METAPHYSICS

Introduction.

The difficulty of the problem put before us is that every answer, no matter how general and
abstract it tries to be, is the expression of a special metaphysical understanding of metaphysics and
of a special theological understanding of theology. There is no court above them to decide about
them. This refers immediately to the definition of the two concepts, the relation of which is under
discussion, metaphysics and theology. In the context of this paper, only the result of much
philosophical and theological arguing can go into the definition, not the arguments themselves.

I. Definitions.

There are two problematic factors which must be considered in every definition of
metaphysics, the first of which was effective for a long time, the other only recently. Metaphysics
has suffered under the unjustified connotation that the "meta" in metaphysics points to a realm
above the physical realm. This connotation was strongly supported by the Latin word
"supranatural" which designated the realm of the divine above nature. Finally the term
"experience" in its empiricistic application pushed metaphysics into the role of a "speculation"
without an experiential basis. Against these distortions metaphysics should be defined. as the
analysis of those elements in the encountered reality which belong to its general structure and make
experience universally possible. Metaphysics then is the rational inquiry into the structure of
being, its polarities and categories as they appear in man's encounter with reality.
If this is accepted one may ask why one should not use the term "ontology" for this
enterprise. It is the structure of being which is under inquiry, and this is what ontology is
supposed to do. But the difficulty is that there are structures of lees universality like nature,
man, history, which also precede in logical dignity anything concrete in their respective
spheres but which are not structures of being as such. and which, consequently, are not
objects of ontology in the strict sense of the wont. Therefore, if the word "metaphysics" can
be saved from its supranaturalietic connotations, it should be used. If. however, this is
impossible, the term ontology must be enlarged so that it embraces all structures which
constitute reality. Both ways are open.
The term "theology" needs equally careful consideration. It is burdened not only with
semantic difficulties. Its literal meaning: logos of Moor, the rational wont about God,
immediately leads to the question of where and when God has leonine manifest and in which
situation his manifestation can be received. And here theology leaves the philosophical
road. It asks the question of situation in which the manifestation of the divine has appeared.
Theology deals with the concrete revelatory experience in which human beings have been
grasped by an ultimate concern. Theology is existentially related to the concrete place at
which the divine self-manifestation has been received. As theology it is bound to this
place in time and space even if it claims universal validity. And that theology does. As the
logos of them it tries to show the universal validity of the concrete manifestation of the
ultimate on which it is based. This is the reason why the early Christian theologians called
Jesus as the Christ the Logos. Logos is the principle of the divine self. manifestation in
nature and history. There is no thee-logy where there is no concrete, revelatory experience.
And there is no Theo. logy where there is not the universal claim for truth. This unity of the
concrete-existential and the universal-essential gives theology its special position, its
greatness and its dangers.

Theology is not religion, but it presupposes religion. Every religion expresses itself in
symbol; of its ultimate concern. These "symbols of faith" are the subject.matter of theology.
Theology, in spite of its name, is not "science of God," but it is the logos-determined
interpretation of the symbols of God's self-manifestation in a concrete situation. These
symbols are not arbitrary interpretations of the concrete revelatory experiences. But they
appear within this experience itself. They are not created inten• tionally, but tlie. are loco in
the same dimension in which the revelatory experience takes place. In and through its
symbols the religious encuouter with reality opens up the dimension of reality in whi ch
ultimo. appears. These is no other way Of expressing our encounter with the holy than in
symbols. There-fore, the logos of theice." theology, is the logo. of the symbols in which Ills
manifestation expresses itself.

II. The Kristenliol Ground of Metaphysics. The definitive. OT more esacUy.

cimunwriptive task per-formed so far emphasizes the divergent traits of metaphysics and
theology. They are counterbalanced by convergent trends in both of them. Metaphysics (or
ontology in the broader sense) is direet. cd towards the observation and analysis of the
categorical struc-tura of being and its general spheres. It does not ask the ques-tion of its
own existential roots. It does not kook at itself and the ultimate concern underlying it. But
the fact that metaphysics is directed towards being and its universal characteristic. does not
imply that it has no existential roots. It certainly has them, for the philosopher is a human
bang, and in every philosophical school human interests and passions are a driving for ce.
No philosophy is without an ultimate concern in its background, whether this is
acknowledged or denied. This makes the philos-opher a theologian, always implicitly and
sometimes explicitly. It is possible and even not diffloill to trace the implicit th eological
elements in every philosophy, even that which restricts itself to logical analysis. The reasons
given for this restriction betray an ultimate concern about man's relation to reality. The
nature of this concern is sometimes openly expressed in the philosophy of religion of such a
system. But it is manifest also in its logic and epistemology, in its philosophy of nature end
its doctrine of man. The effect of this existential element on metaphysics has not the
character of interference. The experiential basis and the logical structure of • metaphysics
are not affected. But the direc-tion in which the question is asked and the dimension of
reality which is opened up for experience are partly determined by the