PEOPLE v.

DICTO ARPA & MAALUM ARPA

G.R. No. L-26789, 25 April 1969, Supreme court EN BANC, (Teehankee, J.)

FACTS
Dicto Arpa and Maalum Arpa having boarded a motor banca named "MAMI I", owned by Epimaco Mola
together with other passengers bound for Talicud Island, Davao.

Once the motor banca was in the middle of the sea and when it developed engine trouble, the accused
Dicto Arpa firing his .22 cal. revolver to scare the passengers of the banca, and fired at one of the passengers,
hitting the said passenger at the right shoulder. Then, they took and carried away the said motor banca "MAMI
I". Because of the jumping into the sea of all the passengers of the motor banca, Alfonso Villegas, Bernardo
Villegas and Lourdes Villegas, all passengers of the motor banca were drowned and died.

The trial court convicted the accused of Robbery with Triple Homicide crediting them with the
mitigating circumstance of their voluntary plea of guilty, but rejecting the claimed mitigating circumstance of
lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong. Also, the Court found two aggravating circumstances: (1) the crime
was committed in an uninhabited place; (2) the crime is committed on the occasion of conflagration, shipwreck,
earthquake, epidemic or other calamity or misfortune, i.e. engine trouble. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:
1. Should the 2 aggravating circumstances appreciated by the trial court be credited against the accused?
2. Should the court recognize the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong?

RULING:
Only the aggravating circumstance of having the crime committed in an uninhabited place should be
credited against the accused.

The Court hold that the trial court correctly held that the crime committed was attended by the
aggravating circumstance of uninhabited place…Once it was in the middle of the sea and when it developed
engine trouble, with one of them firing revolver shots to forestall any resistance, certainly cannot disclaim that
they sought the isolation of the sea to attain their criminal objective without interference.

The development of engine trouble at sea is a misfortune, but it does not come within the context of the
phrase "other calamity or misfortune" as used in Article 14, paragraph 7 of the Revised Penal Code, which refer
to other conditions of distress similar to those precedingly enumerated therein, namely, "configuration,
shipwreck, earthquake, epidemic"…The reason for the provision of this aggravating circumstance "is found in
the debased form of criminality met in one who, in the midst of a great calamity, instead of lending aid to the
afflicted adds to their suffering by taking advantage of their misfortune to despoil them."

Clearly, no such condition of great calamity or misfortune existed when the motor banca developed
engine trouble. It should be added that there is nothing in the record whatever to indicate that the engine
trouble developed was a serious one such as to create confusion and apprehension on the part of the
passengers.

The mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that committed should not be
applied in this case.

The Court holds also against the accused's claim of a second mitigating circumstance of lack of intent
to commit so grave a wrong. The trial court correctly held that this circumstance could not properly be
appreciated in favor of the accused viewed from the nature and gravity of the offense committed.

The lower court then sentenced each of the accused to the penalty of death and order both, jointly and
severally, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Alfonso Villegas, Bernardo Villegas and Lourdes Villegas in the
amount of P6,000.00 for each of them, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency due to the
penalty imposed, and to indemnify Epimaco Mola in the sum of P2,100.00, and to pay the costs proportionately
but modified later on due to the Automatic review of the Court of the death penalty imposed by the trial court
on the accused for the crime of Robbery with Triple Homicide.
Nevertheless, We, the Supreme Court feel constrained to add that in reviewing the records of the case, we were
struck with the paucity of facts and evidence attending the commission of the crime other than those stated in
the information and other circumstances that would aid the Court in its ordained task of passing en consulta
upon the legality and propriety of the death penalty imposed by the trial court, e. g. the age and education or
lack thereof of the accused, and whether there were other passengers who survived, aside from the three
persons named in the information as having drowned, as well as what the crew did, if anything, during the
commission of the crime. Were it not for the conclusion here reached of imposing .the lesser penalty of
reclusion perpetua, by virtue of our disallowance of the additional aggravating circumstance of calamity or
misfortune found by the trial court, we might have been constrained to remand the case for new trial to the
court a quo in order to satisfy ourselves as to the degree of culpability of the accused in relation to the death
penalty imposed, especially since the information did not expressly designate as such the aggravating
circumstances found by the trial court and there was no discussion nor spelling out thereof whatever in the
eight-page transcript of the entire proceedings. We therefore reiterate the rule of practice recommended since
the early cases of U. S. vs. Talbanos[16] and U. S. vs. Rota,[17] set out in Rule 118, section 5 of the Rules of Court,[18]
and thereafter suggested in number of cases, lastly, in the case of People vs. Bulalake,[19] where this Court said:
"It is of course true that the taking of such evidence is a matter left to the discretion of the trial court. Never-
theless, inasmuch as judgments of conviction imposing the extreme penalty of death are subject to review by
the Supreme Court as law and justice shall dictate, whether the defendant appeals or not, which automatic
review neither the Court nor the accused could waive or evade it would seem that the proper and prudent
course to follow where the accused enters a plea of 'guilty' to capital offenses specially where he is an ignorant
person with little or no education, is to take testimony not only to satisfy the trial judge himself but to aid the
Supreme Court in determining whether the accused really and truly understood and comprehended the
meaning, full significance and consequences of his plea."

WHEREFORE, the decision under review is modified: the accused are imposed the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and ordered, jointly and severally, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Alfonso Villegas, Bernardo
Villegas and Lourdes Villegas, in the amount of P12,000.00 for each of them, and Epimaco Mola in the sum of
P2,100.00, and proportionately, to pay the costs.