1
ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY – COLLEGE OF LAW
Public Officers and Corporations | Deputy Omb. Rodolfo Elman
CIVIL SERVICE
ERLINDA MERAM vs. FILIPINA EDRALIN, the MNR and the
PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS
G.R. No. L-71228 | September 24, 1987
Facts: Herein private respondent Filipina V. Edralin, who was a
training officer of the Bureau of Forest Development (BFD) was
proposed for appointment to the position of Administrative Officer V,
R-73, Administrative Division of the BFD. Petitioner herein and Mr.
Hermecio M. Agravio who hold the positions of Administrative Officer
III, R-70 and Supply Officer V, R-70 respectively, filed their protests
against the proposal.
The Director of the BFD sent a memorandum to the
respondent Minister of Natural Resources stating that in the course
of the deliberation of the BFD Promotion Board, the latter found out
that there are four BFD Personnel in the Central Office who are
considered "next-in-rank" to the position of Administrative Officer V,
namely:
 Erlinda P. Meram, Administrative Officer III, Range 70, assigned as
Chief of the Internal Control Staff.
 Hermecio M. Agravio, Supply Officer V, Range 70, Chief of the
Property Section, designated Asst. Chief of the Administrative
Division from October 8, 1981 to July 20, 1982.
 Atty. Dominador Malong, Legal Officer, Range 69, assigned in the
Legal Division.
 Atty. Salome T. Cansino, Trial Attorney Range 69, assigned in the
Legal Division.
In his memorandum, the Director also pointed out that the
Board found that Mrs. Filipina V. Edralin, Training Officer, Range 60,
assigned in the Training Center was not next-in-rank. The Civil Service
Commission also forwarded to the respondent Minister the protests
of the petitioner and Agravio for appropriate action.
The respondent Minister forwarded the permanent
appointment of respondent Edralin to take effect on August 17,
1982, as Administrative Officer V to the Commission for appropriate
action. In due course, the appointment was approved by the
Commission "subject to the final outcome of the protests against the
appointment by Erlinda Meram and H. Agravio."
The respondent Minister rendered a decision, embodied
in two separate letters, dismissing the protests. Petitioner and
Agravio appealed to the Merit Systems Board (MSB) pursuant to
paragraph 2, Section 5 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1409.
The Merit Systems Board promulgated a decision in favor
of Hermecio M. Agravio, revoking the previous approval of the
appointment of respondent Edralin and directing the Minister to
appoint, in her stead, Agravio to the contested position.
 In terms of education, Mrs. Meram is a holder of bachelor's degree
with 12 units in Master in Business Administration and has 9 years
and 6 months relevant experience with 12 relevant trainings
completed. Mr. Agravio, who is a third year Commerce student,
however, has 13 years of relevant experience to his credit and 23
relevant training completed. Moreover, for a period of 9 months,
Mr. Agravio was designated Officer-in-Charge, Administrative
Division, pursuant to MNR Special Order No. 359, series of 1981,
and there is no showing that he failed to discharge efficiently the
duties and responsibilities of the position. Thus, Mr. Agravio is
considered more competent and qualified than Meram.
Both the petitioner and respondent Edralin filed motions
for reconsideration. The MSB promulgated another decision
modifying the earlier one and appointed the petitioner, after finding
that Agravio's designation as Assistant Officer-in-Charge was revoked
because he had been ineffective in said position.
Respondent Edralin appealed to the Civil Service
Commission. The Commission dismissed the appeal and it also denied
the respondent's motion for reconsideration.
Respondent Edralin filed a letter-petition with the Office
of the President invoking Section 19(6) of P.D. No. 807. In her petition,
Edralin alleged that jurisdiction in promotional contests is lodged with
the Ministry head and appeal by the aggrieved party from decisions
of said Ministry head should be taken to the Office of the President.
Therefore, the Merit System Board and the Civil Service Commission
had no jurisdiction to act on petitioner's appeal.
Presidential Assistant for Legal Affairs Lazaro rendered the
questioned decision, affirming the decision of the MNR embodied in
two separate letters, dismissing the protests of Hermecio M. Agravio
and Erlinda P. Meram, and enjoining the MNR and the Director of the
BFD rom carrying out, complying with and/or enforcing in any manner
whatsoever the decisions of the MSB and the CSC, respectively.
Issue: W/N the Office of the President acted correctly in taking
cognizance of respondent's letter-petition, and passing
upon the same, and thereafter, setting aside the decisions
of the Merit Systems Board and the Civil Service
Commission.
Held: No. The civil service system rests on the principle of
application of the merit system instead of the spoils system in the
matter of appointment and tenure of office. The very purpose of the
civil service law dictates that persons who are qualified and next-in-
rank should be given preferential consideration when filling up a
vacated position through promotion.
In the case at bar, the BFD personnel who are considered
next-in-rank to the vacated position were identified. Respondent
Edralin was not one of them. In fact, she was nine or ten salary ranges
below the next-in-rank personnel. Subsequently, the MSB made the
same finding in its decision. Evidently, therefore, the foremost
consideration why respondent's appointment was ordered by the
Office of the President notwithstanding the fact that petitioner was
more qualified and that she was next-in-rank was because of her
petition to the President in the form of a letter rather than an appeal
and which started by introducing herself as "Filipina Villeses-Edralin,
wife of Efren E. Edralin of Sarrat, Ilocos Norte." The clear intent of her
letter-petition was not to appeal in accordance with P.D. No. 807 but
to elicit some kind of favorable response from the President based on
ALAG, M. | 2-MANRESA

ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY – COLLEGE OF LAW
Public Officers and Corporations | Deputy Omb. Rodolfo Elman
considerations of blood ties, influence, or ethnic and regional
affiliations. To a certain extent she succeeded but this Court must
strike down the practice of political, ethnic, religious, or blood ties
being used to get choice appointments for it goes against the very
purpose behind the establishment of the civil service in our country.
Appointments under the civil service law should be based
on merit and fitness and should never depend on blood ties or how
intimate a friend or how closely an appointee is related to the
powers that be. And granting that the respondent possesses the
qualifications required for the contested position, it cannot be denied
that the petitioner equally possesses the same qualifications, if not in
greater degree, and more important, she is next-in-rank to the
vacated position. Therefore, she deserves to be appointed to the
disputed position.
EDUARDO CORSIGA vs. HON. DEFENSOR and ROMEO ORTIZO
G.R. No. 139302 | October 28, 2002
Facts: Private respondent Romeo P. Ortizo was the Senior
Engineer B in the National Irrigation Administration (NIA), Jalaur-
Suague River Irrigation System, Region VI, tasked with the duty of
assisting the Irrigation Superintendent in the said station.
Sometime in June, 1995, petitioner Eduardo P. Corsiga,
then Regional Irrigation Manager of the NIA, Region VI, issued
Regional Office Memorandum (ROM) No. 52, reassigning private
respondent to Aganan-Sta. Barbara River Irrigation System, likewise
to assist the Irrigation Superintendent thereat.
Aggrieved, private respondent wrote petitioner Corsiga
requesting exemption and citing Memorandum Circular No. 47, Series
of 1987 issued by the NIA Administrator, which states that the policy
of rotation applies only to Department Managers, Irrigation
Superintendents, Provincial Engineers and Division Manager of Field
Offices. Petitioner denied the request.
Private respondent filed with the RTC of Iloilo City a
complaint for prohibition and injunction, with prayer for issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the petition for lack of
jurisdiction and non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, but the
motion was denied. The RTC likewise denied the motion for
reconsideration. Alleging that these two orders were issued without
jurisdiction, petitioner elevated the controversy to the Court of
Appeals via a petition for certiorari.
On June 30, 1999, the appellate court rendered a decision,
affirming the trial court's jurisdiction over the case, saying that the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply
where the controverted act is patently illegal, arbitrary, and
oppressive. Regional Office Memorandum No. 52, according to the
court, was illegal since it violated private respondent's constitutional
right to security of tenure. Hence, this petition.
Issue: W/N the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case.
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Held: No. The Civil Service Commission has jurisdiction over all
employees of Government branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities,
and agencies, including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters. As such, it is the sole arbiter of
controversies relating to the civil service. The National Irrigation
Administration, created under Presidential Decree No. 1702, is a
government-owned and controlled corporation with original charter.
Thus, being an employee of the NIA, private respondent is covered by
the Civil Service Commission.
As held in Mantala vs. Salvador, cases involving personnel
actions, reassignment included, affecting civil service employees, are
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. The
trial court should have dismissed the case on motion of petitioner and
let private respondent question ROM No. 52 before the NIA
Administrator, and then the Civil Service Commission.
In the case at bar, being an NIA employee covered by the
Civil Service Law, the Court held that private respondent should have
first complained to the NIA Administrator, and if necessary, then
appeal to the Civil Service Commission. As ruled in Abe-Abe vs. Manta,
if a litigant goes to court without first pursuing his administrative
remedies, his action is premature, and he has no cause of action to
ventilate in court. Hence, petitioner asserts that private respondent's
case is not ripe for judicial determination.
However, private respondent failed to reckon with the fact
that the issue in Civil Case No. 22462 was not purely a question of law.
Certain facts needed to be resolved first. Did private respondent's
reassignment involve a reduction in rank? Private respondent claimed
his transfer to a new station violated the rule on reassignment for he
was allegedly transferred to a lower position. But petitioner had
refuted this contention, adding that his order reassigning private
respondent was a lawful exercise of management prerogatives. Also,
was private respondent the only one, among the employees of his rank,
who was reassigned? Private respondent alleged he was singled out,
but he did not present any evidence to prove it. Moreover, there is no
convincing evidence of grave abuse of discretion on petitioner's part.
Private respondent speculated that petitioner's real intent in
reassigning him was to create a vacancy in his position so that
petitioner could appoint someone close to him. This is a mere
allegation which private respondent failed to substantiate. Official
functions are presumed to be regular unless proven otherwise.
GONZALO GO, JR. vs. CA and OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
G.R. No. 172027 | July 29, 2010
Facts: Petitioner Gonzalo S. Go, Jr. (Go) was appointed in 1980 as
Hearing Officer III of the Board of Transportation (BOT), then the
government's land transportation franchising and regulating agency,
with a salary rate of PhP 16,860 per annum.
On June 19, 1987, EO 202 was issued creating, within the
Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), the Land
Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB) to replace
the BOT. The issuance placed the LTFRB under the administrative
control and supervision of the DOTC Secretary.
ALAG, M. | 2-MANRESA

ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY – COLLEGE OF LAW
Public Officers and Corporations | Deputy Omb. Rodolfo Elman
On February 1, 1990, the DOTC Secretary extended Go a
promotional appointment as Chief Hearing Officer (Chief, Legal
Division), with a salary rate of PhP 151,800 per annum. The Civil
Service Commission (CSC) later approved this permanent
appointment. In her Certification, the LTFRB Administrative Division
Chief Cynthia G. Angulo stated that the promotion was to the position
of Attorney VI, Salary Grade (SG)-26, obviously following budgetary
circulars allocating SG-26 to division chief positions.
The instant controversy started when the Department of
Budget and Management (DBM), by letter, informed the then DOTC
Secretary of the erroneous classification in the Position Allocation List
(PAL) of the DBM of two positions in his department, one in the LTFRB
and, the other, in the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB). The error,
according to the DBM, stemmed from the fact that division chief
positions in quasi-judicial or regulatory agencies, whose decisions are
immediately appealable to the department secretary instead of to the
court, are entitled only to Attorney V, SG-25 allocation.
After an exchange of communications between the DBM
and the DOTC, the corresponding changes in position classification
with all its wage implications were implemented.
Unable to accept this new development where his position
was allocated the rank of Attorney V, SG-25, Go wrote the DBM to
question the "summary demotion or downgrading of his salary grade"
from SG-26 to SG-25.
In his protest-letter, Go excepted from the main reason proferred by the DBM
that the decisions or rulings of the LTFRB are only appealable to the DOTC
Secretary under Sec. 6 of EO 202 and not to the CA. As Go argued, the
aforecited proviso cannot prevail over Sec. 9 (3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP)
129, or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, under which appeals from
decisions of quasi-judicial bodies are to be made to the CA.
The DBM Secretary denied Go's protest, holding that
decisions, orders or resolutions of the LTFRB are appealable to the
DOTC Secretary. The DBM reminded Go that based on the
department's standards and criteria formulated pursuant to PD 985
and RA 6758, the division chief of bureau-level agencies, like the
LTFRB, is allocable to Attorney V, SG-25.
On appeal, the Office of the President, affirmed the ruling
of the DBM. It also denied the motion for reconsideration. Undaunted,
Go interposed before the CA a petition for review.
The appellate court dismissed the petition on the following
procedural grounds: (a) Go resorted to the wrong mode of appeal,
Rule 43 being available only to assail the decision of a quasi-judicial
agency issued in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions, as DBM is
not a quasi-judicial body; (b) his petition violated Sec. 6 (a) of Rule 43;
and (c) his counsel violated Bar Matter Nos. 287 and 1132.
Issue: W/N the remedy availed by Go was proper.
Held: No. The appellate court is correct in ruling that the remedy
availed of by Go is improper but not for the reason it proffered. Both
Go and the appellate court overlooked the fact that the instant case
involves personnel action in the government, i.e., Go is questioning
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the reallocation and demotion directed by the DBM which resulted in
the diminution of his benefits. Thus, the proper remedy available to
Go is to question the DBM denial of his protest before the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) which has exclusive jurisdiction over cases
involving personnel actions, and not before the OP. In turn, the
resolution of the CSC may be elevated to the CA under Rule 43 and,
finally, before this Court. Consequently, Go availed himself of the
wrong remedy when he went directly to the CA under Rule 43 without
repairing first to the CSC.
Summary Reallocation – Illegal
The summary reallocation of his position to a lower degree
resulting in the corresponding downgrading of his salary infringed the
policy of non-diminution of pay which the Court recognized and
applied in Philippine Ports Authority v. COA, as well as in the
subsequent sister cases involving benefits of government employees.
Running through the gamut of these cases is the holding that the
affected government employees shall continue to receive benefits
they were enjoying as incumbents upon the effectivity of RA 6758.
From his promotional appointment as Chief, LTFRB Legal
Division to the time (April 8, 1991) the summary reallocation was
implemented, Go had occupied the position and enjoyed the
corresponding salary and emoluments therefor for one year, two
months and eight days. In this length of time, Go's entitlement to the
benefits appurtenant to the position has well-nigh ripened into a
vested right.
Go has established a clear, equitable vested right to the
emoluments of his position as Attorney VI, SG-26. He continues to
occupy-at least up to April 11, 2006 when he filed this petition-the
position of Chief, LTFRB Legal Division. His title to Attorney VI, SG-26
is without question, having been legally appointed to the position on
February 1, 1990. And being an incumbent to that position, he has, at
the very least, an equitable right to receive the corresponding salary
and emoluments attached thereto. The summary demotion to a lower
salary grade, with the corresponding decrease in salary and
emoluments after he has occupied his current rank and position, goes
against his right to continue enjoying the benefits accorded the
position and which his predecessors must have been receiving. His
right thereto has ripened into a vested right, of which he could be
deprived only by due process of law, but which we believe he was
denied through the summary reallocation. With the view we take of
this case, Go was neither apprised nor given the opportunity to
contest the reallocation before its summary implementation.
ALAG, M. | 2-MANRESA

ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY – COLLEGE OF LAW
Public Officers and Corporations | Deputy Omb. Rodolfo Elman
LAW ON ADMINISTRATIVE JURISDICTION vs. PUBLIC SCHOOL
TEACHERS
MARTIN EMIN vs. DE LEON et al.
G.R. No. 139794 | February 27, 2002
Facts: Sometime in the year 1991, appointment papers for a
change of status from provisional to permanent under Republic Act
No. 6850 of teachers were submitted to the Civil Service Field Office-
Cotabato. Attached to these appointment papers were photocopies
of certificates of eligibility of the teachers.
Director Gantungan U. Kamed noticed that the certificates
of eligibility were of doubtful authenticity. He called the Head Civil
Service Field Officer. While the certificates seemed to be authentic,
the signature of Civil Service Commission Director Elmer R. Bartolata
and the initials of the processors of said certificates were clearly
forgeries. Director Kamed initially forwarded five (5) appointments to
Civil Service Regional Office No. XII for verification of their R.A. 6850
eligibilities and for appropriate action through an indorsement letter.
The appointment papers of the same nature subsequently submitted
to the Field Office were likewise forwarded to the CSRO No. XII.
Upon verification of the records of CSRO No. XII, it was
found that said applications for civil service eligibility under R.A.
6850 were disapproved. However, the certificates of eligibility they
submitted were genuine as their control number belonged to the
batch issued to CSRO No. XII by the CSC Central Office. But the records
showed that these certificates were never issued to any one.
Two separate investigations were conducted by Director
Cesar P. Buenaflor of Regional Office No. 12 of the CSC in Cotabato
City: (1) on how the R.A. 6850 certificates were issued/released from
the Office, and (2) on how the teachers got said certificates. The
teachers concerned were asked to report to the Office and bring the
original copies of their certificates of eligibility. On several dates, the
teachers appeared and gave their sworn statements pointing to
petitioner as the person who gave them the R.A. 6850 certificates of
eligibility they had attached to their appointments for a fee. Upon
finding a prima facie case, petitioner was formally charged with
dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service.
In his sworn letter to the CSC Regional Director, petitioner
denied the accusation. He filed a motion to dismiss, but the motion
was denied on July 8, 1992.
Alforjas and Delgado identified petitioner and a certain
Teddy Cruz as the persons who facilitated their applications for R.A.
6850 eligibility. The other witnesses corroborated Alforjas' and
Delgado's testimonies. They all identified petitioner as the person
who helped them obtain the fake certificates of eligibility.
The CSC found petitioner guilty of grave misconduct.
Accordingly, the penalty of dismissal from the service including all its
accessory penalties is imposed upon him. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, but it was denied.
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Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, but it
was dismissed. However, the CA granted petitioner's motion for
reconsideration and time to amend his petition. Finding the petition
unmeritorious, the appellate court dismissed the appeal.
Issue: W/N the CA erred in finding that the CSC has original
jurisdiction over administrative cases against public school teachers.
Held: Yes. Section 9 of Republic Act 4670 otherwise known as the
"Magna Carta for Public School Teacher," provides:
Sec. 9. Administrative Charges.- Administrative charges against a teacher shall
be heard initially by a committee composed of the corresponding School
Superintendent of the Division or a duly authorized representative who should
at least have the rank of a division supervisor, where the teacher belongs, as
chairman, a representative of the local, or, in its absence, any existing
provincial or national teacher's organization and a supervisor of the Division,
the last two to be designated by the Director of Public Schools within thirty
days from the termination of the hearings: Provided, however, That where the
school superintendent is the complainant or an interested party, all the
members of the committee shall be appointed by the Secretary of Education.
As used in this Act, the term "teacher" shall mean all persons engaged in
classroom teaching, in any level of instruction, on full-time basis, including
guidance counselors, school librarians, industrial arts or vocational instructors,
and all other persons performing supervisory and/or administrative functions
in all schools, colleges and universities operated by the Government or its
political subdivisions; but shall not include school nurses, school physicians,
school dentists, and other school employees.
Petitioner is the Non-Formal Education Supervisor of the
DECS, in Kidapawan, Cotabato, in-charge of the out-of-school
programs. The 1993 Bureau of Non-formal Education Manual outlines
the functions of a NFE Division Supervisor which include, (5)
implementation of externally assisted NFE programs and projects; (6)
monitoring and evaluation of NFE programs and projects (8)
supervision of the implementation of NFE programs/projects at the
grassroots level. Clearly, petitioner falls under the category of "all
other persons performing supervisory and/or administrative
functions in all schools, colleges and universities operated by the
government or its political subdivisions."
As petitioner is covered by R.A. 4670, it is the Investigating
Committee that should have investigated his case conformably with
Section 9 of R.A. 4670, now being implemented by Section 2, Chapter
VII of DECS Order No. 33, series of 1999, otherwise known as the DECS
Rules of Procedure.
However, at this late hour, the proceedings conducted by
the public respondent CSC can no longer be nullified on procedural
grounds. Under the principle of estoppel by laches, petitioner is now
barred from impugning the CSC's jurisdiction over his case.
In the case at bar, the Civil Service Commission had afforded
petitioner sufficient opportunity to be heard and defend himself
against charges of participation in faking civil service eligibilities of
certain teachers for a fee. Not only did he answer the charges before
the CSC Regional Office but he participated in the hearings of the
charges against him to the extent that we are left with no doubt that
his participation in its proceedings was willful and voluntary.
ALAG, M. | 2-MANRESA

ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY – COLLEGE OF LAW
Public Officers and Corporations | Deputy Omb. Rodolfo Elman
As held previously, participation by parties in the
administrative proceedings without raising any objection thereto
bars them from raising any jurisdictional infirmity after an adverse
decision is rendered against them. In the case at bar, petitioner
raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction for the first time in his amended
petition for review before the CA. He did not raise this matter in his
Motion to Dismiss filed before the CSC Regional Office. Notably, in his
Counter-Affidavit, he himself invoked the jurisdiction of the
Commission by stating that he was "open to further investigation by
the CSC to bring light to the matter” and by further praying for "any
remedy or judgment which under the premises are just and
equitable." It is an undesirable practice of a party participating in the
proceedings, submitting his case for decision, and then accepting the
judgment only if favorable, but attacking it for lack of jurisdiction,
when adverse.
SARAH AMPONG vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
G.R. No. 167916 | August 26, 2008
Facts: During the 1991 Professional Board Examination for
Teachers (PBET), a certain Evelyn Junio-Decir took the examination
and passed with a rating of 74.27%.
At the time of the examination, petitioner Sarah Ampong
and Evelyn Decir were public school teachers under the supervision
of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS). Later, on
August 3, 1993, Ampong transferred to the RTC in Sarangani Province
where she was appointed as Court Interpreter III.
When Evelyn Decir went to the Civil Service Regional Office
to claim a copy of her PBET Certificate of Eligibility, the CSRO
personnel noticed that the woman did not resemble the picture of the
examinee in the Picture Seat Plan (PSP). It was found that it was
Ampong who took and passed the examinations under the name
Evelyn Decir.
Decir and Ampong were charged by the CSRO for
Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service. Decir denied the charges against her. But
Ampong voluntarily appeared at the CSRO and admitted to the
wrongdoing and claimed she was persuaded into the act by the
husband of Evelyn Junio-Decir, her (Ampong) husband's cousin.
The Civil Service Commission (CSC) found petitioner
Ampong and Decir guilty of dishonesty, dismissing them from the
service.
Petitioner Ampong moved for reconsideration, raising for
the first time the issue of jurisdiction. She contended that at the time
the case was instituted on August 23, 1994, the CSC already lost
jurisdiction over her since she was then already serving as Court
Interpreter III of the RTC. She argued that the exclusive authority to
discipline employees of the judiciary lies with the Supreme Court and
that the CSC acted with abuse of discretion when it continued to
exercise jurisdiction despite her assumption of duty as a judicial
employee.
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The Court of Appeals (CA) denied petitioner's appeal
noting that petitioner never raised the issue of jurisdiction until after
the CSC ruled against her. Thus, she was estopped from questioning
the Commission's jurisdiction. The CA further ruled that whether as a
public school teacher or a court interpreter, petitioner was part of the
civil service, subject to its rules and regulations.
Issue: W/N the CSC has administrative jurisdiction over an
employee of the Judiciary for acts committed while said employee
was still with the Executive or Education Department.
Held: No, administrative jurisdiction over a court employee
belongs to the Supreme Court, regardless of whether the offense was
committed before or after employment in the judiciary. However, the
Court ruled against the petition on the ground of estoppel by laches.
It is true that the CSC has administrative jurisdiction over
the civil service. As defined under the Constitution and the
Administrative Code, the civil service embraces every branch, agency,
subdivision, and instrumentality of the government, and government-
owned or controlled corporations. Pursuant to its administrative
authority, the CSC is granted the power to "control, supervise, and
coordinate the Civil Service examinations." This authority grants to
the CSC the right to take cognizance of any irregularity or anomaly
connected with the examinations.
However, the Constitution provides that the Supreme Court
is given exclusive administrative supervision over all courts and
judicial personnel. By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court
that can oversee the judges' and court personnel's compliance with
all laws, rules and regulations. It may take the proper administrative
action against them if they commit any violation. No other branch of
government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the
doctrine of separation of powers.
The fact that petitioner committed the dishonest act before
she joined the RTC does not take her case out of the administrative
reach of the Supreme Court. The bottom line is administrative
jurisdiction over a court employee belongs to the Supreme Court,
regardless of whether the offense was committed before or after
employment in the judiciary. Indeed, the standard procedure is for
the CSC to bring its complaint against a judicial employee before the
OCA. Records show that the CSC did not adhere to this procedure in
the present case.
However, the Court upheld the ruling of the CSC based on
the principle of estoppel. The previous actions of petitioner have
estopped her from attacking the jurisdiction of the CSC. A party who
has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court or tribunal
exercising quasi-judicial functions to secure an affirmative relief may
not afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.
Petitioner was given ample opportunity to present her side
and adduce evidence in her defense before the CSC. She filed with it
her answer to the charges leveled against her. When the CSC found
her guilty, she moved for a reconsideration of the ruling. These
circumstances all too clearly show that due process was accorded to
petitioner.
ALAG, M. | 2-MANRESA

ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY – COLLEGE OF LAW
Public Officers and Corporations | Deputy Omb. Rodolfo Elman
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN vs. HEIDI ESTANDARTE and CA
G.R. No. 168670 | April 13, 2007
Facts: On August 17, 1998, People's Graftwatch, through its
Chairman, Dr. Patricio Y. Tan, referred to the Office of the
Ombudsman (Visayas), for immediate investigation, a complaint of
the Faculty Club and Department Heads of the Ramon Torres National
High School against Heidi Estandarte, the school principal.
The complaint consisted of 33 allegations of improprieties
ranging from illegal handling of school funds, irregular financial
transactions, perjury, and abuse of authority. However, the complaint
was not subscribed and sworn to by the complainant, and not
supported by the sworn statements of witnesses. The complaint also
lacked a statement of non-forum shopping. The Ombudsman (Visayas)
treated the matter as a request for assistance.
The Ombudsman forwarded the complaint to the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports Regional Office VI
(DECS-Region VI) and the Commission on Audit (COA) for appropriate
action pursuant to Section 15(2) of Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise
known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989.
A Special Investigating Committee was created by DECS to
hear the case. Meanwhile, the COA referred the complaint against
Estandarte to the Provincial Auditor for the Province of Negros
Occidental, Crispin A. Pinaga, Jr. Pursuant thereto, Pinaga conducted
an investigation and submitted his report to the Ombudsman
(Visayas). He found that Estandarte's actions in connection with 24 of
the 33 allegations in the complaint were "within the bounds of
propriety."
The Ombudsman (Visayas) decided to refer the
administrative aspect of the case to the DECS-Region VI for
administrative adjudication pursuant to Section 23(2) of Rep. Act No.
6770. In view of the referral to DECS-Region VI, the Ombudsman
(Visayas) considered OMB-VIS-ADM-99-0941 closed and terminated
in its Memorandum of November 27, 2001.
In a letter, the Faculty Club requested the Ombudsman
(Visayas) to take over the case for speedier disposition. Ms. Lucia
Jane Grecia, a member of the Faculty Club, also wrote a letter to the
Ombudsman (Visayas) complaining that she was being oppressed by
Estandarte. She likewise requested the Ombudsman (Visayas) to take
over the case. Consequently, the Ombudsman (Visayas) informed the
DECS-Region VI that it would not object if the case is returned to it.
DECS-Region VI turned over the records of the case to the
Ombudsman (Visayas) for adjudication, stating that "it is the
impression of this Office that the complainants intend that their case
be heard by the Office of the Ombudsman and that Office had also
manifested its willingness to reassume jurisdiction of the same."
Estandarte filed an Urgent Motion to Remand the case to
the DECS-Region VI on the ground that jurisdiction is now exclusively
vested on the latter. The Ombudsman (Visayas) denied the motion
ratiocinating that it was not barred from assuming jurisdiction over
the complaint after the DECS-Region VI had relinquished its
6
jurisdiction over the same. Estandarte filed a motion for
reconsideration of said Order, which was later denied by the
Ombudsman (Visayas).
Estandarte filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings on the
ground that she filed a petition for review on certiorari with the CA
assailing the order denying her motion to remand the case to the
DECS-Region VI. The Ombudsman denied the motion.
In its Decision, the Ombudsman (Visayas) found
Estandarte guilty of grave misconduct. Estandarte filed a petition for
review with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order/writ of preliminary injunction with the CA. She alleged, among
others, that the DECS-Region VI has jurisdiction over the case.
The CA issued the assailed Decision granting the petition
and remanding the case to the Special Investigating Committee of
the DECS-Region VI. The CA held that the Ombudsman (Visayas) acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction when it took over the case after it
issued a memorandum considering the case closed and terminated
and after jurisdiction had already been vested in the Special
Investigating Committee. Such act violates the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction. Once jurisdiction is acquired by or attached to a proper
investigative body or agency, such jurisdiction continues until the
termination of the case.
Issue: W/N the DECS has exclusive jurisdiction over the case.
Held: Yes. Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 4670, otherwise known as the
Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, provides that:
Section 9. Administrative Charges. - Administrative charges against a teacher
shall be heard initially by a committee composed of the corresponding School
Superintendent of the Division or a duly authorized representative who would
at least have the rank of a division supervisor, where the teacher belongs, as
chairman, a representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing
provincial or national teacher's organization and a supervisor of the Division,
the last two to be designated by the Director of Public Schools. The committee
shall submit its findings, and recommendations to the Director of Public
Schools within thirty days from the termination of the hearings: Provided,
however, that where the school superintendent is the complainant or an
interested party, all the members of the committee shall be appointed by the
Secretary of Education.
Undoubtedly, the DECS-Region VI first assumed jurisdiction
over the administrative complaint against the respondent. It should
be recalled that when People's Graftwatch forwarded the complaint
to the Ombudsman (Visayas), the latter treated it as a request for
assistance and referred it to the DECS-Region VI and COA for
appropriate action. After it had resolved to upgrade the matter to an
administrative case, the Ombudsman decided not to take cognizance
of the same and refer it, instead, to the DECS-Region VI.
The SC does not agree with petitioner's contention that it
could assume jurisdiction over the administrative case after the
DECS-Region VI had voluntarily relinquished its jurisdiction over the
same in favor of the petitioner. Jurisdiction is a matter of law.
Jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of the parties
but continues until the case is terminated. When the complainants
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ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY – COLLEGE OF LAW
Public Officers and Corporations | Deputy Omb. Rodolfo Elman
filed their formal complaint with the DECS-Region VI, jurisdiction was
vested on the latter. It cannot now be transferred to petitioner upon
the instance of the complainants, even with the acquiescence of the
DECS and petitioner.
Nonetheless, even if the Ombudsman (Visayas) had
concurrent jurisdiction over the administrative case, the Court held
that it would still sustain the DECS' authority to decide the
administrative case. Considering that the respondent is a public
school teacher who is covered by the provisions of Rep. Act No. 4670,
the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, the DECS-Region VI is in
a better position to decide the matter. Moreover, the DECS has
already commenced proceedings over the administrative case by
constituting the Special Investigating Committee pursuant to Section
9 of Rep. Act No. 4670.
The ruling of the Court in De Leon is not applicable in this
case. From the very start, respondent consistently protested the
referral of the case back to the Ombudsman, and demanded that the
same be remanded to the DECS. She refused to participate in the
proceedings before the Ombudsman precisely because she believed
that jurisdiction was already vested on the DECS-Region VI. Hence,
she filed instead a motion to remand the case to the DECS-Region VI
and motions to postpone or suspend the proceedings. On the other
hand, what was striking in the Emin and Alcala cases was that the
respondent therein actively participated in the proceedings before
the other tribunal.
HIGHER EDUCATION MODERNIZATION ACT OF 1997 (RA 8292)
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION vs. HENRY SOJOR
G.R. No. 168766 | May 22, 2008
Facts: Respondent Sojor was appointed by then President Corazon
Aquino as president of the Central Visayas Polytechnic College (CVPC)
in Dumaguete City. In June 1997, R.A. No. 8292, or the "Higher
Education Modernization Act of 1997," was enacted, mandating that
a Board of Trustees (BOT) be formed to act as the governing body in
state colleges. The BOT of CVPC appointed respondent as president,
with a four-year term beginning September 1998 up to September
2002. Upon the expiration of his first term of office in 2002, he was
appointed president of the institution for a second four-year term.
CVPC was converted into Negros Oriental State University (NORSU)
which was governed by a Board of Regents (BOR).
Meanwhile, 3 separate administrative cases was filed
against Sojor by CVPC faculty members before the Civil Service
Commission, the first one for dishonesty, grave misconduct and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service due to approval
of release of salary differentials in the absence of required Plantilla,
salary adjustment form and valid appointments, the second one for
dishonesty, misconduct and falsification of official documents for
allowing antedating and falsification of reclassification differential
payroll, and the last one for nepotism because he appointed his half-
sister as casual clerk in violation of the Administrative Code.
7
Before filing his counter-affidavits, respondent moved to
dismiss the first two complaints on grounds of lack of jurisdiction,
bar by prior judgment and forum shopping.
He claimed that the CSC had no jurisdiction over him as a presidential
appointee. Being part of the non-competitive or unclassified service of the
government, he was exclusively under the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Office
of the President (OP). He argued that CSC had no authority to entertain,
investigate and resolve charges against him; that the Civil Service Law
contained no provisions on the investigation, discipline, and removal of
presidential appointees. He also pointed out that the subject matter of the
complaints had already been resolved by the Office of the Ombudsman.
Finding no sufficient basis to sustain respondent's
arguments, the CSC-RO denied his motion to dismiss. His motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied. Thus, respondent was formally
charged with three administrative cases, namely: (1) Dishonesty,
Misconduct, and Falsification of Official Document; (2) Dishonesty,
Grave Misconduct, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
Service; and (3) Nepotism.
Respondent appealed the actions of the CSC-regional
office to the CSC, raising the same arguments in his motion to dismiss.
He argued that since the BOT is headed by the Committee on Higher
Education Chairperson who was under the OP, the BOT was also
under the OP. Since the president of CVPC was appointed by the BOT,
then he was a presidential appointee.
The CSC dismissed respondent's appeal and authorized its
regional office to proceed with the investigation. He was also
preventively suspended for 90 days. In decreeing that it had
jurisdiction over the disciplinary case against respondent, the CSC
opined that his claim that he was a presidential appointee had no
basis in fact or in law. CSC maintained that it had concurrent
jurisdiction with the BOT of the CVPC.
Respondent appealed the CSC resolutions to the CA via a
petition for certiorari and prohibition. The CA resolved in favor of
respondent. It annulled the questioned CSC resolutions and
permanently enjoined the CSC from proceeding with the
administrative investigation.
 The CA ruled that the power to appoint carries with it the power to
remove or to discipline. It declared that the enactment of R.A. No.
9299 in 2004, which converted CVPC into NORSU, did not divest the
BOT of the power to discipline and remove its faculty members,
administrative officials, and employees. Respondent was
appointed as president of CVPC by the BOT by virtue of the
authority granted to it under Section 6 of R.A. No. 8292. The power
of the BOT to remove and discipline erring employees, faculty
members, and administrative officials as expressly provided for
under Section 4 of R.A. No. 8292 is also granted to the BOR of
NORSU under Section 7 of R.A. No. 9299. The CA added that E.O.
No. 292, a general law, does not prevail over R.A. No. 9299, a
special law.
Issue: W/N the CSC has jurisdiction over the case.
Held: Yes.
ALAG, M. | 2-MANRESA

ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY – COLLEGE OF LAW
Public Officers and Corporations | Deputy Omb. Rodolfo Elman
The Constitution grants to the CSC administration over the
entire civil service. As defined, the civil service embraces every
branch, agency, subdivision, and instrumentality of the government,
including every government-owned or controlled corporations with
original charters.
The CSC has been granted by the Constitution and the
Administrative Code jurisdiction over all civil service positions in the
government service, whether career or non-career. From this grant of
general jurisdiction, the CSC promulgated the Revised Uniform Rules
on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.
Respondent, a state university president with a fixed term
of office appointed by the governing board of trustees of the
university, is a non-career civil service officer. He was appointed by
the chairman and members of the governing board of CVPC. By clear
provision of law, respondent is a non-career civil servant who is under
the jurisdiction of the CSC.
CSC has concurrent jurisdiction with BOR over a president of a state
university
The BOR of NORSU has the sole power of administration
over the university. But this power is not exclusive in the matter of
disciplining and removing its employees and officials.
Although the BOR of NORSU is given the specific power
under R.A. No. 9299 to discipline its employees and officials, there
is no showing that such power is exclusive. When the law bestows
upon a government body the jurisdiction to hear and decide cases
involving specific matters, it is to be presumed that such jurisdiction
is exclusive unless it be proved that another body is likewise vested
with the same jurisdiction, in which case, both bodies have
concurrent jurisdiction over the matter.
All members of the civil service are under the jurisdiction of
the CSC, unless otherwise provided by law. Being a non-career civil
servant does not remove respondent from the ambit of the
CSC. Career or non-career, a civil service official or employee is within
the jurisdiction of the CSC.
GOCCs NOT COVERED BY CIVIL SERVICE LAW
PH NATL. OIL COMPANY-ENERGY DEVT. CORP. vs. HON LEOGARDO
G.R. No. 58494 | July 5, 1989
Facts: Petitioner PNOC-EDC is a subsidiary of the Philippine
National Oil Company (PNOC). On January 20, 1978, it filed with the
Ministry of Labor and Employment, Regional Office No. VII, Cebu City
(MOLE), a clearance application to dismiss/terminate the services of
private respondent, Vicente D. Ellelina, a contractual employee.
The application for clearance was premised on Ellelina's
alleged commission of a crime (Alarm or Public Scandal) during a
Christmas party at petitioner's camp in Uling, Cebu, when, because of
the refusal of the raffle committee to give him the prize
corresponding to his lost winning ticket, he tried to grab the armalite
8
rifle of the PC Officer outside the building despite the warning shots
fired by the latter.
Clearance to dismiss was initially granted by MOLE but was
subsequently revoked and petitioner was ordered to reinstate Ellelina
to his former position, without loss of seniority rights, and with
backwages from February 1, 1978 up to his actual reinstatement.
Petitioner appealed to the Minister of Labor who, acting through
public respondent, affirmed the appealed Order. Hence, this Petition
Issue: Whether the Ministry of Labor and Employment has no
jurisdiction over petitioner because it is a GOCC.
Held: No. Priot to the 1987 Constitution, employees of
government-owned and/or controlled corporations were governed
by the Civil Service Law and not by the Labor Code. However, Article
IX-B, Section 2 [1] of the 1987 Constitution provides that: "The Civil
Service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and
agencies of the Government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters."
Thus, under the present state of the law, the test in
determining whether a government-owned or controlled
corporation is subject to the Civil Service Law is the manner of its
creation such that government corporations created by special
law/charter are subject to its provisions while those incorporated
under the general Corporation Law are not within its coverage.
In the case at bar, the PNOC-EDC, having been incorporated
under the general Corporation Law, is a government-owned or
controlled corporation whose employees are subject to the provisions
of the Labor Code. Therefore, the Ministry of Labor and Employment
has jurisdiction over petitioner.
BLISS DEVELOPMENT CORP. UNION v. HON. CALLEJA and BDC
G.R. No. 80887 | September 30, 1994
Facts: Petitioner, a duly registered labor union, filed with the
Department of Labor, National Capital Region, a petition for
certification election of private respondent Bliss Development
Corporation (BDC).
Based on the position papers submitted by the parties,
Med-Arbiter Napoleon V. Fernando dismissed the petition for lack
of jurisdiction stating that the majority of BDC's stocks is owned by
the Human Settlement Development Corporation (HSDC), a wholly-
owned government corporation. Therefore, BDC is subject to Civil
Service law, rules and regulations.
Petitioner then filed an appeal with the Bureau of Labor
Relations. In the meantime, or on June 1, 1987 Executive Order No.
180 was issued by the then President Corazon C. Aquino extending to
government employees the right to organize and bargain collectively.
On August 7, 1987, Director Pura Ferrer-Calleja of the
Bureau of Labor Relations issued an Order dismissing the appeal. He
ratiocinated that with the issuance of EO No. 180 dated June 1, 1987,
government employees are now given the right to organize and
ALAG, M. | 2-MANRESA
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ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY – COLLEGE OF LAW
Public Officers and Corporations | Deputy Omb. Rodolfo Elman

bargain collectively. This, therefore, renders academic the order

subject of the appeal.
Issue: W/N BDC is a GOCC subject to the CSC rules and regulations.
Held: No. Section 1 of Executive Order No. 180 expressly limits
its application only to government-owned or controlled corporations
with original charters. Hence, public respondent's order dated August
7, 1987 requiring petitioner to register in accordance with Section 7
of Executive Order No. 180 is without legal basis.
The 1987 Constitution provides that: “The civil service
embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies
of the Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charter.”
A corporation is created by operation of law. It acquires a
juridical personality either by special law or a general law. The general
law under which a private corporation may be formed or organized is
the Corporation Code, the requirements of which must be complied
with by those wishing to incorporate. Only upon such compliance will
the corporation come into being and acquire a juridical personality,
thus giving rise to its right to exist and act as a legal entity. On the
other hand, a government corporation is normally created by special
law, referred to often as a charter.
BDC is a government-owned corporation created under
the Corporation Law. It is without a charter, governed by the Labor
Code and not by the Civil Service Law hence, Executive Order No. 180
does not apply to it.
Consequently, public respondent committed grave abuse of
discretion in ordering petitioner to register under Section 7, of
Executive Order No. 180 as a precondition for filing a petition for
certification election.

ALAG, M. | 2-MANRESA