PIMENTEL V. OFFICE OF EXEC. SEC.

FACTS:
- Petitioners filed the instant petition to compel the respondents the Office of the
Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed
text of the treaty to the Senate of the Philippines for ratification. (in accordance
with Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution)
- The Rome Statute established the International Criminal Court which shall have
the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of
international concern xxx and shall be complementary to the national criminal
jurisdictions. Crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and
the crime of aggression as defined in the Statute.
-The Philippines signed the Statute on December 28, 2000 through ​Charge d
Affairs​ Enrique A. Manalo of the Philippine Mission to the United Nations.
- It is the theory of the petitioners that ratification of a treaty, under both domestic
law and international law, is a function of the Senate. Hence, it is the duty of the
executive department to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute to the
Senate. Moreover, petitioners submit that the Philippines has a ministerial duty to
ratify the Rome Statute under treaty law and customary international law.
Petitioners invoke the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties enjoining the
states to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty
when they have signed the treaty prior to ratification unless they have made their
intention clear not to become parties to the treaty.
-OSG questioned the standing of the petitioners to file the suit. It also contended
the petition violates the rule on hierarchy of courts.
-On the substantive issue raised by petitioners, respondents argue that the
executive department has no duty to transmit the Rome Statute to the Senate for
concurrence.

ISSUE:
1) WON the petitioners have legal standing in filing the suit.
2) Whether the Executive Secretary and the DFA have a ​ministerial​ duty to
transmit to the Senate the copy of the Rome Statute signed by a member
of the Philippine Mission to the United Nations even without the signature
of the President.

HELD:
1) Among the petitioners, only Senator Pimentel has the legal standing.
It has been held that to the extent the powers of Congress are impaired,
so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to
participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution
Thus, legislators have the standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives,
powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office and are
allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which they
claim infringes their prerogatives as legislators.
The petition at bar invokes the power of the Senate to grant or withhold its
concurrence to a treaty entered into by the executive branch, in this case,
the Rome Statute.
The petition seeks to order the executive branch to transmit the copy of
the treaty to the Senate to allow it to exercise such authority. Senator
Pimentel, as member of the institution, certainly has the legal standing to
assert such authority of the Senate.

2) NO. In our system of government, the President, being the head of state,
is regarded as the sole organ and authority in external relations and is the
countrys sole representative with foreign nations. Although, Constitution
provides a limitation to his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all
the members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty entered into by
him. Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that no treaty
or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in
by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.

Petitioners submission that the Philippines is bound under treaty law and
international law to ratify the treaty which it has signed is without basis. The
signature does not signify the final consent of the state to the treaty. It is the
ratification that binds the state to the provisions thereof. In fact, the Rome
Statute itself requires that the signature of the representatives of the states be
subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the signatory states. After the
treaty is signed by the states representative, the President, being accountable
to the people, is burdened with the responsibility and the duty to carefully
study the contents of the treaty and ensure that they are not inimical to the
interest of the state and its people. Thus, the President has the discretion
even after the signing of the treaty by the Philippine representative whether or
not to ratify the same. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties does
not contemplate to defeat or even restrain this power of the head of states.
Under our Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in the President,
subject to the concurrence of the Senate. The role of the Senate, however, is
limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the
ratification. The Court, therefore, cannot issue the writ of ​mandamus ​prayed
for by the petitioners as it is beyond its jurisdiction to compel the executive
 branch of the government to transmit the signed text of Rome Statute to the
Senate.

FABIAN V. DESIERTO

Facts: Petitioner Teresita Fabian was the major stockholder and President of
PROMAT Construction Development Corporation which was engaged in the
construction business. Private respondent Nestor Agustin was the District
Engineer of the First Metro Manila Engineering District. PROMAT participated in
the bidding for government construction projects, and private respondent,
reportedly taking advantage of his official position, inveigled petitioner into an
amorous relationship. Their affair lasted for some time, in the course of which,
private respondent gifted PROMAT with public works contracts and interceded
for it in problems concerning the same in his office. When petitioner tried to
terminate their relationship, private respondent refused and resisted her attempts
to do so to the extent of employing acts of harassment, intimidation and threats.
Petitioner filed an administrative complaint against private respondent.

Ombudsman found private respondent guilty of misconduct and meted out the
penalty of suspension without pay for 1 year. After private respondent moved for
reconsideration, the Ombudsman discovered that the private respondent’s new
counsel had been his classmate and close associate, hence, he inhibited himself.
The case was transferred to respondent Deputy Ombudsman who exonerated
private respondent from the administrative charges. Petitioner appealed to the
SC by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Issue: Whether or not Section 27 of RA 6770 which provides for appeals in

administrative disciplinary cases from the Office of the Ombudsman to the SC in
accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is valid

Held: The revised Rules of Civil Procedure preclude appeals from quasi-judicial
agencies to the SC via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Under
the present Rule 45, appeals may be brought through a petition for review on
certiorari but only from judgments and final orders of the courts enumerated in
Sec. 1 thereof. Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial
agencies are now required to be brought to the CA on a verified petition for
review, under the requirements and conditions in Rule 43 which was precisely
formulated and adopted to provide for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for
quasi-judicial agencies.
 Section 27 of RA 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to the SC from
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It
consequently violates the proscription in Sec. 30, Art. VI of the Constitution
against a law which increases the appellate jurisdiction of the SC.

Abbas vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal

G.R. No. 83767 October 27, 1988
Gancayco, J;

FACTS:
On October 9, 1987, the petitioners filed before the respondent Tribunal
an election contest against 22 candidates of the LABAN coalition who were
proclaimed senators-elect in the May 11, 1987 congressional elections by the
Commission on Elections.
The respondent Tribunal was at the time composed of three (3) Justices of
the Supreme Court and six (6) Senators, namely: Senior Associate Justice Pedro
L. Yap (Chairman). Associate Justices Andres R. Narvasa and Hugo E.
Gutierrez, Jr., and Senators Joseph E. Estrada, Neptali A. Gonzales, Teofisto T.
Guingona, Jose Lina, Jr., Mamintal A.J. Tamano and Victor S. Ziga.
On November 17, 1987, the petitioners, with the exception of Senator
Estrada but including Senator Juan Ponce Enrile (who had been designated
Member of the Tribunal replacing Senator Estrada, the latter having affiliated with
the Liberal Party and resigned as the Opposition’s representative in the Tribunal)
filed with the respondent Tribunal a Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition of the
Senators-Members thereof from the hearing and resolution of SET Case No.
002-87 on the ground that all of them are interested parties to said case, as
respondents therein. Before that, Senator Rene A.V. Saguisag, one of the
respondents in the same case, had filed a Petition to Recuse and later a
Supplemental Petition to Recuse the same Senators-Members of the Tribunal on
essentially the same ground. Senator Vicente T. Paterno, another respondent in
the same contest, thereafter filed his comments on both the petitions to recuse
and the motion for disqualification or inhibition. Memoranda on the subject were
also filed and oral arguments were heard by the respondent Tribunal, with the
latter afterwards issuing the Resolutions now complained of.
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile in the meantime had voluntarily inhibited
himself from participating in the hearings and deliberations of the respondent
Tribunal in both SET Case No. 002-87 and SET Case No. 001-87, the latter
being another contest filed by Augusto S. Sanchez against him and Senator
Santanina T. Rasul as alternative respondents, citing his personal involvement
as a party in the two cases. Abbas vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal, 166 SCRA 651,
No. L-83767 October 27, 1988
The petitioners, in essence, argue that considerations of public policy and
the norms of fair play and due process imperatively require the mass
disqualification sought and that the doctrine of necessity which they perceive to
be the foundation of the questioned Resolutions does not rule out a solution both
practicable and constitutionally unobjectionable, namely; the amendment of the
respondent Tribunal’s Rules of procedure so as to permit the contest being
decided by only three Members of the Tribunal.

The proposed amendment to the Tribunal’s Rules (Section 24)—requiring

the concurrence of five (5) members for the adoption of resolutions of whatever
nature—is a proviso that where more than four (4) members are disqualified, the
remaining members shall constitute a quorum, if not less than three (3) including
one (1) Justice, and may adopt resolutions by majority vote with no abstentions.
Obviously tailored to fit the situation created by the petition for disqualification,
this would, in the context of that situation, leave the resolution of the contest to
the only three Members who would remain, all Justices of this Court, whose
disqualification is not sought.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Section 17 of Article VI clearly mandates the participation
in the same process of decision of a representative/s of the Supreme
Court and;

2. Whether or not the SET cannot legally function as such, absent its entire
membership of Senators and no amendment of its Rules can confer on
the three Justices-Members alone the power of valid adjudication of a
senatorial election contest.

RULINGS:
1. The Court considered it quite clear to them that in thus providing for a
Tribunal to be staffed by both Justices of the Supreme Court and
Members of the Senate, the Constitution intended that both those
“Judicial” and “legislative” components commonly share the duty and
authority of deciding all contests relating to the election, returns and
 qualifications of Senators. The respondent Tribunal correctly stated one
part of this proposition when it held that said provision “x x x is a clear
expression of an intent that all (such) contests x x x shall be resolved by a
panel or body in which their (the Senators’) peers in that Chamber are
represented.” The other part, of course, is that the constitutional provision
just as clearly mandates the participation in the same process of decision
of a representative or representatives of the Supreme Court.

2. The Court reminded us not be misunderstood as saying that no

Senator-Member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal may inhibit or disqualify
himself from sitting in judgment on any case before said Tribunal. Every
Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience.

Sarmiento vs. Mison

G.R. No. 79974 December 17, 1987
Padilla, J;

FACTS:
The petitioners, who are taxpayers, lawyers, members of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and professors of Constitutional Law, seek to enjoin the
respondent Salvador Mison from performing the functions of the Office of
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and the respondent Guillermo Carague,
as Secretary of the Department of Budget, from effecting disbursements in
payment of Mison's salaries and emoluments, on the ground that Mison's
appointment as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by
reason of its not having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.
The respondents, on the other hand, maintain the constitutionality of respondent
Mison's appointment without the confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the confirmation of the appointment of Commissioners of
Bureau of Customs by the Commission on Appointments not required;
2. Whether or not the appointment of respondent Mison by the President as
the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs without submitting his
nomination to the Commission on Appointment is within the constitutional
authority of the President of the Philippines

HELD:
 1. Coming now to the immediate question before the Court, it is evident that
the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is
not one of those within the first group of appointments where the consent
of the Commission on Appointment.

2. Appointments is required. As a matter of fact, as already pointed out, while

the 1935 Constitution includes "heads of bureaus" among those officers
whose appointments need the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, the 1987 Constitution, on the other hand, deliberately
excluded the position of "heads of bureaus" from appointments that need
the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.
Sarmiento III vs. Mison, 156 SCRA 549, No. L-79974 December 17, 1987
Consequently, the Court ruled that that the President of the Philippines
acted within her constitutional authority and power in appointing
respondent Salvador Mison, Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs,
without submitting his nomination to the Commission on Appointments for
confirmation. He is thus entitled to exercise the full authority and functions
of the of fice and to receive all the salaries and emoluments pertaining
thereto.

TAN vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 73155 July 11, 1986

FACTS​:
This case was prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885, An Act
Creating a New Province in the Island of Negros to be known as the Province of
Negros del Norte, effective Dec. 3, 1985. (Cities of Silay, Cadiz and San Carlos
and the municipalities of Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla,
Victorias, E.R. Magalona, and Salvador Benedicto proposed to belong to the new
province).
Pursuant to and in implementation of this law, the COMELEC scheduled a
plebiscite for January 3, 1986. Petitioners opposed, filing a case for Prohibition
and contending that the B.P. 885 is unconstitutional and not in complete accord
with the Local Government Code because:
• The voters of the parent province of Negros Occidental, other than those living
within the territory of the new province of Negros del Norte, were not included in
the plebiscite.
• The area which would comprise the new province of Negros del Norte would
only be about 2,856.56 sq. km., which is lesser than the minimum area
prescribed by the governing statute, Sec. 197 of LGC.

ISSUE​:
WON the plebiscite was legal and complied with the constitutional requisites of
the Consititution, which states that — “Sec. 3. No province, city, municipality or
barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially
altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the Local
Government Code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a
plebiscite in the unit or units affected”? NO.

HELD​:
Whenever a province is created, divided or merged and there is substantial
alteration of the boundaries, “the approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite
in the unit or units affected” must first be obtained. The creation of the proposed
new province of Negros del Norte will necessarily result in the division and
alteration of the existing boundaries of Negros Occidental (parent province).
Plain and simple logic will demonstrate that two political units would be affected.
The first would be the parent province of Negros Occidental because its
boundaries would be substantially altered. The other affected entity would be
composed of those in the area subtracted from the mother province to constitute
the proposed province of Negros del Norte.
Paredes vs. Executive (G.R. No. 55628) should not be taken as a doctrinal or
compelling precedent. Rather, the dissenting view of Justice Abad Santos is
applicable, to wit:
“…when the Constitution speaks of “the unit or units affected” it means all of the
people of the municipality if the municipality is to be divided such as in the case
at bar or of the people of two or more municipalities if there be a merger.”
The remaining portion of the parent province is as much an area affected. The
substantial alteration of the boundaries of the parent province, not to mention the
adverse economic effects it might suffer, eloquently argue the points raised by
the petitioners.”
SC pronounced that the plebscite has no legal effect for being a patent nullity.

Ulpiano Sarmiento III vs Salvador Mison

G.R. No. 79974 December 17, 1987

FACTS:
This is the 1st major case under the 1987 Constitution. In 1987, Salvador Mison
was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs by then president
Corazon Aquino. Ulpiano Sarmiento III and Juanito Arcilla, being members of the
bar, taxpayers, and professors of constitutional law questioned the appointment
of Mison because it appears that Mison’s appointment was not submitted to the
Commission on Appointments (COA) for approval. Sarmiento insists that uner
the new Constitution, heads of bureaus require the confirmation of the COA.

Meanwhile, Sarmiento also sought to enjoin Guillermo Carague, the then

Secretary of the Department of Budget, from disbursing the salary payments of
Mison due to the unconstitutionality of Mison’s appointment.

ISSUE​: Whether or not the appointment of “heads of bureaus” needed

confirmation by the Commission on Appointment.

HELD​: No. In the 1987 Constitution, the framers removed “heads of bureaus” as
one of those officers needing confirmation by the Commission on Appointment.
Under the 1987 Constitution, there are four (4) groups of officers whom the
President shall appoint. These four (4) groups are:

First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public

ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or
naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution;

Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;

Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest
in the President alone.

The first group above are the only public officers appointed by the president
which require confirmation by the COA. The second, third, and fourth group do
not require confirmation by the COA. The position of Mison as the head of the
Bureau of Customs does not belong to the first group hence he does not need to
be confirmed by the COA.