of candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the campaign period.

Lanot was
Penera vs. COMELEC GR 181613 September 11, decided on the ground that one who files a certificate of candidacy is not a
2009 & November 25, 2009 Premature candidate until the start of the campaign period.

Campaigning
FACTS:
Penera and private respondent Edgar T. Andanar were mayoralty candidates in
Sta. Monica during the 14 May 2007 elections. On 2 April 2007, Andanar filed
before the Office of the Regional Election Director, Caraga Region (Region XIII), a
Petition for Disqualification against Penera, as well as the candidates for Vice-
Mayor and Sangguniang Bayan who belonged to her political party, for unlawfully
engaging in election campaigning and partisan political activity prior to the
commencement of the campaign period.
Rosalinda A. Penera’s filed a motion for reconsideration of this Court’s Decision
of 11 September 2009.The assailed Decision dismissed Penera’s petition and
affirmed the Resolution dated 30 July 2008 of the COMELEC En Banc as well as
the Resolution dated 24 July 2007 of the COMELEC Second Division. The Decision
disqualified Penera from running for the office of Mayor in Sta. Monica, Surigao
del Norte and declared that the Vice-Mayor should succeed Penera.
ISSUE:
Is Penera guilty of premature campaigning? May premature campaigning be
committed by a person who is not a candidate?
Congress elevated the Lanot doctrine into a statute by specifically inserting it as
the second sentence of the third paragraph of the amended Section 15 of RA
8436. In RA 9369, Congress inserted the word “only” so that the first proviso now
reads:
x x x Provided, that, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take
effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period x x x.
Thus, Congress not only reiterated but also strengthened its mandatory directive
that election offenses can be committed by a candidate “only” upon the start of
the campaign period. This clearly means that before the start of the campaign
period, such election offenses cannot be so committed.
In layman’s language, this means that a candidate is liable for an election offense
only for acts done during the campaign period, not before. The law is clear as
daylight — any election offense that may be committed by a candidate under any
election law cannot be committed before the start of the campaign period. In
ruling that Penera is liable for premature campaigning for partisan political acts
before the start of the campaigning, the assailed Decision ignores the clear and
express provision of the law.

RULING:

No to both. Under the assailed September 11, 2009 Decision, a candidate may
already be liable for premature campaigning after the filing of the certificate of
candidacy but even before the start of the campaign period. Thus, such person
can be disqualified for premature campaigning for acts done before the start of
the campaign period. In short, the Decision considers a person who files a
certificate of candidacy already “candidate” even before the start of the
campaign period.

Now the Court holds that the assailed Decision is contrary to the clear intent and
letter of the law. In Lanot v. COMELEC,it held that a person who files a certificate
EBRALINAG v. THE DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF CEBU
Facts:
The petitioners in both (consolidated) cases were expelled from their classes by
the public school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the
national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as required by Republic Act No.
1265 (An Act making flag ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions) of
July 11, 1955 , and by Department Order No. 8 (Rules and Regulations for
Conducting the Flag Ceremony in All Educational Institutions) dated July 21, 1955
of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) making the flag
ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions.
Jehovah's Witnesses admitted that they taught their children not to salute the
flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge for they believe that
those are "acts of worship" or "religious devotion" which they "cannot
conscientiously give to anyone or anything except God". They consider the flag
as an image or idol representing the State. They think the action of the local
authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional
limitations on the State's power and invades the sphere of the intellect and spirit
which the Constitution protect against official control..
Issue:
Whether or not school children who are members or a religious sect may
be expelled from school for disobedience of R.A. No. 1265 and Department Order
No. 8
Held:
No. Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest
priority and the amplest protection among human rights, for it involves the
relationship of man to his Creator
The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of religious
freedom is the existence of a grave and present danger of a character both grave
and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or
any other legitimate public interest, that the State has a right (and duty) to
prevent." Absent such a threat to public safety, the expulsion of the petitioners
from the schools is not justified. (Teehankee)
The petitioners further contend that while they do not take part in the
compulsory flag ceremony, they do not engage in "external acts" or behavior that
would offend their countrymen who believe in expressing their love of country
through the observance of the flag ceremony. They quietly stand at attention
during the flag ceremony to show their respect for the right of those who choose
to participate in the solemn proceedings. Since they do not engage in disruptive
behavior, there is no warrant for their expulsion.
The Court is not persuaded that by exempting the Jehovah's Witnesses from
saluting the flag, singing the national anthem and reciting the patriotic pledge,
this religious group which admittedly comprises a "small portion of the school
population" will shake up our part of the globe and suddenly produce a nation
"untaught and uninculcated in and unimbued with reverence for the flag,
patriotism, love of country and admiration for national heroes" . What the
petitioners seek only is exemption from the flag ceremony, not exclusion from
the public schools where they may study the Constitution, the democratic way of
life and form of government, and learn not only the arts, sciences, Philippine
history and culture but also receive training for a vocation of profession and be
taught the virtues of "patriotism, respect for human rights, appreciation for
national heroes, the rights and duties of citizenship, and moral and spiritual
values (Sec. 3[2], Art. XIV, 1987 Constitution) as part of the curricula. Expelling or
banning the petitioners from Philippine schools will bring about the very situation
that this Court had feared in Gerona. Forcing a small religious group, through the
iron hand of the law, to participate in a ceremony that violates their religious
beliefs, will hardly be conducive to love of country or respect for dully constituted
authorities.
Also, the expulsion of members of Jehovah's Witnesses from the schools where
they are enrolled violates their right as Philippine citizens, under the 1987
Constitution, to "protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education
. . . and to make such education accessible to all (Sec. 1, Art. XIV).
Ebralinag v Cebu G.R. No. 95770 March 1, 1993 However, things took a turn for the worst. In the Daan Bantayan District, the
District Supervisor, Manuel F. Biongcog, ordered the "dropping from the rolls" of
Facts:
students who "opted to follow their religious belief which is against the Flag
All the petitioners in these two cases were expelled from their classes by the Salute Law" on the theory that "they forfeited their right to attend public
public school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national schools."
anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as required by Republic Act No. 1265 and
43 students were subsequently expelled after refusing to sing.
DECS Department Order No. 8 which stipulated compulsory flag ceremonies in all
educational institutions. The petition in G.R. No. 95887 was filed by 25 students who were similarly
expelled because Dr. Pablo Antopina, who succeeded Susana Cabahug as Division
Jehovah's Witnesses admittedly teach their children not to salute the flag, sing
Superintendent of Schools, would not recall the expulsion orders of his
the national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge for they believe that those
predecessor. Instead, he verbally caused the expulsion of some more children of
are "acts of worship" or "religious devotion" which they "cannot conscientiously
Jehovah's Witnesses.
give . . . to anyone or anything except God"
The petitioning students filed on account of grave abuse of discretion on the part
They consider the flag as an image or idol representing the State. They allege that
of the respondents in violating their due process and their right to education.
the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge
They alleged for the nullity of the expulsion or dropping from the rolls of
transcends constitutional limitations on the State's power and invades the sphere
petitioners from their respective schools, prohibiting respondents from further
of the intellect and spirit which the Constitution protects against official control.
barring the petitioners from their classes, and compelling the respondent and all
Gerona, et al. vs. Secretary of Education- In requiring school pupils to participate persons acting for him to admit and order the re-admission of petitioners to their
in the flag salute, the State thru the Secretary of Education is not imposing a respective schools. They also prayed for a TRO.
religion or religious belief or a religious test on said students. It is merely enforcing
On November 27, 1990, the Court issued a temporary restraining order and a writ
a non-discriminatory school regulation applicable to all alike.
of preliminary mandatory injunction commanding the respondents to
Under the Administrative Code of 1987, Any teacher or student or pupil who immediately re-admit the petitioners to their respective classes until further
refuses to join or participate in the flag ceremony may be dismissed after due orders from this Court.
investigation. (This was due to Gerona)
The OSG commented on the defense of the expulsion orders and claimed that the
In 1989, the DECS Regional Office in Cebu received complaints about teachers and flag salute was devoid of any religious significance and the State had compelling
pupils belonging to the Jehovah's Witnesses, and enrolled in various public and interests to expel the children.
private schools, who refused to sing the Philippine national anthem, salute the
Philippine flag and recite the patriotic pledge.
Issue: Whether school children who are members or a religious sect known as
Cebu school officials resorted to a number of ways to persuade the children of
Jehovah's Witnesses may be expelled from school (both public and private), for
Jehovah's Witnesses to obey the memorandum. In the Buenavista Elementary
refusing, on account of their religious beliefs, to take part in the flag ceremony
School, the children were asked to sign an Agreement (Kasabutan) in the Cebuano
which includes playing (by a band) or singing the Philippine national anthem,
dialect promising to sing the national anthem, place their right hand on their
saluting the Philippine flag and reciting the patriotic pledge.
breast until the end of the song and recite the pledge of allegiance to the flag.
Held: No. Petition granted.
Ratio: Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest
priority and the amplest protection among human rights, for it involves the
relationship of man to his Creator
The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, vis., freedom
to believe and freedom to act on one's belief. The first is absolute as long as the
belief is confined within the realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation
where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare.
Petitioners stress, however, that while they do not take part in the compulsory
flag ceremony, they do not engage in "external acts" or behavior that would
offend their countrymen who believe in expressing their love of country through
the observance of the flag ceremony. Ie. they stand quietly during the ceremony.
The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of religious
freedom is the existence of a grave and present danger of a character both grave
and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or
any other legitimate public interest, that the State has a right (and duty) to
prevent.
"protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education . . . and to make
such education accessible to all
We hold that a similar exemption may be accorded to the Jehovah's Witnesses
with regard to the observance of the flag ceremony out of respect for their
religious beliefs, however "bizarre" those beliefs may seem to others.
Nevertheless, their right not to participate in the flag ceremony does not give
them a right to disrupt such patriotic exercises. Paraphrasing the warning cited
by this Court in Non vs. Dames II, while the highest regard must be afforded their
right to the free exercise of their religion, "this should not be taken to mean
that school authorities are powerless to discipline them" if they should commit
breaches of the peace by actions that offend the sensibilities, both religious and
patriotic, of other persons. If they quietly stand at attention during the flag
ceremony while their classmates and teachers salute the flag, sing the national
anthem and recite the patriotic pledge, we do not see how such conduct may
possibly disturb the peace, or pose "a grave and present danger of a serious evil
to public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public
interest that the State has a right (and duty) to prevent.

We are not persuaded that by exempting the Jehovah's Witnesses from saluting
the flag, singing the national anthem and reciting the patriotic pledge, this
religious group which admittedly comprises a "small portion of the school
population" will shake up our part of the globe and suddenly produce a nation
"untaught and uninculcated in and unimbued with reverence for the flag,
patriotism, love of country and admiration for national heroes

Expelling or banning the petitioners from Philippine schools will bring about the
very situation that this Court had feared in Gerona. Forcing a small religious
group, through the iron hand of the law, to participate in a ceremony that violates
their religious beliefs, will hardly be conducive to love of country or respect for
dully constituted authorities.

Furthermore, let it be noted that coerced unity and loyalty even to the country —
assuming that such unity and loyalty can be attained through coercion — is not a
goal that is constitutionally obtainable at the expense of religious liberty. A
desirable end cannot be promoted by prohibited means.

Moreover, the expulsion of members of Jehovah's Witnesses from the schools

where they are enrolled will violate their right as Philippine citizens, under the
1987 Constitution, to receive free education, for it is the duty of the State to
Philconsa vs Enriquez
G.R. No. 113105 August 19 1994 [Article VI Section 25 - Appropriations]
FACTS:
Petitioners assailed the validity of RA 7663 or General Appropriations Act of 1994.
GAA contains a special provision that allows any members of the Congress the
Realignment of Allocation for Operational Expenses, provided that the total of
said allocation is not exceeded.
Philconsa claims that only the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives are the ones authorized under the Constitution to realign
savings, not the individual members of Congress themselves.
President signed the law, but Vetoes certain provisions of the law and imposed
certain provisional conditions: that the AFP Chief of Staff is authorized to use
savings to augment the pension funds under the Retirement and Separation
Benefits of the AFP.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 7663 is violative of Article VI, Section 25 (5) of 1987
Constitution.
RULING:
Yes. Only the Senate President and the Speaker of the House are allowed to
approve the realignment
Furthermore, two conditions must be met: 1) the funds to be realigned are
actually savings, and 2) the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the items of
expenditures to which said transfer to be made.
As to the certain condition given to the AFP Chief of Staff, it is violative of of
Sections 25(5) and 29(1) of the Article VI of the Constitution. The list of those who
may be authorized to transfer funds is exclusive. the AFP Chief of Staff may not
be given authority.
Categories: Constitutional Law 1
PHILCONSA vs. HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, G.R. No. 113105 August 19, 1994
Facts:
House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 (GAB of 1994), was
passed and approved by both houses of Congress on December 17, 1993. As
passed, it imposed conditions and limitations on certain items of appropriations
in the proposed budget previously submitted by the President. It also authorized
members of Congress to propose and identify projects in the “pork barrels”
allotted to them and to realign their respective operating budgets.
Pursuant to the procedure on the passage and enactment of bills as prescribed
by the Constitution, Congress presented the said bill to the President for
consideration and approval.
On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill into law, and declared the
same to have become Republic Act NO. 7663, entitled “AN ACT APPROPRIATING
FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM
JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTY ONE, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND NINETY-
FOUR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES” (GAA of 1994). On the same day, the
President delivered his Presidential Veto Message, specifying the provisions of
the bill he vetoed and on which he imposed certain conditions, as follows:
1. Provision on Debt Ceiling, on the ground that “this debt reduction scheme
cannot be validly done through the 1994 GAA.” And that “appropriations for
payment of public debt, whether foreign or domestic, are automatically
appropriated pursuant to the Foreign Borrowing Act and Section 31 of P.D. No.
1177 as reiterated under Section 26, Chapter 4, Book VI of E.O. No. 292, the
Administrative Code of 1987.
2. Special provisions which authorize the use of income and the creation,
operation and maintenance of revolving funds in the appropriation for State
Universities and Colleges (SUC’s),
3. Provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for road maintenance.
4. Special provision on the purchase by the AFP of medicines in compliance with
the Generics Drugs Law (R.A. No. 6675).
5. The President vetoed the underlined proviso in the appropriation for the
modernization of the AFP of the Special Provision No. 2 on the “Use of Fund,”
which requires the prior approval of the Congress for the release of the
corresponding modernization funds, as well as the entire Special Provision No. 3
on the “Specific Prohibition” which states that the said Modernization Fund “shall
not be used for payment of six (6) additional S-211 Trainer planes, 18 SF-260
Trainer planes and 150 armored personnel carriers”
6. New provision authorizing the Chief of Staff to use savings in the AFP to
augment pension and gratuity funds.
7. Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, Ombudsman, COA, and
CHR, the Congress.
Issue:
Whether or not the conditions imposed by the President in the items of the GAA
of 1994: (a) for the Supreme Court, (b) Commission on Audit (COA), (c)
Ombudsman, (d) Commission on Human Rights, (CHR), (e) Citizen Armed Forces
Geographical Units (CAFGU’S) and (f) State Universities and Colleges (SUC’s) are
constitutional; whether or not the veto of the special provision in the
appropriation for debt service and the automatic appropriation of funds
therefore is constitutional
Held:
The veto power, while exercisable by the President, is actually a part of the
legislative process. There is, therefore, sound basis to indulge in the presumption
of validity of a veto. The burden shifts on those questioning the validity thereof
to show that its use is a violation of the Constitution.
The vetoed provision on the debt servicing is clearly an attempt to repeal Section
31 of P.D. No. 1177 (Foreign Borrowing Act) and E.O. No. 292, and to reverse the
debt payment policy. As held by the court in Gonzales, the repeal of these laws
should be done in a separate law, not in the appropriations law.
In the veto of the provision relating to SUCs, there was no undue discrimination
when the President vetoed said special provisions while allowing similar
provisions in other government agencies. If some government agencies were
allowed to use their income and maintain a revolving fund for that purpose, it is
because these agencies have been enjoying such privilege before by virtue of the
special laws authorizing such practices as exceptions to the “one-fund policy”
(e.g., R.A. No. 4618 for the National Stud Farm, P.D. No. 902-A for the Securities
and Exchange Commission; E.O. No. 359 for the Department of Budget and
Management’s Procurement Service).
The veto of the second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 of the item for the
DPWH is unconstitutional. The Special Provision in question is not an
inappropriate provision which can be the subject of a veto. It is not alien to the
appropriation for road maintenance, and on the other hand, it specifies how the
said item shall be expended — 70% by administrative and 30% by contract.
The Special Provision which requires that all purchases of medicines by the AFP
should strictly comply with the formulary embodied in the National Drug Policy
of the Department of Health is an “appropriate” provision. Being directly related
to and inseparable from the appropriation item on purchases of medicines by the
AFP, the special provision cannot be vetoed by the President without also vetoing
the said item.
The requirement in Special Provision No. 2 on the “use of Fund” for the AFP
modernization program that the President must submit all purchases of military
equipment to Congress for its approval, is an exercise of the “congressional or
legislative veto.” However the case at bench is not the proper occasion to resolve
the issues of the validity of the legislative veto as provided in Special Provisions
Nos. 2 and 3 because the issues at hand can be disposed of on other grounds.
Therefore, being “inappropriate” provisions, Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 were
properly vetoed.
Furthermore, Special Provision No. 3, prohibiting the use of the Modernization
fund for payment of the trainer planes and armored personnel carriers, which
have been contracted for by the AFP, is violative of the Constitutional prohibition
on the passage of laws that impair the obligation of contracts (Art. III, Sec. 10),
more so, contracts entered into by the Government itself. The veto of said special
provision is therefore valid.
The Special Provision, which allows the Chief of Staff to use savings to augment
the pension fund for the AFP being managed by the AFP Retirement and
Separation Benefits System is violative of Sections 25(5) and 29(1) of the Article
VI of the Constitution.
Regarding the deactivation of CAFGUS, we do not find anything in the language
used in the challenged Special Provision that would imply that Congress intended
to deny to the President the right to defer or reduce the spending, much less to
deactivate 11,000 CAFGU members all at once in 1994. But even if such is the
intention, the appropriation law is not the proper vehicle for such purpose. Such
intention must be embodied and manifested in another law considering that it
abrades the powers of the Commander-in-Chief and there are existing laws on
the creation of the CAFGU’s to be amended.

On the conditions imposed by the President on certain provisions relating to

appropriations to the Supreme Court, constitutional commissions, the NHA and
the DPWH, there is less basis to complain when the President said that the
expenditures shall be subject to guidelines he will issue. Until the guidelines are
issued, it cannot be determined whether they are proper or inappropriate. Under
the Faithful Execution Clause, the President has the power to take “necessary and
proper steps” to carry into execution the law. These steps are the ones to be
embodied in the guidelines.
LAMP vs. SEC OF BUDGET
FACTS: For consideration of the Court is an original action for certiorari assailing
the constitutionality and legality of the implementation of the Priority
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) as provided for in Republic Act (R.A.) 9206
or the General Appropriations Act for 2004 (GAA of 2004).
Petitioner Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP), a group of lawyers
who have banded together with a mission of dismantling all forms of political,
economic or social monopoly in the country. According to LAMP, the above
provision is silent and, therefore, prohibits an automatic or direct allocation of
lump sums to individual senators and congressmen for the funding of projects. It
does not empower individual Members of Congress to propose, select and
identify programs and projects to be funded out of PDAF.
For LAMP, this situation runs afoul against the principle of separation of powers
because in receiving and, thereafter, spending funds for their chosen projects, the
Members of Congress in effect intrude into an executive function. Further, the
authority to propose and select projects does not pertain to legislation. “It is, in
fact, a non-legislative function devoid of constitutional sanction,”8 and,
therefore, impermissible and must be considered nothing less than malfeasance.
RESPONDENT’S POSITION: the perceptions of LAMP on the implementation of
PDAF must not be based on mere speculations circulated in the news media
preaching the evils of pork barrel.
ISSUES: 1) whether or not the mandatory requisites for the exercise of judicial
review are met in this case; and 2) whether or not the implementation of PDAF
by the Members of Congress is unconstitutional and illegal.
HELD:
I.
A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct
adverse effect on the individual challenging it. In this case, the petitioner
contested the implementation of an alleged unconstitutional statute, as citizens
and taxpayers. The petition complains of illegal disbursement of public funds
derived from taxation and this is sufficient reason to say that there indeed exists
a definite, concrete, real or substantial controversy before the Court.
LOCUS STANDI: The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges
“such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the
court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
Here, the sufficient interest preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by
taxation required in taxpayers’ suits is established. Thus, in the claim that PDAF
funds have been illegally disbursed and wasted through the enforcement of an
invalid or unconstitutional law, LAMP should be allowed to sue.
Lastly, the Court is of the view that the petition poses issues impressed with
paramount public interest. The ramification of issues involving the
unconstitutional spending of PDAF deserves the consideration of the Court,
warranting the assumption of jurisdiction over the petition.
II.
The Court rules in the negative.
In determining whether or not a statute is unconstitutional, the Court does not
lose sight of the presumption of validity accorded to statutory acts of Congress.
To justify the nullification of the law or its implementation, there must be a clear
and unequivocal, not a doubtful, breach of the Constitution. In case of doubt in
the sufficiency of proof establishing unconstitutionality, the Court must sustain
legislation because “to invalidate [a law] based on x x x baseless supposition is an
affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature that passed it but also of the
executive which approved it.”
The petition is miserably wanting in this regard. No convincing proof was
presented showing that, indeed, there were direct releases of funds to the
Members of Congress, who actually spend them according to their sole
discretion. Devoid of any pertinent evidentiary support that illegal misuse of PDAF
in the form of kickbacks has become a common exercise of unscrupulous
Members of Congress, the Court cannot indulge the petitioner’s request for
rejection of a law which is outwardly legal and capable of lawful enforcement.
PORK BARREL:
The Members of Congress are then requested by the President to recommend
projects and programs which may be funded from the PDAF. The list submitted
by the Members of Congress is endorsed by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives to the DBM, which reviews and determines whether such list of
projects submitted are consistent with the guidelines and the priorities set by the
Executive.”33 This demonstrates the power given to the President to execute
appropriation laws and therefore, to exercise the spending per se of the budget.

As applied to this case, the petition is seriously wanting in establishing that

individual Members of Congress receive and thereafter spend funds out of PDAF.
So long as there is no showing of a direct participation of legislators in the actual
spending of the budget, the constitutional boundaries between the Executive and
the Legislative in the budgetary process remain intact.

_______________

NOTES:

POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW:

(1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial
power;

(2) (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the
validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal
and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement;

(3) (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity;
and

(4) (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
Belgica v. Executive Secretary Ochoa (2013)
Subject:
Justiciable Controversy, Ripeness for Adjudication, Political Question, Locus
Standi, Res Judicata, Stare Decisis, Pork Barrel, Congressional Pork Barrel,
Presidential Pork Barrel, Mandamus, Right to Information, SARO, Operative Fact
Doctrine
Facts:
Before the Court are consolidated petitions, taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, all of which assail the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System.
Pork Barrell refers to an appropriation of government spending meant for
localized projects and secured solely or primarily to bring money to a
representative's district.In the Philippines, the “pork barrel” has been commonly
referred to as lump-sum, discretionary funds of Members of the Legislature,
although, its usage would evolve in reference to certain funds of the President
such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund.
The Malampaya Funds was a special fund created under PD 910 issued by then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos for the development of indigenous energy
resources vital to economic growth.
The Presidential Social Fund is sourced from the share of the government in the
aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR through which the President provides direct
assistance to priority programs and projects not funded under the regular budget.
In 1996, an anonymous source later identified as Former Marikina City Romeo
Candazo revealed that huge sums of government money went into the pockets
of legislators as kickbacks.
In 2004, several concerned citizens sought the nullification of the PDAF for being
unconstitutional. Unfortunately, for lack of any pertinent evidentiary support that
illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks has become a common exercise of
unscrupulous Members of Congress, the petition was dismissed.
In July 2013, NBI began its probe into allegations that “the government has been
defrauded of some P10 Billion over the past 10 years by a syndicate using funds
from the pork barrel of lawmakers and various government agencies for scores of
ghost projects.” The investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six whistle-
blowers who declared that JLN Corporation (stands for Janet Lim Napoles) had
facilitated the swindling of billions of pesos from the public coffers for “ghost
projects” using no fewer than 20 dummy non-government organizations for an
entire decade.
In August 2013, the Commission on Audit released report revealing substantial
irregularities in the disbursement and utilization of PDAF by the Congressmen
during the Arroyo administration.
As for the 'Presidential Pork Barrel', whistle-blowers alleged that "at least P900
Million from royalties in the operation of the Malampaya gas project off Palawan
province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy NGO.
Spurred in large part by the findings contained in the CoA Report and the Napoles
controversy, several petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that
the Pork Barrel System be declared unconstitutional
Held:
I. Procedural issues
Justiciable Controversy
1. By virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, judicial power
operates only when there is an actual case or controversy.
2. Jurisprudence provides that an actual case or controversy is one which involves
a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of
judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or
dispute.
3. The Court finds that there exists an actual and justiciable controversy in these
cases. The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by the
antagonistic positions of the parties on the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel
System. Also, the challenged funds and the provisions allowing for their utilization
– such as the 2013 GAA for the PDAF, PD 910 for the Malampaya Funds and PD
1869 for the Presidential Social Fund – are currently existing and operational;
hence, there exists an immediate or threatened injury to petitioners as a result of
the unconstitutional use of these public funds.
Ripeness for Adjudication
4. Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement
of ripeness, meaning that the questions raised for constitutional scrutiny are
already ripe for adjudication. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act
being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it.
It is a prerequisite that something had then been accomplished or performed by
either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must
allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of
the challenged action
5. The cases at present have not become moot. A case becomes moot when there
is no more actual controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be
served in passing upon the merits.
6. The Court observes that respondents‘ proposed line-item budgeting scheme
would not terminate the controversy since said reform is geared towards the
2014 budget, and not the 2013 PDAF Article which, being a distinct subject
matter, remains legally effective and existing.
7. Neither will the President‘s declaration that he had already abolished the PDAF
render the issues on PDAF moot precisely because the Executive branch of
government has no constitutional authority to nullify or annul its legal existence.
By constitutional design, the annulment or nullification of a law may be done
either by Congress, through the passage of a repealing law, or by the Court,
through a declaration of unconstitutionality
8. Moreover, the Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if: (a) there is a grave
violation of the Constitution; (b) the exceptional character of the situation and
the paramount public interest is involved; (c) when the constitutional issue raised
requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the
public; (d) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. All the four
exceptions are applicable in this case.
Political Question
9. The issues raised before the Court do not present political but legal questions
which are within its province to resolve. A political question refers to those
questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government. It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure.
10. The intrinsic constitutionality of the “Pork Barrel System” is not an issue
dependent upon the wisdom of the political branches of government but rather
a legal one which the Constitution itself has commanded the Court to act upon.
More importantly, the present Constitution has not only vested the Judiciary the
right to exercise judicial power but essentially makes it a duty to proceed
therewith under the expanded concept of judicial power under Section1, Article
8 of the 1987 Constitution
Locus Standi
11. Unless a person is injuriously affected in any of his constitutional rights by the
operation of statute or ordinance, he has no standing.
12. Petitioners, as taxpayers, possess the requisite standing to question the
validity of the existing Pork Barrel System under which the taxes they pay have
been and continue to be utilized. They are bound to suffer from the
unconstitutional usage of public funds.
13. Moreover, as citizens, petitioners have equally fulfilled the standing
requirement given that the issues they have raised may be classified as matters
of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of
paramount public interest
Res Judicata (does not apply)
14. Res judicata means “a matter adjudged”. The focal point of res judicata is the
judgment. The res judicata principle states that a judgment on the merits in a
previous case rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction would bind a
subsequent case if, between the first and second actions, there exists an identity
of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action.
15. The res judicata principle cannot apply in this case. The required identity is
not present since Philconsa and LAMP, respectively, involved constitutional
challenges against the 1994 CDF Article and 2004 PDAF Article, whereas the cases
at bar call for a broader constitutional scrutiny of the entire Pork Barrel System.
Also, the ruling in LAMP is essentially a dismissal based on a procedural
technicality – and, thus, hardly a judgment on the merits.
Stare Decisis (does not apply)
16. Stare decisis non quieta et movere (or simply, stare decisis) means “follow past
precedents and do not disturb what has been settled”. The focal point of stare
decisis is the doctrine created. The stare decisis principle, entrenched under
Article 8 of the Civil Code, evokes the general rule that, for the sake of certainty,
a conclusion reached in one case should be doctrinally applied to those that
follow if the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may be
different. It proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent any powerful
countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike.
17. The Philconsa resolution was a limited response to a separation of powers
problem, specifically on the propriety of conferring post-enactment identification
authority to Members of Congress. On the contrary, the present cases call for a
more holistic examination of the entire Pork Barrel System. The complexity of the
issues and the broader legal analyses herein warranted may be, therefore,
considered as a powerful countervailing reason against a wholesale application
of the stare decisis principle.
18. In addition, the Court observes that the Philconsa ruling was actually riddled
with inherent constitutional inconsistencies which similarly countervail against a
full resort to stare decisis.
19. As for LAMP, suffice it to restate that the said case was dismissed on a
procedural technicality and, hence, has not set any controlling doctrine
susceptible of current application to the substantive issues in these cases.
II. Substantive issues
Pork Barrel System
20. The Court defines the Pork Barrel System as the collective body of rules and
practices that govern the manner by which lump-sum, discretionary funds,
primarily intended for local projects, are utilized through the respective
participations of the Legislative and Executive branches of government, including
its members.
21. The Pork Barrel System involves two (2) kinds of lump-sum discretionary
funds: (a) Congressional Pork Barrel-- a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund
wherein legislators, either individually or collectively organized into committees,
are able to effectively control certain aspects of the fund’s utilization through
various post-enactment measures and/or practices. (b) Presidential Pork Barrel-
- a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund which allows the President to determine
the manner of its utilization.
Constitutionality of the Congressional Pork Barrel
22. The Supreme Court declared that the Priority Development Assistance Fund
(PDAF) and its predecessor, the Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) are
unconstitutional.
23. The Supreme Court declared the Pork Barrel System as unconstitutional on
the following grounds:
(a) Separation of Powers. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, legislators have been
authorized to participate in “the various operational aspects of budgeting,”
including “the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities” and
the “regulation and release of funds”, in violation of the separation of powers
principle. From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that
empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the implementation
or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is
thus unconstitutional.
(b) Non-delegability of legislative power. The power to appropriate is lodged in
Congress and must be exercised only through legislation, pursuant to Section
29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Insofar as the 2013 PDAF Article has
conferred unto legislators the power of appropriation by giving them personal,
discretionary funds from which they are able to fund specific projects which they
themselves determine, it has violated the principle of non-delegability of
legislative power;
(c) Checks and balances. Even without its post-enactment legislative identification
feature, the 2013 PDAF Article would remain constitutionally flawed since the
lump-sum amount of P24.79 Billion would be treated as a mere funding source
allotted for multiple purposes of spending. This setup connotes that the
appropriation law leaves the actual amounts and purposes of the appropriation
for further determination and, therefore, does not readily indicate a discernible
item which may be subject to the President’s power of item veto. Insofar as it has
created a system of budgeting wherein items are not textualized into the
appropriations bill, it has flouted the prescribed procedure of presentment and,
in the process, denied the President the power to veto items
(d) Public Accountability. To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. As it reads, the said phrase
tainted as said legislators, who are vested with post-enactment authority, would, gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other
in effect, be checking on activities in which they themselves participate. Also, this purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public
very same concept of post-enactment authorization runs afoul of Section 14, funds beyond the purview of the law.
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Allowing legislators to intervene in the various
26. Hence, insofar as it has conferred to the President the power to appropriate
phases of project implementation renders them susceptible to taking undue
funds intended by law for energy-related purposes only to other purposes he may
advantage of their own office.
deem fit as well as other public funds under the broad classification of “priority
(e) Political dynasty. Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution is considered infrastructure development projects”, it has transgressed the principle of non-
as not self-executing due to the qualifying phrase “as may be defined by law.” In delegability.
this respect, said provision does not, by and of itself, provide a judicially
Previous Rulings on PDAF/CDF
enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or
executive action. 27. In Philconsa v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 113105, August 19, 1994, the Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of the then known Countrywide Development
(f) Local autonomy. The gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based solely
Fund (CDF). The petitioners in the said case claimed that the power given to the
on the fact of office, without taking into account the specific interests and
members of Congress to propose and identify the projects and activites to be
peculiarities of the district the legislator represents. As a result, a district
funded by the CDF is an encroachment by the legislature on executive power.
representative of a highly-urbanized metropolis gets the same amount of funding
They argued that the proposal and identification of the projects do not involve
as a district representative of a far-flung rural province which would be relatively
the making of laws or the repeal and amendment thereof which is the only
“underdeveloped” compared to the former. This concept of legislator control
function given to the Congress by the Constitution. The Supreme Court held that
underlying the CDF and PDAF conflicts with the functions of the various Local
the power of appropriation carries with it the power to specify the project or
Development Councils (LDCs). Insofar as it has authorized legislators, who are
activity to be funded under the appropriation law. It can be as detailed and as
national officers, to intervene in affairs of purely local nature, despite the
broad as Congress wants it to be. The CDF is explicit that it shall be used "for
existence of capable local institutions, it has likewise subverted genuine local
infrastructure, purchase of ambulances and computers and other priority
autonomy.
projects and activities and other credit facilities to qualified beneficiaries..." It was
Constitutionality of the Presidential Pork Barrel Congress itself that determined the purposes for the appropriation. On the other
hand, the Executive was responsive for the implementation of the priority
24. While the designation of a determinate or determinable amount for a
projects specified in the law. The Supreme Court emphasized that the authority
particular public purpose is sufficient for a legal appropriation to exist, the
given to the members of Congress is only to propose and identify projects to be
appropriation law must contain adequate legislative guidelines if the same law
implemented by the President. Under the GAA of 1994, the President must
delegates rule-making authority to the Executive either for the purpose of (a)
examine whether the proposals submitted by the members of Congress fall within
filling up the details of the law for its enforcement, known as supplementary rule-
the specific items of expenditures for which the CDF was set up, and if qualified,
making, or (b) ascertaining facts to bring the law into actual operation, referred
the President next determines whether they are in line with other projects
to as contingent rule-making.
planned for the locality.
25. The phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
Thereafter, if the proposed projects qualify for funding, it is the President who
President” under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of
shall implement them. The proposals and identifications made by the members of
legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to
Congress are merely recommendatory. In addition, the Supreme Court stated that
adequately determine the limits of the President’s authority with respect to the
the CDF is a recognition that individual members of Congress, far more than the
President and their congressional colleagues are likely to be knowledgeable about
the needs of their respective constituents and the priority to be given to each
project.
28. In Sarmiento v. Treasurer, G.R. Nos. 125680 & 126313, September 4, 2001,
the petitioners questioned the constitutionality of the CDF under the GAA of
1996. Seeking the reversal of Philconsa v. Enriquez, the petitioners alleged that
the proposal and identification of projects by members of Congress were not
merely recommendatory considering that requests for releases of funds under
the CDF are automically released. The Solicitor General argued that since the
questioned provision is basically the same provision found in the 1994 GAA held
as constitutional by the Supreme Court in Philconsa v. Enriquez, the instant case
should be resolved in the same manner, following the principle of stare decisis.
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the CDF under the 1996 GAA.
29. In League Against Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP) v. Secretary of Budget and
Management, G.R. 164987, April 21, 2012, petitioners assailed the
constitutionality and legality of the implementation of the Priority Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF) as provided for in the GAA of 2004. According to the
petitioners, the provision in the GAA as regards the PDAF is silent and therefore
prohibits an automatic allocation of lump sums to individual senators and
congressmen for funding of projects. It does not give the individual members of
Congress the mandate to propose, select and identify programs and projects to
be funded out of PDAF. The petitioners submitted that such a situation violates
the principle of separation of powers because in receiving and thereafter
spending funds for their chosen projects, the members of Congress in effect
intruded into an executive function. Further, the authority to propose and select
projects does not pertain to legislation. It is, in fact, a non-legislative function
devoid of constitutional sanction and therefore impermissible and must be
considered nothing less than malfeasance.
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the PDAF. The Court stated
that no convincing proof was presented showing that, indeed there were direct
releases of funds to members of Congresss, who actually spent them according
to their sole discretion. Not even a documentation of the disbursement of funds
by the DBM in favor of the members of Congres was presented by the petitioner
to convince the Court to probe into the truth of their claims. The Court further
stated that the authority granted to members of Congress to propose and select
projects was already upheld in Philconsa v. Enriquez, and there is no need to
review or reverse the pronouncements made in said case so long as there is no
showing of a direct participation of legislators in the actual spending of the
budget.
Mandamus
30. Petitioners prayed that the Executive Secretary and/or the Department of
Budget and Management be ordered to provide the public and the Commission
on Audit complete lists/schedules or detailed reports related to the availments
and utilization of the PDAF and Malampaya funds.
31. Petitioners‘ prayer was grounded on Section 28, Article II (policy of full public
disclosure) and Section 7, Article III (right of the people to information on matters
of public concern) of the 1987 Constitution.
32. The court denied the prayer of petitioner on procedural grounds. The proper
remedy to invoke the right to information is to file a petition for mandamus. Citing
Legaspi vs CSC: “ the duty to disclose the information of public concern, and to
afford access to public records cannot be discretionary on the part of said
agencies. Xxx The constitutional duty, not being discretionary, its performance
may be compelled by a writ of mandamus in a proper case”
33. Moreover, in the case of Valmonte v. Belmonte Jr., it has been clarified that
the right to information does not include the right to compel the preparation of
lists, abstracts, summaries and the like. In the same case, it was stressed that it is
essential that the applicant has a well defined, clear and certain legal right to the
thing demanded and that it is the imperative duty of defendant to perform the
act required. Hence, without the foregoing substantiations, the Court cannot
grant a particular request for information.
34. In these cases, aside from the fact that none of the petitions are in the nature
of mandamus actions, the Court finds that petitioners have failed to establish a
"a well-defined, clear and certain legal right" to be furnished by the Executive
Secretary and/or the DBM of their requested PDAF Use Schedule/List and
Presidential Pork Use Report. Neither did petitioners assert any law or
administrative issuance which would form the bases of the latter‘s duty to furnish
them with the documents requested
35. Nevertheless, petitioners are not denied access to official documents which
are already existing and of public record.
Inclusion of Funds in Budgetary Deliberations
36. The Court also denied petitioners' prayer to order the inclusion of the subject
funds in the budgetary deliberations of Congress as the same is a matter left to
the prerogative of the political branches of government.
TRO Enjoining Release of Remaining PDAF
37. In response to the Court‘s September 10, 2013 TRO that enjoined the release
of the remaining PDAF allocated for the year 2013, the DBM issued Circular 2013-
8 which authorized the continued implementation and disbursement of PDAF
funds as long as they are: (a) covered by a Special Allotment Release Order
(SARO); and (b) that said SARO had been obligated by the implementing agency
concerned prior to the issuance of the Court‘s September 10, 2013 TRO.
41. the Court‘s pronouncement anent the unconstitutionality of (a) the 2013
PDAF Article and its Special Provisions, (b) all other Congressional Pork Barrel
provisions similar thereto, and (c) the phrases (1) "and for such other purposes as
may be hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD 910, and (2)
"to finance the priority infrastructure development projects" under Section 12 of
PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, must only be treated as prospective in effect
in view of the operative fact doctrine.
42. The operative fact doctrine exhorts the recognition that until the judiciary, in
an appropriate case, declares the invalidity of a certain legislative or executive
act, such act is presumed constitutional and thus, entitled to obedience and
respect and should be properly enforced and complied with.

38. As to the issue of lifting the TRO, the present decision has rendered it moot
and academic. The unconstitutionality of the 2013 PDAF Article as declared herein
has the consequential effect of converting the temporary injunction into a
permanent one. Hence, from the promulgation of this Decision, the release of the
remaining PDAF funds for 2013, among others, is now permanently enjoined.

39. As to the coverage and application of the TRO, the Court agreed with the
petitioners’ position that "the issuance of the SARO does not yet involve the
release of funds under the PDAF, as release is only triggered by the issuance of a
Notice of Cash Allocation (NCA). As such, PDAF disbursements, even if covered by
an obligated SARO, should remain enjoined. A SARO only evinces the existence of
an obligation and not the directive to pay. Practically speaking, the SARO does not
have the direct and immediate effect of placing public funds beyond the control
of the disbursing authority. In fact, a SARO may even be withdrawn under certain
circumstances which will prevent the actual release of funds

40. Thus, unless an NCA has been issued, public funds should not be treated as
funds which have been "released." In this respect, therefore, the disbursement
of 2013 PDAF funds which are only covered by obligated SAROs, and without any
corresponding NCAs issued, must, at the time of this Decision’s promulgation, be
enjoined and consequently reverted to the unappropriated surplus of the general
fund

Operative Fact Doctrine

Belgica v. Executive Secretary Ochoa (2013)

NATURE:
These are consolidated petitions taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, all of
which assail the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System.
UDK-14951 – A Petition filed seeking that the PDAF be declared unconstitutional,
and a cease and desist order be issued restraining President Benigno Simeon S.
Aquino III (President Aquino) and Secretary Abad from releasing such funds to
Members of Congress

FACTS:
ISSUES:
The NBI Investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers
1. Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork
who declared that JLN Corporation (Janet Lim Napoles) had swindled billions of
Barrel Laws similar thereto are unconstitutional considering that they violate the
pesos from the public coffers for "ghost projects" using dummy NGOs. Thus,
principles of/constitutional provisions on (a) separation of powers; (b) non-
Criminal complaints were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, charging five
delegability of legislative power; (c) checks and balances; (d) accountability; (e)
(5) lawmakers for Plunder, and three (3) other lawmakers for Malversation, Direct
political dynasties; and (f) local autonomy.
Bribery, and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Also
recommended to be charged in the complaints are some of the lawmakers’ chiefs 2. Whether or not the phrases (under Section 8 of PD 910, 116 relating to the
-of-staff or representatives, the heads and other officials of three (3) Malampaya Funds, and under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993,
implementing agencies, and the several presidents of the NGOs set up by relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are unconstitutional insofar as they
Napoles. constitute undue delegations of legislative power.

Whistle-blowers alleged that" at least P900 Million from royalties in the operation
of the Malampaya gas project off Palawan province intended for agrarian reform
HELD:
beneficiaries has gone into a dummy NGO. Several petitions were lodged before
the Court similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared 1. Yes, the PDAF article is unconstitutional. The post-enactment measures
unconstitutional which govern the areas of project identification, fund release and fund
realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence,
G.R. No. 208493 – SJS filed a Petition for Prohibition seeking that the "Pork Barrel
allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the
System" be declared unconstitutional, and a writ of prohibition be issued
sphere of budget execution. This violates the principle of separation of powers.
permanently
Congress‘role must be confined to mere oversight that must be confined to: (1)
G.R. No. 208566 - Belgica, et al filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and scrutiny and (2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws. Any
Prohibition With Prayer For The Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed
Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel by the constitution.
System," presently embodied in the provisions of the GAA of 2013 which provided
Thus, the court declares the 2013 pdaf article as well as all other provisions of law
for the 2013 PDAF, and the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as
which similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in
the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, be declared
the implementation or enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional
unconstitutional and null and void for being acts constituting grave abuse of
oversight, as violative of the separation of powers principle and thus
discretion. Also, they pray that the Court issue a TRO against respondents
unconstitutional.
2. Yes. Sec 8 of PD 910- the phrase “and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President”‖ constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to
adequately determine the limits of the President‘s authority with respect to the
purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. It gives the President wide
latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct and, in
effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of
the law.”

Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993- the phrases:

(b) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects” was declared
constitutional. IT INDICATED PURPOSE ADEQUATELY CURTAILS THE AUTHORITY
OF THE PRESIDENT TO SPEND THE PRESIDENTIAL SOCIAL FUND ONLY FOR
RESTORATION PURPOSES WHICH ARISE FROM CALAMITIES.

(b)” and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to

calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of
the Philippines” was declared unconstitutional.IT GIVES THE PRESIDENT CARTE
BLANCHE AUTHORITY TO USE THE SAME FUND FOR ANY INFRASTRUCTURE
PROJECT HE MAY SO DETERMINE AS A ―PRIORITY‖. VERILY, THE LAW DOES NOT
SUPPLY A DEFINITION OF ―PRIORITY INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT
PROJECTS‖ AND HENCE, LEAVES THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT ANY GUIDELINE TO
CONSTRUE THE SAME.
This case is consolidated with G.R. No. 208493 and G.R. No. 209251.
The so-called pork barrel system has been around in the Philippines since about
1922. Pork Barrel is commonly known as the lump-sum, discretionary funds of the
members of the Congress. It underwent several legal designations from
“Congressional Pork Barrel” to the latest “Priority Development Assistance Fund”
or PDAF. The allocation for the pork barrel is integrated in the annual General
Appropriations Act (GAA).
Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in the following manner:
a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house; broken down to – P40 million
for “hard projects” (infrastructure projects like roads, buildings, schools, etc.), and
P30 million for “soft projects” (scholarship grants, medical assistance, livelihood
programs, IT development, etc.);
b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to – P100 million for hard projects,
P100 million for soft projects;
c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to – P100 million for hard
projects, P100 million for soft projects.
The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of funds whereby certain
cabinet members may request for the realignment of funds into their department
provided that the request for realignment is approved or concurred by the
legislator concerned.
Presidential Pork Barrel
The president does have his own source of fund albeit not included in the GAA.
The so-called presidential pork barrel comes from two sources: (a)
the Malampaya Funds, from the Malampaya Gas Project – this has been around
since 1976, and (b) the Presidential Social Fund which is derived from the earnings
of PAGCOR – this has been around since about 1983.
Pork Barrel Scam Controversy
Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by allegations of corruption.
In July 2013, six whistle blowers, headed by Benhur Luy, exposed that for the last
decade, the corruption in the pork barrel system had been facilitated by Janet Lim
Napoles. Napoles had been helping lawmakers in funneling their pork barrel
funds into about 20 bogus NGO’s (non-government organizations) which would
make it appear that government funds are being used in legit existing projects
but are in fact going to “ghost” projects. An audit was then conducted by the
Commission on Audit and the results thereof concurred with the exposes of Luy
et al.
Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others, filed various
petitions before the Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality of the pork
barrel system.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is constitutional.
II. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is constitutional.
HELD:
I. No, the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional. It is
unconstitutional because it violates the following principles:
a. Separation of Powers
As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates the release of funds
(power of the purse). The executive, on the other hand, implements the laws –
this includes the GAA to which the PDAF is a part of. Only the executive may
implement the law but under the pork barrel system, what’s happening was that,
after the GAA, itself a law, was enacted, the legislators themselves dictate as to
which projects their PDAF funds should be allocated to – a clear act of
implementing the law they enacted – a violation of the principle of separation of
powers. (Note in the older case of PHILCONSA vs Enriquez, it was ruled that pork
barrel, then called as CDF or the Countrywide Development Fund, was
constitutional insofar as the legislators only recommend where their pork barrel
funds go).
This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the PDAF, the executive will
still have to get the concurrence of the legislator concerned.
b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power
As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in Congress alone. (The
Constitution does grant the people legislative power but only insofar as the
processes of referendum and initiative are concerned). That being, legislative
power cannot be delegated by Congress for it cannot delegate further that which
was delegated to it by the Constitution.
Exceptions to the rule are:
(i) delegated legislative power to local government units but this shall involve
purely local matters;
(ii) authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to
carry out a declared national policy in times of war or other national
emergency, or fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and
restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas,
tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework
of the national development program of the Government.
government (note, a congressman is a national officer) meddles with the affairs
of the local government – and this is contrary to the State policy embodied in the
Constitution on local autonomy. It’s good if that’s all that is happening under the
pork barrel system but worse, the PDAF becomes more of a personal fund on the
part of legislators.
II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid.
The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the presidential pork barrel is that
it is unconstitutional because it violates Section 29 (1), Article VI of the
Constitution which provides:
No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law.

In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual legislator to identify the Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork comes from the earnings of
projects to which his PDAF money should go to is a violation of the rule on non- the Malampaya and PAGCOR and not from any appropriation from a particular
delegability of legislative power. The power to appropriate funds is solely lodged legislation.
in Congress (in the two houses comprising it) collectively and not lodged in the
The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which created the
individual members. Further, nowhere in the exceptions does it state that the
Malampaya Fund, as well as PD 1869 (as amended by PD 1993), which
Congress can delegate the power to the individual member of Congress.
amended PAGCOR’s charter, provided for the appropriation, to wit:
c. Principle of Checks and Balances
(i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among others, collected from
One feature in the principle of checks and balances is the power of the president certain energy-related ventures shall form part of a special fund (the Malampaya
to veto items in the GAA which he may deem to be inappropriate. But this power Fund) which shall be used to further finance energy resource development and
is already being undermined because of the fact that once the GAA is approved, for other purposes which the President may direct;
the legislator can now identify the project to which he will appropriate his PDAF.
(ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides that a part of PAGCOR’s
Under such system, how can the president veto the appropriation made by the
earnings shall be allocated to a General Fund (the Presidential Social Fund) which
legislator if the appropriation is made after the approval of the GAA –
shall be used in government infrastructure projects.
again, “Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting which effectively renders
the constitutionally-given power of the President useless.” These are sufficient laws which met the requirement of Section 29, Article VI of
the Constitution. The appropriation contemplated therein does not have to be a
d. Local Autonomy
particular appropriation as it can be a general appropriation as in the case of PD
As a rule, the local governments have the power to manage their local affairs. 910 and PD 1869.
Through their Local Development Councils (LDCs), the LGUs can develop their
own programs and policies concerning their localities. But with the PDAF,
particularly on the part of the members of the house of representatives, what’s
happening is that a congressman can either bypass or duplicate a project by the
LDC and later on claim it as his own. This is an instance where the national