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Facts:
In 1960, the petitioner, Caltex (Philippines) Inc., launched a promotional scheme called "Caltex Hooded Pump
Contest" which calls for participants to estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump of each Caltex
Station will dispense within a specific period. Such contest is open to all motor vehicle owners and/or licensed
drivers. There is no required fee or consideration, and there is no need for the contestants to purchase the products
of Caltex. The forms are available upon request at each Caltex Station and there is a sealed can where accomplished
entry stubs may be deposited. Then, seeing the extensive use of mails for publicizing and transmission of
communication purposes, Caltex sent representatives to the postal authorities for advance clearing for the use of
mails for the contest. But then, the Postmaster General, Enrico Palomar, denied the request of Caltex in view of
Sections 1954 (a), 1982 and 1983 of the Revised Administrative Code. The aforesaid sections prohibits the use of
mail conveying any information concerning non-mailable schemes, such as lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme.
Consequently, Caltex invoked a judicial intervention by filing a petition of declaratory relief against the Postmaster
General, ordering the Postmaster General to allow the petitioner to use the mails to bring the contest to the
attention of the public and that the aforesaid contest is not violative of the Postal Law.
Issue:
Whether or not the scheme proposed by Caltex is within the coverage of the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law
inescapably requires an inquiry into the intended meaning of the words used therein.
Held:
No. Caltex may be granted declaratory relief, even if Enrico Palomar simply applied the clear provisions of the law to
a given set of facts as embodied in the rules of the contest. For, construction is the art or process of discovering and
expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case is not
explicitly provided for in the law.
In this case, the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law inescapably required an inquiry into the intended meaning
of the words used therein. Also, the Court is tasked to look beyond the fair exterior, to the substance, in order to
unmask the real element that the law is seeking to prevent or prohibit.
2. GSIS V PAUIG – DEFINITION OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
FACTS:
Respondent Apolinario C. Pauig (Pauig) was the Municipal Agriculturist of the Municipality of San Pablo,
lsabela. He started in the government service on February 12, 1964 as Emergency Laborer on casual status.
Later, he became a temporary employee from July 5, 1972 to July 18, 1977. On July 19, 1977, he became a
permanent employee, and on August 1, 1977, he became a GSIS member. On November 3, 2004, he retired
from the service upon reaching the mandatory retirement age of 65 years old. But when he filed his
retirement papers with the GSIS-Cauayan, the latter processed his claim based on a Record of Creditable
Service and a Total Length of Service of only twenty-seven (27) years. Disagreeing with the computation,
Pauig wrote a letter-complaint to the GSIS, arguing that his first fourteen (14) years in the government service
had been. erroneously omitted.
The GSIS ratiocinated that Pauig's first fourteen (14) years in the government were excluded in the
computation of his retirement benefits because during those years, no premium payments were remitted to
it. Aggrieved, Pauig filed a case before the RTC. the RTC rendered a Decision in favour of Pauig. GSIS then filed
a motion for reconsideration, which was later denied. Thus, the instant petition.
ISSUE:
whether or not the GSIS should include Pauig's first fourteen (14) years in government service for the
calculation of the latter's retirement benefits claim.
RULING:
No. Retirement benefits are given to government employees to reward them for giving the best years of their
lives to the service of their country. This is especially true with those in government service occupying
positions of leadership or positions requiring management skills because the years they devote to
government service could be spent more profitably elsewhere, such as in lucrative appointments in the
private sector.
The doctrine of liberal construction cannot be applied in this case, where the law invoked is clear,
unequivocal and leaves no room for interpretation or construction. To uphold Pauig's position will
contravene the very words of the law, and will defeat the ends which it seeks to attain.
Pauig claims that his service in the government from February 12, 1964 to July 18, 1977 should be credited
for the purpose of computing his retirement benefits is unmeritorious. compulsory coverage under the GSIS
had previously and consistently included regular and permanent employees, and expressly excluded casual,
substitute or temporary employees from its retirement insurance plan.
Based on the records, Pauig began his career in the government on February 12, 1964 as Emergency Laborer
on a casual status. Then, he became a temporary employee from July 5, 1972 to July 18, 1977. However, the
Court notes that it was not until 1997 that the compulsory membership in the GSIS was extended to
employees other than those on permanent status.
Petition granted.
3. PESCA V PESCA – DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION
FACTS:
The petitioner and respondent were married and had four children. Lorna filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of their marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of her husband. She alleged
that he is emotionally immature and irresponsible. He was cruel and violent. The Petitioner as well as her
children suffered physical violence. Petitioner and their children left the home. Her husband
was imprisoned for 11 days for slight physical injuries. RTC declared their marriage null and void. CA reversed
the decision of the trial court, stating that petitioner had failed to establish that the respondent showed signs
of mental incapacity, that incapacity is grave, preceded the marriage and is incurable, that such incapacity is
psychological, that the root cause has been identified medically/clinically and has been
proven by an expert and that such incapacity is permanent and incurable in nature. Petitioner argued that
the doctrine enunciated in Santos v. CA as well as the guidelines set out in Republic v. CA and Molina
should have no retroactive application. Petitioner further argues, the application of the Santos and
Molina case should at least only warrant a remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings
and not its dismissal.
ISSUE:
Are the guidelines for psychological incapacity in the Molina and Santos cases should be taken in
consideration in deciding this case?
HELD:
Yes. In the Molina case, guidelines were laid down by the SC before a case would fall under the category
of psychological incapacity to declare a marriage null and void. This decision has force and effect of a
law. These guidelines are mandatory in nature.
The Court held that the “doctrine of stare decisis” (a legal doctrine that obligates courts to follow
historical cases when making a ruling on a similar case. Stare decisis ensures that cases with similar
scenarios and facts are approached in the same way. Simply put, it binds courts to follow legal
precedents set by previous decisions.) ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses
that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines.
The rule follows the legal maxim – “legis interpretado legis vim obtinet” – that the interpretation placed
upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. The interpretation or
construction placed by the courts establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent of the law. The latter as
so interpreted and construed would thus constitute a part of that law as of the date the statute was enacted.
It is only when a prior ruling of the Court finds itself later overruled, and a different view is adopted, that
the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of the parties who have relied on the old
doctrine and have acted in good faith in accordance therewith (“lex prospicit, non respicit”). Petitioner
utterly failed, both in her allegations and in her evidence to prove psychological incapacity on the part
of the respondent.
Petition Denied.
4. AMORES V HRET – CONSTRUCTION OR INTERPRETATION BY THE COURTS
Party-list Representatives:
AMORES v HRET
GR 189600, 6/29/2010
SUMMARY:
Petition to declare Villanueva as ineligible to hold office as representative of CIBAC for being overage to represent
youth. Change of affiliation must be made six months before elections. Youth sector is represented by 25 – 30.
FACTS:
5/14/2009: Petition for certiorari challenging the assumption of office of one Emmanuel Joel Villanueva as
representative of CIBAC in the HoR.
Petitioner argues:
o Villanueva was 31 at the time of filing of nomination, beyond the age limit of 30 which was the limit
imposed by RA 7941 for "youth sector".
o Villanueva's change of affiliation from Youth Sector to OFW and families not affected six months prior
to elections.
Respondent argues:
o RA 7941 requirement for "age" for youth sector representative only applicable to first three elections
after the party list act.
o There was no resultant change in affiliation.
ISSUE:
Whether the requirement for youth sector representatives apply to respondent Villanueva
RULING:
Villauneva ineligible to hold office as a member of HoR representing CIBAC
HELD:
Villanueva's arguments are invalid. The law is clear. If representative of youth sector, should be between 25 to
30.
Villanueva is ineligible to also represent OFW. Sectoral representation should be changed SIX MONTHS prior
to elections.
5. RCBC v. IAC - CONSTRUCTION OR INTERPRETATION BY THE COURTS
Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation vs. Intermediate Appellate Court and BF Homes
G.R. No. 74851 (December 9, 1999)
FACTS:
Petitioner RCBC is a mortgagor-creditor of the party respondent BF Homes. BF Homes, being a distressed firm, filed
before the Securities and Exchange Commission a Petition for Rehabilitation and for Declaration of Suspension of
Payments. Consequently, RCBC requested the sheriff of Rizal to levy on execution the properties of party respondent,
and consequently obtained favorable judgment. RCBC being the highest bidder during the public auction is now
seeking for the transfer certificate of titles from the Register of Deeds issued in its name. It is worthy to note that it
was on October 26, 1984 that RCBC obtained favor over the execution of the respondent’s properties, and it was
only on March 18, 1985 that a Management Committee was organized by the SEC for BF Homes.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court may depart from the words of the law which clearly provides that a creditor may levy
execution on a firm’s properties when such execution precedes SEC’s organization of a Management Committee to
act as its receiver.
HELD:
PD 209-A states that suspension of claims against a corporation under rehabilitation is counted or figured up only
upon the appointment of a management committee or a rehabilitation receiver. The holding that suspension of
actions for claims against a corporation under rehabilitation takes effect as soon as the application or a petition for
rehabilitation is filed with the SEC — may, to some, be more logical and wise but unfortunately, such is incongruent
with the clear language of the law. Suspension of actions for claims commences only from the time a management
committee or receiver is appointed by the SEC. Petitioner RCBC rightfully moved for the extrajudicial foreclosure of
its mortgage on October 26, 1984 because a management committee was not appointed by the SEC until March 18,
1985.
No matter how practical and noble a reason would be, in order to depart from the words of the law stated in clear
and unambiguous manner, would be to encroach upon legislative prerogative to define the wisdom of the law. Such
is plainly judicial legislation.
6. GO KA TOC SONS - CONSTRUCTION OR INTERPRETATION BY THE COURTS
Go Ka Toc Sons and Co., etc. v. Rice and Corn Board
G.R. No. L-23607
May 23, 1967
This case is about the selling of rice and corn by-products by non-Filipino owned and controlled
corporation.
STATEMENT OF FACTS:
Go Ka Toc Sons & Co. (Petitioner) is a duly registered partnership not wholly owned by Filipinos. It
engaged in the manufacturing, processing and Marketing of vegetable oil extracted from different vegetable
products.
On August 2, 1960, Republic Act 3018 was approved which prohibited partnerships whose capital was
not wholly owned by Filipinos from engaging, directly or indirectly, in the rice and/or corn industry. The law
takes effect on January 1, 1951, however such partnerships, upon registration with the municipal treasurer,
are allowed to exist until 2 years after January 1, 1961 for the purpose of liquidation.
The Rice and Cord Board (RICOB) issued Resolution No. 10, defining the term "by product", and
General Circular No. 1, which defined the term Capital Investment which limits the maximum amount of
capital investments of alien persons engaged in the rice and/or corn industry in pursuant to Republic Act
3018.
Petitioner has stopped in the sale of rice and/or corn since the lapse of the two-year period from the
effectivity of the law and has limited its activities to the trade, processing and manufacture of corn and rice
oil from raw materials consisting of corn germ proper or embryo ("Sungo") and "Tahup", as well as rice husk it
secures from those who produce rice and corn. Petitioner also produces "Corn Meal" or "Corn Meal Germ"
which it sells and trades.
Petitioners filed an action in the Court of First Instance (CFI) to declare the said law and RICOB
Resolution No. 10 and Gen. Circulation No. 1 as inapplicable to it. The lower court was in favor of the
Petitioner and thus issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for.
RICOB, through the Solicitor General has taken the instant appeal to raise questions purely of law,
hence the petition to this court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Petitioner, not a 100% Filipino owned corporation, can engage in the trade,
processing and manufacture of corn and rice oil from raw materials.
RULING:
The Judgment is REVERSED
The lower court erred in the construction of the in which it proclaimed that the issue of by-products
was germane to the case at hand and on the interpretation legislative intent of the makers of the law with
the remark that Filipino's do not depend for their survival by the eating the by-products if rice and corn,
hence the error in the decision that the Petitioners were not included in the scope of Republic Act No. 3018.
Since the Law is clear and unambiguous, there is no need for construction or interpretation, but only
implementation. Only 100% Filipino owned artificial persons may engage in the rice and/or corn industry.
In regards to the validity of Resolution No. 10 and General Circular No. 1 is is rendered moot and
academic.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is reversed and the writ of injuction issued therein is
annulled and set aside. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
7. US vs. Hart – PUNCTUATION AND GRAMMAR: AN AID TO CONSTRUCTION
(GR L 8848) November 21, 1913
FACTS:
Hart, Miller, and Natividad were found guilty in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga on a charge of
vagrancy. All appealed.
Evidence of the prosecution as to the defendant Hart shows that he pleaded guilty and was convicted on
a gambling charge about 2-3 weeks before his arrest on the vagrancy charge.
Hart had been conducting two gambling games, one in his saloon and in another house.
Each of the defendants was earning a living at a lawful trade or business.
Sec. 1 of Act No. 519 – divided into 7 clauses, separated by semicolons. Each clause enumerates a certain calls of
person who, within the meaning of this statute, are to be considered as vagrants.
“Every person having no apparent means of subsistence, who had the physical ability to work, and who neglects
to apply himself or herself to some lawful calling; every person found loitering about saloons or dram shops or
gambling housed, or tramping or straying through the country without visible means of support; … … …”
ISSUE:
Whether or not “without visible means of support" apply to “every person found loitering about saloons
or dram shops”
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION:
When the meaning of legislative enactment is in question, it is the duty of the courts to ascertain, if
possible, the true legislative intention, and adopt that the construction of the statute which will give it
effect.
The construction finally adopted should be based upon something more substantial than the mere
punctuation found in the printed Act.
If the punctuation of the statute gives it a meaning which is reasonable and in apparent accord with the
legislative will, it may be used as an additional argument for adopting the literal meaning of the words of
the statute as thus punctuated.
But an argument based upon punctuation alone is not conclusive, and the courts will not hesitate to
change the punctuation when necessary, to give the Act the effect intended by the Legislature,
disregarding superfluous or incorrect punctuation marks, and inserting others where necessary.
HELD:
A most important step in this reasoning, necessary to make it sound, is to ascertain the consequences
flowing from such a construction of the law.
o What is loitering? It is idling or wasting one’s time.
o The time spent in saloons, dram shops, and gambling houses is seldom anything but that.
o If “visible means of support” does not apply to “every person found loitering about saloons or
dram shops or gambling houses”, practically all who frequent such places commit a crime of
vagrancy.
Vagrancy as defined in Act No. 519 is the Anglo-Saxon method of dealing with the habitually idle and
harmful parasites of the society.
o That the visible means of support or a lawful calling is necessary under these statutes to a
conviction for loitering around saloons, dram shops, and gambling houses is not even negatived
by the punctuation employed.
For these reasons, the defendants are acquitted.
8. FLORESCA V PHILEX MINING – STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION VIS-À-VIS JUDICIAL LEGISLATION
PERFECTO S. FLORESCA et al vs. PHILEX MINING CORPORATION et al
G.R. No. L-30642
April 30, 1985
FACTS:
Floresca and his heirs are the deceased employees of Philex Mining Corp. who at that time working at its
copper mines underground operation at Tuba Benguet on June 28 19, died as a result of cave-in that buried
them in tunnels of the mine. The petitioners claim that Philex, in violation of government rules and
regulations, negligently and deliberately failed to take the required precautions for the protection of the lives
of its workers specialy those working underground. The petitioners moved to claim their benefits pursuant to
the Worker’s Compensation Act and petitioned before regular courts and sue Philex for additional damages.
Philex, in return, invoked that the can longer be sued due to the benefits they have already claimed under the
Worker’s Compensation Act.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Floresca et al can claim benefits under the Worker’s Compensation Act and suing in regular
courts under the civil code for higher damage.
HELD:
No. under the law, floresca and his heirs could only do either one. In case they filed for benefits under the
Worker’s Compensation Act, they can no longer proceed with a civil case before any regular courts. Also, if
they filed a civil case under regular courts, they will be stopped from claiming benefits from Worker’s
Compensation Act. However, the Supreme Court ruled that the petitioners are excused from this deficiency
due to ignorance of the fact. In case they have been aware of this ruling, they may have not avail of such a
remedy. In any case they’ll win in the lower court, whatever award may be granted, whatever amount given
to them will be deducted under the Worker’s Compensation Act.
ISSUE 2:
Does the CFI (RTC) have jurisdiction over the complaint?
HELD 2:
Pursuant to Article 9 of the Civil Code which provides that: “No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by
reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws.” It argues that the application or interpretation placed by
the Court upon a law is part of the law as of the date of the enactment of the said law since the Court’s application or
interpretation merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed law purports to carry into
effect. Yet, the Court argues that the Court can legislate, pursuant to Article 9 of the New Civil Code. However, even the
legislator himself recognizes that in certain instances, the courts “do and must legislate” to fill in the gaps in the law;
because the mind of the legislator, like all human beings, is finite and therefore cannot envisage all possible cases to
which the law may apply.
9. REPUBLIC V CA AND MOLINA – STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION VIS-À-VIS JUDICIAL LEGISLATION
Judicial legislation means new legal rules made by judges. It means the power of the judicature to make rules for the
regulation of their own procedure by adopting their delegated legislative powers. Judicial legislation varies from precedent
whereby judges create new laws.
GR 108763 February 13, 1997
FACTS:
Roridel O. Molina filed a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. The
petition alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985; that a son, Andre O. Molina was
born; that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband
and a father since he preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he squandered his
money; that he depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard
to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them; Thereafter, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in
Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the family; Subsequently, the couple had a
very intense quarrel, as a result of which their relationship was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel
resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City; that a few weeks later,
Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus shown
that he was psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital obligations and was a highly
immature and habitually quarrel some individual who thought of himself as a king to be served; and that it
would be to the couple's best interest to have their marriage declared null and void in order to free them
from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the start.
In his Answer, Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live together as husband and wife, but
contended that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's strange behavior of
insisting on maintaining her group of friends even after their marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to perform some
of her marital duties such as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run the household and handle their
finances.
The trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The appeal of petitioner was denied by the CA
which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the Regional Trial Court decision in declaring the marriage
void by reason of psychological incapacity on the part of Reynaldo Molina.
RULING:
Guidelines presented by the court.
The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground (in addition to those enumerated in the Civil
Code) to assail the validity of a marriage, namely, “psychological incapacity.” In addition to resolving the present
case, the court finds the need to lay down specific guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the
Family Code. In the present case, it appears to that there is a “difficulty,” if not outright “refusal” or “neglect” in the
performance of some marital obligations of the respondent spouse. Mere showing of “irreconcilable differences”
and “conflicting personalities” in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. Hence, the Court decided to go beyond
merely ruling on the facts of this case vis-a-vis existing law and jurisprudence. For psychological incapacity to
prosper, three characteristics should manifest: gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability.
Yes. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court.
In the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears
to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital
obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes
psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as
married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (nor
physical) illness.
The following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down
for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the
fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our
Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees
marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and
marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes the permanence,
inviolability and solidarity
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological — not physical. although its manifestations and/or symptoms may
be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to
such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not
have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit
the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature explained. Expert evidence may be given qualified
psychiatrist and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must
show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need
not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same
sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to
those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be
effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically
capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be
accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards
the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children.
Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines,
while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by
the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in
1983 and which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature.
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith
of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to
decision of such appellate tribunal. Ideally — subject to our law on evidence — what is decreed as canonically invalid
should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision,
contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church — while
remaining independent, separate and apart from each other — shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the
same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in
the decision, briefly staring therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.
The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen
(15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall
discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi defensor vinculi - Latin term for "Defender of the Bond."
contemplated under Canon 1095.
PART 3 : STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS
Facts:
The petitioner Enrique V. Morales is the chief of the detective bureau of the Manila Police
Department and holds the rank of lieutenant colonel. He rose to the rank in the said police
force despite his having no college degree. He was provisionally appointed as chief of police
of Manila which became vacant upon the resignation of the former chief of police, Brig. Gen.
Ricardo G. Papa on March 14, 1968.
The respondent Commission of the Civil Service, Abelardo Subido, approved his designation
but rejected his appointment for failure to meet the minimum educational and civil service
eligibility requirements for the said position. The pertinent rule cited is that of sec. 10 of the
Police Act of 1966 (RA 4864). The resp. instead certified other persons as qualified for the
post and called the attention of the Mayor of Manila to fill the vacancy within 30 days as
required by sec. 4 of the Decentralization Act.
The petitioner requested for a mandamus A mandamus is a judicial writ, a command issuing in the name of the
sovereign authority from a superior court having jurisdiction over person or inferior court. from the Court to compel the
respondent to include him in the list of eligible persons to the post of Chief of Police of Manila
for the consideration of the City Mayor. He contended that he is qualified despite lacking a
college degree under the statement of the aforementioned rule: “has served in the police
department of any city with the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three
years”
Issue:
Whether the petition for mandamus be granted due to a different interpretation of the
respondent and the petitioner of Sec 10 of the Police Act of 1966.
Decision
No. The petition for mandamus to compel the respondent Commissioner of Civil Service to
include the name of the petitioner will not be granted since taking the present state of the
law, he is neither qualified nor eligible. Even if ,as noted by the Court, there may be a
possibility of omission of a phrase, when the bill was passed by the Congress to the Senate,
that may permit the interpretation that he is qualified, the enrolled bill in possession of the
legislative secretary of the President, is signed by the Presidents of both the Lower and Upper
Houses together with their respective secretaries and the President and therefore must be
deemed valid and binding to the Court. No inclusion of other enlargements, no matter how
sound they are, should be used in the interpretation of an already enrolled bill.
13. ASTORGA v. VILLEGAS – JOURNAL ENTRY RULE
G.R. No. L-23475, April 30, 1974
o Enrolled Bill Doctrine: As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled
Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the Chief Executive, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance
by the legislative and executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and
executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress.
Doctrine: “Journal Entry Rule” or “Enrolled Bill Theory”, it is based mainly on “the respect due to coequal and
independent departments,” which requires the judicial department “to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills
authenticated in the manner stated”.
FACTS:
- House Bill no. 9266 was signed into a law, that is RA 4065, which amended the Revised Charter of the City of
Manila and provided the Vice Mayor of Manila with power, duties, and rights. However, as it turns out, the said bill
that was signed into a law contains amendments that are different from those approved by the Senate. After
learning about it, the President of the Philippines withdrew his signature there from. Thereafter, the Mayor of Manila
issued circulars to various local government units to disregard the provisions of the said law. Petitioner Astorga, Vice
Mayor of Manila, filed a Petition for Mandamus, Injunction and/or Prohibition with Preliminary Mandatory and
Prohibitory Injunction to compel Respondents Villegas, et. al, with the provisions of RA 4065. Respondents, on the
other hand, argued that RA 4065 never became a law since it was not the bill actually passed by the Senate and the
entries in the journal of that body and not the enrolled bill itself should be decisive in the resolution of the issue.
ISSUE:
- Whether or not the doctrine of “Enrolled Bill Theory” The enrolled bill rule is a principle of judicial interpretation of
rules of procedure in legislative bodies. Under the doctrine, once a bill passes a legislative body and is signed into
law, the courts assume that all rules of procedure in the enactment process were properly followed. or “Journal Entry
Rule” Attorneys preparing the journal entry must, within 14 days-unless the court orders otherwise-serve copies on
all other attorneys involved who must, within 14 days after service is made, serve on the attorney(s) preparing
said journal entry any objections in writing. should be observed in the case at bar.
RULING:
- Yes, the Supreme Court (SC) is merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill 9266 signed by the Chief
Executive (President of the Phils.) was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the facts and
circumstances of the case, the SC can do this and resort to the Senate Journal for that purpose. The Journal discloses
that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were not
incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by him. The SC is not asked to incorporate such
amendments in the alleged law, which admittedly is a risky undertaking, but to declare that the bill was not duly
enacted and therefore did not become a law.4 - In other words, Journals of the Congress may be resorted to
determine whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the President of the Phils. Was the same text passed by
both Houses of Congress.
Facts:
Petitioner Joseph Estrada prosecuted An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder, wishes to impress upon
the Court that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the
valid from the constitutionally infirm. His contentions are mainly based on the effects of the said law that it suffers
from the vice of vagueness; it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and it
abolishes the element of mens rea refers to criminal intent. The literal translation from Latin is "guilty mind." ...
The mens rea requirement is premised upon the idea that one must possess a guilty state of mind and be aware of
his or her misconduct; however, a defendant need not know that their conduct is illegal to be guilty of a crime. in
crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code saying that it violates the fundamental rights of the
accused.
The focal point of the case is the alleged “vagueness” of the law in the terms it uses. Particularly, this terms are:
combination, series and unwarranted. Because of this, the petitioner uses the facial challenge on the validity of the
mentioned law.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner possesses the locus standi locus standi – standing before the court. locus
standi means the right to bring an action, to be heard in court, or to address the Court on a matter before it . to
attack the validity of the law using the facial challenge.
Ruling:
On how the law uses the terms combination and series does not constitute vagueness. The petitioner’s contention
that it would not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what the law seeks to penalize cannot be plausibly
argued. Void-for-vagueness doctrine A statute that is so unclear or vague that the average person could
not reasonably understand or appreciate its meaning and application makes the statute void on its
face. A criminal statute that is vague is unconstitutional since one cannot adhere to the
requirements of a law that one could not reasonably understand. is manifestly misplaced under the
petitioner’s reliance since ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only
be invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, wherein clarification by a saving clause
or construction cannot be invoked. Said doctrine may not invoked in this case since the statute is clear and free from
ambiguity. Vagueness doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld, not
absolute precision or mathematical exactitude.
On the other hand, overbreadth doctrine a principle of judicial review that a law is invalid if it punishes
constitutionally protected speech or conduct along with speech or conduct that the government may limit to further
a compelling government interest. decrees that governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.
Doctrine of strict scrutiny holds that a facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute and to one which is
overbroad because of possible chilling effect upon protected speech. Furthermore, in the area of criminal law, the
law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech. A facial challenge to legislative acts is the most difficult
challenge to mount successfully since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists.
Doctrines mentioned are analytical tools developed for facial challenge of a statute in free speech cases. With
respect to such statue, the established rule is that one to who application of a statute is constitutional will not be
heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other
situations in which its application might be unconstitutional. On its face invalidation of statues results in striking
them down entirely on the ground that they might be applied to parties not before the Court whose activities are
constitutionally protected. It is evident that the purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law is more imagined than real.
The crime of plunder as a malum in se malum in se - a Latin phrase for something to be judged to be evil in civilised
society. An offence malum in se is one which is naturally evil, as murder, theft, and the like;
offences at common law are generally mala in sese. is deemed to have been resolve in the Congress’
decision to include it among the heinous crime punishable by reclusion perpetua ''reclusion perpetua'' (20 to 40
years jail time) to death.
Supreme Court holds the plunder law constitutional and petition is dismissed for lacking merit.
15. David v Arroyo – VOID FOR VAGUENESS DOCTRINE - "a law is facially invalid if men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. "
GR No. 171396, May 3, 2006
Facts:
As the nation celebrated EDSA’s 20th anniversary, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national
emergency and thereby commanded the AFP and PNP to immediately carry out necessary and appropriate actions
and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence.
This declaration led to cancellation of all programs and activities related to the EDSA People Power I celebration.
Rally permits were revoked and warrantless arrests and take-over of facilities, including the media, were
implemented. Assemblies and rallyists were dispersed. Along with the dispersal, petitioner was arrested without
warrant.
A week after PP 1017, PP1021 was issued lifting the state of emergency.
Issue:
Whether or not there is an actual controversy or case subject for judicial review.
Whether or not there petition is with legal standing particularly on his qualification to sue.
Ratio Decidendi Ratio Decidendi -the rule of law on which a judicial decision is based.:
The Solicitor General’s refute that the case has been moot and academic was not upheld by the Court. According to
the Supreme Court, courts will decide cases otherwise found moot and academic if: there is grave Constitutional
violation, the situation’s exceptional character and paramount public interest involved, issue raised requires
formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, bar and public, and lastly it is capable of repetition yet
evading review.
Petitioner was found to be of legal standing on the grounds that his personal rights were involved. The petitioner
qualifies under the direct injury test. The personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or
will sustain direct injury qualifies him to impugn the validity of the statute. To wit some of these direct injuries he
sustained are the illegal arrest and unlawful search he experienced. Given this fact, the court entertained his petition
as he has adequately shown that he entitled to judicial protection.
However, the court does not liberally declare statutes as invalid although they may be abused and misabused and
may afford an opportunity for abuse in the manner of application. The validity of a statute or ordinance is to be
determined from its general purpose and its efficiency to accomplish the end desired, not from its effects in a
particular case.
The Court ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to
promulgate decrees, taking into consideration that legislative power is vested only in congress.
The Court partly grants the petitions. PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it allows the President to call the AFP to
prevent or suppress lawless violence. However, commanding the AFP to enforce laws not related to lawless violence
are declared unconstitutional. Such proclamation does not also authorize the President to take over privately-owned
public utilities or business affected with public interest without prior legislation. General Order No. 5 is constitutional
as it is a standard on how the AFP and PNP would implement PP1017, but portion where “acts of terrorism” has not
been defined and punishable by congress is held unconstitutional.
Furthermore, the following acts of the government were held unconstitutional: warrantless arrest of the petitioner,
dispersal and warrantless arrests of rallyists in the absence of proof that said petitioners were committing acts
constituting lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, or violating BP 800; imposition of media standards and any form
of prior restraint on the press, as well as warrantless search of the Tribune Offices and whimsical seizure of its
articles for publication and other materials.
DOCTRINE
● Overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing ‘on their faces’ statutes in free speech cases.
● Void for vagueness – a law is facially invalid if men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application.
○ Same principles with overbreadth doctrine. [Tinga dissents this]
SUMMARY
● President Arroyo issued PP1017 declaring a state of national emergency. This case covers the seven consolidated
petitions for cetiorari assailing the constitutionality of PP1017 and General Order No. 5 implementing the former.
it is alleged that in doing so, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo committed grave abuse of discretion and that
respondent officials of the Government, in their professed efforts to defend and preserve democratic institutions
are actually trampling upon the very freedom guaranteed and protected by the constitution.Petitioner contend
that PP 1017 is void on its face because of overbreadth. SC ruled that the application of facial review using
overbreadth doctrine cannot be applied it the cases. Furthermore, SC also ruled that PP 1017 cannot be “void for
vagueness” since same principles are used for testing if it is void for vagueness and the overbreadth doctrine.
Petitioners failed to show that those principles were present in the case.
RELEVANT FACTS
● In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery of a plan (Oplan Hackle I) to
assassinate the president, then president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) issued Presidential Proclamation 1017
(PP1017) and is to be implemented by General Order No. 5 (GO 5). The said law was aimed to suppress
lawlessness and the connivance of extremists to bring down the government.
● GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same time revoked all permits issued for rallies and other
public organization/meeting. Notwithstanding the cancellation of their rally permit, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU)
head Randolf David proceeded to rally which led to his arrest.
● The Daily Tribune and Malaya, known anti-GMA news agencies, were also raided and seized. Beltran of
Anakpawis, was also arrested. His arrest was however grounded on a warrant of arrest issued way back in 1985
for his actions against Marcos. His supporters cannot visit him in jail because of the current imposition of PP 1017
and GO 5.
● In March, GMA issued PP 1021 which declared that the state of national emergency ceased to exist. David and
some opposition Congressmen averred that PP1017 is unconstitutional for it has no factual basis and it cannot be
validly declared by the president for such power is reposed in Congress. Also such declaration is actually a
declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also averred that the emergency contemplated in the Constitution are
those of natural calamities and that such is an overbreadth. Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an overbreadth
because it encroaches upon protected and unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen argued that the issue has become moot
and academic by reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of the declaration of PP 1021. The Sol-Gen averred that
PP 1017 is within the president’s calling out power, take care power and take over power.
ISSUE
RATIO DECIDENDI
Issue Ratio
W/N PP 1017 is void on its NO, a facial review of PP 1017, using the overbreadth doctrine and on
face because of its the ground of vagueness, is uncalled for.
overbreadth. 1. Overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing ‘on
their faces’ statutes in free speech cases.
a. 7 consolidated cases at bar are not primarily ‘freedom of
speech’ cases.
b. a plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily
directed to speech or even speech-related conduct.
i. actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress
all forms of lawless violence.
ii. the incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017
pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free speech,
which is manifestly subject to state regulation.
2. The overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of
a law that ‘reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining
comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected
conduct.
3. “Void for vagueness” is subject to the same principle governing
overbreadth doctrine.
a. Void for vagueness – a law is facially invalid if men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application.
b. Same principles as with overbreadth:
i. Also an analytical tool for testing “on their faces”
statutes in free speech cases.
ii. A litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if
it is vague in all possible applications.
4. Petitioner did not even attempt to show that PP 1017 is vague in
all its application. They also failed to establish that men of
common intelligence cannot understand the meaning and
application of PP 1017.
RULING
WHEREFORE,the Petitions are partly granted. The Court rules that PP 1017 is CONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it constitutes
a call by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. However, the
provisions of PP 1017 commanding the AFP to enforce laws not related to lawless violence, as well as decrees
promulgated by the President, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. In addition, the provision in PP 1017 declaring
national emergency under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution is CONSTITUTIONAL, but such declaration does
not authorize the President to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest without
prior legislation.
G.O. No. 5 is CONSTITUTIONAL since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the PNP should implement PP 1017,
i.e. whatever is “necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence.“
Considering that “acts of terrorism” have not yet been defined and made punishable by the Legislature, such portion
of G.O. No. 5 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal and warrantless arrest of the KMU and
NAFLU-KMU members during their rallies, in the absence of proof that these petitioners were committing acts
constituting lawless violence, invasion or rebellion and violating BP 880; the imposition of standards on media or any
form of prior restraint on the press, as well as the warrantless search of the Tribune offices and whimsical seizure of
its articles for publication and other materials, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
No costs.
there must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and
jurisprudence.
Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for
adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it
Applying these precepts, this Court finds that there exists an actual justiciable controversy in this case given the
evident clash of the parties' legal claims, particularly on whether the Curfew Ordinances impair the minors' and
parents' constitutional rights, and whether the Manila Ordinance goes against the provisions of RA 9344.
2. Legal Standing.
[Petitioners] must show that they have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that they have sustained
or are in immediate danger of sustaining, some direct injury as a consequence of the enforcement of the challenged
governmental act."
Among the five (5) individual petitioners, only Clarissa Joyce Villegas (Clarissa) has legal standing to raise the issue
affecting the minor's right to travel,[43] because: (a) she was still a minor at the time the petition was filed before
this Court,[44] and, hence, a proper subject of the Curfew Ordinances; and (b) as alleged, she travels from Manila to
Quezon City at night after school and is, thus, in imminent danger of apprehension by virtue of the Curfew
Ordinances. On the other hand, petitioners Joanne Rose Sace Lim, John Arvin Navarro Buenaagua, Ronel Baccutan
(Ronel), and Mark Leo Delos Reyes (Mark Leo) admitted in the petition that they are all of legal age, and therefore,
beyond the ordinances' coverage. Thus, they are not proper subjects of the Curfew Ordinances, for which they could
base any direct injury as a consequence thereof.
None of them, however, has standing to raise the issue of whether the Curfew Ordinances violate the parents' right
to rear their children as they have not shown that they stand before this Court as parent/s and/or guardian/s whose
constitutional parental right has been infringed. I
As for SPARK, it is an unincorporated association and, consequently, has no legal personality to bring an action in
court.[45] Even assuming that it has the capacity to sue, SPARK still has no standing as it failed to allege that it was
authorized by its members who were affected by the Curfew Ordinances, i.e., the minors, to file this case on their
behalf.
Hence, save for Clarissa, petitioners do not have the required personal interest in the controversy. More particularly,
Clarissa has standing only on the issue of the alleged violation of the minors' right to travel, but not on the alleged
violation of the parents' right.
Indeed, when those who challenge the official act are able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the
people, the Court may exercise its sound discretion and take cognizance of the suit.
Accordingly, this case is of overarching significance to the public, which, therefore, impels a relaxation of procedural
rules, including, among others, the standing requirement.
In particular, petitioners submit that the Curfew Ordinances are void for not containing sufficient enforcement
parameters, which leaves the enforcing authorities with unbridled discretion to carry out their provisions. They claim
that the lack of procedural guidelines in these issuances led to the questioning of petitioners Ronel and Mark Leo,
even though they were already of legal age. They maintain that the enforcing authorities apprehended the suspected
curfew offenders based only on their physical appearances and, thus, acted arbitrarily. Meanwhile, although they
conceded that the Quezon City Ordinance requires enforcers to determine the age of the child, they submit that
nowhere does the said ordinance require the law enforcers to ask for proof or identification of the child to show his
age.[
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It
It is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons,
especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled
discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle."[48]
They do not assert any confusion as to what conduct the subject ordinances prohibit or not prohibit but only point to
the ordinances' lack of enforcement guidelines
As above-mentioned, petitioners fail to point out any ambiguous standard in any of the provisions of the Curfew
Ordinances, but rather, lament the lack of detail on how the age of a suspected minor would be determined. Thus,
without any correlation to any vague legal provision, the Curfew Ordinances cannot be stricken down under the void
for vagueness doctrine.
While it is true that the Curfew Ordinances do not explicitly state these parameters, law enforcement agents are still
bound to follow the prescribed measures found in statutory law when implementing ordinances.
This provision should be read in conjunction with the Curfew Ordinances because RA 10630 (the law that amended
RA 9344) repeals all ordinances inconsistent with statutory law.[53] Pursuant to Section 57-A of RA 9344, as
amended by RA 10630,[54] minors caught in violation of curfew ordinances are children at risk and, therefore,
covered by its provisions.[
B. Right of Parents to Rear their Children. Petitioners submit that the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional
because they deprive parents of their natural and primary right in the rearing of the youth without substantive due
process.
Petitioners' stance cannot be sustained.
Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution articulates the State's policy relative to the rights of parents in the
rearing of their children: Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen
the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the
unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic
efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied.)
This means that parents are not only given the privilege of exercising their authority over their children; they are
equally obliged to exercise this authority conscientiously.
While parents have the primary role in child-rearing, it should be stressed that "when actions concerning the child
have a relation to the public welfare or the well-being of the child, the [S]tate may act to promote these legitimate
interests."[66] Thus, "[i]n cases in which harm to the physical or mental health of the child or to public safety, peace,
order, or welfare is demonstrated, these legitimate state interests may override the parents' qualified right to control
the upbringing of their children."[67]
As parens patriae, the State has the inherent right and duty to aid parents in the moral development of their
children,[70] and, thus, assumes a supporting role for parents to fulfill their parental obligations.
At this juncture, it should be emphasized that the Curfew Ordinances apply only when the minors are not - whether
actually or constructively (as will be later discussed) - accompanied by their parents.
This serves as an explicit recognition of the State's deference to the primary nature of parental authority and the
importance of parents' role in child-rearing. Parents are effectively given unfettered authority over their children's
conduct during curfew hours when they are able to supervise them.
In this respect, the ordinances neither dictate an over-all plan of discipline for the parents to apply to their minors
nor force parents to abdicate their authority to influence or control their minors' activities.[74] As such, the Curfew
Ordinances only amount to a minimal - albeit reasonable - infringement upon a parent's right to bring up his or her
child.
Petitioners further assail the constitutionality of the Curfew Ordinances based on the minors' right to travel. They
claim that the liberty to travel is a fundamental right, which, therefore, necessitates the application of the strict
scrutiny te
At the outset, the Court rejects petitioners' invocation of the overbreadth doctrine, considering that petitioners have
not claimed any transgression of their rights to free speech or any inhibition of speech-related conduct. In Southern
Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council (Southern Hemisphere),[80] this Court explained
that "the application of the overbreadth doctrine is limited to a facial kind of challenge and, owing to the given
rationale of a facial challenge, applicable only to free speech cases,"[81] viz.:
In Virginia v. Hicks,[84] it was held that rarely, if ever, will an overbreadth challenge succeed against a law or
regulation that is not specifically addressed to speech or speech-related conduct. Attacks on overly broad statutes
are justified by the 'transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression."'[85]... transcendent
value to all society of constitutionally protected expression."'[85]
That being said, this Court finds it improper to undertake an overbreadth analysis in this case, there being no claimed
curtailment of free speech. On the contrary, however, this Court finds proper to examine the assailed regulations
under the strict scrutiny test.
The right to travel is recognized and guaranteed as a fundamental right[88] under Section 6, Article III of the 1987
Constitution, to wit: Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law
shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in
the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law. (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
Jurisprudence provides that this right refers to the right to move freely from the Philippines to other countries or
within the Philippines.[89] It is a right embraced within the general concept of liberty.[
The right to travel is essential as it enables individuals to access and exercise their other rights, such as the rights to
education, free expression, assembly, association, and religion
As the 1987 Constitution itself reads, the State[96] may impose limitations on the exercise of this right, provided that
they: (1) serve the interest of national security, public safety, or public health; and (2) are provided by law.[97]
The stated purposes of the Curfew Ordinances, specifically the promotion of juvenile safety and prevention of
juvenile crime, inarguably serve the interest of public safety. The restriction on the minor's movement and activities
within the confines of their residences and their immediate vicinity during the curfew period is perceived to reduce
the probability of the minor becoming victims of or getting involved in crimes and criminal activities. As to the
second requirement, i.e., that the limitation "be provided by law," our legal system is replete with laws emphasizing
the State's duty to afford special protection to children,... Particularly relevant to this case is Article 139 of PD 603,
which explicitly authorizes local government units, through their city or municipal councils, to set curfew hours for
children.
The restrictions set by the Curfew Ordinances that apply solely to minors are likewise constitutionally permissible. In
this relation, this Court recognizes that minors do possess and enjoy constitutional rights,[108] but the exercise of
these rights is not co-extensive as those of adults.[
In Bellotti,[117] the US Supreme Court identified three (3) justifications for the differential treatment of the minors'
constitutional rights. These are: first, the peculiar vulnerability of children; second, their inability to make critical
decisions in an informed and mature manner; and third, the importance of the parental role in child rearing:[118]
It is true children have rights, in common with older people, in the primary use of highways. But even in such use
streets afford dangers for them not affecting adults. And in other uses, whether in work or in other things, this
difference may be magnified.[12... i) interferes with the exercise of fundamental rights, including the basic liberties
guaranteed under the Constitution, or (ii) burdens suspect classes.
Philippine jurisprudence has developed three (3) tests of judicial scrutiny to determine the reasonableness of
classifications.[122] The strict scrutiny test applies when a classification either (i) interferes with the exercise of
fundamental rights, including the basic liberties guaranteed under the Constitution, or (ii) burdens suspect classes.
[123] The intermediate scrutiny test applies when a classification does not involve suspect classes or fundamental
rights, but requires heightened scrutiny, such as in classifications based on gender and legitimacy.[124] Lastly, the
rational basis test applies to all other subjects not covered by the first two tests.[125]
Considering that the right to travel is a fundamental right in our legal system guaranteed no less by our Constitution,
the strict scrutiny test[126] is the applicable test.
Thus, the government has the burden of proving that the classification (i) is necessary to achieve a compelling State
interest, and (ii) is the least restrictive means to protect such interest or the means chosen is narrowly tailored to
accomplish the interest.[132]... a. Compelling State Interest.
This Court has ruled that children's welfare and the State's mandate to protect and care for them as parens patriae
constitute compelling interests to justify regulations by the State.
In this case, respondents have sufficiently established that the ultimate objective of the Curfew Ordinances is to keep
unsupervised minors during the late hours of night time off of public areas, so as to reduce - if not totally eliminate -
their exposure to potential harm, and to insulate them against criminal pressure and influences which may even
include themselves. A
Similar to the City of Charlottesville in Schleifer, the local governments of Quezon City and Manila presented
statistical data in their respective pleadings showing the alarming prevalence of crimes involving juveniles, either as
victims or perpetrators, in their respective localities.[139] Based on these findings, their city councils found it
necessary to enact curfew ordinances pursuant to their police power under the general welfare clause.[140] In this
light, the Court thus finds that the local governments have not only conveyed but, in fact, attempted to substantiate
legitimate concerns on public welfare, especially with respect to minors. A... b. Least Restrictive Means/ Narrowly
Drawn.
When it is possible for governmental regulations to be more narrowly drawn to avoid conflicts with constitutional
rights, then they must be so narrowly drawn.[1
After a thorough evaluation of the ordinances' respective provisions, this Court finds that only the Quezon City
Ordinance meets the above-discussed requirement, while the Manila and Navotas Ordinances do not.
The Manila Ordinance cites only four (4) exemptions from the coverage of the curfew, namely: (a) minors
accompanied by their parents, family members of legal age, or guardian; (b) those running lawful errands such as
buying of medicines, using of telecommunication facilities for emergency purposes and the like; (c) night school
students and those who, by virtue of their employment, are required in the streets or outside their residence after
10:00 p.m.; and (d) those working at night.[146] For its part, the Navotas Ordinance provides more exceptions, to
wit: (a) minors with night classes; (b) those working at night; (c) those who attended a school or church activity, in
coordination with a specific barangay office; (d) those traveling towards home during the curfew hours; (e) those
running errands under the supervision of their parents, guardians, or persons of legal age having authority over
them; (f) those involved in accidents, calamities, and the like. It also exempts minors from the curfew during these
specific occasions: Christmas eve, Christmas day, New Year's eve, New Year's day, the night before the barangay
fiesta, the day of the fiesta, All Saints' and All Souls' Day, Holy Thursday, Good Friday, Black Saturday, and Easter
Sunda
This Court observes that these two ordinances are not narrowly drawn in that their exceptions are inadequate and
therefore, run the risk of overly restricting the minors' fundamental freedoms.
First, although it allows minors to engage in school or church activities, it hinders them from engaging in legitimate
non-school or non-church activities in the streets or going to and from such activities; thus, their freedom of
association is effectively curtailed.
Second, although the Navotas Ordinance does not impose the curfew during Christmas Eve and Christmas day, it
effectively prohibits minors from attending traditional religious activities (such as simbang gabi) at night without
accompanying adults,... Third, the Navotas Ordinance does not accommodate avenues for minors to engage in
political rallies or attend city council meetings to voice out their concerns in line with their right to peaceably
assemble and to free expression.
In sum, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances should be completely stricken down since their exceptions, which are
essentially determinative of the scope and breadth of the curfew regulations, are inadequate to ensure protection of
the above-mentioned fundamental rights.
As compared to the first two (2) ordinances, the list of exceptions under the Quezon City Ordinance is more narrowly
drawn to sufficiently protect the minors' rights of association, free exercise of religion, travel, to peaceably assemble,
and of free expression.
Specifically, the inclusion of items (b) and (g) in the list of exceptions guarantees the protection of these
aforementioned rights. These items uphold the right of association by enabling minors to attend both official and
extra-curricular activities not only of their school or church but also of other legitimate organizations. The rights to
peaceably assemble and of free expression are also covered by these items given that the minors' attendance in the
official activities of civic or religious organizations are allowed during the curfew hours. Unlike in the Navotas
Ordinance, the right to the free exercise of religion is sufficiently safeguarded in the Quezon City Ordinance
Meanwhile, the Manila Ordinance imposed various sanctions to the minor based on the age and frequency of
violations, to wit: SEC. 4. Sanctions and Penalties for Violation. Any child or youth violating this ordinance shall be
sanctioned/punished as follows: (a) If the offender is Fifteen (15) years of age and below, the sanction shall consist of
a REPRIMAND for the youth offender and ADMONITION to the offender's parent, guardian or person exercising
parental authority. (b) If the offender is Fifteen (15) years of age and under Eighteen (18) years of age, the
sanction/penalty shall be: For the FIRST OFFENSE, Reprimand and Admonition; For the SECOND OFFENSE, Reprimand
and Admonition, and a warning about the legal impostitions in case of a third and subsequent violation; and For the
THIRD AND SUBSEQUENT OFFENSES, Imprisonment of one (1) day to ten (10) days, or a Fine of TWO THOUSAND
PESOS (Php2,000.00), or both at the discretion of the Court, PROVIDED, That the complaint shall be filed by the
Punong Barangay with the office of the City Prosecutor.[156] (Emphases and underscoring supplied).
Thus springs the question of whether local governments could validly impose on minors these sanctions - i.e., (a)
community service; (b) reprimand and admonition; (c) fine; and (d) imprisonment. Pertinently, Sections 57 and 57-A
of RA 9344, as amended, prohibit the imposition of penalties on minors for status offenses such as curfew violations,
viz.:... what they prohibit is the imposition of penalties on minors for violations of these regulations.
In this regard, requiring the minor to perform community service is a valid form of intervention program that a local
government (such as Navotas City in this case) could appropriately adopt in an ordinance to promote the welfare of
minors.
The sanction of admonition imposed by the City of Manila is likewise consistent with Sections 57 and 57-A of RA
9344 as it is merely a formal way of giving warnings and expressing disapproval to the minor's misdemeanor.
In other words, the disciplinary measures of community-based programs and admonition are clearly not penalties -
as they are not punitive in nature - and are generally less intrusive on the rights and conduct of the minor. To be
clear, their objectives are to formally inform and educate the minor, and for the latter to understand, what actions
must be avoided so as to aid him in his future conduct.
Fines and/or imprisonment, on the other hand, undeniably constitute penalties - as provided in our various criminal
and administrative laws and jurisprudence - that Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended, evidently prohibits.
In sum, while the Court finds that all three Curfew Ordinances have passed the first prong of the strict scrutiny test -
that is, that the State has sufficiently shown a compelling interest to promote juvenile safety and prevent juvenile
crime in the concerned localities, only the Quezon City Ordinance has passed the second prong of the strict scrutiny
test, as it is the only issuance out of the three which provides for the least restrictive means to achieve this interest.
In particular, the Quezon City Ordinance provides for adequate exceptions that enable minors to freely exercise their
fundamental rights during the prescribed curfew hours, and therefore, narrowly drawn to achieve the State's
purpose. Section 4 (a) of the said ordinance, i.e., "[t]hose accompanied by their parents or guardian", has also been
construed to include parental permission as a constructive form of accompaniment and hence, an allowable
exception to the curfew measure; the manner of enforcement, however, is left to the discretion of the local
government unit. In fine, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances are declared unconstitutional and thus, null and void,
while the Quezon City Ordinance is declared as constitutional and thus, valid in accordance with this Decision.
Principles:
i) interferes with the exercise of fundamental rights, including the basic liberties guaranteed under
the Constitution, or (ii) burdens suspect classes.
17.Tañada v. Tuvera
Case No. 287
G.R. No. L-63915 (December 29, 1986)
Chapter I, Page 37, Footnote No.159
FACTS:
Due process was invoked by the Petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a number of Presidential
Decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by law. The government argued that while
publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was “otherwise provided” as when the decrees
themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval.
ISSUE:
W/N the clause “otherwise provided” in Article 2 of Civil Code pertains to the necessity of publication.
HELD:
No, the clause “otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication per se, which cannot in any event be omitted.
Publication in full should be indispensable. Without such notice or publication, there would be no basis for
the application of the maxim “ignorantia Legis non excusat”. The court, therefore, declares that presidential
issuances of general application which have not been published shall have no force and effect, and the court
ordered that the unpublished decrees be published in the Official Gazette immediately.
LATIN MAXIM:
6c, 9a
Facts2:
Petitioners asked for the issuance of the Writ of mandamus A mandamus is a judicial writ, a command issuing in
the name of the sovereign authority from a superior court having jurisdiction over person or inferior court. to
compel the respondents to publish in the Official Gazette the unpublished Executive Issuances such as; Presidential
Decrees, Proclamations, Executive Orders, general orders, letters of implementation, and administrative orders. In
defense, respondents stated that the petitioners have no legal personality in the case citing sec. 3 of rule 65 of the
Rules of Court which lays-out the requirement for filing for a Writ of Mandamus. Petitioners contended that the issue
touches the public and thereby does not require any special circumstance to institute an action. On the other hand,
respondents stated that publication of the mentioned issuances is not a sine qua non requirement as the Law
provides its own affectivity date as stated in Art. 2 of the Civil Code.
Issue2:
Ruling2:
The Supreme Court in its decision, ordered the respondents to publish the Executive Issuances of general
application, and further stated that failure for publication would render the Issuances no binding force and effect.
It was explained that such publication is essential as it gives basis to the legal maxim known as ignorantia legis non
excusat. Thus, failure to publish would make create injustice as would it would punish the citizen for transgression of
the law which he had no notice.
The court declared that Presidential issuances with general application without publication would be inoperative and
null and void. However, some justices in their concurring opinions made a qualification stating that publication is not
an absolute requirement for the publication. As Justice Fernando stated that, publication is needed but it must not
only confined in the Official Gazette because it would make those other laws not published in the Official Gazette
bereft of any binding force or effect.
Facts: The Philippine Coast Guard seized 9000 sacks of refined sugar owned by petitioner Yaokasin, which were then
being unloaded from the M/V Tacloban, and turned them over to the custody of the Bureau of Customs. On June 7,
1988, the District Collector of Customs ordered the release of the cargo to the petitioner but this order was
subsequently reversed on June 15, 1988. The reversal was by virtue ofCustoms Memorandum Order (CMO) 20-87 in
implementation of the Integrated Reorganization Plan under P.D. 1, which provides that in protest and seizure cases
where the decision is adverse to the government, the Commissioner of Customs has the power of automatic review.
Petitioner objected to the enforcement of Sec. 12 of the Plan and CMO 20-87 contending that these were not
published in the Official Gazette. The Plan which was part of P.D. 1 was however published in the Official Gazette.
Issue: W/n circular orders such as CMO 20-87 need to be published in the OG to take effect
NO.
Article 2 of the Civil Code does not apply to circulars like CMO 20-87 which is an administrative order of the
Commissioner of Customs addressed to his subordinates, the custom collectors. Said issuance requiring collectors of
customs to comply strictly with Section 12 of he Plan, is addressed only to particular persons or a class of persons
(the customs collectors), hence no general applicability. As held in Tanada v. Tuvera, “It need not be published, on
the assumption that it has been circularized to all concerned.”
Moreover, Commonwealth Act. 638 provides an enumeration of what shall be published in the Official Gazette. It
provides that besides legislative acts, resolutions of public nature of Congress, executive, administrative orders and
proclamations shall be published except when these have no general applicability.
FACTS:
The Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 7522, “An Ordinance Regulating the Operation of Public
Markets and Prescribing Fees for the Rentals of Stalls and Providing Penalties for Violation thereof and for other
Purposes.” Respondent were seeking the declaration of nullity of the Ordinance for the reason that a) the publication
requirement under the Revised Charter of the City of Manila has not been complied with, b) the Market Committee
was not given any participation in the enactment, c) Sec. 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act has been
violated, and d) the ordinance would violate P.D. 7 prescribing the collection of fees and charges on livestock and
animal products.
ISSUE:
What law shall govern the publication of tax ordinance enacted by the Municipal Board of Manila, the Revised City
Charter or the Local Tax Code.
HELD:
The fact that one is a special law and the other a general law creates the presumption that the special law is to be
considered an exception to the general. The Revised Charter of Manila speaks of “ordinance” in general whereas the
Local Tax Code relates to “ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or other charges” in particular. In regard
therefore, the Local Tax Code controls.
FACTS:
AAA, who was seven years old at the time of the incident. Quimvel, at that time, was the caretaker of the
ducks of AAA's grandfather and lived near AAA’s house. While YYY (AAA’s father) was away to buy kerosene, Quimvel
arrived bringing a vegetable viand from AAA's grandfather. AAA requested Quimvel to stay with them as she and her
siblings were afraid. He agreed and accompanied them. AAA and her siblings then went to sleep. However, she was
awakened when she felt Quimvel's right leg on top of her body. She likewise sensed Quimvel inserting his right hand
inside her panty. In a trice, she felt Quimvel caressing her private part. She removed his hand. Quimvel was about to
leave when YYY arrived. She asked him what he was doing in his house. Quimvel replied that he was just
accompanying the children. After he left, YYY and his children went back to sleep.
On July 29, 2007, XXX (AAA’s mother) arrived from Batangas. BBB (AAA’s sibling) told her that Quimvel
touched her Ate. When XXX asked AAA what Quimvel did to her, she recounted that Quimvel laid down beside her
and touched her vagina. Upon hearing this, XXX and YYY went to the Office of the Barangay Tanod and thereafter to
the police station to report the incident. Afterwards, they brought AAA to a doctor for medical examination. The
Regional Trial Court in Ligao City, Albay rendered its Judgment finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime charged.
ISSUE:
Whether the accused may be convicted only of acts of lasciviousness under Art. 336 of the Revised Penal
Code and not in relation to Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610.
RULING:
Yes. Before an accused can be held criminally liable for lascivious conduct under Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610, the
requisites of Acts of Lasciviousness as penalized under Art. 336 of the RPC earlier enumerated must be met in
addition to the requisites for sexual abuse under Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610, which are as follows:
XXX
2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse
XXX
The fault in petitioner's logic lies in his misapprehension of how the element that the victim is "exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse" should be alleged in the Information.
To the mind of the Court, the allegations are sufficient to classify the victim as one "exploited in prostitution or
subject to other sexual abuse." This is anchored on the very definition of the phrase in Sec. 5 of RA 7610, which
encompasses children who indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct (a) for money, profit, or any other
consideration; or (b) under the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group.
Correlatively, Sec. 5(a) of RA 7610 punishes acts pertaining to or connected with child prostitution wherein
the child is abused primarily for profit. On the other hand, paragraph (b) punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct committed on a child subjected to other sexual abuse. It covers not only a situation where a child is abused
for profit but also one in which a child, through coercion, intimidation or influence, engages in sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct. Hence, the law punishes not only child prostitution but also other forms of sexual abuse against
children.
Clear from the records of the deliberation is that the original wording of Sec. 5 of RA 7610 has been expanded
so as to cover abuses that are not characterized by gain, monetary or otherwise. In the case at bar, the abuse
suffered by AAA squarely falls under this expanded scope as there was no allegation of consideration or profit in
exchange for sexual favor. As stated in the Information, petitioner committed lascivious conduct through the use of
"force" and "intimidation."
The Senate deliberations made clear, though, that other forms of sexual abuse, not just prostitution, are
within the extended coverage of RA 7610. It is immaterial whether or not the accused himself employed the
coercion or influence to subdue the will of the child for the latter to submit to his sexual advances for him to be
convicted under paragraph (b). Sec. 5 of RA 7610 even provides that the offense can be committed by "any adult,
syndicate or group," without qualification. The clear language of the special law, therefore, does not preclude the
prosecution of lascivious conduct performed by the same person who subdued the child through coercion or
influence. This is, in fact, the more common scenario of abuse that reaches this Court and it would be an
embarrassment for us to rule that such instances are outside the ambit Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid
reasons other than those mentioned above.
The Rules contemplate two kinds of inhibition: compulsory and voluntary. Under the first paragraph of the
cited Rule, it is conclusively presumed that judges cannot actively and impartially sit in the instances
mentioned. The second paragraph, which embodies voluntary inhibition, leaves to the sound discretion of
the judges concerned whether to sit in a case for other just and valid reasons, with only their conscience as
guide.
In denying the motions for his inhibition, Justice Hernandez explained that petitioner failed to impute any
act of bias or impartiality on his part, to wit:
What can reasonably be gleaned from jurisprudence on this point of law is the necessity of proving bias
and partiality under the second paragraph of the rule in question. The proof required needs to point to
some act or conduct on the part of the judge being sought for inhibition. In the instant Motions, there is not
even a single act or conduct attributed to Justice Hernandez from where a suspicion of bias or partiality can
be derived or appreciated. In fact, it is oddly striking that the accused does not even make a claim or
imputation of bias or partiality on the part of Justice Hernandez. Understandably, he simply cannot make
such allegation all because there is none to be told. If allegations or perceptions of bias from the tenor and
language of a judge is considered by the Supreme Court as insufficient to show prejudgment, how much
more insufficient it becomes if there is absent any allegation of bias or partiality to begin with.
We find the above explanation well-taken and thus uphold the assailed Resolution upon the grounds so
stated. We have ruled in Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Dy Hong Pi, G.R. No. 171137, June
5, 2009, 588 SCRA 612, 632 that the mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough ground for
inhibition, especially when the charge is without basis. Extrinsic evidence must further be presented to
establish bias, bad faith, malice, or corrupt purpose, in addition to palpable error which may be inferred
from the decision or order itself. This Court has to be shown acts or conduct of the judge clearly indicative
of arbitrariness or prejudice before the latter can be branded the stigma of being biased or partial.
An allegation of prejudgment, without more, constitutes mere conjecture and is not one of the just or valid
reasons contemplated in the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court for which a
judge may inhibit himself from hearing the case. The bare allegations of the judges partiality, as in this
case, will not suffice in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that the
judge will undertake his noble role of dispensing justice in accordance with law and evidence, and without
fear or favor. Verily, for bias and prejudice to be considered valid reasons for the involuntary inhibition of
judges, mere suspicion is not enough.
Petitioner contends that his motions were based on the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137, but a
closer examination of the motions for inhibition reveals that petitioner undoubtedly invoked the second
paragraph by underscoring the phrase, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above. This
was an express indication of the rule that he was invoking. Moreover, it was specifically stated in paragraph
7 of both motions that in accused mind, such circumstances militates against the Hon. Justice Hernandez
and constitutes a just and valid ground for his inhibition under the 2nd paragraph, Section 1 of Rule 137, in
so far as the cases against accused are concerned. Hence, there is no question that petitioner relied on the
second paragraph of the Rule which contemplates voluntary inhibition as basis for his motions for
inhibition.
And even if we were to assume that petitioner indeed invoked the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 in
his motions to inhibit, we should stress that marital relationship by itself is not a ground to disqualify a judge
from hearing a case. Under the first paragraph of the rule on inhibition, No judge or judicial officer shall sit
in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or
otherwise…. The relationship mentioned therein becomes relevant only when such spouse or child of the
judge is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise. Petitioner, however, miserably failed
to show that Professor Carolina G. Hernandez is financially or pecuniarily interested in these cases before
the Sandiganbayan to justify the inhibition of Justice Hernandez under the first paragraph of Section 1 of
Rule 137 (Ramiscal Jr. v. Justice Hernandez et al., G.R. Nos. 173057-74, September 20, 2010).
In Umale v. Villaluz, 151-A Phil. 563, 568, May 25, 1973, the Court traced the history of the second
paragraph of the above-quoted provision, which had been added only as an amendment to the Rules of
Court in 1964. Prior to that year, the question on whether to take cognizance of the case did not depend
upon the discretion of the judges not legally disqualified to sit in a given case. If those concerned were not
disqualified, it was their official duty to proceed with the case or else risk being called upon to account for
their dereliction. They could not voluntarily inhibit themselves on grounds of prejudice or bias, extreme
delicacy, or even if they themselves took great interest and an active part in the filing of the case. Gutierrez
v. Santos 112 Phil. 184, May 30, 1961 and Del Castillo v. Javelona 116 Phil. 451, September 29, 1962
paved the way for the recognition of other circumstances for disqualification –those that depended upon
the exercise of discretion of the judges concerned.
The judges right, however, must be weighed against their duty to decide cases without fear of repression.
Verily, the second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 137 does not give judges the unfettered discretion to
decide whether to desist from hearing a case. The inhibition must be for just and valid causes. The mere
imputation of bias or partiality is not enough ground for them to inhibit, especially when the charge is
without basis. This Court has to be shown acts or conduct clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice
before it can brand them with the stigma of bias or partiality Gohu v. Spouses Gohu, 397 Phil. 126, October
13, 2000; Abdula v. Guiani, 382 Phil. 757, February 18, 2000).
22.
23. MIRALLOSA VS CARMEL DEVT INC
GR 194538 November 27, 2013
FACTS:
Respondent Carmel Development, Inc. was the registered owner of a Caloocan property known as the Pangarap
Village located at Barrio Makatipo, Caloocan City. The said property is registered under the name of Carmel Farms
Inc. under a Transfer Certificate Title (TCT). One of the lots in the said title is presently occupied by Petitioner Moreto
Mirallosa. On September 14, 1973, P.D. 293 was issued invalidating the titles of respondent and declared them open
for disposition to the members of the Malacañang Homeowners Association, Inc. (MHAI). However, on January 29,
1988 as decided on the case of Tuason, P.D. 293 was declared as unconstitutional. In effect, on February 17, 1988
Carmel Farms Inc. restored its ownership of the property. Meanwhile, sometime in 1995, Petitioner took over the lot
in question by virtue of an Affidavit executed by Pelagio M. Juan (petitioner’s predecessor who was a member of
MHAI).In the basis of Tuason case, the respondent filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer before the Metropolitan
Trial court (MeTC) wherefore the petitioner was ordered to vacate the property in question among others. The
petitioner appealed to the RTC. RTC then rendered a Decision to reverse and set aside the findings of MeTC which
led to dismissal of the complaint. On September 24, 2008, respondent appealed to Court of Appeals and decided to
reversed and set aside the Decision of RTC and then reinstated the decision of MeTC.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the MeTC had jurisdiction over the case
(2) Whether or not Tuason case may be applied here, despite petitioner not being a party to the case
(3) Whether or not petitioner is a builder in good faith
HELD:
(1) Yes. In this case, what was once a legal possession of petitioner, emanating from P.D. 293, later became illegal by
the pronouncement in Tuason that the law was unconstitutional.
(2) Yes. Tuason may be applied despite petitioner not being a party to that case, because an unconstitutional law
produces no effect and confers no right upon any person.
(3) No. Since petitioner only started occupying the property sometime in 1995, or about seven years after Tuason
was promulgated, he should have been aware of the binding effect of that ruling. Since all judicial decisions form
part of the law of the land, its existence should be on one hand, x x x matter of mandatory judicial notice; on the
other, ignorantia legis non excusat.
24. MUNICIPALITY OF NUEVA ERA VS. MUNICIPALITY OF MARCOS - casus omissus pro omisso habendus est
- Casus omissus pro omisso habendus est. Lat. A case omitted is to be held as intentionally omitted.” It is a rule of
statutory construction. If a person, object, or thing is omitted from being enumerated in a statute, it must be held or
considered to have been omitted intentionally.
Case: MUNICIPALITY OF NUEVA ERA, ILOCOS NORTE, represented by its Municipal Mayor,
CAROLINE ARZADON-GARVIDA vs. MUNICIPALITY OF MARCOS, ILOCOS NORTE,
represented by its Municipal Mayor, SALVADOR PILLOS, and the COURT OF APPEALS
Case No.: G.R. No. 169435
Petitioner: MUNICIPALITY OF NUEVA ERA, ILOCOS NORTE, represented by its Municipal Mayor,
CAROLINE ARZADON-GARVIDA
Respondents: MUNICIPALITY OF MARCOS, ILOCOS NORTE, represented by its Municipal Mayor,
SALVADOR PILLOS, and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
Statutory Rule:
EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSIO ALTERIUS (Express Mention and Implied Exclusion)
Anything that is not included in the enumeration is excluded therefrom and a meaning that does not
appear nor is intended or reflected in the very language of the statute cannot be placed therein.
Law in Dispute:
SECTION 1. The barrios of Capariaan, Biding, Escoda, Culao, Alabaan, Ragas and Agunit in the
Municipality of Dingras, Province of Ilocos Norte, are hereby separated from the said municipality and
constituted into a new and separate municipality to be known as the Municipality of Marcos, with the
following boundaries:
On the Northwest, by the barrios Biding-Rangay boundary going down to the barrios
Capariaan-Gabon boundary consisting of foot path and feeder road; on the Northeast, by the
Burnay River which is the common boundary of barrios Agunit and Naglayaan; on the East, by
the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary; on the South, by the Padsan River which is at the
same time the boundary between the municipalities of Banna and Dingras; on the West and
Southwest, by the boundary between the municipalities of Batac and Dingras.
The Municipality of Marcos shall have its seat of government in the barrio of Biding.
FACTS
1. The Municipality of Nueva Era was created from the settlements of Bugayong, Cabittaoran, Garnaden,
Padpadon, Padsan, Paorpatoc, Tibangran, and Uguis which were previously organized as rancherias,
each of which was under the independent control of a chief. Governor General Francis Burton Harrison,
acting on a resolution passed by the provincial government of Ilocos Norte, united these rancherias and
created the township of Nueva Era by virtue of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 66 5 dated September 30,
1916.
2. The Municipality of Marcos, on the other hand, was created on June 22, 1963 pursuant to Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 3753 entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of Marcos in the Province of Ilocos Norte."
3. Based on the first paragraph of the said Section 1 of R.A. No. 3753, it is clear that Marcos shall be derived
from the listed barangays of Dingras, namely: Capariaan, Biding, Escoda, Culao, Alabaan, Ragas and
Agunit. The Municipality of Nueva Era or any of its barangays was not mentioned. Hence, if based only
on said paragraph, it is clear that Nueva Era may not be considered as a source of territory of Marcos.
4. There is no issue insofar as the first paragraph is concerned which named only Dingras as the mother
municipality of Marcos. The problem, however, lies in the description of Marcos' boundaries as stated in
the second paragraph, particularly in the phrase: "on the East, by the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province
boundary."
5. On the basis of the said phrase, which described Marcos' eastern boundary, Marcos claimed that the
middle portion of Nueva Era, which adjoins its eastern side, formed part of its territory. Its reasoning
was founded upon the fact that Nueva Era was between Marcos and the Ilocos Norte-Apayao boundary
such that if Marcos was to be bounded on the east by the Ilocos Norte-Apayao boundary, part of Nueva
Era would consequently be obtained by it.
6. Marcos did not claim any part of Nueva Era as its own territory until after almost 30 years,7 or only on
March 8, 1993, when its Sangguniang Bayan passed Resolution No. 93-015.8 Said resolution was
entitled: "Resolution Claiming an Area which is an Original Part of Nueva Era, But Now Separated Due to
the Creation of Marcos Town in the Province of Ilocos Norte."
7. Marcos submitted its claim to the SP of Ilocos Norte for its consideration and approval. The SP, on the
other hand, required Marcos to submit its position paper.
8. On March 29, 2000, the SP of Ilocos Norte ruled in favor of Nueva Era, by dismissing the case of Marcos.
This decision was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court of Ilocos Norte.
9. In a decision dated June 6, 2005,the Court of Appeals partly reversed the Regional Trial Court decision
with the following disposition:
10. “WHEREFORE, we partially GRANT the petition treated as one for certiorari. The Decisions of both the
SangguniangPanlalawigan and Regional Trial Court of Ilocos Norte are REVERSED and SET ASIDE
insofar as they made the eastern boundary of the municipality of Marcos co-terminous with the eastern
boundary of Dingras town, and another is rendered extending the said boundary of Marcos to the
boundary line between the province of Ilocos Norte and Kalinga-Apayao, but the same Decisions are
AFFIRMED with respect to the denial of the claim of Marcos to the detached northern portion of
barangay Sto. Ninñ o which should, as it is hereby ordered to, remain with the municipality of Nueva Era.”
ISSUE
Whether or not the eastern boundary of Marcos extends over and covers a portion of Nueva Era.
RULING
1. Only the barrios (now barangays) of Dingras from which Marcos obtained its territory are named in R.A.
No. 3753. To wit:
SECTION 1. The barrios of Capariaan, Biding, Escoda, Culao, Alabaan, Ragas and Agunit in the
Municipality of Dingras, Province of Ilocos Norte, are hereby separated from the said municipality
and constituted into a new and separate municipality to be known as the Municipality of Marcos,
with the following boundaries:
2. Since only the barangays of Dingras are enumerated as Marcos' source of territory, Nueva Era's territory
is, therefore, excluded.
3. Under the maxim expressiouniusestexclusioalterius, the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of
another thing not mentioned. If a statute enumerates the things upon which it is to operate, everything
else must necessarily and by implication be excluded from its operation and effect.49 This rule, as a
guide to probable legislative intent, is based upon the rules of logic and natural workings of the human
mind.
4. Had the legislature intended other barangays from Nueva Era to become part of Marcos, it could have
easily done so by clear and concise language. Where the terms are expressly limited to certain matters, it
may not by interpretation or construction be extended to other matters. The rule proceeds from the
premise that the legislature would not have made specified enumerations in a statute had the intention
been not to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.
5. Moreover, since the barangays of Nueva Era were not mentioned in the enumeration of barangays out of
which the territory of Marcos shall be set, their omission must be held to have been done intentionally.
This conclusion finds support in the rule of casus omissus pro omissohabendusest, which states that a
person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally.
6. Furthermore, this conclusion on the intention of the legislature is bolstered by the explanatory note of
the bill which paved the way for the creation of Marcos. Said explanatory note mentioned only Dingras
as the mother municipality of Marcos.
7. Where there is ambiguity in a statute, as in this case, courts may resort to the explanatory note to clarify
the ambiguity and ascertain the purpose and intent of the statute.
8. Despite the omission of Nueva Era as a mother territory in the law creating Marcos, the latter still
contends that said law included Nueva Era. It alleges that based on the description of its boundaries, a
portion of Nueva Era is within its territory.
9. The boundaries of Marcos under R.A. No. 3753 read:
On the Northwest, by the barrios Biding-Rangay boundary going down to the barrios Capariaan-
Gabon boundary consisting of foot path and feeder road; on the Northeast, by the Burnay River
which is the common boundary of barrios Agunit and Naglayaan; on the East, by the Ilocos Norte-
Mt. Province boundary; on the South, by the Padsan River which is at the same time the boundary
between the municipalities of Banna and Dingras; on the West and Southwest, by the boundary
between the municipalities of Batac and Dingras.
10. Marcos contends that since it is "bounded on the East, by the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary," a
portion of Nueva Era formed part of its territory because, according to it, Nueva Era is between the
Marcos and Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary. Marcos posits that in order for its eastern side to reach
the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary, it will necessarily traverse the middle portion of Nueva
Era.Marcos further claims that it is entitled not only to the middle portion of Nueva Era but also to its
northern portion which, as a consequence, was isolated from the major part of Nueva Era.
11. The Court cannot accept the contentions of Marcos. Only Dingras is specifically named by law as source
territory of Marcos. Hence, the said description of boundaries of Marcos is descriptive only of the listed
barangays of Dingras as a compact and contiguous territory.Considering that the description of the
eastern boundary of Marcos under R.A. No. 3753 is ambiguous, the same must be interpreted in light of
the legislative intent.The law must be given a reasonable interpretation, to preclude absurdity in its
application. We thus uphold the legislative intent to create Marcos out of the territory of Dingras only.
12. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is partly REVERSED. The
Decision of the Regional Trial Court in Ilocos Norte is Reinstated.
25.
FACTS:
At the time the decedent met the vehicular accident on September 12, 1961, which led to his death 16
days later, the claimant-widow was not yet married to the decedent although they had already been living
together as husband and wife for the past 3 months. However, on the day following the accident, they were
lawfully wedded. The claimant widow gave birth on April 8, 1962, to the posthumous daughter of the deceased,
Racquel.
ISSUE:
W/N the widow and posthumous child are considered dependents under the Workmen’s Compensation
Act.
HELD:
Yes. According to the Workmen’s Compensation Act, a widow living with the deceased or actually
dependent upon him totally or partly as well as her daughter, if under 18 years of age or incapable of supporting
herself, and unmarried, whether or not actually dependent on the deceased are considered dependents.
Although not his wife at the time of the accident but at the time of his death, are still considered dependents
under the Act.
LATIN MAXIM:
6c, 7a, 9c, 12a, 37
FACTS:
Five siblings inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of land registered in the name of their
deceased parents. Two siblings sold their share to the same vendee. By virtue of such agreements, the
Petitioners occupied after the said sales, 2/5 of the lot, representing the portions bought. They subsequently
enclosed their portion with a fence and built a semi-concrete house. One of the sisters filed a complaint invoking
the right to redeem the area sold. The trial court dismissed this complaint because the time had lapsed, not
having been exercised within 30 days from notice of the sales.
ISSUE:
1. W/N there was a valid notice.
2. W/N Art. 1088 of the Civil Code was interpreted correctly.
HELD:
Although there was no written notice, there was actual knowledge of the sales satisfying the requirement
of the law. It is unbelievable that the co-heirs were unaware of the sale, with the erection of a permanent semi-
concrete structure. While Art. 1088 of the Civil Code stresses the need for a written notice of sale; the Petitioners
claimed that because there was no written notice, despite their obvious knowledge of it, the 30-day period for
redemption had not yet begun. The intent of the lawmakers was to ensure that the redemptioner was properly
notified of the sale and to indicate the date of such notice as the starting time of the 30- day period of
redemption. The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales although no notice in writing was
given to them.
LATIN MAXIM:
1, 8, 9a, 10, 11d, 11e, 12a, 17
Latin Maxims
Chapter II – CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION
B. POWER TO CONSTRUE
C. CONTEMPORARY CONSTRUCTION
11. Interpretatio talis in ambiguis simper fienda est ut evitetur inconveniens et absurdum.
Where there is ambiguity, the interpretation of such that will avoid inconveniences and absurdity is to be
adopted.
Legis construction non facit injuriam.
The construction of the law will not be such as to work injury or injustice.
Argumentum ab inconvenient plurimum valet in lege.
An argument drawn from inconvenience is forcible in law.
Verba nihil operari melius est quam absurde.
It is better that words should have no operation at all than that they should operate absurdly.
Lex simper intendit quod convenit rationi.
The law always intends that which is in accordance with reason.
Ubi eadem ratio ibi idem jus.
Like reason doth make like law.
Argumentum a simili valet in lege.
An argument drawn from a similar case, or analogy, prevails in law.
De similibus idem est judicium.
Concerning similars, the judgment is the same.
14. Jurae naturae aequum est neminem cum alterius detrimento et injuria fieri locupletiorem.
It is certainly not agreeable to natural justice that a stranger should reap the pecuniary produce of
another man’s work.
17. Ibi quid generaliter conceditur, inest haec exception, si non aliquid sit contras jus basque.
Where anything is granted generally, exemption from rigid application of law is implied; that nothing shall
be contrary to law and right.
C. IMPLICATIONS
A. IN GENERAL
B. ASSOCIATED WORDS
233
A. IN GENERAL
A. MANDATORY STATUTES
A. IN GENERAL
A. REPEAL
B. In obscuris inspici solere quod versimilius est, aut quod plerumque fieri solet.
When matters are obscure, it is customary to take what appears to be more likely or what usually often
happens.
Ambiguitas verborum patens nulla verificatione excluditur.
A patent ambiguity cannot be cleared up by extrinsic evidence.