SUBJECT: AMENDMENTS
 The City of Quezon passed two ordinances namely.
DOMINGO SARCOS, as Mayor of Barobo, Surigao del Sur petitioners vs HON. RECARELO
CASTILLO, Provincial Governor of Surigao del Sur & the Hon. Provincial Board of Surigao del
Sur respondents
FACTS:
Sarcos, an independent candidate, won in the 14 November 1967 elections, as Mayor of
Barobo, Surigao del Sur. Castillo charged Sarcos with misconduct and dishonesty in office.
Such act alleged constituted connivance with certain private individuals, to cut and fell timber
and selling of the timber cut, for own use and benefit, within the communcal forest reserve
of the municipality of Barobo, Surigao del Sur, to the damage and prejudice of the public and
the government.
As early as 18 April 196 there was already a charge under oath for abuse of official power in
consenting to and authorizing the violations of forestry laws was filed against petitioner by
Municipal Council of Barobo. It was on the basis of this administrative complaint that the
Castillo filed petition ordering the immediate suspension of Sarcos from position as Mayor
saying that the acts committed by mayor Sarcos affects his official integrity, the petition was
in accordance with the Sec.5 of RA 5185- Decentralization Act of 1967.
ISSUES:
WON Provincial Governor is vested power to order preventive suspension of Mayor Sarcos
under RA 5185
HELD / RATIONALE:
No. Castillo as governor lacks authority to order the preventive suspension of the Petitioner,
Sarcos. According to the Decentralization Act of 1967, particularly the paragraph dealing with
preventive suspension: "…The President, Provincial Board and City or Municipality Council, as
the case may be, shall hear and investigate the truth or falsity if the charges within 1- days
after receipt of such notice." It was the former law Sec. 2188 of Rev. Adm. Code which gives
power to the Governor to order preventive suspension, however, it was already repealed by
the Decentralization Act of 1967.
The court was also lead to the suspicion that politics was a cause for the order by Governor of
the preventive suspension of the Mayor, being an independent candidate thus of a different
political persuasion.
The writs of certiorari and prohibition are then granted. The preventive suspension order by
Castillo is annulled and set aside. Mayor Sarcos to be reinstated to his position.
*The Decentralization Act, to which the decision in this case is based, amended / repealed
Sec. 2188, Rev. Adm. Code. The former law provides that the provicnicla gorvernor, if the
charge against a munucupola officaial was municipal official was one affecting his official
integrity, could order his preventive suspension. It was repealed by the RA NO. 5185 Sec. 5
which provides that now it is the provincial board which has been granted the power to order
preventive suspension.
Facts:
 The first one was the Socialized Housing Tax of QC allowing the imposition
of special assessment (1/2 of the assessed valued of land in excess of P100k)
 The second one was Ordinance No. SP-2235, S-2013 on Garbage
Collection Fees imposing fees depending on the amount of the land or floor
area).
 Jose Ferrer, as a property in Quezon City questioned the validity of the city
ordinances.
 According to Ferrer:
 The city has no power to impose the tax.
 The SHT violates the rule on equality because it burdens real
property owners with expenses to provide funds for the housing of
informal settlers.
 The SHT is confiscatory or oppressive.
 Also, he assails the validity of the garbage fees imposition because:
 It violates the rule on double taxation.
 It violates the rule on equality because the fees are collected from
only domestic households and not from restaurants, food courts, fast
food chains, and other commercial dining places that spew garbage
much more than residential property owners.
Issue: WON the ordinances were valid.
Held:
1st ordinance: Socialized Housing Tax of Quezon City is valid.
Cities have the power to tax
It must be noted that local government units such as cities has the power to tax. The
collection for the socialized housing tax is valid. It must be noted that the collections
were made to accrue to the socialized housing programs and projects of the city.
The imposition was for a public purpose (exercise of power of taxation + police
power)
In this case, there was both an exercise of the power to tax (primary) and police
power (incidental). Removing slum areas in Quezon City is not only beneficial to the
underprivileged and homeless constituents but advantageous to the real property
owners as well.
The situation will improve the value of the their property investments, fully enjoying
the same in view of an orderly, secure, and safe community, and will enhance the
quality of life of the poor, making them law-abiding constituents and better consumers
of business products.
There is no violation of the rule on equality
Note: There is a substantial distinction between: real property owner and an informal
settler. In fact, the Supreme Court said that the disparity is so obvious. It is inherent in
the power to tax that a State is free to select the subjects of taxation. Inequities which
result from a singling out of one particular class for taxation or exemption infringe no
constitutional limitation.
All these requisites are complied with: An ordinance based on reasonable
classification does not violate the constitutional guaranty of the equal protection of the
law. The requirements for a valid and reasonable classification are: (1) it must rest on
substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it must
not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all members
of the same class.
The ordinance is not oppressive or confiscatory
The ordinance is also not oppressive since the tax rate being imposed is consistent
with the UDHA (Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992). While the law
authorizes LGUs to collect SHT on properties with an assessed value of more than
P50,000.00, the questioned ordinance only covers properties with an assessed value
exceeding P100,000.00. As well, the ordinance provides for a tax credit equivalent to
the total amount of the special assessment paid by the property owner beginning in
the sixth (6th) year of the effectivity of the ordinance.
2nd ordinance: The imposition of garbage fee is invalid.
Note: There was no violation of double taxation but there was a violation of the rule
on equity.
There is no violation of double taxation: the garbage fees are not taxes
In Progressive Development Corporation v. Quezon City, the Court declared that:
"if the generating of revenue is the primary purpose and regulation is merely
incidental, the imposition is a tax; but if regulation is the primary purpose, the fact that
incidentally revenue is also obtained does not make the imposition a tax."
Contention of Ferrer: that the imposition of garbage fee is tantamount to double
taxation because garbage collection is a basic and essential public service that
should be paid out from property tax, business tax, transfer tax, amusement tax,
community tax certificate, other taxes, and the IRA of the Quezon City Government.
All these are valid taxes. The garbage fees are license fees
Footnote: In order to constitute double taxation in the objectionable or prohibited
sense the same property must be taxed twice when it should be taxed but once; both
taxes must be imposed on the same property or subject-matter, for the same
purpose, by the same State, Government, or taxing authority, within the same
jurisdiction or taxing district, during the same taxing period, and they must be the
same kind or character of tax.
There is a violation of the rule on equality: no substantial distinction
There is no substantial distinction between an occupant of a lot, on one hand, and an
occupant of a unit in a condominium, socialized housing project or apartment, on the
other hand.
Most likely, garbage output produced by these types of occupants is uniform and
does not vary to a large degree; thus, a similar schedule of fee is both just and
equitable.
The garbage fees or rates are unjust and inequitable
A resident of a 200 sq. m. unit in a condominium or socialized housing project has to
pay twice the amount than a resident of a lot similar in size; unlike unit occupants, all
occupants of a lot with an area of 200 sq. m. and less have to pay a fixed rate of
Php100.00; and the same amount of garbage fee is imposed regardless of whether
the resident is from a condominium or from a socialized housing project.
The classifications are not germane to the purpose of the ordinance
The declared purpose is: "promoting shared responsibility with the residents to attack
their common mindless attitude in over-consuming the present resources and in
generating waste."
Instead of simplistically categorizing the payee into land or floor occupant of a lot or
unit of a condominium, socialized housing project or apartment, respondent City
Council should have considered factors that could truly measure the amount of
wastes generated and the appropriate fee for its collection. Factors include, among
others, household age and size, accessibility to waste collection, population density of
the barangay or district, capacity to pay, and actual occupancy of the property.
SC:
→ Validity of Socialized Housing Tax of Quezon City is upheld.
→ Ordinance No. SP-2235, S-2013, which collects an annual garbage fee on all
domestic households in Quezon City, is unconstitutional and illegal.
JARDELEZA, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review[1] assailing the Decision[2] dated January 2, 2008
(assailed Decision) and Order[3] dated April 14, 2008 (assailed Order) of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 20 in Civil Case No. 07-116531, upholding the
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 567 [4] (E.O. No. 567), issued by then
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (President Arroyo) on September 8, 2006.
Facts of the Case
On July 25, 1994, Republic Act No. 7842[5] (R.A. No. 7842) was enacted establishing,
under the administration and supervision of the Department of Health (DOH), the
Taguig-Pateros District Hospital (TPDH).
On September 8, 2006, President Arroyo issued E.O. No. 567 devolving the
administration and supervision of TPDH from the DOH to the City of Taguig. [6] E.O.
No. 567 provided that it was issued pursuant to Republic Act No. 7160 (R.A. No.
7160), otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991 (Local Government
Code) and the President's continuing authority to reorganize the offices under the
executive department.
Thus, the City of Taguig, through its then Mayor and respondent Hon. Sigfrido R.
Tinga (Mayor Tinga), issued Executive Order No. 053 [7] (E.O. No. 053) dated October
18, 2006 formalizing the plan for the City of Taguig's take-over of the operations of
TPDH. The City of Taguig and the DOH subsequently entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement[8] (MOA) dated October 23, 2006 providing the details of the transition
and turn-over of the hospital's operations from the DOH to the City of Taguig.
In the meantime, petitioners, who were employees of the DOH assigned to the TPDH,
submitted a position paper to the then Secretary of Health, respondent Hon.
Francisco Duque III (Secretary Duque), expressing their objections to E.O. No. 567.
[9]
The position paper was received by the Office of the Secretary on November 6,
2006.[10] However, the DOH did not act on the Position Paper. [11]Petitioners also wrote
a letter[12] to the Office of the President requesting the deferment of the
implementation of E.O. No. 567, which also took no action. [13]
Thereafter, on January 3, 2007, Mayor Tinga issued Executive Order No. 001 [14] (E.O.
No. 001) creating the TPDH Management Team which will implement the MOA and
directing the creation of an audit team which will conduct an inventory of all the
medical supplies, materials, equipment and other documents to be turned-over from
the DOH to the City of Taguig.
On January 15, 2007, petitioners filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief [15] against
respondents in the RTC of Manila. On January 26, 2007, petitioners filed an amended
Petition for Prohibition and Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with
prayer for Ex-Parte Issuance of 72-hour Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), 20-day
TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction.[16] The petition prayed that E.O. No. 567 be
declared unconstitutional, illegal and null and void for having been issued in violation
of the constitutional principle of separation of powers and with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. [17]
The RTC denied petitioners' prayer for a 72-hour TRO and 20-day TRO. [18] As for the
Writ of Preliminary Injunction, the RTC, in its Order [19] dated February 9, 2007,
deemed the prayer for the same withdrawn in light of petitioners' manifestation that
they are no longer pursuing their prayer for the writ.
On motion[20] of petitioners and due to the Municipal Government of Pateros' failure
to file its Answer to the amended petition despite notice, the RTC declared it in
default.[21]
After the parties filed their respective pleadings, marked their exhibits and identified
the issues, the RTC, on July 26, 2007, issued the Pre-Trial Order. [22] As only legal
issues are involved, the RTC directed the parties to file their respective position
papers after which, the petition will be submitted for decision. [23]
Respondents City of Taguig, Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita and DOH Secretary
Francisco Duque III, and petitioners filed their respective position papers. [24]
Ruling of the RTC
The RTC dismissed the petition and held E.O. No. 567 valid and constitutional.
The RTC held that the issuance of E.O. No. 567 is in accordance with the President's
power of supervision over government entities in the executive department. [25] The
RTC also ruled that R.A. No. 7842, which established the TPDH, did not prohibit the
devolution of the TPDH's administration and supervision from the DOH to the City of
Taguig because the constitutional provision on local autonomy and provisions of the
Local Government Code on devolution are impliedly written in R.A. No. 7842.
[26]
Further, the Local Government Code provides that any doubt must be resolved in
favor of devolution.[27]
The RTC further opined that petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies
when they did not seek the intervention of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) with
respect to their transfer or reassignment[28] and when they failed to bring action
against the DOH and the Office of the President for their inaction on their objections
to E.O. No. 567.[29]
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration[30] which the RTC denied through the
assailed Order.
Hence, this petition.
Issues
I. Whether the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies applies; and
II. Whether E.O. No. 567 is constitutional.
Ruling
We deny the petition.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies provides that a party must first
avail himself or herself of all the means of administrative processes afforded him or
her before he or she is allowed to seek the intervention of the court. [31] If resort to a
remedy within the administrative machinery can still be made by giving the
administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes
within his or her jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the
court's judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of the intervention of
the court is fatal to one's cause of action. [32] However, the doctrine admits of
exceptions, one of which is when the issue involved is purely a legal question. [33] As
the issue in this case involves the legality of E.O. No. 567, a purely legal question, the
filing of the petition without exhausting administrative remedies is justified.
E.O. No. 567 is constitutional.
E.O. No. 567 reads in full:
Executive Order No. 567
DEVOLVING THE TAGUIG-PATEROS DISTRICT HOSPITAL FROM THE
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH TO THE CITY OF TAGUIG

WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 7842 approved on 16 December 1994 established the
Taguig-Pateros District Hospital under the administration and supervision of the
Department of Health (DOH);
WHEREAS, under Republic Act No. 7160 otherwise known as the Local Government
Code of 1991, local government units (LGUs) shall exercise such powers and discharge
such functions and responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate or incidental to
efficient and effective provision of basic services and facilities which cover, among
others, health services including secondary and tertiary hospitals;
WHEREAS, the President has the continuing authority to reorganize the offices under
the executive department;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, President of the
Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby order:
Section 1. The administration and supervision of Taguig-Pateros District Hospital is
hereby devolved from the Department of Health to the City of Taguig.
Section 2. All laws, issuances, rules and regulations which are inconsistent with this
Order are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 3. This Executive Order shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication
in a national newspaper of general circulation.
Done in the City of Manila, this 8th day of September, in the year of Our Lord, Two
Thousand and Six.
Petitioners aver that E.O. No. 567 contradicts the constitutional principle of
separation of powers as: (1) it amends the Local Government Code, particularly its
Section 17(e), which limits devolution of basic services and facilities to local
government units (LGUs) to only six (6) months after the effectivity of the law; [34] and
(2) it violates the DOH-issued Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of the
Local Government Code which provides that district health offices in the National
Capital Region (NCR), including its district hospitals, are exempt from devolution.
[35]
Petitioners also argue that E.O. No. 567 violates Republic Act No. 7305 [36] (R.A. No.
7305) because the former did not include provisions for the expenses relative to
petitioners' transfer and reassignment. [37]
Respondents counter that the issuance of E.O. No. 567 is within the President's
constitutional power of control over government entities in the executive department,
her continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the
President and her constitutional duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.
Consequently, the MOA between the City of Taguig and DOH as well as the
subsequent executive orders of then Mayor Tinga are valid. [38]
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they
are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution. [39] Thus, to be valid, an administrative
issuance, such as an executive order,[40] must comply with the following
requisites:
(1) Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature;
(2) It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure;
(3) It must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature; and
(4) It must be reasonable.[41]
E.O. No. 567 satisfies all of the above requisites.
First, E.O. No. 567 itself identifies its statutory and constitutional basis.
E.O. No. 567 was issued pursuant to Section 17 of the Local Government Code
expressly devolving to the local government units the delivery of basic services and
facilities, including health services, to wit:
Sec. 17. Basic Services and Facilities. -
(a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall continue
exercising the powers and discharging the duties and functions currently vested upon
them. They shall also discharge the functions and responsibilities of
national agencies and offices devolved to them pursuant to this Code. Local
government units shall likewise exercise such other powers and discharge
such other functions and responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate,
or incidental to efficient and effective provisions of the basic services and
facilities enumerated herein.
(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, the following:
xxx
(2) For a Municipality:
xxx
(iii) Subject to the provisions of Title Five, Book I of this Code, health services which
include the implementation of programs and projects on primary health care,
maternal and child care, and communicable and non-communicable disease control
services, access to secondary and tertiary health services; purchase of medicines,
medical supplies, and equipment needed to carry out the services herein enumerated;
xxx
(4) For a City:
All the services and facilities of the municipality and province. x x x
xxx
(e) National agencies or offices concerned shall devolve to local
government units the responsibility for the provision of basic services
and facilities enumerated in this Section within six (6) months after the effectivity
of this Code.
As used in this Code, the term "devolution" refers to the act by which the
national government confers power and authority upon the various local
government units to perform specific functions and responsibilities.[42]
It is the policy of the Local Government Code to provide for a more responsive and
accountable local government structure through a system of decentralization. [43] Thus,
E.O. No. 567 merely implements and puts into operation the policy and directive set
forth in the Local Government Code.
Similarly, E.O. No. 567 is within the constitutional power of the President to issue.
The President may, by executive or administrative order, direct the reorganization of
government entities under the executive department. This is sanctioned under the
Constitution, as well as other statutes.[44]
[45]
In Tondo Medical Center Employees Association v. Court of Appeals, petitioners
questioned the validity of Executive Order No. 10246 (E.O. No. 102 [46] issued by then
President Joseph Ejercito Estrada which, also pursuant to Section 17 of the Local
Government Code, provided for the changes in the roles, functions, and
organizational processes of the DOH. Petitioners alleged that E.O. No. 102 was void
on the ground that it was issued in excess of the President's authority, as the
structural and functional reorganization of the DOH is a legislative function. [47] In
rejecting petitioners' argument, we held that the issuance of E.O. No. 102 is an
exercise of the President's constitutional power of control over the executive
department, supported by the provisions of the Administrative Code, recognized by
other statutes, and consistently affirmed by this Court. [48] Similarly, in Malaria
Employees and Workers Association of the Philippines, Inc. v. Romulo,[49] where the
issue is also the validity of E.O. No. 102, we reiterated that the President has the
authority to carry out a reorganization of the DOH under the Constitution and other
statutory laws.
Our ruling in the above cases applies squarely in this case. The transfer of the
administration and supervision of TPDH from the DOH to the City of Taguig is a
result of the President's exercise of her power of control over the executive
department, including the DOH.
The Constitution declares it a policy of the State to ensure the autonomy of local
governments while Section 17 of the Local Government Code secures to the local
governments the genuine and meaningful autonomy that would develop them into
self-reliant communities and effective partners in the attainment of national goals.
[50]
Therefore, in issuing E.O. No. 567, the President was actually carrying out the
provisions of the Constitution and the Local Government Code. She was performing
her duty to ensure the faithful execution of the laws. [51]
As regards the second requisite, that the order must be issued or promulgated in
accordance with the prescribed procedure, petitioners do not question the procedure
by which E.O. No. 567 was issued. In the absence of strong evidence to the contrary,
acts of the other branches of the government are presumed to be valid, and there
being no objection from the respondents as to the procedure in the promulgation of
E.O. No. 567, the presumption is that the executive issuance duly complied with the
procedures and limitations imposed by law. [52]
The third requisite provides that an administrative issuance must not be ultra
vires or beyond the limits of the authority conferred. It must not supplant or modify
the Constitution, its enabling statute and other existing laws, for such is the sole
function of the legislature which the other branches of the government cannot usurp.
[53]
In assailing E.O. No. 567, petitioners argue that it violates Section 17(e) of the Local
Government Code. Section 17(e) partly reads:
(e) National agencies or offices concerned shall devolve to local government units the
responsibility for the provision of basic services and facilities enumerated in this
Section within six (6) months after the effectivity of this Code.
xxx
For petitioners, the provision limits the devolution of services to a period of only six
(6) months from the effectivity of the Local Government Code. Any devolution after
the expiration of such period can only be done through a statutory act. Thus, the
issuance of E.O. No. 567, which was well-beyond such period, is a clear usurpation of
legislative functions.
In order to ascertain whether the six-month period bars devolution after its
expiration, we bear in mind that we must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by
the spirit that giveth life.[54] Thus, we revisit the Declaration of Policy of the Local
Government Code, which provides:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. -
(a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the territorial and political
subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable
them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them
more effective partners in the attainment of national goals. Toward this end, the State
shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government
structure instituted through a system of decentralization whereby local government
units shall be given more powers, authority, responsibilities, and resources. The
process of decentralization shall proceed from the national government to the local
government units.
(b) It is also the policy of the State to ensure the accountability of local government
units through the institution of effective mechanisms of recall, initiative and
referendum.
(c) It is likewise the policy of the State to require all national agencies and offices to
conduct periodic consultations with appropriate local government units, non
governmental and people's organizations, and other concerned sectors of the
community before any project or program is implemented in their respective
jurisdictions.[55]
The foregoing provision echoes Section 3, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, which
reads:
Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a
more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a
system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and
referendum, allocate among the different local government units their powers,
responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, and
appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local
officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local
units.[56]
Decentralization is the devolution of national administration, not power, to local
governments.[57] One form of decentralization is devolution,[58] which involves the
transfer of powers, responsibilities, and resources for the performance of certain
functions from the central government to the LGUs. [59] It has been said that
devolution is indispensable to decentralization. [60]
Based on the foregoing, there is no question that the law favors devolution. In fact, as
mentioned earlier, Section 5(a) of the Local Government Code explicitly states that in
case of doubt, any question on any provision on a power of a local government shall
be resolved in favor of devolution of powers and of the LGU.
Considering the same, petitioners' restrictive interpretation of Section 17(e) is
inconsistent with the Constitution and the Local Government Code. It limits the
devolution intended by both the Constitution and the Local Government Code to an
unduly short period of time.
health offices and hospitals in the NCR, including TPDLI, from devolution.
We emphasize that under the Local Government Code, it is the Oversight Committee,
composed of representatives from both the executive and the legislative branches of
government, which was tasked to formulate the implementing rules and regulations of
the law.[62] The Local Government Code did not delegate to any other entity the
formulation of its implementing rules and regulations. Thus, on February 21, 1992,
President CorazoniC. Aquino approved the Oversight Committee's draft of the
implementing rules and regulations and issued Administrative Order No. 270 [63] (A.O.
No. 270).
Petitioners' position that Article 25 of the IRR of the Local Government Code further
delegated to the DOH the task of formulating another set of implementing rules and
regulations is without any basis.
The Local Government Code and its IRR do not contain any provision directing the
DOH to promulgate implementing rules and regulations on the devolution of health
services. The pertinent portion of Article 25 of the IRR of the Local Government Code
actually states:
Art. 25. Responsibility for Delivery of Basic Services and Facilities. - The LGUs shall,
in addition to their existing functions and responsibilities, provide basic services and
facilities devolved to them covering, but not limited to, the following:
xxx

The more reasonable understanding of the six-month period is that the framers of the Municipality
law provided for the period to prompt the national government to speedily devolve
the existing services to the LGUs. However, it was not intended as a prescriptive
period, as to absolutely prohibit the national government from devolving services xxx
beyond the period. Most especially so in this case because the TPDH was created long
after the lapse of the six-month period, thus making its devolution within such period
impossible.
Subject to the provisions of Rule XXIII on local health boards and in
(c) accordance with the standards and criteria of the Department of Health
Notably, there is nothing in Section 17(e) or in the Local Government Code which
(DOH), provision of health services through:
provides for what would happen after the six-month period. Therefore, it cannot be
said that the law clearly and unequivocally prohibits devolution after the six-month
Implementation of programs and projects on primary health care, maternal
period.
(1) and child care, and communicable and non-communicable disease control
services;
In support of their position that devolution can only be done within said period,
(2) Access to secondary and tertiary health services; and
petitioners quote a portion of the Transcript of the Session Proceedings for the Local
Purchase of medicines, medical supplies, and equipment needed to carry out
Government Code.[61] However, a reading of the quoted transcript indicates that what (3)
the devolved health services.
the legislators considered was when the law and devolution will commence and not
their intent to prohibit devolution after the end of the six-month period. Notably,
xxx
in Tondo Medical Center Employees Association, we upheld the validity of E.O. No.
102 which also sought to implement the devolution of services under the Local
Based from the above, Article 25 mandates that the health services to be provided by
Government Code, even if it was issued long after the lapse of the six-month period.
the LGUs must comply with the standards and criteria given by the DOH. It does not
direct the DOH to create rules on how devolution of health services must be
Petitioners also posit that E.O. No. 567 violates the IRR promulgated by the DOH
implemented.
pursuant to Article 25 of the IRR of the Local Government Code as it excludes district
Indeed, petitioners' failure to explain why there would be two (2) implementing rules
and regulations for a single law and its basis proves that their position is without any
merit. More, their failure to provide important details regarding the supposed DOH
IRR such as its title and number, date of issuance and series number signifies the
falsity of petitioners' claim.
Even assuming that the DOH was directed to promulgate a subsequent IRR, and that
the DOH issued the IRR, said IRR does not exempt district health offices, including
hospitals in the NCR from devolution. The quoted sections of the alleged DOH IRR
read:
Sec. 17. General Provisions. -
The DOH shall devolve to LGUs concerned public health programs and projects
and such health and medical packages as currently in place at the Integrated
(a)
Provincial Health Offices, District Health Offices, City Health Offices, and
Municipal Health Offices, including the barangay health stations as follows:
xxx
Secondary health services are medical health services provided by some rural
(3) health units, infirmaries, district hospitals and out-patient departments of
provincial hospitals. x x x
Sec. 18. Specific Provisions. - The devolution prescribed in the preceding
section shall include the following:
(a) Province
The Integrated Provincial Health Office including the provincial hospital,
district health offices including district hospitals, Medicare and municipal
(1) hospitals. However, the district health offices in the National Capital Region
including its district hospitals are not included in the devolution as
prescribed herein. x x x[64]
Section 18 (a)(l) merely excludes district hospitals in the NCR from the process of
devolution as prescribed in Section 17. The former does not entirely prohibit
devolution of health services in district hospitals in the NCR.
At any rate, we emphasize that the DOH is subject to the power of control of the
President. Therefore, E.O. No. 567 issued by the President shall prevail over any
issuance made by the DOH and not the other way around.
The fourth requisite pertains to the reasonableness of an administrative issuance. It
is an axiom in administrative law that administrative authorities should not act
arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid, such
rules and regulations must be reasonable and fairly adapted to secure the end in view.
If shown to bear no reasonable relation to the purposes for which they were
authorized to be issued, then they must be held to be invalid. [65] Specific to a
reorganization, it is regarded as valid provided it is pursued in good faith. As a general
rule, a reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for the purpose of economy or
to make bureaucracy more efficient.[66]
E.O. No. 567 meets the test of reasonableness. The transfer of the administration and
supervision of TPDH from the DOH to the City of Taguig aims to provide the City of
Taguig the genuine and meaningful autonomy which would make it an effective and
efficient partner in the attainment of national goals and providing basic health
services and facilities to the community. It implements and breathes life to the
provisions of the Constitution and the Local Government Code on creating a more
responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization.
Petitioners complain that E.O. No. 567 violated their rights because they were
transferred to other public health facilities without being afforded with the necessary
provisions for expenses relative to their transfer and reassignment, as required by
Section 6 of R.A. No. 7305.
Similar to our ruling in Tondo Medical Center Employees Association, we hold that
petitioners' allegations are too general and unsubstantiated by the records for us to
pass upon. The persons affected are not specified; details of their appointments and
transfers—such as position, salary grade, and the date they were appointed—are not
given; and the circumstances which attended the alleged violations are not identified.
[67]
Further, while we recognize the inconvenience which may be suffered by
petitioners as a result of E.O. No. 567, the need to make the delivery of health services
more efficient and more compelling is far from being unreasonable or arbitrary.
Be that as it may, we stress that E.O. No. 567 only lays down the directive to transfer
the administration and supervision of TPDH from the DOH to the City of Taguig. The
details and particulars of its implementation are set forth in the subsequent issuances
of the City of Taguig, i.e., E.O. No. 053 and E.O. No. 001, as well as the MOA dated
October 23, 2006 between the DOH and the City of Taguig.
Considering the validity of E.O. No. 567, the subsequent Executive Orders issued by
Mayor Tinga, as well as the MOA between the DOH and the City of Taguig,
implementing E.O. No. 567 are likewise valid.
In sum, we find that the petition failed to show any constitutional infirmity or grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in President Arroyo's
issuance of E.O. No. 567.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The January 2, 2008
Decision and April 14, 2008 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 20 in
Civil Case No. 07-116531 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
MMDA vs Bel-Air Village Assoc.
March 27, 2000
Puno, J.
Facts
Petitioner MMDA is a government agency tasked with the delivery of basic services in Metro
Manila. Respondent Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. (BAVA) is a non-stock, non-profit
corporation whose members are homeowners in Bel-Air Village, a private subdivision in
Makati City. Respondent BAVA is the registered owner of Neptune Street, a road inside Bel-Air
Village.
On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner, through its Chairman, a notice
dated December 22, 1995 requesting respondent to open Neptune Street to public vehicular
traffic starting January 2, 1996.
Actions Filed:
1. BAVA – applied for injunction; trial court issued temporary restraining order but
after due hearing, trial court denied the issuance of a preliminary injunction.
2. BAVA – appealed to CA which issued preliminary injunction and later ruled that
MMDA has no authority to order the opening of Neptune Street, a private
subdivision road and cause the demolition of its perimeter walls. It held that the
authority is lodged in the City Council of Makati by ordinance.
3. MMDA – filed motion for reconsideration but was denied by CA; hence the current
recourse.
Issues
1. Has the MMDA the mandate to open Neptune Street to public traffic pursuant to its
regulatory and police powers?
2. Is the passage of an ordinance a condition precedent before the MMDA may order
the opening of subdivision roads to public traffic?
Held
The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, "development authority." All its functions are
administrative in nature.
The powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation, coordination,
regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies,
installation of a system and administration. There is no syllable in R.A. No. 7924 that grants
the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power.
The MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is the local
government units, acting through their respective legislative councils that possess legislative
power and police power. In the case at bar, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did
not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of Neptune Street, hence, its
proposed opening by petitioner MMDA is illegal and the respondent Court of Appeals did not
err in so ruling.
The MMDA was created to put some order in the metropolitan transportation system but
unfortunately the powers granted by its charter are limited. Its good intentions cannot justify
the opening for public use of a private street in a private subdivision without any legal
warrant. The promotion of the general welfare is not antithetical to the preservation of the
rule of law.
Dispositive
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is denied. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals
are affirmed.
[G.R. No. 130230. April 15, 2005]
METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. DANTE O. GARIN,
respondent.
Facts:
One day, Respondent, Dante O. Garin, a lawyer, was issued a traffic violation receipt (TVR)
and his driver’s license was confiscated for parking illegally along Gandara Street, Binondo,
Manila, on 05 August 1995.
Shortly before the expiration of the TVR’s validity (which is 48 hours from date of
apprehension), the respondent addressed a letter to then MMDA Chairman Prospero Oreta
requesting the return of his driver’s license, and expressing his preference for his case to be
filed in court
Since there was no reply, Garin filed the original complaint with application for preliminary
injunction in Branch 260 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Parañaque, on 12 September
1995, contending that, in the absence of any implementing rules and regulations, Sec. 5(f) of
Rep. Act No. 7924 grants the MMDA unbridled discretion to deprive erring motorists of their
licenses, pre-empting a judicial determination of the validity of the deprivation, thereby
violating the due process clause of the Constitution. The respondent further contended that
the provision violates the constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of legislative
authority, allowing as it does the MMDA to fix and impose unspecified – and therefore
unlimited - fines and other penalties on erring motorists.
For its part, the MMDA, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, pointed out that
the powers granted to it by Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 are limited to the fixing, collection
and imposition of fines and penalties for traffic violations, which powers are legislative and
executive in nature; the judiciary retains the right to determine the validity of the penalty
imposed. The MMDA also refuted Garin’s allegation that the Metro Manila Council, the
governing board and policy making body of the petitioner, has as yet to formulate the
implementing rules for Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 and directed the court’s attention to
MMDA Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-001 dated 15 April 1995 which authorizes
confiscation of driver’s licenses upon issuance of a TVR. Respondent Garin, however,
questioned the validity of MMDA Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-001, as he claims that it
was passed by the Metro Manila Council in the absence of a quorum.
On 23 October 1995, the RTC granted the preliminary mandatory injunction which ordered
the MMDA to return the respondent’s driver’s license. On 14 August 1997, the RTC rendered
the decision in favor of the respondent.
Meanwhile, on 12 August 2004, the MMDA, through its Chairman Bayani Fernando,
implemented Memorandum Circular No. 04, Series of 2004, outlining the procedures for the
use of the Metropolitan Traffic Ticket (MTT) scheme. Under the circular, erring motorists are
issued an MTT, which can be paid at any Metrobank branch. Traffic enforcers may no longer
confiscate drivers’ licenses as a matter of course in cases of traffic violations. All motorists
with unredeemed TVRs were given seven days from the date of implementation of the new
system to pay their fines and redeem their license or vehicle plates
Although this case was considered as moot and academic by the implementation of
Memorandum Circular No. 04, Series of 2004, the Supreme Court believed that it was but
proper to address the current issue for the proper implementation of the petitioner’s future
programs.
Issue:
Whether or not Section 5(f) of Republic Act No. 7924, which created the Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority (MMDA), authorizes the MMDA to confiscate and suspend or revoke
driver’s licenses in the enforcement of traffic laws and regulations
Ruling:
By virtue of the doctrine promulgated in the case of Metro Manila Development Authority v.
Bel-Air Village Association, Inc., Rep. Act No. 7924 does not grant the MMDA with police
power, let alone legislative power, and that all its functions are administrative in nature.
Police power, having been lodged primarily in the National Legislature, cannot be exercised
by any group or body of individuals not possessing legislative power. The National
Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the president and administrative boards as
well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government units (LGUs).
Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them
by the national lawmaking body.
Thus, as held in the aforementioned case, . . .
“[T]he powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation, coordination,
regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies,
installation of a system and administration. There is no syllable in R. A. No. 7924 that grants
the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. Even the Metro Manila Council has
not been delegated any legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local
government units, there is no provision in R. A. No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its
Council to "enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general
welfare" of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself,
a "development authority." It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies
and coordinating with the various national government agencies, people's organizations,
non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious
delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All its functions are
administrative in nature and these are actually summed up in the charter itself, viz:..”
Although petitioner is not precluded – and in fact is duty-bound – to confiscate and suspend or
revoke drivers’ licenses in the exercise of its mandate of transport and traffic management, as
well as the administration and implementation of all traffic enforcement operations, traffic
engineering services and traffic education programs, it still needs a valid law, or ordinance,
or regulation arising from a legitimate source. This is consistent with the ruling in Bel-Air
that the MMDA is a development authority created for the purpose of laying down policies
and coordinating with the various national government agencies, people’s organizations, non-
governmental organizations and the private sector, which may enforce, but not enact,
ordinances.
Hence, the power of MMDA to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers’ licenses without
need of any other legislative enactment, is an unauthorized exercise of police power.
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority vs. Trackworks Rail
Transit Advertising, Vending and Promotions, Inc.
G.R. No. 179554 December 16, 2009
Petitioner: Metropolitan Manila Development Authority
Respondent: Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising, Vending and Promotions,
Inc.
Facts: In 1997, the Government, through the Department of Transportation
and Communications, entered into a build-lease-transfer agreement (BLT
agreement) with Metro Rail Transit Corporation, Limited (MRTC) pursuant
to Republic Act No. 6957 (Build, Operate and Transfer Law), under which
MRTC undertook to build MRT3 subject to the condition that MRTC would
own MRT3 for 25 years, upon the expiration of which the ownership would
transfer to the Government. In 1998, respondent Trackworks Rail Transit
Advertising, Vending & Promotions, Inc. (Trackworks) entered into a
contract for advertising services with MRTC. Trackworks thereafter
installed commercial billboards, signages and other advertising media in
the different parts of the MRT3. In 2001, however, MMDA requested
Trackworks to dismantle the billboards, signages and other advertising
media pursuant to MMDA Regulation No. 96-009, whereby MMDA prohibited
the posting, installation and display of any kind or form of billboards, signs,
posters, streamers, in any part of the road, sidewalk, center island, posts,
trees, parks and open space. After Trackworks refused the request of
MMDA, MMDA proceeded to dismantle the former’s billboards and similar
forms of advertisement.
Issue: Whether MMDA has the power to dismantle, remove or destroy the
billboards, signages and other advertising media installed by Trackworks on
the interior and exterior structures of the MRT3.
Ruling: That Trackworks derived its right to install its billboards, signages
and other advertising media in the MRT3 from MRTC’s authority under the
BLT agreement to develop commercial premises in the MRT3 structure or to
obtain advertising income therefrom is no longer debatable. Under the BLT
agreement, indeed, MRTC owned the MRT3 for 25 years, upon the
expiration of which MRTC would transfer ownership of the MRT3 to the
Government.
Considering that MRTC remained to be the owner of the MRT3 during the
time material to this case, and until this date, MRTC’s entering into the
contract for advertising services with Trackworks was a valid exercise of
ownership by the former. In fact, in Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority v. Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising, Vending &
Promotions, Inc., this Court expressly recognized Trackworks’ right to
install the billboards, signages and other advertising media pursuant to said
contract. The latter’s right should, therefore, be respected.
It is futile for MMDA to simply invoke its legal mandate to justify the
dismantling of Trackworks’ billboards, signages and other advertising
media. MMDA simply had no power on its own to dismantle, remove, or
destroy the billboards, signages and other advertising media installed on
the MRT3 structure by Trackworks. In Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc., Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority v. Viron Transportation Co., Inc., and Metropolitan
Manila Development Authority v. Garin, the Court had the occasion to rule
that MMDA’s powers were limited to the formulation, coordination,
regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting
of policies, installing a system, and administration. Nothing in Republic Act
No. 7924 granted MMDA police power, let alone legislative power.
The Court also agrees with the CA’s ruling that MMDA Regulation No. 96-009
and MMC Memorandum Circular No. 88-09 did not apply to Trackworks’
billboards, signages and other advertising media. The prohibition against
posting, installation and display of billboards, signages and other
advertising media applied only to public areas, but MRT3, being private
property pursuant to the BLT agreement between the Government and
MRTC, was not one of the areas as to which the prohibition applied.
MMDA v. Concerned
Residents of Manila Bay
(CASE DIGEST)
MMDA v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay (CASE DIGEST)
GR No. 171947-48
18 December 2008
TOPIC: Environmental Law, Mandamus, PD1152
FACTS:
Respondents filed a complaint before the RTC against several government agencies,
among them the petitioners, for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and protection of the
Manila Bay. The complaint alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen
way below the allowable standards set by law, specifically PD 1152. Respondents, as
plaintiffs, prayed that petitioners be ordered to clean the Manila Bay and submit to the
RTC a concerted concrete plan of action for the purpose.
RTC rendered a Decision in favor of respondents, ordering the defendant-government
agencies to clean up and rehabilitate Manila Bay.
Petitioners, before the CA, argued that PD 1152 relates only to the cleaning of
specific pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in general. Apart from raising
concerns about the lack of funds, petitioners also asserted that the cleaning of the
Manila Bay is not a ministerial act, which can be compelled by mandamus.
The CA denied petitioners’ appeal and affirmed the Decision of the RTC in
toto. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
1. Does PD 1152 include a cleanup in general or is it limited only to the cleanup of
specific pollution incidents?
2. Whether or not petitioners may be compelled by mandamus to clean up and
rehabilitate the Manila Bay?
RULING:
Issue 1:
PD 1152 does not in any way state that the government agencies concerned ought to
confine themselves to the containment, removal, and cleaning operations when a
specific pollution incident occurs. The underlying duty to upgrade the quality of water
is not conditional on the occurrence of any pollution incident.
Even assuming the absence of a categorical legal provision specifically prodding
petitioners to clean up the bay, they and the men and women representing them
cannot escape their obligation to future generations of Filipinos to keep the waters of
the Manila Bay clean and clear as humanly as possible.
Issue 2:
Yes, petitioners may be compelled.
The MMDA’s duty in the area of solid waste disposal is set forth not only in the
Environment Code (PD 1152) and RA 9003, but in its charter as well. This duty of
putting up a proper waste disposal system cannot be characterised as discretionary,
for, as earlier stated, discretion presupposes the power or right given by law to public
functionaries to act officially according to their judgment or conscience.
A perusal of other petitioners’ respective charters would yield to the conclusion that
these government agencies are enjoined, as a matter of statutory obligation, to
perform certain functions relating directly or indirectly to the cleanup, rehabilitation,
protection, and preservation of the Manila Bay. They are precluded from choosing not
to perform these duties.
The petition is DENIED.
THE METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, et
al . v . VIRON TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., et al . 530 SCRA 341
(2007)
To solve the worsening traffic congestions problem in Metro Manila the
President issued Executive Order (E.O.) 179, ―Providing for the
Establishment of Greater Manila Mass Transportation System. As
determined in E.O. 179, the primary cause of traffic congestion in Metro
Manila has been the numerous buses plying the streets that impede the flow
of vehicles and commuters and the inefficient connectivity of the different
transport modes. To decongest traffic, petitioner Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority (MMDA) came up with a recommendation,
proposing the elimination of bus terminals located along major Metro Manila
thoroughfares, and the construction of mass transport terminal facilties to
provide a more convenient access to mass transport system to the commuting
public. The project provided for under this E.O. was called ―Greater Manila
Transport System‖ (Project) wherein the MMDA was designated as the
implementing agency. Accordingly, the Metro Manila Council the governing
board of the MMDA issued a resolution, expressing full support of the
project. The respondents, which are engaged in the business of public
transportation with a provincial bus operation, Viron Transport Co., Inc. and
Mencorp Transportation System, Inc., assailed the constitutionality of E.O.
179 before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. They alleged that the E.O.,
insofar as it permitted the closure of existing bus terminal, constituted a
deprivation of property without due process; that it contravened the Public
Service Act which mandates public utilities to provide and maintain their
own terminals as a requisite for the privilege of operating as
common carriers; and that Republic Act 7924, which created MMDA, did
not authorize the latter to order the closure of bus terminals. The trial
court declared the E.O. unconstitutional. The MMDA argued before the Court
that there was no justiciable controversy in the case for declaratory relief filed
by the respondents; that E.O. 179 was only an administrative directive to
government agencies to coordinate with the MMDA, and as such did not bind
third persons; that the President has the authority to implement the Project
pursuant to E.O. 125; and that E.O. 179 was a valid exercise of police power.
ISSUE:
Whether or not E.O, 179 is constitutional.
HELD:
By designating the MMDA as implementing agency of the “Greater Manila
Transport System,” the President clearly overstepped the limits of the
authority conferred by law, rendering E.O. 179 ultra vires. Executive Order
125, invoked by the MMDA, was issued by former President Aquino in her
exercise of legislative powers. This executive order reorganized the Ministry
(now Department) of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), and
defined its powers and functions. It mandated the DOTC to be the primary
policy, planning, programming, coordinating, implementing, regulating and
administrative entity to promote, develop and regulate networks of
transportation and communications. The grant of authority to the DOTC
includes the power to establish and administer comprehensive and integrated
programs for transportation and communications. Accordingly, it is the
DOTC Secretary who is authorized to issue such orders, rules, regulations
and other issuances as may be necessary to ensure the effective
implementation of the law. The President may also exercise the same power
and authority to order the implementation of the mass transport system
project, which admittedly is one for transportation. Such authority springs
from the President‘s power of control over all executive departments as well
as for the faithful execution of the laws under the Constitution. Thus, the
President, although authorized to establish or cause the implementation of
the Project, must exercise the authority through the instrumentality of the
DOTC, which, by law, is the primary implementing and administrative entity
in the promotion, development and regulation of networks of transportation.
It is the DOTC, and not the MMDA, which is authorized to establish and
implement a project such as the mass transport system. By designating the
MMDA as implementing agency of the Project, the President clearly
overstepped the limits of the authority conferred by law, rendering E.O. 179
ultra vires. In the absence of a specific grant of authority to it under R.A.
7924, MMDA cannot issue order for the closure of existing bus
terminalsRepublic Act (R.A.) 7924 authorizes the MMDA to perform
planning, monitoring and coordinative functions, and in the
process exercises regulatory and supervisory authority over the delivery of
metro-wide services, including transport and traffic management. While
traffic decongestion has been recognized as a valid ground in the exercise of
police power, MMDA is not granted police power, let alone legislative power.
Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government units, there is no
provision in R.A. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or the Metro Manila
Council to enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for
the general welfare of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. In light of the
administrative nature of its powers and functions, the MMDA is devoid of
authority to implement the Greater Manila Transport System as envisioned
by E.O. 179; hence, it could not have been validly designated by the President
to undertake the project. It follows that the MMDA cannot validly order
the elimination of respondents‘ terminals. Even assuming arguendo that
police power was delegated to the MMDA, its exercise of such power does not
satisfy the two sets of a valid police power measure: (1) the interest of the
public generally, as distinguished from that of a particular class, requires its
exercise; and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
In various cases, the Court has recognized that traffic congestion is a public,
not merely a private concern. Indeed, the E.O. was issued due to the felt need
to address the worsening traffic congestion in Metro Manila which, the
MMDA so determined, is caused by the increasing volume of buses plying the
major thoroughfares and the inefficient connectivity of existing transport
system. With the avowed objective of decongesting traffic in Metro Manila
the E.O. seeks to eliminate the bus terminals now located along major Metro
Manila thoroughfares and provide more convenient access to the mass
transport system to the commuting public through the provision of mass
transport terminal facilities. Common carriers with terminals along the
major thoroughfares of Metro Manila would thus be compelled to close down
their existing bus terminals and use the MMDA-designated common parking
areas. The Court fails to see how the prohibition against respondents‘
terminals can be considered a reasonable necessity to ease
traffic congestion in the metropolis. On the contrary, the elimination of
respondents‘ bus terminals brings forth the distinct possibility and the
equally harrowing reality of traffic congestion in the common parking areas,
a case of transference from one site to another. Moreover, an order for the
closure of bus terminals is not in line with the provisions of the Public Service
Act. The establishment, as well as the maintenance of vehicle parking areas
or passenger terminals, is generally considered a necessary service by
provincial bus operators, hence, the investments they have poured into the
acquisition or lease of suitable terminal sites.