
individualization
that
are
characteristic
of
modernity
(e.g.
Robbins
2004;
Keane
2007).
Anthropologists
of
Christianity
working
in
late
modern
Western
contexts
have
also
shown
how
focusing
on
the
ethical
and
moral
opens
up
the
everyday
complexities
of
negotiating
Christian
moral
lives
in
the
moral
landscapes
of
pluralist,
differentiated
modernity
(e.g.
Bialecki
2008;
Elisha
2011;
Bielo
2011).
Drawing
questions
about
‘the
moral’
and
‘the
ethical’
into
more
precise
analytical
focus
is
opening
up
promising
discussions
not
only
within
the
anthropology
of
Christianity
and
the
anthropology
of
religion,
but
also
within
anthropology
and
sociology
more
broadly.
However,
as
Robbins
notes
(2012),
to
become
sustained
conversations,
these
discussions
need
orienting
around
shared
resources
and
texts.
James
Faubion’s
An
Anthropology
of
Ethics
is
thus
highly
timely,
developing
an
ambitious
revision
of
Foucault’s
approach
to
ethics
in
his
later
work
as
a
resource
for
anthropological
investigation
into
ethical
life.
Faubion
argues
that
developing
new
programmatic
approaches
in
anthropology
is
something
of
a
lost
art,
and
suggests
that
recovering
‘the
ethical’
holds
promise
for
‘the
reconstitution
of
the
anthropological’
(p.
269).
Thus
the
aim
of
his
book
is
to
do
precisely
to
develop
such
a
programme,
with
the
first
part
of
the
book
assembling
a
conceptual
apparatus
for
the
anthropological
study
of
ethics,
or
more
precisely,
‘modes
of
subjectivation’,
and
the
second
part
utilizing
this
framework
to
analyse
three
particular
individual
life
histories:
(1)
Fernando
Mascarenhas,
a
contemporary
Portuguese
aristocrat,
(2)
Amo
Paul
Bishop
Roden,
a
leader
in
the
Branch
Davidian
Group
in
Waco,
Texas,
and
(3)
Constantine
Cavafy,
a
Greek
poet
living
in
the
late
19th
and
early
20th
century.
The
conceptual
framework
Faubion
develops
draws
primarily
on
Foucault’s
investigation
of
ethics
in
his
later
work,
drawing
this
together
with
Niklas
Luhmann’s
systems
theory
and
Max
Weber’s
work
on
charisma.
Following
Foucault,
Faubion
is
centrally
concerned
with
ethics
in
terms
of
processes
of
subjectivation
–
how
actors
strive
towards
and
come
to
occupy
particular
subject
positions,
and
the
‘autopoietic’
nature
of
this,
i.e.
seeking
to
examine
not
only
the
pedagogic
relationships
that
enable
the
fashioning
of
ethical
subjects,
but
also
how
subjects
learn
to
work
on
themselves.
I
will
not
here
summarize
Faubion’s
account
of
Foucault’s
work
on
ethics
and
technologies
of
the
self,
since
this
will
be
familiar
already
to
many,
but
his
discussion
of
Foucault’s
later
work
presents
a
clear
and
engaging
account,
that
will
be
especially
useful
for
students
encountering
his
ideas
for
the
first
time.
Faubion’s
account
also
goes
beyond
Foucault
in
several
respects,
for
example,
his
placing
Foucault
fruitfully
in
discussion
with
the
work
of
Weber
and
Luhmann.
Through
this,
he
develops
an
argument
for
deeper
engagement
with
questions
about
the
nature
of
‘acknowledgement’
and
interactions
with
‘ethical
others’,
which
has
the
potential
to
enrich
understanding
of
ethical
intersubjectivity
and
the
complex
textures
of
experiencing
the
claims
others
make
on
us.
As
Faubion
puts
it,
‘the
ethical
subject,
even
when
only
an
individual
human
being,
is
thus
already
always
of
intersubjective,
social
and
cultural
tissue.
Its
parts
are
never
entirely
its
own.
Its
self-‐referential
“I”
is
Rimbaudean.
Its
I
is
always
also
other’
(p.
120).
Faubion’s
use
of
Weber’s
concept
of
charismatic
authority
provides
an
original
way
of
thinking
through
questions
about
ethical
innovations
and
creativity
in
the
moral
life.
Faubion
develops
a
distinction
between
what
he
calls
‘the
themitical’
normativity
of
everyday
routines
–
the
‘order
of
the
reproduction
of
what
at
any
particular
place
and
point
in
time
constituted
the
regnant
moral
order’
(p.
24),
which,
following
Aristotle,
he
renders
as
something
like
a
normative
‘architectonic’
–
and
‘the
ethical
domain’
as
a
totality.
He
describes
the
themitical
as
internal
to
this
broader
ethical
field,
which
also
includes
dynamics
of
becoming
and
self-‐becoming
(ibid.).
Following
Weber,
Faubion
describes
how
charismatic
authority
functions
outside
the
routines
of
the
themitical
order,
and
suspends
its
moral
normativity.
In
this
Weberian
primal
charismatic
scene,
there
is
no
place
for
ethics
(p.
84).
The
ethical
enters,
Faubion
argues,
when
the
charismatic
leader
recognizes
their
charisma
as
shared
with
others,
so
that
it
becomes
‘no
longer
a
purely
personal
but
instead
a
collective
affair,
an
affair
of
the
jointly
“elect”’
(p.
87).
Although
this
aspect
of
Faubion’s
analysis
may
be
of
limited
application
to
most
fieldwork
encounters,
it
nevertheless
raises
questions
about
how
we
might
find
new
ways
of
thinking
about
the
nature
of
ethical
creativity
and
change
over
time,
and
the
interrelational
dynamics
of
this,
an
area
that
theorists
across
different
social
scientific
disciplines
have
not
always
been
attuned
to.
These
issues
of
the
reproduction
of
the
moral
order
and
its
interruption
are
intimately
bound
up
with
questions
about
the
nature
of
freedom,
and
in
Faubion’s
account,
all
modalities
of
ethical
practice
require
freedom
(cf.
Laidlaw
2002;
Lambek
2010:
25-‐29;
Robbins
2012).
This
focus
on
the
nature
of
freedom
in
the
moral
life
makes
an
important
contribution
to
debates
about
the
meaning
of
and
limits
of
freedom
within
ethical
praxis
and
autopoiesis.
At
the
end
of
Part
1,
Faubion
presents
a
useful
‘narrative-‐friendly’
version
of
the
schematic
of
the
ethical
domain
he
has
developed,
which
in
Part
2
of
the
book,
he
utilizes
to
analyze
three
ethical
subjects.
Within
this,
the
attention
he
pays
to
‘voice’
and
the
‘ethics
of
parrhesia’
in
particular
has
potential
for
enriching
analysis
of
the
interrelations
of
self,
other,
language,
freedom
and
society
implied
in
the
formation
of
ethical
subjectivity,
resonating
with
Stanley
Cavell’s
conceptualization
of
the
self
and
‘society
being
in
conversation,
demanding
a
voice
in
each
other’
(Cavell
2004:
68).
Whilst
each
of
the
individual
accounts
Faubion
presents
is
engaging
and
demonstrates
how
his
programme
for
an
anthropology
of
ethics
can
be
practically
applied,
this
approach
of
applying
a
schematic
to
particular
life
histories
seems
to
limit
its
utility
for
ethnographers,
most
of
whom
will
are
likely
to
begin
ethnographic
analysis
through
attention
to
the
specificities
of
their
fields.
The
particular
structuring
of
this
part
of
his
book
also
raises
questions
about
the
meaning
of
‘the
ethical’
in
the
practice
of
anthropological
writing.
This
can
be
opened
up
further
through
comparing
this
schematic
approach
with
that
of
another
key
anthropological
text
focused
on
the
textures
of
ethical
life:
Veena
Das’s
Life
and
Words
(2007).
Das’s
attention
to
the
ethical
lives
she
is
studying
opens
out
–
as
is
more
usual
within
ethnographic
writing
–
from
her
informants’
experiences,
and
she
vividly
gestures
towards
the
limits
of
language
to
express
the
alterity
of
the
ethical
others
and
their
experiences
she
has
engaged
with,
the
resistances
of
the
other,
and
the
ways
in
which
the
knowledge
of
the
other
have
marked
her
(2007:
17).
Whilst
her
approach
is
influenced
by
and
centrally
engaged
with
the
philosophical
writings
of
Stanley
Cavell,
her
approach
to
ethics
is
not
articulated
through
a
rigid
schematic
analysis
of
modes
of
subjectivation
such
as
that
structuring
the
second
part
of
Faubion’s
book,
but
rather
through
close
attention
to
how
the
ethical
is
woven
within
the
dense
fabric
of
everyday
interactions.
Faubion’s
analysis
clearly
shows
how
the
programmatic
approach
he
develops
can
be
applied
to
analyse
individuals’
life
histories,
opening
up
the
complexities
of
their
broader
social
and
cultural
locations.
However
Das’s
close
attention
to
the
practice
of
‘ordinary
ethics’
and
the
everyday
as
an
achievement
rather
than
something
we
take
for
granted
(2010:
176)
invites
us
to
consider
drawing
on
the
work
of
other
philosophers
who
might
stimulate
further
reflection
on
how
anthropological
writing
might
‘acknowledge’
the
ethical
others
who
are
the
subjects
of
our
writing
and
the
ultimate
irreducibility
to
language
of
some
forms
of
ethical
experience.
Faubion’s
attention
to
the
question
of
‘ethical
others’
is
certainly
engaged
with
this
conversation,
but
drawing
in
other
philosophical
voices
who
are
more
attentive
than
Foucault
was
to
the
nature
of
responsibility
and
the
claims
that
others
make
on
us
–
for
example,
Stanley
Cavell
and
Emmanuel
Levinas
–
would
be
useful
interlocutors
here
to
open
up
avenues
for
further
thinking
about
acts
of
anthropological
writing
as
themselves
forms
of
ethical
practice.
Overall,
I
recommend
Faubion’s
text
to
all
anthropologists
who
are
interested
in
the
nature
of
ethical
and
moral
life,
which
should
surely
be
all
anthropologists
(and
sociologists):
I
share
Lambek’s
hesitations
(2010:
10)
about
the
attempt
establish
the
anthropology
of
ethics
as
another
subfield:
the
ethical
is
inseparable
from
what
it
is
to
be
human.
However
attending
more
closely
to
what
it
is
to
become
an
ethical
subject
and
the
ambiguities
and
uncertainties
this
entails
undoubtedly
deepens
our
understanding
of
the
complex
textures
of
social
life.
This
increasing
interest
in
the
nature
of
the
ethical,
morality
and
questions
of
value
is
also
an
area
where
anthropology
can
make
significant
contributions
to
wider
public
debates
about
the
cultural
formation
of
understandings
of
‘value’
and
relations
of
obligation.4
Within
the
study
of
Christianities,
Faubion’s
programme
could
easily
be
used
to
develop
comparative
studies
of
modes
of
subjectivation.
His
focus
on
relations
with
‘ethical
others’
invites
further
attention
to
what
it
would
mean
to
develop
more
focused
attention
to
the
dynamics
of
intersubjectivity
and
the
lived
experience
of
the
claims
others
make
on
us
in
the
formation
of
ethical
subjectivities,
in
conversation
with
the
work
of
philosophers
more
attentive
to
these
themes.
This
could
include
exploring
modes
of
relationality
with
and
senses
of
responsibility
towards
non-‐human
others,
including
sacred
others
(cf.
Orsi
2005,
2012;
Strhan
2012;
Bialecki
forthcoming).
The
book
also
raises
questions
about
how
we
might
approach
the
nature
of
motivation
and
desire
in
the
ethical
life,
and
how
the
formation
of
ethical
subjectivity
entails,
as
Cavell
and
others
(including
Foucault)
have
argued,
a
division
of
the
subject,
as
he
or
she
imagines
the
way
a
world
could
be,
memorably
expressed
by
Emerson:
‘I
know
that
the
world
I
converse
with
in
the
cities
and
in
the
farms,
is
not
the
world
I
think’
(cited
in
Cavell
2004:
1).
Cited
Bialecki,
Jon.
(2008)
‘Between
Stewardship
and
Sacrifice:
agency
and
economy
in
a
Southern
California
Charismatic
Church’,
Journal
of
the
Royal
Anthropological
Institute
14:
372-‐90.
-‐-‐
‘Does
God
Exist
in
Methodological
Atheism?
On
Tanya
Luhrmann’s
When
God
Talks
Back
and
Bruno
Latour’,
forthcoming
in
Anthropology
of
Consciousness.
Bielo,
James
(2011)
Emerging
Evangelicals:
Faith,
Modernity
and
the
Desire
for
Authenticity
(New
York,
New
York
University
Press).
Cavell,
Stanley
(2004)
Cities
of
Words:
Pedagogical
Letters
on
a
Register
of
the
Moral
Life
(Cambridge,
MA,
Harvard
University
Press).
Das,
Veena
(2005)
Life
and
Words:
Violence
and
the
Descent
into
the
Ordinary
(Berkeley,
University
of
California
Press).
Elisha,
Omri
(2011)
Moral
Ambition:
Mobilization
and
Social
Outreach
in
Evangelical
Megachurches
(Berkeley,
University
of
California
Press).
Fassin,
Didier
(ed.)
(2012)
A
Companion
to
Moral
Anthropology
(Chichester,
Wiley-‐Blackwell).
Faubion,
James
D.
(2001)
‘Toward
an
Anthropology
of
Ethics:
Foucault
and
the
Pedagogies
of
Autopoiesis’,
Representations
74:83-‐104.
Foucault,
Michel
(1988)
‘Technologies
of
the
Self’,
in
Luther
H.
Martin,
Huck
Gutman
and
Patrick
H.
Hutton
(eds)
Technologies
of
the
Self:
A
Seminar
with
Michel
Foucault
(Amherst,
University
of
Massachusetts
Press),
pp.
16-‐49.
Graeber,
David
(2011)
Debt:
The
First
Thousand
Years
(London,
Melville
House).
Hirschkind,
Charles
(2006)
The
Ethical
Soundscape:
Cassette
Sermons
and
Islamic
Counterpublics
(New
York,
Columbia
University
Press).
Keane,
Webb
(2007)
Christian
Moderns:
Freedom
and
Fetish
in
the
Mission
Encounter
(Berkeley,
University
of
California
Press)
-‐-‐
(2010)
‘Minds,
Surfaces,
and
Reasons
in
the
Anthropology
of
Ethics’,
in
Michael
Lambek
(ed.)
Ordinary
Ethics:
Anthropology,
Language,
and
Action
(New
York,
Fordham
University
Press),
pp.
64-‐83.
Laidlaw,
James
(2002)
‘For
an
Anthropology
of
Ethics
and
Freedom’,
Journal
of
the
Royal
Anthropological
Institute
8(2):
311-‐32.
Lambek,
Michael
(2010)
‘Introduction’,
in
Michael
Lambek
(ed.)
Ordinary
Ethics:
Anthropology,
Language,
and
Action
(New
York,
Fordham
University
Press),
pp.
1-‐36.
Lynch,
Gordon
(2012)
The
Sacred
in
the
Modern
World:
A
Cultural
Sociological
Approach
(Oxford,
Oxford
University
Press).
Mahmood,
Saba
(2005)
Politics
of
Piety:
The
Islamic
Revival
and
the
Feminist
Subject
(Princeton,
Princeton
University
Press).
Pyyhtinen,
Olli
(2010)
Simmel
and
‘The
Social’
(Basingstoke,
Palgrave
Macmillan).
Robbins,
Joel
(2004)
Becoming
Sinners:
Christianity
and
Moral
Torment
in
a
Papua
New
Guinea
Society
(Berkeley,
University
of
California
Press).
-‐-‐
(2012)
‘On
becoming
ethical
subjects:
freedom,
constraint,
and
the
anthropology
of
morality’,
Anthropology
of
This
Century.
Online.
Available
http:
http://aotcpress.com/articles/ethical-‐subjects-‐freedom-‐constraint-‐ anthropology-‐morality/#sthash.KE1yZOsu.dpuf
(accessed
16
July
2013).
Strhan,
Anna
(2012)
Discipleship
and
Desire:
Conservative
Evangelicals,
Coherence
and
the
Moral
Lives
of
the
Metropolis.
PhD
thesis
(Canterbury,
University
of
Kent).
-‐-‐
‘Christianity
and
the
City:
Simmel,
Space
and
Urban
Subjectivities’,
forthcoming
in
Religion
and
Society:
Advances
in
Research
4.
Zigon,
Jarrett
(2007)
‘Moral
Breakdown
and
the
Ethical
Demand:
A
Theoretical
Framework
for
an
Anthropology
of
Moralities’,
Anthropological
Theory
7(2):131-‐ 150.
1 See,
for
example,
recent
volumes
edited
by
Lambek
(2010),
Fassin
(2012).
Earlier
contributions
opening
up
avenues
for
these
conversations
include
those
by
Faubion
2001;
Laidlaw
2002;
Robbins
2004;
Zigon
2007.
2 This
is
not
to
suggest
that
Durkheimian
approaches
necessarily
dissolve
the
ethical
into
the
social.
For
a
non-‐reductive
approach
to
the
sociology
of
moral
life,
that
(critically)
engages
with
the
Durkheimian
tradition,
see
Lynch
2012.
3 See
Pyythinen
2010:
3;
Strhan
forthcoming.
4 As
for
example
evidenced
through
the
recent
popularity
of
David
Graeber’s
study
of
debt
(2011).