CHAPTER 1. EFFECT AND APPLICATION OF LAWS (ARTS. 1-17)
That I am a member of the Communication –Electronics and Information
1. G.R. No. 159747 April 13, 2004
GREGORIO B. HONASAN II, petitioner, vs.
THE PANEL OF INVESTIGATING PROSECUTORS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE (LEO DACERA, SUSAN F. DACANAY, EDNA A. VALENZUELA AND
SEBASTIAN F. CAPONONG, JR.), CIDG-PNP- P/DIRECTOR EDUARDO
MATILLANO, and HON. OMBUDSMAN SIMEON V. MARCELO, respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
On August 4, 2003, an affidavit-complaint was filed with the Department of Justice
(DOJ) by respondent CIDG-PNP/P Director Eduardo Matillano. It reads in part:
… evening of June 4, 2003 in a house located somewhere in San Juan, Metro
2. After a thorough investigation, I found that a crime of coup d'etat was
indeed committed by military personnel who occupied Oakwood on the
27th day of July 2003 and Senator Gregorio "Gringo"Honasan, II …
3. …
4. The said crime was committed as follows:
4.1 On June 4, 2003, at on or about 11 p.m., in a house located in San Juan,
Metro Manila, a meeting was held and presided by Senator
Honasan. Attached as Annex "B" is the affidavit of Perfecto Ragil and
made an integral part of this complaint.
… branch and the like;
4.8 In the early morning of July 27, 2003, Capt. Gerardo Gambala,
for and in behalf of the military rebels occupying Oakwood, made a
public statement aired on nation television, stating their withdrawal
of support to the chain of command of the AFP and the
Government of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and they are
willing to risk their lives in order to achieve the National Recovery
Agenda of Sen. Honasan, which they believe is the only program
that would solve the ills of society. . . . (Emphasis supplied).
The Sworn Statement of AFP Major Perfecto Ragil referred to by PNP/P Director
Matillano is quoted verbatim, to wit:
1.
Systems Services, Armed Forces of the Philippines with the rank of Major;
2. That I met a certain Captain Gary Alejano of the Presidential Security
Guard (PSG) during our Very Important Person (VIP) Protection Course
sometime in last week of March 2003;
3. That sometime in May 2003, Captain Alejano gave me a copy of the
pamphlet of the National Recovery Program (NRP) and told me that:
"Kailangan ng Bansa ng taong kagaya mo na walang bahid ng corruption
kaya basahin mo ito (referring to NRP) pamphlet. I took the pamphlet but
never had the time to read it;
4. That sometime in the afternoon of June 4, 2003, Captain Alejano invited
me to join him in a meeting where the NRP would be discussed and that
there would be a special guest;
5. That Capt. Alejano and I arrived at the meeting at past 9 o'clock in the
Manila;
6. That upon arrival we were given a document consisting of about 3-4
pages containing discussion of issues and concerns within the framework of
NRP and we were likewise served with dinner;
7. That while we were still having dinner at about past 11 o'clock in the
evening, Sen. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan arrived together with another
fellow who was later introduced as Capt. Turingan;
8. That after Sen. Honasan had taken his dinner, the meeting proper started
presided by Sen. Honasan;
9. That Sen. Honasan discussed the NRP, the graft and corruption in the
government including the military institution, the judiciary, the executive
10. That the discussion concluded that we must use force, violence and
armed struggle to achieve the vision of NRP. At this point, I raised the
argument that it is my belief that reforms will be achieved through the
democratic processes and not thru force and violence and/or armed
struggle. Sen. Honasan countered that "we will never achieve reforms
through the democratic processes because the people who are in power will
not give up their positions as they have their vested interests to protect."
After a few more exchanges of views, Sen. Honasan appeared irritated and
asked me directly three (3) times: "In ka ba o out?" I then asked whether all
those present numbering 30 people, more or less, are really committed, Sen.
Honasan replied: "Kung kaya nating pumatay sa ating mga kalaban, kaya
din nating pumatay sa mga kasamahang magtataksil." I decided not to
pursue further questions;
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11. That in the course of the meeting, he presented the plan of action to
achieve the goals of NRP, i.e., overthrow of the government under the
present leadership thru armed revolution and after which, a junta will be
constituted and that junta will run the new government. He further said that
some of us will resign from the military service and occupy civilian positions
in the new government. He also said that there is urgency that we implement
this plan and that we would be notified of the next activities.
12. That after the discussion and his presentation, he explained the rites that
we were to undergo-some sort of "blood compact". He read a prayer that
sounded more like a pledge and we all recited it with raised arms and
clenched fists. He then took a knife and demonstrated how to make a cut on
the left upper inner arm until it bleeds. The cut was in form of the letter "I" in
the old alphabet but was done in a way that it actually looked like letter "H".
Then, he pressed his right thumb against the blood and pressed the thumb
on the lower middle portion of the copy of the Prayer. He then covered his
thumb mark in blood with tape. He then pressed the cut on his left arm
against the NRP flag and left mark of letter "I" on it. Everybody else followed;
13. That when my turn came, I slightly made a cut on my upper inner arm
and pricked a portion of it to let it bleed and I followed what Senator
HONASAN did;
14. That I did not like to participate in the rites but I had the fear for my life
with what Senator HONASAN said that "…kaya nating pumatay ng
kasamahan";
15. That after the rites, the meeting was adjourned and we left the place;
16. That I avoided Captain Alejano after that meeting but I was extra
cautious that he would not notice it for fear of my life due to the threat made
by Senator HONASAN during the meeting on June 4, 2003 and the
information relayed to me by Captain Alejano that their group had already
deeply established their network inside the intelligence community;
17. That sometime in the first week of July 2003, Captain Alejano came to
see me to return the rifle that he borrowed and told me that when the group
arrives at the Malacañang Compound for "D-DAY", my task is to switch off
the telephone PABX that serves the Malacañang complex. I told him that I
could not do it. No further conversation ensued and he left;
18. That on Sunday, July 27, 2003, while watching the television, I saw
flashed on the screen Lieutenant Antonio Trillanes, Captain Gerardo
Gambala, Captain Alejano and some others who were present during the
June 4th meeting that I attended, having a press conference about their
occupation of the Oakwood Hotel. I also saw that the letter "I" on the arm
bands and the banner is the same letter "I" in the banner which was
displayed and on which we pressed our wound to leave the imprint of the
letter "I";
19. That this Affidavit is being executed in order to attest the veracity of the
foregoing and in order to charge SENATOR GREGORIO "GRINGO"
HONASAN, Capt. FELIX TURINGAN, Capt. GARY ALEJANO, Lt. ANTONIO
TRILLANES, Capt. GERARDO GAMBALA and others for violation of Article
134-A of the Revised Penal Code for the offense of "coup d'etat". (Emphasis
supplied)
The affidavit-complaint is docketed as I.S. No. 2003-1120 and the Panel of
Investigating Prosecutors of the Department of Justice (DOJ Panel for brevity) sent a
subpoena to petitioner for preliminary investigation.
On August 27, 2003, petitioner, together with his counsel, appeared at the DOJ. He
filed a Motion for Clarification questioning DOJ's jurisdiction over the case, asserting
that since the imputed acts were committed in relation to his public office, it is the
Office of the Ombudsman, not the DOJ, that has the jurisdiction to conduct the
corresponding preliminary investigation; that should the charge be filed in court, it is
the Sandiganbayan, not the regular courts, that can legally take cognizance of the
case considering that he belongs to the group of public officials with Salary Grade 31;
and praying that the proceedings be suspended until final resolution of his motion.
Respondent Matillano submitted his comment/opposition thereto and petitioner filed a
reply.
On September 10, 2003, the DOJ Panel issued an Order, to wit:
On August 27, 2003, Senator Gregorio B. Honasan II filed through counsel a
"Motion to Clarify Jurisdiction". On September 1, 2003, complainant filed a
Comment/Opposition to the said motion.
The motion and comment/opposition are hereby duly noted and shall be
passed upon in the resolution of this case.
In the meantime, in view of the submission by complainant of additional
affidavits/evidence and to afford respondents ample opportunity to controvert
the same, respondents, thru counsel are hereby directed to file their
respective counter-affidavits and controverting evidence on or before
September 23, 2003.1
Hence, Senator Gregorio B. Honasan II filed the herein petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against the DOJ Panel and its members, CIDG-PNP-
P/Director Eduardo Matillano and Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo, attributing grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the DOJ Panel in issuing the aforequoted Order of
September 10, 2003 on the ground that the DOJ has no jurisdiction to conduct the
preliminary investigation.
Respondent Ombudsman, the Office of Solicitor General in representation of
respondents DOJ Panel, and Director Matillano submitted their respective comments.
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The Court heard the parties in oral arguments on the following issues:
1) Whether respondent Department of Justice Panel of Investigators has
jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation over the charge of coup
d'etat against petitioner;
2) Whether Ombudsman-DOJ Circular No. 95-001 violates the Constitution
and Republic Act No. 6770 or Ombudsman Act of 1989; and
3) Whether respondent DOJ Panel of Investigators committed grave abuse
of discretion in deferring the resolution of the petitioner's motion to clarify
jurisdiction considering the claim of the petitioner that the DOJ Panel has no
jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation.
After the oral arguments, the parties submitted their respective memoranda. The
arguments of petitioner are:
1. The Office of the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary
investigation over all public officials, including petitioner.
2. Respondent DOJ Panel is neither authorized nor deputized under OMB-
DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 to conduct the preliminary investigation
involving Honasan.
3. Even if deputized, the respondent DOJ Panel is still without authority since
OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 is ultra vires for being violative of the
Constitution, beyond the powers granted to the Ombudsman by R.A. 6770
and inoperative due to lack of publication, hence null and void.
4. Since petitioner is charged with coup de 'etat in relation to his office, it is
the Office of the Ombudsman which has the jurisdiction to conduct the
preliminary investigation.
5. The respondent DOJ Panel gravely erred in deferring the resolution of
petitioner's Motion to Clarify Jurisdiction since the issue involved therein is
determinative of the validity of the preliminary investigation.
6. Respondent DOJ Panel gravely erred when it resolved petitioner's Motion
in the guise of directing him to submit Counter-Affidavit and yet refused
and/or failed to perform its duties to resolve petitioner's Motion stating its
legal and factual bases.
The arguments of respondent DOJ Panel are:
1. The DOJ has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation on
petitioner pursuant to Section 3, Chapter I, Title III, Book IV of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1987 in relation to P.D. No. 1275, as amended by
P.D. No. 1513.
2. Petitioner is charged with a crime that is not directly nor intimately related
to his public office as a Senator. The factual allegations in the complaint and
the supporting affidavits are bereft of the requisite nexus between
petitioner's office and the acts complained of.
3. The challenge against the constitutionality of the OMB-DOJ Joint Circular,
as a ground to question the jurisdiction of the DOJ over the complaint below,
is misplaced. The jurisdiction of the DOJ is a statutory grant under the
Revised Administrative Code. It is not derived from any provision of the joint
circular which embodies the guidelines governing the authority of both the
DOJ and the Office of the Ombudsman to conduct preliminary investigation
on offenses charged in relation to public office.
4. Instead of filing his counter-affidavit, petitioner opted to file a motion to
clarify jurisdiction which, for all intents and purposes, is actually a motion to
dismiss that is a prohibited pleading under Section 3, Rule 112 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The DOJ Panel is not required to act
or even recognize it since a preliminary investigation is required solely for
the purpose of determining whether there is a sufficient ground to engender
a well founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is
probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. The DOJ panel did not
outrightly reject the motion of petitioner but ruled to pass upon the same in
the determination of the probable cause; thus, it has not violated any law or
rule or any norm of discretion.
The arguments of respondent Ombudsman are:
1. The DOJ Panel has full authority and jurisdiction to conduct preliminary
investigation over the petitioner for the reason that the crime of coup
d'etat under Article No. 134-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) may fall
under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan only if the same is committed "in
relation to office" of petitioner, pursuant to Section 4, P.D. No. 1606, as
amended by R.A. No. 7975 and R.A. No. 8249.
2. Petitioner's premise that the DOJ Panel derives its authority to conduct
preliminary investigation over cases involving public officers solely from the
OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 is misplaced because the DOJ's
concurrent authority with the OMB to conduct preliminary investigation of
cases involving public officials has been recognized in Sanchez vs.
Demetriou (227 SCRA 627 [1993]) and incorporated in Section 4, Rule 112
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
3. Petitioner's assertion that the Joint Circular is ultra vires and the DOJ
cannot be deputized by the Ombudsman en masse but must be given in
reference to specific cases has no factual or legal basis. There is no rule or
law which requires the Ombudsman to write out individualized authorities to
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 deputize prosecutors on a per case basis. The power of the Ombudsman to
deputize DOJ prosecutors proceeds from the Constitutional grant of power to
request assistance from any government agency necessary to discharge its
functions, as well as from the statutory authority to so deputize said DOJ
prosecutors under Sec. 31 of RA 6770.
4. The Joint Circular which is an internal arrangement between the DOJ and
the Office of the Ombudsman need not be published since it neither contains
a penal provision nor does it prescribe a mandatory act or prohibit any under
pain or penalty. It does not regulate the conduct of persons or the public, in
general.
The Court finds the petition without merit.
The authority of respondent DOJ Panel is based not on the assailed OMB-DOJ
Circular No. 95-001 but on the provisions of the 1987 Administrative Code under
Chapter I, Title III, Book IV, governing the DOJ, which provides:
Sec. 1. Declaration of policy - It is the declared policy of the State to provide
the government with a principal law agency which shall be both its legal
counsel and prosecution arm; administer the criminal justice system in
accordance with the accepted processes thereof consisting in the
investigation of the crimes, prosecution of offenders and administration of
the correctional system; …
Sec. 3. Powers and Functions - To accomplish its mandate, the Department
shall have the following powers and functions:
…
(2) Investigate the commission of crimes, prosecute offenders and
administer the probation and correction system; (Emphasis supplied)
and Section 1 of P.D. 1275, effective April 11, 1978, to wit:
SECTION 1. Creation of the National Prosecution Service; Supervision and
Control of the Secretary of Justice. – There is hereby created and
established a National Prosecution Service under the supervision and
control of the Secretary of Justice, to be composed of the Prosecution Staff
in the Office of the Secretary of Justice and such number of Regional State
Prosecution Offices, and Provincial and City Fiscal's Offices as are
hereinafter provided, which shall be primarily responsible for the
investigation and prosecution of all cases involving violations of penal
laws. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner claims that it is the Ombudsman, not the DOJ, that has the jurisdiction to
conduct the preliminary investigation under paragraph (1), Section 13, Article XI of the
1987 Constitution, which confers upon the Office of the Ombudsman the power
to investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any
public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be
illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. Petitioner rationalizes that the 1987
Administrative Code and the Ombudsman Act of 1989 cannot prevail over the
Constitution, pursuant to Article 7 of the Civil Code, which provides:
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or
non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the
contrary.
When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the
former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they
are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.
and Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito.2
The Court is not convinced. Paragraph (1) of Section 13, Article XI of the
Constitution, viz:
SEC. 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers,
functions, and duties:
1. Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission
of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.
does not exclude other government agencies tasked by law to investigate and
prosecute cases involving public officials. If it were the intention of the framers of the
1987 Constitution, they would have expressly declared the exclusive conferment of
the power to the Ombudsman. Instead, paragraph (8) of the same Section 13 of the
Constitution provides:
(8) Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or
perform such functions or duties as may be provided by law.
Accordingly, Congress enacted R.A. 6770, otherwise known as "The Ombudsman Act
of 1989." Section 15 thereof provides:
Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. - The Office of the Ombudsman
shall have the following powers, functions and duties:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any
act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when
such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It
has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan
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 and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any
stage, from any investigatory agency of the government, the
investigation of such cases.
…. (Emphasis supplied)
Pursuant to the authority given to the Ombudsman by the Constitution and the
Ombudsman Act of 1989 to lay down its own rules and procedure, the Office of the
Ombudsman promulgated Administrative Order No. 8, dated November 8, 1990,
entitled, Clarifying and Modifying Certain Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman, to
wit:
A complaint filed in or taken cognizance of by the Office of the Ombudsman
charging any public officer or employee including those in government-
owned or controlled corporations, with an act or omission alleged to be
illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient is an Ombudsman case. Such a
complaint may be the subject of criminal or administrative proceedings, or
both.
For purposes of investigation and prosecution, Ombudsman cases
involving criminal offenses may be subdivided into two classes, to wit:
(1) those cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and (2) those falling under
the jurisdiction of the regular courts. The difference between the two,
aside from the category of the courts wherein they are filed, is on the
authority to investigate as distinguished from the authority to
prosecute, such cases.
The power to investigate or conduct a preliminary investigation on any
Ombudsman case may be exercised by an investigator or prosecutor
of the Office of the Ombudsman, or by any Provincial or City
Prosecutor or their assistance, either in their regular capacities or as
deputized Ombudsman prosecutors.
The prosecution of cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan shall be
under the direct exclusive control and supervision of the Office of the
Ombudsman. In cases cognizable by the regular Courts, the control
and supervision by the Office of the Ombudsman is only in
Ombudsman cases in the sense defined above. The law recognizes a
concurrence of jurisdiction between the Office of the Ombudsman and
other investigative agencies of the government in the prosecution of
cases cognizable by regular courts. (Emphasis supplied)
It is noteworthy that as early as 1990, the Ombudsman had properly differentiated the
authority to investigate cases from the authority to prosecute cases. It is on this note
that the Court will first dwell on the nature or extent of the authority of the
Ombudsman to investigate cases. Whence, focus is directed to the second sentence
of paragraph (1), Section 15 of the Ombudsman Act which specifically provides that
the Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan, and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at
any stage, from any investigating agency of the government, the investigation of such
cases.
That the power of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public officers or
employees is not exclusive but is concurrent with other similarly authorized agencies
of the government such as the provincial, city and state prosecutors has long been
settled in several decisions of the Court.
In Cojuangco, Jr. vs. Presidential Commission on Good Government, decided in
1990, the Court expressly declared:
A reading of the foregoing provision of the Constitution does not show that
the power of investigation including preliminary investigation vested on the
Ombudsman is exclusive.3
Interpreting the primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman under Section 15 (1) of the
Ombudsman Act, the Court held in said case:
Under Section 15 (1) of Republic Act No. 6770 aforecited, the Ombudsman
has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan so that
it may take over at any stage from any investigatory agency of the
government, the investigation of such cases. The authority of the
Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public officers or
employees is not exclusive but is concurrent with other similarly
authorized agencies of the government. Such investigatory agencies
referred to include the PCGG and the provincial and city prosecutors
and their assistants, the state prosecutors and the judges of the
municipal trial courts and municipal circuit trial court.
In other words the provision of the law has opened up the authority to
conduct preliminary investigation of offenses cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan to all investigatory agencies of the government duly
authorized to conduct a preliminary investigation under Section 2, Rule
112 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure with the only qualification
that the Ombudsman may take over at any stage of such investigation
in the exercise of his primary jurisdiction.4 (Emphasis supplied)
A little over a month later, the Court, in Deloso vs. Domingo,5 pronounced that the
Ombudsman, under the authority of Section 13 (1) of the 1987 Constitution, has
jurisdiction to investigate any crime committed by a public official, elucidating thus:
As protector of the people, the office of the Ombudsman has the power,
function and duty to "act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner
against public officials" (Sec. 12) and to "investigate x x x any act or
omission of any public official x x x when such act or omission appears to be
illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient." (Sec. 13[1].) The Ombudsman is also
empowered to "direct the officer concerned," in this case the Special
Prosecutor, "to take appropriate action against a public official x x x and to
recommend his prosecution" (Sec. 13[3]).
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 The clause "any [illegal] act or omission of any public official" is broad
enough to embrace any crime committed by a public official. The law does
not qualify the nature of the illegal act or omission of the public official or
employee that the Ombudsman may investigate. It does not require that the
act or omission be related to or be connected with or arise from, the
performance of official duty. Since the law does not distinguish, neither
should we.
The reason for the creation of the Ombudsman in the 1987 Constitution and
for the grant to it of broad investigative authority, is to insulate said office
from the long tentacles of officialdom that are able to penetrate judges' and
fiscals' offices, and others involved in the prosecution of erring public
officials, and through the exertion of official pressure and influence, quash,
delay, or dismiss investigations into malfeasances and misfeasances
committed by public officers. It was deemed necessary, therefore, to create
a special office to investigate all criminal complaints against public officers
regardless of whether or not the acts or omissions complained of are related
to or arise from the performance of the duties of their office. The
Ombudsman Act makes perfectly clear that the jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman encompasses "all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and
non-feasance that have been committed by any officer or employee as
mentioned in Section 13 hereof, during his tenure of office" (Sec. 16, R.A.
6770).
.........
Indeed, the labors of the constitutional commission that created the
Ombudsman as a special body to investigate erring public officials would be
wasted if its jurisdiction were confined to the investigation of minor and less
grave offenses arising from, or related to, the duties of public office, but
would exclude those grave and terrible crimes that spring from abuses of
official powers and prerogatives, for it is the investigation of the latter where
the need for an independent, fearless, and honest investigative body, like the
Ombudsman, is greatest.6
At first blush, there appears to be conflicting views in the rulings of the Court in
the Cojuangco, Jr. case and the Deloso case. However, the contrariety is more
apparent than real. In subsequent cases, the Court elucidated on the nature of the
powers of the Ombudsman to investigate.
In 1993, the Court held in Sanchez vs. Demetriou,7 that while it may be true that the
Ombudsman has jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute any illegal act or omission
of any public official, the authority of the Ombudsman to investigate is merely a
primary and not an exclusive authority, thus:
The Ombudsman is indeed empowered under Section 15, paragraph (1) of
RA 6770 to investigate and prosecute any illegal act or omission of any
public official. However as we held only two years ago in the case of
Aguinaldo vs. Domagas,8 this authority "is not an exclusive authority but
rather a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged."
Petitioners finally assert that the information and amended information filed
in this case needed the approval of the Ombudsman. It is not disputed that
the information and amended information here did not have the approval of
the Ombudsman. However, we do not believe that such approval was
necessary at all. In Deloso v. Domingo, 191 SCRA 545 (1990), the Court
held that the Ombudsman has authority to investigate charges of illegal acts
or omissions on the part of any public official, i.e., any crime imputed to a
public official. It must, however, be pointed out that the authority of the
Ombudsman to investigate "any [illegal] act or omission of any public
official" (191 SCRA 550) is not an exclusive authority but rather a
shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged, i.e.,
the crime of sedition. Thus, the non-involvement of the office of the
Ombudsman in the present case does not have any adverse legal
consequence upon the authority of the panel of prosecutors to file and
prosecute the information or amended information.
In fact, other investigatory agencies of the government such as the
Department of Justice in connection with the charge of sedition, and
the Presidential Commission on Good Government, in ill gotten wealth
cases, may conduct the investigation.9 (Emphasis supplied)
In Natividad vs. Felix,10 a 1994 case, where the petitioner municipal mayor contended
that it is the Ombudsman and not the provincial fiscal who has the authority to
conduct a preliminary investigation over his case for alleged Murder, the Court held:
The Deloso case has already been re-examined in two cases,
namely Aguinaldo vs. Domagas and Sanchez vs. Demetriou. However, by
way of amplification, we feel the need for tracing the history of the legislation
relative to the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan since the Ombudsman's primary
jurisdiction is dependent on the cases cognizable by the former.
In the process, we shall observe how the policy of the law, with reference to
the subject matter, has been in a state of flux.
These laws, in chronological order, are the following: (a) Pres. Decree No.
1486, -- the first law on the Sandiganbayan; (b) Pres. Decree No. 1606
which expressly repealed Pres. Decree No. 1486; (c) Section 20 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129; (d) Pres. Decree No. 1860; and (e) Pres. Decree No.
1861.
The latest law on the Sandiganbayan, Sec. 1 of Pres. Decree No. 1861
reads as follows:
"SECTION 1. Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606 is hereby
amended to read as follows:
'SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. – The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:
'(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
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 ...
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers
and employees in relation to their office, including those
employed in government-owned or controlled corporation,
whether simple or complexed with other crimes, where the
penalty prescribed by law is higher that prision
correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine
of P6,000: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that offenses or
felonies mentioned in this paragraph where the penalty
prescribed by law does not exceed prision correccional or
imprisonment for six (6) years or a fine of P6,000 shall be
tried by the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial
Court, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial
Court."
A perusal of the aforecited law shows that two requirements must concur
under Sec. 4 (a) (2) for an offense to fall under the Sandiganbayan's
jurisdiction, namely: the offense committed by the public officer must be in
relation to his office and the penalty prescribed be higher then prision
correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00.11
Applying the law to the case at bench, we find that although the second
requirement has been met, the first requirement is wanting. A review of
these Presidential Decrees, except Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, would reveal
that the crime committed by public officers or employees must be "in relation
to their office" if it is to fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. This
phrase which is traceable to Pres. Decree No. 1468, has been retained by
Pres. Decree No. 1861 as a requirement before the Ombudsman can
acquire primary jurisdiction on its power to investigate.
It cannot be denied that Pres. Decree No. 1861 is in pari materia to
Article XI, Sections 12 and 13 of the 1987 Constitution and the
Ombudsman Act of 1989 because, as earlier mentioned, the
Ombudsman's power to investigate is dependent on the cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. Statutes are in pari materia when
they relate to the same person or thing or to the same class of persons
or things, or object, or cover the same specific or particular subject
matter.
It is axiomatic in statutory construction that a statute must be
interpreted, not only to be consistent with itself, but also to harmonize
with other laws on the same subject matter, as to form a complete,
coherent and intelligible system. The rule is expressed in the maxim,
"interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretandi," or every
statute must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to
form a uniform system of jurisprudence. Thus, in the application and
interpretation of Article XI, Sections 12 and 13 of the 1987 Constitution
and the Ombudsman Act of 1989, Pres. Decree No. 1861 must be taken
into consideration. It must be assumed that when the 1987 Constitution
was written, its framers had in mind previous statutes relating to the
same subject matter. In the absence of any express repeal or
amendment, the 1987 Constitution and the Ombudsman Act of 1989 are
deemed in accord with existing statute, specifically, Pres. Decree No.
1861.12 (Emphasis supplied)
R.A. No. 8249 which amended Section 4, paragraph (b) of the Sandiganbayan Law
(P.D. 1861) likewise provides that for other offenses, aside from those enumerated
under paragraphs (a) and (c), to fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, they must have been committed by public officers or employees in
relation to their office.
In summation, the Constitution, Section 15 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 and
Section 4 of the Sandiganbayan Law, as amended, do not give to the Ombudsman
exclusive jurisdiction to investigate offenses committed by public officers or
employees. The authority of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public
officers or employees is concurrent with other government investigating agencies
such as provincial, city and state prosecutors. However, the Ombudsman, in the
exercise of its primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, may
take over, at any stage, from any investigating agency of the government, the
investigation of such cases.
In other words, respondent DOJ Panel is not precluded from conducting any
investigation of cases against public officers involving violations of penal laws but if
the cases fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, then respondent
Ombudsman may, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction take over at any stage.
Thus, with the jurisprudential declarations that the Ombudsman and the DOJ have
concurrent jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation, the respective heads of
said offices came up with OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 for the proper
guidelines of their respective prosecutors in the conduct of their investigations, to wit:
OMB-DOJ JOINT CIRCULAR NO. 95-001
Series of 1995
TO: ALL GRAFT INVESTIGATION/SPECIAL PROSECUTION OFFICERS
OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
ALL REGIONAL STATE PROSECUTORS AND THEIR ASSISTANTS,
PROVINCIAL/CITY PROSECUTORS AND THEIR ASSISTANTS, STATE
PROSECUTORS AND PROSECUTING ATTORNEYS OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE.
SUBJECT: HANDLING COMPLAINTS FILED AGAINST PUBLIC
OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES, THE CONDUCT OF PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION, PREPARATION OF RESOLUTIONS AND
INFORMATIONS AND PROSECUTION OF CASES BY PROVINCIAL AND
CITY PROSECUTORS AND THEIR ASSISTANTS.
Civil Law Review I – 08.12.19 |7
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- monthly list of complaints filed with their respective offices against public
---x officers and employees.

In a recent dialogue between the OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN and the Manila, Philippines, October 5, 1995.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, discussion centered around the latest
pronouncement of the supreme court on the extent to which the ombudsman
may call upon the government prosecutors for assistance in the investigation (signed) (signed)
and prosecution of criminal cases cognizable by his office and the conditions
under which he may do so. Also discussed was Republic Act No. 7975 TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. ANIANO A. DESIERTO
otherwise known as "an act to strengthen the functional and structural Secretary Ombudsman
organization of the sandiganbayan, amending for the purpose presidential Department of Justice Office of the Ombudsman
decree no. 1606, as amended" and its implications on the jurisdiction of the
office of the Ombudsman on criminal offenses committed by public officers
and employees. A close examination of the circular supports the view of the respondent Ombudsman
that it is just an internal agreement between the Ombudsman and the DOJ.
Concerns were expressed on unnecessary delays that could be caused by
discussions on jurisdiction between the OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN and Sections 2 and 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure on
the department of justice, and by procedural conflicts in the filing of Preliminary Investigation, effective December 1, 2000, to wit:
complaints against public officers and employees, the conduct of preliminary
investigations, the preparation of resolutions and informations, and the SEC. 2. Officers authorized to conduct preliminary investigations-
prosecution of cases by provincial and city prosecutors and their assistants
as deputized prosecutors of the ombudsman.
The following may conduct preliminary investigations:
Recognizing the concerns, the office of the ombudsman and the department
of justice, in a series of consultations, have agreed on the following (a) Provincial or City Prosecutors and their assistants;
guidelines to be observed in the investigation and prosecution of cases
against public officers and employees: (b) Judges of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts;
1. Preliminary investigation and prosecution of offenses committed by public
officers and employees in relation to office whether cognizable by the (c) National and Regional State Prosecutors; and
sandiganbayan or the regular courts, and whether filed with the office of the
ombudsman or with the office of the provincial/city prosecutor shall be under
(d) Other officers as may be authorized by law.
the control and supervision of the office of the ombudsman.

Their authority to conduct preliminary investigation shall include all

2. Unless the Ombudsman under its Constitutional mandate finds reason to
crimes cognizable by the proper court in their respective territorial
believe otherwise, offenses not in relation to office and cognizable by the
jurisdictions.
regular courts shall be investigated and prosecuted by the office of the
provincial/city prosecutor, which shall rule thereon with finality.
SEC. 4. Resolution of investigating prosecutor and its review. - If the
investigating prosecutor finds cause to hold the respondent for trial, he shall
3. Preparation of criminal information shall be the responsibility of the
prepare the resolution and information, He shall certify under oath in the
investigating officer who conducted the preliminary investigation. Resolutions
information that he, or as shown by the record, an authorized officer, has
recommending prosecution together with the duly accomplished criminal
personally examined the complainant and his witnesses; that there is
informations shall be forwarded to the appropriate approving authority.
reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the
accused is probably guilty thereof; that the accused was informed of the
4. Considering that the office of the ombudsman has jurisdiction over public complaint and of the evidence submitted against him; and that he was given
officers and employees and for effective monitoring of all investigations and an opportunity to submit controverting evidence. Otherwise, he shall
prosecutions of cases involving public officers and employees, the office of recommend the dismissal of the complaint.
the provincial/city prosecutor shall submit to the office of the ombudsman a

Civil Law Review I – 08.12.19 |8

 Within five (5) days from his resolution, he shall forward the record of the
case to the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, or to the
Ombudsman or his deputy in cases of offenses cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. They shall act
on the resolution within ten (10) days from their receipt thereof and shall
immediately inform the parties of such action.
No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an
investigating prosecutor without the prior written authority or approval
of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the
Ombudsman or his deputy.
Where the investigating prosecutor recommends the dismissal of the
complaint but his recommendation is disapproved by the provincial or city
prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy on the
ground that a probable cause exists, the latter may, by himself file the
information against the respondent, or direct another assistant prosecutor or
state prosecutor to do so without conducting another preliminary
investigation.
If upon petition by a proper party under such rules as the Department of
Justice may prescribe or motu proprio, the Secretary of Justice reverses or
modifies the resolution of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state
prosecutor, he shall direct the prosecutor concerned either to file the
corresponding information without conducting another preliminary
investigation, or to dismiss or move for dismissal of the complaint or
information with notice to the parties. The same Rule shall apply in
preliminary investigations conducted by the officers of the Office of the
Ombudsman. (Emphasis supplied)
confirm the authority of the DOJ prosecutors to conduct preliminary investigation of
criminal complaints filed with them for offenses cognizable by the proper court within
their respective territorial jurisdictions, including those offenses which come within the
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan; but with the qualification that in offenses
falling within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the prosecutor shall,
after their investigation, transmit the records and their resolutions to the
Ombudsman or his deputy for appropriate action. Also, the prosecutor cannot
dismiss the complaint without the prior written authority of the Ombudsman or his
deputy, nor can the prosecutor file an Information with the Sandiganbayan without
being deputized by, and without prior written authority of the Ombudsman or his
deputy.
Next, petitioner contends that under OMB-Joint Circular No. 95-001, there is no
showing that the Office of the Ombudsman has deputized the prosecutors of the DOJ
to conduct the preliminary investigation of the charge filed against him.
We find no merit in this argument. As we have lengthily discussed, the Constitution,
the Ombudsman Act of 1989, Administrative Order No. 8 of the Office of the
Ombudsman, the prevailing jurisprudence and under the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, all recognize and uphold the concurrent jurisdiction of the Ombudsman
and the DOJ to conduct preliminary investigation on charges filed against public
officers and employees.
To reiterate for emphasis, the power to investigate or conduct preliminary
investigation on charges against any public officers or employees may be exercised
by an investigator or by any provincial or city prosecutor or their assistants, either in
their regular capacities or as deputized Ombudsman prosecutors. The fact that all
prosecutors are in effect deputized Ombudsman prosecutors under the OMB-DOJ
Circular is a mere superfluity. The DOJ Panel need not be authorized nor deputized
by the Ombudsman to conduct the preliminary investigation for complaints filed with it
because the DOJ's authority to act as the principal law agency of the government and
investigate the commission of crimes under the Revised Penal Code is derived from
the Revised Administrative Code which had been held in the Natividad case13 as not
being contrary to the Constitution. Thus, there is not even a need to delegate the
conduct of the preliminary investigation to an agency which has the jurisdiction to do
so in the first place. However, the Ombudsman may assert its primary jurisdiction at
any stage of the investigation.
Petitioner's contention that OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 is ineffective on the
ground that it was not published is not plausible. We agree with and adopt the
Ombudsman's dissertation on the matter, to wit:
Petitioner appears to be of the belief, although NOT founded on a proper
reading and application of jurisprudence, that OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No.
95-001, an internal arrangement between the DOJ and the Office of the
Ombudsman, has to be published.
As early as 1954, the Honorable Court has already laid down the rule in the
case of People vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640 (1954) that only circulars and
regulations which prescribe a penalty for its violation should be published
before becoming effective, this, on the general principle and theory that
before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provision, a
law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially
and specifically informed of said contents and its penalties: said precedent,
to date, has not yet been modified or reversed. OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No.
95-001 DOES NOT contain any penal provision or prescribe a mandatory act
or prohibit any, under pain or penalty.
What is more, in the case of Tanada v. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 453 (1986), the
Honorable Court ruled that:
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is,
regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public,
need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters
of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or
guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their
duties. (at page 454. emphasis supplied)
Civil Law Review I – 08.12.19 |9
 OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 is merely an internal circular between
the DOJ and the Office of the Ombudsman, outlining authority and
responsibilities among prosecutors of the DOJ and of the Office of the
Ombudsman in the conduct of preliminary investigation. OMB-DOJ Joint
Circular No. 95-001 DOES NOT regulate the conduct of persons or the
public, in general.
Accordingly, there is no merit to petitioner's submission that OMB-DOJ Joint
Circular No. 95-001 has to be published.14
Petitioner insists that the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary
investigation because petitioner is a public officer with salary Grade 31 so that the
case against him falls exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Considering the Court's finding that the DOJ has concurrent jurisdiction to investigate
charges against public officers, the fact that petitioner holds a Salary Grade 31
position does not by itself remove from the DOJ Panel the authority to investigate the
charge of coup d'etat against him.
The question whether or not the offense allegedly committed by petitioner is one of
those enumerated in the Sandiganbayan Law that fall within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan will not be resolved in the present petition so as not to pre-
empt the result of the investigation being conducted by the DOJ Panel as to the
questions whether or not probable cause exists to warrant the filing of the information
against the petitioner; and to which court should the information be filed considering
the presence of other respondents in the subject complaint.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
2. G.R. NO. 146779 January 23, 2006
RENATO S. GATBONTON, Petitioner, vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, MAPUA INSTITUTE OF
TECHNOLOGY and JOSE CALDERON, Respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court which seeks to set aside the Decision1 dated November 10, 2000 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 57470, affirming the decision of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC); and the CA Resolution dated January 16,
2001, denying the motion for reconsideration.2
Petitioner Renato S. Gatbonton is an associate professor of respondent Mapua
Institute of Technology (MIT), Faculty of Civil Engineering. Some time in November
1998, a civil engineering student of respondent MIT filed a letter-complaint against
petitioner for unfair/unjust grading system, sexual harassment and conduct
unbecoming of an academician. Pending investigation of the complaint, respondent
MIT, through its Committee on Decorum and Investigation placed petitioner under a
30-day preventive suspension effective January 11, 1999. The committee believed
that petitioner’s continued stay during the investigation affects his performance as a
faculty member, as well as the students’ learning; and that the suspension will allow
petitioner to "prepare himself for the investigation and will prevent his influences to
other members of the community."3
Thus, petitioner filed with the NLRC a complaint for illegal suspension, damages and
attorney’s fees,4 docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No. 01-00388-99.
Petitioner questioned the validity of the administrative proceedings with the Regional
Trial Court of Manila in a petition for certiorari but the case was terminated on May 21,
1999 when the parties entered into a compromise agreement wherein respondent
MIT agreed to publish in the school organ the rules and regulations implementing
Republic Act No. 7877 (R.A. No. 7877) or the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act; disregard
the previous administrative proceedings and conduct anew an investigation on the
charges against petitioner. Petitioner agreed to recognize the validity of the published
rules
and regulations, as well as the authority of respondent to investigate, hear and decide
the administrative case against him.5
On June 18, 1999, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
Wherefore, premises considered, the thirty day preventive suspension of complainant
is hereby declared to be illegal. Accordingly, respondents are directed to pay his
wages during the period of his preventive suspension.
The rest of complainant’s claims are dismissed.
SO ORDERED.6
Both respondents and petitioner filed their appeal from the Labor Arbiter’s Decision,
with petitioner questioning the dismissal of his claim for damages. In a Decision dated
September 30, 1999, the NLRC granted respondents’ appeal and set aside the Labor
Arbiter’s decision. His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the NLRC on
December 13, 1999, petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA.
On November 10, 2000, the CA promulgated the assailed decision affirming the
NLRC decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED DUE
COURSE and ORDERED DISMISSED, and the challenged decision and order of
public respondent NLRC AFFIRMED.
Civil Law Review I – 08.12.19 |10
SO ORDERED.7
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which the CA denied in its Resolution
dated January 16, 2001.
Hence, the present petition based on the following grounds:
A
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
NLRC WAS NOT GUILTY OF GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
RENDERING BOTH THE APPEAL DECISION AND THE NLRC
RESOLUTION.
B Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
NLRC’S DISMISSAL OF PETITIONER’S CLAIM FOR DAMAGES.8
Petitioner finds fault in the CA’s decision, arguing that his preventive suspension does
not find any justification in the Mapua Rules and Regulations considering that at the
time of his preventive suspension on January 11, 1999, the rules have not been
promulgated yet as it was published only on February 23, 1999. Petitioner also
contests the lack of award of damages in his favor.9
The petition is partly meritorious.
Preventive suspension is a disciplinary measure for the protection of the company’s
property pending investigation of any alleged malfeasance or misfeasance committed
by the employee. The employer may place the worker concerned under preventive
suspension if his continued employment poses a serious and imminent threat to the
life or property of the employer or of his co-workers.10 However, when it is determined
that there is no sufficient basis to justify an employee’s preventive suspension, the
latter is entitled to the payment of salaries during the time of preventive suspension. 11
R.A. No. 7877 imposed the duty on educational or training institutions to "promulgate
rules and regulations in consultation with and jointly approved by the employees or
students or trainees, through their duly designated representatives, prescribing the
procedures for the investigation of sexual harassment cases and the administrative
sanctions therefor."12 Petitioner’s preventive suspension was based on respondent
MIT’s Rules and Regulations for the Implemention of the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act
of 1995, or R.A. No. 7877. Rule II, Section 1 of the MIT Rules and Regulations
provides:
Section 1. Preventive Suspension of Accused in Sexual Harassment Cases. Any
member of the educational community may be placed immediately under preventive
suspension during the pendency of the hearing of the charges of grave sexual
harassment against him if the evidence of his guilt is strong and the school head is
morally convinced that the continued stay of the accused during the period of
investigation constitutes a distraction to the normal operations of the institution or
poses a risk or danger to the life or property of the other members of the educational
community.
It must be noted however, that respondent published said rules and regulations only
on February 23, 1999. In Tañada vs. Tuvera,13 it was ruled that:
… all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published
as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication
unless a different effectivity is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by
the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly
delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the
purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid
delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only
the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published.
Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by
administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in the performance of their duties.
…
We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its
purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. (Emphasis supplied)
The Mapua Rules is one of those issuances that should be published for its effectivity,
since its purpose is to enforce and implement R.A. No. 7877, which is a law of
general application.14 In fact, the Mapua Rules itself explicitly required publication of
the rules for its effectivity, as provided in Section 3, Rule IV (Administrative
Provisions), which states that "[T]hese Rules and Regulations to implement the Anti-
Sexual Harassment Act of 1995 shall take effect fifteen (15) days after publication by
the Committee." Thus, at the time of the imposition of petitioner’s preventive
suspension on January 11, 1999, the Mapua Rules were not yet legally effective, and
therefore the suspension had no legal basis.
Moreover, even assuming that the Mapua Rules are applicable, the Court finds that
there is no sufficient basis to justify his preventive suspension. Under the Mapua
Rules, an accused may be placed under preventive suspension during pendency of
the hearing under any of the following circumstances:
(a) if the evidence of his guilt is strong and the school head is morally
convinced that the continued stay of the accused during the period of
investigation constitutes a distraction to the normal operations of the
institution; or
Civil Law Review I – 08.12.19 |11
 (b) the accused poses a risk or danger to the life or property of the other
members of the educational community.
In petitioner’s case, there is no indication that petitioner’s preventive suspension may
be based on the foregoing circumstances. Committee Resolution No. 1 (Re:
Preventive Suspension of Engr. Renato Gatbonton) passed by the Committee on
Decorum and Investigation states the reasons for petitioner’s preventive suspension,
to wit:
Whereas, the committee believe[s] that the continued stay of the respondent during
the period of investigation,
1. Affects the respondent’s performance as a faculty member and laboratory
head considering the psychological effects depression and/or emotional
stress during investigation;lavvphil.ne+
2. Affects the student[’s] learning and other members of the Mapua Institute
of Technology community.
Whereas, the committee believe[s] that this preventive suspension will allow the
respondent to prepare himself for the investigation and will prevent his influences to
other members of the community.15
Said resolution does not show that evidence of petitioner’s guilt is strong and that the
school head is morally convinced that petitioner’s continued stay during the period of
investigation constitutes a distraction to the normal operations of the institution; or that
petitioner poses a risk or danger to the life or property of the other members of the
educational community.
Even under the Labor Code, petitioner’s preventive suspension finds no valid
justification. As provided in Section 8, Rule XXIII, Book V of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code:
Sec. 8. Preventive Suspension. The employer may place the worker concerned under
preventive suspension if his continued employment poses a serious threat to the life
or property of the employer or of his co-workers.
As previously stated, there is nothing on record which shows that respondent MIT
imposed the preventive suspension on petitioner as his continued employment poses
a serious threat to the life or property of the employer or of his co-workers; therefore,
his preventive suspension is not justified.16 Consequently, the payment of wages
during his 30-day preventive suspension, i.e., from January 11, 1999 to February 10,
1999, is in order.
With regard to petitioner’s claim for damages, the Court finds the same to be without
basis. While petitioner’s preventive suspension may have been unjustified, this does
not automatically mean that he is entitled to moral or other damages. In Cocoland
Development Corp. vs. NLRC,17 the Court ruled:lavvphil.ne+
In Primero vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, this Court held that "… an award (of
moral damages) cannot be justified solely upon the premise (otherwise sufficient for
redress under the Labor Code) that the employer fired his employee without just
cause or due process. Additional facts must be pleaded and proven to warrant the
grant of moral damages under the Civil Code, these being, to repeat, that the act of
dismissal was attended by bad faith or fraud, or was oppressive to labor, or done in a
manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy; and of course, that social
humiliation, wounded feelings, grave anxiety, etc., resulted therefrom." This was
reiterated in Garcia vs. NLRC, where the Court added that exemplary damages may
be awarded only if the dismissal was shown to have been effected in a wanton,
oppressive or malevolent manner.
This the private respondent failed to do. Because no evidence was adduced to show
that petitioner company acted in bad faith or in a wanton or fraudulent manner in
dismissing the private respondent, the labor arbiter did not award any moral and
exemplary damages in his decision. Respondent NLRC therefore had no factual or
legal basis to award such damages in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. …
The records of this case are bereft of any evidence showing that respondent MIT
acted in bad faith or in a wanton or fraudulent manner in preventively suspending
petitioner, thus, the Labor Arbiter was correct in not awarding any damages in favor of
petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated
November 10, 2000 and Resolution dated January 16, 2001 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 57470 as well as the NLRC Decision dated September 30, 1999
together with its Resolution dated December 13, 1999, are hereby SET ASIDE and
the Labor Arbiter’s Decision dated June 18, 1999 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
3. A.M. No. RTJ-07-2062* January 18, 2011
IMELDA R. MARCOS, Complainant, vs.
JUDGE FERNANDO VIL PAMINTUAN, Respondent.
DECISION
Per Curiam:
The judiciary cannot keep those who cannot meet the exacting standards of judicial
conduct and integrity. This being so, in the performance of the functions of their office,
judges must endeavor to act in a manner that puts them and their conduct above
reproach and beyond suspicion. They must act with extreme care for their office
indeed is burdened with a heavy load of responsibility. 1
Civil Law Review I – 08.12.19 |12
At bench is an administrative case filed by Imelda R. Marcos (Marcos) against Judge
Fernando Vil Pamintuan (Judge Pamintuan), Presiding Judge, Branch 3, Regional
Trial Court, Baguio City (RTC), for Gross Ignorance of the Law.
THE FACTS:
From the records, it appears that on November 15, 2006, Marcos filed a complaint-
affidavit charging Judge Pamintuan with Gross Ignorance of the Law for reversing
motu proprio the final and executory order of then Acting Presiding Judge Antonio
Reyes (Judge Reyes) dated May 30, 1996 (and modified in the September 2, 1996
order), in Civil Case No. 3383-R, entitled "Albert D. Umali, in his capacity as the
exclusive administrator and as President of the Treasure Hunters Association of the
Philippines v. Jose D. Roxas, et al."
Judge Reyes dismissed Civil Case No. 3383-R in an order, dated May 30, 1996, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises and further, for failure to comply
with Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94 dated April 1, 1994 on forum
shopping, the petition is DISMISSED.
It is further ORDERED that the Buddha statuette in the custody of this Court be
immediately RELEASED to the children of the late Rogelio Roxas, namely, Henry
Roxas and Gervic Roxas and to decedent’s brother, Jose Roxas, IN TRUST FOR the
estate of the late Rogelio Roxas.
SO ORDERED.
The parties filed their separate motions for reconsideration of the said order but both
motions were denied by the RTC for lack of merit in its June 24, 1996 Order.
On June 25, 1996, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its own motion for
reconsideration which was also denied in a court order dated September 2, 1996.
Ten (10) years later, in an order dated May 9, 2006, Judge Pamintuan set the case
for hearing on June 29, 2006 purportedly to formally and finally release the Golden
Buddha to its rightful owner. Marcos was one of the subpoenaed parties, being a
person with interest in the case.
On August 15, 2006, Judge Pamintuan issued an order, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, in accordance with the final and executory Order of this Court dated
September 2, 1996, the Buddha Statuette or Buddha replica is awarded to the estate
of Rogelio Roxas. However, the Buddha Statuette or Buddha replica shall be
under custodia legis until the final settlement of the estate of the late Rogelio Roxas,
or upon the appointment of his estate’s administrator.
This Court further rules that the Golden Buddha in its custody is a fake one, or a mere
replica of the original Golden Buddha which has a detachable head, which has been
missing since 1971 up to the present, or for a period of thirty five (35) years by now,
and has been in unlawful possession of persons who do not have title over it, nor any
right at all to possess this original Golden Buddha.
Marcos averred that the act of Judge Pamintuan in reversing a final and executory
order constituted gross ignorance of the law. In her complaint, citing A.M. No. 93-7-
696-0, she argued that final and executory judgments of lower courts were not
reviewable even by the Supreme Court. Judge Pamintuan reversed a final and
executory order not upon the instance of any of the parties in Civil Case No. 3383-R
but motu proprio. He even failed to indicate where he obtained the information that
the Golden Buddha sitting in his sala was a "mere replica." Marcos claimed that his
order was in conflict with Rule 36 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure which
provides that a judgment or final order shall state "clearly and distinctly the facts and
the law on which it (his order) is based xxx."
In his Comment, Judge Pamintuan argued that Marcos could have just filed a
pleading manifesting lack of interest or moving for the recall of the subpoena, but she
did not. In fact, her counsel, Atty. Robert Sison, entered his appearance and actually
appeared in court. With her appearance through counsel, she subjected herself to the
jurisdiction of the court. She should have filed a motion for reconsideration of the
August 15, 2006 Order instead of filing an administrative complaint. As she did not,
Judge Pamintuan opined that her lost judicial remedies could not be substituted with
the filing of this case.
Marcos, in her Reply-Affidavit, stated that she was not a party in Civil Case No. 3383-
R, hence, she could not file a motion for reconsideration. She cited Section 1 of Rule
37 which provides that only the aggrieved party may file a motion for reconsideration
within the period for taking an appeal.
In its Report, dated June 29, 2007, the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) recommended that Judge Pamintuan be dismissed from the
service with the additional penalty of forfeiture of all his retirement benefits and
disqualification from re-employment in the government service, including government
owned or controlled corporations, for Gross Ignorance of the Law and for "violation of
Canon 4 of the Code of Judicial Conduct." The OCA pointed out that:
As held, execution is the fruit and end of the suit and is the life of the law. A judgment,
if left unexecuted, would be nothing but an empty victory for the prevailing party.
Bearing this in mind, respondent issued the questioned Order dated August 15, 2006,
the pertinent text of which reads:
Despite said Order which was issued almost ten (10) years ago, the estate of the late
Rogelio Roxas has not taken possession of the Buddha Statuette or the Buddha
replica from the Court, thus, this incumbent Presiding Judge, seeing the necessity of
finally disposing of the Buddha Statuette physically, and finding out the present statue
of the late Rogelio Roxas, ordered the hearing on June 29, 2006. (Italics supplied)
Civil Law Review I – 08.12.19 |13
 xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, in accordance with the final and executory Order of this Court dated
September 2, 1996, the Buddha Statuette or Buddha replica is awarded to the estate
of Rogelio Roxas. However, the Buddha Statuette or Buddha replica shall be under
custodia legis until the final settlement of the estate of the late Rogelio Roxas, or upon
the appointment of his estate’s administrator.
Clearly, the questioned Order conforms to the directive of the Court in its previous
Order dated May 30, 1996, which provides:
It is further ORDERED that the Buddha Statuette in custody of this Court be
immediately RELEASED to the children of the late Rogelio Roxas, namely, Henry
Roxas and Gervic Roxas and to the decedent’s brother, Jose Roxas, IN TRUST FOR
the estate of the late Rogelio Roxas.
And modified in an Order dated September 2, 1996, which reads:
"WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Solicitor General is
DENIED. The Order of this Court on May 30, 1996 remains insofar as the Buddha
statuette is awarded to the state of the late Rogelio Roxas and is at the same time
MODIFIED in the sense that the Buddha statuette shall be under the custodia legis
until the final settlement of the estate of the late Rogelio Roxas or upon the
appointment of his estate’s administrator."
xxx xxx xxx
A normal course of proceedings would have been that respondent Judge waits for the
proper party to go to court to ask for the release of the Buddha statuette. x x x.
However, respondent was being overzealous when he ruled that the Golden Buddha
in its custody is a "fake one, or a mere replica." Notwithstanding that the same may
be his’ and the litigants’ opinion during the hearing of June 29, 2006. (sic) He should
have borne in mind that there were no issues nor controversies left for consideration
in Civil Case No. 3383-R. It must be noted that the Order dated May 30, 1996 (and
modified on September 2, 1996) has become final and executory. Hence, issues have
been settled and the matter laid to rest. As repeatedly ruled by this Court, a decision
that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable. A final judgment may
no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct
erroneous conclusions of fact or law. Should judgment of lower courts – which may
normally be subject to review by higher tribunals – become final and executory
before, or without exhaustion of all recourse of appeal, they too become inviolable,
impervious to modification. They may, then, no longer be reviewed, or in any way
modified directly or indirectly, by a higher court, not even by Supreme Court, much
less by any other official, branch or department of government.
It is inexcusable for respondent Judge to have overlooked such an elementary legal
principle."
Upon recommendation of the OCA, the Court, in its July 31, 2007 Resolution,
preventively suspended Judge Pamintuan pending resolution of this administrative
case to stop him from committing further damage to the judiciary. Judge Pamintuan
moved for reconsideration and eventually filed a Motion for Early Resolution of Motion
for Reconsideration and to Submit the Case for Decision.
The matter was referred again to the OCA for evaluation, report and recommendation.
In its Memorandum dated November 22, 2007, the OCA recommended that "the
Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent be GRANTED and that the Order of
Preventive Suspension dated July 31, 2007, be LIFTED." Thus, in its December 11,
2007 Resolution, the Court granted the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Judge
Pamintuan and lifted the Order of Preventive Suspension effective immediately.
Judge Pamintuan then sent a letter requesting for his backpay and benefits covering
the period of his preventive suspension from August to December 13, 2007. In its
June 3, 2008 Resolution, following the recommendation of the OCA, the Court denied
said request for being premature and for lack of merit.
Now, the Court resolves the complaint against Judge Pamintuan.
After a thorough study of the case, the Court agrees with the evaluation and
recommendation of the OCA.
Doubtless, the May 30, 1996 Order, which was modified on September 2, 1996, in
Civil Case No. 3383-R, has long become final and executory. In his assailed August
15, 2006 Order, Judge Pamintuan made express declarations that were not embodied
either in the May 30, 1996 Order or in the September 2, 1996 Order. He ruled that the
Golden Buddha in the custody of the court was a "fake one, or a mere replica" of the
original. This may be his opinion or the litigants’ during the hearing of June 29, 2006
but Judge Pamintuan should have realized that the trial court did not rule on that point
in its May 30, 1996 Order (even in its September 2, 1996 Order). Insofar as this issue
is concerned, the May 30, 1996 Order pertinently reads:
Albert Umali anchors his claim on the supposed Memorandum of Agreement between
him and the late Rogelio Roxas executed on November 25, 1988. He claims that
under this agreement, he and Rogelio Roxas will share in the profits of their business
venture, that is, treasure hunting and claim for lost treasure.
He adds, however, that the Buddha with this Court is not the genuine Buddha.
According to him, he has photographs to prove the existence of the real and genuine
golden Buddha. To be sure, this Court is baffled by the foregoing submission of Mr.
Umali, if the subject Buddha is not the genuine golden Buddha, and therefore a fake
one, it cannot be covered by the memorandum of Agreement.
Be it noted that the Memorandum of Agreement speaks of treasure hunting and lost
treasure which could refer to things of great value. Based on Mr. Umali’s own claim
the subject Buddha has no appreciable material value. It is therefore outside the
scope of the Memorandum of Agreement. This being the case, what right then does
Albert Umali have to demand the return of the subject Buddha to him? On this score
Civil Law Review I – 08.12.19 |14
alone, this Court should already reject the claim of Mr. Umali over the Buddha now in
this Court’s custody.
xxx xxx xxx
Now, as to whether or not there is that controversial golden Buddha different from the
one now in custody of this Court, there is none. X x x.
Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial
Conducthttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/april2006/A. M. No. RTJ-05-
1920.htm - _ftn provides:
SECTION 6. Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression,
belief, association and assembly, but in exercising such rights, they shall always
conduct themselves in such manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office
and the impartiality and independence of the judiciary. [Emphases ours]
Judge Pamintuan indeed made a serious error in making such a pronouncement in
the challenged order.
It is axiomatic that when a judgment is final and executory, it becomes immutable and
unalterable. It may no longer be modified in any respect either by the court which
rendered it or even by this Court. The doctrine of immutability and inalterability of a
final judgment has a two-fold purpose, to wit: (1) to avoid delay in the administration
of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial business;
and (2) to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which is
precisely why courts exist. Controversies cannot drag on indefinitely.2
It is inexcusable for Judge Pamintuan to have overlooked such basic legal principle
no matter how noble his objectives were at that time. Judges owe it to the public to be
well-informed, thus, they are expected to be familiar with the statutes and procedural
rules at all times. When the law is so elementary, not to know it or to act as if one
does not know it, constitutes gross ignorance of the law.3
The Court agrees with the view of OCA that Judge Pamintuan manifested gross
ignorance of the law in issuing the questioned August 15, 2006 Order. Verily, he failed
to conform to the high standards of competence required of judges under the Code of
Judicial Conduct, which provides that:
Rule 1.01 - A judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and
independence.
Rule 3.01 - A judge shall x x x maintain professional competence.
Competence is a mark of a good judge. When a judge exhibits an utter lack of know-
how with the rules or with settled jurisprudence, he erodes the public’s confidence in
the competence of our courts. It is highly crucial that judges be acquainted with the
law and basic legal principles. Ignorance of the law, which everyone is bound to
know, excuses no one - not even judges.4
Notably, this is not Judge Pamintuan’s first and sole administrative case. In The
Officers and Members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Baguio-Benguet
Chapter v. Pamintuan,5 Judge Pamintuan was charged with Gross Ignorance of the
Law, Gross Violation of the Constitutional Rights of the Accused, Arrogance and
Violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics and was suspended for one (1) year.
In the case of Atty. Gacayan v. Hon. Pamintuan,6 he was found guilty of violating
Canons 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Ethics
which amounted to grave misconduct, conduct unbecoming of an officer of the
judiciary and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. He was
reprimanded and was sternly warned that a repetition of the foregoing or similar
transgressions would be dealt with more severely. He was also meted a fine of
₱10,000.00.
In a much recent case, Biggel v. Pamintuan,7 he was charged with manifest partiality,
gross misconduct, ignorance of the law, and unjust and malicious delay in the
resolution of the incidents in Criminal Case No. 25383-R entitled "People of the
Philippines v. Emil Biggel," a case for estafa. He was found guilty of violating Rule
3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which requires judges to dispose of court
business promptly. The Court imposed upon him a fine in the amount of ₱20,000.00,
with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts would be dealt with
more severely.
As of this time, there is another administrative case yet to be resolved against Judge
Pamintuan filed by one Peter Cosalan for gross ignorance of the law. 8 Although, this
is not pertinent in the resolution of this case, it is clear from the other undisputed
records that Judge Pamintuan has failed to meet the exacting standards of judicial
conduct and integrity. He has shown himself unworthy of the judicial robe and place of
honor reserved for guardians of justice. As held in the case of Malabed v. Asis: 9
Respondent Judge must bear in mind that membership in the judiciary circumscribes
one’s personal conduct and imposes upon him certain restrictions, the faithful
observance of which is the price one has to pay for holding such a distinguished
position. x x x His conduct must be able to withstand the most searching public
scrutiny, for the ethical principles and sense of propriety of a judge are essential to
the preservation of the people’s faith in the judicial system lest public confidence in
the judiciary would be eroded by the incompetent, irresponsible and negligent conduct
of judges.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/RTJ-07-2031.htm -
_ftn
The Court has held time and again that a judge is expected to demonstrate more than
just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules. It is essential that he
be familiar with basic legal principles and be aware of well-settled doctrines.10
As fittingly stated in the case of Borromeo v. Mariano,11 "Our conception of good
judges has been, and is, of men who has a mastery of the principles of law, who
Civil Law Review I – 08.12.19 |15
discharge their duties in accordance with law." Thus, this Court has had the occasion
to hold that:
When the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule,
a law or a principle in the discharge of his duties, a judge is either too incompetent
and undeserving of the position and title he holds or he is too vicious that the
oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial
authority. In both instances, the judge’s dismissal is in order. After all, faith in the
administration of justice exists only if every party-litigant is assured that occupants of
the bench cannot justly be accused of deficiency in their grasp of legal principles. 12
In this case, the Court finds Judge Pamintuan accountable for gross ignorance of the
law.1âwphi1 He could have simply been suspended and fined, but the Court cannot
take his previous infractions lightly. His violations are serious in character. Having
been previously warned and punished for various infractions, Judge Pamintuan now
deserves the ultimate administrative penalty − dismissal from service.
The Court doubts if he ever took seriously its previous warnings that a repetition of his
offenses would merit a more severe sanction from this Court. His conduct in this case
and his prior infractions are grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service. As
shown from the cited administrative cases filed against Judge Pamintuan, he was
liable not only for gross ignorance of the law but for other equally serious
transgressions.1âwphi1 This Court should, therefore, refrain from being lenient, when
doing so would give the public the impression that incompetence and repeated
offenders are tolerated in the judiciary.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Fernando Vil Pamintuan of the Regional Trial Court
of Baguio City, Branch 3, is DISMISSED from the service. He shall
forthwith CEASE and DESIST from performing any official act or function appurtenant
to his office upon service on him of this decision. SO ORDERED.
4. PEOPLE OF THE PHILLIPPINES vs. ROBERTO QUIACHON
G.R. No. 170236 August 31, 2006
FACTS: Appellant Roberto Quiachon was charged with the crime of qualified rape. On
or about May 12, 2001, the accused, by means of force and intimidation had sexual
intercourse with one Rowena Quiachon, his daughter, 8 years old, a deaf-mute minor.
Rowel recounted that on the night of May 12, 2001, Rowel saw his father on top of his
sister Rowena and they were covered by a blanket or "kumot." His father's buttocks
were moving up and down, and Rowel could hear Rowena crying. He could not do
anything because he was afraid of their father. Rowel remained in the room but the
following morning, he told his aunt, Carmelita Mateo about what he had witnessed.
Together, Carmelita and Rowel went to the police to report what had transpired.
The Regional Trial Court found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of qualified rape defined and penalized under Articles 266-A and B of the Revised
Penal Code. The court imposed death penalty against the accused. The defense
argued that the benefits of RA 9346 should be extended to the accused.
ISSUE: Whether the appellant can benefit from R.A. 9346 which abolished the death
penalty law.
HELD: Yes. In view of the enactment of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9346 on June 24, 2006
prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty to be meted on appellant is
reclusion perpetua in accordance with Section 2 thereof which reads:
SECTION 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:
(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the
nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or
(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make use of the
nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code.
The aforequoted provision of R.A. No. 9346 is applicable in this case pursuant to the
principle in criminal law, favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa restrigenda. Penal laws
which are favorable to accused are given retroactive effect. This principle is embodied
under Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides as follows: Retroactive
effect of penal laws. — Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor
the persons guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in
Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws, a
final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.
However, appellant is not eligible for parole because Section 3 of R.A. No. 9346
provides that "persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or
whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua by reason of the law, shall not
be eligible for parole."
5. G.R. No. 164435 September 29, 2009
VICTORIA S. JARILLO, Petitioner, vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, praying that the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated July 21, 2003,
and its Resolution2 dated July 8, 2004, be reversed and set aside.
On May 31, 2000, petitioner was charged with Bigamy before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 117 under the following Information in Criminal Case No.
00-08-11:
INFORMATION
The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses VICTORIA S. JARILLO of the
crime of BIGAMY, committed as follows:
Civil Law Review I – 08.12.19 |16
That on or about the 26th day of November 1979, in Pasay City, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, Victoria S. Jarillo, being previously united in lawful marriage with Rafael M.
Alocillo, and without the said marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with Emmanuel
Ebora Santos Uy which marriage was only discovered on January 12, 1999.
Contrary to law.
On July 14, 2000, petitioner pleaded not guilty during arraignment and, thereafter, trial
proceeded.
The undisputed facts, as accurately summarized by the CA, are as follows.
On May 24, 1974, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo were married in a civil wedding
ceremony solemnized by Hon. Monico C. Tanyag, then Municipal Mayor of Taguig,
Rizal (Exhs. A, A-1, H, H-1, H-2, O, O-1, pp. 20-21, TSN dated November 17, 2000).
On May 4, 1975, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo again celebrated marriage in a
church wedding ceremony before Rev. Angel Resultay in San Carlos City,
Pangasinan (pp. 25-26, TSN dated November 17, 2000). Out of the marital union,
appellant begot a daughter, Rachelle J. Alocillo on October 29, 1975 (Exhs. F, R, R-
1).
Appellant Victoria Jarillo thereafter contracted a subsequent marriage with Emmanuel
Ebora Santos Uy, at the City Court of Pasay City, Branch 1, before then Hon. Judge
Nicanor Cruz on November 26, 1979 (Exhs. D, J, J-1, Q, Q-1, pp. 15-18, TSN dated
November 22, 2000).
On April 16, 1995, appellant and Emmanuel Uy exchanged marital vows anew in a
church wedding in Manila (Exh. E).
In 1999, Emmanuel Uy filed against the appellant Civil Case No. 99-93582 for
annulment of marriage before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
Thereafter, appellant Jarillo was charged with bigamy before the Regional Trial Court
of Pasay City x x x.
xxxx
Parenthetically, accused-appellant filed against Alocillo, on October 5, 2000, before
the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Civil Case No. 00-1217, for declaration of nullity of
their marriage.
On July 9, 2001, the court a quo promulgated the assailed decision, the dispositive
portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing premises, this court hereby finds accused Victoria
Soriano Jarillo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of BIGAMY.
Accordingly, said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
SIX (6) YEARS of prision correccional, as minimum, to TEN (10) YEARS of prision
mayor, as maximum.
This court makes no pronouncement on the civil aspect of this case, such as the
nullity of accused’s bigamous marriage to Uy and its effect on their children and their
property. This aspect is being determined by the Regional Trial Court of Manila in
Civil Case No. 99-93582.
Costs against the accused.
The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the same court in that assailed
Order dated 2 August 2001.3
For her defense, petitioner insisted that (1) her 1974 and 1975 marriages to Alocillo
were null and void because Alocillo was allegedly still married to a certain Loretta
Tillman at the time of the celebration of their marriage; (2) her marriages to both
Alocillo and Uy were null and void for lack of a valid marriage license; and (3) the
action had prescribed, since Uy knew about her marriage to Alocillo as far back as
1978.
On appeal to the CA, petitioner’s conviction was affirmed in toto. In its Decision dated
July 21, 2003, the CA held that petitioner committed bigamy when she contracted
marriage with Emmanuel Santos Uy because, at that time, her marriage to Rafael
Alocillo had not yet been declared null and void by the court. This being so, the
presumption is, her previous marriage to Alocillo was still existing at the time of her
marriage to Uy. The CA also struck down, for lack of sufficient evidence, petitioner’s
contentions that her marriages were celebrated without a marriage license, and that
Uy had notice of her previous marriage as far back as 1978.
In the meantime, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 140, rendered a Decision dated
March 28, 2003, declaring petitioner’s 1974 and 1975 marriages to Alocillo null and
void ab initio on the ground of Alocillo’s psychological incapacity. Said decision
became final and executory on July 9, 2003. In her motion for reconsideration,
petitioner invoked said declaration of nullity as a ground for the reversal of her
conviction. However, in its Resolution dated July 8, 2004, the CA, citing Tenebro v.
Court of Appeals,4 denied reconsideration and ruled that "[t]he subsequent
declaration of nullity of her first marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity,
while it retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum
between the spouses is concerned, the said marriage is not without legal
consequences, among which is incurring criminal liability for bigamy." 5
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court where petitioner alleges that:
Civil Law Review I – 08.12.19 |17
V.1. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
PROCEEDING WITH THE CASE DESPITE THE PENDENCY OF A CASE WHICH IS
PREJUDICIAL TO THE OUTCOME OF THIS CASE.
V.2. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION OF PETITIONER FOR THE CRIME OF BIGAMY
DESPITE THE SUPERVENING PROOF THAT THE FIRST TWO MARRIAGES OF
PETITIONER TO ALOCILLO HAD BEEN DECLARED BY FINAL JUDGMENT NULL
AND VOID AB INITIO.
V.3. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT
CONSIDERING THAT THERE IS A PENDING ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE AT
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT BRANCH 38 BETWEEN EMMANUEL SANTOS
AND VICTORIA S. JARILLO.
V.4. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT
CONSIDERING THAT THE INSTANT CASE OF BIGAMY HAD ALREADY
PRESCRIBED.
V.5. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT
CONSIDERING THAT THE MARRIAGE OF VICTORIA JARILLO AND EMMANUEL
SANTOS UY HAS NO VALID MARRIAGE LICENSE.
V.6. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT
ACQUITTING THE PETITIONER BUT IMPOSED AN ERRONEOUS PENALTY
UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE AND THE INDETERMINATE SENTENCE
LAW.
The first, second, third and fifth issues, being closely related, shall be discussed
jointly. It is true that right after the presentation of the prosecution evidence, petitioner
moved for suspension of the proceedings on the ground of the pendency of the
petition for declaration of nullity of petitioner’s marriages to Alocillo, which, petitioner
claimed involved a prejudicial question. In her appeal, she also asserted that the
petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Uy, initiated by the latter, was a
ground for suspension of the proceedings. The RTC denied her motion for
suspension, while the CA struck down her arguments. In Marbella-Bobis v.
Bobis,6 the Court categorically stated that:
x x x as ruled in Landicho v. Relova, he who contracts a second marriage before the
judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted
for bigamy, and in such a case the criminal case may not be suspended on the
ground of the pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity. x x x
xxxx
x x x The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is
presumed to be subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent was for all legal intents and
purposes regarded as a married man at the time he contracted his second marriage
with petitioner. Against this legal backdrop, any decision in the civil action for nullity
would not erase the fact that respondent entered into a second marriage during the
subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the
determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question. x x x7
The foregoing ruling had been reiterated in Abunado v. People, 8 where it was held
thus:
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial
because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated.
Moreover, petitioner’s assertion would only delay the prosecution of bigamy cases
considering that an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous
marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the
criminal case. We cannot allow that.
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to [private
complainant] had no bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt
in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy
to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is
contracted.
Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed
valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner
eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is,
both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was
annulled.9
For the very same reasons elucidated in the above-quoted cases, petitioner’s
conviction of the crime of bigamy must be affirmed. The subsequent judicial
declaration of nullity of petitioner’s two marriages to Alocillo cannot be considered a
valid defense in the crime of bigamy. The moment petitioner contracted a second
marriage without the previous one having been judicially declared null and void, the
crime of bigamy was already consummated because at the time of the celebration of
the second marriage, petitioner’s marriage to Alocillo, which had not yet been
declared null and void by a court of competent jurisdiction, was deemed valid and
subsisting. Neither would a judicial declaration of the nullity of petitioner’s marriage to
Uy make any difference.10 As held in Tenebro, "[s]ince a marriage contracted during
the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second
marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. x
x x A plain reading of [Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code], therefore, would
indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage." 11
Petitioner’s defense of prescription is likewise doomed to fail.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, bigamy is punishable by prision mayor,
which is classified under Article 25 of said Code as an afflictive penalty. Article 90
thereof provides that "[c]rimes punishable by other afflictive penalties shall prescribe
in fifteen years," while Article 91 states that "[t]he period of prescription shall
Civil Law Review I – 08.12.19 |18
commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended
party, the authorities, or their agents x x x ."
Petitioner asserts that Uy had known of her previous marriage as far back as 1978;
hence, prescription began to run from that time. Note that the party who raises a fact
as a matter of defense has the burden of proving it. The defendant or accused is
obliged to produce evidence in support of its defense; otherwise, failing to establish
the same, it remains self-serving.12 Thus, for petitioner’s defense of prescription to
prosper, it was incumbent upon her to adduce evidence that as early as the year
1978, Uy already obtained knowledge of her previous marriage.
A close examination of the records of the case reveals that petitioner utterly failed to
present sufficient evidence to support her allegation. Petitioner’s testimony that her
own mother told Uy in 1978 that she (petitioner) is already married to Alocillo does not
inspire belief, as it is totally unsupported by any corroborating evidence. The trial
court correctly observed that:
x x x She did not call to the witness stand her mother – the person who allegedly
actually told Uy about her previous marriage to Alocillo. It must be obvious that
without the confirmatory testimony of her mother, the attribution of the latter of any act
which she allegedly did is hearsay.13
As ruled in Sermonia v. Court of Appeals,14 "the prescriptive period for the crime of
bigamy should be counted only from the day on which the said crime was discovered
by the offended party, the authorities or their [agents]," as opposed to being counted
from the date of registration of the bigamous marriage.15 Since petitioner failed to
prove with certainty that the period of prescription began to run as of 1978, her
defense is, therefore, ineffectual.1avvphi1
Finally, petitioner avers that the RTC and the CA imposed an erroneous penalty
under the Revised Penal Code. Again, petitioner is mistaken.
The Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that the accused shall be sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty, the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the
attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the Revised Penal Code,
and the minimum of which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower than that
prescribed by the Code for the offense, without first considering any modifying
circumstance attendant to the commission of the crime. The Indeterminate Sentence
Law leaves it entirely within the sound discretion of the court to determine the
minimum penalty, as long as it is anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower
without any reference to the periods into which it might be subdivided. The modifying
circumstances are considered only in the imposition of the maximum term of the
indeterminate sentence.16
Applying the foregoing rule, it is clear that the penalty imposed on petitioner is proper.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty for bigamy is
prision mayor. The penalty next lower is prision correccional, which ranges from 6
months and 1 day to 6 years. The minimum penalty of six years imposed by the trial
court is, therefore, correct as it is still within the duration of prision correccional. There
being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances proven in this case, the prescribed
penalty of prision mayor should be imposed in its medium period, which is from 8
years and 1 day to 10 years. Again, the trial court correctly imposed a maximum
penalty of 10 years.
However, for humanitarian purposes, and considering that petitioner’s marriage to
Alocillo has after all been declared by final judgment 17 to be void ab initio on account
of the latter’s psychological incapacity, by reason of which, petitioner was subjected to
manipulative abuse, the Court deems it proper to reduce the penalty imposed by the
lower courts. Thus, petitioner should be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty
of imprisonment from Two (2) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals dated July 21, 2003, and its Resolution dated July 8, 2004 are
hereby MODIFIED as to the penalty imposed, but AFFIRMED in all other respects.
Petitioner is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from Two
(2) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to
Eight (8) years and One (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
6. G.R. No. 165300 April 23, 2010
ATTY. PEDRO M. FERRER, Petitioner, vs.
SPOUSES ALFREDO DIAZ and IMELDA DIAZ, REINA COMANDANTE and
SPOUSES BIENVENIDO PANGAN and ELIZABETH PANGAN, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
The basic questions to be resolved in this case are: Is a waiver of hereditary rights in
favor of another executed by a future heir while the parents are still living valid? Is an
adverse claim annotated on the title of a property on the basis of such waiver likewise
valid and effective as to bind the subsequent owners and hold them liable to the
claimant?
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the
December 12, 2003 Decision2of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
70888.3 Said Decision modified the June 14, 2001 Summary Judgment4 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-99-38876 by holding
respondents Spouses Bienvenido and Elizabeth Pangan (the Pangans) not solidarily
liable with the other respondents, Spouses Alfredo and Imelda Diaz (the Diazes) and
Reina Comandante (Comandante), to petitioner Atty. Pedro M. Ferrer (Atty. Ferrer).
Likewise assailed is the CA Resolution5 dated September 10, 2004 which denied
petitioner’s as well as respondents Spouses Diaz and Comandante’s respective
motions for reconsideration.
Civil Law Review I – 08.12.19 |19
The parties’ respective versions of the factual antecedents are as follows:
Version of the Petitioner
Petitioner Atty. Ferrer claimed in his original Complaint6 that on May 7, 1999, the
Diazes, as represented by their daughter Comandante, through a Special Power of
Attorney (SPA),7 obtained from him a loan of ₱1,118,228.00. The loan was secured
by a Real Estate Mortgage Contract8 by way of second mortgage over Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-66049 and a Promissory Note10 payable within six
months or up to November 7, 1999. Comandante also issued to petitioner postdated
checks to secure payment of said loan.
Petitioner further claimed that prior to this or on May 29, 1998, Comandante, for a
valuable consideration of ₱600,000.00, which amount formed part of the
abovementioned secured loan, executed in his favor an instrument entitled Waiver of
Hereditary Rights and Interests Over a Real Property (Still Undivided), 11 the pertinent
portions of which read:
I, REINA D. COMANDANTE, of legal age, Filipino, married, with residence and postal
address at No. 6, Road 20, Project 8, Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines, for a
valuable consideration of SIX HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (₱600,000.00) which
constitutes my legal obligation/loan to Pedro M. Ferrer, likewise of legal age, Filipino,
married to Erlinda B. Ferrer, with residence and postal address at No. 9, Lot 4, Puerto
Rico Street, Loyola Grand Villas, Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines, by virtue of
these presents, do hereby WAIVE, and/or REPUDIATE all my hereditary rights and
interests as a legitimate heir/daughter of Sps. Alfredo T. Diaz and Imelda G. Diaz in
favor of said Pedro M. Ferrer, his heirs and assigns over a certain parcel of land
together with all the improvements found thereon and which property is more
particularly described as follows:
TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE
NO. RT-6604 (82020) PR-18887
xxxx
and which property is titled and registered in the name of my parents Alfredo T. Diaz
and Imelda G. Diaz, as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT 6604
(82020) PR-18887.
(sgd.)
REINA D. COMANDANTE
Affiant
On the basis of said waiver, petitioner executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim 12 which
he caused to be annotated at the back of TCT No. RT-6604 on May 26, 1999.
The Diazes, however, reneged on their obligation as the checks issued by
Comandante were dishonored upon presentment. Despite repeated demands, said
respondents still failed and refused to settle the loan. Thus, petitioner filed on
September 29, 1999 a Complaint13 for Collection of Sum of Money Secured by Real
Estate Mortgage Contract against the Diazes and Comandante docketed as Civil
Case No. Q-99-38876 and raffled to Branch 224 of RTC, Quezon City.
Petitioner twice amended his complaint. First, by including as an alternative relief the
Judicial Foreclosure of Mortgage14 and, second, by impleading as additional
defendants the Pangans as the mortgaged property covered by TCT No. RT-6604
was already transferred under their names in TCT No. N-209049. Petitioner prayed in
his second amended complaint that all the respondents be ordered to jointly and
solidarily pay him the sum of ₱1,118,228.00, exclusive of interests, and/or for the
judicial foreclosure of the property pursuant to the Real Estate Mortgage Contract.
Version of the Respondents
In her Answer15 to petitioner’s original complaint, Comandante alleged that petitioner
and his wife were her fellow members in the Couples for Christ Movement. Sometime
in 1998, she sought the help of petitioner with regard to the mortgage with a bank of
her parents’ lot located at No. 6, Rd. 20, Project 8, Quezon City and covered by TCT
No. RT-6604. She also sought financial accommodations from the couple on several
occasions which totaled ₱500,000.00. Comandante, however, claimed that these
loans were secured by chattel mortgages over her taxi units in addition to several
postdated checks she issued in favor of petitioner.
As she could not practically comply with her obligation, petitioner and his wife,
presented to Comandante sometime in May 1998 a document denominated as
Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interests Over a Real Property (Still Undivided)
pertaining to a waiver of her hereditary share over her parents’ abovementioned
property. Purportedly, the execution of said waiver was to secure Comandante’s loan
with the couple which at that time had already ballooned to ₱600,000.00 due to
interests.
A year later, the couple again required Comandante to sign the following documents:
(1) a Real Estate Mortgage Contract over her parents’ property; and, (2) an undated
Promissory Note, both corresponding to the amount of ₱1,118,228.00, which
petitioner claimed to be the total amount of Comandante’s monetary obligation to him
exclusive of charges and interests. Comandante alleged that she reminded petitioner
that she was not the registered owner of the subject property and that although her
parents granted her SPA, same only pertains to her authority to mortgage the
property to banks and other financial institutions and not to individuals. Petitioner
nonetheless assured Comandante that the SPA was also applicable to their
transaction. As Comandante was still hesitant, petitioner and his wife threatened to
foreclose the former’s taxi units and present the postdated checks she issued to the
bank for payment. For fear of losing her taxi units which were the only source of her
livelihood, Comandante was thus constrained to sign the mortgage agreement as well
as the promissory note. Petitioner, however, did not furnish her with copies of said
documents on the pretext that they still have to be notarized, but, as can be gleaned
from the records, the documents were never notarized. Moreover, Comandante
claimed that the SPA alluded to by petitioner in his complaint was not the same SPA
under which she thought she derived the authority to execute the mortgage contract.
Civil Law Review I – 08.12.19 |20
Comandante likewise alleged that on September 29, 1999 at 10:00 o‘ clock in the
morning, she executed an Affidavit of Repudiation/Revocation of Waiver of Hereditary
Rights and Interests Over A (Still Undivided) Real Property,16 which she caused to be
annotated on the title of the subject property with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon
City on the same day. Interestingly, petitioner filed his complaint later that day too.
By way of special and affirmative defenses, Comandante asserted in her Answer to
the amended complaint17 that said complaint states no cause of action against her
because the Real Estate Mortgage Contract and the waiver referred to by petitioner in
his complaint were not duly, knowingly and validly executed by her; that the Waiver of
Hereditary Rights and Interests Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) is a useless
document as its execution is prohibited by Article 1347 of the Civil Code, 18 hence, it
cannot be the source of any right or obligation in petitioner’s favor; that the Real
Estate Mortgage was of doubtful validity as she executed the same without valid
authority from her parents; and, that the prayer for collection and/or judicial
foreclosure was irregular as petitioner cannot seek said remedies at the same time.
Apart from executing the affidavit of repudiation, Comandante also filed on October 4,
1999 a Petition for Cancellation of Adverse Claim (P.E. 2468) Under The
Memorandum of Encumbrances of TCT No. RT-6604 (82020) PR-1888719 docketed
as LRC Case No. Q-12009 (99) and raffled to Branch 220 of RTC, Quezon City.
Petitioner who was impleaded as respondent therein moved for the consolidation of
said case20 with Civil Case No. Q-99-38876. On June 24, 2000, Branch 220 of RTC,
Quezon City ordered the consolidation of LRC Case No. Q-12009 (99) with Civil Case
No. Q-99-38876. Accordingly, the records of the former case was forwarded to
Branch 224.
For their part, the Diazes asserted that petitioner has no cause of action against them.
They claimed that they do not even know petitioner and that they did not execute any
SPA in favor of Comandante authorizing her to mortgage for the second time the
subject property. They also contested the due execution of the SPA as it was neither
authenticated before the Philippine Consulate in the United States nor notarized
before a notary public in the State of New York where the Diazes have been residing
for 16 years. They claimed that they do not owe petitioner anything. The Diazes also
pointed out that the complaint merely refers to Comandante’s personal obligation to
petitioner with which they had nothing to do. They thus prayed that the complaint
against them be dismissed.21
At the Pangans’ end, they alleged that they acquired the subject property by purchase
in good faith and for a consideration of ₱3,000,000.00 on November 11, 1999 from
the Diazes through the latter’s daughter Comandante who was clothed with SPA
acknowledged before the Consul of New York. The Pangans immediately took actual
possession of the property without anyone complaining or protesting. Soon thereafter,
they were issued TCT No. N-209049 in lieu of TCT No. RT-6604 which was
cancelled. 22
However, on December 21, 1999, they were surprised upon being informed by
petitioner that the subject land had been mortgaged to him by the Diazes. Upon
inquiry from Comandante, the latter readily admitted that she has a personal loan with
petitioner for which the mortgage of the property in petitioner’s favor was executed.
She admitted, though, that her parents were not aware of such mortgage and that
they did not authorize her to enter into such contract. Comandante also informed the
Pangans that the signatures of her parents appearing on the SPA are fictitious and
that it was petitioner who prepared such document.
As affirmative defense, the Pangans asserted that the annotation of petitioner’s
adverse claim on TCT No. RT-6604 cannot impair their rights as new owners of the
subject property. They claimed that the Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interests
Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) upon which petitioner’s adverse claim is
anchored cannot be the source of any right or interest over the property considering
that it is null and void under paragraph 2 of Article 1347 of the Civil Code.
Moreover, the Pangans asserted that the Real Estate Mortgage Contract cannot bind
them nor in any way impair their ownership of subject property because it was not
registered before the Register of Deeds.23
All the respondents interposed their respective counterclaims and prayed for moral
and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees in varying amounts.
After the parties have submitted their respective pre-trial briefs, the Diazes filed on
March 29, 2001 a Motion for Summary Judgment24 alleging that: first, since the
documents alluded to by petitioner in his complaint were defective, he was not entitled
to any legal right or relief; and, second, it was clear from the pleadings that it is
Comandante who has an outstanding obligation with petitioner which the latter never
denied. With these, the Diazes believed that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact against them and, hence, they were entitled to summary judgment.
On May 7, 2001, petitioner also filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, 25 claiming that
his suit against the respondents is meritorious and well-founded and that same is
documented and supported by law and jurisprudence. He averred that his adverse
claim annotated at the back of TCT No. RT-6604, which was carried over in TCT No.
209049 under the names of the Pangans, is not merely anchored on the Waiver of
Hereditary Rights and Interests Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) executed by
Comandante, but also on the Real Estate Mortgage likewise executed by her in
representation of her parents and in favor of petitioner. Petitioner insisted that said
adverse claim is not frivolous and invalid and is registrable under Section 70 of
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529. In fact, the Registrar of Deeds of Quezon City
had already determined the sufficiency and/or validity of such registration by
annotating said claim, and this, respondents failed to question. Petitioner further
averred that even before the sale and transfer to the Pangans of the subject property,
the latter were already aware of the existence of his adverse claim. In view of these,
petitioner prayed that his Motion for Summary Judgment be granted.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
After the filing of the parties’ respective Oppositions to the said motions for summary
judgment, the trial court, in an Order dated May 31, 2001,26 deemed both motions for
summary judgment submitted for resolution. Quoting substantially petitioner’s
allegations in his Motion for Summary Judgment, it thereafter rendered on June 14,
Civil Law Review I – 08.12.19 |21
2001 a Summary Judgment27 in favor of petitioner, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, summary judgment is hereby rendered in favor
of plaintiff and against defendants by:
a) ORDERING all defendants jointly and solidarily to pay plaintiff the sum of
ONE MILLION ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEEN THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED
TWENTY EIGHT PESOS (₱1,118,228.00) which is blood money of plaintiff;
b) ORDERING the Honorable Registrar of Deeds of Quezon City that the
rights and interest of the plaintiff over subject property be annotated at the
back of T.C.T. No. N-209049;
c) SENTENCING all defendants to pay plaintiff’s expenses of TEN
THOUSAND PESOS (₱10,000.00) and to pay the costs of suit.
IT IS SO ORDERED.28
The Pangans, the Diazes, and Comandante appealed to the CA.29 The Pangans
faulted the trial court in holding them jointly and severally liable with the Diazes and
Comandante for the satisfaction of the latter’s personal obligation to petitioner in the
total amount of ₱1,118,228.00. The Diazes and Comandante, on the other hand,
imputed error upon the trial court in rendering summary judgment in favor of
petitioner. They averred that assuming the summary judgment was proper, the trial
court should not have considered the Real Estate Mortgage Contract and the
Promissory Note as they were defective, as well as petitioner’s frivolous and non-
registrable adverse claim.
In its Decision30 dated December 12, 2003, the CA declared Comandante’s waiver of
hereditary rights null and void. However, it found the Real Estate Mortgage executed
by Comandante on behalf of her parents as binding between the parties thereto.
As regards the Pangans, the CA ruled that the mortgage contract was not binding
upon them as they were purchasers in good faith and for value. The property was free
from the mortgage encumbrance of petitioner when they acquired it as they only
came to know of the adverse claim through petitioner’s phone call which came right
after the former’s acquisition of the property. The CA further ruled that as
Comandante’s waiver of hereditary rights and interests upon which petitioner’s
adverse claim was based is a nullity, it could not be a source of any right in his favor.
Hence, the Pangans were not bound to take notice of such claim and are thus not
liable to petitioner.
Noticeably, the appellate court did not rule on the propriety of the issuance of the
Summary Judgment as raised by the Diazes and Comandante. In the ultimate, the CA
merely modified the assailed Summary Judgment of the trial court by excluding the
Pangans among those solidarily liable to petitioner, in effect affirming in all other
respects the assailed summary judgment, viz:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 224 in Civil Case No. Q-99-38876 is hereby
MODIFIED, as follows:
1. Ordering defendants-appellants Comandante and Spouses Diaz to jointly
and severally pay plaintiff the sum of Php 1,118, 228.00; and
2. Ordering defendants-appellants Comandante and Spouses Diaz to jointly
and severally pay plaintiff the amount of Php10,000.00 plus cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.31
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration32 having been denied by the CA in its
Resolution33 dated September 10, 2004, he now comes to us through this petition for
review on certiorari insisting that the Pangans should, together with the other
respondents, be held solidarily liable to him for the amount of ₱1,118,228.00.
Our Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
Petitioner merely reiterates his contentions in the Motion for Summary Judgment he
filed before the trial court. He insists that his Adverse Claim annotated at the back of
TCT No. RT-6604 is not merely anchored on Comandante’s Waiver of Hereditary
Rights and Interests Over A Real Property (Still Undivided) but also on her being the
attorney-in-fact of the Diazes when she executed the mortgage contract in favor of
petitioner. He avers that his adverse claim is not frivolous or invalid and is registrable
as the Registrar of Deeds of Quezon City even allowed its annotation. He also claims
that even prior to the sale of subject property to the Pangans, the latter already knew
of his valid and existing adverse claim thereon and are, therefore, not purchasers in
good faith. Thus, petitioner maintains that the Pangans should be held, together with
the Diazes and Comandante, jointly and severally liable to him in the total amount of
₱1,118,228.00.
Petitioner’s contentions are untenable.
The Affidavit of Adverse Claim executed by petitioner reads in part:
xxxx
1. That I am the Recipient/Benefactor of compulsory heir’s share over an
undivided certain parcel of land together with all the improvements found
therein x x x as evidenced by Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interests Over
A Real Property, executed by REINA D. COMANDANTE (a
compulsory/legitimate heir of Sps. Alfredo T. Diaz and Imelda G. Diaz), x x x.
Civil Law Review I – 08.12.19 |22
 2. That in order to protect my interest over said property as a
Recipient/Benefactor, for the registered owners/parents might dispose (of)
and/or encumber the same in a fraudulent manner without my knowledge
and consent, for the owner’s duplicate title was not surrendered to me, it is
petitioned that this Affidavit of Adverse Claim be ANNOTATED at the back of
the said title particularly on the original copy of Transfer Certificate of Title
No. RT-6604 (82020) PR-18887 which is on file with the Register of Deeds
of Quezon City.
3. That I am executing this Affidavit in order to attest (to) the truth of the
foregoing facts and to petition the Honorable Registrar of Deeds, Quezon
City, to annotate this Affidavit of Adverse Claim at the back of the said title
particularly the original copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-6604
(82020) PR-18887 which is on file with the said office, so that my interest as
Recipient/Benefactor of the said property will be protected especially the
registered owner/parents, in a fraudulent manner might dispose (of) and/or
encumber the same without my knowledge and consent. (Emphasis ours)
Clearly, petitioner’s Affidavit of Adverse Claim was based solely on the waiver of
hereditary interest executed by Comandante. This fact cannot be any clearer
especially so when the inscription of his adverse claim at the back of TCT No. RT-
6604 reads as follows:
P.E. 2468/T-(82020)RT-6604 - - AFFIDAVIT OF ADVERSE CLAIM - - Executed
under oath by PEDRO M. FERRER, married to Erlinda B. Ferrer, claiming among
others that they have a claim, the interest over said property as
Recipient/Benefactor, by virtue of a waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest
over a real property x x x34(Emphasis ours)
Therefore, there is no basis for petitioner’s assertion that the adverse claim was also
anchored on the mortgage contract allegedly executed by Comandante on behalf of
her parents.
The questions next to be resolved are: Is Comandante’s waiver of hereditary rights
valid? Is petitioner’s adverse claim based on such waiver likewise valid and effective?
We note at the outset that the validity of petitioner’s adverse claim should have been
determined by the trial court after the petition for cancellation of petitioner’s adverse
claim filed by Comandante was consolidated with Civil Case No. Q-99-38876.35 This
is in consonance with Section 70 of PD 1529 which provides:
Section 70. Adverse Claim. – Whoever claims any part or interest in registered land
adverse to the registered owner, arising subsequent to the date of the original
registration, may, if no other provision is made in this Decree for registering the same,
make a statement in writing setting forth fully his alleged right or interest, and how or
under whom acquired, a reference to the number of the certificate of title of the
registered owner, the name of the registered owner, and a description of the land in
which the right or interest is claimed.
The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state the adverse claimant’s
residence, and a place at which all notices may be served upon him. This statement
shall be entitled to registration as an adverse claim on the certificate of title. The
adverse claim shall be effective for a period of thirty days from the date of registration.
After the lapse of said period, the annotation of adverse claim may be cancelled upon
filing of a verified petition therefor by the party in interest: Provided, however, That
after cancellation, no second adverse claim based on the same ground shall be
registered by the same claimant.
Before the lapse of thirty days aforesaid, any party in interest may file a petition in the
Court of First Instance where the land is situated for the cancellation of the adverse
claim, and the court shall grant a speedy hearing upon the question of validity of such
adverse claim, and shall render judgment as may be just and equitable. If the adverse
claim is adjudged to be invalid, the registration thereof shall be ordered cancelled. If,
in any case, the court, after notice and hearing, shall find that the adverse claim thus
registered was frivolous, it may fine the claimant in an amount not less than one
thousand pesos nor more than five thousand pesos, in its discretion. Before the lapse
of thirty days, the claimant may withdraw his adverse claim by filing with the Register
of Deeds a sworn petition to that effect. (Emphasis ours)
Pursuant to the third paragraph of the afore-quoted provision, it has been held that
the validity or efficaciousness of an adverse claim may only be determined by the
Court upon petition by an interested party, in which event, the Court shall order the
immediate hearing thereof and make the proper adjudication as justice and equity
may warrant. And, it is only when such claim is found unmeritorious that the
registration of the adverse claim may be cancelled. 36
As correctly pointed out by respondents, the records is bereft of any showing that the
trial court conducted any hearing on the matter. Instead, what the trial court did was to
include this material issue among those for which it has rendered its summary
judgment as shown by the following portion of the judgment:
x x x it will be NOTED that subject Adverse Claim annotated at the back of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. RT-6604 (82020) PR-18887, and carried over to defendants-
Sps. Pangan’s Title No. N-20909, is not merely anchored on defendant Reina
Comandante’s "Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real Property" but
also on her being the Attorney-In-Fact of the previous registered
owners/parents/defendants Sps. Alfredo and Imelda Diaz about the Real Estate
Mortgage Contract for a loan of ₱1,118,228.00 which is a blood money of the
plaintiff. Moreover, subject Adverse Claim in LRC Case No. Q-12009 (99) is NOT
frivolous and invalid and consequently, REGISTRABLE by virtue of Section 110 of the
Land Registration Act (now Section 70 of Presidential Decree No.
1529). 37 (Emphasis ours)
It does not escape our attention that the trial court merely echoed the claim of
petitioner that his adverse claim subject of LRC Case No. Q-12009 (99) is not
frivolous, invalid and is consequently registrable. We likewise lament the apparent
lack of effort on the part of said court to make even a short ratiocination as to how it
came up with said conclusion. In fact, what followed the above-quoted portion of the
summary judgment are mere recitals of the arguments raised by petitioner in his
Civil Law Review I – 08.12.19 |23
motion for summary judgment. And in the dispositive portion, the trial court merely
casually ordered that petitioner’s adverse claim be inscribed at the back of the title of
the Pangans. What is worse is that despite this glaring defect, the CA manifestly
overlooked the matter even if respondents vigorously raised the same before it.
Be that as it may, respondents’ efforts of pointing out this flaw, which we find
significant, have not gone to naught as will be hereinafter discussed.
All the respondents contend that the Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a
Real Property (Still Undivided) executed by Comandante is null and void for being
violative of Article 1347 of the Civil Code, hence, petitioner’s adverse claim which was
based upon such waiver is likewise void and cannot confer upon the latter any right or
interest over the property.
We agree with the respondents.
Pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 1347 of the Civil Code, no contract may
be entered into upon a future inheritance except in cases expressly authorized by law.
For the inheritance to be considered "future", the succession must not have been
opened at the time of the contract. A contract may be classified as a contract upon
future inheritance, prohibited under the second paragraph of Article 1347, where the
following requisites concur:
(1) That the succession has not yet been opened.
(2) That the object of the contract forms part of the inheritance; and,
(3) That the promissor has, with respect to the object, an expectancy of a
right which is purely hereditary in nature.38
In this case, there is no question that at the time of execution of Comandante’s
Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real Property (Still Undivided),
succession to either of her parent’s properties has not yet been opened since both of
them are still living. With respect to the other two requisites, both are likewise present
considering that the property subject matter of Comandante’s waiver concededly
forms part of the properties that she expect to inherit from her parents upon their
death and, such expectancy of a right, as shown by the facts, is undoubtedly purely
hereditary in nature.
From the foregoing, it is clear that Comandante and petitioner entered into a contract
involving the former’s future inheritance as embodied in the Waiver of Hereditary
Rights and Interest Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) executed by her in
petitioner’s favor.
In Tañedo v. Court of Appeals,39 we invalidated the contract of sale between Lazaro
Tañedo and therein private respondents since the subject matter thereof was a "one
hectare of whatever share the former shall have over Lot 191 of the cadastral survey
of Gerona, Province of Tarlac and covered by Title T-13829 of the Register of Deeds
of Tarlac." It constitutes a part of Tañedo’s future inheritance from his parents, which
cannot be the source of any right nor the creator of any obligation between the
parties.
Guided by the above discussions, we similarly declare in this case that the Waiver of
Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) executed by
Comandante in favor of petitioner as not valid and that same cannot be the source of
any right or create any obligation between them for being violative of the second
paragraph of Article 1347 of the Civil Code.
Anent the validity and effectivity of petitioner’s adverse claim, it is provided in Section
70 of PD 1529, that it is necessary that the claimant has a right or interest in the
registered land adverse to the registered owner and that it must arise subsequent to
registration. Here, as no right or interest on the subject property flows from
Comandante’s invalid waiver of hereditary rights upon petitioner, the latter is thus not
entitled to the registration of his adverse claim. Therefore, petitioner’s adverse claim
is without any basis and must consequently be adjudged invalid and ineffective and
perforce be cancelled.
Albeit we have already resolved the issues raised by petitioner, we shall not stop here
as the Diazes and Comandante in their Comment40 call our attention to the failure of
the CA to pass upon the issue of the propriety of the issuance by the trial court of the
Summary Judgment in favor of petitioner despite the fact that they have raised this
issue before the appellate court. They argue that summary judgment is proper only
when there is clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact in the action. Thus,
where the defendant presented defenses tendering factual issue which call for
presentation of evidence, as when he specifically denies the material allegations in
the complaint, summary judgment cannot be rendered.
The Diazes and Comandante then enumerate the genuine issues in the case which
they claim should have precluded the trial court from issuing a summary judgment in
petitioner’s favor. First, the execution of the SPA in favor of Comandante referred to
by petitioner in his complaint was never admitted by the Diazes. They assert that as
such fact is disputed, trial should have been conducted to determine the truth of the
matter, same being a genuine issue. Despite this, the trial court merely took the word
of the plaintiff and assumed that said document was indeed executed by
them. Second, although Comandante acknowledges that she has a personal
obligation with petitioner, she nevertheless, did not admit that it was in the amount of
₱1,118,228.00. Instead, she claims only the amount of ₱500,000.00 or ₱600,000.00
(if inclusive of interest) as her obligation. Moreover, the Diazes deny borrowing any
money from petitioner and neither did the Pangans owe him a single centavo. Thus,
the true amount of the obligation due the petitioner and how each of the respondents
are responsible for such amount are genuine issues which need formal presentation
of evidence. Lastly, they aver that the trial court ignored factual and material issues
such as the lack of probative value of Comandante’s waiver of hereditary rights as
well as of the SPA; the fact that Comandante signed the mortgage contract and
promissory note in her personal capacity; and, that all such documents were prepared
by petitioner who acted as a lawyer and the creditor of Comandante at the same time.
Civil Law Review I – 08.12.19 |24
Rule 35 of the Rules of Court provides for summary judgment, the pertinent
provisions of which are the following:
Section 1. Summary Judgment for claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim,
counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time after the
pleading in answer thereto has been served, move with supporting affidavits,
depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part
thereof.
Section 2. Summary Judgment for the defending party. A party against whom a claim,
counterclaim or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory relief is sought may, at any
time, move with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary
judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof.
Section 3. Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least ten
(10) days before the time specified for the hearing. The adverse party may serve
opposing affidavits, depositions, or admissions at least three (3) days before the
hearing. After the hearing, the judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the
pleadings, supporting affidavits, depositions and admissions on file, show that, except
as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
As can be deduced from the above provisions, summary judgment is a procedural
devise resorted to in order to avoid long drawn out litigations and useless delays.
When the pleadings on file show that there are no genuine issues of facts to be tried,
the Rules of Court allows a party to obtain immediate relief by way of summary
judgment. That is, when the facts are not in dispute, the court is allowed to decide the
case summarily by applying the law to the material facts. Conversely, where the
pleadings tender a genuine issue, summary judgment is not proper. A genuine issue
is such fact which requires the presentation of evidence as distinguished from a
sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim.41
Here, we find the existence of genuine issues which removes the case from the
coverage of summary judgment. The variance in the allegations of the parties in their
pleadings is evident.
Petitioner anchors his complaint for sum of money and/or judicial foreclosure on the
alleged real estate mortgage over the subject property allegedly entered into by
Comandante in behalf of her parents to secure payment of a loan amounting to
₱1,118,228.00. To support this claim, petitioner attached to his complaint (1) the SPA
alleged to have been executed by the Diazes; (2) the Real Estate Mortgage Contract
pertaining to the amount of ₱1,118,228.00; and, (3) a Promissory Note.
Comandante, in her Answer to petitioner’s Amended Complaint, assailed the validity
and due execution of the abovementioned documents. She asserted that the same
were not duly, knowingly and validly executed by her and that it was petitioner who
prepared all of them. Also, although she admitted owing petitioner, same was not an
absolute admission as she limited herself to an obligation amounting only to
₱600,000.00 inclusive of charges and interests. She likewise claimed that such
obligation is her personal obligation and not of her parents.
The Diazes, for their part, also denied that they executed the SPA authorizing their
daughter to mortgage their property to petitioner as well as having any obligation to
the latter.
Clearly, there are genuine issues in this case which require the presentation of
evidence. For one, it is necessary to ascertain in a full blown trial the validity and due
execution of the SPA, the Real Estate Mortgage and the Promissory Notes because
the determination of the following equally significant questions depends on them, to
wit: (1) Are the Diazes obligated to petitioner or is the obligation a purely personal
obligation of Comandante? and, (2) Is the sum of ₱1,118,228.00 as shown in the Real
Estate Mortgage and the Promissory Note, the amount which is really due the
petitioner?
To stress, trial courts have limited authority to render summary judgments and may
do so only when there is clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact. When the
facts as pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for summary
judgment cannot take the place of trial.42 From the foregoing, it is apparent that the
trial court should have refrained from issuing the summary judgment but instead
proceeded to conduct a full blown trial of the case. In view of this, the present case
should be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings and proper disposition
according to the rudiments of a regular trial on the merits and not through an
abbreviated termination of the case by summary judgment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated December 12, 2003 insofar as it excluded the respondents Spouses
Bienvenido Pangan and Elizabeth Pangan from among those solidarily liable to
petitioner Atty. Pedro M. Ferrer, is AFFIRMED. The inscription of the adverse claim of
petitioner Atty. Pedro M. Ferrer on T.C.T. No. N-209049 is hereby
ordered CANCELLED. Insofar as its other aspects are concerned, the assailed
Decision is SET ASIDE and VACATED. The case is REMANDED to the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 224 for further proceedings in accordance with this
Decision. SO ORDERED
Civil Law Review I – 08.12.19 |25
CHAPTER 2. HUMAN RELATIONS (ARTS. 19-35)
7. G.R. No. 171303 JANUARY 20, 2016
ELIZABETH L. DIAZ, Petitioner, vs.
GEORGINA R. EN CANTO, ERNESTO G. TABUJARA, GEMINO H. ABAD and
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court,
as amended, which seeks to reverse and set aside the April 28, 2005 Decision 1 and
January 20, 2006 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
55165,3 which reversed the April 17, 1996 Decision4 and September 1 7, 1996
Order5 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 71, Pasig City, in Civil Case No.
58397.
The undisputed facts as narrated by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
Plaintiff-appellant [Elizabeth L. Diaz] has been in the service of [the University of the
Philippines] U.P. since 1963. In 1987, she was an associate professor in the College
of Mass Communication (CMC). During the second semester for Academic Year (A
Y) 1987-1988, she was a full time member of the faculty and taught 12 units on full
load. After 2 to 3 weeks of teaching, she applied for sick leave effective November 23,
1987 until March 1, 1988. She returned on March 2, 1988 and submitted a Report for
Duty Form.
On May 3, 1988, Diaz filed a letter-application directly with U.P.'s "Office of the
President (Abueva) for sabbatical leave with pay for one (1) year effective June 1988
to May 1989, for "rest, renewal and study." Cecilia Lazaro, Chair of the Broadcast
Department, initially recommended to CMC Dean Encanto that Diaz's sabbatical
application be granted. After they discussed the options available to the CMC, Lazaro,
on May 10, 1988, recommended instead that Diaz be granted any leave of absence
she may be qualified for. In her May 2, 1988 letter, Diaz indicated her unwillingness to
teach. Considering the CMC's experience with Diaz who dropped her courses in the
previous semester, Lazaro deleted Diaz's name in the final schedule of classes for
the 1st semester of A Y 1988-89 beginning June 6, 1988. Incidentally, Diaz received
her salary for June 1988, indicating that her sabbatical might be approved.
Thereafter, Encanto referred Diaz's sabbatical application to the Secretary of U.P.,
recommending its denial. When requested by (Chancellor) Tabujara, Encanto
transmitted to the former a Reference Slip together with her comments thereon.
Meanwhile, Encanto requested Ermelina Kalagayan to hold Diaz's salary effective
July 1, 1988 until further notice considering that her sabbatical application has not yet
been approved and that she did not teach that semester. Consequently, Diaz's name
was deleted in the payroll from September 1988 to January 1989.
On July 4, 1988, Tabujara recommended instead that Diaz be granted a leave without
pay in order to enable the CMC to hire a substitute. The next day, the U.P.'s
Secretary referred to Abad, VicePresident (VP) for Academic Affairs, the fact of denial
of such sabbatical request, for his own comment/recommendation to the U.P.
President. Meantime, Diaz confessed her problems to Abad. On July 8, 1988, Abad
returned the Reference Slip indicating therein that Diaz had promised him earlier "to
put down in writing, from her point of view, the historical backdrop as it were to the
latest denial of her sabbatical leave." With comments, Abad then referred the matter
to the U .P. President.
Pursuant to Administrative Order No. 42 issued by the U.P. President, the Academic
Policy Coordinating Committee (APCC), on July 21, 1988, reviewed the case of Diaz.
When reminded by Abad, Diaz again promised to give the background information.
On Diaz's request to teach for that semester, AY 1988-89, the Vice Chancellor for
Academic Affairs, Edgardo Pacheco, and the HRDO Director, Atty. Pio Frago,
instructed Encanto that "Until Prof. Diaz officially reports for duty, accomplishes the
Certificate of Report for Duty, and the Dean of CMC confirms her date of actual report
for duty, she is considered absent without official leave (AWOL) for the University."
On November 8, 1988, Abad, then as OIC, issued a Memorandum to Diaz to confirm
as valid Encanto' s reason of shortage of teaching staff in denying her sabbatical.
Later, he also informed Diaz of her lack of service during the first semester of A Y
1988-89, hence, she is not entitled to be paid and asked her to clarify her status of
being on leave without pay.
[While Diaz was able to teach during the second semester of AY 1988-89, she was
not able to claim her salaries for her refusal to submit the Report for Duty Form. 6 She
received her salaries for June to July 15, 1989, but could no longer claim her salary
after July 15, 1989, when Encanto reminded the University Cashier, in a letter dated
July 26, 1989,7 that Diaz had to "accomplish the Report for Duty Form to entitle her to
salaries and make official her return to the service of the University."8 Diaz's name
was subsequently included in the payroll starting July 1990, when she submitted a
Report for Duty after her return from compulsory summer leave.9]
xxxx
In the meantime, on January 3, 1989, Diaz filed a complaint with the Office of the
Ombudsman (OMB-00-89-0049), against Gemino H. Abad, Ernesto G. Tabujara and
Georgina R. Encanto, all officials of the University of the Philippines, for the alleged
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, involving the legality of a Report for Duty Form
as a prerequisite to the payment of her salary.
On May 4, 1989, the Ombudsman dismissed the said complaint and ruled, inter alia:
Considering that Prof. Diaz was rightfully considered on leave without pay during the
first semester of A Y 1988-1989, to make official her return to the service of the
University, it is advised that she accomplish the Report for Duty Form which will then
be the basis to establish the date of her actual return to the service. However, if
Civil Law Review I – 08.12.19 |26
possible, the University authorities can perhaps dispense with the requirement and
pay her salaries for actual services rendered from November 3, 1988.
Diaz's initial Petition for Certiorari in the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 88834) assailing
the above-quoted Ombudsman's ruling was subsequently dismissed. She filed
another Petition (G.R. No. 89207) raising exactly the same issued found in G.R. No.
88834.
Meanwhile, on July 18, 1989, Diaz instituted a complaint against the U.P., Abueva,
Encanto, Tabujara and Abad with the Regional Trial Court, Pasig, Metro Manila
praying that the latter be adjudged, jointly and severally to pay her damages. She
claimed, among others, that [respondents] conspired together as joint tortfeasors, in
not paying her salaries from July 1, 1988 in the first semester of academic year 1988-
89, for the entire period when her sabbatical application was left unresolved, as well
as the salaries she earned from teaching in the second semester from November
1988 to May 1989. She likewise claimed moral and exemplary damages and
attorney's fees.
On August 31, 1989, the Supreme Court En Banc dismissed Diaz's Petition in G.R.
No. 89207, viz.:
It is noted that the Ombudsman found no manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or
gross inexcusable negligence on the part of the private respondents in denying the
application for sabbatical leave of petitioner (Diaz) and in requiring her to fill up a
Report for Duty Form as a requisite for her entitlement to salary.
To the petitioner's contentions, the Ombudsman observed, among others, the
following: that, the denial of her sabbatical leave application was due to the
exigencies of the service; that petitioner was not given a teaching assignment for the
first semester of A Y 1988-1989, because she did not want to teach then; that the
delay in action on her leave application was due to petitioner's own fault for not
following the usual procedures in the processing of her application; and that there is
no malice on the part of the private respondents in requiring petitioner to accomplish
the Report for Duty Form which is the basis of the date of her actual return to the
service.10 (Citations omitted.)
In a Decision dated April 1 7, 1996, the R TC ruled in favor of petitioner Diaz, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and against
defendants:
1. Ordering defendants, except Abueva, to pay plaintiff, jointly and severally,
the amount of P133,665.50 representing the total unpaid salaries from July
1, 1988 to May 31, 1989 and from July 16, 1989 to May 31, 1990 to be
covered by corresponding certificate of service, with legal rate of interest
from the date of this Decision until its full payment.
2. Ordering defendants, except the University and Abueva, to pay plaintiff,
jointly and severally, the amount of P300,000.00 as moral damages.
3. Ordering defendants, except the University and Abueva, to pay plaintiff,
jointly and severally, the amount of P60,000.00 as exemplary damages.
4. Ordering defendants, except the University and Abueva, to pay plaintiff,
jointly and severally, the reduced amount of PS0,000.00 as and by way of
attorney's fees.
5. Costs of suit.
The counterclaims filed by defendant Tabujara are DISMISSED.11
The RTC, ruling that a sabbatical leave is not a right but a privilege, held that
petitioner Diaz was entitled to such privilege and found that the delay in
the_resolution of her application was unreasonable and unconscionable.
However, on September 17, 1996, the RTC, in denying the Motions for
Reconsideration of the respondents in said case, also amended its earlier decision by
absolving respondent Encanto from any liability, to wit:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and against
defendants:
1. Ordering defendants, except Abueva and Encanto, to pay plaintiff, jointly
and severally, the amount of P133,665.50 representing the total unpaid
salaries from July 1, 1988 to May 31, 1989 and from July 16, 1989 to May
31, 1990 to be covered by corresponding certificate of service, with legal rate
of interest from the date of this Decision until its full payment.
2. Ordering defendants, except the University, Abueva and Encanto, to pay
plaintiff, jointly and severally, the amount of P300,000.00 as moral damages.
3. Ordering defendants, except the University, Abueva and Encanto, to pay
plaintiff, jointly and severally, the amount of P60,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
4. Ordering defendants, except University, Abueva and Encanto, to pay
plaintiff, jointly and severally, the reduced amount of P50,000.00 as and by
way of attorney's fees.
5. Costs of suit.
The counterclaims filed by defendant Tabujara are DISMISSED.12
Civil Law Review I – 08.12.19 |27
The RTC dismissed the claim of petitioner Diaz against respondent Encanto on the
ground that her function was purely recommendatory in nature. It held that she was
not instrumental in the unreasonable and unconscionable delay in the resolution of
petitioner Diaz's sabbatical application as she transmitted her recommendation to
Abueva within eighteen days from her receipt of such application. 13
Petitioner Diaz14 and respondents Tabujara,15 U.P., Abad16 and even
Encanto17 appealed the RTC's ruling to the Court of Appeals.
As respondent Encanto was absolved of liability by the R TC in its September 1 7,
1996 Order, the Court of Appeals admitted her Brief,18 as an incorporation to the
other respondents' Brief,19 and as a comment on petitioner Diaz's appeal.20
The respondents mainly argued that the R TC erred in holding them liable for
damages despite the absence of bad faith on their part, as held by both the
Ombudsman in OMB-00-89-0049 and the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 89207.
Petitioner Diaz, on the other hand, questioned the reversal of the R TC ruling only
with respect to the liability of respondent Encanto, in a lone assignment of error, viz.:
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN REVERSING ITS ORIGINAL
DECISION WITH REGARD TO PRINCIPAL DEFENDANT GEORGINA R.
ENCANTO BY ABSOLVING HER OF LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES TO PLAINTIFF-
APPELLANT ELIZABETH L. DIAZ WITHOUT ALTERING IN ANY MATERIAL
RESPECT WHATSOEVER THE FINDINGS OF FACT IN THE ORIGINAL DECISION
SHOWING CLEARLY THE RESPONSIBILITY OF DEFENDANT ENCANTO FOR (I)
THE WRONGFUL DISAPPROVAL OF PLAINTIFF'S SABBATICAL APPLICATION;
(II) THE UNJUST DEPRIVATION OF SALARIES DUE THE PLAINTIFF FOR
ALMOST ONE WHOLE SEMESTER DURING WHICH HER SABBATICAL
APPLICATION REMAINED UNRESOLVED; AND (III) THE WRONGFUL
WITHHOLDING OF PLAINTIFF'S EARNED SALARIES IN THE THREE
SUCCEEDING SEMESTERS DURING WHICH THE PLAINTIFF TAUGHT
WITHOUT BEING PAID.21
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals trimmed down the issue to whether or not respondents U.P.,
Tabujara and Abad were negligent or acted in bad faith in denying petitioner Diaz's
application for sabbatical leave and in withholding her salaries. In its Decision
promulgated on April 28, 2005, it effectively reversed the decision of the R TC, viz.:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a NEW
JUDGMENT is RENDERED, as follows: (1) defendant-appellant University of the
Philippines, through its appropriate officials, is DIRECTED to pay plaintiff-appellant
Elizabeth Diaz the sum of Twenty-One Thousand, Eight Hundred Seventy-Nine and
64/100 (P21,879.64) as unpaid salaries and allowances, and (2) the sums awarded
as moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees are hereby DELETED. This is
without prejudice to the enforcement of valid rules and regulations of the University of
the Philippines pertaining to Diaz's employment status. 22
The Court of Appeals found neither negligence nor bad faith on the part of the
respondents in their denial of petitioner Diaz's sabbatical leave application and in
withholding her salaries.
The Court of Appeals emphasized that a sabbatical leave is not a right which could be
demanded at will, even by petitioner Diaz who has been a veteran professor of 24
years at U.P. Moreover, the Court of Appeals said that the eventual denial of her
sabbatical leave application was not actionable in view of the fact that (i) it would be
unfair to impute negligence to respondents in the regular discharge of their functions;
and (ii) assuming that there was delay in the resolution of her application, she herself
caused such delay.23
The Court of Appeals also held that petitioner Diaz's own recalcitrance and defiance
to comply with certain documentary requirements was the reason her salaries were
withheld.24
Petitioner Diaz filed a Motion for Reconsideration to the aforementioned decision,
which was subsequently denied for lack of merit in a Resolution dated January 20,
2006.
Issues
Undaunted, petitioner Diaz is again before this Court, with the following Assignments
of Error:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
WITHOUT DISTURBING THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF. THE TRIAL COURT BASED
ON OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE REVEALING THE COMMISSION BY
RESPONDENTS OF THE TORTIOUS ACTS COMPLAINED OF BY PETITIONER IN
DENYING HER SABBATICAL LEA VE, THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY
ERRED IN IGNORING THOSE FINDINGS AND ADOPTING AND TREATING AS
VALID THE FLIMSY EXCUSES OF RESPONDENTS TO A VOID THE LEGAL
CONSEQUENCES OF THEIR ACTS.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE
ON RECORD, THAT "THERE WAS JUDICIOUS EXERCISE" BY RESPONDENTS
"OF THEIR DISCRETIONARY POWER WITH RESPECT TO THE DENIAL OF THE
SUBJECT SABBATICAL LEAVE."
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN TREATING AS LAWFUL THE
WITHHOLDING OF PETITIONER'S SALARIES, CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE
ON RECORD.
Civil Law Review I – 08.12.19 |28
 FOURTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING, CONTRARY TO THE
EVIDENCE ON RECORD, THAT PETITIONER "FAILED TO SHOW BY A
PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE THE NEGLIGENCE OF RESPONDENTS SO
AS TO BE ENTITLED TO THE DAMAGES SOUGHT."
FIFTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT CORRECTLY COMPUTING THE SUM
OF PETITIONER'S UNPAID AND EARNED SALARIES, IN UTTER DISREGARD OF
THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.
SIXTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING, CONTRARY TO THE
EVIDENCE ON RECORD, THAT RESPONDENTS EN CANTO, TABUJARA AND
ABAD ARE JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE TO PETITIONER FOR ACTUAL,
MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AS JOINT TORTFEASORS UNDER THE
LAW.25
The issue in this case boils down to whether or not the respondents acted in bad faith
when they resolved petitioner Diaz's application for sabbatical leave and withheld her
salaries.
Ruling of the Court
The resolution of this case hinges on the question of bad faith on the part of the
respondents in denying petitioner Diaz's sabbatical leave application and withholding
of her salaries. Bad faith, however, is a question of fact and is evidentiary. 26 Thus,
contrary to petitioner Diaz's belief that " [ w ]hat is involved in this stage of the case is
the legal interpretation or the legal consequence of the material facts of this case," the
resolution of the issue at hand involves a question of fact, which the respondents
rightly assert, is not within the province of a Rule 45 petition.27Nonetheless, the Court
makes an exception in this case especially so that both the RTC and the Court of
Appeals have the same findings of fact, but they arrived at different conclusions. 28
Application for Sabbatical Leave
Petitioner Diaz's complaint29 for recovery of damages before the RTC was based on
the alleged bad faith of the respondents in denying her application for sabbatical
leave vis-a-vis Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code.30
Articles 19 and 20 read as follows:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to
another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
Article 19 of the Civil Code "prescribes a 'primordial limitation on all rights' by setting
certain standards that must be observed in the exercise thereof." 31 Abuse of right
under Article 19 exists when the following elements are present: (1) there is a legal
right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or
injuring another.32
This Court, expounding on the concept of bad faith under Article 19, held:
Malice or bad faith is at the core of Article 19 of the Civil Code. Good faith refers to
the state of mind which is manifested by the acts of the individual concerned. It
consists of the intention to abstain from taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous
advantage of another. It is presumed. Thus, he who alleges bad faith has the duty to
prove the same. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or simple
negligence; it involves a dishonest purpose or some moral obloquy and conscious
doing of a wrong, a breach of known duty due to some motives or interest or ill will
that partakes of the nature of fraud. Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in
response to duty. It implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. Malice is
bad faith or bad motive.33(Citations omitted.)
Undoubtedly, the respondents had a duty to resolve petitioner Diaz's sabbatical leave
application. The crucial question is if they did so with the intention of prejudicing or
injuring petitioner Diaz.
We hold in the negative.
There is no dispute, and both the RTC and the Court of Appeals agree, that the grant
of a sabbatical leave is not a matter of right, but a privilege. Moreover, the issue of
whether or not the respondents acted in bad faith when they denied petitioner Diaz's
application for sabbatical leave has been answered several times, in separate
jurisdictions.
On May 4, 1989, the Ombudsman issued a Resolution34 in Case No. OMB-0-89-0049
on the complaint filed by petitioner Diaz against respondents Encanto, Tabujara, and
Abad for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, recommending the
dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit. It found no manifest partiality, evident bad
faith, or gross inexcusable negligence on the part of the respondents in their denial of
petitioner Diaz's application for sabbatical leave and in requiring her to accomplish a
Report for Duty form as a prerequisite for her entitlement to salary.
Petitioner Diaz protested the outcome of this resolution by filing a special civil action
for certiorari with this Court, on two occasions. When G.R. No. 88834 was dismissed
for non-compliance with Circular No. 1-88,35 petitioner Diaz re-filed her petition,
raising exactly the same issues, and this was docketed as G.R. No. 89207. 36
Civil Law Review I – 08.12.19 |29
On August 31, 1989, this Court issued a Resolution,37 dismissing petitioner Diaz's
petition in G.R. No. 89207. This Court noted the Ombudsman's findings and
observations and found them to be supported by substantial evidence.
On April 28, 2005, the Court of Appeals had the same findings and held that the
denial of petitioner Diaz's application for sabbatical leave was "a collegial decision
based on UP. 's established rules, the grant of which is subject to the exigencies of
the service, like acute shortage in teaching staff" It added that "the UP. officials'
eventual denial of [Diaz's} application is not actionable xx x it is unfair to impute
negligence to [respondents] in the regular discharge of their official functions. "38
The Ombudsman and all three courts, starting from the R TC to this Court, have
already established that a sabbatical leave is not a right and therefore petitioner Diaz
cannot demand its grant. It does not matter that there was only one reason for the
denial of her application, as the approving authorities found that such reason was
enough. Moreover, not only the Court of Appeals but also the Ombudsman, and this
Court, have ruled that the respondents did not act in bad faith when petitioner Diaz's
sabbatical leave application was denied. Those three separate rulings verily must be
given great weight in the case at bar.
The Court does not find any reason to disregard those findings, especially when our
own perusal of the evidence showed no traces of bad faith or malice in the
respondents' denial of petitioner Diaz's application for sabbatical leave. They
processed her application in accordance with their usual procedure - with more
leeway, in fact, since petitioner Diaz was given the chance to support her application
when she was asked to submit a historical background; and the denial was based on
the recommendation of respondent Encanto, who was in the best position to know
whether petitioner Diaz's application should be granted or not.
While the RTC declared that petitioner Diaz should have been granted a sabbatical
leave, it is important to note that the RTC awarded damages to petitioner Diaz merely
for the unreasonable and unconscionable delay in the resolution of her
sabbatical leave application,39 and not its denial per se. Thus, petitioner Diaz's
entitlement to a sabbatical leave should no longer be an issue in this case. This is
supported by petitioner Diaz's own action when she did not move for the
reconsideration of the April 17, 1996 Decision of the RTC for awarding her damages
due only to the delay in the resolution of her sabbatical leave application and not for
its denial; and more so by the prayer in her petition to this Court wherein she asked
that the April 17, 1996 Decision of the RTC be "reinstated and affirmed in toto."40
Nevertheless, on the question of whether or not there was bad faith in the delay of the
resolution of petitioner Diaz's sabbatical leave application, the Court still rules in the
negative. "It is an elementary rule in this jurisdiction that good faith is presumed and
that the burden of proving bad faith rests upon the party alleging the
same."41 Petitioner Diaz has failed to prove bad faith on the part of the respondents.
There is nothing in the records to show that the respondents purposely delayed the
resolution of her application to prejudice and injure her. She has not even shown that
the delay of six months in resolving a sabbatical leave application has never
happened prior to her case. On the contrary, any delay that occurred was due to the
fact that petitioner Diaz's application for sabbatical leave did not follow the usual
procedure; hence, the processing of said application took time.42
In petitioner Diaz's petition, she criticized the Court of Appeals for imputing the cause
of delay to her, arguing that as the requirement that a sabbatical leave application be
filed at least one semester before its intended date of effectivity was only imposed in
1990, long after she had filed hers in 1988.43 But, precisely, this rule may have been
imposed by U.P. to address any untoward delays and to likewise provide a time frame
for the approving authorities in resolving sabbatical leave applications.
This Court understands petitioner Diaz's frustration, but she cannot keep on arguing
that the facts, as established, and which she herself does not dispute, had been
misappreciated.in different occasions.
Petitioner Diaz's Withheld Salaries
Petitioner Diaz is entitled to her withheld salaries from July 1, 1988 to October 31,
1988, and from November 1, 1988 to May 31, 1989, and July 16, 1989 to May 31,
1990, upon submission of the required documents.
The denial of petitioner Diaz's salaries during the first semester of Academic Year
(AY) 1988-1989 was due to the fact that she did not teach that semester. But when
respondent Lazaro removed petitioner Diaz's name from the final schedule of
teaching assignments in CMC for the first semester of AY 1988-89, it was without
petitioner Diaz's prior knowledge, as admitted by respondent Lazaro herself, to wit:
ATTY. DIAZ: Now, did Prof. Diaz ask you to remove her from [the] schedule of
classes?
LAZARO: I did it.
Q: Because you said you did it on your own?
A: Yes.
xxxx
Q: She did not [ask] you?
A: No.44
The Court, however, observes that respondent Lazaro, in so doing, did not act in bad
faith as she expected petitioner Diaz's application for leave, of whatever nature, to be
granted. As such, she did not want Diaz to have to drop the classes she was already
handling once her sabbatical leave was approved, as was the case the semester
before, when petitioner Diaz dropped her classes, three weeks into the start of the
semester, when her application for sick leave was approved, viz.:
Civil Law Review I – 08.12.19 |30
ATTY. GUNO: You mentioned a while ago that you deleted the name of Professor
Diaz from this final schedule of classes.1âwphi1 Why did you delete it?
LAZARO: I presumed in good faith that based on the letter she sent which was routed
to me where she stated she could no longer be efficient and effective as a teacher
and she was suffering from fatigue and that she could no longer work under those
circumstances, I felt, as a gesture of sympathy to her that this should be granted
suggesting that she be given a leave of absence of whatever kind she was qualified
for and based on my previous experience on the second semester where two to three
weeks into the course she dropped her courses, I did not want that to happen again.45
ATTY. GUNO: You also testified that because of the application for sabbatical leave
and the reasons she gave in that letter, you deleted her name in the final list of class
schedule for school year 1988-89 first semester?
LAZARO: Yes.
Q: Why did you delete her name, will you tell the Court?
A: She had applied for sabbatical leave for the whole year of 1988-89 and based on
the experience of her sick leave during the previous semester which was the second
semester of the previous school year where three (3) weeks into classes she filed for
a sick leave and did not teach, based on that experience, I did not include her name
in the class list because the same thing could happen again.46
While petitioner Diaz was not consulted about the removal of her name from the class
schedule, she did not contest such upon the belief that her application for sabbatical
leave would be approved, as in fact, she was given her salary in June 1988. As such,
this Court believes, in the interest of equity and fairness, that petitioner Diaz should
be entitled to her salary during the semester when her name was dropped from the
final list of schedule of classes, without her knowledge and consent, and while action
on her application for sabbatical leave was still pending.47
On the matter of her salaries from the second semester of A Y 1988-89 up until A Y
1989-1990, the respondents legally withheld such, as found by the Ombudsman and
the Court of Appeals for petitioner Diaz's own refusal to comply with the documentary
requirements of U.P. Even the RTC, in its Omnibus Order of January 12, 1990,
denied petitioner Diaz's petition for mandatory injunction upon the finding that the
Report for Duty Form required of her is a basic and standard requirement that is
asked from all employees of U.P. The RTC held:
It is therefore clear that the acts sought to be enjoined [by Diaz] are in fact pursuant to
the proper observance of administrative or internal rules of the University. This Court
sympathizes with [Diaz] for not being able to receive her salaries after July 15, 1989.
However, such predicament cannot be outrightly attributable to the defendants, as
their withholding of her salaries appears to be in accordance with existing University
regulations.
Apart from such reasons, this Court believes that petitioner Diaz failed to show why
she should be spared from the Report for Duty requirement, which remains a
standard practice even in other offices or institutions. To be entitled to an injunctive
writ, one must show an unquestionable right and/or blatant violation of said right to be
entitled to its issuance.48
But it cannot be denied that during the periods of November 1, 1988 to May 31, 1988
and July 16, 1989 to May 31, 1990, petitioner Diaz rendered service to U.P. for which
she should be compensated.
Given the foregoing, petitioner Diaz should be paid, as the RTC had computed, her
salaries from July l, 1988 to October 1988, the semester when petitioner Diaz's name
was dropped from the final list of schedule of classes, without her prior knowledge
and consent; and for the periods of November 1, 1988 to May 31, 1989 and July 16,
1989 to May 31, 1990, for the work she rendered during said periods, but upon
petitioner Diaz's submission of the documents required by U.P.
No Payment of Other Damages
Given that the respondents have not abused their rights, they should not be held
liable for any damages sustained by petitioner Diaz. "The law affords no remedy for
damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal wrong. Situations
like this have been appropriately denominated damnum absque injuria."49 Similarly,
the Court cannot grant petitioner Diaz's claim for attorney's fees as no premium
should be placed on the right to litigate. "Even when a claimant is compelled to litigate
or to incur expenses to protect his rights, still attorney's fees may not be awarded
where there is no sufficient showing of bad faith in a party's persistence in a case
other than an erroneous conviction of the righteousness of his cause." 50
Legal Interest Due on the Salaries Withheld
Pursuant to Nacar v. Gallery Frames,51 the applicable rate of legal interest due on
petitioner Diaz's withheld salaries - (i) from July 1, 1988 to October 31, 1988, the
period corresponding to the first semester of A Y 1988-89, when her name was
removed from the final list of class schedule without her prior knowledge and consent,
less the amount she had received in June 1988 - will be from April 17, 1996, the date
of the Decision of the RTC, up to the full satisfaction thereof, is 6% per annum;
and (ii) from November 1, 1988 to May 31, 1989, and July 16, 1989 to May 31, 1990,
the periods when she was refused payment of her salaries for not accomplishing a
Report for Duty Form - will be from the time petitioner Diaz submits the required
Report for Duty Form up to the full satisfaction thereof, is 6% per annum.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 55165 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that
the University of the Philippines, through its appropriate officials, is directed to pay
petitioner Elizabeth L. Diaz her withheld salaries 1) from July 1, 1988 to October 31,
1988, with legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum, computed from the
date of the Decision of the R TC on April 17, 1996 until fully paid; and 2) from
November 1, 1988 to May 31, 1989 and July 16, 1989 to May 31, 1990, with legal
Civil Law Review I – 08.12.19 |31
interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum computed from the date petitioner
Elizabeth L. Diaz submits the documents required by the University of the Philippines
until fully paid.SO ORDERED.
8. G.R. No. 175822 October 23, 2013
CALIFORNIA CLOTHING INC. and MICHELLE S. YBAÑEZ, Petitioners, vs.
SHIRLEY G. QUIÑONES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the ; Rules of Court
are the Court of Appeals Decision1 dated August 3, 2006 and Resolution2 dated
November 14, 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 80309. The assailed decision reversed and
set aside the June 20, 2003 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (RTC),
Branch 58, in Civil Case No. CEB-26984; while the assailed resolution denied the
motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Michelle Ybañez (Ybañez).
The facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as follows:
On July 25, 2001, respondent Shirley G. Quiñones, a Reservation Ticketing Agent of
Cebu Pacific Air in Lapu Lapu City, went inside the Guess USA Boutique at the
second floor of Robinson’s Department Store (Robinson’s) in Cebu City. She fitted
four items: two jeans, a blouse and a shorts, then decided to purchase the black jeans
worth ₱2,098.00.4 Respondent allegedly paid to the cashier evidenced by a
receipt5 issued by the store.6
While she was walking through the skywalk connecting Robinson’s and Mercury Drug
Store (Mercury) where she was heading next, a Guess employee approached and
informed her that she failed to pay the item she got. She, however, insisted that she
paid and showed the employee the receipt issued in her favor. 7 She then suggested
that they talk about it at the Cebu Pacific Office located at the basement of the mall.
She first went to Mercury then met the Guess employees as agreed upon. 8
When she arrived at the Cebu Pacific Office, the Guess employees allegedly
subjected her to humiliation in front of the clients of Cebu Pacific and repeatedly
demanded payment for the black jeans.9 They supposedly even searched her wallet
to check how much money she had, followed by another argument. Respondent,
thereafter, went home.10
On the same day, the Guess employees allegedly gave a letter to the Director of
Cebu Pacific Air narrating the incident, but the latter refused to receive it as it did not
concern the office and the same took place while respondent was off duty.11 Another
letter was allegedly prepared and was supposed to be sent to the Cebu Pacific Office
in Robinson’s, but the latter again refused to receive it.12 Respondent also claimed
that the Human Resource Department (HRD) of Robinson’s was furnished said letter
and the latter in fact conducted an investigation for purposes of canceling
respondent’s Robinson’s credit card. Respondent further claimed that she was not
given a copy of said damaging letter.13 With the above experience, respondent
claimed to have suffered physical anxiety, sleepless nights, mental anguish, fright,
serious apprehension, besmirched reputation, moral shock and social
humiliation.14 She thus filed the Complaint for Damages15 before the RTC against
petitioners California Clothing, Inc. (California Clothing), Excelsis Villagonzalo
(Villagonzalo), Imelda Hawayon (Hawayon) and Ybañez. She demanded the payment
of moral, nominal, and exemplary damages, plus attorney’s fees and litigation
expenses.16
In their Answer,17 petitioners and the other defendants admitted the issuance of the
receipt of payment. They claimed, however, that instead of the cashier (Hawayon)
issuing the official receipt, it was the invoicer (Villagonzalo) who did it manually. They
explained that there was miscommunication between the employees at that time
because prior to the issuance of the receipt, Villagonzalo asked Hawayon " Ok na ?,"
and the latter replied " Ok na ," which the former believed to mean that the item has
already been paid.18 Realizing the mistake, Villagonzalo rushed outside to look for
respondent and when he saw the latter, he invited her to go back to the shop to make
clarifications as to whether or not payment was indeed made. Instead, however, of
going back to the shop, respondent suggested that they meet at the Cebu Pacific
Office. Villagonzalo, Hawayon and Ybañez thus went to the agreed venue where they
talked to respondent.19 They pointed out that it appeared in their conversation that
respondent could not recall whom she gave the payment. 20 They emphasized that
they were gentle and polite in talking to respondent and it was the latter who was
arrogant in answering their questions.21 As counterclaim, petitioners and the other
defendants sought the payment of moral and exemplary damages, plus attorney’s
fees and litigation expenses.22
On June 20, 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing both the complaint and
counterclaim of the parties. From the evidence presented, the trial court concluded
that the petitioners and the other defendants believed in good faith that respondent
failed to make payment. Considering that no motive to fabricate a lie could be
attributed to the Guess employees, the court held that when they demanded payment
from respondent, they merely exercised a right under the honest belief that no
payment was made. The RTC likewise did not find it damaging for respondent when
the confrontation took place in front of Cebu Pacific clients, because it was
respondent herself who put herself in that situation by choosing the venue for
discussion. As to the letter sent to Cebu Pacific Air, the trial court also did not take it
against the Guess employees, because they merely asked for assistance and not to
embarrass or humiliate respondent. In other words, the RTC found no evidence to
prove bad faith on the part of the Guess employees to warrant the award of
damages.23
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City, Branch 58, in Civil Case No. CEB-26984 (for: Damages) is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Defendants Michelle Ybañez and California Clothing,
Civil Law Review I – 08.12.19 |32
Inc. are hereby ordered to pay plaintiff-appellant Shirley G. Quiñones jointly and
solidarily moral damages in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) and
attorney’s fees in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (₱20,000.00).
SO ORDERED.24
While agreeing with the trial court that the Guess employees were in good faith when
they confronted respondent inside the Cebu Pacific Office about the alleged non-
payment, the CA, however, found preponderance of evidence showing that they acted
in bad faith in sending the demand letter to respondent’s employer. It found
respondent’s possession of both the official receipt and the subject black jeans as
evidence of payment.25 Contrary to the findings of the RTC, the CA opined that the
letter addressed to Cebu Pacific’s director was sent to respondent’s employer not
merely to ask for assistance for the collection of the disputed payment but to subject
her to ridicule, humiliation and similar injury such that she would be pressured to
pay.26 Considering that Guess already started its investigation on the incident, there
was a taint of bad faith and malice when it dragged respondent’s employer who was
not privy to the transaction. This is especially true in this case since the purported
letter contained not only a narrative of the incident but accusations as to the alleged
acts of respondent in trying to evade payment.27 The appellate court thus held that
petitioners are guilty of abuse of right entitling respondent to collect moral damages
and attorney’s fees. Petitioner California Clothing Inc. was made liable for its failure to
exercise extraordinary diligence in the hiring and selection of its employees; while
Ybañez’s liability stemmed from her act of signing the demand letter sent to
respondent’s employer. In view of Hawayon and Villagonzalo’s good faith, however,
they were exonerated from liability.28
Ybañez moved for the reconsideration29 of the aforesaid decision, but the same was
denied in the assailed November 14, 2006 CA Resolution.
Petitioners now come before the Court in this petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court based on the following grounds:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE LETTER
SENT TO THE CEBU PACIFIC OFFICE WAS MADE TO SUBJECT HEREIN
RESPONDENT TO RIDICULE, HUMILIATION AND SIMILAR INJURY.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AWARDING MORAL
DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY’S FEES.30
The petition is without merit.
Respondent’s complaint against petitioners stemmed from the principle of abuse of
rights provided for in the Civil Code on the chapter of human relations. Respondent
cried foul when petitioners allegedly embarrassed her when they insisted that she did
not pay for the black jeans she purchased from their shop despite the evidence of
payment which is the official receipt issued by the shop. The issuance of the receipt
notwithstanding, petitioners had the right to verify from respondent whether she
indeed made payment if they had reason to believe that she did not. However, the
exercise of such right is not without limitations. Any abuse in the exercise of such right
and in the performance of duty causing damage or injury to another is actionable
under the Civil Code. The Court’s pronouncement in Carpio v. Valmonte31 is
noteworthy:
In the sphere of our law on human relations, the victim of a wrongful act or omission,
whether done willfully or negligently, is not left without any remedy or recourse to
obtain relief for the damage or injury he sustained. Incorporated into our civil law are
not only principles of equity but also universal moral precepts which are designed to
indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain of good conscience and which are
meant to serve as guides for human conduct. First of these fundamental precepts is
the principle commonly known as "abuse of rights" under Article 19 of the Civil Code.
It provides that " Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due and observe
honesty and good faith."x x x32 The elements of abuse of rights are as follows: (1)
there is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent
of prejudicing or injuring another.33
In this case, petitioners claimed that there was a miscommunication between the
cashier and the invoicer leading to the erroneous issuance of the receipt to
respondent. When they realized the mistake, they made a cash count and discovered
that the amount which is equivalent to the price of the black jeans was missing. They,
thus, concluded that it was respondent who failed to make such payment. It was,
therefore, within their right to verify from respondent whether she indeed paid or not
and collect from her if she did not. However, the question now is whether such right
was exercised in good faith or they went overboard giving respondent a cause of
action against them.
Under the abuse of rights principle found in Article 19 of the Civil Code, a person
must, in the exercise of legal right or duty, act in good faith. He would be liable if he
instead acted in bad faith, with intent to prejudice another. 34 Good faith refers to the
state of mind which is manifested by the acts of the individual concerned. It consists
of the intention to abstain from taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous
advantage of another.35 Malice or bad faith, on the other hand, implies a conscious
and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral
obliquity.36
Initially, there was nothing wrong with petitioners asking respondent whether she paid
or not. The Guess employees were able to talk to respondent at the Cebu Pacific
Office. The confrontation started well, but it eventually turned sour when voices were
raised by both parties. As aptly held by both the RTC and the CA, such was the
natural consequence of two parties with conflicting views insisting on their respective
beliefs. Considering, however, that respondent was in possession of the item
purchased from the shop, together with the official receipt of payment issued by
petitioners, the latter cannot insist that no such payment was made on the basis of a
Civil Law Review I – 08.12.19 |33
mere speculation. Their claim should have been proven by substantial evidence in the
proper forum.
It is evident from the circumstances of the case that petitioners went overboard and
tried to force respondent to pay the amount they were demanding. In the guise of
asking for assistance, petitioners even sent a demand letter to respondent’s employer
not only informing it of the incident but obviously imputing bad acts on the part of
respondent.1âwphi1 Petitioners claimed that after receiving the receipt of payment
and the item purchased, respondent "was noted to hurriedly left (sic) the store." They
also accused respondent that she was not completely being honest when she was
asked about the circumstances of payment, thus:
x x x After receiving the OR and the item, Ms. Gutierrez was noted to hurriedly left
(sic) the store. x x x
When I asked her about to whom she gave the money, she gave out a blank
expression and told me, "I can’t remember." Then I asked her how much money she
gave, she answered, "₱2,100; 2 pcs 1,000 and 1 pc 100 bill." Then I told her that that
would (sic) impossible since we have no such denomination in our cash fund at that
moment. Finally, I asked her if how much change and if she received change from the
cashier, she then answered, "I don’t remember." After asking these simple questions,
I am very certain that she is not completely being honest about this. In fact, we invited
her to come to our boutique to clear these matters but she vehemently refused saying
that she’s in a hurry and very busy.37
Clearly, these statements are outrightly accusatory. Petitioners accused respondent
that not only did she fail to pay for the jeans she purchased but that she deliberately
took the same without paying for it and later hurriedly left the shop to evade payment.
These accusations were made despite the issuance of the receipt of payment and the
release of the item purchased. There was, likewise, no showing that respondent had
the intention to evade payment. Contrary to petitioners’ claim, respondent was not in
a rush in leaving the shop or the mall. This is evidenced by the fact that the Guess
employees did not have a hard time looking for her when they realized the supposed
non-payment.
It can be inferred from the foregoing that in sending the demand letter to respondent’s
employer, petitioners intended not only to ask for assistance in collecting the disputed
amount but to tarnish respondent’s reputation in the eyes of her employer. To malign
respondent without substantial evidence and despite the latter’s possession of
enough evidence in her favor, is clearly impermissible. A person should not use his
right unjustly or contrary to honesty and good faith, otherwise, he opens himself to
liability.38
The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was
established and must not be excessive or unduly harsh.39 In this case, petitioners
obviously abused their rights.
Complementing the principle of abuse of rights are the provisions of Articles 20 and 2
of the Civil Code which read:40
Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage
to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals or good customs, or public policy shall compensate the latter for
the damage.
In view of the foregoing, respondent is entitled to an award of moral damages and
attorney s fees. Moral damages may be awarded whenever the defendant s wrongful
act or omission is the proximate cause of the plaintiffs physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral
shock, social humiliation and similar injury in the cases specified or analogous to
those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code.41 Moral damages are not a bonanza.
They are given to ease the defendant s grief and suffering. They should, thus,
reasonably approximate the extent of hurt caused and the gravity of the wrong
done.42 They are awarded not to enrich the complainant but to enable the latter to
obtain means, diversions, or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral
suffering he has undergone.43 We find that the amount of ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages awarded by the CA is reasonable under the circumstances. Considering
that respondent was compelled to litigate to protect her interest, attorney s fees in the
amount of of₱20,000.00 is likewise just and proper.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The
Court of Appeals Decision dated August 3, 2006 and Resolution dated November 14,
2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 80309, are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
9. G.R. No. 161921 July 17, 2013
JOYCE V. ARDIENTE, PETITIONER, vs.
SPOUSES JAVIER AND MA. THERESA PASTORFIDE, CAGAYAN DE ORO
WATER DISTRICT AND GASPAR GONZALEZ,* JR., RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision 1 and Resolution2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA), dated August 28, 2003 and December 17, 2003, respectively, in CA-
G.R. CV No. 73000. The CA Decision affirmed with modification the August 15, 2001
Decision3of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 24, while
the CA Resolution denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
The facts, as summarized by the CA, are as follows:
[Herein petitioner] Joyce V. Ardiente and her husband Dr. Roberto S. Ardiente are
owners of a housing unit at Emily Homes, Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City with a lot
Civil Law Review I – 08.12.19 |34
area of one hundred fifty-three (153) square meters and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 69905.
On June 2, 1994, Joyce Ardiente entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (Exh.
"B", pp. 470-473, Records) selling, transferring and conveying in favor of [respondent]
Ma. Theresa Pastorfide all their rights and interests in the housing unit at Emily
Homes in consideration of ₱70,000.00. The Memorandum of Agreement carries a
stipulation:
"4. That the water and power bill of the subject property shall be for the account of the
Second Party (Ma. Theresa Pastorfide) effective June 1, 1994." (Records, p. 47)
vis-a-vis Ma. Theresa Pastorfide's assumption of the payment of the mortgage loan
secured by Joyce Ardiente from the National Home Mortgage (Records, Exh. "A", pp.
468-469)
For four (4) years, Ma. Theresa's use of the water connection in the name of Joyce
Ardiente was never questioned nor perturbed (T.S.N., October 31, 2000, pp. 7-8) until
on March 12, 1999, without notice, the water connection of Ma. Theresa was cut off.
Proceeding to the office of the Cagayan de Oro Water District (COWD) to complain, a
certain Mrs. Madjos told Ma. Theresa that she was delinquent for three (3) months
corresponding to the months of December 1998, January 1999, and February 1999.
Ma. Theresa argued that the due date of her payment was March 18, 1999 yet
(T.S.N., October 31, 2000, pp. 11-12). Mrs. Madjos later told her that it was at the
instance of Joyce Ardiente that the water line was cut off (T.S.N., February 5, 2001, p.
31).
On March 15, 1999, Ma. Theresa paid the delinquent bills (T.S.N., October 31, 2000,
p. 12). On the same date, through her lawyer, Ma. Theresa wrote a letter to the
COWD to explain who authorized the cutting of the water line (Records, p. 160).
On March 18, 1999, COWD, through the general manager, [respondent] Gaspar
Gonzalez, Jr., answered the letter dated March 15, 1999 and reiterated that it was at
the instance of Joyce Ardiente that the water line was cut off (Records, p. 161).
Aggrieved, on April 14, 1999, Ma. Theresa Pastorfide [and her husband] filed [a]
complaint for damages [against petitioner, COWD and its manager Gaspar Gonzalez]
(Records, pp. 2-6).
In the meantime, Ma. Theresa Pastorfide's water line was only restored and
reconnected when the [trial] court issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction on
December 14, 1999 (Records, p. 237).4
After trial, the RTC rendered judgment holding as follows:
xxxx
In the exercise of their rights and performance of their duties, defendants did not act
with justice, gave plaintiffs their due and observe honesty and good faith. Before
disconnecting the water supply, defendants COWD and Engr. Gaspar Gonzales did
not even send a disconnection notice to plaintiffs as testified to by Engr. Bienvenido
Batar, in-charge of the Commercial Department of defendant COWD. There was one
though, but only three (3) days after the actual disconnection on March 12, 1999. The
due date for payment was yet on March 15. Clearly, they did not act with justice.
Neither did they observe honesty.
They should not have been swayed by the prodding of Joyce V. Ardiente. They
should have investigated first as to the present ownership of the house. For doing the
act because Ardiente told them, they were negligent. Defendant Joyce Ardiente
should have requested before the cutting off of the water supply, plaintiffs to pay.
While she attempted to tell plaintiffs but she did not have the patience of seeing them.
She knew that it was plaintiffs who had been using the water four (4) years ago and
not hers. She should have been very careful. x x x5
The dispositive portion of the trial court's Decision reads, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering
defendants [Ardiente, COWD and Gonzalez] to pay jointly and severally plaintiffs, the
following sums:
(a) ₱200,000.00 for moral damages;
(b) 200,000.00 for exemplary damages; and
(c) 50,000.00 for attorney's fee.
The cross-claim of Cagayan de Oro Water District and Engr. Gaspar Gonzales is
hereby dismissed. The Court is not swayed that the cutting off of the water supply of
plaintiffs was because they were influenced by defendant Joyce Ardiente. They were
negligent too for which they should be liable.
SO ORDERED.6
Petitioner, COWD and Gonzalez filed an appeal with the CA.
On August 28, 2003, the CA promulgated its assailed Decision disposing as follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED, with the
modification that the awarded damages is reduced to ₱100,000.00 each for moral and
exemplary damages, while attorney's fees is lowered to ₱25,000.00. Costs against
appellants.
SO ORDERED.7
Civil Law Review I – 08.12.19 |35
The CA ruled, with respect to petitioner, that she has a "legal duty to honor the
possession and use of water line by Ma. Theresa Pastorfide pursuant to their
Memorandum of Agreement" and "that when [petitioner] applied for its disconnection,
she acted in bad faith causing prejudice and [injury to] Ma. Theresa Pastorfide." 8
As to COWD and Gonzalez, the CA held that they "failed to give a notice of
disconnection and derelicted in reconnecting the water line despite payment of the
unpaid bills by the [respondent spouses Pastorfide]." 9
Petitioner, COWD and Gonzalez filed their respective Motions for Reconsideration,
but these were denied by the CA in its Resolution dated December 17, 2003.
COWD and Gonzalez filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court, which was
docketed as G.R. No. 161802. However, based on technical grounds and on the
finding that the CA did not commit any reversible error in its assailed Decision, the
petition was denied via a Resolution10 issued by this Court on March 24, 2004.
COWD and Gonzalez filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied
with finality through this Court's Resolution11 dated June 28, 2004.
Petitioner, on the other hand, timely filed the instant petition with the following
Assignment of Errors:
7.1 HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (ALTHOUGH IT HAS REDUCED
THE LIABILITY INTO HALF) HAS STILL COMMITTED GRAVE AND
SERIOUS ERROR WHEN IT UPHELD THE JOINT AND SOLIDARY
LIABILITY OF PETITIONER JOYCE V. ARDIENTE WITH CAGAYAN DE
ORO WATER DISTRICT (COWD) AND ENGR. GASPAR D. GONZALES
FOR THE LATTER'S FAILURE TO SERVE NOTICE UPON
RESPONDENTS SPOUSES PASTORFIDE PRIOR TO THE ACTUAL
DISCONNECTION DESPITE EVIDENCE ADDUCED DURING TRIAL THAT
EVEN WITHOUT PETITIONER'S REQUEST, COWD WAS ALREADY SET
TO EFFECT DISCONNECTION OF RESPONDENTS' WATER SUPPLY
DUE TO NON-PAYMENT OF ACCOUNT FOR THREE (3) MONTHS.
7.2 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE AND
SERIOUS ERROR WHEN IT RULED TOTALLY AGAINST PETITIONER
AND FAILED TO FIND THAT RESPONDENTS ARE GUILTY OF
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE WHEN THEY FAILED TO PAY THEIR
WATER BILLS FOR THREE MONTHS AND TO MOVE FOR THE
TRANSFER OF THE COWD ACCOUNT IN THEIR NAME, WHICH WAS A
VIOLATION OF THEIR MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT WITH
PETITIONER JOYCE V. ARDIENTE. RESPONDENTS LIKEWISE
DELIBERATELY FAILED TO EXERCISE DILIGENCE OF A GOOD
FATHER OF THE FAMILY TO MINIMIZE THE DAMAGE UNDER ART.
2203 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE.
7.3 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN
IT DISREGARDED THE FACT THAT RESPONDENT SPOUSES
PASTORFIDE ARE LIKEWISE BOUND TO OBSERVE ARTICLE 19 OF
THE NEW CIVIL CODE, i.e., IN THE EXERCISE OF THEIR RIGHTS AND
IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THEIR DUTIES TO ACT WITH JUSTICE,
GIVE EVERYONE HIS DUE AND OBSERVE HONESTY AND GOOD
FAITH.
7.4 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT
GRANTED AN AWARD OF MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND
ATTORNEY'S FEES AS AGAINST PETITIONER ARDIENTE.12
At the outset, the Court noticed that COWD and Gonzalez, who were petitioner's co-
defendants before the RTC and her co-appellants in the CA, were impleaded as
respondents in the instant petition. This cannot be done. Being her co-parties before
the RTC and the CA, petitioner cannot, in the instant petition for review on certiorari,
make COWD and Gonzalez, adversary parties. It is a grave mistake on the part of
petitioner's counsel to treat COWD and Gonzalez as respondents. There is no basis
to do so, considering that, in the first place, there is no showing that petitioner filed a
cross-claim against COWD and Gonzalez. Under Section 2, Rule 9 of the Rules of
Court, a cross-claim which is not set up shall be barred. Thus, for failing to set up a
cross-claim against COWD and Gonzalez before the RTC, petitioner is already barred
from doing so in the present petition.
More importantly, as shown above, COWD and Gonzalez's petition for review on
certiorari filed with this Court was already denied with finality on June 28, 2004,
making the presently assailed CA Decision final and executory insofar as COWD and
Gonzalez are concerned. Thus, COWD and Gonzalez are already precluded from
participating in the present petition. They cannot resurrect their lost cause by filing
pleadings this time as respondents but, nonetheless, reiterating the same prayer in
their previous pleadings filed with the RTC and the CA.
As to the merits of the instant petition, the Court likewise noticed that the main issues
raised by petitioner are factual and it is settled that the resolution of factual issues is
the function of lower courts, whose findings on these matters are received with
respect and considered binding by the Supreme Court subject only to certain
exceptions, none of which is present in this instant petition.13 This is especially true
when the findings of the RTC have been affirmed by the CA as in this case. 14
In any case, a perusal of the records at hand would readily show that the instant
petition lacks merit.
Petitioner insists that she should not be held liable for the disconnection of
respondent spouses' water supply, because she had no participation in the actual
disconnection. However, she admitted in the present petition that it was she who
requested COWD to disconnect the Spouses Pastorfide's water supply. This was
confirmed by COWD and Gonzalez in their cross-claim against petitioner. While it was
COWD which actually discontinued respondent spouses' water supply, it cannot be
denied that it was through the instance of petitioner that the Spouses Pastorfide's
water supply was disconnected in the first place.
Civil Law Review I – 08.12.19 |36
It is true that it is within petitioner's right to ask and even require the Spouses
Pastorfide to cause the transfer of the former's account with COWD to the latter's
name pursuant to their Memorandum of Agreement. However, the remedy to enforce
such right is not to cause the disconnection of the respondent spouses' water supply.
The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was
established and must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no intention to
harm another.15 Otherwise, liability for damages to the injured party will attach. 16 In
the present case, intention to harm was evident on the part of petitioner when she
requested for the disconnection of respondent spouses’ water supply without warning
or informing the latter of such request. Petitioner claims that her request for
disconnection was based on the advise of COWD personnel and that her intention
was just to compel the Spouses Pastorfide to comply with their agreement that
petitioner's account with COWD be transferred in respondent spouses' name. If such
was petitioner's only intention, then she should have advised respondent spouses
before or immediately after submitting her request for disconnection, telling them that
her request was simply to force them to comply with their obligation under their
Memorandum of Agreement. But she did not. What made matters worse is the fact
that COWD undertook the disconnection also without prior notice and even failed to
reconnect the Spouses Pastorfide’s water supply despite payment of their arrears.
There was clearly an abuse of right on the part of petitioner, COWD and Gonzalez.
They are guilty of bad faith.
The principle of abuse of rights as enshrined in Article 19 of the Civil Code provides
that every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
In this regard, the Court's ruling in Yuchengco v. The Manila Chronicle Publishing
Corporation17 is instructive, to wit:
xxxx
This provision of law sets standards which must be observed in the exercise of one’s
rights as well as in the performance of its duties, to wit: to act with justice; give
everyone his due; and observe honesty and good faith.
In Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation v. Court of Appeals, it was elucidated
that while Article 19 "lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human
relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remedy for its
violation. Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would
be proper." The Court said:
One of the more notable innovations of the New Civil Code is the codification of
"some basic principles that are to be observed for the rightful relationship between
human beings and for the stability of the social order." [REPORT ON THE CODE
COMMISSION ON THE PROPOSED CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, p. 39].
The framers of the Code, seeking to remedy the defect of the old Code which merely
stated the effects of the law, but failed to draw out its spirit, incorporated certain
fundamental precepts which were "designed to indicate certain norms that spring from
the fountain of good conscience" and which were also meant to serve as "guides for
human conduct [that] should run as golden threads through society, to the end that
law may approach its supreme ideal, which is the sway and dominance of justice."
(Id.) Foremost among these principles is that pronounced in Article 19 x x x.
xxxx
This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse
of rights, sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of
one's rights, but also in the performance of one's duties. These standards are the
following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and
good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in
their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A
right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may
nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a
manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in
damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must
be held responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the
government of human relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not
provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for damages under either
Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper.
Corollarilly, Article 20 provides that "every person who, contrary to law, willfully or
negligently causes damage to another shall indemnify the latter for the same." It
speaks of the general sanctions of all other provisions of law which do not especially
provide for its own sanction. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not
conform to the standards set forth in the said provision and results in damage to
another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be
responsible. Thus, if the provision does not provide a remedy for its violation, an
action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code would be
proper.
The question of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated
resulting in damages under Article 20 or other applicable provision of law, depends on
the circumstances of each case. x x x18
To recapitulate, petitioner's acts which violated the abovementioned provisions of law
is her unjustifiable act of having the respondent spouses' water supply disconnected,
coupled with her failure to warn or at least notify respondent spouses of such
intention. On the part of COWD and Gonzalez, it is their failure to give prior notice of
the impending disconnection and their subsequent neglect to reconnect respondent
spouses' water supply despite the latter's settlement of their delinquent account.
On the basis of the foregoing, the Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the
ruling of both the RTC and the CA that petitioner, COWD and Gonzalez are solidarily
liable.
The Spouses Pastorfide are entitled to moral damages based on the provisions of
Article 2219,19 in connection with Articles 2020 and 2121 of the Civil Code.
Civil Law Review I – 08.12.19 |37
As for exemplary damages, Article 2229 provides that exemplary damages may be
imposed by way of example or correction for the public good. Nonetheless, exemplary
damages are imposed not to enrich one party or impoverish another, but to serve as a
deterrent against or as a negative incentive to curb socially deleterious actions.22 In
the instant case, the Court agrees with the CA in sustaining the award of exemplary
damages, although it reduced the amount granted, considering that respondent
spouses were deprived of their water supply for more than nine (9) months, and such
deprivation would have continued were it not for the relief granted by the RTC.
With respect to the award of attorney's fees, Article 2208 of the Civil Code provides,
among others, that such fees may be recovered when exemplary damages are
awarded, when the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate
with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest, and where the
defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiffs’
plainly valid, just and demandable claim.
WHEREFORE, instant petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated August 28, 2003 and December 17, 2003,
respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 73000 are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
10. G.R. No. 154259 February 28, 2005
NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN and RUBY LIM, petitioners, vs.
ROBERTO REYES, a.k.a. "AMAY BISAYA," respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners Nikko Hotel Manila Garden (Hotel
Nikko)1 and Ruby Lim assail the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals dated 26 November
2001 reversing the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City,
Branch 104, as well as the Resolution4 of the Court of Appeals dated 09 July 2002
which denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
The cause of action before the trial court was one for damages brought under the
human relations provisions of the New Civil Code. Plaintiff thereat (respondent herein)
Roberto Reyes, more popularly known by the screen name "Amay Bisaya," alleged
that at around 6:00 o’clock in the evening of 13 October 1994, while he was having
coffee at the lobby of Hotel Nikko,5 he was spotted by his friend of several years, Dr.
Violeta Filart, who then approached him.6 Mrs. Filart invited him to join her in a party
at the hotel’s penthouse in celebration of the natal day of the hotel’s manager, Mr.
Masakazu Tsuruoka.7 Mr. Reyes asked if she could vouch for him for which she
replied: "of course."8Mr. Reyes then went up with the party of Dr. Filart carrying the
basket of fruits which was the latter’s present for the celebrant.9 At the penthouse,
they first had their picture taken with the celebrant after which Mr. Reyes sat with the
party of Dr. Filart.10 After a couple of hours, when the buffet dinner was ready, Mr.
Reyes lined-up at the buffet table but, to his great shock, shame and embarrassment,
he was stopped by petitioner herein, Ruby Lim, who claimed to speak for Hotel Nikko
as Executive Secretary thereof.11 In a loud voice and within the presence and hearing
of the other guests who were making a queue at the buffet table, Ruby Lim told him to
leave the party ("huwag ka nang kumain, hindi ka imbitado, bumaba ka na
lang").12 Mr. Reyes tried to explain that he was invited by Dr. Filart.13 Dr. Filart, who
was within hearing distance, however, completely ignored him thus adding to his
shame and humiliation.14 Not long after, while he was still recovering from the
traumatic experience, a Makati policeman approached and asked him to step out of
the hotel.15 Like a common criminal, he was escorted out of the party by the
policeman.16 Claiming damages, Mr. Reyes asked for One Million Pesos actual
damages, One Million Pesos moral and/or exemplary damages and Two Hundred
Thousand Pesos attorney’s fees.17
Ruby Lim, for her part, admitted having asked Mr. Reyes to leave the party but not
under the ignominious circumstance painted by the latter. Ms. Lim narrated that she
was the Hotel’s Executive Secretary for the past twenty (20) years. 18 One of her
functions included organizing the birthday party of the hotel’s former General
Manager, Mr. Tsuruoka.19 The year 1994 was no different. For Mr. Tsuruoka’s party,
Ms. Lim generated an exclusive guest list and extended invitations accordingly.20 The
guest list was limited to approximately sixty (60) of Mr. Tsuruoka’s closest friends and
some hotel employees and that Mr. Reyes was not one of those invited.21 At the party,
Ms. Lim first noticed Mr. Reyes at the bar counter ordering a drink. 22 Mindful of Mr.
Tsuruoka’s wishes to keep the party intimate, Ms. Lim approached Mr. Boy Miller, the
"captain waiter," to inquire as to the presence of Mr. Reyes who was not invited. 23 Mr.
Miller replied that he saw Mr. Reyes with the group of Dr. Filart. 24 As Dr. Filart was
engaged in conversation with another guest and as Ms. Lim did not want to interrupt,
she inquired instead from the sister of Dr. Filart, Ms. Zenaida Fruto, who told her that
Dr. Filart did not invite Mr. Reyes.25 Ms. Lim then requested Ms. Fruto to tell Mr.
Reyes to leave the party as he was not invited.26 Mr. Reyes, however, lingered
prompting Ms. Lim to inquire from Ms. Fruto who said that Mr. Reyes did not want to
leave.27 When Ms. Lim turned around, she saw Mr. Reyes conversing with a Captain
Batung whom she later approached.28 Believing that Captain Batung and Mr. Reyes
knew each other, Ms. Lim requested from him the same favor from Ms. Fruto, i.e., for
Captain Batung to tell Mr. Reyes to leave the party as he was not invited. 29 Still, Mr.
Reyes lingered. When Ms. Lim spotted Mr. Reyes by the buffet table, she decided to
speak to him herself as there were no other guests in the immediate
vicinity.30However, as Mr. Reyes was already helping himself to the food, she decided
to wait.31 When Mr. Reyes went to a corner and started to eat, Ms. Lim approached
him and said: "alam ninyo, hindo ho kayo dapat nandito. Pero total nakakuha na ho
kayo ng pagkain, ubusin na lang ninyo at pagkatapos kung pwede lang po umalis na
kayo."32 She then turned around trusting that Mr. Reyes would show enough decency
to leave, but to her surprise, he began screaming and making a big scene, and even
threatened to dump food on her.33 1awphi1.nét
Dr. Violeta Filart, the third defendant in the complaint before the lower court, also
gave her version of the story to the effect that she never invited Mr. Reyes to the
party.34 According to her, it was Mr. Reyes who volunteered to carry the basket of
fruits intended for the celebrant as he was likewise going to take the elevator, not to
the penthouse but to Altitude 49.35 When they reached the penthouse, she reminded
Mr. Reyes to go down as he was not properly dressed and was not invited. 36 All the
while, she thought that Mr. Reyes already left the place, but she later saw him at the
bar talking to Col. Batung.37 Then there was a commotion and she saw Mr. Reyes
Civil Law Review I – 08.12.19 |38
shouting.38 She ignored Mr. Reyes.39 She was embarrassed and did not want the
celebrant to think that she invited him.40
After trial on the merits, the court a quo dismissed the complaint,41 giving more
credence to the testimony of Ms. Lim that she was discreet in asking Mr. Reyes to
leave the party. The trial court likewise ratiocinated that Mr. Reyes assumed the risk
of being thrown out of the party as he was uninvited:
Plaintiff had no business being at the party because he was not a guest of Mr.
Tsuruoka, the birthday celebrant. He assumed the risk of being asked to leave for
attending a party to which he was not invited by the host. Damages are pecuniary
consequences which the law imposes for the breach of some duty or the violation of
some right. Thus, no recovery can be had against defendants Nikko Hotel and Ruby
Lim because he himself was at fault (Garciano v. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 436).
He knew that it was not the party of defendant Violeta Filart even if she allowed him to
join her and took responsibility for his attendance at the party. His action against
defendants Nikko Hotel and Ruby Lim must therefore fail.42
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial court as it found more
commanding of belief the testimony of Mr. Reyes that Ms. Lim ordered him to leave in
a loud voice within hearing distance of several guests:
In putting appellant in a very embarrassing situation, telling him that he should not
finish his food and to leave the place within the hearing distance of other guests is an
act which is contrary to morals, good customs . . ., for which appellees should
compensate the appellant for the damage suffered by the latter as a consequence
therefore (Art. 21, New Civil Code). The liability arises from the acts which are in
themselves legal or not prohibited, but contrary to morals or good customs.
Conversely, even in the exercise of a formal right, [one] cannot with impunity
intentionally cause damage to another in a manner contrary to morals or good
customs.43
The Court of Appeals likewise ruled that the actuation of Ms. Lim in approaching
several people to inquire into the presence of Mr. Reyes exposed the latter to ridicule
and was uncalled for as she should have approached Dr. Filart first and both of them
should have talked to Mr. Reyes in private:
Said acts of appellee Lim are uncalled for. What should have been done by appellee
Lim was to approach appellee Mrs. Filart and together they should have told appellant
Reyes in private that the latter should leave the party as the celebrant only wanted
close friends around. It is necessary that Mrs. Filart be the one to approach appellant
because it was she who invited appellant in that occasion. Were it not for Mrs. Filart’s
invitation, appellant could not have suffered such humiliation. For that, appellee Filart
is equally liable.
...
The acts of [appellee] Lim are causes of action which are predicated upon mere
rudeness or lack of consideration of one person, which calls not only protection of
human dignity but respect of such dignity. Under Article 20 of the Civil Code, every
person who violates this duty becomes liable for damages, especially if said acts were
attended by malice or bad faith. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or
simple negligence. It imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and
conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a known duty to some motive or interest or
ill-will that partakes of the nature of fraud (Cojuangco, Jr. v. CA, et al., 309 SCRA
603).44
Consequently, the Court of Appeals imposed upon Hotel Nikko, Ruby Lim and Dr.
Violeta Filart the solidary obligation to pay Mr. Reyes (1) exemplary damages in the
amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000); (2) moral damages in the
amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000); and (3) attorney’s fees in the
amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000).45 On motion for reconsideration, the Court
of Appeals affirmed its earlier decision as the argument raised in the motion had
"been amply discussed and passed upon in the decision sought to be
reconsidered."46
Thus, the instant petition for review. Hotel Nikko and Ruby Lim contend that the Court
of Appeals seriously erred in –
I.
… NOT APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF VOLENTI NON FIT
INJURIA CONSIDERING THAT BY ITS OWN FINDINGS, AMAY BISAYA WAS A
GATE-CRASHER
II.
… HOLDING HOTEL NIKKO AND RUBY LIM JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE
WITH DR. FILART FOR DAMAGES SINCE BY ITS OWN RULING, AMAY BISAYA
"COULD NOT HAVE SUFFERED SUCH HUMILIATION," "WERE IT NOT FOR DR.
FILART’S INVITATION"
III.
… DEPARTING FROM THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT AS
REGARDS THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT ALLEGEDLY CAUSED THE
HUMILIATION OF AMAY BISAYA
IV.
… IN CONCLUDING THAT AMAY BISAYA WAS TREATED UNJUSTLY BECAUSE
OF HIS POVERTY, CONSIDERING THAT THIS WAS NEVER AN ISSUE AND NO
EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED IN THIS REGARD
V.
Civil Law Review I – 08.12.19 |39
… IN FAILING TO PASS UPON THE ISSUE ON THE DEFECTS OF THE
APPELLANT’S BRIEF, THEREBY DEPARTING FROM THE ACCEPTED AND
USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
Petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko contend that pursuant to the doctrine of volenti non fit
injuria, they cannot be made liable for damages as respondent Reyes assumed the
risk of being asked to leave (and being embarrassed and humiliated in the process)
as he was a "gate-crasher."
The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria ("to which a person assents is not esteemed in
law as injury"47 ) refers to self-inflicted injury48 or to the consent to injury49 which
precludes the recovery of damages by one who has knowingly and voluntarily
exposed himself to danger, even if he is not negligent in doing so.50 As formulated by
petitioners, however, this doctrine does not find application to the case at bar because
even if respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave the party,
petitioners, under Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil Code, were still under obligation
to treat him fairly in order not to expose him to unnecessary ridicule and shame.
Thus, the threshold issue is whether or not Ruby Lim acted abusively in asking
Roberto Reyes, a.k.a. "Amay Bisaya," to leave the party where he was not invited by
the celebrant thereof thereby becoming liable under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil
Code. Parenthetically, and if Ruby Lim were so liable, whether or not Hotel Nikko, as
her employer, is solidarily liable with her.
As the trial court and the appellate court reached divergent and irreconcilable
conclusions concerning the same facts and evidence of the case, this Court is left
without choice but to use its latent power to review such findings of facts. Indeed, the
general rule is that we are not a trier of facts as our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing
and revising errors of law.51 One of the exceptions to this general rule, however,
obtains herein as the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial
court.52 The lower court ruled that Ms. Lim did not abuse her right to ask Mr. Reyes to
leave the party as she talked to him politely and discreetly. The appellate court, on the
other hand, held that Ms. Lim is liable for damages as she needlessly embarrassed
Mr. Reyes by telling him not to finish his food and to leave the place within hearing
distance of the other guests. Both courts, however, were in agreement that it was Dr.
Filart’s invitation that brought Mr. Reyes to the party.
The consequential question then is: Which version is credible?
From an in depth review of the evidence, we find more credible the lower court’s
findings of fact.
First, let us put things in the proper perspective.
We are dealing with a formal party in a posh, five-star hotel,53 for-invitation-only,
thrown for the hotel’s former Manager, a Japanese national. Then came a person who
was clearly uninvited (by the celebrant)54 and who could not just disappear into the
crowd as his face is known by many, being an actor. While he was already spotted by
the organizer of the party, Ms. Lim, the very person who generated the guest list, it
did not yet appear that the celebrant was aware of his presence. Ms. Lim, mindful of
the celebrant’s instruction to keep the party intimate, would naturally want to get rid of
the "gate-crasher" in the most hush-hush manner in order not to call attention to a
glitch in an otherwise seamless affair and, in the process, risk the displeasure of the
celebrant, her former boss. To unnecessarily call attention to the presence of Mr.
Reyes would certainly reflect badly on Ms. Lim’s ability to follow the instructions of the
celebrant to invite only his close friends and some of the hotel’s personnel. Mr.
Reyes, upon whom the burden rests to prove that indeed Ms. Lim loudly and rudely
ordered him to leave, could not offer any satisfactory explanation why Ms. Lim would
do that and risk ruining a formal and intimate affair. On the contrary, Mr. Reyes, on
cross-examination, had unwittingly sealed his fate by admitting that when Ms. Lim
talked to him, she was very close. Close enough for him to kiss:
Q: And, Mr. Reyes, you testified that Miss Lim approached you while you
were at the buffet table? How close was she when she approached you?
A: Very close because we nearly kissed each other.
Q: And yet, she shouted for you to go down? She was that close and she
shouted?
A: Yes. She said, "wag kang kumain, hindi ka imbitado dito, bumaba ka na
lang."
Q: So, you are testifying that she did this in a loud voice?
...
A: Yes. If it is not loud, it will not be heard by many.55
In the absence of any proof of motive on the part of Ms. Lim to humiliate Mr. Reyes
and expose him to ridicule and shame, it is highly unlikely that she would shout at him
from a very close distance. Ms. Lim having been in the hotel business for twenty
years wherein being polite and discreet are virtues to be emulated, the testimony of
Mr. Reyes that she acted to the contrary does not inspire belief and is indeed
incredible. Thus, the lower court was correct in observing that –
Considering the closeness of defendant Lim to plaintiff when the request for the latter
to leave the party was made such that they nearly kissed each other, the request was
meant to be heard by him only and there could have been no intention on her part to
cause embarrassment to him. It was plaintiff’s reaction to the request that must have
made the other guests aware of what transpired between them. . .
Had plaintiff simply left the party as requested, there was no need for the police to
take him out.56
Moreover, another problem with Mr. Reyes’s version of the story is that it is
unsupported. It is a basic rule in civil cases that he who alleges proves. Mr. Reyes,
Civil Law Review I – 08.12.19 |40
however, had not presented any witness to back his story up. All his witnesses –
Danny Rodinas, Pepito Guerrero and Alexander Silva - proved only that it was Dr.
Filart who invited him to the party.57
Ms. Lim, not having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party to which he
was not invited, cannot be made liable to pay for damages under Articles 19 and 21 of
the Civil Code. Necessarily, neither can her employer, Hotel Nikko, be held liable as
its liability springs from that of its employee.58
Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of
rights,59 is not a panacea for all human hurts and social grievances. Article 19 states:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith.1awphi1.nét
Elsewhere, we explained that when "a right is exercised in a manner which does not
conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a
legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be
responsible."60 The object of this article, therefore, is to set certain standards which
must be observed not only in the exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance
of one’s duties.61 These standards are the following: act with justice, give everyone
his due and observe honesty and good faith.62 Its antithesis, necessarily, is any act
evincing bad faith or intent to injure. Its elements are the following: (1) There is a legal
right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or
injuring another.63 When Article 19 is violated, an action for damages is proper under
Articles 20 or 21 of the Civil Code. Article 20 pertains to damages arising from a
violation of law64 which does not obtain herein as Ms. Lim was perfectly within her
right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave. Article 21, on the other hand, states:
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.
Article 2165 refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the following elements: (1)
There is an act which is legal; (2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public
order, or public policy; and (3) it is done with intent to injure.66
A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21,67 and that is, the act complained of
must be intentional.68
As applied to herein case and as earlier discussed, Mr. Reyes has not shown that Ms.
Lim was driven by animosity against him. These two people did not know each other
personally before the evening of 13 October 1994, thus, Mr. Reyes had nothing to
offer for an explanation for Ms. Lim’s alleged abusive conduct except the statement
that Ms. Lim, being "single at 44 years old," had a "very strong bias and prejudice
against (Mr. Reyes) possibly influenced by her associates in her work at the hotel with
foreign businessmen."69 The lameness of this argument need not be belabored.
Suffice it to say that a complaint based on Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code must
necessarily fail if it has nothing to recommend it but innuendos and conjectures.
Parenthetically, the manner by which Ms. Lim asked Mr. Reyes to leave was likewise
acceptable and humane under the circumstances. In this regard, we cannot put our
imprimatur on the appellate court’s declaration that Ms. Lim’s act of personally
approaching Mr. Reyes (without first verifying from Mrs. Filart if indeed she invited Mr.
Reyes) gave rise to a cause of action "predicated upon mere rudeness or lack of
consideration of one person, which calls not only protection of human dignity but
respect of such dignity."70 Without proof of any ill-motive on her part, Ms. Lim’s act of
by-passing Mrs. Filart cannot amount to abusive conduct especially because she did
inquire from Mrs. Filart’s companion who told her that Mrs. Filart did not invite Mr.
Reyes.71 If at all, Ms. Lim is guilty only of bad judgment which, if done with good
intentions, cannot amount to bad faith.
Not being liable for both actual and moral damages, neither can petitioners Lim and
Hotel Nikko be made answerable for exemplary damages72 especially for the reason
stated by the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals held –
Not a few of the rich people treat the poor with contempt because of the latter’s lowly
station in life.l^vvphi1.net This has to be limited somewhere. In a democracy, such a
limit must be established. Social equality is not sought by the legal provisions under
consideration, but due regard for decency and propriety (Code Commission, pp. 33-
34). And by way of example or correction for public good and to avert further
commission of such acts, exemplary damages should be imposed upon appellees. 73
The fundamental fallacy in the above-quoted findings is that it runs counter with the
very facts of the case and the evidence on hand.l^vvphi1.net It is not disputed that at
the time of the incident in question, Mr. Reyes was "an actor of long standing; a co-
host of a radio program over DZRH; a Board Member of the Music Singer Composer
(MUSICO) chaired by popular singer Imelda Papin; a showbiz Coordinator of Citizen
Crime Watch; and 1992 official candidate of the KBL Party for Governor of Bohol; and
an awardee of a number of humanitarian organizations of the Philippines." 74 During
his direct examination on rebuttal, Mr. Reyes stressed that he had income75 and
nowhere did he say otherwise. On the other hand, the records are bereft of any
information as to the social and economic standing of petitioner Ruby Lim.
Consequently, the conclusion reached by the appellate court cannot withstand
scrutiny as it is without basis.
All told, and as far as Ms. Lim and Hotel Nikko are concerned, any damage which Mr.
Reyes might have suffered through Ms. Lim’s exercise of a legitimate right done
within the bounds of propriety and good faith, must be his to bear alone.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition filed by Ruby Lim and Nikko Hotel
Manila Garden is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 26
November 2001 and its Resolution dated 09 July 2002 are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104,
dated 26 April 1999 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED.
Civil Law Review I – 08.12.19 |41
 11. G.R. No. 179736 June 26, 2013
SPOUSES BILL AND VICTORIA HING, Petitioners, vs.
ALEXANDER CHOACHUY, SR. and ALLAN CHOACHUY, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
"The concept of liberty would be emasculated if it does not likewise compel respect
for one's personality as a unique individual whose claim to privacy and non-
interference demands respect."1
This Petition for Review on Certiorari2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the
July 10, 2007 Decision3 and the September 11, 2007 Resolution4 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01473.
Factual Antecedents
On August 23, 2005, petitioner-spouses Bill and Victoria Hing filed with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaue City a Complaint5 for Injunction and Damages with
prayer for issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction/Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO), docketed as Civil Case MAN-5223 and raffled to Branch 28,
against respondents Alexander Choachuy, Sr. and Allan Choachuy.
Petitioners alleged that they are the registered owners of a parcel of land (Lot 1900-B)
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 42817 situated in Barangay Basak,
City of Mandaue, Cebu;6 that respondents are the owners of Aldo Development &
Resources, Inc. (Aldo) located at Lots 1901 and 1900-C, adjacent to the property of
petitioners;7 that respondents constructed an auto-repair shop building (Aldo
Goodyear Servitec) on Lot 1900-C; that in April 2005, Aldo filed a case against
petitioners for Injunction and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Injunction/TRO,
docketed as Civil Case No. MAN-5125;8 that in that case, Aldo claimed that
petitioners were constructing a fence without a valid permit and that the said
construction would destroy the wall of its building, which is adjacent to petitioners’
property;9 that the court, in that case, denied Aldo’s application for preliminary
injunction for failure to substantiate its allegations;10 that, in order to get evidence to
support the said case, respondents on June 13, 2005 illegally set-up and installed on
the building of Aldo Goodyear Servitec two video surveillance cameras facing
petitioners’ property;11 that respondents, through their employees and without the
consent of petitioners, also took pictures of petitioners’ on-going construction;12 and
that the acts of respondents violate petitioners’ right to privacy.13 Thus, petitioners
prayed that respondents be ordered to remove the video surveillance cameras and
enjoined from conducting illegal surveillance.14
In their Answer with Counterclaim,15 respondents claimed that they did not install the
video surveillance cameras,16nor did they order their employees to take pictures of
petitioners’ construction.17 They also clarified that they are not the owners of Aldo but
are mere stockholders.18
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On October 18, 2005, the RTC issued an Order19 granting the application for a TRO.
The dispositive portion of the said Order reads:
WHEREFORE, the application for a Temporary Restraining Order or a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction is granted. Upon the filing and approval of a bond by
petitioners, which the Court sets at ₱50,000.00, let a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
issue against the respondents Alexander Choachuy, Sr. and Allan Choachuy. They
are hereby directed to immediately remove the revolving camera that they installed at
the left side of their building overlooking the side of petitioners’ lot and to transfer and
operate it elsewhere at the back where petitioners’ property can no longer be viewed
within a distance of about 2-3 meters from the left corner of Aldo Servitec, facing the
road.
IT IS SO ORDERED.20
Respondents moved for a reconsideration21 but the RTC denied the same in its
Order22 dated February 6, 2006.23Thus:
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
Issue a Writ of Preliminary Injunction in consonance with the Order dated 18 October
2005.
IT IS SO ORDERED.24
Aggrieved, respondents filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari 25 under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court with application for a TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On July 10, 2007, the CA issued its Decision26 granting the Petition for Certiorari. The
CA ruled that the Writ of Preliminary Injunction was issued with grave abuse of
discretion because petitioners failed to show a clear and unmistakable right to an
injunctive writ.27 The CA explained that the right to privacy of residence under Article
26(1) of the Civil Code was not violated since the property subject of the controversy
is not used as a residence.28 The CA alsosaid that since respondents are not the
owners of the building, they could not have installed video surveillance
cameras.29 They are mere stockholders of Aldo, which has a separate juridical
personality.30 Thus, they are not the proper parties.31 The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us
GRANTING the petition filed in this case. The assailed orders dated October 18, 2005
and February 6, 2006 issued by the respondent judge are hereby ANNULLED and
SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.32
Civil Law Review I – 08.12.19 |42
 Issues
Hence, this recourse by petitioners arguing that:
I.
THE X X X CA COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT ANNULLED AND
SET ASIDE THE ORDERS OF THE RTC DATED 18 OCTOBER 2005 AND 6
FEBRUARY 2006 HOLDING THAT THEY WERE ISSUED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION.
II.
THE X X X CA COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT
PETITIONER SPOUSES HING ARE NOT ENTITLED TO THE WRIT OF
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ON THE GROUND THAT THERE IS NO VIOLATION
OF THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL AND CIVIL RIGHT TO PRIVACY DESPITE THE
FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE RTC, WHICH RESPONDENTS CHOACHUY FAILED
TO REFUTE, THAT THE ILLEGALLY INSTALLED SURVEILLANCE CAMERAS OF
RESPONDENTS CHOACH[U]Y WOULD CAPTURE THE PRIVATE ACTIVITIES OF
PETITIONER SPOUSES HING, THEIR CHILDREN AND EMPLOYEES.
III.
THE X X X CA COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT
SINCE THE OWNER OF THE BUILDING IS ALDO DEVELOPMENT AND
RESOURCES, INC. THEN TO SUE RESPONDENTS CHOACHUY CONSTITUTES
A PURPORTEDLY UNWARRANTED PIERCING OF THE CORPORATE VEIL.
IV.
THE X X X CA COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT IGNORED THE
SERIOUS FORMAL DEFICIENCIES OF BOTH THE PETITION AND THE MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION DATED 15 MARCH 2006 OF RESPONDENTS
CHOACHUY AND GAVE X X X THEM DUE COURSE AND CONSIDERATION.33
Essentially, the issues boil down to (1) whether there is a violation of petitioners’ right
to privacy, and (2) whether respondents are the proper parties to this suit.
Petitioners’ Arguments
Petitioners insist that they are entitled to the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction because respondents’ installation of a stationary camera directly facing
petitioners’ property and a revolving camera covering a significant portion of the same
property constitutes a violation of petitioners’ right to privacy.34 Petitioners cite Article
26(1) of the Civil Code, which enjoins persons from prying into the private lives of
others.35 Although the said provision pertains to the privacy of another’s residence,
petitioners opine that it includes business offices, citing Professor Arturo M.
Tolentino.36 Thus, even assuming arguendo that petitioners’ property is used for
business, it is still covered by the said provision. 37
As to whether respondents are the proper parties to implead in this case, petitioners
claim that respondents and Aldo are one and the same, and that respondents only
want to hide behind Aldo’s corporate fiction.38 They point out that if respondents are
not the real owners of the building, where the video surveillance cameras were
installed, then they had no business consenting to the ocular inspection conducted by
the court.39
Respondents’ Arguments
Respondents, on the other hand, echo the ruling of the CA that petitioners cannot
invoke their right to privacy since the property involved is not used as a
residence.40 Respondents maintain that they had nothing to do with the installation of
the video surveillance cameras as these were installed by Aldo, the registered owner
of the building,41as additional security for its building.42 Hence, they were wrongfully
impleaded in this case.43
Our Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
The right to privacy is the right to be let alone.
The right to privacy is enshrined in our Constitution 44 and in our laws. It is defined as
"the right to be free from unwarranted exploitation of one’s person or from intrusion
into one’s private activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a person’s
ordinary sensibilities."45 It is the right of an individual "to be free from unwarranted
publicity, or to live without unwarranted interference by the public in matters in which
the public is not necessarily concerned."46 Simply put, the right to privacy is "the right
to be let alone."47
The Bill of Rights guarantees the people’s right to privacy and protects them against
the State’s abuse of power. In this regard, the State recognizes the right of the people
to be secure in their houses. No one, not even the State, except "in case of overriding
social need and then only under the stringent procedural safeguards," can disturb
them in the privacy of their homes.48
The right to privacy under Article 26(1)
of the Civil Code covers business offices
where the public are excluded
therefrom and only certain individuals
Civil Law Review I – 08.12.19 |43
are allowed to enter.
Article 26(1) of the Civil Code, on the other hand, protects an individual’s right to
privacy and provides a legal remedy against abuses that may be committed against
him by other individuals. It states:
Art. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind
of his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may
not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages,
prevention and other relief:
(1) Prying into the privacy of another’s residence;
xxxx
This provision recognizes that a man’s house is his castle, where his right to privacy
cannot be denied or even restricted by others. It includes "any act of intrusion into,
peeping or peering inquisitively into the residence of another without the consent of
the latter."49 The phrase "prying into the privacy of another’s residence," however,
does not mean that only the residence is entitled to privacy. As elucidated by Civil law
expert Arturo M. Tolentino:
Our Code specifically mentions "prying into the privacy of another’s residence." This
does not mean, however, that only the residence is entitled to privacy, because the
law covers also "similar acts." A business office is entitled to the same privacy when
the public is excluded therefrom and only such individuals as are allowed to enter
may come in. x x x50 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, an individual’s right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code should not
be confined to his house or residence as it may extend to places where he has the
right to exclude the public or deny them access. The phrase "prying into the privacy of
another’s residence," therefore, covers places, locations, or even situations which an
individual considers as private. And as long as his right is recognized by society, other
individuals may not infringe on his right to privacy. The CA, therefore, erred in limiting
the application of Article 26(1) of the Civil Code only to residences.
The "reasonable expectation of
privacy" test is used to determine
whether there is a violation of the right
to privacy.
In ascertaining whether there is a violation of the right to privacy, courts use the
"reasonable expectation of privacy" test. This test determines whether a person has a
reasonable expectation of privacy and whether the expectation has been violated. 51 In
Ople v. Torres,52 we enunciated that "the reasonableness of a person’s expectation of
privacy depends on a two-part test: (1) whether, by his conduct, the individual has
exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2) this expectation is one that society
recognizes as reasonable." Customs, community norms, and practices may,
therefore, limit or extend an individual’s "reasonable expectation of privacy." 53 Hence,
the reasonableness of a person’s expectation of privacy must be determined on a
case-to-case basis since it depends on the factual circumstances surrounding the
case.54
In this day and age, video surveillance cameras are installed practically everywhere
for the protection and safety of everyone. The installation of these cameras, however,
should not cover places where there is reasonable expectation of privacy, unless the
consent of the individual, whose right to privacy would be affected, was obtained. Nor
should these cameras be used to pry into the privacy of another’s residence or
business office as it would be no different from eavesdropping, which is a crime under
Republic Act No. 4200 or the Anti-Wiretapping Law.
In this case, the RTC, in granting the application for Preliminary Injunction, ruled that:
After careful consideration, there is basis to grant the application for a temporary
restraining order. The operation by respondents of a revolving camera, even if it were
mounted on their building, violated the right of privacy of petitioners, who are the
owners of the adjacent lot. The camera does not only focus on respondents’ property
or the roof of the factory at the back (Aldo Development and Resources, Inc.) but it
actually spans through a good portion of the land of petitioners.
Based on the ocular inspection, the Court understands why petitioner Hing was so
unyielding in asserting that the revolving camera was set up deliberately to monitor
the on[-]going construction in his property. The monitor showed only a portion of the
roof of the factory of Aldo. If the purpose of respondents in setting up a camera at the
back is to secure the building and factory premises, then the camera should revolve
only towards their properties at the back. Respondents’ camera cannot be made to
extend the view to petitioners’ lot. To allow the respondents to do that over the
objection of the petitioners would violate the right of petitioners as property owners.
"The owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the
rights of a third person."55
The RTC, thus, considered that petitioners have a "reasonable expectation of privacy"
in their property, whether they use it as a business office or as a residence and that
the installation of video surveillance cameras directly facing petitioners’ property or
covering a significant portion thereof, without their consent, is a clear violation of their
right to privacy. As we see then, the issuance of a preliminary injunction was justified.
We need not belabor that the issuance of a preliminary injunction is discretionary on
the part of the court taking cognizance of the case and should not be interfered with,
unless there is grave abuse of discretion committed by the court. 56 Here, there is no
indication of any grave abuse of discretion. Hence, the CA erred in finding that
petitioners are not entitled to an injunctive writ.
This brings us to the next question: whether respondents are the proper parties to this
suit.
A real party defendant is one who has a
correlative legal obligation to redress a
wrong done to the plaintiff by reason of
Civil Law Review I – 08.12.19 |44
the defendant's act or omission which
had violated the legal right of the
former.
Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 2. Parties-in-interest. — A real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the
suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest.
A real party defendant is "one who has a correlative legal obligation to redress a
wrong done to the plaintiff by reason of the defendant’s act or omission which had
violated the legal right of the former."57
In ruling that respondents are not the proper parties, the CA reasoned that since they
do not own the building, they could not have installed the video surveillance
cameras.58 Such reasoning, however, is erroneous. The fact that respondents are not
the registered owners of the building does not automatically mean that they did not
cause the installation of the video surveillance cameras.
In their Complaint, petitioners claimed that respondents installed the video
surveillance cameras in order to fish for evidence, which could be used against
petitioners in another case.59 During the hearing of the application for Preliminary
Injunction, petitioner Bill testified that when respondents installed the video
surveillance cameras, he immediately broached his concerns but they did not seem to
care,60 and thus, he reported the matter to the barangay for mediation, and
eventually, filed a Complaint against respondents before the RTC. 61 He also admitted
that as early as 1998 there has already been a dispute between his family and the
Choachuy family concerning the boundaries of their respective properties. 62 With
these factual circumstances in mind, we believe that respondents are the proper
parties to be impleaded.
Moreover, although Aldo has a juridical personality separate and distinct from its
stockholders, records show that it is a family-owned corporation managed by the
Choachuy family.63
Also quite telling is the fact that respondents, notwithstanding their claim that they are
not owners of the building, allowed the court to enter the compound of Aldo and
conduct an ocular inspection. The counsel for respondents even toured Judge Marilyn
Lagura-Yap inside the building and answered all her questions regarding the set-up
and installation of the video surveillance cameras.64 And when respondents moved
for reconsideration of the Order dated October 18, 2005 of the RTC, one of the
arguments they raised is that Aldo would suffer damages if the video surveillance
cameras are removed and transferred.65 Noticeably, in these instances, the
personalities of respondents and Aldo seem to merge.
All these taken together lead us to the inevitable conclusion that respondents are
merely using the corporate fiction of Aldo as a shield to protect themselves from this
suit. In view of the foregoing, we find that respondents are the proper parties to this
suit.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated July 10, 2007
and the Resolution dated September 11, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CEB-SP No. 01473 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders dated
October 18,2005 and February 6, 200[6] of Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court of
Mandaue City in Civil Case No. MAN-5223 are hereby REINSTATED and
AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
PREJUDICIAL QUESTION (ART. 36)
12. G.R. No. 183788 April 5, 2010
KRIZIA KATRINA TY-DE ZUZUARREGUI, Petitioner, vs.
THE HON. JOSELITO C. VILLAROSA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of
Branch 66 of the RTC of Makati City, and FANNIE TORRES-TY, Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, assailing the Resolutions dated August 23, 2007 2 and July
14, 20083 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 98978. The Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioner seeking the
reversal of the November 16, 2006 and March 9, 2007 Orders 4 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 66, which found that there was no prejudicial
question to warrant the suspension of the criminal actions against petitioner.
The following facts are established:
Sometime in August 2000, Rosemary Torres Ty-Rasekhi (Rosemary), the sister of
petitioner’s late father Alexander Torres Ty, filed a petition for the issuance of letters
of administration of the estate of her mother, Bella Torres (Bella), before the RTC of
Pasig City.5 Petitioner initially opposed6 Rosemary’s petition, but they eventually
reached an amicable settlement and entered into a compromise agreement which
they submitted to the RTC for approval.7 In a Decision8 dated November 19, 2002,
the RTC approved the compromise agreement.
Subsequently, two (2) of Rosemary’s alleged siblings, Peter Torres Ty (Peter) and
Catherine Torres Ty-Chavez (Catherine), filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition to
Annul Judgment Approving Compromise Agreement, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
87222.9 Peter and Catherine claimed that they are also biological children of the late
Bella, and are entitled to participate in the settlement of the latter’s estate. Later,
private respondent Fannie Torres-Ty (Fannie), who likewise claimed to be a biological
child of the late Bella and therefore also entitled to inherit from her, filed a petition-in-
intervention in the action for annulment of judgment. 10
Civil Law Review I – 08.12.19 |45
Peter, Catherine, and Fannie alleged that upon the death of Bella, they held a number
of discussions pertaining to the settlement of the latter’s estate. Rosemary, their elder
sister, promised to take care of the processing of papers so that the estate may be
divided among them in the manner provided by law. However, in subsequent
discussions, Rosemary made known to them her intention to get a disproportionately
larger share of the estate, but they did not agree. No agreement was reached and as
far as they know, no progress was made towards the settlement of Bella’s estate.
They were not aware that Rosemary had filed a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration and that a judgment by compromise agreement was rendered by the
RTC of Pasig City. Rosemary had falsely averred that aside from herself, petitioner,
who was her niece, was the only other heir of Bella. In petitioner’s opposition, it was
likewise averred that petitioner and Rosemary were the only heirs of Bella. The
subsequent compromise agreement contained similar averments, and it was not
disclosed that Peter, Catherine, and Fannie were also Bella’s heirs. It was only
sometime in June 2004 that they came to know of the decision by compromise
agreement of the Pasig City RTC.
Petitioner and Rosemary filed their answers11 to the petition for annulment of
judgment and the petition-in-intervention. They raised similar defenses. They denied
that Peter, Catherine, and Fannie were heirs of Bella for, as far as they knew, the
three (3) were literally purchased from third persons who represented to Bella and the
latter’s common-law husband, Alejandro Ty, that they were abandoned children. Bella
and Alejandro took pity on the three (3) and brought them up as their own. This was
known within the family circle, but was not disclosed to Peter, Catherine, and Fannie
in order to protect them from the stigma of knowing they were unwanted children.
However, Alejandro and Bella did not legally adopt them; hence, they were never
conferred the rights of legitimate children.
While the action for annulment of judgment was pending before the Court of Appeals,
Fannie filed a complaint12 for falsification and perjury against petitioner and
Rosemary. Fannie alleged that petitioner and Rosemary falsely and maliciously stated
in the pertinent pleadings filed before the RTC of Pasig City that the late Bella had
only two (2) heirs, namely the two (2) of them. Petitioner and Rosemary forthwith filed
a joint motion to suspend the preliminary investigation on the ground of a pending
prejudicial question before the Court of Appeals.13 They argued that the issue of
whether Peter, Catherine, and Fannie are related to Bella and therefore legal heirs of
the latter was pending before the Court of Appeals. The investigating prosecutor
denied the joint motion and found probable cause against petitioner and Rosemary for
two (2) counts each of falsification of public documents. 14 The prosecutor held that
the issue before the Court of Appeals is the validity of the compromise agreement
which is not determinative of the criminal case which involves the liability of petitioner
and Rosemary for falsification, allegedly for willfully making the false statements in the
opposition to the petition for letters of administration and in the subsequent
compromise agreement filed before the RTC of Pasig City.
On December 20, 2005, three (3) informations15 against petitioner and Rosemary
were thus filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati City, Branch 61.
Petitioner filed a petition for review16 with the Department of Justice (DOJ) and a
motion to defer proceedings17before the MeTC on the ground of the pending appeal
before the DOJ. Also, petitioner and Rosemary filed with the MeTC separate motions
to suspend proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question. 18 However, petitioner’s
appeal was dismissed by the DOJ,19 while her motions before the MeTC were denied
by the said court.20 The MeTC agreed with the prosecutor that the issue before the
Court of Appeals in the action for annulment of judgment is the validity of the
compromise agreement while the criminal case involves their liability for falsification of
public documents. The MeTC also denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. 21
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition 22 with the RTC of
Makati City, Branch 66. In an Order23 dated November 16, 2006, the RTC denied the
petition on the ground that there was no prejudicial question; hence, the MeTC did not
act with grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to suspend
proceedings. The RTC held that there was no prejudicial question as the quantum of
evidence in the civil action for annulment of judgment differs from the quantum of
evidence required in the criminal action for falsification of public documents.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration24 was also denied by the RTC in its
Order25 dated March 9, 2007.1avvphi1
Undaunted, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of
Appeals assailing the RTC’s orders. In its August 23, 2007 Resolution, 26 the appellate
court dismissed the petition on the ground that the certification of non-forum shopping
was signed only by petitioner’s counsel and not by petitioner herself. Petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration was also denied in the July 14, 2008 Resolution27 of the
Court of Appeals.
Hence, the present recourse.
Petitioner alleges that:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI ON THE GROUND THAT THE CERTIFICATION OF
NON-FORUM SHOPPING WAS SIGNED BY COUNSEL ALLEGEDLY IN
VIOLATION OF SEC. 3, RULE 46, IN RELATION TO SEC. 1 RULE 65, 1997 RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT NULLIFYING
THE ASSAILED ORDERS OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT JOSELITO VILLAROSA ON
THE GROUND THAT THE SAME WAS ISSUED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION.28
The petition is meritorious.
Under Rule 46, Section 3, paragraph 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, petitions for certiorari must be verified and accompanied by a sworn
Civil Law Review I – 08.12.19 |46
certification of non-forum shopping.29 The primary question that has to be resolved in
this case is whether the verification and certification of non-forum shopping,
erroneously signed by counsel, may be cured by subsequent compliance. 30
Generally, subsequent compliance with the requirement of a certification of non-forum
shopping does not excuse a party from failure to comply in the first instance. 31 A
certification of the plaintiff’s counsel will not suffice for the reason that it is the
petitioner, and not the counsel, who is in the best position to know whether he actually
filed or caused the filing of a petition.32 A certification against forum shopping signed
by counsel is a defective certification that is equivalent to non-compliance with the
requirement and constitutes a valid cause for the dismissal of the petition. 33
However, there are instances when we treated compliance with the rule with relative
liberality, especially when there are circumstances or compelling reasons making the
strict application of the rule clearly unjustified.34
In the case of Far Eastern Shipping Company v. Court of Appeals,35 while we said
that, strictly, a certification against forum shopping by counsel is a defective
certification, the verification, signed by petitioner’s counsel in said case, is substantial
compliance inasmuch as it served the purpose of the Rules of informing the Court of
the pendency of another action or proceeding involving the same issues. We then
explained that procedural rules are instruments in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice which should be used to achieve such end and not to derail
it.36
In Sy Chin v. Court of Appeals,37 we categorically stated that while the petition was
flawed as the certification of non-forum shopping was signed only by counsel and not
by the party, such procedural lapse may be overlooked in the interest of substantial
justice.38 Finally, the Court has also on occasion held that the party need not sign the
verification; a party’s representative, lawyer or any person who personally knows the
truth of the facts alleged in the pleading may sign the verification. 39
Here, the verification and certification of non-forum shopping was signed by
petitioner’s counsel. Upon receipt of the resolution of the Court of Appeals dismissing
her petition for non-compliance with the rules, petitioner submitted, together with her
motion for reconsideration, a verification and certification signed by her in compliance
with the said rule.40 We deem this to be sufficient compliance especially in view of the
merits of the case, which may be considered as a special circumstance or a
compelling reason that would justify tempering the hard consequence of the
procedural requirement on non-forum shopping.41
On the second assignment of error that the Court of Appeals erred in denying
petitioner’s prayer for a writ of certiorari and prohibition, we likewise find for petitioner.
Under Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, a criminal
action may be suspended upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action,
to wit:
SEC. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. - A petition for suspension of
the criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action
may be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary
investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to
suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time before the prosecution
rests.
For a prejudicial question in a civil case to suspend a criminal action, it must appear
not only that said civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the
criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or
issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily
be determined.42 The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid
two (2) conflicting decisions.
Thus, for a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the
suspension of the criminal proceedings until the final resolution of the civil case, the
following requisites must be present: (1) the civil case involves facts intimately related
to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based; (2) in the resolution of
the issue or issues raised in the civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused
would necessarily be determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try said question must be
lodged in another tribunal.43
If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal
responsibility of the accused in the criminal action based on the same facts, or there
is no necessity "that the civil case be determined first before taking up the criminal
case," the civil case does not involve a prejudicial question.44 Neither is there a
prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed
independently of each other.45
As stated, the determination of whether the proceedings may be suspended on the
basis of a prejudicial question rests on whether the facts and issues raised in the
pleadings in the civil case are so related with the issues raised in the criminal case
such that the resolution of the issues in the civil case would also determine the
judgment in the criminal case.
A perusal of the allegations in the petition to annul judgment shows that CA-G.R. SP
No. 87222 pending before the Court of Appeals is principally for the determination of
the validity of the compromise agreement which did not include Peter, Catherine, and
Fannie as heirs of Bella. Peter, Catherine, and Fannie presented evidence to prove
that they are also biological children of Bella and Alejandro. On the other hand,
Criminal Case Nos. 343812 to 343814 before the MeTC involve the determination of
whether petitioner committed falsification of public documents in executing pleadings
containing untruthful statements that she and Rosemary were the only legal heirs of
Bella.
It is evident that the result of the civil case will determine the innocence or guilt of the
petitioner in the criminal cases for falsification of public documents. The criminal
cases arose out of the claim of Peter, Catherine, and Fannie that they are also the
legal heirs of Bella. If it is finally adjudged in the civil case that they are not biological
children of the late Bella and consequently not entitled to a share in her estate as
Civil Law Review I – 08.12.19 |47
heirs, there is no more basis to proceed with the criminal cases against petitioner who
could not have committed falsification in her pleadings filed before the RTC of Pasig
City, the truth of her statements regarding the filiation of Peter, Catherine and Fannie
having been judicially settled.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated August 23, 2007
and July 14, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 98978 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The criminal proceedings against petitioner
Krizia Katrina Ty-De Zuzuarregui in Criminal Case Nos. 343812 to 343814 before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61 are hereby ordered SUSPENDED
until the final resolution of CA-G.R. SP No. 87222.
No costs. SO ORDERED.
13. G.R. No. 172060 September 13, 2010
JOSELITO R. PIMENTEL, Petitioner, vs.
MARIA CHRYSANTINE L. PIMENTEL and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the Decision2 of the Court of
Appeals, promulgated on 20 March 2006, in CA-G.R. SP No. 91867.
The Antecedent Facts
The facts are stated in the Court of Appeals’ decision:
On 25 October 2004, Maria Chrysantine Pimentel y Lacap (private respondent) filed
an action for frustrated parricide against Joselito R. Pimentel (petitioner), docketed as
Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415, before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
which was raffled to Branch 223 (RTC Quezon City).
On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before the Regional Trial
Court of Antipolo City, Branch 72 (RTC Antipolo) for the pre-trial and trial of Civil Case
No. 04-7392 (Maria Chrysantine Lorenza L. Pimentel v. Joselito Pimentel) for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Section 36 of the Family Code on the ground
of psychological incapacity.
On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings
before the RTC Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question.
Petitioner asserted that since the relationship between the offender and the victim is a
key element in parricide, the outcome of Civil Case No. 04-7392 would have a
bearing in the criminal case filed against him before the RTC Quezon City.
The Decision of the Trial Court
The RTC Quezon City issued an Order dated 13 May 20053 holding that the
pendency of the case before the RTC Antipolo is not a prejudicial question that
warrants the suspension of the criminal case before it. The RTC Quezon City held
that the issues in Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 are the injuries sustained by
respondent and whether the case could be tried even if the validity of petitioner’s
marriage with respondent is in question. The RTC Quezon City ruled:
WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing, the Motion to Suspend Proceedings On
the [Ground] of the Existence of a Prejudicial Question is, for lack of merit, DENIED.
SO ORDERED.4
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 22 August 2005 Order,5 the RTC
Quezon City denied the motion.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with application for a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order before the Court of Appeals, assailing
the 13 May 2005 and 22 August 2005 Orders of the RTC Quezon City.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its 20 March 2006 Decision, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. The Court
of Appeals ruled that in the criminal case for frustrated parricide, the issue is whether
the offender commenced the commission of the crime of parricide directly by overt
acts and did not perform all the acts of execution by reason of some cause or
accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. On the other hand, the issue in
the civil action for annulment of marriage is whether petitioner is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The Court of Appeals
ruled that even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent would be declared
void, it would be immaterial to the criminal case because prior to the declaration of
nullity, the alleged acts constituting the crime of frustrated parricide had already been
committed. The Court of Appeals ruled that all that is required for the charge of
frustrated parricide is that at the time of the commission of the crime, the marriage is
still subsisting.
Petitioner filed a petition for review before this Court assailing the Court of Appeals’
decision.
The Issue
The only issue in this case is whether the resolution of the action for annulment of
marriage is a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case for
frustrated parricide against petitioner.
Civil Law Review I – 08.12.19 |48
 The Ruling of this Court
The petition has no merit.
Civil Case Must be Instituted
Before the Criminal Case
Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure6 provides:
Section 7. Elements of Prejudicial Question. - The elements of a prejudicial question
are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately
related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action and (b) the resolution of
such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
The rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted first before the filing of the
criminal action. In this case, the Information7 for Frustrated Parricide was dated 30
August 2004. It was raffled to RTC Quezon City on 25 October 2004 as per the
stamped date of receipt on the Information. The RTC Quezon City set Criminal Case
No. Q-04-130415 for pre-trial and trial on 14 February 2005. Petitioner was served
summons in Civil Case No. 04-7392 on 7 February 2005.8 Respondent’s petition9 in
Civil Case No. 04-7392 was dated 4 November 2004 and was filed on 5 November
2004. Clearly, the civil case for annulment was filed after the filing of the criminal case
for frustrated parricide. As such, the requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000
Rules on Criminal Procedure was not met since the civil action was filed subsequent
to the filing of the criminal action.
Annulment of Marriage is not a Prejudicial Question
in Criminal Case for Parricide
Further, the resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question that would
warrant the suspension of the criminal action.
There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action are both
pending, and there exists in the civil action an issue which must be preemptively
resolved before the criminal action may proceed because howsoever the issue raised
in the civil action is resolved would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
accused in the criminal case.10 A prejudicial question is defined as:
x x x one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the
issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is a
question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately
connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to
suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts
intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but
also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or
innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.11
The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in the crime of
parricide,12 which punishes any person "who shall kill his father, mother, or child,
whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants or descendants, or his
spouse."13 The relationship between the offender and the victim distinguishes the
crime of parricide from murder14 or homicide.15 However, the issue in the annulment
of marriage is not similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal case for
parricide. Further, the relationship between the offender and the victim is not
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code is whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the accused killed the
victim. In this case, since petitioner was charged with frustrated parricide, the issue is
whether he performed all the acts of execution which would have killed respondent as
a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of petitioner’s will.16 At the time of the commission of the alleged crime,
petitioner and respondent were married. The subsequent dissolution of their marriage,
in case the petition in Civil Case No. 04-7392 is granted, will have no effect on the
alleged crime that was committed at the time of the subsistence of the marriage. In
short, even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner
could still be held criminally liable since at the time of the commission of the alleged
crime, he was still married to respondent.1avvphi1
We cannot accept petitioner’s reliance on Tenebro v. Court of Appeals17 that "the
judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as
the vinculum between the spouses is concerned x x x." First, the issue in Tenebro is
the effect of the judicial declaration of nullity of a second or subsequent marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity on a criminal liability for bigamy. There was no
issue of prejudicial question in that case. Second, the Court ruled in Tenebro that
"[t]here is x x x a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although
void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences."18 In fact, the Court declared in
that case that "a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the State’s penal laws
are concerned."19
In view of the foregoing, the Court upholds the decision of the Court of Appeals. The
trial in Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 may proceed as the resolution of the issue in
Civil Case No. 04-7392 is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of petitioner in
the criminal case.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 20 March 2006 Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91867. SO ORDERED.
Civil Law Review I – 08.12.19 |49
 14. A.C. No. 6971 February 23, 2006 Respondent alleged that the case should be dismissed outright for violation of the rule
on non-forum shopping. He argued that complainant did not inform the IBP about the
QUIRINO TOMLIN II, Complainant, vs. cases he filed for violations of B.P. Blg. 22 against respondent pending before the
ATTY. SALVADOR N. MOYA II, Respondent. Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Maria, Bulacan.9 Respondent argued that the filing of the
administrative case despite the pendency of the criminal cases is a form of
harassment which should not be allowed.
DECISION
On April 28, 2004, the Commission on Bar Discipline denied10 the motion to dismiss
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: for being a prohibited pleading under Section 2, Rule 3 of its Rules of Procedure.
Respondent’s motion for reconsideration11 was likewise denied on June 16, 2004.12
On December 1, 2003, Quirino Tomlin II filed a complaint1 before the Commission on
Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) against Atty. Salvador N. Thereafter, respondent filed several motions for extension of time to file an
Moya II for allegedly reneging on his monetary obligations and for having issued answer.13 His last motion for extension was however denied for lack of merit.
bouncing checks; thereby violating the Code of Professional Responsibility 2 and Consequently, the Commission on Bar Discipline declared him in default.14
Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22.3
Respondent thereafter filed a manifestation with motion to terminate proceedings on
Complainant averred that respondent borrowed from him P600,000.00 partially the ground of prescription15and omnibus motion to recall the default order.16
covered by seven postdated checks. However, when complainant tried to encash
them on their respective due dates, the checks were all dishonored by the drawee
bank, to wit: On January 3, 2005, the Commission on Bar Discipline required the parties to submit
their respective verified position papers after which the case shall be considered
submitted for resolution.17
Check No. Due Date Amount Reason for Dishonor
MOB May 16, 2001 P13,500.00 RTCOCI Only the complainant submitted his position paper. 18
1011326
MOB June 11, 2001 P30,000.00 RTCOCI In the Report and Recommendation dated March 31, 2005, the Investigating
1011311
Commissioner noted that respondent failed to file an answer and/or position paper
MOB June 17, 2001 P5,000.00 Account Closed despite several requests for extension, in disregard of the orders of the IBP.
1011328 Moreover, it was observed that the pending criminal action against respondent does
MOB August 12, 2001 P50,000.00 Account Closed not pose a prejudicial question to the resolution of the issues in the present
1011313 administrative case. Hence, it was recommended that respondent be suspended from
MOB August 16, 2001 P5,000.00 Account Closed the practice of law for one year.
1011329
MOB August 19, 2001 P50,000.00 Account Closed On October 22, 2005, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the report
1011314 of the Investigating Commissioner, but modified the penalty of suspension from the
MOB September 18, 2001 P5,000.00 Account Closed practice of law from one year to two years.
1011330
We agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP.
Complainant made several demands, the last being a formal letter4 sent on
September 25, 2002;5 however, respondent still failed and refused to pay his debt Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice. As vanguards of our legal
without justifiable reason. Consequently, complainant instituted a case for seven system, they are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a high
counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 against the respondent before the Municipal Trial standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing. In so doing, the people’s faith
Court of Sta. Maria, Bulacan.6 In addition, he filed the instant case for respondent’s and confidence in the judicial system is ensured. 19 Lawyers may be disciplined –
disbarment. whether in their professional or in their private capacity – for any conduct that is
wanting in morality, honesty, probity and good demeanor.20 Any gross misconduct of
On December 1, 2003, respondent was directed to file his answer but instead he filed a lawyer in his profession or private capacity is a ground for the imposition of the
several motions for extension of time to file a responsive pleading7 and a motion to penalty of suspension or disbarment because good character is an essential
dismiss complaint.8 qualification for the admission to the practice of law and for the continuance of such
privilege.21

Civil Law Review I – 08.12.19 |50

In the present case, respondent admitted his monetary obligations to the complainant
but offered no justifiable reason for his continued refusal to pay. Complainant made
several demands, both verbal and written, but respondent just ignored them and even
made himself scarce. Although he acknowledged his financial obligations to the
complainant, respondent never offered nor made arrangements to pay his debt. On
the contrary, he refused to recognize any wrongdoing nor shown remorse for issuing
worthless checks, an act constituting gross misconduct.22Respondent must be
reminded that it is his duty as a lawyer to faithfully perform at all times his duties to
society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. As part of his duties, he must
promptly pay his financial obligations.23
The contention that complainant violated the rule against forum shopping with the
filing of this administrative complaint is bereft of merit. There is forum-shopping
whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable
opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another24 or when he institutes two or
more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that
one or the other court would make a favorable disposition.25 Forum shopping applies
only to judicial cases or proceedings, not to disbarment proceedings. 26 Moreover,
Criminal Case Nos. 6-367-03 to 6-373-03 for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 refer to the
respondent’s act of making or drawing and issuance of worthless checks; while the
present administrative case seeks to discipline respondent as a lawyer for his
dishonest act of failing to pay his debt in violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.lavvph!1.net
Respondent, being a member of the bar, should note that administrative cases
against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they may
proceed independently of criminal cases. The burden of proof in a criminal case is
guilt beyond reasonable doubt while in an administrative case, only preponderance of
evidence is required. Thus, a criminal prosecution will not constitute a prejudicial
question even if the same facts and circumstances are attendant in the administrative
proceedings.27
Besides, it is not sound judicial policy to await the final resolution of a criminal case
before a complaint against a lawyer may be acted upon; otherwise, this Court will be
rendered helpless from applying the rules on admission to and continuing
membership in the legal profession during the whole period that the criminal case is
pending final disposition when the objectives of the two proceedings are vastly
disparate.28
Finally, we note that respondent failed to file his answer and verified position paper
despite several opportunities given him by the IBP, that is, from the time he received
on December 20, 200329 the Order30 of the IBP requiring him to file an answer until
March 31, 2005 when the Investigating Commissioner submitted the Report and
Recommendation. Instead, he filed several motions for extension of time, motion to
dismiss the complaint, motion for reconsideration, manifestation with motion to
terminate proceedings, and omnibus motion to recall the default order. Until the end,
respondent offered no plausible explanation for his failure to pay his debts. Instead,
he kept on insisting, on plainly unmeritorious grounds, the dismissal of the complaint.
Verily, respondent’s failure to comply with the orders of the IBP without justifiable
reason manifests his disrespect of judicial authorities.31 Respondent should be
reminded that the IBP has disciplinary authority over him by virtue of his membership
therein.32
In view of the foregoing, we find the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for
two years as recommended by the IBP commensurate under the circumstances.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Salvador N. Moya II is found GUILTY of gross misconduct and
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for two years, effective immediately, with a warning that any further
infraction by him shall be dealt with most severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to all courts as well as the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and the Office of the Bar Confidant. SO ORDERED.
BOOK I. PERSONS
TITLE I. CIVIL PERSONALITY
CHAPTER I. GENERAL PROVISIONS (ARTS. 37-39)
CHAPTER II. NATURAL PERSONS (ARTS. 40-43)
15. G.R. No. L-16439 July 20, 1961
ANTONIO GELUZ, petitioner, vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and OSCAR LAZO, respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
This petition for certiorari brings up for review question whether the husband of a
woman, who voluntarily procured her abortion, could recover damages from physician
who caused the same.
The litigation was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Manila by respondent
Oscar Lazo, the of Nita Villanueva, against petitioner Antonio Geluz, a physician.
Convinced of the merits of the complaint upon the evidence adduced, the trial court
rendered judgment favor of plaintiff Lazo and against defendant Geluz, ordering the
latter to pay P3,000.00 as damages, P700.00 attorney's fees and the costs of the suit.
On appeal, Court of Appeals, in a special division of five, sustained the award by a
majority vote of three justices as against two, who rendered a separate dissenting
opinion.
The facts are set forth in the majority opinion as follows:
Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant (Antonio Geluz) for the first time
in 1948 — through her aunt Paula Yambot. In 1950 she became pregnant by
Civil Law Review I – 08.12.19 |51
 her present husband before they were legally married. Desiring to conceal
her pregnancy from her parent, and acting on the advice of her aunt, she
had herself aborted by the defendant. After her marriage with the plaintiff,
she again became pregnant. As she was then employed in the Commission
on Elections and her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had herself
aborted again by the defendant in October 1953. Less than two years later,
she again became pregnant. On February 21, 1955, accompanied by her
sister Purificacion and the latter's daughter Lucida, she again repaired to the
defendant's clinic on Carriedo and P. Gomez streets in Manila, where the
three met the defendant and his wife. Nita was again aborted, of a two-
month old foetus, in consideration of the sum of fifty pesos, Philippine
currency. The plaintiff was at this time in the province of Cagayan,
campaigning for his election to the provincial board; he did not know of, nor
gave his consent, to the abortion.
It is the third and last abortion that constitutes plaintiff's basis in filing this action and
award of damages. Upon application of the defendant Geluz we granted certiorari.
The Court of Appeals and the trial court predicated the award of damages in the sum
of P3,000.06 upon the provisions of the initial paragraph of Article 2206 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines. This we believe to be error, for the said article, in fixing a
minimum award of P3,000.00 for the death of a person, does not cover the case of an
unborn foetus that is not endowed with personality. Under the system of our Civil
Code, "la criatura abortiva no alcanza la categoria de persona natural y en
consscuencia es un ser no nacido a la vida del Derecho" (Casso-Cervera,
"Diccionario de Derecho Privado", Vol. 1, p. 49), being incapable of having rights and
obligations.
Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death
pertains primarily to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for such
damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of the injuries it
received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In
fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was
extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take place
from on that lacked juridical personality (or juridical capacity as distinguished from
capacity to act). It is no answer to invoke the provisional personality of a conceived
child (conceptus pro nato habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Code, because that
same article expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the condition
that the child should be subsequently born alive: "provided it be born later with the
condition specified in the following article". In the present case, there is no dispute
that the child was dead when separated from its mother's womb.
The prevailing American jurisprudence is to the same effect; and it is generally held
that recovery can not had for the death of an unborn child (Stafford vs. Roadway
Transit Co., 70 F. Supp. 555; Dietrich vs. Northampton, 52 Am. Rep. 242; and
numerous cases collated in the editorial note, 10 ALR, (2d) 639).
This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at all. But
such damages must be those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from the
injury or violation of the rights of the deceased, his right to life and physical integrity.
Because the parents can not expect either help, support or services from an unborn
child, they would normally be limited to moral damages for the illegal arrest of the
normal development of the spes hominis that was the foetus, i.e., on account of
distress and anguish attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of their parental
expectations (Civ. Code Art. 2217), as well as to exemplary damages, if the
circumstances should warrant them (Art. 2230). But in the case before us, both the
trial court and the Court of Appeals have not found any basis for an award of moral
damages, evidently because the appellee's indifference to the previous abortions of
his wife, also caused by the appellant herein, clearly indicates that he was
unconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes and affections. The lower court
expressly found, and the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals did not contradict it,
that the appellee was aware of the second abortion; and the probabilities are that he
was likewise aware of the first. Yet despite the suspicious repetition of the event, he
appeared to have taken no steps to investigate or pinpoint the causes thereof, and
secure the punishment of the responsible practitioner. Even after learning of the third
abortion, the appellee does not seem to have taken interest in the administrative and
criminal cases against the appellant. His only concern appears to have been directed
at obtaining from the doctor a large money payment, since he sued for P50,000.00
damages and P3,000.00 attorney's fees, an "indemnity" claim that, under the
circumstances of record, was clearly exaggerated.
The dissenting Justices of the Court of Appeals have aptly remarked that:
It seems to us that the normal reaction of a husband who righteously feels
outraged by the abortion which his wife has deliberately sought at the hands
of a physician would be highminded rather than mercenary; and that his
primary concern would be to see to it that the medical profession was purged
of an unworthy member rather than turn his wife's indiscretion to personal
profit, and with that idea in mind to press either the administrative or the
criminal cases he had filed, or both, instead of abandoning them in favor of a
civil action for damages of which not only he, but also his wife, would be the
beneficiaries.
It is unquestionable that the appellant's act in provoking the abortion of appellee's
wife, without medical necessity to warrant it, was a criminal and morally reprehensible
act, that can not be too severely condemned; and the consent of the woman or that of
her husband does not excuse it. But the immorality or illegality of the act does not
justify an award of damage that, under the circumstances on record, have no factual
or legal basis.
The decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint ordered dismissed.
Without costs.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished to the Department of Justice and the Board of
Medical Examiners for their information and such investigation and action against the
appellee Antonio Geluz as the facts may warrant.
Civil Law Review I – 08.12.19 |52
 16. G.R. No. 182836 October 13, 2009
CONTINENTAL STEEL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs.
HON. ACCREDITED VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR ALLAN S. MONTAÑO and
NAGKAKAISANG MANGGAGAWA NG CENTRO STEEL CORPORATION-
SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT AND
REFORMS (NMCSC-SUPER), Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the Decision1 dated 27 February 2008 and the Resolution2 dated 9 May
2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101697, affirming the
Resolution3 dated 20 November 2007 of respondent Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator
Atty. Allan S. Montaño (Montaño) granting bereavement leave and other death
benefits to Rolando P. Hortillano (Hortillano), grounded on the death of his unborn
child.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation
(Continental Steel) and a member of respondent Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng
Centro Steel Corporation-Solidarity of Trade Unions in the Philippines for
Empowerment and Reforms (Union) filed on 9 January 2006, a claim for Paternity
Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance for dependent,
pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) concluded between
Continental and the Union, which reads:
ARTICLE X: LEAVE OF ABSENCE
xxxx
Section 2. BEREAVEMENT LEAVE—The Company agrees to grant a bereavement
leave with pay to any employee in case of death of the employee’s legitimate
dependent (parents, spouse, children, brothers and sisters) based on the following:
2.1 Within Metro Manila up to Marilao, Bulacan - 7 days
2.2 Provincial/Outside Metro Manila - 11 days
xxxx
ARTICLE XVIII: OTHER BENEFITS
xxxx
Section 4. DEATH AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE—The Company shall grant death
and accidental insurance to the employee or his family in the following manner:
xxxx
4.3 DEPENDENTS—Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (Php11,550.00) in
case of death of the employees legitimate dependents (parents, spouse, and
children). In case the employee is single, this benefit covers the legitimate parents,
brothers and sisters only with proper legal document to be presented (e.g. death
certificate).4
The claim was based on the death of Hortillano’s unborn child. Hortillano’s wife,
Marife V. Hortillano, had a premature delivery on 5 January 2006 while she was in the
38th week of pregnancy.5 According to the Certificate of Fetal Death dated 7 January
2006, the female fetus died during labor due to fetal Anoxia secondary to
uteroplacental insufficiency.6
Continental Steel immediately granted Hortillano’s claim for paternity leave but denied
his claims for bereavement leave and other death benefits, consisting of the death
and accident insurance.7
Seeking the reversal of the denial by Continental Steel of Hortillano’s claims for
bereavement and other death benefits, the Union resorted to the grievance machinery
provided in the CBA. Despite the series of conferences held, the parties still failed to
settle their dispute,8 prompting the Union to file a Notice to Arbitrate before the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) of the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE), National Capital Region (NCR).9 In a Submission Agreement
dated 9 October 2006, the Union and Continental Steel submitted for voluntary
arbitration the sole issue of whether Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave and
other death benefits pursuant to Article X, Section 2
and Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of the CBA.10 The parties mutually chose Atty. Montaño,
an Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator, to resolve said issue.11
When the preliminary conferences again proved futile in amicably settling the dispute,
the parties proceeded to submit their respective Position Papers, 12 Replies,13 and
Rejoinders14 to Atty. Montaño.
The Union argued that Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave and other death
benefits pursuant to the CBA. The Union maintained that Article X, Section 2 and
Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of the CBA did not specifically state that the dependent
should have first been born alive or must have acquired juridical personality so that
his/her subsequent death could be covered by the CBA death benefits. The Union
cited cases wherein employees of MKK Steel Corporation (MKK Steel) and Mayer
Steel Pipe Corporation (Mayer Steel), sister companies of Continental Steel, in similar
situations as Hortillano were able to receive death benefits under similar provisions of
their CBAs.
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The Union mentioned in particular the case of Steve L. Dugan (Dugan), an employee
of Mayer Steel, whose wife also prematurely delivered a fetus, which had already died
prior to the delivery. Dugan was able to receive paternity leave, bereavement leave,
and voluntary contribution under the CBA between his union and Mayer
Steel.15 Dugan’s child was only 24 weeks in the womb and died before labor, as
opposed to Hortillano’s child who was already 37-38 weeks in the womb and only
died during labor.
The Union called attention to the fact that MKK Steel and Mayer Steel are located in
the same compound as Continental Steel; and the representatives of MKK Steel and
Mayer Steel who signed the CBA with their respective employees’ unions were the
same as the representatives of Continental Steel who signed the existing CBA with
the Union.
Finally, the Union invoked Article 1702 of the Civil Code, which provides that all
doubts in labor legislations and labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the
safety of and decent living for the laborer.
On the other hand, Continental Steel posited that the express provision of the CBA
did not contemplate the death of an unborn child, a fetus, without legal personality. It
claimed that there are two elements for the entitlement to the benefits, namely: (1)
death and (2) status as legitimate dependent, none of which existed in Hortillano’s
case. Continental Steel, relying on Articles 40, 41 and 42 16 of the Civil Code,
contended that only one with civil personality could die. Hence, the unborn child never
died because it never acquired juridical personality. Proceeding from the same line of
thought, Continental Steel reasoned that a fetus that was dead from the moment of
delivery was not a person at all. Hence, the term dependent could not be applied to a
fetus that never acquired juridical personality. A fetus that was delivered dead could
not be considered a dependent, since it never needed any support, nor did it ever
acquire the right to be supported.
Continental Steel maintained that the wording of the CBA was clear and
unambiguous. Since neither of the parties qualified the terms used in the CBA, the
legally accepted definitions thereof were deemed automatically accepted by both
parties. The failure of the Union to have unborn child included in the definition of
dependent, as used in the CBA – the death of whom would have qualified the parent-
employee for bereavement leave and other death benefits – bound the Union to the
legally accepted definition of the latter term.
Continental Steel, lastly, averred that similar cases involving the employees of its
sister companies, MKK Steel and Mayer Steel, referred to by the Union, were
irrelevant and incompetent evidence, given the separate and distinct personalities of
the companies. Neither could the Union sustain its claim that the grant of
bereavement leave and other death benefits to the parent-employee for the loss of an
unborn child constituted "company practice."
On 20 November 2007, Atty. Montaño, the appointed Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator,
issued a Resolution17 ruling that Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave with
pay and death benefits.
Atty. Montaño identified the elements for entitlement to said benefits, thus:
This Office declares that for the entitlement of the benefit of bereavement leave with
pay by the covered employees as provided under Article X, Section 2 of the parties’
CBA, three (3) indispensable elements must be present: (1) there is "death"; (2) such
death must be of employee’s "dependent"; and (3) such dependent must be
"legitimate".
On the otherhand, for the entitlement to benefit for death and accident insurance as
provided under Article XVIII, Section 4, paragraph (4.3) of the parties’ CBA, four (4)
indispensable elements must be present: (a) there is "death"; (b) such death must be
of employee’s "dependent"; (c) such dependent must be "legitimate"; and (d) proper
legal document to be presented.18
Atty. Montaño found that there was no dispute that the death of an employee’s
legitimate dependent occurred. The fetus had the right to be supported by the parents
from the very moment he/she was conceived. The fetus had to rely on another for
support; he/she could not have existed or sustained himself/herself without the power
or aid of someone else, specifically, his/her mother. Therefore, the fetus was already
a dependent, although he/she died during the labor or delivery. There was also no
question that Hortillano and his wife were lawfully married, making their dependent,
unborn child, legitimate.
In the end, Atty. Montaño decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, a resolution is hereby rendered ORDERING
[herein petitioner Continental Steel] to pay Rolando P. Hortillano the amount of Four
Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Nine Pesos (₱4,939.00), representing his
bereavement leave pay and the amount of Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty
Pesos (₱11,550.00) representing death benefits, or a total amount of ₱16,489.00
The complaint against Manuel Sy, however, is ORDERED DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
All other claims are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Further, parties are hereby ORDERED to faithfully abide with the herein dispositions.
Aggrieved, Continental Steel filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review on
Certiorari,19 under Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 101697.
Continental Steel claimed that Atty. Montaño erred in granting Hortillano’s claims for
bereavement leave with pay and other death benefits because no death of an
employee’s dependent had occurred. The death of a fetus, at whatever stage of
pregnancy, was excluded from the coverage of the CBA since what was
contemplated by the CBA was the death of a legal person, and not that of a fetus,
which did not acquire any juridical personality. Continental Steel pointed out that its
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contention was bolstered by the fact that the term death was qualified by the phrase
legitimate dependent. It asserted that the status of a child could only be determined
upon said child’s birth, otherwise, no such appellation can be had. Hence, the
conditions sine qua non for Hortillano’s entitlement to bereavement leave and other
death benefits under the CBA were lacking.
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated 27 February 2008, affirmed Atty.
Montaño’s Resolution dated 20 November 2007. The appellate court interpreted
death to mean as follows:
[Herein petitioner Continental Steel’s] exposition on the legal sense in which the term
"death" is used in the CBA fails to impress the Court, and the same is irrelevant for
ascertaining the purpose, which the grant of bereavement leave and death benefits
thereunder, is intended to serve. While there is no arguing with [Continental Steel]
that the acquisition of civil personality of a child or fetus is conditioned on being born
alive upon delivery, it does not follow that such event of premature delivery of a fetus
could never be contemplated as a "death" as to be covered by the CBA provision,
undoubtedly an event causing loss and grief to the affected employee, with whom the
dead fetus stands in a legitimate relation. [Continental Steel] has proposed a narrow
and technical significance to the term "death of a legitimate dependent" as condition
for granting bereavement leave and death benefits under the CBA. Following
[Continental Steel’s] theory, there can be no experience of "death" to speak of. The
Court, however, does not share this view. A dead fetus simply cannot be equated with
anything less than "loss of human life", especially for the expectant parents. In this
light, bereavement leave and death benefits are meant to assuage the employee and
the latter’s immediate family, extend to them solace and support, rather than an act
conferring legal status or personality upon the unborn child. [Continental Steel’s]
insistence that the certificate of fetal death is for statistical purposes only sadly misses
this crucial point.20
Accordingly, the fallo of the 27 February 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby DENIED for lack
of merit. The assailed Resolution dated November 20, 2007 of Accredited Voluntary
Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montaño is hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
With costs against [herein petitioner Continental Steel].21
In a Resolution22 dated 9 May 2008, the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for
Reconsideration23 of Continental Steel.
Hence, this Petition, in which Continental Steel persistently argues that the CBA is
clear and unambiguous, so that the literal and legal meaning of death should be
applied. Only one with juridical personality can die and a dead fetus never acquired a
juridical personality.
We are not persuaded.
As Atty. Montaño identified, the elements for bereavement leave under Article X,
Section 2 of the CBA are: (1) death; (2) the death must be of a dependent, i.e.,
parent, spouse, child, brother, or sister, of an employee; and (3) legitimate relations of
the dependent to the employee. The requisites for death and accident insurance
under Article XVIII, Section 4(3) of the CBA are: (1) death; (2) the death must be of a
dependent, who could be a parent, spouse, or child of a married employee; or a
parent, brother, or sister of a single employee; and (4) presentation of the proper legal
document to prove such death, e.g., death certificate.
It is worthy to note that despite the repeated assertion of Continental Steel that the
provisions of the CBA are clear and unambiguous, its fundamental argument for
denying Hortillano’s claim for bereavement leave and other death benefits rests on
the purportedly proper interpretation of the terms "death" and "dependent" as used in
the CBA. If the provisions of the CBA are indeed clear and unambiguous, then there
is no need to resort to the interpretation or construction of the same. Moreover,
Continental Steel itself admitted that neither management nor the Union sought to
define the pertinent terms for bereavement leave and other death benefits during the
negotiation of the CBA.
The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code for the
legal definition of death is misplaced. Article 40 provides that a conceived child
acquires personality only when it is born, and Article 41 defines when a child is
considered born. Article 42 plainly states that civil personality is extinguished by
death.
First, the issue of civil personality is not relevant herein. Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the
Civil Code on natural persons, must be applied in relation to Article 37 of the same
Code, the very first of the general provisions on civil personality, which reads:
Art. 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is
inherent in every natural person and is lost only through death. Capacity to act, which
is the power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired and may be lost.
We need not establish civil personality of the unborn child herein since his/her
juridical capacity and capacity to act as a person are not in issue. It is not a question
before us whether the unborn child acquired any rights or incurred any obligations
prior to his/her death that were passed on to or assumed by the child’s parents. The
rights to bereavement leave and other death benefits in the instant case pertain
directly to the parents of the unborn child upon the latter’s death.
Second, Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code do not provide at all a definition of
death. Moreover, while the Civil Code expressly provides that civil personality may be
extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state that only those who have acquired
juridical personality could die.
And third, death has been defined as the cessation of life. 24 Life is not synonymous
with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could
die. Even a child inside the womb already has life. No less than the Constitution
recognizes the life of the unborn from conception,25 that the State must protect
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equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation
thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death.
Likewise, the unborn child can be considered a dependent under the CBA. As
Continental Steel itself defines, a dependent is "one who relies on another for
support; one not able to exist or sustain oneself without the power or aid of someone
else." Under said general definition,26 even an unborn child is a dependent of its
parents. Hortillano’s child could not have reached 38-39 weeks of its gestational life
without depending upon its mother, Hortillano’s wife, for sustenance. Additionally, it is
explicit in the CBA provisions in question that the dependent may be the parent,
spouse, or child of a married employee; or the parent, brother, or sister of a single
employee. The CBA did not provide a qualification for the child dependent, such that
the child must have been born or must have acquired civil personality, as Continental
Steel avers. Without such qualification, then child shall be understood in its more
general sense, which includes the unborn fetus in the mother’s womb.
The term legitimate merely addresses the dependent child’s status in relation to
his/her parents. In Angeles v. Maglaya,27 we have expounded on who is a legitimate
child, viz:
A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage.
Remove the element of lawful union and there is strictly no legitimate filiation between
parents and child. Article 164 of the Family Code cannot be more emphatic on the
matter: "Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are
legitimate." (Emphasis ours.)
Conversely, in Briones v. Miguel,28 we identified an illegitimate child to be as follows:
The fine distinctions among the various types of illegitimate children have been
eliminated in the Family Code. Now, there are only two classes of children --
legitimate (and those who, like the legally adopted, have the rights of legitimate
children) and illegitimate. All children conceived and born outside a valid marriage
are illegitimate, unless the law itself gives them legitimate status. (Emphasis ours.)
It is apparent that according to the Family Code and the afore-cited jurisprudence, the
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child attaches upon his/her conception. In the present
case, it was not disputed that Hortillano and his wife were validly married and that
their child was conceived during said marriage, hence, making said
child legitimate upon her conception.1avvphi1
Also incontestable is the fact that Hortillano was able to comply with the fourth
element entitling him to death and accident insurance under the CBA, i.e.,
presentation of the death certificate of his unborn child.
Given the existence of all the requisites for bereavement leave and other death
benefits under the CBA, Hortillano’s claims for the same should have been granted by
Continental Steel.
We emphasize that bereavement leave and other death benefits are granted to an
employee to give aid to, and if possible, lessen the grief of, the said employee and his
family who suffered the loss of a loved one. It cannot be said that the parents’ grief
and sense of loss arising from the death of their unborn child, who, in this case, had a
gestational life of 38-39 weeks but died during delivery, is any less than that of
parents whose child was born alive but died subsequently.
Being for the benefit of the employee, CBA provisions on bereavement leave and
other death benefits should be interpreted liberally to give life to the intentions thereof.
Time and again, the Labor Code is specific in enunciating that in case of doubt in the
interpretation of any law or provision affecting labor, such should be interpreted in
favor of labor.29 In the same way, the CBA and CBA provisions should be interpreted
in favor of labor. In Marcopper Mining v. National Labor Relations Commission,30 we
pronounced:
Finally, petitioner misinterprets the declaration of the Labor Arbiter in the assailed
decision that "when the pendulum of judgment swings to and fro and the forces are
equal on both sides, the same must be stilled in favor of labor." While petitioner
acknowledges that all doubts in the interpretation of the Labor Code shall be resolved
in favor of labor, it insists that what is involved-here is the amended CBA which is
essentially a contract between private persons. What petitioner has lost sight of is the
avowed policy of the State, enshrined in our Constitution, to accord utmost protection
and justice to labor, a policy, we are, likewise, sworn to uphold.
In Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Corporation v. NLRC [183 SCRA 451 (1990)],
we categorically stated that:
When conflicting interests of labor and capital are to be weighed on the scales of
social justice, the heavier influence of the latter should be counter-balanced by
sympathy and compassion the law must accord the underprivileged worker.
Likewise, in Terminal Facilities and Services Corporation v. NLRC [199 SCRA 265
(1991)], we declared:
Any doubt concerning the rights of labor should be resolved in its favor pursuant to
the social justice policy.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 27 February 2008
and Resolution dated 9 May 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101697,
affirming the Resolution dated 20 November 2007 of Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator
Atty. Allan S. Montaño, which granted to Rolando P. Hortillano bereavement leave
pay and other death benefits in the amounts of Four Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-
Nine Pesos (₱4,939.00) and Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos
(₱11,550.00), respectively, grounded on the death of his unborn child,
are AFFIRMED. Costs against Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation.
SO ORDERED.
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