1 Villavicencio v.
Lukban
Villavicencio v. Lukban
The mayor of the City of Manila ordered the closure of prostitution houses found in his
municipality and had the prostituted women deported to Davao.
Facts:
1. Justo Lukban, the Mayor of the City of Manila, “ordered the segregated district for
women of ill repute, which had been permitted for a number of years in the city of
Manila, closed.” From October 16 to 25, 1918, 170 women were kept confined to
their houses in the district by the police. During said period, the city authorities,
with some arrangements with the Bureau of Labor, planned to send the women to
Davao as laborers.
2. On the midnight of October 25, the police and Lukban went to the houses and
hustled the 170 prostituted women into patrol wagons and placed them aboard the
steams Corregidor and Negros. The women were given no opportunity to collect
their belongings, and were under the impression that they were being taken to a
police station for an investigation and had no knowledge that they were being sent
to Mindanao. Moreover, the women were not asked whether they wanted to leave
Manila and live in Davao.
3. The vessels reached Davao on October 29. The women were received by the
provincial governor, Francisco Sales and by haciendero Feliciano Yñigo.
Ruling:
1. Alien prostitutes can be expelled from the Philippine Islands in conformity with an
Act of Congress. The Governor-General can order the eviction of undesirable aliens
after a hearing from the Islands. Act No. 519 of the Philippine Commission and
section 733 of the Revised Ordinances of the city of Manila provide for the
conviction and punishment by a court of justice of any person who is a common
prostitute.
2. But one can search in vain for any law, order or regulation, which even hints at the
right of the Mayor of the City of Manila or the chief of police of that city to force
citizens of the Philippine Islands – and these women despite their being in a sense
lepers of society are nevertheless not chattels but Philippine citizens protected by
the same constitutional guaranties as are other citizens – to change domicile from
Manila to another locality. On the contrary Philippine penal law specifically
punishes any public officer who, not being expressly authorized by law or
regulation, compels any person to change his residence.
3. In other countries, as in Spain and Japan, the privilege of domicile is deemed so
important as to be found in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution. Under the
American constitutional system, liberty of abode is a principle so deeply imbedded
in jurisprudence and considered so elementary in nature as not even to require a
constitutional sanction. Even the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, even
the President of the US, who has often been said to exercise more power than any
Case Digests: Liberty of Abode and Travel • Mark Justin Mooc
king or potentate, has no such arbitrary prerogative, either inherent or express.
Much less, therefore, has the executive of a municipality, who acts within a sphere
of delegated powers.
Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro
Acting through Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, the provincial governor of
Mindoro directed the Manguines to permanently settle in the sitio of Tigbao on Lake Naujan.
Rubi, one of the Manguines subject to said measure, and those living in his Rancheria have
not fixed their dwelling within the reservation of Tigbao and were liable to be punished in
accordance with Section 2759 of Administrative Code.
Facts:
1. The provincial governor of Mindoro, Juan Morente, Jr., chose the sitio of Tigbao on
Lake Naujan as the place most convenient for the Manguianes (Mangyanes) to live
and permanently settle. It is 800 hectares of public land. The action of the
provincial governor is anchored on Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of
1917. Said provision states that provincial governor of any province where non-
Christian inhabitants may be found is authorized to take up their habitation on sites
on unoccupied public lands, when such a course is deemed necessary in the
interest of law and order. The site is to be selected by the provincial governor, to be
approved by the provincial board and by the Department Head.
2. The governor’s choice was approved by the provincial board on February 1, 1917,
through Resolution No. 25, and further by the Secretary of Interior 20 days later.
Pursuant to this, the provincial governor issued executive order no. 2 on December
4, which directed all the Mangyans in the towns of Naujan and Pola, Mangyans east
of the Baco River including those in the districts of Dulangan and Rubi’s place in
Calapan to permanently settle on the site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake not later than
December 31, 1917. The executive order likewise stated that those Mangyans who
refused to comply were to be imprisoned for not more than 60 days upon
conviction, in accordance with Section 2759, Administrative Code.
3. Rubi and those living in his Rancheria have not fixed their dwelling within the
reservation of Tigbao. They have questioned Section 2145 of the Administrative
Code of 1917.
4. The Manguianes are very low in nature. They have considerable Negrito blood and
have not advanced beyond the Negritos in civilization. They are a peaceful, timid,
primitive, semi-nomadic people and numbered approximately 15,000. They have
shown no desire for community life and have not progressed sufficiently in
civilization to make it practicable to bring them under any form of municipal
government.
Ruling:
2 Villavicencio v. Lukban
1. Civil liberty may be said to mean that measure of freedom which may be enjoyed in
a civilized community, consistently with the peaceful enjoyment of like freedom in
others. The right to Liberty guaranteed by the Constitution includes the right to
exist and the right to be free from arbitrary personal restraint or servitude. The
term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of
the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the faculties with
which he has been endowed by this Creator. Liberty includes the right of the
citizens to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to live and work where he
will; to earn his livelihood by a lawful calling, among others. The chief elements of
the guaranty are the right to contract, the right to choose one’s employment, right
to labor, and the right of locomotion. In general, liberty means the opportunity to
do those things which are ordinarily done by free men.
2. To hold Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 would leave people weak
and defenseless. However, considered purely as an exercise of the police power,
the courts cannot fairly say that the Legislature has exceeded its rightful authority.
3. One cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered without when
the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for
their own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that the
due process of law has not been followed. To go back to the definition of due
process of law and equal protection of law, there exists a law; the law seems to be
reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular methods of procedure
prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class.
4. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a person of his liberty
without due process of law and does not deny to him the equal protection of law.
Said section is constitutional. Petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or
restrained of their liberty. Thus, habeas corpus cannot issue.
Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon
DOLE had issued Department Order No. 1 which enumerated guidelines governing the
temporary suspension of deployment of Filipino domestic and household workers. Petitioner
contended that, among other reasons, violated the right to travel.
Facts:
1. The Department of Labor and Employment issued Department Order No. 1, Series
of 1988 which provided for the guidelines governing the temporary suspension of
deployment of Filipino domestic and household workers.
2. According to petitioner, a firm engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino
workers for overseas employment, the said measure discriminated males or
females, did not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and
females with similar skills, and violated the right to travel.
Ruling:
Case Digests: Liberty of Abode and Travel • Mark Justin Mooc
1. The police power of the State constitutes an implied limitation on the Bill of Rights.
The Bill of Rights does not purport to be an absolute guaranty of individual rights
and liberties.
2. The consequence of the deployment ban on the right to travel does not impair the
right. Said right is subject to the requirements of “public safety as may be provided
by law.” The right to travel is not absolute. As a matter of fact, Department Order
No. 1 afforded protection of labor.
Kant Kwong v. PCGG
Petitioners were prevented to leave the country due to hold-orders issued against them by the
PCGG. According to PCGG, the petitioners, who are foreign nationals, are representatives of
the Hong Kong-Chinese investors of two domestic garment corporations, whose 67% of
shareholdings were owned by the Marcoses.
Facts:
1. Petitioners are foreign nationals who are representatives of the Hong Kong-Chinese
investors who own 33% of the shares of stock in De Soleil Apparel Manufacturing
Corporation and American Inter-Fashion Manufacturing Corporation (domestic
garment corporations). The said firms were ordered segregated by the PCGG with
the belief that the Marcoses, through nominees and dummies, appear to control
67% of the firms’ shareholdings.
2. For the aforementioned belief, the PCGG issued hold-orders against petitioners on
February 12, 1987. Petitioners prayed that the said hold-orders be lifted. However,
said motion was not calendared for hearing and was later denied the Motion to Lift
in an Order.
3. On September 24, 1987, Yim Kang Shing, one of the petitioners, wishing to undergo
medical treatment, was allowed to leave.
Ruling:
1. Executive Order No. 1, dated February 28, 1986, created the PCGG and principally
tasked the said commission to recover all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former
President Marcos, his immediate family relative, subordinates and close associates,
whether in the Philippines or abroad. The PCGG, in its rules and regulations
pursuant to Section 3(h) of same EO, may issue writs of sequestration and freeze
and/or hold orders in order for the commission to accomplish its task of recovering
ill-gotten wealth. According to the same Rules and Regulations of PCGG, a hold-
order is an order to temporarily prevent a person from leaving the country where
his departure will prejudice, hamper or otherwise obstruct the task of the
Commission in the enforcement of EO 1 and 2, because such person is known or
suspected to be involved in the properties or transactions covered by said EOs.
2. Petitioners’ right to travel has been impaired. For one, the validity of the hold-
orders issued against petitioners had already expired pursuant to the Rules and
3 Villavicencio v. Lukban
Regulations of the PCGG. A “hold-order,” as defined in PCGG’s Rules and
Regulations, is valid only for a maximum period of 6 months, unless for good
reasons extended by the Commission en banc. The PCGG has not extended the
lifespan of the hold-orders in question nor has it advanced good reasons for doing
so.
3. Second, the grounds for the issuance of the hold-orders have become stale. There
were changes made and accomplishments achieved to that effect.
Marcos v. Manglapus
The Marcoses wanted to return to the Philippines three years after they had fled to Hawaii.
President Corazon Aquino, however, barred their return due to interests of safety and
tranquillity and order of the State and society.
Facts:
1. The Marcoses, who fled to Hawaii in 1986, wanted to be return to the country.
Thirteen days after the SC dismissed the petition, then-President Marcos died on
September 28, 1989.
2. In a motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners on October 2, 1989, the
petitioners contended that “to bar former President Marcos and his family from
returning to the Philippines is to deny them not only the inherent right of citizens to
return to their country of birth but also the protection of the Constitution and all of
the rights guaranteed to Filipinos under the Constitution;” “the President has no
power to bar a Filipino from his own country;” and “there is no basis for barring the
return of the family of former President Marcos.”
Ruling:
1. The death of Mr. Marcos, although it may be viewed as a supervening event, has
not changed the factual scenario under which the Court’s decision was rendered.
The threats to the government, to which the return of the Marcoses has been
viewed to provide a catalytic effect, have not been shown to have ceased. On the
contrary, instead of erasing fears to the destabilization that will be caused by the
return of the Marcoses.
2. Among the duties of the President under the Constitution, in compliance with
his/her oath of office, is to protect and promote the interest and welfare of the
people. Her decision to bar the return of the Marcoses and subsequently, the
remains of Mr. Marcos at the present time and under present circumstances is in
compliance with this bounden duty. In the absence of a clear showing that she had
acted with arbitrariness or with grave abuse of discretion in arriving at this decision,
the Court will not enjoin the implementation of this decision.
Case Digests: Liberty of Abode and Travel • Mark Justin Mooc
Silverio v. CA
Petitioner was charged for violating Section 20(4) of the Revised Securities Act but was able to
post bail. More than 2 years later, petitioner’s passport was cancelled and prevented him
from reapplying after RTC’s order to DFA.
Facts:
1. Petitioner is charged with violation of Section 20(4) of the Revised Securities Act,
but was able to post bail for his provisional liberty. More than 2 years after the
filing of the information (January 26, 1988), respondent People of the Philippines
filed an urgent ex parte Motion to cancel the passport of and to issue a hold-
departure order against petitioner who travelled abroad several times without
necessary Court approval,
2. The RTC issued an order directing the DFA to cancel petitioner’s passport or deny
his application, and the Commission on Immigration to prevent petitioner from
leaving the country.
Ruling:
1. Under the 1935 Constitution, the liberty of abode and of travel were treated under
provision which reads that “[t]he liberty of abode and of changing the same within
the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired” (Article III, Section 1(4)). The
1973 Constitution altered the 1935 text by explicitly including the liberty of travel
which reads “[t[he liberty of abode and of travel shall not be impaired except upon
lawful order of the court or when necessary in the interest of national security,
public safety or public health” (Article IV, Section 5). The 1987 Constitution has split
the two freedoms into 2 distinct sentences and treats them differently under “[t]he
liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall
not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to
travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety or public
health, as may be provided by law” (Section 6).
2. Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should be interpreted to mean that
while the liberty of travel may be impaired even without Court Order, the
appropriate executive officers or administrative authorities are not armed with
arbitrary discretion to impose limitations. They can impose limits only on the basis
of “national security, public safety or public health” and “as may be provided by
law,” a limitive phrase which does not appear in the 1973 text. Apparently, the
phraseology in the 1987 Constitution was a reaction to the ban on international
travel imposed under the previous regime when there was a Travel Processing
Center, which issued certificates of eligibility to travel upon application of an
interested party.
3. Said provision should by no means should be construed as delimiting the inherent
power of the Courts to use all means necessary to carry their orders into effect in
criminal cases pending before them. When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a
4 Villavicencio v. Lukban

Court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, process and other means necessary to
carry it into effect may be employed by such Court or officer.
Salonga v. Hermoso
Salonga’s certificate of eligibility to travel was not issued by the Travel Processing Center.
However, said ban on international travel was lifted by President Marcos.
wanting to go to the US, filed a motion for permission to leave the country. It was
denied.
3. Petitioner contends that having been admitted to bail as a matter of right, neither
the courts which granted him bail nor the SEC which has no jurisdiction over his
liberty, could prevent him from exercising his constitutional right to travel.
Ruling:

Facts: 1. A court has power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the
Philippines. This is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail
1. Salonga was not issued a certificate of eligibility to travel by the Travel Processing bond for he needs to appear before any court in which his appearance may be
Center. required as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance. The condition imposed
2. On August 21, 1977, President Marcos lifted the ban on international travel during upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court requires
his keynote address in the Manila World Law Conference in celebration of the his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel.
World Peace Through law Day.

Ruling:

1. The Travel Processing Center should exercise the utmost care to avoid the
impression that certain citizens desirous of exercising their constitutional right to
travel could be subjected to inconvenience or annoyance. In case of doubt of the
Officer-in-charge of the Travel Processing Center the view of General Fabian Ver
should immediately be sought.
2. It goes without saying that the petition for such certificate of eligibility to travel be
filed at the earliest opportunity to facilitate the granting thereof and preclude any
disclaimer as to the person desiring to travel being in any responsible for any delay.

Manotoc v. CA

Petitioner was charged for estafa by six clients of his Manotor Securities, Inc. Wanting to go
to the US, petitioner applied for a motion for permission to leave the country. But, it was
denied.

Facts:

1. Ricardo Manotoc Jr. appointed a management committee, not only for Manotoc
Securities, Inc. but also for Trans-Insular Management, Inc., after petitioner came
home from the US following the “run” on stock brokerages caused by stock broker
Santamaria’s flight from this jurisdiction. He filed this petition with the Securities
and Exchange Commission. Pending disposition, SEC requested the Commissioner
of Immigration not to clear petitioner for departure and a memorandum to this
effect.
2. When a Torrens title submitted to and accepted by Manotoc Securities, Inc. was
suspected to be a fake, six of its clients filed six separate criminal complaints against
petitioner (President) and Raul Leveriza (vice-President) for estafa. Petitioner,

Case Digests: Liberty of Abode and Travel • Mark Justin Mooc