(Sgd.) JOKER P.
ARROYO
1. EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 200
PROVIDING FOR THE PUBLICATION OF LAWS EITHER IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE OR IN A
NEWSPAPER OF GENERAL CIRCULATION IN THE PHILIPPINES AS A REQUIREMENT FOR
THEIR EFFECTIVITY.
WHEREAS, Article 2 of the Civil Code partly provides that “laws shall take effect after fifteen days following
the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided x x x;”
WHEREAS, the requirement that for laws to be effective only a publication thereof in the Official Gazette will
suffice has entailed some problems, a point recognized by the Supreme Court in Tañada, et al. vs. Tuvera, et al.
(G.R. No. 63915, December 29, 1986), when it observed that “[t]here is much to be said of the view that the
publication need not be made in the Official Gazette, considering its erratic release and limited readership;”
WHEREAS, it was likewise observed that “[u]ndoubtedly, newspapers of general circulation could better perform
the function of communicating the laws to the people as such periodicals are more easily available, have a wider
readership, and come out regularly;” and
WHEREAS, in view of the foregoing premises Article 2 of the Civil Code should accordingly be amended so the
laws to be effective must be published either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in
the country;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in
me by the Constitution, do hereby order:
SECTION 1. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication either in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided.
SEC. 2. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the “Civil Code of the Philippines,” and all other
laws inconsistent with this Executive Order are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
SEC. 3. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately after its publication in the Official Gazette.
Done in the City of Manila, this 18th day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and eighty-seven.
(Sgd.) CORAZON C. AQUINO
President of the Philippines
By the President:
Executive Secretary
Source: Presidential Management Staff
Office of the President of the Philippines. (1987). [Executive Order Nos. : 171-390]. Manila : Presidential
Management Staff.
2. People vs. Verdiano, G.R. No. L-62243 October 12, 1984
[G.R. No. L-62243. October 12, 1984.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. HON. REGINO VERIDIANO II, as Presiding Judge of
the Court of First Instance of Zambales and Olongapo City, Branch I, and BENITO GO BIO,
JR., Respondents.
The Solicitor General for Petitioner.
Anacleto T . Lacanilao, Jr. and Carmelino M. Roque for Private Respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; EFFECTIVITY OF LAW; RECKONED
FROM DATE OF OFFICIAL RELEASE NOT ON PRINTED DATE OF ISSUE OF OFFICIAL GAZETTE
WHERE PUBLISHED; CASE AT BAR. — The Solicitor General admitted the certification issued by Ms.
Charito A. Mangubat, Copy Editor of the Official Gazette Section of the Government Printing Office, stating —
This is to certify that Volume 75, No. 15 of the Official Gazette was officially released for circulation on June
14, 1979" (p. 138, Rollo). It is therefore, certain that the penal statute in question was made public only on June
14, 1979 and not on the printed date April 9, 1979. Differently stated, June 14, 1979 was the date of publication
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. Before the public may be bound by its contents especially its penal provisions,
the law must be published and the people officially informed of its contents and/or its penalties. For, if a statute
had not been published before its violation, then in the eyes of the law there was no such law to be violated and,
consequently, the accused could not have committed the alleged crime.
2. ID.; ID.; TERM "PUBLICATION" IN EFFECTIVITY CLAUSE OF BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 22
GIVEN ORDINARY ACCEPTED MEANING. — The effectivity clause of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22
specifically states that "This Act shall take effect fifteen days after publication in the Official Gazette." The term
"publication" in such clause should be given the ordinary accepted meaning, that is, to make known to the
people in general. If the Batasang Pambansa had intended to make the printed date of issue of the Gazette as the
point of reference in determining the effectivity of the statute in question, then it could have so stated in the
special effectivity provision of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22.
3. CRIMINAL LAW; BOUNCING CHECKS LAW; PROSPECTIVE OPERATION. — When private
respondent Go Bio, Jr. committed the act, complained of in the Information as criminal, in May 1979, there was
then no law penalizing such act. Following the special provision of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, it became
effective only on June 29 1979. As a matter of fact, in May 1979, there was no law to be violated and,
consequently, respondent Go Bio, Jr. did not commit any violation thereof.
4. ID.; ID.; PENALIZES ACT OF MAKING OR DRAWING AND ISSUANCE OF BOUNCING CHECK,
NOT ONLY FACT OF DISHONOR. — With respect to the allegation of petitioner that the offense was
committed on September 26, 1979 when the check was presented for encashment and was dishonored by the
bank, suffice it to say that the law penalizes the act of making or drawing and issuance of a bouncing check and
not only the fact of its dishonor. The title of the law itself states: "AN ACT PENALIZING THE MAKING OR
DRAWING AND ISSUANCE OF A CHECK WITHOUT SUFFICIENT FUNDS OR CREDIT AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES."
DECISION
RELOVA, J.:
Private respondent Benito Go Bio, Jr. was charged with violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 in Criminal
Case No. 5396 in the then Court of First Instance of Zambales, presided by respondent judge. The information
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That on or about and during the second week of May 1979, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, guaranteeing the authenticity and
genuineness of the same and with intent to defraud one Filipinas Tan by means of false pretenses and
pretending to have sufficient funds deposited in the Bank of the Philippine Island, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously make and issue Bank of Philippine Island Check No. D-357726 in the amount of
P200,000.00 Philippine Currency, said accused well knowing that he has no sufficient funds at the Bank of the
Philippine Island and upon presentation of the said check to the bank for encashment, the same was dishonored
for the reason that the said accused has no sufficient funds with the said bank and despite repeated demands
made by Filipinas Tan on the accused to redeem the said check or pay the amount of P200,000.00, said accused
failed and continues to fail to redeem the said check or to pay the said amount, to the damage and prejudice of
said Filipinas Tan in the aforementioned amount of P200,000.00 Philippine Currency." (pp. 23-24, Rollo)
Before he could be arraigned respondent Go Bio, Jr. filed a Motion to Quash the information on the ground that
the information did not charge an offense, pointing out that at the alleged commission of the offense, which was
about the second week of May 1979, Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 has not yet taken effect.
The prosecution opposed the motion contending, among others, that the date of the dishonor of the check, which
is on September 26, 1979, is the date of the commission of the offense; and that assuming that the effectivity of
the law — Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 — is on June 29, 1979, considering that the offense was committed on
September 26, 1979, the said law is applicable.
In his reply, private respondent Go Bio, Jr. submits that what Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 penalizes is not the fact
of the dishonor of the check but the act of making or drawing and issuing a check without sufficient funds or
credit.
Resolving the motion, respondent judge granted the same and cancelled the bail bond of the accused. In its
order of August 23, 1982, respondent judge said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The Court finds merit to the contention that the accused cannot be held liable for bouncing checks prior to the
effectivity of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 although the check may have matured after the effectivity of the said
law. No less than the Minister of Justice decreed that the date of the drawing or making and issuance of the
bouncing check is the date to reckon with and not on the date of the maturity of the check. (Resolution No. 67,
S. 1981, People’s Car v. Eduardo N. Tan, Feb. 3, 1981; Resolution No. 192, S. 1981, Ricardo de Guia v.
Agapito Miranda, March 20, 1981).
"Hence, the Court believes that although the accused can be prosecuted for swindling (Estafa, Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code), the Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 cannot be given a retroactive effect to apply to the above
entitled case." (pp. 49-50, Rollo).
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner submitting for review respondent judge’s dismissal of
the criminal action against private respondent Go Bio, Jr. for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, otherwise
known as the Bouncing Checks Law.chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
Petitioner contends that Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 was published in the April 9, 1979 issue of the Official
Gazette. Fifteen (15) days therefrom would be April 24, 1979, or several days before respondent Go Bio, Jr.
issued the questioned check around the second week of May 1979; and that respondent judge should not have
taken into account the date of release of the Gazette for circulation because Section 11 of the Revised
Administrative Code provides that for the purpose of ascertaining the date of effectivity of a law that needed
publication, "the Gazette is conclusively presumed to be published on the day indicated therein as the date of
issue."cralaw virtua1aw library
Private respondent Go Bio, Jr. argues that although Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 was published in the Official
Gazette issue of April 9, 1979, nevertheless, the same was released only on June 14, 1979 and, considering that
the questioned check was issued about the second week of May 1979, then he could not have violated Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 because it was not yet released for circulation at the time.
We uphold the dismissal by the respondent judge of the criminal action against the private Respondent.
The Solicitor General admitted the certification issued by Ms. Charito A. Mangubat, Copy Editor of the Official
Gazette Section of the Government Printing Office, stating —
"This is to certify that Volume 75, No. 15, of the April 9, 1979 issue of the Official Gazette was officially
released for circulation on June 14, 1979." (p. 138, Rollo)
It is therefore, certain that the penal statute in question was made public only on June 14, 1979 and not on the
printed date April 9, 1979. Differently stated, June 14, 1979 was the date of publication of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22. Before the public may be bound by its contents especially its penal provisions, the law must be
published and the people officially informed of its contents and/or its penalties. For, if a statute had not been Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Gutierrez, Jr. and De la Fuente, JJ., concur.
published before its violation, then in the eyes of the law there was no such law to be violated and,
consequently, the accused could not have committed the alleged crime. Separate Opinions

The effectivity clause of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 specifically states that "This Act shall take effect fifteen
days after publication in the Official Gazette." The term "publication" in such clause should be given the TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
ordinary accepted meaning, that is, to make known to the people in general. If the Batasang Pambansa had
intended to make the printed date of issue of the Gazette as the point of reference in determining the effectivity I concur on the ground that actual publication of the penal law is indispensable for its effectivity (Pesigan v.
of the statute in question, then it could have so stated in the special effectivity provision of Batas Pambansa Angeles, 129 SCRA 174).
Bilang 22.

When private respondent Go Bio, Jr. committed the act, complained of in the Information as criminal, in May
1979, there was then no law penalizing such act. Following the special provision of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, 3. Tanada vs Tuvera, G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985
it became effective only on June 29, 1979. As a matter of fact, in May 1979, there was no law to be violated
and, consequently, respondent Go Bio, Jr. did not commit any violation thereof.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law
Republic of the Philippines
library
SUPREME COURT
Manila
With respect to the allegation of petitioner that the offense was committed on September 26, 1979 when the
check was presented for encashment and was dishonored by the bank, suffice it to say that the law penalizes the
act of making or drawing and issuance of a bouncing check and not only the fact of its dishonor. The title of the EN BANC
law itself states:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985
"AN ACT PENALIZING THE MAKING OR DRAWING AND ISSUANCE OF A CHECK WITHOUT
SUFFICIENT FUNDS OR CREDIT AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES."cralaw virtua1aw library LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR
BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners,
and, Sections 1 and 2 of said Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 provide:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN
"SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient funds. — Any person who makes or draws and issues any check to VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA
apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds . . . shall be CRUZ, in his capacity as Director, Malacañang Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his
punished . . . . capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing, respondents.

"The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who, having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank when he makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to
cover the full amount of the check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing
thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank. ESCOLIN, J.:

x x x Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article
IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be
published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to
"SECTION 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. — The making, drawing and issuance of a check compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various
payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds . . . ." (Emphasis supplied) presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of
implementation and administrative orders.
ACCORDINGLY, the order of respondent judge dated August 23, 1982 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:
SO ORDERED.
 a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200, 234, 265,
286, 298, 303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404, 406, 415, 427, 429,
445, 447, 473, 486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718,
731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961, 1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143,
1165, 1166, 1242, 1246, 1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-1817, 1819-
1826, 1829-1840, 1842-1847.
b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153, 155,
161, 173, 180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213, 215-224, 226-228, 231-
239, 241-245, 248, 251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-289, 291, 293, 297-299,
301-303, 309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386, 396-
397, 405, 438-440, 444- 445, 473, 486, 488, 498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599, 600,
602, 609, 610, 611, 612, 615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881, 882,
939-940, 964,997,1149-1178,1180-1278.
c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.
d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529, 1532,
1535, 1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600, 1606-1609, 1612-
1628, 1630-1649, 1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737-1742, 1744, 1746-
1751, 1752, 1754, 1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800, 1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-
1814, 1816, 1825-1826, 1829, 1831-1832, 1835-1836, 1839-1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847,
1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866, 1868, 1870, 1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952,
1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-2028, 2030-2044, 2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244.
e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494-507, 509-510,
522, 524-528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-568, 570, 574, 593,
594, 598-604, 609, 611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-786, 788-852, 854-857.
f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92, 94,
95, 107, 120, 122, 123.
g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439.
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the ground that
petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is submitted that in the
absence of any showing that petitioners are personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-
publication of the presidential issuances in question 2 said petitioners are without the requisite legal personality
to institute this mandamus proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties" within the meaning of Section 3,
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which we quote:
SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from
an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use a rd enjoyment of a
right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition
in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
commanding the defendant, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act
required to be done to Protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by
the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant.
Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its
object is to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific interest for their petition
to be given due course.
The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs. Governor
General, 3 this Court held that while the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to a private
individual only in those cases where he has some private or particular interest to be subserved, or some
particular right to be protected, independent of that which he holds with the public at large," and "it is for the
public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are to be subserved [Mithchell vs. Boardmen,
79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless, "when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to
procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at
whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the
result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws [High,
Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].
Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as a proper party to the
mandamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor General to call a special election for the position of
municipal president in the town of Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent
said:
We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the proposition that the
relator is a proper party to proceedings of this character when a public right is sought to be
enforced. If the general rule in America were otherwise, we think that it would not be
applicable to the case at bar for the reason 'that it is always dangerous to apply a general rule
to a particular case without keeping in mind the reason for the rule, because, if under the
particular circumstances the reason for the rule does not exist, the rule itself is not applicable
and reliance upon the rule may well lead to error'
No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by counsel for
the respondent. The circumstances which surround this case are different from those in the
United States, inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to these proceedings no other
person could be, as we have seen that it is not the duty of the law officer of the Government to
appear and represent the people in cases of this character.
The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the aforementioned case
apply squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public
right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute this
proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate the same, considering that the
Solicitor General, the government officer generally empowered to represent the people, has entered his
appearance for respondents in this case.
Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the
effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that
since the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect,
publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on
Article 2 of the Civil Code:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication
in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...
The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said article. In a long line of
decisions,4 this Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the
legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of publication is material for
determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law
itself provides for the date when it goes into effect.
Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with the
fact of publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is
easily reached that said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even
if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides as
follows:
Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legisiative acts
and resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive and
administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability; [3]
decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may be
deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such documents or
classes of documents as may be required so to be published by law; and [5] such documents
or classes of documents as the President of the Philippines shall determine from time to time
to have general applicability and legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be published. ...
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws
which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be
no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to
punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not
even a constructive one.
Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws taken so vital
significance that at this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed
solely by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and deliberations in
the Batasan Pambansa—and for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative records—no such publicity
accompanies the law-making process of the President. Thus, without publication, the people have no means of
knowing what presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing
themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la
denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones,
Circulares y Reales ordines dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad. 5
The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in the Official
Gazette ... ." The word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty
must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern is to be
given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette. Such
listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded
from such publication.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by
law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or
otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other
presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and
executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned. 6
It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general
applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he
must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. As Justice Claudio Teehankee said in Peralta
vs. COMELEC 7:
In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form part of the
law of the land, the requirement of due process and the Rule of Law demand that the Official
Gazette as the official government repository promulgate and publish the texts of all such
decrees, orders and instructions so that the people may know where to obtain their official and
specific contents.
The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published,
shall have no force and effect. Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling
effect this decision might have on acts done in reliance of the validity of those presidential decrees which were
published only during the pendency of this petition, have put the question as to whether the Court's declaration
of invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been enforced or implemented prior to their publication. The answer is all
too familiar. In similar situations in the past this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth
in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank 8 to wit:
The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found
to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and
imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby
County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite
clear, however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of
unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to
such a determination, is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be
ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the
subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects-with respect to
 particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of
status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public
policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand
examination. These questions are among the most difficult of those which have engaged the
attention of courts, state and federal and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-
inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.
Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban 9 sustained the right of a party under the
Moratorium Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said law was declared unconstitutional by this
Court.
Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official
Gazette is "an operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot
always be erased by a new judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute
retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."
From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the presidential decrees sought
by petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive,
1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so published. 10 Neither the subject matters nor the texts of
these PDs can be ascertained since no copies thereof are available. But whatever their subject matter may be, it
is undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs has ever been implemented or enforced by the government.
In Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to
apprise the public of the contents of [penal] regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons
affected thereby. " The cogency of this holding is apparently recognized by respondent officials considering the
manifestation in their comment that "the government, as a matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting violations
of criminal laws until the same shall have been published in the Official Gazette or in some other publication,
even though some criminal laws provide that they shall take effect immediately.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished
presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding
force and effect.
SO ORDERED.
Relova, J., concurs.
Aquino, J., took no part.
Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):
There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably written opinion of Justice
Escolin. I am unable, however, to concur insofar as it would unqualifiedly impose the requirement of
publication in the Official Gazette for unpublished "presidential issuances" to have binding force and effect.
I shall explain why.
1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question would arise if made to apply
adversely to a party who is not even aware of the existence of any legislative or executive act having the force
and effect of law. My point is that such publication required need not be confined to the Official Gazette. From
the pragmatic standpoint, there is an advantage to be gained. It conduces to certainty. That is too be admitted. It
does not follow, however, that failure to do so would in all cases and under all circumstances result in a statute,
presidential decree or any other executive act of the same category being bereft of any binding force and effect.
To so hold would, for me, raise a constitutional question. Such a pronouncement would lend itself to the
interpretation that such a legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute of effectivity unless published in
the Official Gazette. There is no such requirement in the Constitution as Justice Plana so aptly pointed out. It is
true that what is decided now applies only to past "presidential issuances". Nonetheless, this clarification is, to
my mind, needed to avoid any possible misconception as to what is required for any statute or presidential act to
be impressed with binding force or effectivity.
2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Plana. Its first paragraph sets
forth what to me is the constitutional doctrine applicable to this case. Thus: "The Philippine Constitution does
not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. It
may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected Parties before they can
be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process
clause is not that precise. 1 I am likewise in agreement with its closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur in the
majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no person should be
bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that
such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette. 2
3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command of the government "must be
ascertainable in some form if it is to be enforced at all. 3 It would indeed be to reduce it to the level of mere
futility, as pointed out by Justice Cardozo, "if it is unknown and unknowable. 4 Publication, to repeat, is thus
essential. What I am not prepared to subscribe to is the doctrine that it must be in the Official Gazette. To be
sure once published therein there is the ascertainable mode of determining the exact date of its effectivity. Still
for me that does not dispose of the question of what is the jural effect of past presidential decrees or executive
acts not so published. For prior thereto, it could be that parties aware of their existence could have conducted
themselves in accordance with their provisions. If no legal consequences could attach due to lack of publication
in the Official Gazette, then serious problems could arise. Previous transactions based on such "Presidential
Issuances" could be open to question. Matters deemed settled could still be inquired into. I am not prepared to
hold that such an effect is contemplated by our decision. Where such presidential decree or executive act is
made the basis of a criminal prosecution, then, of course, its ex post facto character becomes evident. 5 In civil
cases though, retroactivity as such is not conclusive on the due process aspect. There must still be a showing of
arbitrariness. Moreover, where the challenged presidential decree or executive act was issued under the police
power, the non-impairment clause of the Constitution may not always be successfully invoked. There must still
be that process of balancing to determine whether or not it could in such a case be tainted by infirmity. 6 In
traditional terminology, there could arise then a question of unconstitutional application. That is as far as it
goes.
4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm that publication is
essential to the effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general application. I am not in agreement with
the view that such publication must be in the Official Gazette. The Civil Code itself in its Article 2 expressly
recognizes that the rule as to laws taking effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication
in the Official Gazette is subject to this exception, "unless it is otherwise provided." Moreover, the Civil Code is
itself only a legislative enactment, Republic Act No. 386. It does not and cannot have the juridical force of a
constitutional command. A later legislative or executive act which has the force and effect of law can legally
provide for a different rule.
5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin that presidential decrees
and executive acts not thus previously published in the Official Gazette would be devoid of any legal character.
That would be, in my opinion, to go too far. It may be fraught, as earlier noted, with undesirable consequences.
I find myself therefore unable to yield assent to such a pronouncement.
I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay concur in this separate
opinion.
Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion of Mme. Justice Herrera. The
Rule of Law connotes a body of norms and laws published and ascertainable and of equal application to all
similarly circumstances and not subject to arbitrary change but only under certain set procedures. The Court has
consistently stressed that "it is an elementary rule of fair play and justice that a reasonable opportunity to be
informed must be afforded to the people who are commanded to obey before they can be punished for its
violation,1 citing the settled principle based on due process enunciated in earlier cases that "before the public is
bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and
the people officially and specially informed of said contents and its penalties.
Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and the Revised
Administrative Code, there would be no basis nor justification for the corollary rule of Article 3 of the Civil
Code (based on constructive notice that the provisions of the law are ascertainable from the public and official
repository where they are duly published) that "Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.
Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code that "only laws which are silent as
to their effectivity [date] need be published in the Official Gazette for their effectivity" is manifestly untenable.
The plain text and meaning of the Civil Code is that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, " i.e. a different
effectivity date is provided by the law itself. This proviso perforce refers to a law that has been duly published
pursuant to the basic constitutional requirements of due process. The best example of this is the Civil Code
itself: the same Article 2 provides otherwise that it "shall take effect [only] one year [not 15 days] after such
publication. 2 To sustain respondents' misreading that "most laws or decrees specify the date of their effectivity
and for this reason, publication in the Official Gazette is not necessary for their effectivity 3 would be to nullify
and render nugatory the Civil Code's indispensable and essential requirement of prior publication in the Official
Gazette by the simple expedient of providing for immediate effectivity or an earlier effectivity date in the law
itself before the completion of 15 days following its publication which is the period generally fixed by the Civil
Code for its proper dissemination.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of effectivity, it has to be
published. What I would like to state in connection with that proposition is that when a date of effectivity is
mentioned in the decree but the decree becomes effective only fifteen (15) days after its publication in the
Official Gazette, it will not mean that the decree can have retroactive effect to the date of effectivity mentioned
in the decree itself. There should be no retroactivity if the retroactivity will run counter to constitutional rights
or shall destroy vested rights.
PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):
The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike
some Constitutions elsewhere. * It may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws
to affected parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the
Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. Neither is the publication of laws in the Official
Gazette required by any statute as a prerequisite for their effectivity, if said laws already provide for their
effectivity date.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of
their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided " Two things may be said of this
provision: Firstly, it obviously does not apply to a law with a built-in provision as to when it will take effect.
Secondly, it clearly recognizes that each law may provide not only a different period for reckoning its
effectivity date but also a different mode of notice. Thus, a law may prescribe that it shall be published
elsewhere than in the Official Gazette.
Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition that for their effectivity, laws must
be published in the Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act to Provide for the Uniform Publication and
Distribution of the Official Gazette." Conformably therewith, it authorizes the publication of the Official
Gazette, determines its frequency, provides for its sale and distribution, and defines the authority of the Director
of Printing in relation thereto. It also enumerates what shall be published in the Official Gazette, among them,
"important legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the Congress of the Philippines" and "all
executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability." It is
noteworthy that not all legislative acts are required to be published in the Official Gazette but only "important"
ones "of a public nature." Moreover, the said law does not provide that publication in the Official Gazette is
essential for the effectivity of laws. This is as it should be, for all statutes are equal and stand on the same
footing. A law, especially an earlier one of general application such as Commonwealth Act No. 638, cannot
nullify or restrict the operation of a subsequent statute that has a provision of its own as to when and how it will
take effect. Only a higher law, which is the Constitution, can assume that role.
In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no
person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar
as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette.
Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:
I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity of such publication being in
the Official Gazette.
DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:
I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of a public nature or general
applicability ineffective, until due publication thereof.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):
There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably written opinion of Justice
Escolin. I am unable, however, to concur insofar as it would unqualifiedly impose the requirement of
publication in the Official Gazette for unpublished "presidential issuances" to have binding force and effect.
I shall explain why.
1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question would arise if made to apply
adversely to a party who is not even aware of the existence of any legislative or executive act having the force
and effect of law. My point is that such publication required need not be confined to the Official Gazette. From
the pragmatic standpoint, there is an advantage to be gained. It conduces to certainty. That is too be admitted. It
does not follow, however, that failure to do so would in all cases and under all circumstances result in a statute,
presidential decree or any other executive act of the same category being bereft of any binding force and effect.
To so hold would, for me, raise a constitutional question. Such a pronouncement would lend itself to the
interpretation that such a legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute of effectivity unless published in
the Official Gazette. There is no such requirement in the Constitution as Justice Plana so aptly pointed out. It is
true that what is decided now applies only to past "presidential issuances". Nonetheless, this clarification is, to
my mind, needed to avoid any possible misconception as to what is required for any statute or presidential act to
be impressed with binding force or effectivity.
2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Plana. Its first paragraph sets
forth what to me is the constitutional doctrine applicable to this case. Thus: "The Philippine Constitution does
not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. It
may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected Parties before they can
be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process
clause is not that precise. 1 I am likewise in agreement with its closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur in the
majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no person should be
bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that
such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette. 2
3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command of the government "must be
ascertainable in some form if it is to be enforced at all. 3 It would indeed be to reduce it to the level of mere
futility, as pointed out by Justice Cardozo, "if it is unknown and unknowable. 4 Publication, to repeat, is thus
essential. What I am not prepared to subscribe to is the doctrine that it must be in the Official Gazette. To be
sure once published therein there is the ascertainable mode of determining the exact date of its effectivity. Still
for me that does not dispose of the question of what is the jural effect of past presidential decrees or executive
acts not so published. For prior thereto, it could be that parties aware of their existence could have conducted
themselves in accordance with their provisions. If no legal consequences could attach due to lack of publication
in the Official Gazette, then serious problems could arise. Previous transactions based on such "Presidential
Issuances" could be open to question. Matters deemed settled could still be inquired into. I am not prepared to
hold that such an effect is contemplated by our decision. Where such presidential decree or executive act is
made the basis of a criminal prosecution, then, of course, its ex post facto character becomes evident. 5 In civil
cases though, retroactivity as such is not conclusive on the due process aspect. There must still be a showing of
arbitrariness. Moreover, where the challenged presidential decree or executive act was issued under the police
power, the non-impairment clause of the Constitution may not always be successfully invoked. There must still
be that process of balancing to determine whether or not it could in such a case be tainted by infirmity. 6 In
traditional terminology, there could arise then a question of unconstitutional application. That is as far as it
goes.
4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm that publication is
essential to the effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general application. I am not in agreement with
the view that such publication must be in the Official Gazette. The Civil Code itself in its Article 2 expressly
recognizes that the rule as to laws taking effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication
in the Official Gazette is subject to this exception, "unless it is otherwise provided." Moreover, the Civil Code is
itself only a legislative enactment, Republic Act No. 386. It does not and cannot have the juridical force of a
constitutional command. A later legislative or executive act which has the force and effect of law can legally
provide for a different rule.
5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin that presidential decrees
and executive acts not thus previously published in the Official Gazette would be devoid of any legal character.
That would be, in my opinion, to go too far. It may be fraught, as earlier noted, with undesirable consequences.
I find myself therefore unable to yield assent to such a pronouncement.
I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay concur in this separate
opinion.
Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion of Mme. Justice Herrera. The
Rule of Law connotes a body of norms and laws published and ascertainable and of equal application to all
similarly circumstances and not subject to arbitrary change but only under certain set procedures. The Court has
consistently stressed that "it is an elementary rule of fair play and justice that a reasonable opportunity to be
informed must be afforded to the people who are commanded to obey before they can be punished for its
violation,1 citing the settled principle based on due process enunciated in earlier cases that "before the public is
bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and
the people officially and specially informed of said contents and its penalties.
Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and the Revised
Administrative Code, there would be no basis nor justification for the corollary rule of Article 3 of the Civil
Code (based on constructive notice that the provisions of the law are ascertainable from the public and official
repository where they are duly published) that "Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.
Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code that "only laws which are silent as
to their effectivity [date] need be published in the Official Gazette for their effectivity" is manifestly untenable.
The plain text and meaning of the Civil Code is that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, " i.e. a different
effectivity date is provided by the law itself. This proviso perforce refers to a law that has been duly published
pursuant to the basic constitutional requirements of due process. The best example of this is the Civil Code
itself: the same Article 2 provides otherwise that it "shall take effect [only] one year [not 15 days] after such
publication. 2 To sustain respondents' misreading that "most laws or decrees specify the date of their effectivity
and for this reason, publication in the Official Gazette is not necessary for their effectivity 3 would be to nullify
and render nugatory the Civil Code's indispensable and essential requirement of prior publication in the Official
Gazette by the simple expedient of providing for immediate effectivity or an earlier effectivity date in the law
itself before the completion of 15 days following its publication which is the period generally fixed by the Civil
Code for its proper dissemination.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of effectivity, it has to be
published. What I would like to state in connection with that proposition is that when a date of effectivity is
mentioned in the decree but the decree becomes effective only fifteen (15) days after its publication in the
Official Gazette, it will not mean that the decree can have retroactive effect to the date of effectivity mentioned
in the decree itself. There should be no retroactivity if the retroactivity will run counter to constitutional rights
or shall destroy vested rights.
PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):
The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike
some Constitutions elsewhere. * It may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws
to affected parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the
Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. Neither is the publication of laws in the Official
Gazette required by any statute as a prerequisite for their effectivity, if said laws already provide for their
effectivity date.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of
their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided " Two things may be said of this
provision: Firstly, it obviously does not apply to a law with a built-in provision as to when it will take effect.
Secondly, it clearly recognizes that each law may provide not only a different period for reckoning its
effectivity date but also a different mode of notice. Thus, a law may prescribe that it shall be published
elsewhere than in the Official Gazette.
Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition that for their effectivity, laws must
be published in the Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act to Provide for the Uniform Publication and
Distribution of the Official Gazette." Conformably therewith, it authorizes the publication of the Official
Gazette, determines its frequency, provides for its sale and distribution, and defines the authority of the Director
of Printing in relation thereto. It also enumerates what shall be published in the Official Gazette, among them,
"important legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the Congress of the Philippines" and "all
executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability." It is
noteworthy that not all legislative acts are required to be published in the Official Gazette but only "important" 5 1 Manresa, Codigo Civil 7th Ed., p. 146.
ones "of a public nature." Moreover, the said law does not provide that publication in the Official Gazette is
essential for the effectivity of laws. This is as it should be, for all statutes are equal and stand on the same 6 People vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640; Balbuena et al. vs. Secretary of Education, et al., 110
footing. A law, especially an earlier one of general application such as Commonwealth Act No. 638, cannot Phil. 150.
nullify or restrict the operation of a subsequent statute that has a provision of its own as to when and how it will
take effect. Only a higher law, which is the Constitution, can assume that role.
7 82 SCRA 30, dissenting opinion.

In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no
person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar
as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette.
Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:
8 308 U.S. 371, 374.
9 93 Phil.. 68,.
10 The report was prepared by the Clerk of Court after Acting Director Florendo S. Pablo Jr.
of the Government Printing Office, failed to respond to her letter-request regarding the
respective dates of publication in the Official Gazette of the presidential issuances listed
therein. No report has been submitted by the Clerk of Court as to the publication or non-
publication of other presidential issuances.

I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity of such publication being in 11 129 SCRA 174.
the Official Gazette.
Fernando, CJ.:

1 Separate Opinion of Justice Plana, first paragraph. He mentioned in tills connection Article
DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring: 7, Sec. 21 of the Wisconsin Constitution and State ex rel. White v. Grand Superior Ct., 71
ALR 1354, citing the Constitution of Indiana, U.S.A
I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of a public nature or general
applicability ineffective, until due publication thereof. 2 Ibid, closing paragraph.

Footnotes 3 Learned Hand, The Spirit of Liberty 104 (1960).

1 Section 6. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shag be 4 Cardozo, The Growth of the Law, 3 (1924).
recognized, access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, shag be afforded the citizens subject to such limitation as may be
5 Cf. Nunez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 50581-50617, January 30, 1982, 111 SCRA 433.
provided by law.
6 Cf. Alalayan v. National Power Corporation, L-24396, July 29, 1968, 24 SCRA 172.
2 Anti-Chinese League vs. Felix, 77 Phil. 1012; Costas vs. Aidanese, 45 Phil. 345; Almario
vs. City Mayor, 16 SCRA 151;Parting vs. San Jose Petroleum, 18 SCRA 924; Dumlao vs.
Comelec, 95 SCRA 392. Teehankee, J.:

3 16 Phil. 366, 378. 1 People vs. de Dios, G.R. No. 11003, Aug. 3l, 1959, per the late Chief Justice Paras.

4 Camacho vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 80 Phil 848; Mejia vs. Balolong, 81 Phil. 486; 2 Notes in brackets supplied.
Republic of the Philippines vs. Encamacion, 87 Phil. 843; Philippine Blooming Mills, Inc. vs.
Social Security System, 17 SCRA 1077; Askay vs. Cosalan, 46 Phil. 179. 3 Respondents: comment, pp. 14-15.
 Plana, J.:
* See e.g., Wisconsin Constitution, Art. 7, Sec. 21: "The legislature shall provide publication
of all statute laws ... and no general law shall be in force until published." See also S ate ex
rel. White vs. Grand Superior Ct., 71 ALR 1354, citing Constitution of Indiana, U.S.A.
4. MRCA vs CA G.R. No. 86675 December 19, 1989
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 86675. December 19, 1989.]
MRCA, INC., Petitioner, v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. BENJAMIN V. PELAYO, Judge,
Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 168, Pasig, M.M., SPOUSES DOMINGO
SEBASTIAN, JR. & LILIA TIOSECO SEBASTIAN, and EXPECTACION P. TIOSECO, Respondents.
Ramon A. Gonzales for Petitioner.
Tanjuatco, Oreta, Tanjuatco, Berenguer and Sanvicente for Private Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; RULES OF PROCEDURE; MAY BE CHANGED AT ANY TIME AND BECOME
EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY; EXCEPTION. — Petitioner’s argument regarding the need for publication of
the Manchester ruling in the Official Gazette before it may be applied to other cases is not well taken. As
pointed out by the private respondents in their comment on the petition, publication in the Official Gazette is not
a prerequisite for the effectivity of a court ruling even if it lays down a new rule of procedure, for "it is a
doctrine well established that the procedure of the court may be changed at any time and become effective at
once, so long as it does not affect or change vested rights." (Aguillon v. Director of Lands, 17 Phil. 508). In a
later case, this Court held thus: "It is a well-established rule of statutory construction that statutes regulating the
procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their
passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent. As the resolution of October 1, 1945,
relates to the mode of procedure, it is applicable to cases pending in courts at the time of its adoption; but it can
not be invoked in and applied to the present case in which the decision had become final before said resolution
became effective. In this case, the motion for reconsideration filed by the defendant was denied on July 17,
1944, and a second motion for re-hearing or consideration could not be filed after the expiration of the period of
fifteen days from promulgation of the order or judgment deducting the time in which the first motion had been
pending in this Court (Section 1, Rule 54); for said period had already expired before the adoption of the
resolution on October 1, 1945. Therefore, the Court cannot now permit or allow the petitioner to file any
pleading or motion in the present case." (People v. Sumilang, 77 Phil. 765-766.)
2. ID.; CIVIL PROCEDURE; PAYMENT OF DOCKET FEES; MAYBE ALLOWED WITHIN A
REASONABLE TIME BUT NOT BEYOND THE REGLEMENTARY PERIOD. — The complaint in this case
was filed on March 24, 1988, or ten months after Manchester was promulgated on May 7, 1987, hence,
Manchester should apply except for the fact that it was modified in the Sun Insurance case, where we ruled that
the court may allow payment of the proper filing fee "within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the
prescriptive or reglementary period." We quote: "1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate
initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over
the subject-matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by
payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case
beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. (p. 80, Rollo.)
DECISION
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
The petitioner prays this Court to set aside the decision promulgated on January 18, 1989 by the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP 15745, affirming the order of the Regional Trial Court dismissing the complaint for
non-payment of the proper filing fees as the prayer of the complaint failed to specify the amounts of moral
damages, exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and litigation expenses sought to be recovered by it from the
defendants, but left them "to the discretion of this Honorable Court" or "to be proven during the
trial." chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
Invoking the decision of this Court in Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 149 SCRA
562, the private respondents (defendants in Civil Case No. 55740 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro
Manila, entitled "MRCA, Inc. v. Spouses Domingo Sebastian, Jr., Et. Al." filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint on July 15, 1988. The petitioner opposed the motion, but the trial court granted it in its order of
August 10, 1988 (p. 54, Rollo). The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court, hence, this petition for review
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Petitioner argues that since the decision in Manchester had not yet been published in the Official Gazette when
its complaint was filed, the ruling therein was ineffective; that said ruling may not be given retroactive effect
because it imposes a new penalty for its non-observance; the dismissal of the complaint for want of jurisdiction;
and, that it should not apply to the present case because the petitioner herein (plaintiff in the trial court) had no
fraudulent intent to deprive the government of the proper docketing fee, unlike the Manchester case where
enormous amounts of damages were claimed in the body of the complaint, but the amounts were not mentioned
in the prayer thereof, to mislead the clerk of court in computing the filing fees to be paid.
Petitioner’s argument regarding the need for publication of the Manchester ruling in the Official Gazette before
it may be applied to other cases is not well taken. As pointed out by the private respondents in their comment on
the petition, publication in the Official Gazette is not a prerequisite for the effectivity of a court ruling even if it
lays down a new rule of procedure, for "it is a doctrine well established that the procedure of the court may be
changed at any time and become effective at once, so long as it does not affect or change vested rights."
(Aguillon v. Director of Lands, 17 Phil. 508). In a later case, this Court held thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"It is a well-established rule of statutory construction that statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be
construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are
retrospective in that sense and to that extent. As the resolution of October 1, 1945, relates to the mode of
procedure, it is applicable to cases pending in courts at the time of its adoption; but it can not be invoked in and
applied to the present case in which the decision had become final before said resolution became effective. In
this case, the motion for reconsideration filed by the defendant was denied on July 17, 1944, and a second
motion for re-hearing or consideration could not be filed after the expiration of the period of fifteen days from
promulgation of the order or judgment deducting the time in which the first motion had been pending in this
Court (Section 1, Rule 54); for said period had already expired before the adoption of the resolution on October
1, 1945. Therefore, the Court cannot now permit or allow the petitioner to file any pleading or motion in the
present case." (People v. Sumilang, 77 Phil. 765-766.)
The Manchester ruling was applied retroactively in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., Et. Al. v. Asuncion, Et Al., G.R.
Nos. 79937-38, February 13, 1989, a case that was already pending before Manchester was promulgated.
The complaint in this case was filed on March 24, 1988, or ten months after Manchester was promulgated on
May 7, 1987, hence, Manchester should apply except for the fact that it was modified in the Sun Insurance case,
where we ruled that the court may allow payment of the proper filing fee "within a reasonable time but in no
case beyond the prescriptive or reglementary period." We quote:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the
prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of the action.
Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may
allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period. (p. 80, Rollo.)
Intent to cheat the government of the proper filing fees may not be presumed from the petitioner’s omission to
specify in the body and prayer of its complaint the amounts of moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s
fees that it claims to have suffered and/or incurred in its transaction with the private respondents. The petitioner
might not have computed its damages yet, or probably did not have the evidence to prove them at the time it
filed its complaint. In accordance with our ruling in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., the petitioner may be allowed to
amend its complaint for the purpose of specifying, in terms of pesos, how much it claims as damages, and to
pay the requisite filing fees therefor, provided its right of action has not yet prescribed. This the petitioner is
ready to do.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted.
The Order of the Regional Trial Court is hereby set aside. The complaint in Civil Case No. 55740 (MRCA, Inc.
v. Domingo Sebastian, Jr. and Lilia Tioseco Sebastian) is reinstated and the petitioner is allowed to amend the
same by specifying the amounts of damages it seeks to recover from the defendants (private respondents) and to
pay the proper filing fees therefor as computed by the Clerk of Court.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
5. Commissioner of Customs vs Hypermix Feeds G.R. No. 179579, February 1, 2012
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 179579 February 1, 2012
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and the DISTRICT COLLECTOR OF THE PORT OF
SUBIC, Petitioners,
vs.
HYPERMIX FEEDS CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45,1 assailing the Decision2 and the Resolution3 of the Court of
Appeals (CA), which nullified the Customs Memorandum Order (CMO) No. 27-20034 on the tariff
classification of wheat issued by petitioner Commissioner of Customs.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On 7 November 2003, petitioner Commissioner of Customs issued CMO 27-2003. Under the Memorandum, for
tariff purposes, wheat was classified according to the following: (1) importer or consignee; (2) country of
origin; and (3) port of discharge.5 The regulation provided an exclusive list of corporations, ports of discharge,
commodity descriptions and countries of origin. Depending on these factors, wheat would be classified either as
food grade or feed grade. The corresponding tariff for food grade wheat was 3%, for feed grade, 7%.
CMO 27-2003 further provided for the proper procedure for protest or Valuation and Classification Review
Committee (VCRC) cases. Under this procedure, the release of the articles that were the subject of protest
required the importer to post a cash bond to cover the tariff differential. 6
A month after the issuance of CMO 27-2003, on 19 December 2003, respondent filed a Petition for Declaratory
Relief7 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City. It anticipated the implementation of the
regulation on its imported and perishable Chinese milling wheat in transit from China. 8 Respondent contended
that CMO 27-2003 was issued without following the mandate of the Revised Administrative Code on public
participation, prior notice, and publication or registration with the University of the Philippines Law Center.
Respondent also alleged that the regulation summarily adjudged it to be a feed grade supplier without the
benefit of prior assessment and examination; thus, despite having imported food grade wheat, it would be
subjected to the 7% tariff upon the arrival of the shipment, forcing them to pay 133% more than was proper.
Furthermore, respondent claimed that the equal protection clause of the Constitution was violated when the
regulation treated non-flour millers differently from flour millers for no reason at all.
Lastly, respondent asserted that the retroactive application of the regulation was confiscatory in nature.
On 19 January 2004, the RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) effective for twenty (20) days from
notice.9
10
Petitioners thereafter filed a Motion to Dismiss. They alleged that: (1) the RTC did not have jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the case, because respondent was asking for a judicial determination of the classification of
wheat; (2) an action for declaratory relief was improper; (3) CMO 27-2003 was an internal administrative rule
and not legislative in nature; and (4) the claims of respondent were speculative and premature, because the
Bureau of Customs (BOC) had yet to examine respondent’s products. They likewise opposed the application for
a writ of preliminary injunction on the ground that they had not inflicted any injury through the issuance of the
regulation; and that the action would be contrary to the rule that administrative issuances are assumed valid until
declared otherwise.
On 28 February 2005, the parties agreed that the matters raised in the application for preliminary injunction and
the Motion to Dismiss would just be resolved together in the main case. Thus, on 10 March 2005, the RTC
rendered its Decision11 without having to resolve the application for preliminary injunction and the Motion to
Dismiss.
The trial court ruled in favor of respondent, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is GRANTED and the subject Customs Memorandum
Order 27-2003 is declared INVALID and OF NO FORCE AND EFFECT. Respondents Commissioner of
Customs, the District Collector of Subic or anyone acting in their behalf are to immediately cease and desist
from enforcing the said Customs Memorandum Order 27-2003.
SO ORDERED.12
The RTC held that it had jurisdiction over the subject matter, given that the issue raised by respondent
concerned the quasi-legislative powers of petitioners. It likewise stated that a petition for declaratory relief was
the proper remedy, and that respondent was the proper party to file it. The court considered that respondent was
a regular importer, and that the latter would be subjected to the application of the regulation in future
transactions.
With regard to the validity of the regulation, the trial court found that petitioners had not followed the basic
requirements of hearing and publication in the issuance of CMO 27-2003. It likewise held that petitioners had
"substituted the quasi-judicial determination of the commodity by a quasi-legislative predetermination."13 The
lower court pointed out that a classification based on importers and ports of discharge were violative of the due
process rights of respondent.
Dissatisfied with the Decision of the lower court, petitioners appealed to the CA, raising the same allegations in
defense of CMO 27-2003.14 The appellate court, however, dismissed the appeal. It held that, since the regulation
affected substantial rights of petitioners and other importers, petitioners should have observed the requirements
of notice, hearing and publication.
Hence, this Petition.
Petitioners raise the following issues for the consideration of this Court:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE WHICH IS NOT IN
ACCORD WITH THE LAW AND PREVAILING JURISPRUDENCE.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE TRIAL COURT
HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE.
The Petition has no merit.
We shall first discuss the propriety of an action for declaratory relief.
Rule 63, Section 1 provides:
Who may file petition. – Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or
whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental
regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to
determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties,
thereunder.
The requirements of an action for declaratory relief are as follows: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy;
(2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking declaratory relief
must have a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue involved must be ripe for judicial
determination.15 We find that the Petition filed by respondent before the lower court meets these requirements.
First, the subject of the controversy is the constitutionality of CMO 27-2003 issued by petitioner Commissioner
of Customs. In Smart Communications v. NTC,16 we held:
The determination of whether a specific rule or set of rules issued by an administrative agency contravenes the
law or the constitution is within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. Indeed, the Constitution vests the power of
judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree,
order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation in the courts, including the regional trial courts. This is within the
scope of judicial power, which includes the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the
validity of the acts of the political departments. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)
Meanwhile, in Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders, Inc. v. Department of Finance Secretary,17 we
said:
xxx [A] legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate legislation, designed to implement a primary legislation
by providing the details thereof. xxx
In addition such rule must be published. On the other hand, interpretative rules are designed to provide
guidelines to the law which the administrative agency is in charge of enforcing.
Accordingly, in considering a legislative rule a court is free to make three inquiries: (i) whether the rule is
within the delegated authority of the administrative agency; (ii) whether it is reasonable; and (iii) whether it was
issued pursuant to proper procedure. But the court is not free to substitute its judgment as to the desirability or
wisdom of the rule for the legislative body, by its delegation of administrative judgment, has committed those
questions to administrative judgments and not to judicial judgments. In the case of an interpretative rule, the
inquiry is not into the validity but into the correctness or propriety of the rule. As a matter of power a court,
when confronted with an interpretative rule, is free to (i) give the force of law to the rule; (ii) go to the opposite
extreme and substitute its judgment; or (iii) give some intermediate degree of authoritative weight to the
interpretative rule. (Emphasis supplied)
Second, the controversy is between two parties that have adverse interests. Petitioners are summarily imposing a
tariff rate that respondent is refusing to pay.
Third, it is clear that respondent has a legal and substantive interest in the implementation of CMO 27-2003.
Respondent has adequately shown that, as a regular importer of wheat, on 14 August 2003, it has actually made
shipments of wheat from China to Subic. The shipment was set to arrive in December 2003. Upon its arrival, it
would be subjected to the conditions of CMO 27-2003. The regulation calls for the imposition of different tariff
rates, depending on the factors enumerated therein. Thus, respondent alleged that it would be made to pay the
7% tariff applied to feed grade wheat, instead of the 3% tariff on food grade wheat. In addition, respondent
would have to go through the procedure under CMO 27-2003, which would undoubtedly toll its time and
resources. The lower court correctly pointed out as follows:
xxx As noted above, the fact that petitioner is precisely into the business of importing wheat, each and every
importation will be subjected to constant disputes which will result into (sic) delays in the delivery, setting aside
of funds as cash bond required in the CMO as well as the resulting expenses thereof. It is easy to see that
business uncertainty will be a constant occurrence for petitioner. That the sums involved are not minimal is
shown by the discussions during the hearings conducted as well as in the pleadings filed. It may be that the
petitioner can later on get a refund but such has been foreclosed because the Collector of Customs and the
Commissioner of Customs are bound by their own CMO. Petitioner cannot get its refund with the said agency.
We believe and so find that Petitioner has presented such a stake in the outcome of this controversy as to vest it
with standing to file this petition.18 (Emphasis supplied)
Finally, the issue raised by respondent is ripe for judicial determination, because litigation is inevitable 19 for the
simple and uncontroverted reason that respondent is not included in the enumeration of flour millers classified
as food grade wheat importers. Thus, as the trial court stated, it would have to file a protest case each time it
imports food grade wheat and be subjected to the 7% tariff.
It is therefore clear that a petition for declaratory relief is the right remedy given the circumstances of the case.
Considering that the questioned regulation would affect the substantive rights of respondent as explained above,
it therefore follows that petitioners should have applied the pertinent provisions of Book VII, Chapter 2 of the
Revised Administrative Code, to wit:
Section 3. Filing. – (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center three (3)
certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not
filed within three (3) months from that date shall not thereafter be the bases of any sanction against any party of
persons.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 9. Public Participation. - (1) If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall, as far as practicable,
publish or circulate notices of proposed rules and afford interested parties the opportunity to submit their views
prior to the adoption of any rule.
(2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless the proposed rates shall have been
published in a newspaper of general circulation at least two (2) weeks before the first hearing thereon.
(3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases shall be observed.
When an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its applicability needs nothing further than its
bare issuance, for it gives no real consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed. When, on
the other hand, the administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the means that can facilitate or render
least cumbersome the implementation of the law but substantially increases the burden of those governed, it
behooves the agency to accord at least to those directly affected a chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly
informed, before that new issuance is given the force and effect of law.20
Likewise, in Tañada v. Tuvera,21 we held:
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws
which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be
no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to
punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not
even a constructive one.
Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws taken so vital
significance that at this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed
solely by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and deliberations in
the Batasan Pambansa – and for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative records – no such publicity
accompanies the law-making process of the President. Thus, without publication, the people have no means of
knowing what presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing
themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees. (Emphasis supplied)
Because petitioners failed to follow the requirements enumerated by the Revised Administrative Code, the
assailed regulation must be struck down.
Going now to the content of CMO 27-3003, we likewise hold that it is unconstitutional for being violative of the
equal protection clause of the Constitution.
The provision mandates that the customs officer must first assess and determine the classification of the
imported article before tariff may be imposed. Unfortunately, CMO 23-2007 has already classified the article
even before the customs officer had the chance to examine it. In effect, petitioner Commissioner of Customs
diminished the powers granted by the Tariff and Customs Code with regard to wheat importation when it no
longer required the customs officer’s prior examination and assessment of the proper classification of the wheat.

The equal protection clause means that no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of
laws enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place in like circumstances. Thus, the guarantee of
the equal protection of laws is not violated if there is a reasonable classification. For a classification to be
reasonable, it must be shown that (1) it rests on substantial distinctions; (2) it is germane to the purpose of the
law; (3) it is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it applies equally to all members of the same class. 22
It is well-settled that rules and regulations, which are the product of a delegated power to create new and
additional legal provisions that have the effect of law, should be within the scope of the statutory authority
granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. It is required that the regulation be germane to the
objects and purposes of the law; and that it be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards
prescribed by law.23

Unfortunately, CMO 27-2003 does not meet these requirements. We do not see how the quality of wheat is In summary, petitioners violated respondent’s right to due process in the issuance of CMO 27-2003 when they
affected by who imports it, where it is discharged, or which country it came from. failed to observe the requirements under the Revised Administrative Code. Petitioners likewise violated
respondent’s right to equal protection of laws when they provided for an unreasonable classification in the
application of the regulation. Finally, petitioner Commissioner of Customs went beyond his powers of delegated
Thus, on the one hand, even if other millers excluded from CMO 27-2003 have imported food grade wheat, the
authority when the regulation limited the powers of the customs officer to examine and assess imported articles.
product would still be declared as feed grade wheat, a classification subjecting them to 7% tariff. On the other
hand, even if the importers listed under CMO 27-2003 have imported feed grade wheat, they would only be
made to pay 3% tariff, thus depriving the state of the taxes due. The regulation, therefore, does not become WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is DENIED.
disadvantageous to respondent only, but even to the state.
SO ORDERED.
It is also not clear how the regulation intends to "monitor more closely wheat importations and thus prevent
their misclassification." A careful study of CMO 27-2003 shows that it not only fails to achieve this end, but MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
results in the opposite. The application of the regulation forecloses the possibility that other corporations that Associate Justice
are excluded from the list import food grade wheat; at the same time, it creates an assumption that those who
meet the criteria do not import feed grade wheat. In the first case, importers are unnecessarily burdened to prove WE CONCUR:
the classification of their wheat imports; while in the second, the state carries that burden.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Petitioner Commissioner of Customs also went beyond his powers when the regulation limited the customs Associate Justice
officer’s duties mandated by Section 1403 of the Tariff and Customs Law, as amended. The law provides: Chairperson

Section 1403. – Duties of Customs Officer Tasked to Examine, Classify, and Appraise Imported Articles. – The
ARTURO D. BRION JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
customs officer tasked to examine, classify, and appraise imported articles shall determine whether the packages Associate Justice Associate Justice
designated for examination and their contents are in accordance with the declaration in the entry, invoice and
other pertinent documents and shall make return in such a manner as to indicate whether the articles have been
truly and correctly declared in the entry as regard their quantity, measurement, weight, and tariff classification BIENVENIDO L. REYES
and not imported contrary to law. He shall submit samples to the laboratory for analysis when feasible to do so Associate Justice
and when such analysis is necessary for the proper classification, appraisal, and/or admission into the
Philippines of imported articles. ATTESTATION

Likewise, the customs officer shall determine the unit of quantity in which they are usually bought and sold, and I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
appraise the imported articles in accordance with Section 201 of this Code. the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

Failure on the part of the customs officer to comply with his duties shall subject him to the penalties prescribed
under Section 3604 of this Code.1âwphi1
ANTONIO T. CARPIO 1.2 Under HS 1001.9010 (Feed Grade)
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division 1.2.1 When any or all of the elements prescribed under 1.1 above is not present.

CERTIFICATION 1.2.2 All other wheat importations by non-flour millers, i.e., importers/consignees NOT listed
in Annex ‘A’
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the 6
SUBJECT: Tariff Classification of Wheat
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
xxx xxx xxx
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice 2. Any issue arising from this Order shall be resolved in an appropriate protest or VCRC case.

3. In case of a VCRC case, the following applies:

3.1 The shipment may qualify for Tentative Release upon payment of the taxes and duties as
Footnotes per declaration and the posting of cash bond to cover the tariff differential.
1
Rollo, pp. 124-142.
3.2 The Tentative Release granted by the VCRC shall, prior to the release of the shipment
from Customs custody, be subject to representative. For this purpose, the District/Port
2
Id. at 33-46. Collector concerned shall forward to the Office of the Commissioner the Tentative Release
papers, together with all pertinent shipping and supporting documents, including, but not
3
Id. at 47. limited to, contract of sale, phytosanitary certificate and certificate of quality.

4
Records, pp. 16-18. In the case of Outports, the required documents shall be faxed to the Office of the
Commissioner of Customs to any of these numbers: 527-1953/527-4573.
5
SUBJECT: Tariff Classification of Wheat
3.3 In resolving the classification issue, the VCRC shall consider the import/consignee,
In order to monitor more closely wheat importations and thus prevent their misclassification, type/source of wheat and port of discharge of the wheat importation, as indicated in Annex
the following are hereby prescribed: ‘A’, and require the proofs/evidences (sic), including, but not limited to, proofs of sale or
consumption of said wheat importation, certificate of quality issued by manufacturing country
and contract of sale.
1. For tariff purposes, wheat shall be classified as follows:

3.4 Any VCRC decision adverse to the government shall be subject to automatic review by
1.1 Under HS 1001.9090 (Food Grade) when all the following elements are present:
the Commissioner of Customs.
1.1.1 the importer/consignee of the imported wheat is a flour miller as per attached list 7
(Annex ‘A’), which shall form as integral part of this Order Rollo¸ pp. 158-168.

8
Records, p. 12.
1.1.2 the wheat importation consists of any of those listed in Annex ‘A’ according to the
country of origin indicated therein
9
Rollo, pp. 58-59.
1.1.3 the wheat importation is entered/unloaded in the Port of Discharge indicated opposite
10
the name of the flour miller, as per Annex ‘A’ Id. at 60-78.
 11
Id. at 108-114; penned by Judge Romeo C. De Leon. G.R. No. 187654

12
Id. at 114. WESTERN BICUTAN LOT OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., represented by its Board of
Directors, Petitioner,
13
Id. at 112. vs.
MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES - PHILIPPINE VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF
14
Id. at 117-122. NATIONAL DEFENSE, Respondent.

15 DECISION
Tolentino v. Board of Accountancy, 90 Phil. 83 (1951).

16
456 Phil. 145 (2003). SERENO, CJ.:

17 Before us are consolidated Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
G.R. No. 108524, 10 November 1994, 238 SCRA 63, 69-70.
Decision1promulgated on 29 April 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97925.
18
Rollo, p. 112.
THE FACTS
19
Office of the Ombudsman v. Ibay, 416 Phil. 659 (2001).
The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:
20
CIR v. Michel J. Lhuiller Pawnshop Inc., 453 Phil. 1043 (2003).
On 12 July 1957, by virtue of Proclamation No. 423, President Carlos P. Garcia reserved parcels of land in the
21
Municipalities of Pasig, Taguig, Parañaque, Province of Rizal and Pasay City for a military reservation. The
220 Phil. 422 (1985). military reservation, then known as Fort William McKinley, was later on renamed Fort Andres Bonifacio (Fort
Bonifacio).
22
Philippine Rural Electric Cooperatives Association, Inc. v. DILG, 451 Phil. 683 (2003).
On 28 May 1967, President Ferdinand E. Marcos (President Marcos) issued Proclamation No. 208, amending
23
Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De los Angeles v. Home Development Mutual Fund, 389 Proclamation No. 423, which excluded a certain area of Fort Bonifacio and reserved it for a national shrine. The
Phil. 296 (2000). excluded area is now known as Libingan ng mga Bayani, which is under the administration of herein respondent
Military Shrine Services – Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (MSS-PVAO).
6. Nagkakaisang Maralita vs Military Shrine Services G.R. No. 187587 June 5, 2013
Again, on 7 January 1986, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 2476, further amending Proclamation No.
Republic of the Philippines 423, which excluded barangaysLower Bicutan, Upper Bicutan and Signal Village from the operation of
SUPREME COURT Proclamation No. 423 and declared it open for disposition under the provisions of Republic Act Nos. (R.A.) 274
Manila and 730.

FIRST DIVISION At the bottom of Proclamation No. 2476, President Marcos made a handwritten addendum, which reads:

G.R. No. 187587 June 5, 2013 "P.S. – This includes Western Bicutan

NAGKAKAISANG MARALITA NG SITIO MASIGASIG, INC., Petitioner, (SGD.) Ferdinand E. Marcos"2

vs.
MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES - PHILIPPINE VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF The crux of the controversy started when Proclamation No. 2476 was published in the Official Gazette 3 on 3
NATIONAL DEFENSE, Respondent. February 1986, without the above-quoted addendum.

x-----------------------x
Years later, on 16 October 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino (President Aquino) issued Proclamation No. 172
which substantially reiterated Proclamation No. 2476, as published, but this time excluded Lots 1 and 2 of
Western Bicutan from the operation of Proclamation No. 423 and declared the said lots open for disposition
under the provisions of R.A. 274 and 730.
Memorandum Order No. 119, implementing Proclamation No. 172, was issued on the same day.
Through the years, informal settlers increased and occupied some areas of Fort Bonifacio including portions of
the Libingan ng mga Bayani. Thus, Brigadier General Fredelito Bautista issued General Order No. 1323
creating Task Force Bantay (TFB), primarily to prevent further unauthorized occupation and to cause the
demolition of illegal structures at Fort Bonifacio.
On 27 August 1999, members of petitioner Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig, Inc. (NMSMI) filed a
Petition with the Commission on Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP), where it was docketed as COSLAP
Case No. 99-434. The Petition prayed for the following: (1) the reclassification of the areas they occupied,
covering Lot 3 of SWO-13-000-298 of Western Bicutan, from public land to alienable and disposable land
pursuant to Proclamation No. 2476; (2) the subdivision of the subject lot by the Director of Lands; and (3) the
Land Management Bureau’s facilitation of the distribution and sale of the subject lot to its bona fide occupants.4
On 1 September 2000, petitioner Western Bicutan Lot Owners Association, Inc. (WBLOAI) filed a Petition-in-
Intervention substantially praying for the same reliefs as those prayed for by NMSMI with regard to the area the
former then occupied covering Lot 7 of SWO-00-001302 in Western Bicutan.5
6
Thus, on 1 September 2006, COSLAP issued a Resolution granting the Petition and declaring the portions of
land in question alienable and disposable, with Associate Commissioner Lina Aguilar-General dissenting.7
The COSLAP ruled that the handwritten addendum of President Marcos was an integral part of Proclamation
No. 2476, and was therefore, controlling. The intention of the President could not be defeated by the negligence
or inadvertence of others. Further, considering that Proclamation
No. 2476 was done while the former President was exercising legislative powers, it could not be amended,
repealed or superseded, by a mere executive enactment. Thus, Proclamation No. 172 could not have superseded
much less displaced Proclamation No. 2476, as the latter was issued on October 16, 1987 when President
Aquino’s legislative power had ceased.
In her Dissenting Opinion, Associate Commissioner Lina AguilarGeneral stressed that pursuant to Article 2 of
the Civil Code, publication is indispensable in every case. Likewise, she held that when the provision of the law
is clear and unambiguous so that there is no occasion for the court to look into legislative intent, the law must be
taken as it is, devoid of judicial addition or subtraction. 8 Finally, she maintained that the Commission had no
authority to supply the addendum originally omitted in the published version of Proclamation No. 2476, as to do
so would be tantamount to encroaching on the field of the legislature.
Herein respondent MSS-PVAO filed a Motion for Reconsideration,9 which was denied by the COSLAP in a
Resolution dated 24 January 2007.10
MSS-PVAO filed a Petition with the Court of Appeals seeking to reverse the COSLAP Resolutions dated 1
September 2006 and 24 January 2007.
Thus, on 29 April 2009, the then Court of Appeals First Division rendered the assailed Decision granting MSS-
PVAO’s Petition, the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions dated
September 1, 2006 and January 24, 2007 issued by the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems in
COSLAP Case No. 99-434 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, the petitions of
respondents in COSLAP Case No. 99-434 are DISMISSED, for lack of merit, as discussed herein. Further,
pending urgent motions filed by respondents are likewise
DENIED. SO ORDERED.11 (Emphasis in the original)
Both NMSMI12 and WBLOAI13 appealed the said Decision by filing their respective Petitions for Review with
this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
THE ISSUES
Petitioner NMSMI raises the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT
PROCLAMATION NO. 2476 DID NOT INCLUDE ANY PORTION OF WESTERN BICUTAN AS THE
HANDWRITTEN NOTATION BY PRESIDENT MARCOS ON THE SAID PROCLAMATION WAS NOT
PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT
PROCLAMATION NO. 172 LIKEWISE EXCLUDED THE PORTION OF LAND OCCUPIED BY
MEMBER OF HEREIN PETITIONER.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT
THE HON. COSLAP HAS BROAD POWERS TO RECOMMEND TO THE PRESIDENT >INNOVATIVE
MEASURES TO RESOLVE EXPEDITIOUSLY VARIOUS LAND CASES.14
On the other hand, petitioner WBLOAI raises this sole issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
SUBJECT PROPERTY WAS NOT DECLARED ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE BY VIRTUE OF
PROCLAMATION NO. 2476 BECAUSE THE HANDWRITTEN ADDENDUM OF PRESIDENT
FERDINAND E. MARCOS INCLUDING WESTERN BICUTAN IN PROCLAMATION NO. 2476 WAS
NOT INCLUDED IN THE PUBLICATION.15
Both Petitions boil down to the principal issue of whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the subject
lots were not alienable and disposable by virtue of Proclamation No. 2476 on the ground that the handwritten
addendum of President Marcos was not included in the publication of the said law.
THE COURT’S RULING
We deny the Petitions for lack of merit.
Considering that petitioners were occupying Lots 3 and 7 of Western Bicutan (subject lots), their claims were
anchored on the handwritten addendum of President Marcos to Proclamation No. 2476. They allege that the
former President intended to include all Western Bicutan in the reclassification of portions of Fort Bonifacio as
disposable public land when he made a notation just below the printed version of Proclamation No. 2476.
However, it is undisputed that the handwritten addendum was not included when Proclamation No. 2476 was
published in the Official Gazette.
The resolution of whether the subject lots were declared as reclassified and disposable lies in the determination
of whether the handwritten addendum of President Marcos has the force and effect of law. In relation thereto,
Article 2 of the Civil Code expressly provides:
ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication.
Under the above provision, the requirement of publication is indispensable to give effect to the law, unless the
law itself has otherwise provided. The phrase "unless otherwise provided" refers to a different effectivity date
other than after fifteen days following the completion of the law’s publication in the Official Gazette, but does
not imply that the requirement of publication may be dispensed with. The issue of the requirement of
publication was already settled in the landmark case Tañada v. Hon. Tuvera, 16 in which we had the occasion to
rule thus:
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-
day period shall be shortened or extended. An example, as pointed out by the present Chief Justice in his
separate concurrence in the original decision, is the Civil Code which did not become effective after fifteen days
from its publication in the Official Gazette but "one year after such publication." The general rule did not apply
because it was "otherwise provided."
It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with altogether. The reason
is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that
are supposed to govern it. Surely, if the legislature could validly provide that a law shall become effective
immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an unreasonably short period
after publication), it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result; and they would
be so not because of a failure to comply with it but simply because they did not know of its existence.
Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal
measures, like a law on prescription, which must also be communicated to the persons they may affect before
they can begin to operate.
xxxx
The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking all
laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. An example is a law
granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant
naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law does not affect the public although it unquestionably does
not apply directly to all the people. The subject of such law is a matter of public interest which any member of
the body politic may question in the political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in the courts of justice. In
fact, a law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation
or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest even if it
might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date
is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise
of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly
conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to
enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
xxxx
Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the
national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place. All presidential decrees must be
published, including even, say, those naming a public place after a favored individual or exempting him from
certain prohibitions or requirements. The circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be published if they are
meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to
enforce.
xxxx
We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public
of the contents of the laws. As correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the mere mention of the number of the
presidential decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date
of effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication
requirement.1âwphi1 This is not even substantial compliance. This was the manner, incidentally, in which the
General Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree undeniably of general applicability and interest, LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
was "published" by the Marcos administration. The evident purpose was to withhold rather than disclose Associate Justice Associate Justice
information on this vital law.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
xxxx Associate Justice

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark,
deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their
existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper
notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot feint, parry or cut unless the naked
blade is drawn. (Emphases supplied)
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

Applying the foregoing ruling to the instant case, this Court cannot rely on a handwritten note that was not part MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
of Proclamation No. 2476 as published. Without publication, the note never had any legal force and effect. Chief Justice

Furthermore, under Section 24, Chapter 6, Book I of the Administrative Code, "the publication of any law,
resolution or other official documents in the Official Gazette shall be prima facie evidence of its authority."
Thus, whether or not President Marcos intended to include Western Bicutan is not only irrelevant but
speculative. Simply put, the courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the Footnotes
words appearing in the law.17 This Court cannot rule that a word appears in the law when, evidently, there is
none. In Pagpalain Haulers, Inc. v. Hon. Trajano,18 we ruled that "under Article 8 of the Civil Code, 'judicial 1
Penned by Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr., with Associate Justices Jose C. Mendoza (now
decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the a member of this Court) and Ramon M. Bato, Jr., concurring, rollo (G.R. No. 187587). pp. 62-82.
Philippines.' This does not mean, however, that courts can create law. The courts exist for interpreting the law,
not for enacting it. To allow otherwise would be violative of the principle of separation of powers, inasmuch as 2
CA rollo, p. 664.
the sole function of our courts is to apply or interpret the laws, particularly where gaps or lacunae exist or where
ambiguities becloud issues, but it will not arrogate unto itself the task of legislating." The remedy sought in 3
Vol. 82, No. 5, pp. 801-805.
these Petitions is not judicial interpretation, but another legislation that would amend the law ‘to include
petitioners' lots in the reclassification. 4
Supra note 2, at 68-69.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petitions are hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The 5
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 97925 dated 29 April 2009 is AFFIRMED in Id. at 72-76.
toto. Accordingly, this Court's status quo order dated 17 June 2009 is hereby LIFTED. Likewise, all pending
6
motions to cite respondent in contempt is DENIED, having been rendered moot. No costs. Id. at 205-212.

7
SO ORDERED. Id. at 213-218.

8
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO Insular Lumber Co. v. Court of Tax Appeals, 192 Phil. 221, 231 (1981).
Chief Justice, Chairperson
9
CA rollo, pp. 112-113.
WE CONCUR:
10
Id. at pp. 219-222.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice 11
Id. at 1285.
 12
Rollo (G.R. No. 187587), pp. 39-61. plaintiffs-respondents jointly and severally pay to the defendant-petitioner the sum of P1,000 with interest at 6
percent per annum from the date of the decision; and absolved the plaintiffs-respondents from the cross-
13
Rollo (G.R. No. 187654), pp. 3-26. complaint relative to the value of the improvements claimed by the defendant-petitioner. The appealed decision
also ordered the registrar of deeds of Bataan to cancel certificate of title No. 325, in the name of the deceased
14 Emiliana Ambrosio and to issue in lieu thereof another certificate of title in favor of the plaintiffs-respondents
Rollo (G.R. No. 187587), p. 47.
and their brother Gavino Rodriguez, as undivided owners in equal parts, free of all liens and incumbrances
15
except those expressly provided by law, without special pronouncement as to the costs.
Rollo (G.R. No. 187654 ), pp. 15-16.

16
The respondents, children and heirs of the deceased Emiliana Ambrosio, commenced the aforesaid civil case to
230 Phil. 528, 533-538 (1986). the end that they recover from the petitioner the possession of the land and its improvements granted by way of
homestead to Emiliana Ambrosio under patent No. 16074 issued on January 11, 1931, with certificate of title
17
Aparri v. CA, 212 Phil. 215.224 (1984). No. 325 issued by the registrar of deeds of Bataan on June 27, 1931 in her favor, under section 122 of Act No.
496, which land was surveyed and identified in the cadastre of the municipality of Limay, Province of Bataan,
18 as lot No. 285; that the petitioner pay to them the sum of P650 being the approximate value of the fruits which
369 Phil. 617. 626 ( 1999).
he received from the land; that the petitioner sign all the necessary documents to transfer the land and its
7. Kasilag vs Rodriguez G.R. No. 46623 December 7, 1939 possession to the respondents; that he petitioner be restrained, during the pendency of the case, from conveying
or encumbering the land and its improvements; that the registrar of deeds of Bataan cancel certificate of title
No. 325 and issue in lieu thereof another in favor of the respondents, and that the petitioner pay the costs of suit.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila The petitioner denied in his answer all the material allegations of the complaint and by way of special defense
alleged that he was in possession of the land and that he was receiving the fruits thereof by virtue of a mortgage
contract, entered into between him and the deceased Emiliana Ambrosio on May 16, 1932, which was duly
EN BANC
ratified by a notary public; and in counterclaim asked that the respondents pay him the sum of P1,000 with 12
per cent interest per annum which the deceased owed him and that, should the respondents be declared to have a
G.R. No. 46623 December 7, 1939 better right to the possession of the land, that they be sentenced to pay him the sum of P5,000 as value of all the
improvements which he introduced upon the land.lawphil.net
MARCIAL KASILAG, petitioner,
vs. On May 16, 1932 Emiliana Ambrosio, in life, and the petitioner executed the following public deed:
RAFAELA RODRIGUEZ, URBANO ROQUE, SEVERO MAPILISAN and IGNACIO DEL
ROSARIO, respondents.
"This agreement, made and entered into this 16th day of May, 1932, by and between Emiliana Ambrosio,
Filipino, of legal age, widow and resident of Limay, Bataan, P.L., hereinafter called the party of the first part,
Luis M. Kasilag for petitioner. and Marcial Kasilag, Filipino, of legal age, married to Asuncion Roces, and resident at 312 Perdigon Street,
Fortunato de Leon for respondents. Manila, P.L., hereinafter called party of the second part.

WITNESSETH: That the parties hereto hereby covenant and agree to and with each other as follows:

IMPERIAL, J.:
This is an appeal taken by the defendant-petitioner from the decision of the Court of Appeals which modified
that rendered by the court of First Instance of Bataan in civil case No. 1504 of said court and held: that the
contract Exhibit "1" is entirely null and void and without effect; that the plaintiffs-respondents, then appellants,
are the owners of the disputed land, with its improvements, in common ownership with their brother Gavino
Rodriguez, hence, they are entitled to the possession thereof; that the defendant-petitioner should yield
possession of the land in their favor, with all the improvements thereon and free from any lien; that the
ARTICLE I. That the party of the first part is the absolute registered owner of a parcel of land in the
barrio of Alngan, municipality of Limay, Province of Bataan, her title thereto being evidenced by
homestead certificate of title No. 325 issued by the Bureau of Lands on June 11, 1931, said land being
lot No. 285 of the Limay Cadastre, General Land Registration Office Cadastral Record No. 1054,
bounded and described as follows:
Beginning at point marked 1 on plan E-57394, N. 84º 32' W. 614.82 m. from B.B.M. No. 3, thence N. 66º 35' E.
307.15 m. to point "2"; S. 5º 07' W. to point "5"; S.6º 10' E. 104.26 m. to point "4"; S. 82º 17' W. to point "5"; S.
28º 53' W. 72.26 m. to point "6"; N. 71º 09' W. to point "7"; N. 1º 42' E. 173.72 m. to point 1, point of
beginning, "Containing an area of 6.7540 hectares. "Points 1,2,6 and 7, B.L.; points 3,4 and 5, stakes; points 4,
5 and 6 on bank of Alangan River. "Bounded on the North, by property claimed by Maria Ambrosio; on the
East, by Road; on the South, by Alangan River and property claimed by Maxima de la Cruz; and on the West,
by property claimed by Jose del Rosario. "Bearing true. Declination 0º 51' E. "Surveyed under authority of
sections 12-22, Act No. 2874 and in accordance with existing regulations of the Bureau of Lands, by Mamerto
Jacinto, public land surveyor, on July 8, 1927 and approved on February 25, 1931.
ARTICLE IX. That in the event the contemplated motion under Article VII hereof is not approved by
the Court, the foregoing contract of sale shall automatically become null and void, and the mortgage
stipulated under Article IV and V shall remain in full force and effect.
In testimony whereof, the parties hereto have hereunto set their hands the day and year first herein
before written.

ARTICLE II. That the improvements on the above described land consist of the following: (Sgd.) MARCIAL KASILAG

Four (4) mango trees, fruit bearing: one hundred ten (110) hills of bamboo trees; one (1) tamarind and (Sgd.) EMILIANA AMBROSIO
six (6) boñga trees.
Signed in the presence of:
ARTICLE III. That the assessed value of the land is P940 and the assessed value of the improvements
is P860, as evidenced by tax declaration No. 3531 of the municipality of Limay, Bataan.
(Sgd.) ILLEGIBLE

ARTICLE IV. That for and in consideration of the sum of one thousand pesos (P1,000) Philippine
currency, paid by the party of second part to the party of the first part, receipt whereof is hereby
acknowledged, the party of the first part hereby encumbers and hypothecates, by way of mortgage,
only the improvements described in Articles II and III hereof, of which improvements the party of the
first part is the absolute owner.
ARTICLE V. That the condition of said mortgage is such that if the party of the first part shall well and
truly pay, or cause to paid to the party of the second part, his heirs, assigns, or executors, on or before
the 16th day of November, 1936, or four and one-half (4½) years after date of the execution of this
instrument, the aforesaid sum of one thousand pesos (P1,000) with interest at 12 per cent per annum,
then said mortgage shall be and become null and void; otherwise the same shall be and shall remain in
full force and effect, and subject to foreclosure in the manner and form provided by law for the amount
due thereunder, with costs and also attorney's fees in the event of such foreclosure.lawphil.net
ARTICLE VI. That the party of the first part shall pay all taxes and assessments which are or may
become due on the above described land and improvements during the term of this agreement.
(Sgd.) GAVINO RODRIGUEZ.
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS } ss.
BALANGA, BATAAN } ss.
Before me this day personally appeared Emiliana Ambrosio without cedula by reason of her sex, to me
known and known to me to be the person who signed the foregoing instrument, and acknowledged to
me that she executed the same as her free and voluntary act and deed.
I hereby certify that this instrument consists of three (3) pages including this page of the
acknowledgment and that each page thereof is signed by the parties to the instrument and the witnesses
in their presence and in the presence of each other, and that the land treated in this instrument consists
of only one parcel.

ARTICLE VII. That within thirty (30) days after date of execution of this agreement, the party of the In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my notarial seal, this 16th day of May,
first part shall file a motion before the Court of First Instance at Balanga, Bataan, P. I., requesting 1932.
cancellation of Homestead Certificate of Title No. 325 referred to in Article I hereof and the issuance,
in lieu thereof, of a certificate of title under the provisions of Land Registration Act No. 496, as (Sgd.) NICOLAS NAVARRO
amended by Act 3901. Notary Public

ARTICLE III. It if further agreed that if upon the expiration of the period of time (4½) years stipulated My commission expires December 31, 1933.
in this mortgage, the mortgagor should fail to redeem this mortgage, she would execute a deed of
absolute sale of the property herein described for the same amount as this mortgage, including all
unpaid interests at the rate of 12 per cent per annum, in favor of the mortgagee.
 Doc. No. 178
Page 36 of my register
Book No. IV
One year after the execution of the aforequoted deed, that is, in 1933, it came to pass that Emiliana Ambrosio
was unable to pay the stipulated interests as well as the tax on the land and its improvements. For this reason,
she and the petitioner entered into another verbal contract whereby she conveyed to the latter the possession of
the land on condition that the latter would not collect the interest on the loan, would attend to the payment of the
land tax, would benefit by the fruits of the land, and would introduce improvements thereon. By virtue of this
verbal contract, the petitioner entered upon the possession of the land, gathered the products thereof, did not
collect the interest on the loan, introduced improvements upon the land valued at P5,000, according to him and
on May 22, 1934 the tax declaration was transferred in his name and on March 6, 1936 the assessed value of the
land was increased from P1,020 to P2,180.
After an analysis of the conditions of Exhibit "1" the Court of Appeals came to the conclusion and so held that
the contract entered into by and between the parties, set out in the said public deed, was one of absolute
purchase and sale of the land and its improvements. And upon this ruling it held null and void and without legal
effect the entire Exhibit 1 as well as the subsequent verbal contract entered into between the parties, ordering,
however, the respondents to pay to the petitioner, jointly and severally, the loan of P1,000 with legal interest at
6 per cent per annum from the date of the decision. In this first assignment of error the petitioner contends that
the Court of Appeals violated the law in holding that Exhibit 1 is an absolute deed of sale of the land and its
improvements and that it is void and without any legal effect.
The cardinal rule in the interpretation of contracts is to the effect that the intention of the contracting parties
should always prevail because their will has the force of law between them. Article 1281 of the Civil Code
consecrates this rule and provides, that if the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt as to the intention
of the contracting parties, the literal sense of its stipulations shall be followed; and if the words appear to be
contrary to the evident intention of the contracting parties, the intention shall prevail. The contract set out in
Exhibit 1 should be interpreted in accordance with these rules. As the terms thereof are clear and leave no room
for doubt, it should be interpreted according to the literal meaning of its clauses. The words used by the
contracting parties in Exhibit 1 clearly show that they intended to enter into the principal contract of loan in the
amount of P1,000, with interest at 12 per cent per annum, and into the accessory contract of mortgage of the
improvements on the land acquired as homestead, the parties having moreover, agreed upon the pacts and
conditions stated in the deed. In other words, the parties entered into a contract of mortgage of the
improvements on the land acquired as homestead, to secure the payment of the indebtedness for P1,000 and the
stipulated interest thereon. In clause V the parties stipulated that Emiliana Ambrosio was to pay, within four and
a half years, or until November 16, 1936, the debt with interest thereon, in which event the mortgage would not
have any effect; in clause VI the parties agreed that the tax on the land and its improvements, during the
existence of the mortgage, should be paid by the owner of the land; in clause VII it was covenanted that within
thirty days from the date of the contract, the owner of the land would file a motion in the Court of First Instance
of Bataan asking that certificate of title No. 325 be cancelled and that in lieu thereof another be issued under the
provisions of the Land Registration Act No. 496, as amended by Act No. 3901; in clause VIII the parties agreed
that should Emiliana Ambrosio fail to redeem the mortgage within the stipulated period of four years and a half,
she would execute an absolute deed of sale of the land in favor of the mortgagee, the petitioner, for the same
amount of the loan of P1,000 including unpaid interest; and in clause IX it was stipulated that in case the motion
to be presented under clause VII should be disapproved by the Court of First Instance of Bataan, the contract of
sale would automatically become void and the mortgage would subsist in all its force.
Another fundamental rule in the interpretation of contracts, not less important than those indicated, is to the
effect that the terms, clauses and conditions contrary to law, morals and public order should be separated from
the valid and legal contract and when such separation can be made because they are independent of the valid
contract which expresses the will of the contracting parties. Manresa, commenting on article 1255 of the Civil
Code and stating the rule of separation just mentioned, gives his views as follows:
On the supposition that the various pacts, clauses or conditions are valid, no difficulty is presented; but
should they be void, the question is as to what extent they may produce the nullity of the principal
obligation. Under the view that such features of the obligation are added to it and do not go to its
essence, a criterion based upon the stability of juridical relations should tend to consider the nullity as
confined to the clause or pact suffering therefrom, except in case where the latter, by an established
connection or by manifest intention of the parties, is inseparable from the principal obligation, and is a
condition, juridically speaking, of that the nullity of which it would also occasion. (Manresa,
Commentaries on the Civil Code, Volume 8, p. 575.)
The same view prevails in the Anglo-American law, as condensed in the following words:
Where an agreement founded on a legal consideration contains several promises, or a promise to do
several things, and a part only of the things to be done are illegal, the promises which can be separated,
or the promise, so far as it can be separated, from the illegality, may be valid. The rule is that a lawful
promise made for a lawful consideration is not invalid merely because an unlawful promise was made
at the same time and for the same consideration, and this rule applies, although the invalidity is due to
violation of a statutory provision, unless the statute expressly or by necessary implication declares the
entire contract void. . . . (13 C. J., par. 470, p. 512; New York Cent. etc. R. Co. v. Gray, 239 U.S., 583;
60 Law ed., 451; U.S. v. Mora, 97 U.S., 413, 24 Law. ed., 1017; U.S. v. Hodson, 10 Wall, 395; 19 Law
ed. 937; Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175, 17 Law ed., 520; U.S. v. Bradly, 10 Pet. 343, 9 Law. ed.,
448; Borland v. Prindle, 144 Fed 713; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas Pac. R. Co., 4 Fed., 284;
Northern Pac. R. Co. v. U.S., 15 Ct. Cl., 428.)
Addressing ourselves now to the contract entered into by the parties, set out in Exhibit 1, we stated that the
principal contract is that of loan and the accessory that of mortgage of the improvements upon the land acquired
as a homestead. There is no question that the first of these contract is valid as it is not against the law. The
second, or the mortgage of the improvements, is expressly authorized by section 116 of Act No. 2874, as
amended by section 23 of Act No. 3517, reading:
SEC. 116. Except in favor of the Government or any of its branches, units or institutions, or legally
constituted banking corporations, lands acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions shall
not be subject to encumbrance or alienation from the date of the approval of the application and for a
term of five years from and after the date of issuance of the patent or grant, nor shall they become
liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the expiration of said period; but the
improvements or crops on the land may be mortgaged or pledged to qualified persons, associations, or
corporations.
It will be recalled that by clause VIII of Exhibit 1 the parties agreed that should Emiliana Ambrosio fail to
redeem the mortgage within the stipulated period of four and a half years, by paying the loan together with
interest, she would execute in favor of the petitioner an absolute deed of sale of the land for P1,000, including
the interest stipulated and owing. The stipulation was verbally modified by the same parties after the expiration
of one year, in the sense that the petitioner would take possession of the land and would benefit by the fruits
thereof on condition that he would condone the payment of interest upon the loan and he would attend to the
payment of the land tax. These pacts made by the parties independently were calculated to alter the mortgage a
contract clearly entered into, converting the latter into a contract of antichresis. (Article 1881 of the Civil Code.)
The contract of antichresis, being a real encumbrance burdening the land, is illegal and void because it is legal
and valid.
The foregoing considerations bring us to the conclusion that the first assignment of error is well-founded and
that error was committed in holding that the contract entered into between the parties was one of absolute sale
of the land and its improvements and that Exhibit 1 is null and void. In the second assignment of error the
petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that he is guilty of violating the Public Land Act
because he entered into the contract, Exhibit 1. The assigned error is vague and not specific. If it attempts to
show that the said document is valid in its entirety, it is not well-founded because we have already said that
certain pacts thereof are illegal because they are prohibited by section 116 of Act No. 2874, as amended.
In the third assignment of error the petitioner insists that his testimony, as to the verbal agreement entered into
between him and Emiliana Ambrosio, should have been accepted by the Court of Appeals; and in the fourth and
last assignment of error the same petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that he acted in
bad faith in taking possession of the land and in taking advantage of the fruits thereof, resulting in the denial of
his right to be reimbursed for the value of the improvements introduced by him.
We have seen that subsequent to the execution of the contract, Exhibit 1, the parties entered into another verbal
contract whereby the petitioner was authorized to take possession of the land, to receive the fruits thereof and to
introduce improvements thereon, provided that he would renounce the payment of stipulated interest and he
would assume payment of the land tax. The possession by the petitioner and his receipt of the fruits of the land,
considered as integral elements of the contract of antichresis, are illegal and void agreements because, as
already stated, the contract of antichresis is a lien and such is expressly prohibited by section 116 of Act No.
2874, as amended. The Court of Appeals held that the petitioner acted in bad faith in taking possession of the
land because he knew that the contract he made with Emiliana Ambrosio was an absolute deed of sale and,
further, that the latter could not sell the land because it is prohibited by section 116. The Civil Code does not
expressly define what is meant by bad faith, but section 433 provides that "Every person who is unaware of any
flaw in his title, or in the manner of its acquisition, by which it is invalidated, shall be deemed a possessor in
good faith"; and provides further, that "Possessors aware of such flaw are deemed possessors in bad faith".
Article 1950 of the same Code, covered by Chapter II relative to prescription of ownership and other real rights,
provides, in turn, that "Good faith on the part of the possessor consists in his belief that the person from whom
he received the thing was the owner of the same, and could transmit the title thereto." We do not have before us
a case of prescription of ownership, hence, the last article is not squarely in point. In resume, it may be stated
that a person is deemed a possessor in bad faith when he knows that there is a flaw in his title or in the manner
of its acquisition, by which it is invalidated.
Borrowing the language of Article 433, the question to be answered is whether the petitioner should be deemed
a possessor in good faith because he was unaware of any flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition by
which it is invalidated. It will be noted that ignorance of the flaw is the keynote of the rule. From the facts found
established by the Court of Appeals we can neither deduce nor presume that the petitioner was aware of a flaw
in his title or in the manner of its acquisition, aside from the prohibition contained in section 116. This being the
case, the question is whether good faith may be premised upon ignorance of the laws. Manresa, commenting on
article 434 in connection with the preceding article, sustains the affirmative. He says:
"We do not believe that in real life there are not many cases of good faith founded upon an error of law. When
the acquisition appears in a public document, the capacity of the parties has already been passed upon by
competent authority, and even established by appeals taken from final judgments and administrative remedies
against the qualification of registrars, and the possibility of error is remote under such circumstances; but,
unfortunately, private documents and even verbal agreements far exceed public documents in number, and
while no one should be ignorant of the law, the truth is that even we who are called upon to know and apply it
fall into error not infrequently. However, a clear, manifest, and truly unexcusable ignorance is one thing, to
which undoubtedly refers article 2, and another and different thing is possible and excusable error arising from
complex legal principles and from the interpretation of conflicting doctrines.
But even ignorance of the law may be based upon an error of fact, or better still, ignorance of a fact is
possible as to the capacity to transmit and as to the intervention of certain persons, compliance with
certain formalities and appreciation of certain acts, and an error of law is possible in the interpretation
of doubtful doctrines. (Manresa, Commentaries on the Spanish Civil Code. Volume IV, pp. 100, 101
and 102.)
According to this author, gross and inexcusable ignorance of law may not be the basis of good faith, but
possible, excusable ignorance may be such basis. It is a fact that the petitioner is not conversant with the laws
because he is not a lawyer. In accepting the mortgage of the improvements he proceeded on the well-grounded
belief that he was not violating the prohibition regarding the alienation of the land. In taking possession thereof
and in consenting to receive its fruits, he did not know, as clearly as a jurist does, that the possession and
enjoyment of the fruits are attributes of the contract of antichresis and that the latter, as a lien, was prohibited by
section 116. These considerations again bring us to the conclusion that, as to the petitioner, his ignorance of the
provisions of section 116 is excusable and may, therefore, be the basis of his good faith. We do not give much
importance to the change of the tax declaration, which consisted in making the petitioner appear as the owner of
the land, because such an act may only be considered as a sequel to the change of possession and enjoyment of
the fruits by the petitioner, to about which we have stated that the petitioner's ignorance of the law is possible
and excusable. We, therefore, hold that the petitioner acted in good faith in taking possession of the land and
enjoying its fruits.
The petitioner being a possessor in good faith within the meaning of article 433 of the Civil Code and having
introduced the improvements upon the land as such, the provisions of article 361 of the same Code are
applicable; wherefore, the respondents are entitled to have the improvements and plants upon indemnifying the
petitioner the value thereof which we fix at P3,000, as appraised by the trial court; or the respondents may elect
to compel the petitioner to have the land by paying its market value to be fixed by the court of origin.
The respondents also prayed in their complaint that the petitioner be compelled to pay them the sum of P650,
being the approximate value of the fruits obtained by the petitioner from the land. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the judgment of the trial court denying the claim or indemnity for damages, being of the same opinion
as the trial court that the respondents may elect to compel the petitioner to have the land. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the judgment of the trial court that the respondents have not established such damages. Under the
verbal contract between the petitioner and the deceased Emiliana Ambrosio, during the latter's lifetime, the
former would take possession of the land and would receive the fruits of the mortgaged improvements on
condition that he would no longer collect the stipulated interest and that he would attend to the payment of the
land tax. This agreement, at bottom, is tantamount to the stipulation that the petitioner should apply the value of
the fruits of the land to the payment of stipulated interest on the loan of P1,000 which is, in turn, another of the
elements characterizing the contract of antichresis under article 1881 of the Civil Code. It was not possible for
the parties to stipulate further that the value of the fruits be also applied to the payment of the capital, because
the truth was that nothing remained after paying the interest at 12% per annum. This interest, at the rate fixed,
amounted to P120 per annum, whereas the market value of the fruits obtainable from the land hardly reached
said amount in view of the fact that the assessed value of said improvements was, according to the decision,
P860. To this should be added the fact that, under the verbal agreement, from the value of the fruits had to be
taken a certain amount to pay the annual land tax. We mention these data here to show that the petitioner is also
not bound to render an accounting of the value of the fruits of the mortgaged improvements for the reason stated
that said value hardly covers the interest earned by the secured indebtednes.
For all the foregoing considerations, the appealed decision is reversed, and we hereby adjudge: (1) that the
contract of mortgage of the improvements, set out in Exhibit 1, is valid and binding; (2) that the contract of
antichresis agreed upon verbally by the parties is a real incumbrance which burdens the land and, as such, is a
null and without effect; (3) that the petitioner is a possessor in good faith; (4) that the respondents may elect to
have the improvements introduced by the petitioner by paying the latter the value thereof, P3,000, or to compel
the petitioner to buy and have the land where the improvements or plants are found, by paying them its market
value to be filed by the court of origin, upon hearing the parties; (5) that the respondents have a right to the
possession of the land and to enjoy the mortgaged improvements; and (6) that the respondents may redeem the
mortgage of the improvements by paying to the petitioner within three months the amount of P1,000, without
interest, as that stipulated is set off by the value of the fruits of the mortgaged improvements which petitioner
received, and in default thereof the petitioner may ask for the public sale of said improvements for the purpose
of applying the proceeds thereof to the payment of his said credit. Without special pronouncement as to the
costs in all instances. So ordered.
Diaz, J., concur.
Separate Opinions
VILLA-REAL, J., concurring and dissenting:
According to the contract entered into May 16, 1932, between Emiliana Ambrosio, in life, and the petitioner
Marcial Kasilag, the first, in consideration of the sum of P1,000 given to her by the second, constituted a
mortgage on the improvements only of the land which she acquired by way of homestead. The improvements
which she mortgaged consisted of four fruit bearing mango trees, one hundred ten hills of bamboo trees, 1
tamarind tree and 6 betelnut trees, the assessed value of which was P660. The condition of the loan were that if
the mortgagor should pay the mortgage on November 16, 1936, that is, four and a half years after the execution
of the deed, said sum of P1,000 with interest thereon at 12% per annum, the aforesaid mortgage would become
null and void, otherwise it would remain in full force and effect and would b subject to foreclosure in the
manner provided by law; that the mortgagor would pay all the land tax on the land and its improvements during
the duration of the contract; and that if after the expiration of the said period of four and a half years the
mortgagor should fail to redeem the mortgage, she would execute in favor of the mortgage an absolute deed of
sale of the property described in the contract for the same sum of P1,000 plus interest due and unpaid at the rate
of 12 per cent per annum.
The principal rule in the interpretation of contracts is that "If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt
as to the intention of the contracting parties, the literal sense of its stipulations shall be followed. If the words
appear to be contrary to the evident intention of the contracting parties, the intention shall prevail" (article 1281,
Civil Cod). "In order to judge as to the intention of the contracting parties, attention must be paid principally to
their conduct at the time of making the contract and subsequently thereto." (Article 1282.)
Now, then what is the true nature of the contract entered into between the parties by virtue of the deed of sale
executed by them on May 16, 1932? The Court of Appeals held that it is an absolute deed of sale of a land with
a homestead certificate of title, under the guise of a loan secured by a mortgage upon its improvements in order
to go around the prohibition contained in section 116 of Act No. 2874, as amended by section 23 of Act No.
3517.
Closely examined, the only clauses of the contract which may lead to the conclusion that it is one of the sale are
those which state that if at the expiration of the period of four years and a half the mortgagor should fail to pay
the amount of the loan plus interest due and unpaid at the rate of 12 per cent per annum, she would execute in
favor of the mortgagee a deed of absolute sale of the land whose improvements were mortgaged for the amount
of the loan and the interest owing. It will be seen that the sale would not be made until after the lapse of four
and a half years from the execution of the deed, if the mortgagor should fail or should not wish to redeem the
mortgaged improvements. Consequently, the obligation contracted by said mortgagor was no more than a
conditional promise to sell. Now, then, is this a promise to sell valid? Like any other onerous, consensual and
mutually binding contract, that of promise to sell requires for its legal existence and validity the concurrence of
consent, consideration and subject-matter. The contract before us dos not show what is the cause or
consideration for such promise to sell. Assuming that it was the economic impotence of the mortgagor to
redeem the mortgaged improvements, before she could be compelled to comply with her obligation to sell, there
is need to wait until she should fail of funds or to abandonment. The cause will come into being only upon the
happening of said event after the four and half years and only then will the said contract of promise to sell have
juridical existence. The P1,000 and its interest, should the mortgagor fail to redeem the improvements upon the
maturity of the indebtedness, would be the consideration of the sale; because the promise to sell is a contract
different and distinct from that of sale and each requires a consideration for its existence and validity.
The terms of the contract are clear and explicit and do not leave room for doubt that the intention of the
contracting parties was to constitute a mortgage on the improvements of the land in litigation to secure the
payment of the loan for P1,000, within interest thereon at 12 per cent per annum. It cannot be said that this
contract is simulated because the assessed value of the improvements is P860 only. It is well known that rural
properties are valued for assessment purposes not less than half of their market value. The true value of the said
improvements may therefore be P1,720, and the mortgagee may have considered that adequate. Moreover, the
petitioner could not have the property whose improvements were mortgaged to him the property whose
improvements were mortgaged to him even should the mortgagor default in the payment of interest. He could
only have the mortgaged improvements in case of foreclosure should he bid therefor at the sale. Neither could
the mortgagor sell the same property to the mortgagee, even after the expiration of five years from the issuance
of the homestead certificate of title, for then the sale would be in satisfaction of an obligation contracted during
the five years, which is prohibited by the oft-mentioned section 116 of Act No. 2874, as amended by section 23
of Act No. 3517. The fact that after one year the contracting parties had novated the contract of loan secured by
a mortgagee, converting the same into a contract of anti-chresis because of the mortgagor's failure to pay the
accrued interest, does not show that they intended to enter into a contract of sale, because the conversion in this
case of the contract of loan secured by a mortgage into one of antichresis was accidental, due to the mortgagor's
default in the payment of unpaid interest for the first year. if the parties' intention from the beginning had been
to sell the property, the mortgagee would have immediately entered upon the possession of the land instead of
waiting until after the expiration of one year. The transfer of the Torrens certificate of title to the homestead by
the original owner to the mortgagee in 1934 was only a consequence of the conversion of the mortgage loan into
an anti-chretic loan, the parties having such a transfer. The setting off of the interest on the debt against the
fruits of the property given in antichresis finds authority in article 1885 of the of the Civil Code. There is,
therefore, no ambiguity in the terms of the contract warranting the search outside its four corners for the true
intention of the contracting parties other than that of entering into a contract of loan secured by the said
improvements. If the true intention of the contracting parties, as clearly gathered from the terms of the contract,
was to enter into a contract, was to enter into a contract of loan secured by a mortgage upon the improvements,
although they should convert it into a contract of antichresis after one year and although after the maturity of the
loan with interest they may wish to convert it into one of absolute sale — both conversions being illegal and,
hence, void, — 8 the original intention of entering into a contract of loan secured by a mortgagee upon the
improvements would prevail, the said contract of loan being the only one legal and valid, and the petitioner
having acted in good faith in making it.
The verbal contract of antichresis, entered into by the petitioner Marcial Kasilag and Emiliana Ambrosio, being
null and void ab initio and without any legal effect because it is in violation of the express prohibition of section
116 of Act No. 2874 as amended by section 23 of Act No. 3517, (article 4 of the Civil Code), the contracting
parties should restore to each other the things which have been the subject-matter of the contract, together with
their fruits, and the price paid therefor, together with interest, pursuant to Article 1303 of the same Code.
Marcial Kasilag, therefore, should return to Emiliana Ambrosio or to her heirs the possession of the homestead
and the improvements thereon with its fruits, and Emiliana Ambrosio or her heirs should pay him the sum of
P1,000, being the amount of the loan, plus interest due and unpaid.
As to the improvements introduced upon the land by the petitioner, having done so with the knowledge and
consent of its owner Emiliana Ambrosio, the former acted in good faith, and under article 361 of the Civil Code,
the owner of the land may have the said improvements upon paying the indemnity provided in articles 453 and
454, or may compel the said Marcial Kasilag, who introduced the said improvements, to pay the price of the
land. If the herein respondents, as heirs of Emiliana Ambrosio, do not wish or are unable to pay for said
improvements, and Marcial Kasilag does not wish or is unable to pay the land, said petitioner would lose his
right of intention over the same (Bernardo vs. Batalan, 37 Off. G., No. 74, p. 1382), provided that he may
remove the improvements which he had introduced in good faith.
In view of the foregoing, I concur in the majority opinion except insofar as it holds that the interest is set off
against the fruits of the mortgaged improvements, because as a result of the nullity of the contract of antichresis
the petitioner should return to the respondents the products of the mortgaged improvements, and the latter
should pay to the petitioner the amount of the loan plus interest due and unpaid at the rate of 12 per cent per
annum from the date of the contract until fully paid.
LAUREL, J., concurring in the result:
On August 27, 1918, Emiliana Ambrosio put in a homestead application for lot No. 285 of the Limay cadastre,
Province of Bataan. After complying with the requisite legal formalities, she obtained therefor homestead patent
No. 16074, the same having been recorded in the Registry of Deeds of Bataan on Juner 26, 1931. On May 16,
1932, she entered with the herein petitioner, Marcial Kasilag, into a contract, Exhibit 1, inserted in the foregoing
majority opinion.
Sometime in 1933, or a year after the execution of the aforequoted and land taxes, whereupon, the mortgage,
Marcial Kasilag, and the mortgagor, Emiliana Ambrosio, verbally agreed that the former would pay the land
taxes and waive the unpaid interest, enter into the possession of the property in question, introducing
improvements thereon, and thereafter be reimbursed for the value of such improvements. Under this verbal pact,
Kasilag went into possession of the property, planted it with the fruit trees allegedly valued at P5,000, and on
May 22, 1934, declared the same for taxation purposes. In 1934 the original homesteader, Emiliana Rodriguez,
Severo Mapilisan, Ignacio del Rosario and Gavino Rodriguez.
On May 16, 1936, the said heirs, with the exception Gavino Rodriguez who testified for the defendant, sued
Marcial Kasilag in the Court of First Instance of Bataan to recover the possession of the aforesaid property
belonging to their mother. For answer, the defendant put in as was in good faith with the knowledge and
tolerance of the plaintiffs, a counterclaim for P1,000 representing the loan to the deceased homesteader with
stipulated interest there on, and a recoupment for P5,000 allegedly the value of the improvements he had
introduced upon the land. On the issues thus joined, the trial court gave judgment for the defendant couched in
the following language:
Resuming all that has been said above, the court find and declares that the deed of combined mortgage
and sale executed by Emiliana Ambrosio in favor of the defendant Marcial Kasilag and dated May 16,
1932, is null and void as a contract for a future conveyance or sale of the homestead, but valid as an
equitable mortgage on the improvements for the sum of P1,000; and that the possession of the
homestead by the defendant Marcial Kasilag by virtue of said contract or by virtue of any other
agreement is null and void, but that the making of the improvements thereon by him, which the court
finds to be valued at P3,000, by virtue of the verbal agreement entered into after the executing of the
original instrument of mortgage, was in good faith, entitling the said Marcial Kasilag to be reimbursed
of their actual value, the above-mentioned amount. Wherefore, let judgment be entered declaring that
the plaintiffs are entitled to the possession as owners of the homestead subject of the present suit, lot
No. 285 of the Limay cadastral survey, subject to an encumbrance of the improvements for the sum of
P1,000 in favor of the defendant, ordering the defendant deliver unto the plaintiffs in turn to pay unto
the defendant jointly and severally, as heirs of their deceased mother Rafaela Rodriguez the sum of
P3,000, value of the improvements introduced on said homestead by defendant. Let there be no
pronouncement as to costs." On appeal by the plaintiffs, the Third Division of the Court of Appeals
reached a different result and modified the judgment of the trial court as follows:
 Wherefore, the appealed judgment is hereby modified by declaring that the contract, Exhibit "1", is
entirely null and void; that the plaintiffs and appellants are the owners of the lot in question together
with all the improvements thereon in common with their brother, Gavino Rodriguez, and are, therefore,
entitled to the possession thereof; ordering the defendant and appellee to vacate and deliver the
possession of the aforementioned plaintiffs and appellants free from any encumbrance; requiring latter,
however, to pay jointly and severally to the said appellee the sum of P1,000 with the interest thereon at
the rate of 6 per cent per annum from and including the date this decision becomes final; and absolving
the said plaintiffs and appellants from the cross-complaint with respect to the value of the
improvements claimed by the appellee.
It is further ordered that the register of deeds of Bataan cancel the certificate of title No. 325 in the
name of the deceased, Emiliana Ambrosio, and issue in lieu thereof anew certificate of title in favor of
the herein plaintiffs and appellants and their brother, Gavino Rodriguez, as owners pro indiviso and in
equal shares free from any lien or encumbrance except those expressly provided by law.
Without special pronouncement as to the costs.
The case is before us on petition for certiorari which was given due course, filed by defendant-appellee, Marcial
Kasilag, now petitioner, against plaintiffs-appellants, Rafaela Rodriguez and others, now respondents. The
burden of petitioner's case is condensed in the following assignments of error:
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred:
I. In having interpreted that document Exhibit "1" is an absolute sale and declared it entirely null and
void, and in not having interpreted and declared that it is a deed of combined mortgage and future sale
which, if void as a contract for future conveyance of the homestead in question is, however, valid as an
equitable mortgage on the improvements thereof for the sum of P1,000 loaned by petitioner Marcial
Kasilag to the homestead owner Emiliana Ambrosio.
II. In holding that the petitioner was guilty of the violation of the public land law for having entered
into said contract Exhibit "1".
III. In not giving probative value to the uncontradicted testimony of the petitioner Marcial Kasilag that
he was expressly authorized by the homestead owner Emiliana Ambrosio to introduction by him of
improvements therein by virtue of the verbal agreement entered into after the execution of the original
instrument of mortgage was in good faith, entitling him to reimbursed of the actual value of
improvements he introduced.
Boiled down to the fundamentals, there are only two propositions which stands to be resolved in this appeal: (1)
What is the legal nature of the agreement, Exhibit 1, entered into by and between the parties? and (2) Is Marcial
Kasilag guilty of bad faith in entering upon the possession of the homestead, paying the land tax and
introducing improvements thereon?
The numerous adjudications in controversies of this nature will show that each case must be decided in the light
of the attendant circumstances and the situation of the parties which, upon the whole, mark its character.
However, for the purpose of ascertaining the manner and extent to which persons have intended to be found by
their written agreements, the safe criterion, the time honored test, is their contention which is intimately woven
into the instrument itself. It is true that resort to extrinsic evidence is imperative when the contract is ambiguos
and is susceptible of divergent interpretations; nevertheless, the primary obligation of the courts is to discover
the intention of the contracting parties, as it is expressed by the language of the document itself. We are not
authorized to make a contract for the parties.
In the trial court as in the Court of Appeals, the discussion centered on the nature and validity of the document,
Exhibit 1. This is the correct approach. The Court of Appeals, however, rejected the conclusion of the trial court
that it is an absolute deed of sale which is null and void in its entirely because it is banned by section 116, as
amended of the Public land Act. The ruling is now assailed by the petitioner. I share petitioner's view that the
deed is not what it was construed to be by the Court of Appeals.
From Article I to III thereof is a description of the homestead and the improvements existing thereon. By its
Article IV the homesteader, Emiliana Ambrosio, "encumbers and hipothecates, by way of mortgage, only the
improvements described in Articles II and III" under the conditions set out in Articles V, VI and VII. Its closing
Articles VIII and IX, particularly relied upon by the Court of Appeals, speak, not of a present deed of absolute
sale, but of one to be executed "upon the expiration of the period of time (4½ years) stipulated in the mortgage"
if "the mortgagor should fail to redeem this mortgage". In other words, the redemption of the mortgage by the
payment of the loan may bring about the frustration of contemplated sale, hence, to hold unqualifiedly that the
whole of Exhibit 1, or even a part thereof, is an absolute deed of sale would be to do violence to the terms of the
document it self.
Still other tokens drive home the same conviction. The intimation by the Court of Appeals that the petitioner
"know, therefore, that the land subject of the patent could not be alienated by express prohibition of law," is an
argument that the petitioner could not have brazenly disregarded the law by intending Exhibit 1 to be an
absolute deed of sale. Its further observation that "the stipulation under article VIII of the contract, Exhibit '1' . .
. clearly indicates that there was nothing left to be done except the execution of the deed of absolute sale," is a
concession that no such sale has yet been executed. Finally it will be recalled that under Article VII of Exhibit
1, "within thirty (30) days after date of execution of this agreement the party of the first part shall file a motion
before the Court of First Instance of Balanga, Bataan, P.I., requesting cancellation of homestead certificate of
title No. 325 referred to in Article 1 hereof and the issuance, in lieu thereof, of a certificate of title under the
provisions of Land Registration Act 496, as amended by Act 3901." And by its Article IX it provides "That in
the event the contemplated motion under Article VII hereof is not approved by the Court, the foregoing contract
of sale shall automatically become null and void." (Underlining is mine.) We have nothing in the record to show
that the required motion was filed within thirty days or thereafter, by Emiliana Ambrosio in life, or by her
successors-in-interest after her death. Indeed, Homestead Certificate of Title No. 325, sought to be substituted
by another through the said motion, still stands. It is, evident, therefore, that the projected sale has and may
never come into being, because under Article IX of Exhibit 1, it became automatically null and void. This view,
incidentally, precludes further consideration of the validity or invalidity of the sale clause of Exhibit 1, as it will
purely academic to dwell upon the nature and effect of a contract that has passed out of existence in the
contemplation of the parties.
Having reached the conclusion, upon its plain language and unequivocal import, that Exhibit 1 is essentially and
fundamentally a mortgage upon the improvements found on the questioned homestead, with a conditional
clause for the future sale of said homestead and improvements which has become a "dead twig" still attached to
a living tree because the condition has never been performed, I would, under Articles 1281 and 1283 of the
Civil Code, be otherwise content in resting our decision of this aspect of the case on this interpretation. But I do
not propose to so limit my inquiry in view of the fact that the Court of Appeals points to contemporaneous and
subsequent circumstances, beyond the four corners of the document, Exhibit 1, allegedly revelatory of
petitioner's concealed but evident intention to circumvent the law. I may state, at the outset, that these
circumstances are fairly susceptible of legitimate explanations. The appealed decision could not conceive of a
man, of petitioner's intelligence, who "would accept improvements valued at only P860 as security for the
payment of a larger amount of P1,000." But we are concerned with an assessed valuation which is not always
nor even frequently the value that it can command in the market. To ignore this is to live in monastic seclusion.
The appealed decision would imply from the fact that petitioner subsequently paid the land taxes and from the
further fact that Emiliana never paid stipulated interest on the one thousand-peso loan, that Exhibit 1 was meant
to vest absolute title irretrievably in the petitioner. It could hardly be supposed at the time of the execution of
Exhibit 1 that the homesteader would fail to make these payments, nor does it seem just to draw from these
circumstances, induced by Emiliana's own neglect, deductions unfavorable to the petitioner. That the petitioner
went upon the possession of the questioned property is not proof that he was even already the would-be owner
thereof, for as elsewhere stated, the said possession came practically at the suggestion of or at least with the
consent of Emiliana Ambrosio as a result of her failure to live up to her part of the bargain. Finally, the Court of
Appeals asked: "If the real purpose was to mortgage the improvements only as specified in article IV of the
contract, why is it that in article VIII thereof it was provided that in case of failure to redeem the alleged
mortgage the grantor would be required to execute a de of absolute sale of the property described therein for the
same amount of the mortgage in favor of the grantee, and not of" the improvements only'?" The precaution
which the petitioner took to have the sale clause of Exhibit I so phrased that the said sale would not be affected
until after the expiration of the five-year period prohibited by law, at which time the alienation of the homestead
would then have been perfectly legitimate, may not be without significance to show petitioner's respect for and
intention to be on the side of the law. The very mention of the word "sale" in the document in question argues
against any attempt at concealment, for if the said document was intended as a cover and cloak of an illegal
alienation, then the reference to the contract of sale therein was illtimed and foolhardy.
The question next at hand is whether or not the mortgage constituted upon the improvement's of the homestead
is valid. It is, under express provisions of section 116 of the Public Land Act, before and after its amendment,
reading pertinently that "the improvements or crops on the land may be mortgaged or pledged to qualified
persons, associations, or corporations." I find no occasion to dispute this legislative policy however mistaken it
may be. It is sufficient to observe that what the law permits may be done. Upon the other hand, I find no
occasion to test the legality of the sale provisions of Exhibit 1, as I have heretofore said, this question is, in my
opinion, moot. Moreover, the petitioner, technically, is barred from raising this question, as he did not appeal
from and, therefore, abided by the decision of the trial court which outlawed this sale clause as violative of the
provisions of section 116 of the Public Land Act. This part of the decision of the trial court was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals when the latter struck down Exhibit 1 in its entirety and, even now, petitioner does not
complain against the destruction of Exhibit 1 with respect to its sale clause. In other words, counsel for
petitioner concedes all along that the said sale clause may be properly legislated out. As the mortgage
provisions of Exhibit 1 are independent of and severable from the rest thereof, the same are perfectly
enforceable. Where a part of the contract is perfectly valid and separable from the rest, the valid portion should
not be avoided. (Ollendorf vs. Abrahamson, 38 Phil., 585.)
The question yet to be answered is whether the petitioner's possession of the question homestead was in good
faith so as to entitle him to reimbursement for improvements introduced upon the land. The basis of petitioner's
possession was a verbal agreement with the original homesteader whereby, for failure of the latter to comply
with her obligations to pay land taxes and stipulated interest on the loan, the former assumed the said
obligations for the privilege of going into possession of the property, introducing improvements thereon, and
thereafter being reimbursed for the value of such improvements. The petitioner did enter upon such possession,
planted the land to fruit trees valued at P5,000, according to him, and P3,000, according to the trial judge. It
should be stated, in passing, that the Court of Appeals was unable to belie this verbal agreement, although it was
of the opinion "that the trial court erred in giving probative value to the testimony of the appellee with reference
to the alleged verbal agreement". Its reason for the opinion is not because the testimony is untrue, but because
even if it were true, "it only tends to corroborate the allegation that he acted in bad faith when he took
possession of the property and made improvements thereon, because then he knew full well that the homestead
owner could not enter into an agreement involving the future final and absolute alienation of the homestead in
his favor." As the said opinion and the reason back of it does not involve a question of strict fact, it is in our
power to inquire into its soundness. The weakness of the argument lies, first, in its, (a) inconsistency and (b) in
the misconception of the legal principle involved: inconsistency, because it considers entry of possession,
payment of land tax as facts tending to show the real character of the transaction and as evidencing bad faith on
the part of the petitioner, but at the same time it improperly rejects the verbal agreement by which such facts are
established. It is clear that we cannot directly reject the verbal agreement between the parties in so fat as it is
favorable to the petitioner. The misconception proceeds from the erroneous legal conclusion that, upon the
facts, the good faith is attributable to the petitioner alone and that Ambrosio was not to be blamed for the
prohibited alienation of the homestead, as I shall presently proceed to discuss.
In holding that the petitioner was a possessor in bad faith, the decision sought to be reviewed first laid down the
premise that such possession is banned by law at least for five years from the issuance of patent (section 116,
Public Land Act), assumed that the petitioner had knowledge of such law, and then drew the conclusion that the
petitioner was aware of the illegality of his possession. We think that the assumption and conclusion are
precipitate. As observed in the foregoing majority opinion-citing Manresa-knowledge of a legal provision does
not necessarily mean knowledge of its true meaning and scope, or of the interpretation which the
courts may place upon it. In this particular case, what section 116 of the Public Land Act prohibits is the
"incumbrance or alienation" of land acquired thereunder within the period prescribed therein. We may concede,
as assumed by the appealed decision, that the petitioner was cognizant of said section 116, but this is not saying
that petitioner knew that his possession came under the phrase "incumbrance or alienation" prohibited by law,
and that the petitioner, therefore, knew that his possession was illegal. The import of the phrase "incumbrance
or alienation" is a subject upon which "men of reason may reasonably differ," in the same way that we ourselves
have differed in the deliberation of this case. It is not correct to assume that the petitioner had knowledge of the
illegality of his possession. The contrary assumption, namely, that petitioner had no idea of such illegality,
would have been more in accord with the experience of everyday, for petitioner would not have invested money
and labor in the land and assumed obligations incumbent upon the homesteader if he had even the least
suspicion that all his efforts would count for nothing and would in the end entangle him in a mild scandal. As
possession in bad faith does not necessarily mean possession illegal under the law, it being necessary that the
possessor be aware of such illegality, it follows that the petitioner's possession of the homestead of the
respondents was in good faith. (Art. 433, Civil Code.) "Good faith is always presumed, and the burden of
proving bad faith on the part of the possessor rests upon the person alleging it" (article 434, Civil Code.) As
a bona fide possessor, and it being unquestioned that the improvements introduced by him upon the land
redounded to its benefit, the petitioner is by law entitled to be paid for the value of such improvements in the
amount of P3,000, as found by the trial judge. "Useful expenditures shall be paid the possessor in good faith
with the same right of retention, the person who has defeated him in his possession having the option of
refunding the amount of such expenditures or paying him the increase in value which the thing has acquired by
reason thereof." ( Article 453, 2nd par., Civil Code). The reimbursement in this particular case is the more in
order in view of the express undertaking of respondent's predecessor-in-interest to pay therefor.
Even the equities of the case militate against the respondents and in favor of the petitioner. There is a
concession that the petitioner's possession was neither imposed upon nor wrested from the homesteader; on the
contrary, it came about by virtue of a mutual agreement whereby the said homesteader and the herein
respondents were spared the burden of paying for land taxes and stipulated interest and extended the benefit of
having their land improved on condition that they pay the value of such improvements upon redeeming the land.
We also have uncontradicted fact that P400 of the one thousand-peso loan were given to the herein respondents
and the balance kept by their mother. They may not reap and retain these benefits at the same time repudiate and
go back upon contractual obligations solemnly entered into.
But let grant that the contract, Exhibit 1, is one of absolute sale, as found by the Court of Appeals, what then?
As the land could not be alienated for five years from the date of the issuance of the patent, the sale was illegal
and void because it was entered into in violation of section 116 of the Public Land Act, as amended. By whom
was the law violated? Certainly, not by Kasilag alone but by Ambrosio as well. Both are presumed to know the
law, and we cannot justly charge Kasilag alone with that knowledge on the alleged reason that Kasilag is rich
and Ambrosio is poor. Neither can we proceed on the bare assumption that because Exhibit 1 was written in
English it was prepared by Kasilag as if he were the only English-speaking person in the Province of Bataan
where the document was executed. Are we already living in the midst of a communistic society that we shall
have to incline invariably the balance in favor of a litigant who happens to be well-to-do, regardless of the
merits of the case? And to this end, shall we, by a series of assumptions and deductions, impute to a party
malice aforethought dishonesty and bad faith, in entering into a transaction made in the open sun, publicly
recorded and whose effectiveness was even conditioned by the approval of a court of justice? If so, then I dare
say that we have not profited by the admonition of Aristotle in his Metaphysics centuries ago that "justice is a
virtue of the soul which discards party, friendship and sentiment and is therefore always represented as blind."
There is a charm in rhetoric but its value in cool judicial reasoning is nil.
And if — as we are confidently told — we should relax the legal principle with reference to Ambrosio, because
she was "poor and ignorant," I am reluctant to believe that she was ignorant of the condition against the
alienation inserted in all homestead patents, and my knowledge of the Public Land Law, of the activities of the
Department and bureau charged with the administration of public lands, gives me just the contrary impression.
Every homestead patent contains that condition. Circulars and instructions and general information have been
issued in pursuance with law. (Sec. 5, Act No. 2874; see also sec. 5, Comonwealth Act No. 141.) I must
presume that the Government and its officials charged with the administration of public lands have complied
with the law and their duties in this connection, and I cannot believe that Ambrosio, when she alienated the
property, was unaware of the legal prohibition. Under the circumstances, then, it is reasonable to conclude that
on the hypothesis that the document, Exhibit 1, was a contract of absolute sale between Kasilag and Ambrosio,
both of them were guilty of infraction of the law. If this is correct, what is the legal situation of the parties?
Justinian, who, by his Corpus Juris Civiles, still speaks through practically all the civil codes of Continental
Europe, considers both as having acted in good faith. "Realmente," bluntly observes Manresa, "si los dos que se
encuentran en lucha sobre la propiedad han provocado el conflicto por su voluntad; a ciencia y paciencia del
dueno del suelo, ante cuya vista las obras se han ejecutado, y con conciencia, por parte del que edifica o
planta, de que el terreno no es suyo, no hay razon alguna que abone derecho preferente en favor de ninguno de
los dos; deben, por tanto, tratarse como si los dos hubiesen obrado de buena fe; la mala fe del uno extingue y
neutraliza, en justa reciprocidad, la del otro." (Manresa, Codigo Civil segunda edicion Tomo III pag. 203.)
Article 364 of our Civil Code then comes into play. "Where there has been bad faith, not only on the part of the
person who built, sewed, or planted on another's land, but also on the part of the owner of the latter, the rights of
both shall be the same as if they had acted in good faith. Bad faith on the part of the owner is deemed to exist
whenever the act has been done in his presence, with his knowledge and tolerance, and without opposition on
his part." ( Article 364, Civil Code; see also arts. 1303, 1306 ibid.) The codal section is evidently based upon
the vulnerable maxim of equity that one who comes into equity must come with clean hands. A court which
seeks to enforce on the part of the defendant uprightness, fairness, and conscientiousness also insists that, if
relief is to be granted, it must be to a plaintiff whose conduct is not inconsistent with the standards he seeks to
have applied to his adversary.
Fundamenta justitiae sunt, ut ne cui noceatur, deinde ut communi serviatur. I therefore concur in the result.
CONCEPCION, J., dissenting:
In view of the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, which are final according to law, I dissent from the
majority opinion as to the legal denomination of the contract really entered into by the petitioners and the now
deceased Emiliana Ambrosio.
The facts according to the decision of the Court of Appeals are as follows:
On August 27, 1918, the deceased Emiliana Ambrosio applied for the land in question as a homestead,
now known as lot No. 285 of the Limay cadastral survey of Bataan, and the application was approved
on September 10, 1919. A final proof was submitted on November 10, 1927 which was approved on
October 17, 1929. The homestead patent No. 16074 and homestead certificate of title No. 325 were
issued in favor of the applicant on June 11, 1931 which were recorded on June 26, 1931 in the office of
registrar of deeds in accordance with the provisions of section 122 of Act 496.
"On or about May 16, 1932, the homestead owner, Emiliana Ambrosio offered to sell the property to the
defendant and appellee, Marcial Kasilag. The latter, upon examining her title found that it was a homestead
patent and knew, therefore, that the land subject of the patent could not be alienated by express prohibition of
law, so he devised a means by which the proposed sale might not appear in any document and had the patentee,
Emiliana Ambrosio, execute a public instrument, Exhibit '1', purporting to be a mere mortgage of the
improvements thereon consisting of four mango trees, fruit bearing; 110 hills of bamboo trees, 1 tamarind, and
6 boñga trees, with the assessed value of P860, in consideration of the sum of P1,000 alleged to have been
loaned by the said Kasilag to the said patentee, Emiliana Ambrosio. It was expressly stipulated in that document
that the aforementioned amount should be paid within four and a half years from the date of the instrument
(May 16, 1932), the condition being that if she would fail to redeem the alleged mortgage at the expiration of
the stipulated period, she would execute a deed of absolute sale of the property therein described for the same
amount of the alleged mortgage (P1,000) including all unpaid interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum in
favor of the alleged mortgagee. It was further stipulated therein that the said Emiliana should pay all the taxes
and assessment which might become due on the land and improvements during the term of the agreement and
that within thirty days after the date of the execution thereof she should file a motion before the Court of First
Instance of Bataan requesting the cancellation of the homestead certificate No. 325 above referred to and the
issuance in lieu thereof a certificate of title under the provisions of the Land Registration Act 496, as amended
by Act 3901.
The lot in question was originally declared for land tax purposes in the name of the homestead (owner)
Emiliana Ambrosio, and assessed at P1,020 in 1933; but on May 22, 1934, the tax declaration was
transferred in the name of the appellee, Marcial Kasilag, and on March 6, 1936 the assessed value was
raised to P2,180.
Emiliana, however, never paid any interest on the alleged loan of P1,000 or paid taxes on the land
since the execution of the contract.
The evidence further discloses that the appellant entered upon the actual possession of the land and had
been holding the same up to the present time, having planted various kinds of fruit trees valued
according to him at P5,000, and collected the products thereof for his own exclusive benefit.
Relying upon the foregoing facts, the majority contends that the contract executed by the parties was one of
mortgage, as per Exhibit 1, with a promise to sell the land in question. I cannot hold to these rulings of the
majority, because the nature of the contract of mortgage is inconsistent with the idea that the creditor should
immediately enter upon a possession of the mortgaged land; that he should pay the land tax; that he should
accept as security something whose values does not cover the amount of the loan sought to be secured, for in
this case the supposed loan was P1,000, and what were mortgaged were only the improvements consisting of 4
mango trees, 110 hills of bamboo trees, 1 tamarind tree and 6 betelnut trees, assessed at P860.
I believe that the contract which the parties intended to execute is a promise to sell the land, for which reason
Ambrosio retained the right of ownership of the land and its improvements while the deed of the promised sale
had not been executed. Under the terms of the deed Exhibit 1, Kasilag could not be considered the owner of the
land, nor could he execute any act promised upon the assumption of ownership, nor could he alienate the same
as he had no title to it. But the parties, in consideration of the fact that Kasilag paid in advance the price of the
land and assumed the obligation to pay the tax thereon, which Ambrosio could not pay, agreed that Kasilag may
enter upon the enjoyment of the land until the promise to sell is converted in fact into an absolute sale by the
execution of the corresponding deed by Ambrosio. It was stipulated, however, that if the sale is not approved by
the Court, Kasilag would collect the amount of P1,000 paid him as a mortgage credit, with all the interest due
and payable.
Under these circumstances, the conclusion of law that Kasilag acted in bad faith is not supported by the
established facts.
Wherefore, the plaintiffs are bound to comply with the contract as heirs of Ambrosio, by executing in favor of
Kasilag the deed of sale of the land, but should the sale, for any reason, be not approved, Kasilag may collect
the amount of P1,000 with all the interest thereon, and may execute the judgment obtained by him upon the land
and all its improvements, deducting, however, in his favor the value of the improvements which he introduced
upon the land in good faith.
In view of the foregoing, I am of the opinion that the decision of the Court of Appeals should be reversed and
that another should be entered against the respondents, requiring them to execute the deed of sale of the land in
favor of the petitioner, provided that if the sale, for any reason, be not approved by the court, the petitioner may
execute his credit upon the land and all its improvements, after deducting the value of the improvements
introduced by him upon the land.
MORAN, J., dissenting:
According to section 116 of Act No. 2874, as amended by section 23 of Act No. 3517, "lands acquired under
the free patent or homestead provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance or alienation from the date of the
approval of the application and for a term of five years from and after the date of issuance of the patent or grant,
nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the expiration of said period."
About June 11, 1931, homestead patent No. 16074 was issued to Emiliana Ambrosio, now deceased. On May
16, 1932 Emiliana Ambrosio offered the sale of the said homestead to the herein petitioner, Marcial Kasilag,
and in view of the above-quoted legal prohibition, the parties executed the document Exhibit 1, copied in the
majority decision. The heirs of Emiliana Ambrosio filed a complaint for the annulment of the contract in the
Court of First Instance of Bataan, and from the judgment rendered by said court an appeal was taken to the
Court of Appeals, which held that the true contract between the parties is one of absolute sale, wherefore, it is
null and void under the already cited legal prohibition. Marcial Kasilag comes to this court on certiorari, and
this court reverses the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The only question is as to the true contract between the parties at the time of the execution of the deed Exhibit
1; Kasilag contends that the contract is that set out in the document Exhibit 1, that is, a mortgage of the
improvements of the homestead to secure a loan of one thousand pesos given to Emiliana Ambrosio; and the
latter's heirs, in turn, contend that the contract is one of the absolute sale of the homestead, wherefore, it is null
and void. The findings of the Court of Appeals are as follows:
The pertinent facts as disclosed by the evidence of record are as follows:
On August 27, 1918 the deceased, Emiliana Ambrosio, applied for the land in question as a homestead,
not known as Lot No. 285 of the Limay cadastral survey of Bataan, and the application was approved
on September 10, 1919. A final proof was submitted on November 10, 1927 which was approved on
October 17, 1929. The homestead patent No. 16074 and homestead certificate of title No. 325 were
issued in favor of the applicant on June 11, 1931 which were recorded on June 26, 1931 in the office of
the register of deeds in accordance with the provisions of Section 122 of Act No. 496.
On or about May 16, 1932, the homestead owner Emiliana Ambrosio offered to sell the property to the
defendant and appellee, Marcial Kasilag. The latter, upon examining her title found that it was a
homestead patent and knew, therefore, that the land subject of the patent could not be alienated by
express prohibition of law, so he devised means by which the proposed sale might not appear in any
document and had the patentee, Emiliana Ambrosio, execute a public instrument, Exhibit 1, purporting
to be a mere mortgage of the improvements thereon consisting of four mango trees, fruit bearing; one
hundred ten hills of bamboo trees, one thousand and six boñga trees, with the assessed value of P860,
in consideration of the sum of P1,000 alleged to have been loaned by the said Kasilag to the said
patentee Emiliana Ambrosio. It was expressly stipulated in that document that the aforementioned
amount should be paid within four and a half years from the date of the instrument (May 16, 1932), the
condition being that if she failed to redeem the alleged mortgage at the expiration of the stipulated
period, she would execute a deed of absolute sale of the property therein described for the same
amount of the alleged mortgage (P1,000) including all unpaid interest at the rate of 12 per cent per
annum in favor of the alleged mortgagee. It was further stipulated therein that the said Emiliana should
pay all the taxes and assessment which might become due on the land and improvements during the
term of the agreement and that within thirty days after the date of the execution thereof she should file
a motion before the Court of First Instance of Bataan requesting the cancellation of the homestead
certificate No. 325 above referred to and the issuance in lieu thereof of a certificate of title under the
provisions of the Land Registration Act No. 496, as amended by Act No. 3901.
The lot in question was originally declared for land tax purposes in the name of the homestead owner,
Emiliana Ambrosio, and assessed at P1,020 in 1933; but on May 22, 1934, the tax declaration was
transferred in the name of the appellee, Marcial Kasilag, and on March 6, 1936 the assessed value was
raised to P2,180.
Emiliana, however, never paid any interest on the alleged loan of P1,000 or paid taxes on the land
since the execution of the contract.
The evidence further discloses that the appellee entered upon the actual possession of the land and had
been holding the same up to the present time, having planted various kinds of fruit trees valued
according to him at P5,000, and collected the products thereof for his own exclusive benefit.
Construing the contract, Exhibit 1, in the light of all the foregoing facts and circumstances under which
it was executed in relation to the subsequent acts of the contracting parties, we are led to the
inescapable conclusion that their real intention was to execute an agreement of absolute sale of the
homestead together with the improvements thereon. The stipulation concerning an alleged mortgage in
the instrument is a mere devise to circumvent the law which expressly prohibits the alienation or
encumbrance of the homestead during the period of five years from the date of the issuance of the
homestead patent. (Sec. 116 of Act No. 2874 as amended by Act No. 3517.)
It is inconceivable, and, therefore, we refuse to believe that the appellee, Marcial Kasilag, being an
intelligent man far above the average, would accept improvements valued at only P860 as security for
the payment of a larger amount of P1,000, the alleged loan. We entertain no doubt that at the time the
execution of the contract, Exhibit 1, the appellee knew that the homestead owner, Emiliana Ambrosio,
a poor ignorant woman, was badly in need of money and that she was determined to dispose of and
alienate definitely her homestead, as evidenced by the fact testified to by Gavino Rodriguez as witness
for the said appellee that she actually offered to sell the land to the latter. He also knew that she would
not be able to pay back to him such a large amount with interest of 12 per cent per annum because she
had no other income except what she would derive from the homestead. Under such circumstances,
there is reason to believe that she was no longer concerned with the form in which the contract would
be drawn, as long as could obtain the amount of P1,000 which was agreeable to her as the price of the
homestead she offered to sell to the appellee. This conclusion is supported in part by the subsequent
action of Emiliana in not paying any interest on the alleged loan of P1,000 or the land taxes thereon
since the execution of the contract and by the action of the appellee in declaring the land for tax
purposes in his own name as owner thereof, notwithstanding that he had no interest in the land, as he
alleged, except in the improvements only.
The contract of absolute sale was consummated, because the grantor, Emiliana, received full payment
of the purchase price disguised as a loan of P1,000 and placed the grantee, Marcial Kasilag, in absolute
possession and control of the land conveyed to him with all the improvements thereon. The stipulation
under article VIII of the contract, Exhibit I, to the effect that the grantor would execute a deed of
absolute sale of the property herein described for the said amount of this mortgage including all unpaid
interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum in favor of the mortgagee', clearly indicates that there was
nothing left to be done except the execution of the deed of absolute sale, which is merely a matter of
form in contracts of this nature, which was postponed until after the expiration of four and a half years
because by that time the period of five years within which the property could not be alienated nor
encumbered in any way, as provided by section 116 of Act No. 2874 as amended by Act No. 3517,
supra, would have already expired. If the real purpose was to mortgage the improvements only as
specified in article VIII thereof it was provided that in case of failure to redeem the alleged mortgage
the grantor would be required to execute a deed of absolute sale of the property described therein for
the same amount of the mortgage in favor of the grantee, and not of 'the improvements only'? It is
clear, therefore, that the real contract under Exhibit 1, was one of absolute sale and not a mortgage with
future sale.
In other words, although the document Exhibit 1 states that it is a mortgage of the improvements, with a
stipulation regarding a future sale of the land in case of failure to comply with the mortgage obligations, in
reality the true contract between the parties is one of absolute sale in the light of the circumstances of the case,
among them the following:
First, Emiliana Ambrosio offered the sale, not the mortgage, of her homestead to Marcial Kasilag, and it is a
fact found established by the Court of Appeals that she was agreeable to the sum of one thousand pesos as the
price of the sale offered by her. If this is so, it is unlikely that Kasilag would refuse the offer of sale of the
homestead and would accept in lieu thereof a simple mortgage of the improvements, for the same sum of one
thousand pesos;
Second. In the deed it is stipulated that, if at the expiration of the period of four and a half years, the debtor
should fail to redeem the mortgage, she would execute in favor of the creditor, Marcial Kasilag, a deed of
absolute sale not only of the mortgaged improvements but also of the land for the same amount of the loan of
one thousand pesos. This magic conversion of the mortgage of the improvements into an absolute sale of the
land at the expiration of four and a half years and without any additional consideration can only mean that the
two contracts are one and the same thing, and that the first has been availed of to go around the legal
prohibition. The scheme is very obvious, and to make any attempt to reconcile it with good faith is simply to
fall into it.
The mortgage of the improvements could not have been intended because the supposed loan which it
guaranteed was the same price of the stipulated sale to be later executed, and further because Kasilag knew,
according to the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, that Emiliana Ambrosio was a poor and ignorant
woman who was not in a position to return to one thousand pesos;
Third. Kasilag had always considered the contract as one of sale of the land and not as a mortgage of the
improvements, because he put the tax declaration of the land in his name, paid the corresponding land tax, took
possession of the land, received the fruits thereof for his exclusive use, and introduced thereon permanent
improvements, one of them being a summer house, all of which were valued at about five thousand pesos. It is
not an attribute of a contract of mortgage that the creditor should take possession of the mortgaged property, or
that he should pay the taxes thereon. Kasilag would not spend five thousand pesos for permanent improvements
if he knew that his possession was precarious.
Fourth. In the document it is stipulated that the debtor would pay interest, but she did not pay any, and the
alleged mortgage was not foreclosed thereby, which shows that the stipulation was nothing but a ruse.
Fifth. The deed Exhibit 1 was drawn by Kasilag, because it is in English, and the other party is a poor and
ignorant woman, wherefore, all doubts and uncertainties arising therefrom should be resolved against Kasilag. It
is to noted that in this document are phrases indicative of the real contract between the parties. For instance: in
clause IV the word paid and not loaned is used in referring to the loan of one thousand pesos; and clause IX of
the document states "the foregoing contract of sale."
Under all these circumstances, the irresistible conclusion is that the real contract between the parties is an
absolute sale, and that the contract of mortgage was made to appear in the document Exhibit 1 for the sole
purpose of defeating the legal prohibition. Nevertheless, the majority of this Court, brushing aside the findings
of fact made by the Court of Appeals without stating its reasons therefor, holds as to the document Exhibit 1,
that "as the terms thereof are clear and leave no room for doubt, it should be interpreted according to the literal
meaning of its clauses." I have already shown in speaking of the second circumstance, that the context itself of
the document Exhibit 1 discloses strong tokens that the contract between the parties was one of the sale and not
of mortgage. Moreover, the rule relied upon by the majority is only applicable in the absence of any allegation
that the document does not express the real contract between the parties. Under section 285, No. 1, of Act No.
190, a document, however clear its conditions may be, may and should be rejected when it is alleged and shown
by evidence aliundethat it does not express the true intent of the parties. We have often considered as document,
by its terms a contract of absolute sale, as one of mortgage because it has been so alleged and established by
convincing oral evidence. (Cuyugan vs. Santos, 34 Phil., 100; Villa vs. Santiago, 38 Phil., 157; Laureano vs.
Kilayco, 34 Phil., 148; Cuyugan vs. Santos, 39 Phil., 970; Rodriguez vs. Pamintuan, 37 Phil., 876; see also
Manalo vs. Gueco, 42 Phil., 925; Gatmaitan vs. Nepumuceno, 42 Phil., 295.)
The majority decision does not only pass over the findings of fact made by the Court of Appeals, but further,
gives weight to certain facts which said court finds not to have been established. For instance, we have the
following passages the majority decision:
One year after the execution of the aforequoted deed, that is, in 1933, it came to pass that Emiliana Ambrosio
was unable to pay the stipulated interest as well as the tax on the land and its improvements. For this reason, she
and the petitioner entered into another verbal contract whereby she conveyed to the latter the possession of the
land on condition that the latter would not collect the interest on the loan, would attend to the payment of the
land tax, would benefit by the fruits of the land, and would introduce improvements thereon. . . . .
. . . This stipulation was verbally modified by the same parties after the expiration of one year, in the
sense that the petitioner would take possession of the land and would benefit by the fruits thereof on
condition that he would condone the payment of interest upon the loan and he would attend to the
payment of the land tax. . . . .
These two paragraphs state as an established fact the supposed verbal contract between the parties which
Kasilag tried to prove by his testimony. However, the Court of Appeals expressly held: "We believe, however,
that the trial court erred in giving probative value to the testimony of the appellee (Marcial Kasilag) with
reference to the alleged verbal agreement with the deceased, Emiliana Ambrosio, and based thereon the
conclusion that the appellee acted in good faith," (Words in parenthesis are mine.)
Rule 47, paragraph (b), of our Rules, provides expressly that in appeals to this court on certiorari, "only
questions of law may be raised and must be distinctly set forth." And we have held in various decisions that in
passing upon the legal conclusions of the Court of Appeals, we shall abide by the findings of fact of said court.
I, moreover, find certain ambiguities in the majority decision, for while it states on the one hand that the verbal
contract had for its purpose the "alteration of the mortgage contract clearly entered into, converting the latter
into a contract of antichresis," (underscoring mine) thereby implying that the mortgage contract was abandoned
by the parties and ceased to exist, in the dispositive part of its decision, the majority holds that the mortgage of
the improvements is valid and binding, and gives to the respondents the right to "redeem the mortgage of the
improvements by paying to the petitioner within three months the amount of P1,000 . . . ." It, therefore, requires
compliance with a contract that has ceased to exist.
While on the one hand the majority states that the aforesaid verbal contract is one of antichresis and that it is
void, on the other hand, it gives force thereto by holding that the interest on the loan of one thousand pesos is
sufficiently "set off by the value of the fruits of the mortgaged improvements which the petitioner received."
And, furthermore, why should the interest be set off against the fruits of the improvements only and not against
those of the entire land? And if the verbal contract of antichresis is void, why is Kasilag not required to render
an accounting of the fruits of the land received by him which may exceed the total amount of interest, taxes and
even the principal itself?
The majority states that Kasilag, in taking possessions of the homestead, receiving its fruits and introducing
improvements thereon, did so under the void contract of antichresis, and did so in good faith as he was
excusably unaware of the legal provision which prohibits the incumbrance of the homestead within the period
of five years. Whether Kasilag was aware or unaware of the legal prohibition is again a factual question
resolved by the Court of Appeals as follows: "the appellee ( Marcial Kasilag) was also aware of these provisions
which were incorporated in the homestead patent shown to him at the beginning of the transaction" (Words in
parenthesis are mine). I do not understand how we can disturb this factual finding.
I found, moreover, that in the majority decision it is ordered that, if the heirs of Emiliana Ambrosio cannot pay
the value of the permanent improvements introduced by Marcial Kasilag, the latter may have the homestead by
paying to them its price in the market. The improvements were appraised by the trial court at three thousand
pesos, and as the heirs of Emiliana Ambrosio probably inherited nothing from the latter but poverty, they will
eventually be unable to pay the said amount and, in the last analysis, will lose the homestead of their mother.
The practical effect, therefore, of the majority decision is that the heirs of Emiliana Ambrosio will be deprived
of the homestead by virtue of a void antichretic obligation contracted by her within the period of five years from
the granting of the homestead. And this, at least, is in violation of the spirit of section 116 of the Homestead
Act.
I have other reasons which I need not set out to bring this dissent to a close. But before I conclude, I should like
to state that the Homestead Act has been enacted for the welfare and protection of the poor. The law gives a
needy citizen a piece of land where he may build a modest house for himself and family and plant what is
necessary for subsistence and for the satisfaction of life's other needs. The right of the citizens to their homes
and to the things necessary for their subsistence is as vital as the right to life itself. They have a right to live with
a certain degree of comfort as become human beings, and the State which looks after the welfare of the people's
happiness is under a duty to safeguard the satisfaction of this vital right. Moreover, a man with a home and a
means of subsistence is a lover of peace and order and will profess affection for his country, whereas one
without a home and in penury is not only a social parasite but also a dangerous element in the social order. The
Homestead Act at once aims at the promotion of wholesome and happy citizenship and the wiping out of the
germs of social discontent found everywhere.
Considering the social and economic ends of the Homestead Act, the courts should exercise supreme care and
strict vigilance towards faithful compliance with all its benign provisions and against the defeat, directly or
indirectly, of its highly commendable purposes. And it is my firm conviction that where, as in the present case,
a rich and clever man attempts to wrest a homestead granted to a poor and ignorant woman, the slightest tokens
of illegality should be enough to move the courts to apply the strong arm of the law.
I dissent from the majority decision and vote for the affirmance of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
AVANCEÑA, C.J., dissenting:
I concur in this dissenting opinion of Justice Moran.
8. Buyco vs PNB G.R. No. L-14406, June 30, 1961
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-14406. June 30, 1961.]
MARCELINO BUYCO, Petitioner-Appellee, v. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, ILOILO BRANCH,
ILOILO CITY, Respondent-Appellant.
Efrain B. Treñas for Petitioner-Appellee.
Ramon B. de los Reyes and Nemesio C. Vargas for Respondent-Appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS; PAYMENT; BACKPAY CERTIFICATE; PNB REFUSE TO
ACCEPT CERTIFICATE; MAY BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS. — Following the ruling of this Court
in Florentino v. Philippine National Bank, 98 Phil., 959 Off. Gaz., [5] 2522 the latter can be compelled by
mandamus to accept acknowledgment of backpay certificate in payment of petitioner’s obligation with the
bank.
2. WORDS AND PHRASES; VESTED RIGHT OR VESTED INTEREST DEFINED. — A vested right or a
vested interest may be held to mean some right or interest in property that has become fixed or established, and
is no longer open to doubt or controversy (Graham v. Great Falls Water Power & Town Site Co. [Mont] 76 Pac.
808, 810, citing Evans-Snider- Buel Co. v. McFadden 10 Fed. 293, 44 CCA, 464 L. R. A. 900).
3. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; LAWS SHALL GENERALLY HAVE NO RETROACTIVE EFFECT.
— Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided (art 4, NCC), for it is said that the law
looks to the future only and has no retroactive effect unless the legislator may have formally given that effect to
some legal provisions (Lopez, Et. Al. v. Crow, 40 Phil. 997), and that statutes are to be construed as having only
prospective operation, unless the purpose and intention of the Legislature to give them a retrospective effect is
expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used, and that in case of doubt the same must be
resolved against retrospective effect (Montilla v. Augustinian Corp., 24 Phil. 220).
4. STATUTES; EFFECT OF AMENDMENT ON ACCRUED RIGHTS. — After an act is amended, the
original act continues to be in force with regard to all rights that had accrued prior to such amendment (Fairchild
v. G. S. 91 Fed. 297; Hathaway v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y. 99 F. 534).
DECISION
PAREDES, J.:
Mandamus case filed by petitioner Marcelino Buyco praying that the Respondent Philippine National Bank be
compelled to accept his backpay acknowledgment certificate No. 4801, as payment of his obligation with
said Respondent.
The case was submitted on an agreed stipulation of facts, with the pertinent documents as annexes.
On April 24, 1966, petitioner Marcelino Buyco was indebted to respondent in the amount of P5,102.90 plus
interest thereon, which represented petitioner’s deficit on his 1952-53 crop loan with respondent bank. The said
loan was secured by a mortgage of real property. Petitioner is a holder of Backpay Acknowledgment Certificate
No. 4801, dated July 9, 1955, under Rep. Act No. 897 in the amount of P22,227.69 payable in thirty (30) years.
On April 24, 1956, petitioner offered to pay respondent bank the deficit of his crop loan for the above
mentioned crop year 1952-53 with his said backpay acknowledgment certificate, but on July 18, 1956,
respondent answered petitioner that since respondent’s motion for reconsideration in the case of Marcelino B.
Florentino v. Philippine National Bank L-8782 (52 O.G. 2522) was still under consideration by this Court (S.
C.) , respondent "cannot yet grant" petitioner’s request (Annex A, amended petition). On February 15, 1957,
and after this Court has denied respondent’s motion for reconsideration in said case No. L-8782, Petitioner,
again wrote respondent, reiterating his request to pay the obligation with said certificate (Annex B). On
February 19, 1957, respondent answered petitioner that in view of the amendment of its charter on June 16,
1956 by R.A. No. 1576, it could not accept petitioners’ certificate (Annex C.) . Petitioner requested respondent
to reconsider its decision, in a letter dated March 26, 1957 (Annex D), which was referred to the respondent’s
Legal Department. In an opinion rendered on April 23, 1957, said department expressed the view that
notwithstanding the decision of this Court, the respondent could not accept the certificate because of the
amendment of its Charter heretofore mentioned.
The Court of First Instance of Iloilo, on July 24, 1958, granted the petition and ordered the respondent bank "to
give due course of the vested right of the petitioner acquired previous to the enactment of Republic Act No.
1576 by accepting his backpay acknowledgment certificate as payment of the obligation of the petitioner with
respondent Bank with costs of the proceedings against respondent." Hence, this appeal by the respondent Bank.
In spousing the cause of the petitioner-appellee, the trial court made the following findings and
conclusions:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) That in the letter Annex A, dated July 18, 1956, the respondent has impliedly admitted the right of petitioner
to apply or offer his certificate in payment of his obligation to Respondent.
(2) That the pendency of the motion for reconsideration of the Florentino case filed by respondent-appellant, did
not affect the petitioner’s vested right already created and acquired at the time he offered to pay his obligation
with his certificate on April 24, 1956, and before the passage of Rep. Act No. 1576.
(3) That Rep. Act No. 1576 does not nullify the right of the petitioner to pay his obligation with his backpay
certificate.
(4) That the writ of mandamus would lie against the Appellant.
The above findings and conclusions are assigned as errors, alleged to have been committed by the trial court.
In the light of the Supreme Court’s decision in the Florentino case, the respondent Philippine National Bank
therein, was declared authorized to accept backpay acknowledgment certificate as payment of the obligation of
any holder thereof. Although the Florentino case was promulgated on April 28, 1956, four (4) days after April
24, 1956, the date the appellee offered to pay with his backpay acknowledgment certificate, it is nevertheless
obvious that on or before said April 24, 1956, the right to have his certificate applied for the payment of his
obligation with the appellant already existed by virtue of Republic Act No. 897, which was merely construed
and clarified by this Court in the said Florentino case. So that when the appellant in its letter of July 18, 1956,
replied that "in the meantime that our motion for reconsideration of the said decision is still pending the
resolution of the Supreme Court, we regret to advise that we cannot yet grant your request", the said appellant
already knew or should have known that a right was vested, only that its enforcement had to wait the resolution
of this Court which it handed on February 15, 1957, by maintaining its decision. A vested right or a vested
interest may be held to mean some right or interest in property that has become fixed or established, and is no
longer open to doubt or controversy (Graham v. Great Falls Water Power & Town Site Co. [Mont] 76 Pac. 808,
810, citing Evan-Snider-Buel Co. v. Mc Fadden, 10 Fed. 293, 44 CCA, 464 L.R.A. 900). Considering the facts
and circumstances obtaining in the case, we agree with the lower court that the appellant herein had impliedly
admitted the right of the petitioner to apply his backpay certificate in payment of his obligation. This
notwithstanding, whether implied or expressed, the admission by the appellant of appellee’s right, has already
lost momentum or importance, because the law on the matter on April 24, 1956, when the offer to pay the
obligation with the certificate was made, or the law before the amendatory Act of June 16, 1956, was the PNB
was compelled to receive petitioner’s backpay certificate.
Section 9-A of Republic Act No. 1576, passed on June 16, 1956, amending the Charter of the respondent-
appellant bank, provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The Board of Directors shall have the power and authority:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . (d) In its discretion, to accept assignment of payments, certificates of indebtedness of the government or
other such similar securities: Provided, however, that the authority herein granted shall not be used as regards
backpay certificates."cralaw virtua1aw library
What would be the effect of this law upon the case at bar? "Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the
contrary is provided" (Art. 4, New Civil Code). It is said that the law looks to the future only and has no
retroactive effect unless the legislator may have formally given that effect to some legal provisions (Lopez, Et.
Al. v. Crow. 40 Phil., 997, 1007); that all statutes are to be construed as having only prospective operation,
unless the purpose and intention of the Legislature to give them a retrospective effect is expressly declared or is
necessarily implied from the language used; and that every case of doubt must be resolved against retroactive
effect (Montilla v. Agustinian Corp., 24 Phil., 220). These principles also apply to amendments of statutes.
Republic Act No. 1576 does not contain any provision regarding its retroactive nor such may be implied from
its language. It simply states its effectivity upon approval. The amendment, therefore has no retroactive effect,
and the present case should be governed by the law at the time the offer in question was made. The rule is
familiar that after an act is amended, the original act continues to be in force with regard to all rights that had
accrued prior to such amendment (Fairchild v. U. S. 91 Fed. 297; Hathaway v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 99
F. 534).
It is true that "acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except when
the law itself authorizes their validity" (Art 5, New Civil Code). It should be recalled, however, that since the
prohibitive amendment of the appellant’s charter should not be given retroactive effect; and that the law, at the
time appellee made his offer, allowed, in fact compelled, the respondent bank to accept the appellee’s
certificate, the above provision finds no application herein.
IN VIEW HEREOF, mandamus is the proper remedy (Florentino case, supra), and the judgment appealed from
is hereby affirmed with costs against the Respondent-Appellant.
Bengzon, C.J., Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, De Leon and Natividad, JJ., concur.
Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion and Barrera, JJ., took no part.
9. Puzon vs Abellera G.R. No. 75082 January 31, 1989
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
 SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 75082 January 31, 1989
JOSE F. PUZON, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
ALEJANDRA ABELLERA, substituted by TOMASA D. DOMONDON, oppositor-appellee.
De Guzman, Florendo & Apolinar Law Office for petitioner-appellant.
Sixto A. Domondon and Hector D. Domondon for oppositor-appellee.
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the then First Civil Cases Division of the
Intermediate Appellate Court ** in AC-G.R. CV No. 04690, dated 13 March 1986, affirming in toto the
decision of the then Court of First Instance of Baguio and Benguet, Branch IV, sitting as a Land Registration
Court, in Administrative Case No. 2091. It is the contention of petitioner that:
THE HONORABLE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN UPHOLDING THAT LANDS WITHIN THE BAGUIO TOWNSITE
RESERVATION WHOSE TITLES HAVE BEEN ISSUED IN CIVIL RESERVATION
CASE NO. 1, G.L.R.O. RECORD NO. 211 PURSUANT TO REPUBLIC ACT 931, AS
AMENDED, ARE NOT SUBJECT TO REALTY TAX. (Petition, p. 7, Rollo)
The oppositor-appellee (now deceased and substituted by her only child Tomasa Domondon) was the registered
owner of the land in question, a two-hectare lot known as Lot 1-B subdivision plan (LRC) PSU-33174, Res.
Sec. 2, Km. 3 Asin Road, Baguio City and covered by TCT No. 8103. The said land was part of a bigger tract of
public land but titled in a judicial reopening proceeding pursuant to the provisions of RA 931, as amended,
entitled "An act to authorize the filing in the court, under certain conditions, of certain claims of titles to parcels
of land that have been declared public land, by virtue of judicial decisions rendered within the forty years next
preceeding the approval of this act' (now inoperative).
Subsequently, in a case entitled Republic, et al. v. Hon. Pio R. Marcos, et al., 29 SCRA 517 (1969), We
declared all titles issued under RA 931 null and void since the said Act was applicable only to places that were
covered by cadastral proceedings, not to the City of Baguio which was covered by a townsite reservation under
Civil Reservation Case No. 1, G.L.R.O. Record No. 211 filed before the enactment of Cadastral Act No. 2259
on 11 February 1913. This was followed by another case also entitled Republic v. Marcos, 52 SCRA 238
(1973), where We reiterated the above ruling. The ruling in these case was subsequently enacted into law as
incorporated in Presidential Decree No. 1271 which took effect on 22 December 1977 with the title "An act
nullifying decrees of registration and certificates of title covering lands within the Baguio Townsite Reservation
Case No. 1, G.L.R.O. Record No. 211 pursuant to Republic Act No. 931, as amended, but considering as valid
certain titles of such lands that are alienable and disposable under certain conditions and for other purposes."
Hence, the lot in question was reverted to the public domain.
On 10 October 1977, certain real properties in Baguio City, which included two (2) properties of the oppositor-
appellee, one of which is the land involved in this appeal, were auctioned off. Allegedly, the real property taxes
on the land in question for the years 1971 to 1977 had not been paid. Having been previously informed of the
scheduled auction sale of tax delinquent properties in Baguio City, petitioner Puzon gained interest in the
property in question. He examined the title of said land and all other documents evidencing transactions over
the same. At the auction sale petitioner Puzon was declared winner in the bidding over the lot in question, being
the lone bidder, and paid to the City Treasurer a total sum of only P3,253.95 which included his bid and other
petty sums.
One year after the tax sale, petitioner Puzon was given a certificate of sale over the parcel of land sold to him.
He went to the Registry of Deeds in order to register said certificate and to secure a new title in his name but
was advised to first go to court for an order confirming said sale. Hence, petitioner filed this suit to consolidate
his ownership over the property.
In the meantime, while trying to avail of the provisions of PD 1271 in oppositor-appellee's behalf, Tomasa
Domondon found out that the two lands of the former had been auctioned off for alleged tax deliquencies for the
years 1971 to 1977, one of which is the land purchased by petitioner Puzon Domondon then arranged a meeting
with the latter to discuss the matter with him. But when the latter failed to appear at the appointed time and
place. Domondon consigned with the Court the amount of P4,780.00 after having verified that Puzon paid only
P3,252.95 for a two-hectare land which could have commanded a very much higher price. She then filed her
opposition to petitioner Puzon's petition for consolidation. The lower court ruled in favor of the then oppositor,
declaring null and void the aforesaid auction sale and illegal the assessment made. This ruling was affirmed by
the then Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC), hence this present petition. As stated by the lower court and
adopted by the IAC, the issues are "whether the (property) involved herein can be considered tax (delinquent)
and, if, so, has there been a valid tax sale of the same as to place the Court under no recourse but to confirm said
(sale) and order the (title) thereof transferred in the name of petitioner Jose F. Puzon . ." (p. 23, Rollo).
In concluding that the assessments made for the years 1971 to 1977 were legal, petitioner contends that PD
1271 is curative in nature. Section 1 of the said Decree states in part:
SECTION 1. All orders and decisions issued by the Court of First Instance of Baguio and
Benguet in connection with the proceedings for the reopening of Civil Reservation Case No.
1, GLRO Record No. 21 1, covering lands within the Baguio Townsite Reservation, and
decreeing such lands in favor of private individuals or entities, are hereby declared null and
void and without force and effect; PROVIDED, HOWEVER that all certificates of titles
issued on or before July 31, 1973 shall be considered valid and the lands covered by them
shall be deemed to have been conveyed in fee simple to the registered owners upon a showing
of, and compliance with, the following conditions.. . (74 O.G. No. 19, pp- 3583-3584).
The petitioner submits that: 'upon compliance with certain requirements the titles so issued are validated and
deemed to have been conveyed in fee simple.... The validation of the title retroacts to the very day the title was
originally issued' (pp. 45, Rollo). We agree with the petitioner. The intent of the law necessarily makes such
titles valid from, the time they were issued. The ninth "whereas" clause of PD 1271 states:
WHEREAS, there are holders of titles who, before the promulgation of the decision of the
Supreme Court on July 31, 1973, had acted in good faith and relied, although mistakenly, on
the indefeasibility of torrens certificates of titles and who had introduced substantial
improvements on the land covered by the certificates. (74 O.G. No. 19, p. 3583)
The foregoing necessarily implies that the intent of the law is to recognize the effects of certain acts of
ownership done in good faith by persons with torrens titles issued in their favor before the cut-off date stated,
honestly believing that they had validly acquired the lands. And such would be possible only by validating all
the said titles issued before 31 July 1973, effective on their respective dates of issue. However, the validity of
these titles would not become operative unless and after the conditions stated in PD 1271 are met. Hence, the
phrase "upon a showing, and compliance with, the following conditions," (Sec. 1, PD 1271)
While it may be argued that Article 4 of the New Civil Code prohibits the retroactive application of laws unless
expressly provided therein, such rule allows some exceptions. As We have held in the case of Nilo v. Court of
Appeals, 128 SCRA 519, "a statute operates prospectively only and never retroactively, unless the legislative
intent to the contrary is made manifest either by the express terms of the statute or by necessary
implications." As pointed out above, PD 1271 falls under one of the exceptions.
Considering, however, that during the years 1971-1977 the land in question was still part of the public domain,
the oppositor-appellee could not, in those years, obviously be held liable for real property taxes over the land in
question. Since the validity of her title would take effect retroactively only after having complied with the
conditions set in PD 1271, only then could she be held liable for taxes for the period starting 1971 to 1977. It
would be absurd then to hold the oppositor-appellee liable for taxes over a piece of land which she did not own
(it being public land) or use. Consequently, the tax sale was prematurely conducted. The oppositor-appellee
should have first been given the opportunity to settle the taxes assessed for the years 1971-1977 after having
complied with PD 1271.
As to the validity of the auction sale, We reiterate that it was prematurely held, hence, null and void for the
above reasons. But even on the evidence presented by the parties, assuming that the sale was properly and
seasonably held, it has been clearly shown by the trial court and the IAC that the oppositor-appellee was not
properly notified. The holding of the tax sale despite the absence of the requisite notice was tantamount to a
violation of her substantial right to due process. As held by the IAC,
. . . Under these provisions (referring to Secs. 59, 65, 73 and 76 of PD 464, the Real Property
Tax Code) notice to the delinquent owner is required as a prerequisite to a valid tax sale.
Failure to notify the registered owner shall vitiate the sale.' (Cabrera v. Prov. Treasurer, 75
Phil. 780)
Tax sales are administrative proceedings. And-
Administrative proceedings established for the sale of private lands for non-payment of taxes
being in personam (Pantaleon v. Santos, L-10289, July 31, 1957), it is essential that there be
actual notice to the delinquent, otherwise the sale is null and void although preceded by
proper advertisement or publication." (Vivencio v. Quintos, CA-G.R. No. 44697, Jan. 23,
1975, 72 O.G. No. 11, March 15, 1975.) (Decision of the IAC, 13 March 1986, pp. 27-28,
Rollo)
We do not see the above findings of fact of the trial court, as adopted by the IAC, to be contrary to the evidence
presented nor tainted with partiality or indiscretion. Hence, We accord them great respect (Premier Insurance
and Surety Corporation v. IAC, 141 SCRA 432; Vda. de Roxas v. IAC, 143 SCRA 77; Republic v. IAC, 144
SCRA 705).
WHEREFORE, the appealed decisions is hereby MODIFIED accordingly, that is the land should really be
considered owned by the respondent and her title thereto must not be disturbed BUT she must pay the real
property taxes thereon for the years 1971-1977. As to the other matters raised, We find no reason to deviate
from the findings of the lower court and, thus, AFFIRM the same.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur. Padilla, J., no part, by reason of
ownership of a lot in the same Baguio townsite reservation.
Footnotes
** Penned by then Associate Justice Coquioa and concurred in by then Presiding Justice
Gaviola and Associate Justices Quetulio-Losa and Ines Luciano.
10. RB Michael Press vs Galit G.R. No. 153510 February 13, 2008
ECOND DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 153510 : February 13, 2008]
R.B. MICHAEL PRESS and ANNALENE REYES ESCOBIA,Petitioners, v. NICASIO C.
GALIT, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
Year in, year out, a copious number of illegal dismissal cases reach the Court of Appeals (CA) and eventually February 24, 1999
end up with this Court. This Petition for Review under Rule 45 registered by petitioners R.B. Michael Press and
Annalene Reyes Escobia against their former machine operator, respondent Nicasio C. Galit, is among them. It Dear Mr. Nicasio Galit,
assails the November 14, 2001 Decision of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 62959, finding the dismissal of
respondent illegal. Likewise challenged is the May 7, 2002 Resolution denying reconsideration.
I am sorry to inform you that your employment with this company has been terminated effective today,
February 24, 1999. This decision was not made without a thorough and complete investigation.
The Facts
You were given an office memo dated February 23, 1999 warning you of a possible dismissal. You were given
On May 1, 1997, respondent was employed by petitioner R.B. Michael Press as an offset machine operator, a chance to defend yourself on a hearing that was held in the afternoon of the said date.
whose work schedule was from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., Mondays to Saturdays, and he was paid PhP 230 a day.
During his employment, Galit was tardy for a total of 190 times, totaling to 6,117 minutes, and was absent
During the hearing, Mrs. Rebecca Velasquez and Mr. Dennis Reyes, were present in their capacity as
without leave for a total of nine and a half days. Production Manager and Supervisor, respectively.

On February 22, 1999, respondent was ordered to render overtime service in order to comply with a job order
Your admission to your offenses against the company and the testimonies from Mrs. Velasquez and Mr. Reyes
deadline, but he refused to do so. The following day, February 23, 1999, respondent reported for work but
justified your dismissal from this company,
petitioner Escobia told him not to work, and to return later in the afternoon for a hearing. When he returned, a
copy of an Office Memorandum was served on him, as follows:
Please contact Ms. Marly Buita to discuss 13th-Month Pay disbursements.
To : Mr. Nicasio Galit
From : ANNALENE REYES-ESCOBIA Cordially,
Re : WARNING FOR DISMISSAL; NOTICE OF HEARING
(SGD) Mrs. Annalene Reyes-Escobia2
This warning for dismissal is being issued for the following offenses:
Respondent subsequently filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and money claims before the National Labor
(1) habitual and excessive tardiness Relations Commission (NLRC) Regional Arbitration Branch No. IV, which was docketed as NLRC Case No.
RAB IV-2-10806-99-C. On October 29, 1999, the labor arbiter rendered a Decision,
(2) committing acts of discourtesy, disrespect in addressing superiors
WHEREFORE, premises considered, there being a finding that complainant was illegally dismissed, respondent
RB MICHAEL PRESS/Annalene Reyes-Escobia is hereby ordered to reinstate complainant to his former
(3) failure to work overtime after having been instructed to do so
position without loss of seniority rights and other benefits, and be paid his full backwages computed from the
time he was illegally dismissed up to the time of his actual reimbursement.
(4) Insubordination - willfully disobeying, defying or disregarding company authority
All other claims are DISMISSED for lack of evidence.
The offenses you ve committed are just causes for termination of employment as provided by the Labor Code.
You were given verbal warnings before, but there had been no improvement on your conduct. SO ORDERED.3

Further investigation of this matter is required, therefore, you are summoned to a hearing at 4:00 p.m. today.
On January 3, 2000, petitioners elevated the case to the NLRC and their appeal was docketed as NLRC NCR
The hearing wills determine your employment status with this company.
CA No. 022433-00. In the April 28, 2000 Decision, the NLRC dismissed the appeal for lack of merit.

(SGD) ANNALENE REYES-ESCOBIA

Not satisfied with the ruling of the NLRC, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA. On November
Manager1
14, 2001, the CA rendered its judgment affirming with modification the NLRC's Decision, thus:

On February 24, 1999, respondent was terminated from employment. The employer, through petitioner Escobia, WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Decision of public respondent is
gave him his two-day salary and a termination letter, which reads: accordingly modified in that the basis of the computation of the backwages, 13th month pay and incentive pay
should be respondent's daily wage of P230.00; however, backwages should be computed from February 22,
1999 up to the finality of this decision, plus the 13 th month and service incentive leave pay.4
The CA found that it was not the tardiness and absences committed by respondent, but his refusal to render
overtime work on February 22, 1999 which caused the termination of his employment. It ruled that the time
frame in which respondent was afforded procedural due process is dubitable; he could not have been afforded
ample opportunity to explain his side and to adduce evidence on his behalf. It further ruled that the basis for
computing his backwages should be his daily salary at the time of his dismissal which was PhP 230, and that his
backwages should be computed from the time of his dismissal up to the finality of the CA's decision.
On December 3, 2001, petitioners asked for reconsideration 5 but was denied in the CA's May 7, 2002
Resolution.
Persistent, petitioners instituted the instant petition raising numerous issues which can be summarized, as
follows: first, whether there was just cause to terminate the employment of respondent, and whether due process
was observed in the dismissal process; and second, whether respondent is entitled to backwages and other
benefits despite his refusal to be reinstated.
The Court's Ruling
It is well settled that findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies, like the NLRC, are accorded not only respect
but even finality if the findings are supported by substantial evidence. This is especially so when such findings
of the labor arbiter were affirmed by the CA.6However, this is not an iron-clad rule. Though the findings of fact
by the labor arbiter may have been affirmed and adopted by the NLRC and the CA as in this case, it cannot
divest the Court of its authority to review the findings of fact of the lower courts or quasi-judicial agencies when
it sees that justice has not been served, more so when the lower courts or quasi-judicial agencies' findings are
contrary to the evidence on record or fail to appreciate relevant and substantial evidence presented before it. 7
Petitioners aver that Galit was dismissed due to the following offenses: (1) habitual and excessive tardiness; (2)
commission of discourteous acts and disrespectful conduct when addressing superiors; (3) failure to render
overtime work despite instruction to do so; and (4) insubordination, that is, willful disobedience of, defiance to,
or disregard of company authority.8 The foregoing charges may be condensed into: (1) tardiness constituting
neglect of duty; (2) serious misconduct; and (3) insubordination or willful disobedience.
Respondent's tardiness cannot be considered condoned by petitioners
Habitual tardiness is a form of neglect of duty. Lack of initiative, diligence, and discipline to come to work on
time everyday exhibit the employee's deportment towards work. Habitual and excessive tardiness is inimical to
the general productivity and business of the employer. This is especially true when the tardiness and/or
absenteeism occurred frequently and repeatedly within an extensive period of time.
In resolving the issue on tardiness, the labor arbiter ruled that petitioners cannot use respondent's habitual
tardiness and unauthorized absences to justify his dismissal since they had already deducted the corresponding
amounts from his salary. Furthermore, the labor arbiter explained that since respondent was not subjected to any
admonition or penalty for tardiness, petitioners then had condoned the offense or that the infraction is not
serious enough to merit any penalty. The CA then supported the labor arbiter's ruling by ratiocinating that
petitioners cannot draw on respondent's habitual tardiness in order to dismiss him since there is no evidence
which shows that he had been warned or reprimanded for his excessive and habitual tardiness.
We find the ruling incorrect.
The mere fact that the numerous infractions of respondent have not been immediately subjected to sanctions
cannot be interpreted as condonation of the offenses or waiver of the company to enforce company rules. A
waiver is a voluntary and intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known legal right or privilege. 9It has
been ruled that "a waiver to be valid and effective must be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave
no doubt as to the intention of a party to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him." 10 Hence, the
management prerogative to discipline employees and impose punishment is a legal right which cannot, as a
general rule, be impliedly waived.
In Cando v. NLRC,11 the employee did not report for work for almost five months when he was charged for
absenteeism. The employee claimed that such absences due to his handling of union matters were condoned.
The Court held that the employee did not adduce proof to show condonation coupled with the fact that the
company eventually instituted the administrative complaint relating to his company violations.
Thus it is incumbent upon the employee to adduce substantial evidence to demonstrate condonation or waiver
on the part of management to forego the exercise of its right to impose sanctions for breach of company rules.
In the case at bar, respondent did not adduce any evidence to show waiver or condonation on the part of
petitioners. Thus the finding of the CA that petitioners cannot use the previous absences and tardiness because
respondent was not subjected to any penalty is bereft of legal basis. In the case of Filipio v. The Honorable
Minister Blas F. Ople,12 the Court, quoting then Labor Minister Ople, ruled that past infractions for which the
employee has suffered the corresponding penalty for each violation cannot be used as a justification for the
employee's dismissal for that would penalize him twice for the same offense. At most, it was explained, "these
collective infractions could be used as supporting justification to a subsequent similar offense." In contrast, the
petitioners in the case at bar did not impose any punishment for the numerous absences and tardiness of
respondent. Thus, said infractions can be used collectively by petitioners as a ground for dismissal.
The CA however reasoned out that for respondent's absences, deductions from his salary were made and hence
to allow petitioners to use said absences as ground for dismissal would amount to "double jeopardy."
This postulation is incorrect.
Respondent is admittedly a daily wage earner and hence is paid based on such arrangement. For said daily paid
workers, the principle of "a day's pay for a day's work" is squarely applicable. Hence it cannot be construed in
any wise that such nonpayment of the daily wage on the days he was absent constitutes a penalty.
Insubordination or willful disobedience
While the CA is correct that the charge of serious misconduct was not substantiated, the charge of
insubordination however is meritorious.
For willful disobedience to be a valid cause for dismissal, these two elements must concur: (1) the employee's
assailed conduct must have been willful, that is, characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude; and (2) the
order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee, and must pertain to the duties
which he had been engaged to discharge.13
In the present case, there is no question that petitioners' order for respondent to render overtime service to meet
a production deadline complies with the second requisite. Art. 89 of the Labor Code empowers the employer to
legally compel his employees to perform overtime work against their will to prevent serious loss or damage:
Art. 89. EMERGENCY OVERTIME WORK
Any employee may be required by the employer to perform overtime work in any of the following cases:
xxx
(c) When there is urgent work to be performed on machines, installations, or equipment, in order to avoid
serious loss or damage to the employer or some other cause of similar nature;
xxx
In the present case, petitioners' business is a printing press whose production schedule is sometimes flexible and
varying. It is only reasonable that workers are sometimes asked to render overtime work in order to meet
production deadlines.
Dennis Reyes, in his Affidavit dated May 3, 1999, stated that in the morning of February 22, 1999, he
approached and asked respondent to render overtime work so as to meet a production deadline on a printing job
order, but respondent refused to do so for no apparent reason. Respondent, on the other hand, claims that the
reason why he refused to render overtime work was because he was not feeling well that day.
The issue now is, whether respondent's refusal or failure to render overtime work was willful; that is, whether
such refusal or failure was characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude. In Lakpue Drug Inc. v. Belga,
willfulness was described as "characterized by a wrongful and perverse mental attitude rendering the employee's
act inconsistent with proper subordination." 14 The fact that respondent refused to provide overtime work despite
his knowledge that there is a production deadline that needs to be met, and that without him, the offset machine
operator, no further printing can be had, shows his wrongful and perverse mental attitude; thus, there is
willfulness.
Respondent's excuse that he was not feeling well that day is unbelievable and obviously an afterthought. He
failed to present any evidence other than his own assertion that he was sick. Also, if it was true that he was then
not feeling well, he would have taken the day off, or had gone home earlier, on the contrary, he stayed and
continued to work all day, and even tried to go to work the next day, thus belying his excuse, which is, at most,
a self-serving statement.
After a re-examination of the facts, we rule that respondent unjustifiably refused to render overtime work
despite a valid order to do so. The totality of his offenses against petitioner R.B. Michael Press shows that he
was a difficult employee. His refusal to render overtime work was the final straw that broke the camel's back,
and, with his gross and habitual tardiness and absences, would merit dismissal from service.
Due process: twin notice and hearing requirement
On the issue of due process, petitioners claim that they had afforded respondent due process. Petitioners
maintain that they had observed due process when they gave respondent two notices and that they had even
scheduled a hearing where he could have had explained his side and defended himself.
We are not persuaded.
We held in Agabon v. NLRC:
Procedurally, (1) if the dismissal is based on a just cause under Article 282, the employer must give the
employee two written notices and a hearing or opportunity to be heard if requested by the employee before
terminating the employment: a notice specifying the grounds for which dismissal is sought a hearing or an
opportunity to be heard and after hearing or opportunity to be heard, a notice of the decision to dismiss; and (2)
if the dismissal is based on authorized causes under Articles 283 and 284, the employer must give the employee
and the Department of Labor and Employment written notices 30 days prior to the effectivity of his separation.15
Under the twin notice requirement, the employees must be given two (2) notices before his employment could
be terminated: (1) a first notice to apprise the employees of their fault, and (2) a second notice to communicate
to the employees that their employment is being terminated. Not to be taken lightly of course is the hearing or
opportunity for the employee to defend himself personally or by counsel of his choice.
In King of Kings Transport v. Mamac,16 we had the occasion to further elucidate on the procedure relating to the
twin notice and hearing requirement, thus:
(1) The first written notice to be served on the employees should contain the specific causes or grounds for
termination against them, and a directive that the employees are given the opportunity to submit their written
explanation within a reasonable period. "Reasonable opportunity" under the Omnibus Rules means every kind
of assistance that management must accord to the employees to enable them to prepare adequately for their
defense. This should be construed as a period of at least five (5) calendar days from receipt of the notice to give
the employees an opportunity to study the accusation against them, consult a union official or lawyer, gather
data and evidence, and decide on the defenses they will raise against the complaint. Moreover, in order to
enable the employees to intelligently prepare their explanation and defenses, the notice should contain a detailed
narration of the facts and circumstances that will serve as basis for the charge against the employees. A general
description of the charge will not suffice. Lastly, the notice should specifically mention which company rules, if
any, are violated and/or which among the grounds under Art. 282 is being charged against the employees.
(2) After serving the first notice, the employers should schedule and conduct a hearing or conference wherein
the employees will be given the opportunity to: (1) explain and clarify their defenses to the charge against them;
(2) present evidence in support of their defenses; and (3) rebut the evidence presented against them by the
management. During the hearing or conference, the employees are given the chance to defend themselves
personally, with the assistance of a representative or counsel of their choice. Moreover, this conference or
hearing could be used by the parties as an opportunity to come to an amicable settlement.
(3) After determining that termination of employment is justified, the employers shall serve the employees
a written notice of termination indicating that: (1) all circumstances involving the charge against the
employees have been considered; and (2) grounds have been established to justify the severance of their
employment.
In addition, if the continued employment poses a serious and imminent threat to the life or property of the
employers or of other employees like theft or physical injuries, and there is a need for preventive
suspension,17 the employers can immediately suspend the erring employees for a period of not more than 30
days. Notwithstanding the suspension, the employers are tasked to comply with the twin notice requirement
under the law. The preventive suspension cannot replace the required notices.18 Thus, there is still a need to
comply with the twin notice requirement and the requisite hearing or conference to ensure that the employees
are afforded due process even though they may have been caught in flagrante or when the evidence of the
commission of the offense is strong.
On the surface, it would seem that petitioners observed due process (twin notice and hearing requirement): On
February 23, 1999 petitioner notified respondent of the hearing to be conducted later that day. On the same day
before the hearing, respondent was furnished a copy of an office memorandum which contained a list of his
offenses, and a notice of a scheduled hearing in the afternoon of the same day. The next day, February 24, 1999,
he was notified that his employment with petitioner R.B. Michael Press had been terminated.
In the February 24, 1999 notice of dismissal, petitioners simply justified respondent's dismissal by citing his
admission of the offenses charged. It did not specify the details surrounding the offenses and the specific
company rule or Labor Code provision upon which the dismissal was grounded.
In view of the infirmities in the proceedings, we conclude that termination of respondent was railroaded in
serious breach of his right to due process. And as a consequence of the violation of his statutory right to due
process and following Agabon, petitioners are liable jointly and solidarily to pay nominal damages to the
respondent in the amount of PhP 30,000.19
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the November 14, 2001 CA Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 62959, the
April 28, 2000 Decision of the NLRC in NLRC NCR CA No. 022433-00, and the October 29, 1999 Decision of
the Labor Arbiter in NLRC Case No. RAB IV-2-10806-99-C are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Court declares respondent's dismissal from employment VALID and LEGAL. Petitioners are, however,
ordered jointly and solidarily to pay respondent nominal damages in the amount of PhP 30,000 for violation of
respondent's right to due process.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Endnotes:
1
Rollo, p. 71.

2
A scrutiny of the disciplinary process undertaken by petitioners leads us to conclude that they only paid lip Id. at 72.
service to the due process requirements.
3
Id. at 59-60.
The undue haste in effecting respondent's termination shows that the termination process was a mere simulation
the required notices were given, a hearing was even scheduled and held, but respondent was not really given a 4
Id. at 47. The Decision was penned by Associate Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria, and concurred in by Associate
real opportunity to defend himself; and it seems that petitioners had already decided to dismiss respondent from Justices Teodoro P. Regino and Rebecca de Guia-Salvador.
service, even before the first notice had been given.
5
CA rollo, pp. 130-132.
Anent the written notice of charges and hearing, it is plain to see that there was merely a general description of
the claimed offenses of respondent. The hearing was immediately set in the afternoon of February 23, 1999 the 6
Nautica Canning Corp. et al. v. Roberto C. Yumul, G.R. No. 164588, Ocotber 19, 2005, 473 SCRA 415, 423-
day respondent received the first notice. Therefore, he was not given any opportunity at all to consult a union 424; Agabon v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 158693, November 17, 2004, 442 SCRA 573,
official or lawyer, and, worse, to prepare for his defense. 604.

Regarding the February 23, 1999 afternoon hearing, it can be inferred that respondent, without any lawyer or 7
See Basilisa Dungaran v. Arleni Koschnicke, G.R. No. 161048, August 31, 2005, 468 SCRA 676, 685; Larena
friend to counsel him, was not given any chance at all to adduce evidence in his defense. At most, he was asked v. Mapili, G.R. No. 146341, August 7, 2003, 408 SCRA 484, 488-489.
if he did not agree to render overtime work on February 22, 1999 and if he was late for work for 197 days. He
was never given any real opportunity to justify his inability to perform work on those days. This is the only 8
Rollo, p. 71.
explanation why petitioners assert that respondent admitted all the charges.
9
Castro v. Del Rosario, et al., No. L-17915, January 31, 1967, 19 SCRA 196, 203. From the conflicting versions of the parties, the Court of Appeals found the following facts which are culled
from and duly supported by the records.
10
Thomson v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116631, October 28, 1998, 298 SCRA 280, 293-294.
Petitioners spouses Sinfronio and Esperanza Puerto were the former registered owners of a house and lot
11
G.R. No. 91344, September 14, 1990, 189 SCRA 666, 671. located at 89 Kapiligan, Araneta Subdivision, Quezon City, subject of the present controversy. They bought this
property from one Mrs. Luna but did not have the title immediately transferred to their names until they
12
G.R. No. 72129, February 7, 1990, 182 SCRA 1, 3-4. mortgaged the same to private respondents spouses Inocencio and Eleuteria Cortes. 4 It appears that on May 8,
1972, petitioners executed, in favor of private respondents, a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage 5 covering the said
13
house and lot. This deed provides, among others, that petitioner spouses, obtained from private respondents a
Micro Sales Operation Network v. NLRC, G.R. No. 155279, October 11, 2005, 472 SCRA 328, 335-336. loan in the amount of P200,000, payable within one year from the date of the execution thereof. Ostensibly, the
mortgage contract did not provide for any stipulated interest. It however provided that should petitioners fail to
14
G.R. No. 166379, October 20, 2005, 473 SCRA 617, 624. pay the principal loan, private respondents were authorized to immediately foreclose the mortgaged property,
judicially or extrajudicially, under the provisions of Act No. 3135. Furthermore, private respondents would be
15 appointed receiver in case of foreclosure.
G.R. No. 158693, November 17, 2004, 442 SCRA 573, 608.

16 According to petitioner Esperanza Puerto, the Deed of Mortgage did not reflect the true intent of the parties, as
G.R. No. 166208, June 29, 2007, 526 SCRA 116, 125-126.
in fact, the consideration of the mortgage was only P150,000. She claims that the one year interest was added to
17
Rules Implementing the Labor Code, as amended by D.O. 09, June 21, 1997, Book V, Rule XXIII, Secs. 8 & the P150,000, the additional P50,000 as advance payment, hence, the amount of P200,000 was stated in the
9. deed. She further testified that the P150,000 constituted the advance of P8,000, with the corresponding receipt;
another P2,000, without any receipt, received by petitioner Esperanza on May 8, 1972, for payment of taxes and
18 to register the deed of sale when the property was first bought by petitioners from Mrs. Luna, and to register the
Tanala v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 116588, January 24, 1996, 252 SCRA 314, 321.
mortgage in favor of private respondents; a Monte de Piedad cashier’s check in the amount of P70,000 received
by Esperanza on May 10, 1972;6 and several pieces of jewelry valued at P70,000 she received on May 9, 1972.
19
Supra note 15. She added that for the last transaction, she made out a receipt to the effect that she received the amount
of P30,000 in cash and pieces of diamond jewelry worth P170,000.7 All the receipts presented by Esperanza
11. Spouses Puerto vs CA G.R. No. 138210. June 06, 2002 were written and duly signed by her.

SECOND DIVISION Esperanza testified that she reached a verbal agreement with private respondents on the following:8

G.R. No. 138210 June 6, 2002 1. that petitioners would not pay an interest for one year from date of mortgage until maturity because
of the prepaid interest of P50,000;
SPOUSES SINFRONIO PUERTO and ESPERANZA PUERTO, petitioners,
vs. 2. that after the maturity of the loan, private respondents would still allow the petitioners to redeem the
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. BR. 83 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY property even after foreclosure as long as the latter would return the amount of P200,000 in lump sum;
and SPS. INOCENCIO and ELEUTERIA CORTES, respondents.
3. that in the event that petitioners could not return the loan in lump sum, they would pay P4,000
QUISUMBING, J.: monthly interest; and

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the amended decision 1 dated February 4, 1999,
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 32197, as well as its resolution2 dated April 5, 1999 denying the
motion for reconsideration. The appellate court affirmed the decision3 dated January 18, 1991, of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 83, dismissing the amended complaint of petitioners (plaintiffs below) in
Civil Case No. Q-21883.
4. that petitioners would cooperate with the private respondents to conceal the usurious character of the
loan by not demanding receipts for payments of interest.
Private respondent Eleuteria Cortes, on the other hand, testified that sometime in 1972, petitioners asked them
for a loan of P200,000 and gave the house and lot as security. According to Eleuteria, she loaned Esperanza the
money because of their long friendship. She claims that the mortgage deed as well as all the receipts presented
by Esperanza reflect all their agreements.9
When the loan matured on May 8, 1973, petitioners failed to pay the P200,000. On August 3, 1973, private
respondents made a formal demand for petitioners to pay the loan under threat of foreclosure of the mortgaged
property. As petitioners failed to pay, private respondents foreclosed the property, which was sold at a public
auction on October 4, 1973. Private respondents were the highest bidders.1âwphi1.nêt
On May 7, 1975, even after title to the property was transferred to private respondents, petitioners were allowed
to stay on the property until they could find a new residence. However, after repeated extensions to stay,
petitioners did not transfer. They then entered into a lease contract where petitioners would pay the respondents,
as new owners, P3,000 by way of rentals, effective January 1, 1975. On September 16, 1976, when petitioners
failed and refused to pay monthly rentals beginning February 1976, private respondents filed an ejectment case
against them in the City Court of Quezon City.10
Petitioners, for their part, alleged that when they failed to pay the loan, private respondents demanded a monthly
interest of P4,000. When they failed to pay said interest for four months, private respondents foreclosed the
mortgage. On October 5, 1974, after the expiration of the redemption period, private respondents acquired full
title to the property and were issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. 207527. Petitioners claim that from
October 1973 until December 1975, they continued to pay the monthly interest of P4,000, but without receipts
because of their verbal agreement to conceal the usurious nature of the transaction. Sometime in January 1976,
according to petitioners, they appealed to private respondents to reduce the interest rate to P3,000 per month.
Private respondents agreed on the condition that they sign a lease contract, whereby private respondents would
appear as lessors and petitioners as lessees, and P3,000 interest would be denominated as "rent".
On January 1, 1976, petitioner Esperanza and private respondent Eleuteria executed a contract of lease.
Petitioners paid the "rent" on the first month but could not pay for the succeeding months allegedly because of
the usurious demands of private respondents.
On August 20, 1976, petitioners filed an action against private respondents for the declaration of nullity of the
Deed of Real Estate Mortgage, before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVII. The complaint was
amended on February 23, 1978 to include additional causes of action.11
The trial court dismissed the complaint as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Dismissing the complaint;
2. As to defendants’ counterclaim, ordering plaintiffs to pay defendants the sum of P3,000.00 per
month beginning February, 1976 until plaintiffs vacate the property;
3. And to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.12
On appeal, the appellate court reversed the decision of the trial court, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE and a NEW ONE ENTERED:
1. Declaring the mortgage contract of the parties null and void;
2. Declaring the foreclosure of said property of no force and effect;
3. Ordering the plaintiff-appellants to pay the defendants-appellees P150,000.00 with the legal rate of
interest thereon from the time of demand until fully paid; and
4. Ordering the cancellation of the Transfer Certificate of Title in defendants-appellees’ name.13
However, private respondents filed motion for reconsideration that was granted by the appellate court. In its
amended decision dated February 4, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, appellees’ motion for reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. The decision herein
promulgated on September 30, 1998 is hereby RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. The Decision
dated January 18, 1991 in Civil Case No. Q-21883 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.14
Thereafter, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforestated amended decision. On April 5, 1999,
the Court of Appeals rendered its resolution denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration and their motion to
set for oral argument, for lack of merit.15
Hence, the present petition, wherein petitioners aver the following "grounds" for review:
I. THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS HAVE CLEARLY OVERLOOKED
AND FAILED TO CONSIDER THE SIGNIFICANT FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS
CASE WHICH IF PROPERLY CONSIDERED SHOULD HAVE DRAWN A DIFFERENT
CONCLUSION WHICH WILL AFFECT THE RESULT OF THIS CASE.
II. CONTRARY TO THE DECISIONS AND PRONOUNCEMENTS OF THIS HONORABLE
SUPREME COURT.
III. TAINTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.16
Principally, the issue for our resolution now is whether the contract between the parties, which is a loan secured
by the deed of real estate mortgage, violated the Usury Law (P.D. 116). In the affirmative, we must also inquire
into its effect upon the real estate mortgage that secured the loan and its subsequent foreclosure.
At the time of the questioned transaction, Act No. 2655, as amended by P.D. 116, known as the Usury Law, was
in full force and effect. It is elementary that the laws in force at the time the contract was made generally govern
the effectivity of its provision. Usury may be defined as contracting for or receiving something in excess of the
amount allowed by law for the forbearance of money, goods or things in action. 17 The Usury Law prescribed
that the legal rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods or credits, where such loan or
renewal or forbearance is secured in whole or in part by a mortgage upon real estate the title to which is duly
registered, in the absence of express contract as to such rate of interest, shall be 12% per annum. 18 Any amount
of interest paid or stipulated to be paid in excess of that fixed by law is considered usurious, therefore unlawful.
Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in upholding the lower court and
declaring that the loan was not usurious, based on the following circumstances:
a) The fact that Mrs. Puerto herself was a jeweler of long standing and the fact that she admitted that
she had a hand in the valuation of the pieces of jewelry loaned her have created doubts on the Court’s
mind as regards the allegation of a usurious transaction x x x;
b) The mortgage contract itself executed by the parties did not provide for any interest on the principal
loan of P200,000.00 x x x;
c) Mrs. Puerto continued to do business with appellees even after the alleged usurious mortgage
transaction x x x;
d) Mrs Puerto even asked for another loan from appellees in the amount of P150,000.00 xxx. 19
Petitioners further argue that the appellate court erred in not considering the fact that the subject property was
purchased by the Puertos for only P150,000. Petitioners add that if the agreement was for a mortgage loan
of P200,000 without interest, as claimed by respondents, how then could the property have been mortgaged at a
higher price when the standard money lending practice was to grant a loan of only up to 80 percent of the value
of the property mortgaged?20 According to petitioners, the appellate court should have considered that a creditor
would not grant a loan the amount of which is much higher than the value of the property securing the loan. It
should not have relied on Esperanza’s knowledge of jewelry valuation to conclude that the transaction was not
usurious. Such conclusion, according to them was an error in law that justifies a review of the amended
decision.21
Private respondents, for their part, insist that petitioners (the Puertos) borrowed P200,000 as a loan secured by
the mortgage of their house and lot. Further, they claim that it was petitioners who prepared the deed of real
estate mortgage, the receipt covering the amount of P30,000 in cash, and the receipt for the P170,000 worth of
jewelry, written entirely in the handwriting of Esperanza. They also point out that petitioners did not present any
proof of their claim that the terms of the loan was usurious. At any rate, according to private respondents, the
instant petition raises questions of facts not reviewable in a petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.22
We have held in several cases that the rule that a petition raising a purely question of fact is dismissible, is not
absolute. The rule admits of exceptions, one of which is when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked
certain relevant facts or circumstances of sufficient weight or significance, which if considered, would justify a
different conclusion.23 In our view, the instant case falls under this exception.
In its amended decision, the appellate court mainly based the re-evaluation of the evidence on record upon the
finding that Esperanza admitted to having a hand in the valuation of the jewelry, which formed part of the total
amount of the loan. It said that "the fact that Mrs. Puerto herself was a jeweler of long standing and the fact that
she admitted that she had a hand in the valuation of the pieces of jewelry loaned her have created doubts on the
court’s mind as regards her allegation of a usurious transaction." 24 However, we note that this premise is not
accurate.
Eleuteria, in her direct examination, testified,
Q: Now, who fixed the value of the jewelr[y] to be at P170,000.00?
A: At first I want it higher but Mrs. Puerto bargained because she said she cannot sell it at that
price. So, I agreed with her.
Q: So, who fixed the valuation?
A: Mrs. Puerto, sir.25
Patently, Esperanza bargained for a lower valuation of the jewelry and the price quoted was the lowest that
Eleuteria could give. Said bargaining makes Esperanza’s allegation that the interest of P50,000 was tucked into
the P200,000 loan, believable. As aptly observed by the appellate court in its original decision, considering that
respondents are in the jewelry business, it is more likely that there is a built-in profit or interest on capital in the
valuation of the jewelry given to appellants (petitioners) as part of their loan. 26
Respondents want to impress upon us that pawnshop owners like them would grant a sizeable loan without
requiring any interest and that after their generous offer to petitioner Esperanza who is in dire need of money,
the latter would ask that she be charged 12 percent interest per annum. 27 However, what is more plausible is
that, after finding themselves in dire financial straits, petitioners were amenable to any stipulation in the loan
agreement, even to tucking a P50,000 interest in the P200,000 stated principal amount.
Moreover, we find it unlikely that respondent Eleuteria gave a loan in an amount much higher than the value of
the security. She is after all a successful pawnshop businesswoman. We are unconvinced by her when she says
that the value of the properties valued at P150,000 in May 1971 had sufficiently increased in May 1972, the
time of the execution of the mortgage. We take note of the fact that in the pawnshop business, properties are
pawned at a much lower price than their original value.
Indeed, the mortgage contract did not stipulate for payment of any interest. However, to conceal usury various
devices have been adopted whereby the substance of the true agreement is withheld from what may be viewed
on the written document. The cupidity of lenders and the willingness of borrowers to concede whatever may be
demanded or to promise whatever may be exacted in order to obtain temporary relief from financial
embarrassment, as would naturally be expected, have resulted in a great variety of devices to evade the usury
law. To frustrate such evasions the courts are compelled to look beyond the form of a transaction and consider
its substance instead.28 It is worth pointing out that respondent Eleuteria testified that she had her own lawyer
correct some errors found in the mortgage contract, which she claims was prepared by the Puertos.29 The
mortgage contract states that the P200,000 loan was given to the Puertos in cash and yet, in reality, as per
respondent Eleuteria’s own testimony, the loan was partly in cash and partly in the form of jewelry. Under these
circumstances, it would be easy to pad the value of the jewelry, way beyond the actual amount.1âwphi1.nêt
The natural inclination of parties to an illegal act is to conceal such illegality, making it extremely difficult to
prove its existence by documentary evidence. It is precisely for this reason that we are constrained to look at
collateral matters, even circumstantial evidence, to find the truth. Otherwise, a document apparently legal on its
face could not be proved to be illegal and intended to evade the statute of usury.30 The real intention of the
parties at the time the written instrument was made must be ascertained from the circumstances surrounding the
transaction and from the language of the document itself.31 It will be noted that the usury law was in effect at the
time Esperanza obtained the loan from Eleuteria. Petitioners needed financial assistance badly. The two women
had known each other for a long time. The language of the contract leaves no doubt that the P200,000 was a
loan secured by a mortgage on a house and lot owned by the Puertos. There was no interest stipulated on the
loan and there was a provision to appoint the mortgagees as receiver of the property in case of foreclosure.
Ordinary human experience tells us that as between the debtor and the creditor, the former stands on more
perilous ground than the latter, and the two do not stand on equal footing. 32 It is this inequality that deprives the
debtor of any bargaining leverage. Eleuteria claims that it was out of pure generosity that she granted the loan
without interest and it was petitioner who offered to pay an interest of 12 percent per annum. 33 She points to
their long friendship as the consideration for this arrangement. We are unconvinced. The records reveal that the
women had for a long time done business with each other. Esperanza frequents Eleuteria’s pawnshop for
jewelry transactions. However, there is nothing to show that they were close friends. What appears from the
records is that Eleuteria knew Esperanza long enough to entrust her with a substantial amount of money but
without any special consideration. In fact, respondents wanted to protect their investment such that they first
required petitioners to have the title to the mortgaged property transferred to petitioners’ name before
concluding the loan transaction.34 This would not appear to be the conduct of a trusting old friend. Private
respondents even appointed themselves as receiver of the property in case of foreclosure. Evidently, theirs was a
purely business deal.
In fine, we find that indeed the contract of loan secured by the deed of real estate mortgage is usurious. Under
Section 2 of the Usury Law,35 the maximum rate of interest on a loan or forbearance of money secured by a
mortgage upon real estate the title to which is duly registered, shall be 12 percent per annum. In the instant case,
the P50,000 interest is clearly in excess of that which the law allows. Thus, the agreement for the payment of
interest is void. Section 7 of the same law further provides that:
All covenants and stipulations contained in conveyances, mortgages x x x and other contracts or
evidences of debts x x x whereupon or whereby there shall be stipulated, charged, demanded, reserved,
secured, taken or received, directly or indirectly, a higher rate or greater sum or value for the loan x x x
than is hereinbefore allowed, shall be void.36
The primordial question to be resolved now is, what happens to the obligation of petitioner to pay the principal
loan? We held in Briones vs. Cammayo:37
…[A] contract of loan with usurious interest consists of principal and accessory stipulations; the
principal one is to pay the debt; the accessory stipulation is to pay interest thereon.
And said two stipulations are divisible in the sense that the former can still stand without the latter….
In a simple loan with a stipulation of usurious interest, the prestation of the debtor to pay the principal debt,
which is the cause of the contract, is not illegal. The illegality lies only in the stipulated interest. Being
separable, only the latter should be deemed void. To discourage stipulations on usurious interest, said
stipulations are treated as wholly void, so that the loan becomes one without a stipulation as to payment of
interest. It should not, however, be interpreted to mean forfeiture even of the principal, for this would unjustly
enrich the borrower at the expense of the lender.
In addition, we award, by way of compensatory damages for the breach of the obligation of petitioners to pay
the sum of money loaned, an interest in the amount of 12 percent per annum, to be computed from
default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand in accordance with Article 1169. 38 Such interest is not due to
stipulation, for there was none, the same being void. Rather it is due to the general provision of law that in
obligations to pay money, where the debtor incurs in delay, he has to pay interest by way of damages, in
conformity to our ruling in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals.39
Going into the matter of the validity of the foreclosure, we find the foreclosure invalid as it stemmed from the
enforcement of a usurious mortgage contract. This is in line with our ruling in Delgado vs. Alonso Duque
Valgona.40In said case, the trial court found usurious payment for parcels of land secured by a deed of mortgage
and declared the mortgage deed void. Affirming the decision of the trial court, we held that the trial judge
committed no error in declaring that instrument void, notwithstanding that the petitioners did not ask that the
whole contract be annulled. We declared that it was not erroneous for the court to eradicate the evil root and
branch, more particularly since the defendant therein had also asked that the mortgage be annulled. 41
Thus, conformably to Delgado, since the mortgage contract is void, the foreclosure of the property provided for
in said deed is ineffectual as well. Contracts and stipulations, under any cloak or device whatever, intended to
circumvent the laws against usury shall be void.42 The parties then must restore what each had received from the
other. Petitioners must pay the principal loan of P150,000 with legal interest at 12 percent per annum from the
date of demand by way of damages. Respondents must return petitioners’ property that had been invalidly
foreclosed. The transfer certificate of title to the subject property is cancelled and a new one duly ordered issued
in favor of petitioners. This is without prejudice to the right of respondents to proceed against petitioners in the
event the latter fail to satisfy their original obligation including payment of twelve percent interest by way of
damages.1âwphi1.nêt
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The amended decision dated February 4, 1999 of the Court
of Appeals and its resolution of April 5, 1999 are REVERSED and its decision dated September 30, 1998
is REINSTATED. No pronouncements as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, De Leon, Jr., and Corona, JJ., concur.
Footnote
1 22
Rollo, pp. 185-189. Id. at 376-377.

2 23
Id. at 235-237. Golangco vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124724, 283 SCRA 493, 504 (1997); Heirs of Felicidad
Canque vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119184, 275 SCRA 741, 751 (1997).
3
CA Rollo, pp. 57-66.
24
Rollo, p.186; Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals, p. 2.
4
TSN, October 2, 1978, pp. 3-6.
25
TSN, February 24, 1983, p. 9.
5
Records, pp. 294-296.
26
Rollo, p. 119.
6
Supra, note 4 at 11-16.
27
Supra, note 25 at 5.
7
Id. at 18-19; Records, p. 301.
28
27 R.C.L. 12, p. 211, cited in Law on Credit Transactions by Narciso Pena.
8
Supra, note 1 at 115.
29
TSN, July 5, 1983, pp. 9-10.
9
TSN, February 24, 1983, pp. 4-6.
30
United States vs. Constantino Tan Quingco Chua, G.R. No. 13708, 39 Phil 552, 557 (1919).
10
Supra, note 1 at 116-117.
31
Id. at 558.
11
Id. at 115-116.
32
Lao vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115307, 275 SCRA 237 (1997).
12
Supra, note 3 at 66.
33
TSN, February 24, 1983, p. 4.
13
Supra, note 1 at 120-121.
34
TSN, October 2, 1978, pp. 14-15.
14
Id. at 188-189.
35
Sec. 2. No person or corporation shall directly or indirectly take or receive in money or other
15
Id. at 237. property, real or personal, a higher rate or greater sum or value for the loan or forbearance of money,
goods, or credits, where such loan or forbearance is secured in whole or in part by a mortgage upon
16
Id. at 28-29. real estate the title to which is duly registered, or by any document conveying such real estate or an
interest therein, than twelve per centum per annum. Mutual building and loan societies incorporated
under the Corporation Act may, however, charge eighteen per centum per annum but nor more, directly
17
Black’s Law Dictionary 1385 (Fifth ed.). or indirectly, including premiums, interest and fines.
18
Section 2, Act No. 2655, as amended, otherwise known as the Usury Law. 36
Section 7, Act No. 2655, as amended, otherwise known as the Usury Law.
19
Supra, note 1 at 347. 37
No. L-23559, 41 SCRA 404, 411 (1971).
20
Id. at 351. 38
Art. 1169, Civil Code:
21
Id. at 349. Those obliged to deliver or to do something incur in delay from the obligee judicially or
extrajudicially demands from them the fulfillment of their obligation.
 xxx overturned it, severely wounding said plaintiff by making a serious cut upon her head, and also
injuring the carromata itself and the harness upon the horse which was drawing it.
39
G.R. No. 97412, 234 SCRA 78, 95 (1994).
xxx xxx xxx
40
No. 19826, 44 Phil. 739 (1923).
These facts are not dispute, but the defendant presented evidence to the effect that the cochero, who
41
Id. at 745. was driving his delivery wagon at the time the accident occurred, was a good servant and was
considered a safe and reliable cochero; that the delivery wagon had sent to deliver some forage at Paco
42 Livery Stable on Calle Herran, and that for the purpose of delivery thereof the cochero driving the team
Article 1957, New Civil Code of the Philippines.
as defendant's employee tied the driving lines of the horses to the front end of the delivery wagon and
then went back inside of the wagon for the purpose of unloading the forage to be delivered; that while
12. Martinez vs Van Buskirk G.R. No. L-5691 December 27, 1910 unloading the forage and in the act of carrying some of it out, another vehicle drove by, the driver of
which cracked a whip and made some other noises, which frightened the horses attached to the
Republic of the Philippines delivery wagon and they ran away, and the driver was thrown from the inside of the wagon out through
SUPREME COURT the rear upon the ground and was unable to stop the horses; that the horses then ran up and on which
Manila street they came into collision with the carromata in which the plaintiff, Carmen Ong de Martinez, was
riding.
EN BANC
The defendant himself was not with the vehicle on the day in question.
G.R. No. L-5691 December 27, 1910
Upon these facts the court below found the defendant guilty of negligence and gave judgment against him for
S. D. MARTINEZ and his wife, CARMEN ONG DE MARTINEZ, plaintiffs-appellees, P442.50, with interest thereon at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from the 17th day of October, 1908, and for
vs. the costs of the action. The case is before us on an appeal from that judgment.
WILLIAM VAN BUSKIRK, defendant-appellant.
There is no general law of negligence in the Philippine Islands except that embodied in the Civil Code. The
Lionel D. Hargis for appellant. provisions of that code pertinent to this case are —
Sanz and Oppisso for appellee.
Art. 1902. A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault or
negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done.

Art. 1903. The obligation imposed by preceding article is demandable, not only for personal acts and
MORELAND, J.: omissions, but also for those of the persons for whom they should be responsible.

The facts found by the trial court are undisputed by either party in this case. They are —
That on the 11th day of September, 1908, the plaintiff, Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding in a
carromata on Calle Real, district of Ermita, city of Manila, P.I., along the left-hand side of the street as
she was going, when a delivery wagon belonging to the defendant used for the purpose of
transportation of fodder by the defendant, and to which was attached a pair of horses, came along the
street in the opposite direction to that the in which said plaintiff was proceeding, and that thereupon the
driver of the said plaintiff's carromata, observing that the delivery wagon of the defendant was coming
at great speed, crowded close to the sidewalk on the left-hand side of the street and stopped, in order to
give defendant's delivery wagon an opportunity to pass by, but that instead of passing by the
defendant's wagon and horses ran into the carromata occupied by said plaintiff with her child and
The father, and on his death or incapacity the mother, is liable for the damages caused by the minors
who live with them.
Guardians are liable for the damages caused by minors or incapacitated persons who are under their
authority and live with them.
Owners of directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for the damages caused by the
employees in the service of the branches in which the latter may be employed or on account of their
duties.
 The State is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but not when the damages should
have been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed, in which case
the provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable.
Finally, masters or directors of arts and trades are liable for the damages caused by their pupils or
apprentices while they are under their custody.
The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove that they
employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage.
Passing the question whether or not an employer who has furnished a gentle and tractable team and a trusty and
capable driver is, under the last paragraph of the above provisions, liable for the negligence of such driver in
handling the team, we are of the opinion that the judgment must be reversed upon the ground that the evidence
does not disclose that the cochero was negligent.
While the law relating to negligence in this jurisdiction may possibly be some what different from that in
Anglo-Saxon countries, a question we do not now discuss, the rules under which the fact of negligence is
determined are, nevertheless, generally the same. That is to say, while the law designating
the person responsible for a negligent act may not be the same here as in many jurisdictions, the law
determining what is a negligent act is the same here, generally speaking, as elsewhere. (Supreme court of Spain,
4 December, 1903; 16 May, 1893; 27 June, 1894; 9 April, 1896; 14 March, 1901; 2 March, 1904; 7 February,
1905; 16 June, 1905; 23 June, 1905; 13 April, 1903; 7 March, 1902; 12 June, 1900; 2 March, 1907; 18 March,
1898; 3 June, 1901.)
It appears from the undisputed evidence that the horses which caused the damage were gentle and tractable; that
the cochero was experienced and capable; that he had driven one of the horses several years and the other five
or six months; that he had been in the habit, during all that time, of leaving them in the condition in which they
were left on the day of the accident; that they had never run away up to that time and there had been, therefore,
no accident due to such practice; that to leave the horses and assist in unloading the merchandise in the manner
described on the day of the accident was the custom of all cochero who delivered merchandise of the character
of that which was being delivered by the cochero of the defendant on the day in question, which custom was
sanctioned by their employers.
In our judgment, the cochero of the defendant was not negligent in leaving the horses in the manner described
by the evidence in this case, either under Spanish or American jurisprudence. (Lynch vs. Nurdin, 1 Q. B., 422;
Rumsey vs. Nelson, 58 Vt., 590; Drake vs. Mount, 33 N. J. L., 442; Hoboken Land and Improvement
Co. vs. Lally, 48 N. J. L., 604; Wasmer vs. D. L. & W. R. R. Co., 80 N. Y., 212.) lawphi1.net
In the case of Hayman vs. Hewitt (Peake N. P. Cas., pt. 2, p. 170), Lord Kenyon said:
He was performing his duty while removing the goods into the house, and, if every person who
suffered a cart to remain in the street while he took goods out of it was obliged to employ another to
look after the horses, it would be impossible for the business of the metropolis to go on.
In the case of Griggs vs. Fleckenstein (14 Minn., 81), the court said:
The degree of care required of the plaintiff, or those in charged of his horse, at the time of the injury, is
that which would be exercised by a person of ordinary care and prudence under like circumstances. It
can not be said that the fact of leaving the horse unhitched is in itself negligence. Whether it is
negligence to leave a horse unhitched must be depend upon the disposition of the horse; whether he
was under the observation and control of some person all the time, and many other circumstances; and
is a question to be determined by the jury from the facts of each case.
In the case of Belles vs. Kellner (67 N. J. L., 255), it was held that it was error on the part of the trial court to
refuse to charge that "it is not negligence for the driver of a quite, gentle horse to leave him unhitched and
otherwise unattended on the side of a public highways while the driver is upon the sidewalk loading goods on
the wagon." The said court closed its opinion with these words:
There was evidence which could have fully justified the jury in finding that the horse was quite and
gentle, and that the driver was upon the sidewalk loading goods on the wagon, at time of the alleged
injury, and that the horse had been used for years in that way without accident. The refusal of the trial
court to charge as requested left the jury free to find was verdict against the defendant, although the
jury was convinced that these facts were proven.lawphil.net
In the case of Southworth vs. Ry. Co. (105 Mass., 342), it was held:
That evidence that a servant, whom traders employed to deliver goods, upon stopping with his horse
and wagon to deliver a parcel at a house from fifty to a hundred rods from a railroad crossing, left the
horse unfastened for four or five minutes while he was in the house, knowing that it was not afraid of
cars, and having used it for three or four months without ever hitching it or knowing it to start, is not
conclusive, as a matter of law, of a want of due care on his part.
The duty, a violation of which is claimed to be negligence in the respect in question, is to exercise reasonable
care and prudence. Where reasonable care is employed in doing an act not itself illegal or inherently likely to
produce damage to others, there will be no liability, although damage in fact ensues. (Milwaukee Ry.
Co. vs. Arms, 91 U. S., 489; Parrott vs. Wells, 15 Wall., 524; Brown vs. Kendall, 6 Cushing, 292; Jackson
Architectural Iron Works vs.Hurlbut, 158 N. Y., 34 Westerfield vs. Levis, 43 La. An., 63; Niosi vs. Empire
Steam Laundry, 117 Cal., 257.)
The act of defendant's driver in leaving the horses in the manner proved was not unreasonable or imprudent.
Acts the performance of which has not proved destructive or injurious and which have, therefore, been
acquiesced in by society for so long a time that they have ripened into custom, can not be held to be themselves
unreasonable or imprudent. Indeed the very reason why they have been permitted by society is that they
beneficial rather than prejudicial.itc-alf Accidents sometimes happen and injuries result from the most ordinary
acts of life. But such are not their natural or customary results. To hold that, because such an act once resulted
in accident or injury, the actor is necessarily negligent, is to go far. The fact that the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur is sometimes successfully invoked in such a case, does not in any sense militate against the reasoning
presented. That maxim at most only creates aprima facie case, and that only in the absence of proof of the
circumstances under which the act complained of was performed. It is something invoked in favor of the
plaintiff before defendant's case showing the conditions and circumstances under which the injury occurred, the
creative reason for the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur disappears. This is demonstrated by the case of Inland and G.R. No. L-29131 August 27, 1969
Seaboard Costing Co. vs. Tolson (139 U.S., 551), where the court said (p. 554):
NATIONAL MARKETING CORPORATION, plaintiff-appellant,
. . . The whole effect of the instruction in question, as applied to the case before the jury, was that if the vs.
steamboat, on a calm day and in smooth water, was thrown with such force against a wharf properly MIGUEL D. TECSON, ET AL., defendants,
built, as to tear up some of the planks of the flooring, this would be prima facie evidence of negligence MIGUEL D. TECSON, defendant-appellee,
on the part of the defendant's agent in making the landing, unless upon the whole evidence in the case THE INSURANCE COMMISSIONER, petitioner.
this prima facie evidence was rebutted. As such damage to a wharf is not ordinarily done by a
steamboat under control of her officers and carefully managed by them, evidence that such damage Government Corporate Counsel Leopoldo M. Abellera and Trial Atty. Antonio M. Brillantes for plaintiff-
was done in this case was prima facie, and, if unexplained, sufficient evidence of negligence on their appellant.
part, and the jury might properly be so instructed. Antonio T. Lacdan for defendant-appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General for petitioner.
There was presented in this case, and by the plaintiffs themselves, not only the fact of the runway and the
accident resulting therefrom, but also the conditions under which the runaway occurred. Those conditions CONCEPCION, C.J.:
showing of themselves that the defendant's cochero was not negligent in the management of the horse,
the prima facie case in plaintiffs' favor, if any, was destroyed as soon as made.
This appeal has been certified to us by the Court of Appeals only one question of law being involved therein.

It is a matter of common knowledge as well as proof that it is the universal practice of merchants to deliver On November 14, 1955, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered judgment, in Civil Case No. 20520
merchandise of the kind of that being delivered at the time of the injury, in the manner in which that was then
thereof, entitled "Price Stabilization Corporation vs. Miguel D. Tecson and Alto Surety and Insurance Co.,
being delivered; and that it is the universal practice to leave the horses in the manner in which they were left at
Inc.," the dispositive part of which reads as follows:
the time of the accident. This is the custom in all cities. It has not been productive of accidents or injuries. The
public, finding itself unprejudiced by such practice, has acquiesced for years without objection. Ought the
public now, through the courts, without prior objection or notice, to be permitted to reverse the practice of For the foregoing consideration, the Court decides this case:
decades and thereby make culpable and guilty one who had every reason and assurance to believe that he was
acting under the sanction of the strongest of all civil forces, the custom of a people? We think not. (a) Ordering the defendants Miguel D. Tecson and Alto Surety Insurance Co., Inc. to pay jointly and
severally plaintiff PRATRA the sum of P7,200.00 plus 7% interest from May 25, 1960 until the
The judgement is reversed, without special finding as to costs. So ordered. amount is fully paid, plus P500.00 for attorney's fees, and plus costs;

Arellano, C. J., Mapa, Johnson, Carson and Trent, JJ., concur. (b) ordering defendant Miguel D. Tecson to indemnify his co-defendant Alto Surety & Insurance Co.,
Inc. on the cross-claim for all the amounts it would be made to pay in this decision, in case defendant
Alto Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. pay the amount adjudged to plaintiff in this decision. From the date
Separate Opinions of such payment defendant Miguel D. Tecson would pay the Alto Surety & Insurance Co., Inc., interest
at 12% per annum until Miguel D. Tecson has fully reimbursed plaintiff of the said amount.
TORRES, J., dissenting:
Copy of this decision was, on November 21, 1955, served upon the defendants in said case. On December 21,
I am of the opinion that the judgment should be affirmed. 1965, the National Marketing Corporation, as successor to all the properties, assets, rights, and choses in action
of the Price Stabilization Corporation, as plaintiff in that case and judgment creditor therein, filed, with the
13. Namarco vs Tecson G.R. No. L-29131 August 27, 1969 same court, a complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 63701 thereof, against the same defendants, for the revival
of the judgment rendered in said Case No. 20520. Defendant Miguel D. Tecson moved to dismiss said
Republic of the Philippines complaint, upon the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof and prescription of action.
SUPREME COURT Acting upon the motion and plaintiff's opposition thereto, said Court issued, on February 14, 1966, an order
Manila reading:

EN BANC Defendant Miguel Tecson seeks the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
and prescription. As for lack of jurisdiction, as the amount involved is less than P10,000 as actually
 these proceedings are a revival of a decision issued by this same court, the matter of jurisdiction must
be admitted. But as for prescription. Plaintiffs admit the decision of this Court became final on
December 21, 1955. This case was filed exactly on December 21, 1965 — but more than ten years
have passed a year is a period of 365 days (Art. 13, CCP). Plaintiff forgot that 1960, 1964 were both
leap years so that when this present case was filed it was filed two days too late.
The complaint insofar as Miguel Tecson is concerned is, therefore, dismissed as having
prescribed.1äwphï1.ñët
The National Marketing Corporation appealed from such order to the Court of Appeals, which, on March 20,
1969t certified the case to this Court, upon the ground that the only question therein raised is one of law,
namely, whether or not the present action for the revival of a judgment is barred by the statute of limitations.
Pursuant to Art. 1144(3) of our Civil Code, an action upon a judgment "must be brought within ten years from
the time the right of action accrues," which, in the language of Art. 1152 of the same Code, "commences from
the time the judgment sought to be revived has become final." This, in turn, took place on December 21, 1955,
or thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment — which was received by the defendants herein on November
21, 1955 — no appeal having been taken therefrom. 1 The issue is thus confined to the date on which ten (10)
years from December 21, 1955 expired.
Plaintiff-appellant alleges that it was December 21, 1965, but appellee Tecson maintains otherwise, because
"when the laws speak of years ... it shall be understood that years are of three hundred sixty-five days each" —
according to Art. 13 of our Civil Code — and, 1960 and 1964 being leap years, the month of February in both
had 29 days, so that ten (10) years of 365 days each, or an aggregate of 3,650 days, from December 21, 1955,
expired on December 19, 1965. The lower court accepted this view in its appealed order of dismissal.
accordance with which a month is to be considered as the regular 30-day month ... and not the solar or civil
month," with the particularity that, whereas the Spanish Code merely mentioned "months, days or nights," ours
has added thereto the term "years" and explicitly ordains that "it shall be understood that years are of three
hundred sixty-five days."
Although some members of the Court are inclined to think that this legislation is not realistic, for failure to
conform with ordinary experience or practice, the theory of plaintiff-appellant herein cannot be upheld without
ignoring, if not nullifying, Art. 13 of our Civil Code, and reviving Section 13 of the Revised Administrative
Code, thereby engaging in judicial legislation, and, in effect, repealing an act of Congress. If public interest
demands a reversion to the policy embodied in the Revised Administrative Code, this may be done through
legislative process, not by judicial decree.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from should be as it is hereby affirmed, without costs. It is so ordered.
Dizon, Makalintal, Sanchez, Castro, Fernando, Capistrano, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur.
Reyes, J.B.L., and Zaldivar, JJ., are on leave.
Footnotes
1
Sec. 1, Rule 39, in relation to Sec. 3, Rule 31, Rules of Court.
2
Emphasis ours.
3
Decision of April 6, 1895.

4
Plaintiff-appellant insists that the same "is erroneous, because a year means a calendar year (Statutory Guzman v. Lichauco, 42 Phil. 292; Gutierrez v. Carpio, 53 Phil. 334, 335-336.
Construction, Interpretation of Laws, by Crawford, p. 383) and since what is being computed here is the number
5
of years, a calendar year should be used as the basis of computation. There is no question that when it is not a 97 Phil. 70-71.
leap year, December 21 to December 21 of the following year is one year. If the extra day in a leap year is not a
day of the year, because it is the 366th day, then to what year does it belong? Certainly, it must belong to the 14. Armigos vs CA G.R. No. L-50654 November 6, 1989
year where it falls and, therefore, that the 366 days constitute one year." 2

The very conclusion thus reached by appellant shows that its theory contravenes the explicit provision of Art. SECOND DIVISION
13 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, limiting the connotation of each "year" — as the term is used in our
laws — to 365 days. Indeed, prior to the approval of the Civil Code of Spain, the Supreme Court thereof had [G.R. No. 50654. November 6, 1989.]
held, on March 30, 1887, that, when the law spoke of months, it meant a "natural" month or "solar" month, in
the absence of express provision to the contrary. Such provision was incorporated into the Civil Code of Spain, RUDY GLEO ARMIGOS, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, CRISTITO MATA, and JUDGE L. D.
subsequently promulgated. Hence, the same Supreme Court declared 3 that, pursuant to Art. 7 of said Code, CARPIO, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao del Sur, Branch
"whenever months ... are referred to in the law, it shall be understood that the months are of 30 days," not the V, Respondents.
"natural," or "solar" or "calendar" months, unless they are "designated by name," in which case "they shall be
computed by the actual number of days they have. This concept was later, modified in the Philippines, by David W. Natividad for Petitioner.
Section 13 of the Revised Administrative Code, Pursuant to which, "month shall be understood to refer to a
calendar month." 4 In the language of this Court, in People vs. Del Rosario, 5 with the approval of the Civil Code Calamba, Garcia, Geralde & Calamba Law Offices for Respondents.
of the Philippines (Republic Act 386) ... we have reverted to the provisions of the Spanish Civil Code in

SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; PRELIMINARY TITLE; COMPUTATION OF PERIOD; LAST DAY OF PERIOD
COMPUTED INCLUDED, EXCEPTION; DAY SYNONYMOUS WITH DATE. — The rule stated in Article
13 of the Civil Code to the effect that "In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day
included" is similar, but not identical to Section 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provided that "Unless
otherwise specially provided, the time within which an act is required by law to be done shall be computed by
excluding the first day and including the last; and if the last be Sunday or a legal holiday it shall be excluded",
as well as the old Rule 28 of the Rules of Court which stated that "In computing any period of time prescribed
or allowed by the Rules of Court, by order of a court, or by any other applicable statute, the day of the act, event
or default after which the designated period of time begins to run is not to be included. The last day of the
period so computed is to be included, unless it is a Sunday or a legal holiday, in which event the time shall run
until the end of the next day which is neither a Sunday or a legal holiday." In applying this rule, the Court
considered the day as synonymous with the date and we find no cogent reason to adopt a different view.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RATIONALE. — Human memory on dates or days is frail and unless the day is an
extraordinary one for a person, there is no reasonable certainty of its correctness. What more for the exact hour
when a pleading, order or decision is received by a party.
3. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; APPEAL; PERIOD FOR FILING HABEAS CORPUS CASES.
— Petitioner’s suggestion that the computation of the period to appeal should commence on the hour he
received a copy of the decision may find application in appeals in habeas corpus cases where the law requires
that such appeals should be made within 48 hours from notice of judgment.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; PERFECTION THEREOF NOT ONLY MANDATORY BUT JURISDICTIONAL,
EXCEPTION; CASE AT BAR. — While it is true that rules of procedure are to be interpreted liberally so that
the real matter in dispute may be submitted to the judgment of the court, and that the trial court is vested with
discretion to allow or admit an appeal filed out of time, this discretion is not unconditional. There must be
justifiable reason to warrant such action, since the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period
laid down by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional, and in the absence of any jurisdiction to approve or
admit an appeal filed out of time. In the instant case, the petitioner failed to prove, or even claim, that his failure
to appeal on time was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence.
DECISION
PADILLA, J.:
Review on certiorari of the decision * of the Court of Appeals, which dismissed the petition filed and docketed
therein as CA-G.R. No. SP-07192-R, entitled: "Rudy Gleo Armigos, Petitioner, versus Judge L.D. Carpio,
respondent," and the resolution denying the motion for reconsideration of said decision.chanrobles virtual
lawlibrary
The undisputed facts are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The private respondent, Cristito Mata, filed a complaint against the herein petitioner with the Municipal Court
of Digos Davao del Sur, docketed as Civil Case No. 971, for the collection of damages and attorney’s fees.
After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of the private respondent and against the herein petitioner. A copy of
the decision was received by the petitioner on 8 June 1977, and the following day, 9 June 1977, he filed a notice
of appeal with the said municipal court, and on 24 June 1977, he completed the other requirements for the
perfection of an appeal, including the filing of an appeal bond and the payment of the appellate court docket fee.
However, when the case was elevated to the Court of First Instance of Davao del Sur (Branch V) for the
consideration of the appeal, the presiding judge thereof ruled that the appeal was filed beyond the reglementary
period; consequently, he dismissed the appeal.
Whereupon, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus with preliminary injunction with the Court
of Appeals, claiming that from 8 June 1977, when he received a copy of the decision of the municipal court, to
24 June 1977, when he perfected his appeal, only fifteen (15) days had elapsed so that the decision of the Court
of First Instance of Davao del Sur, dismissing his appeal for having been filed beyond the reglementary period,
is erroneous and contrary to law. The petitioner contended that the computation of the period to appeal should
commence on the hour he received copy of the decision, so that the first of the 15-day period comprising 24
hours is from 4:00 o’clock p.m. of 9 June 1977 to 4:00 o’clock p.m. of 10 June 1977 and the last day, from 4:00
o’clock p.m. of 23 June 1977 to 4:00 o’clock p.m. of 24 June 1977.
The Court of Appeals, however, rejected the novel interpretation suggested as it would result in many confusing
situations and many unreliable testimonies as to the time a copy of a decision, order or pleading is received, and
cited the case of Republic of the Philippines v. Encarnacion, 1 where this Court held that when a law was to be
effective upon approval by the President and the President signed the same on 16 June 1950, the law should be
considered to have taken effect not on the exact hour when the President signed the same on 16 June 1950 but
from the very first minute or hour of said day of 16 June 1950.
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision, but his motion was denied in
a resolution promulgated on 7 December 1978.
Hence, the present recourse.
We find no merit in the petition. The rule stated in Article 13 of the Civil Code to the effect that "In computing
a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day included" is similar, but not identical to Section 4 of
the Code of Civil Procedure which provided that "Unless otherwise specially provided, the time within which
an act is required by law to be done shall be computed by excluding the first day and including the last; and if
the last be Sunday or a legal holiday it shall be excluded", as well as the old Rule 28 of the Rules of Court
which stated that "In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by the Rules of Court, by order of a
court, or by any other applicable statute, the day of the act, event or default after which the designated period of
time begins to run is not to be included. The last day of the period so computed is to be included, unless it is a
Sunday or a legal holiday, in which event the time shall run until the end of the next day which is neither a
Sunday or a legal holiday." In applying this rule, the Court considered the day as synonymous with the date and
we find no cogent reason to adopt a different view.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Besides, human memory on dates or days is frail and unless the day is an extraordinary one for a person, there is
no reasonable certainty of its correctness. What more for the exact hour when a pleading, order or decision is
received by a party?
Petitioner’s suggestion, however, may find application in appeals in habeas corpus cases where the law requires
that such appeals should be made within 48 hours from notice of judgment. 2
While it is true that rules of procedure are to be interpreted liberally so that the real matter in dispute may be
submitted to the judgment of the court, and that the trial court is vested with discretion to allow or admit an
appeal filed out of time, this discretion is not unconditional. There must be justifiable reason to warrant such
action, since the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period laid down by law is not only
mandatory but jurisdictional, and in the absence of any justifying circumstance, the court has no jurisdiction to
approve or admit an appeal filed out of time. 3 In the instant case, the petitioner failed to prove, or even claim,
that his failure to appeal on time was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. With costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairman), Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Paras, J., took no part.
Endnotes:
* Penned by Justice Edgardo L. Paras, with Justices Ramon G. Gaviola Jr., and B.S. de la Fuente, concurring.
1. 87 Phil. 845.
2. Rule 41, Sec. 18, Rules of Court.
3. Trans-Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-42184, July 28, 1977, 78 SCRA 154, 161.
15. Tenchavez vs Escano G.R. No. L-19671 November 29, 1965
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-19671. November 29, 1965.]
PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. VICENTA F. ESCAÑO, ET AL., Defendants-
Appellees.
I. V. Binamira & F. B. Barria, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Jalandoni & Jamir for Defendants-Appellees.
SYLLABUS
1. HUSBAND AND WIFE; FOREIGN DIVORCE BETWEEN FILIPINO CITIZENS DECREED AFTER
THE EFFECTIVITY OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE; REMARRIAGE OF DIVORCED CONSORT. — A
foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity of the new Civil Code
(Republic Act No. 386), is not entitled to recognition as valid in the Philippines; and neither is the marriage
contracted with another party by the divorced consort, subsequently to the foreign decree of divorce entitled to
validity in this country.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; INNOCENT CONSORT ENTITLED TO LEGAL SEPARATION. — The remarriage of the
divorced wife and her cohabitation with a person other than the lawful husband entitles the latter to a decree of
legal separation conformably to Philippine law.
3. ID.; ID,; ID.; INVALID DIVORCE ENTITLES INNOCENT CONSORT TO RECOVER DAMAGES. —
The desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one consort entitles the other to recover damages.
4. ID.; ACTION FOR ALIENATION OF AFFECTIONS AGAINST PARENTS OF ONE CONSORT;
ABSENCE OF PROOF OF MALICE. — An action for alienation of affection against the parents of one consort
does not lie in the absence of proof of malice or unworthy motives on their part.
DECISION
REYES, J. B. L., J.:
Direct appeal, on factual and legal questions, from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, in its
Civil Case No. R-4177, denying the claim of the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor B. Tenchavez, for legal separation
and one million pesos in damages against his wife and parents-in-law, the defendants-appellees, Vicente,
Mamerto and Mena 1 , all surnamed "Escaño" respectively. 2
The facts, supported by the evidence of record, are the following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Missing her late-afternoon classes on 24 February 1948 in the University of San Carlos, Cebu City, where she
was then enrolled as a second year student of commerce, Vicenta Escaño, 27 years of age (scion of a well-to-do
and socially prominent Filipino family of Spanish ancestry and a "sheltered colegiala"), exchanged marriage
vows with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years of age, an engineer, ex-army officer and of undistinguished stock,
without the knowledge of her parents, before a Catholic chaplain, Lt. Moises Lavares, in the house of one Juan
Alburo in the said city. The marriage was the culmination of previous love affair and was duly registered with
the local civil registrar.

Vicenta’s letters to Pastor, and his to her, before the marriage indicate that the couple were deeply in love.
Together with a friend, Pacita Noel, their matchmaker and go-between, they had planned out their marital future
whereby Pacita would be the governess of their first-born; they started saving money in a piggy bank. A few
weeks before their secret marriage, their engagement was broken; Vicenta returned the engagement ring and
accepted another suitor, Joseling Lao. Her love for Pastor beckoned; she pleaded for his return and they
reconciled. This time they planned to get married and then elope. To facilitate the elopement, Vicenta had
brought some of her clothes to the room of Pacita Noel in St. Mary’s Hall, which was their usual trysting place.
Although planned for the midnight following their marriage, the elopement did not, however, materialize
because when Vicenta went back to her classes after the marriage, her mother, who got wind of the intended
nuptials, was already waiting for her at the college. Vicenta was taken home where she admitted that she had
already married Pastor. Mamerto and Mena Escaño were surprised, because Pastor never asked for the hand of
Vicenta, and were disgusted because of the great scandal that the clandestine marriage would provoke (t.s.n.,
vol. 111, pp. 1105-06). The following morning, the Escaño spouses sought priestly advice. Father Reynes
suggested a recelebration to validate what he believed to be an invalid marriage, from the standpoint of the
Church, due to the lack of authority from the Archbishop or the parish priest for the officiating chaplain to
celebrate the marriage. The recelebration did not take place, because on 26 February 1948 Mamerto Escaño was
handed by a maid, whose name he claims he does not remember, a letter purportedly coming from San Carlos
College students and disclosing an amorous relationship between Pastor Tenchavez and Pacita Noel; Vicenta
translated the letter to her father, and thereafter would not agree to a new marriage. Vicenta and Pastor met that
day in the house of Mrs. Pilar Mendezona. Thereafter, Vicenta continued living with her parents while Pastor
returned to his job in Manila. Her letter of 22 March 1948 (Exh. "M"), while still solicitous of her husband’s
welfare, was not as endearing as her previous letters when their love was aflame.
Vicenta was bred in Catholic ways but is of a changeable disposition and Pastor knew it. She fondly accepted
her being called a "jellyfish." She was not prevented by her parents from communicating with Pastor (Exh. 1-
Escaño"), but her letters became less frequent as the days passed. As of June, 1948 the newlyweds were already
estranged (Exh. "2-Escaño"). Vicenta had gone to Jimenez, Misamis Occidental, to escape from the scandal that
her marriage stirred in Cebu society. There, a lawyer filed for her a petition, drafted by then Senator Emmanuel
Pelaez, to annul her marriage. She did not sign the petition (Exh. "B-5"). The case was dismissed without
prejudice because of her non-appearance at the hearing (Exh. "B-4").
On 24 June 1950, without informing her husband, she applied for a passport, indicating in her application that
she was single, that her purpose was to study, that she was domiciled in Cebu City, and that she intended to
return after two years. The application was approved, and she left for the United States. On 22 August 1950, she
filed a verified complaint for divorce against the herein plaintiff in the Second Judicial District Court of the
State of Nevada in and for the County of Washoe, on the ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in
character." On 21 October 1950, a decree of divorce, "final and absolute", was issued in open court by the said
tribunal.
In 1951 Mamerto and Mena Escaño filed a petition with the Archbishop of Cebu to annul their daughter’s
marriage to Pastor (Exh. "D"). On 10 September 1954, Vicenta sought papal dispensation of her marriage (Exh.
"D-2").
On 13 September 1954, Vicenta married an American, Russell Leo Moran, in Nevada. She now lives with him
in California, and, by him, has begotten children. She acquired American citizenship on 8 August 1958.
But on 30 July 1955, Tenchavez had initiated the proceedings at bar by a complaint in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, and amended on 31 May 1956, against Vicenta F. Escaño, her parents, Mamerto and Mena
Escaño, whom he charged with having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining her husband, and
alienating her affections, and against the Roman Catholic Church, for having, through its Diocesan Tribunal,
decreed the annulment of the marriage, and asked for legal separation and one million pesos in damages.
Vicenta claimed a valid divorce from plaintiff and an equally valid marriage to her present husband, Russell
Leo Moran; while her parents denied that they had in anyway influenced their daughter’s acts, and
counterclaimed for moral damages.
The appealed judgment did not decree a legal separation, but freed the plaintiff from supporting his wife and to
acquire property to the exclusion of his wife. It allowed the counterclaim of Mamerto Escaño and Mena Escaño
for moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees against the plaintiff-appellant, to the extent of
P45,000.00, and plaintiff resorted directly to this Court.
The appellant ascribes, as errors of the trial court, the following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. In not declaring legal separation; in not holding defendant Vicenta F. Escaño liable for damages and in
dismissing the complaint;
2. In not holding the defendant parents Don Mamerto Escaño and the heirs of Doña Mena Escaño liable for
damages;
3. In holding the plaintiff liable for and requiring him to pay the damages to the defendant parents on their
counterclaim; and
4. In dismissing the complaint and in denying the relief sought by the plaintiff.
That on 24 February 1948 the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor Tenchavez, and the defendant-appellee, Vicenta
Escaño, were validly married to each other, from the standpoint of our civil law, is clearly established by the
record before us. Both parties were then above the age of majority, and otherwise qualified; and both consented
to the marriage, which was performed by a Catholic priest (army chaplain Lavares) in the presence of
competent witnesses. It is nowhere shown that said priest was not duly authorized under civil law to solemnize
marriages.
The chaplain’s alleged lack of ecclesiastical authorization from the parish priest and the Ordinary, as required
by Canon law, is irrelevant in our civil law, not only because of the separation of the Church and State but also
because Act 3613 of the Philippine Legislature (which was the marriage law in force at the time) expressly
provided that —
"SEC. 1. Ecclesiastical Requisites.—Essential requisites for marriage are the legal capacity of the contracting
parties and their consent." (Italics supplied)
The actual authority of the solemnizing officer was thus only a formal requirement, and, therefore, not essential
to give the marriage civil effects 3 and this is emphasized by section 27 of said marriage act, which provided the
following:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 27. Failure to comply with formal requirements:—No marriage shall be declared invalid because of the
absence of one or several of the formal requirements of this Act if, when it was performed, the spouses or one of
them believed in good faith that the person who solemnized the marriage was actually empowered to do so, and
that the marriage was perfectly legal."cralaw virtua1aw library
The good faith of all the parties to the marriage (and hence the validity of their marriage) will be presumed until
the contrary is positively proved (Lao v. Dee Tim, 45 Phil. 739, 745; Francisco v. Jason, 60 Phil. 442, 448). It is
well to note here that in the case at bar, doubts as to the authority of the solemnizing priest arose only after the
marriage, when Vicenta’s parents consulted Father Reynes and the archbishop of Cebu. Moreover, the very act
of Vicenta in abandoning her original action for annulment and subsequently suing for divorce implies an
admission that her marriage to plaintiff was valid and binding.
Defendant Vicenta Escaño argues that when she contracted the marriage she was under the undue influence of
Pacita Noel, whom she charges to have been in conspiracy with appellant Tenchavez. Even granting, for
argument’s sake, the truth of that contention, and assuming that Vicenta’s consent was vitiated by fraud and
undue influence, such vices did not render her marriage ab initio void, but merely voidable, and the marriage
remained valid until annulled by a competent civil court. This was never done, and admittedly, Vicenta’s suit
for annulment in the Court of First Instance of Misamis was dismissed for non-prosecution.
It is equally clear from the record that the valid marriage between Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escaño
remained subsisting and undissolved under Philippine Law, notwithstanding the decree of absolute divorce that
the wife sought and obtained on 21 October 1950 from the Second Judicial District Court of Washoe County,
State of Nevada, on grounds of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." At the time the divorce decree
was issued, Vicenta Escaño, like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen. 4 She was then subject to Philippine
law, and Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (Republic Act. No. 386), already in force at the time,
expressly provided:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and legal capacity of person are binding
upon the citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad."cralaw virtua1aw library
The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in force, does not admit absolute divorce, quo ad vinculo matrimonii;
and in fact it does not even use that term, to further emphasize its restrictive policy on the matter, in contrast to
the preceding legislation that admitted absolute divorce on grounds of adultery of the wife or concubinage of the
husband (Act 2710). Instead of divorce, the present Civil Code only provides for legal separation (Title IV,
Book K, Arts. 97 to 108), and, even in that case, it expressly prescribes that "the marriage bonds shall not be
severed" (Art. 106, subpar. 1).
For the Philippine courts to recognize and give recognition or effect to a foreign decree of absolute divorce
between Filipino citizens would be a patent violation of the declared public policy of the state, specially in view
of the third paragraph of Article 17 of the Civil Code that prescribes the following:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property and those which have for their object public order,
public policy and good customs, shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by
determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country."cralaw virtua1aw library
Even more, the grant of effectivity in this jurisdiction to such foreign divorce decrees would, in effect, give rise
to an irritating and scandalous discrimination in favor of wealthy citizens, to the detriment of those members of
our polity whose means do not permit them to sojourn abroad and obtain absolute divorces outside the
Philippines.
From this point of view, it is irrelevant that appellant Pastor Tenchavez should have appeared in the Nevada
divorce court. Primarily because the policy of our law can not be nullified by acts of private parties (Civil Code,
Art. 17, jam quot.); and additionally, because the mere appearance of a non-resident consort can not confer
jurisdiction where the court originally had none (Arca v. Javier, 95 Phil. 579).
From the preceding facts and considerations, there flows as a necessary consequence that in this jurisdiction
Vicenta Escaño’s divorce and second marriage are not entitled to recognition as valid; for her previous union to
plaintiff Tenchavez must be declared to be existent and undissolved. It follows, likewise, that her refusal to
perform her wifely duties, and her denial of consortium and her desertion of her husband constitute in law a
wrong caused through her fault, for which the husband is entitled to the corresponding indemnity (Civil Code,
Art. 2176). Neither an unsubstantiated charge of deceit, nor an anonymous letter charging immorality against
the husband constitute, contrary to her claim, adequate excuse. Wherefore, her marriage and cohabitation with
Russell Leo Moran is technically "intercourse with a person not her husband" from the standpoint of Philippine
law, and entitles plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez to a decree of "legal separation under our law, on the basis of
adultery (Revised Penal Code, Art. 333).
The foregoing conclusions as to the untoward effect of a remarriage after an invalid divorce are in accord with
the previous doctrines and rulings of this court on the subject, particularly those that were rendered under our
laws prior to the approval of the absolute divorce act (Act 2710 of the Philippine Legislature). As a matter of
legal history, our statutes did not recognize divorces a vinculo before 1917, when Act 2710 became effective:
and the present Civil Code of the Philippines, in disregarding absolute divorces, in effect merely reverted to the
policies on the subject prevailing before Act 2710. The rulings, therefore, under the Civil Code of 1889, prior to
the Act above-mentioned, are now fully applicable. Of these, the decision in Ramirez v. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855, is
of particular interest. Said this Court in that case:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"As the divorce granted by the French Court must be ignored, it results that the marriage of Dr. Mory and Leona
Castro, celebrated in London in 1905, could not legalize their relations; and the circumstance that they
afterwards passed for husband and wife in Switzerland until her death is wholly without legal significance. The
claims of the Mory children to participate in the estate of Samuel Bishop must therefore de rejected. The right to
inherit is limited to legitimate, legitimated and acknowledged natural children. The children of adulterous
relations are wholly excluded. The word "descendants" as used in Article 941 of the Civil Code can not be
interpreted to include illegitimates born of adulterous relations." (Italics supplied)
Except for the fact that the successional rights of the children, begotten from Vicenta’s marriage to Leo Moran
after the invalid divorce, are not involved in the case at bar, the Gmur case is authority for the proposition that
such union is adulterous in this jurisdiction, and, therefore, justifies an action for legal separation on the part of
the innocent consort of the first marriage, that stands undissolved in Philippine law. In not so declaring, the trial
court committed error.
True it is that our ruling gives rise to anomalous situations where the status of a person (whether divorced or
not) would depend on the territory where the question arises. Anomalies of this kind are not new in the
Philippines, and the answer to them was given in Barretto v. Gonzales, 58 Phil. 667:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The hardships of the existing divorce laws in the Philippine Islands are well known to the members of the
Legislature. It is the duty of the Courts to enforce laws of divorce as written by the Legislature if they are
constitutional. Courts have no right to say that such laws are too strict or too liberal." (p.72)
The appellant’s first assignment of error is, therefore, sustained.
However, the plaintiff-appellant’s charge that his wife’s parents, Dr. Mamerto Escaño and his wife, the late
Doña Mena Escaño, alienated the affection of their daughter and influenced her conduct toward her husband are
not supported by credible evidence. The testimony of Pastor Tenchavez about the Escaño’s animosity toward
him strikes us to be merely conjecture and exaggeration, and are belied by Pastor’s own letters written before
this suit was begun (Exh. "2- Escaño" and "2-Vicenta", Rec. on App. pp. 270-274). In these letters he expressly
apologized to the defendants for "misjudging them" and for the "great unhappiness" caused by his "impulsive
blunders" and "sinful pride" "effrontery and audacity" (sic). Plaintiff was admitted to the Escaño house to visit
and court Vicenta, and the record shows nothing to prove that he would not have been accepted to marry
Vicenta had he openly asked for her hand, as good manners and breeding demanded. Even after learning of the
clandestine marriage, and despite their shock at such unexpected event, the parents of Vicenta proposed and
arranged that the marriage be recelebrated in strict conformity with the canons of their religion upon advice that
the previous one was canonically defective. If no recelebration of the marriage ceremony was had it was not due
to defendants Mamerto Escaño and his wife, but to the refusal of Vicenta to proceed with it. That the spouses
Escaño did not seek to compel or induce their daughter to assent to the recelebration but respected her decision,
or that they abided by her resolve, does not constitute in law an alienation of affections. Neither does the fact
that Vicenta’s parents sent her money while she was in the United States; for it was natural that they should not
wish their daughter to live in penury even if they did not concur in their decision to divorce Tenchavez (27 Am.
Jur. pp. 130-132).
There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, out of improper motives, aided and abetted her original suit for
annulment, or her subsequent divorce; she appears to have acted independently and being of age, she was
entitled to judge what was best for her and ask that her decisions be respected. Her parents, in so doing,
certainly can not be charged with alienation of affections in the absence of malice or unworthy motives, which
have not been shown, good faith being always presumed until the contrary is proved.
"Sec. 529. Liability of Parents, Guardians or kin. — The law distinguishes between the right of a parent to
interest himself in the marital affairs of his child and the absence of right in a stranger to intermeddle in such
affairs. However, such distinction between the liability of parents and that of strangers is only in regard to what
will justify interference. A parent is liable for alienation of affections resulting from his own malicious conduct,
as where he wrongfully entices his son or daughter to leave his or her spouse, but he is not liable unless he acts
maliciously, without justification and from unworthy motives. He is not liable where he acts and advises his
child in good faith with respect to his child’s marital relations, in the interest of his child as he sees it, the
marriage of his child not terminating his right and liberty to interest himself in, and be extremely solicitous for,
his child’s welfare and happiness, even where his conduct and advice suggest or result in the separation of the
spouses or the obtaining of a divorce or annulment, or where he acts under mistake or misinformation, or where
his advice or interference are indiscreet or unfortunate, although it has been held that the parent is liable for
consequences resulting from recklessness. He may in good faith take his child into his home and afford him or
her protection and support, so long as he has not maliciously enticed his child away, or does not maliciously
entice or cause him or her to stay away, from his or her spouse. This rule has more frequently been applied in
the case of advice given to a married daughter, but it is equally applicable in the case of advice given to a
son."cralaw virtua1aw library
Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta’s aged parents with racial or social discrimination and with
having exerted efforts and pressured her to seek annulment and divorce, unquestionably caused them unrest and
anxiety, entitling them to recover damages. While his suit may not have been impelled by actual malice, the
charges were certainly reckless in the face of the proven facts and circumstances. Court actions are not
established for parties to give vent to their prejudices or spleen.
In the assessment of the moral damages recoverable by appellant Pastor Tenchavez from defendant Vicenta
Escaño, it is proper to take into account, against his patently unreasonable claim for a million pesos in damages,
that (a) the marriage was celebrated in secret, and its failure was not characterized by publicity or undue
humiliation on appellant’s part; (b) that the parties never lived together; and (c) that there is evidence that
appellant had originally agreed to the annulment of the marriage, although such a promise was legally invalid,
being against public policy (cf. Art. 88, Civ. Code). While appellant is unable to remarry under our law, this fact
is a consequence of the indissoluble character of the union that appellant entered into voluntarily and with open
eyes rather than of her divorce and her second marriage. All told, we are of the opinion that appellant should
recover P25,000 only by way of moral damages and attorney’s fees.
With regard to the P45,000 damages awarded to the defendants, Dr. Mamerto Escaño and Mena Escaño, by the
court below, we opine that the same are excessive. While the filing of this unfounded suit have wounded said
defendant’s feelings and caused them anxiety, the same could in no way have seriously injured their reputation,
or otherwise prejudiced them, lawsuits having become a common occurrence in present society. What is
important, and has been correctly established in the decision of the court below, is that said defendants were not
guilty of any improper conduct in the whole deplorable affair. This Court, therefore, reduces the damages
awarded to P5,000 only.
Summing up, the Court rules:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil
Code (Rep. Act No. 386), is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction; and neither is the marriage
contracted with another party by the divorced consort, subsequently to the foreign decree of divorce, entitled to
validity in this country.
(2) That the remarriage of the divorced wife and her cohabitation with a person other than the lawful husband
entitle the latter to a decree of legal separation conformably to Philippine law;
(3) That the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one consort entitles the other to recover
damages;
(4) That an action for alienation of affections against the parents of one consort does not lie in the absence of
proof of malice or unworthy motives on their part.
WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified, as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal separation from defendant
Vicenta F. Escaño;
(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escaño to pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the amount of P25,000
for damages and attorneys’ fees;
(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escaño and the estate of his wife, the
deceased Mena Escaño, P5,000 by way of damages and attorney’s fee.
Neither party to recover costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ.,
concur.
Endnotes:
1. The latter was substituted by her heirs when she died during the pendency of the case in the trial court.
2. The original complaint included the Roman Catholic Church as a defendant, sought to be enjoined from
acting on a petition for the ecclesiastical annulment of the marriage between Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta
Escaño: the case against the defendant Church was dismissed on a joint motion.
3. In the present Civil Code the contrary rule obtains (Art. 53).
4. She was naturalized as an American citizen only on 8 August 1958
16. Van Dorn vs Romillo G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985
ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the
National Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARD UPTON respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:\
In this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn seeks to set aside the Orders,
dated September 15, 1983 and August 3, 1984, in Civil Case No. 1075-P, issued by respondent Judge, which
denied her Motion to Dismiss said case, and her Motion for Reconsideration of the Dismissal Order,
respectively.
The basic background facts are that petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a citizen
of the United States; that they were married in Hongkong in 1972; that, after the marriage, they established their
residence in the Philippines; that they begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975,
respectively; that the parties were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982; and that petitioner has re-married
also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-P of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon Shop,
for short), is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of
that business, and that private respondent be declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner
moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce
proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no
community property" as of June 11, 1982. The Court below denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case
on the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing
in the case. The denial is now the subject of this certiorari proceeding.
Generally, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss in a civil case is interlocutory and is not subject to appeal.
certiorari and Prohibition are neither the remedies to question the propriety of an interlocutory order of the trial
Court. However, when a grave abuse of discretion was patently committed, or the lower Court acted
capriciously and whimsically, then it devolves upon this Court in a certiorari proceeding to exercise its
supervisory authority and to correct the error committed which, in such a case, is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. 1 Prohibition would then lie since it would be useless and a waste of time to go ahead with the
proceedings. 2 Weconsider the petition filed in this case within the exception, and we have given it due course.
For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal property in the
Philippines.
Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged conjugal property because of
the representation he made in the divorce proceedings before the American Court that they had no community
of property; that the Galleon Shop was not established through conjugal funds, and that respondent's claim is
barred by prior judgment.
For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot prevail over the
prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign
Court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to
entertain matters within its jurisdiction.
For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine whether the property relations between petitioner
and private respondent, after their marriage, were upon absolute or relative community property, upon complete
separation of property, or upon any other regime. The pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada divorce of the
parties.
The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over petitioner who appeared
in person before the Court during the trial of the case. It also obtained jurisdiction over private respondent who,
giving his address as No. 381 Bush Street, San Francisco, California, authorized his attorneys in the divorce
case, Karp & Gradt Ltd., to agree to the divorce on the ground of incompatibility in the understanding that there
were neither community property nor community obligations. 3 As explicitly stated in the Power of Attorney he
executed in favor of the law firm of KARP & GRAD LTD., 336 W. Liberty, Reno, Nevada, to represent him in
the divorce proceedings:
xxx xxx xxx
You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to file an Answer, appear on my
behalf and do an things necessary and proper to represent me, without further contesting,
subject to the following:
1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of incompatibility.
2. That there is no community of property to be adjudicated by the Court.
3. 'I'hat there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by the court.
xxx xxx xxx 4
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The
decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue
petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not
valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, 5 only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept
of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. 6 In this case, the divorce in Nevada
released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce
dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton,
45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court of
competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and
wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie when thus severed as to one
party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is
unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty. that the guilty party
shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of
the former marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no
standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he
is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose
decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his
right over the alleged conjugal property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to
private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be
just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to
private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal
property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to dismiss the Complaint filed
in Civil Case No. 1075-P of his Court.
Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente and Patajo, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Sanchez vs. Zosa, 68 SCRA 171 (1975); Malit vs. People, 114 SCRA 348 (1982).
2 U.S.T. vs. Hon. Villanueva, et al., 106 Phil. 439 (1959).
3 Annex "Y", Petition for Certiorari.
4 p. 98, Rollo.
5 "Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
6 cf. Recto vs. Harden, 100 Phil. 427 [1956]; Paras, Civil Code, 1971 ed., Vol. I, p. 52;
Salonga, Private International Law, 1979 ed., p. 231."
17. Pilapil vs Ibay-Somera G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989
IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner,
vs.
HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila; and ERICH
EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
An ill-starred marriage of a Filipina and a foreigner which ended in a foreign absolute divorce, only to be
followed by a criminal infidelity suit of the latter against the former, provides Us the opportunity to lay down a
decisional rule on what hitherto appears to be an unresolved jurisdictional question.
On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich
Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at
Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. The marriage started auspiciously enough, and the couple
lived together for some time in Malate, Manila where their only child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on
April 20, 1980. 1
Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between the spouses, followed by a separation de
facto between them.
After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in private respondent
initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January,
1983. He claimed that there was failure of their marriage and that they had been living apart since April, 1982. 2
Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, on January 23, 1983 where the same is still pending as Civil
Case No. 83-15866. 3
On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a
decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to
petitioner. The records show that under German law said court was locally and internationally competent for the
divorce proceeding and that the dissolution of said marriage was legally founded on and authorized by the
applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction. 4
On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed
two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to said respondent,
petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man named Jesus
Chua sometime in 1983". Assistant Fiscal Jacinto A. de los Reyes, Jr., after the corresponding investigation,
recommended the dismissal of the cases on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. 5 However, upon review,
the respondent city fiscal approved a resolution, dated January 8, 1986, directing the filing of two complaints
for adultery against the petitioner. 6 The complaints were accordingly filed and were eventually raffled to two
branches of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The case entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil
and William Chia", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52435, was assigned to Branch XXVI presided by the
respondent judge; while the other case, "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and James Chua",
docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52434 went to the sala of Judge Leonardo Cruz, Branch XXV, of the same
court. 7
On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary of Justice asking that the aforesaid resolution
of respondent fiscal be set aside and the cases against her be dismissed. 8 A similar petition was filed by James
Chua, her co-accused in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. The Secretary of Justice, through the Chief State
Prosecutor, gave due course to both petitions and directed the respondent city fiscal to inform the Department of
Justice "if the accused have already been arraigned and if not yet arraigned, to move to defer further
proceedings" and to elevate the entire records of both cases to his office for review. 9
Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer her arraignment and to suspend further
proceedings thereon. 10 As a consequence, Judge Leonardo Cruz suspended proceedings in Criminal Case No.
87-52434. On the other hand, respondent judge merely reset the date of the arraignment in Criminal Case No.
87-52435 to April 6, 1987. Before such scheduled date, petitioner moved for the cancellation of the arraignment
and for the suspension of proceedings in said Criminal Case No. 87-52435 until after the resolution of the
petition for review then pending before the Secretary of Justice. 11 A motion to quash was also filed in the same
case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, 12 which motion was denied by the respondent judge in an order dated
September 8, 1987. The same order also directed the arraignment of both accused therein, that is, petitioner and
William Chia. The latter entered a plea of not guilty while the petitioner refused to be arraigned. Such refusal of
the petitioner being considered by respondent judge as direct contempt, she and her counsel were fined and the
former was ordered detained until she submitted herself for arraignment. 13 Later, private respondent entered a
plea of not guilty. 14
On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a
temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to quash.
The petition is anchored on the main ground that the court is without jurisdiction "to try and decide the charge
of adultery, which is a private offense that cannot be prosecuted de officio (sic), since the purported
complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under
his national law prior to his filing the criminal complaint." 15
On October 21, 1987, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from
implementing the aforesaid order of September 8, 1987 and from further proceeding with Criminal Case No.
87-52435. Subsequently, on March 23, 1988 Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoñez acted on the aforesaid
petitions for review and, upholding petitioner's ratiocinations, issued a resolution directing the respondent city
fiscal to move for the dismissal of the complaints against the petitioner. 16
We find this petition meritorious. The writs prayed for shall accordingly issue.
Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, 17 the crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes against
chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has long
since been established, with unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not
merely a formal, requirement. 18 While in point of strict law the jurisdiction of the court over the offense is
vested in it by the Judiciary Law, the requirement for a sworn written complaint is just as jurisdictional a
mandate since it is that complaint which starts the prosecutory proceeding 19 and without which the court cannot
exercise its jurisdiction to try the case.
Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person who can legally
file the complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else. Unlike the offenses of seduction, abduction,
rape and acts of lasciviousness, no provision is made for the prosecution of the crimes of adultery and
concubinage by the parents, grandparents or guardian of the offended party. The so-called exclusive and
successive rule in the prosecution of the first four offenses above mentioned do not apply to adultery and
concubinage. It is significant that while the State, as parens patriae, was added and vested by the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure with the power to initiate the criminal action for a deceased or incapacitated victim in the
aforesaid offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, in default of her parents,
grandparents or guardian, such amendment did not include the crimes of adultery and concubinage. In other
words, only the offended spouse, and no other, is authorized by law to initiate the action therefor.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows
that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the
criminal action. This is a familiar and express rule in civil actions; in fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as a
ground for a motion to dismiss in civil cases, is determined as of the filing of the complaint or petition.
The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the prosecution of criminal cases does not mean that the same
requirement and rationale would not apply. Understandably, it may not have been found necessary since
criminal actions are generally and fundamentally commenced by the State, through the People of the
Philippines, the offended party being merely the complaining witness therein. However, in the so-called
"private crimes" or those which cannot be prosecuted de oficio, and the present prosecution for adultery is of
such genre, the offended spouse assumes a more predominant role since the right to commence the action, or to
refrain therefrom, is a matter exclusively within his power and option.
This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the outrage in
silence rather than go through the scandal of a public trial. 20 Hence, as cogently argued by petitioner, Article
344 of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the
institution of the criminal action for, adultery. This is a logical consequence since the raison d'etre of said
provision of law would be absent where the supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged
offender at the time of the filing of the criminal case. 21
In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and capacity of the complainant to commence the
action be definitely established and, as already demonstrated, such status or capacity must indubitably exist as
of the time he initiates the action. It would be absurd if his capacity to bring the action would be determined by
his status beforeor subsequent to the commencement thereof, where such capacity or status existed prior to but
ceased before, or was acquired subsequent to but did not exist at the time of, the institution of the case. We
would thereby have the anomalous spectacle of a party bringing suit at the very time when he is without the
legal capacity to do so.
To repeat, there does not appear to be any local precedential jurisprudence on the specific issue as to when
precisely the status of a complainant as an offended spouse must exist where a criminal prosecution can be
commenced only by one who in law can be categorized as possessed of such status. Stated differently and with
reference to the present case, the inquiry ;would be whether it is necessary in the commencement of a criminal
action for adultery that the marital bonds between the complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at
the time of the institution of the action by the former against the latter.
American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that jurisdiction which are in pari materia with ours,
yields the rule that after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has the right to institute
proceedings against the offenders where the statute provides that the innocent spouse shall have the exclusive
right to institute a prosecution for adultery. Where, however, proceedings have been properly commenced, a
divorce subsequently granted can have no legal effect on the prosecution of the criminal proceedings to a
conclusion. 22
In the cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that —
'No prosecution for adultery can be commenced except on the complaint of the husband or
wife.' Section 4932, Code. Though Loftus was husband of defendant when the offense is said
to have been committed, he had ceased to be such when the prosecution was begun; and
appellant insists that his status was not such as to entitle him to make the complaint. We have
repeatedly said that the offense is against the unoffending spouse, as well as the state, in
explaining the reason for this provision in the statute; and we are of the opinion that the
unoffending spouse must be such when the prosecution is commenced. (Emphasis supplied.)
We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should not apply in this case and in our jurisdiction, considering
our statutory law and jural policy on the matter. We are convinced that in cases of such nature, the status of the
complainant vis-a-vis the accused must be determined as of the time the complaint was filed. Thus, the person
who initiates the adultery case must be an offended spouse, and by this is meant that he is still married to the
accused spouse, at the time of the filing of the complaint.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic
of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as
private respondent is concerned 23 in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of
persons.
Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al., 24 after a divorce was granted by a United States
court between Alice Van Dornja Filipina, and her American husband, the latter filed a civil case in a trial court
here alleging that her business concern was conjugal property and praying that she be ordered to render an
accounting and that the plaintiff be granted the right to manage the business. Rejecting his pretensions, this
Court perspicuously demonstrated the error of such stance, thus:
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the
United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For
instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union.
...
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law. ...
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner.
He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to
exercise control over conjugal assets. ... 25
Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had
no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the
time he filed suit.
The allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought this case before the decree of divorce for
lack of knowledge, even if true, is of no legal significance or consequence in this case. When said respondent
initiated the divorce proceeding, he obviously knew that there would no longer be a family nor marriage vows
to protect once a dissolution of the marriage is decreed. Neither would there be a danger of introducing spurious
heirs into the family, which is said to be one of the reasons for the particular formulation of our law on
adultery, 26 since there would thenceforth be no spousal relationship to speak of. The severance of the marital
bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not
affect or cast obloquy on the other.
The aforecited case of United States vs. Mata cannot be successfully relied upon by private respondent. In
applying Article 433 of the old Penal Code, substantially the same as Article 333 of the Revised Penal Code,
which punished adultery "although the marriage be afterwards declared void", the Court merely stated that "the
lawmakers intended to declare adulterous the infidelity of a married woman to her marital vows, even though it
should be made to appear that she is entitled to have her marriage contract declared null and void, until and
unless she actually secures a formal judicial declaration to that effect". Definitely, it cannot be logically inferred
therefrom that the complaint can still be filed after the declaration of nullity because such declaration that the
marriage is void ab initio is equivalent to stating that it never existed. There being no marriage from the
beginning, any complaint for adultery filed after said declaration of nullity would no longer have a leg to stand
on. Moreover, what was consequently contemplated and within the purview of the decision in said case is the
situation where the criminal action for adultery was filed beforethe termination of the marriage by a judicial
declaration of its nullity ab initio. The same rule and requisite would necessarily apply where the termination of
the marriage was effected, as in this case, by a valid foreign divorce.
Private respondent's invocation of Donio-Teves, et al. vs. Vamenta, hereinbefore cited, 27 must suffer the same
fate of inapplicability. A cursory reading of said case reveals that the offended spouse therein had duly and
seasonably filed a complaint for adultery, although an issue was raised as to its sufficiency but which was
resolved in favor of the complainant. Said case did not involve a factual situation akin to the one at bar or any
issue determinative of the controversy herein.
WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner's motion to quash is SET ASIDE and another one
entered DISMISSING the complaint in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 for lack of jurisdiction. The temporary
restraining order issued in this case on October 21, 1987 is hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
PARAS, J., concurring:
It is my considered opinion that regardless of whether We consider the German absolute divorce as valid also in
the Philippines, the fact is that the husband in the instant case, by the very act of his obtaining an absolute
divorce in Germany can no longer be considered as the offended party in case his former wife actually has
carnal knowledge with another, because in divorcing her, he already implicitly authorized the woman to have
sexual relations with others. A contrary ruling would be less than fair for a man, who is free to have sex will be
allowed to deprive the woman of the same privilege.
In the case of Recto v. Harden (100 Phil. 427 [1956]), the Supreme Court considered the absolute divorce
between the American husband and his American wife as valid and binding in the Philippines on the theory that
their status and capacity are governed by their National law, namely, American law. There is no decision yet of
the Supreme Court regarding the validity of such a divorce if one of the parties, say an American, is married to a
Filipino wife, for then two (2) different nationalities would be involved.
In the book of Senate President Jovito Salonga entitled Private International Law and precisely because of
the National law doctrine, he considers the absolute divorce as valid insofar as the American husband is
concerned but void insofar as the Filipino wife is involved. This results in what he calls a "socially grotesque
situation," where a Filipino woman is still married to a man who is no longer her husband. It is the opinion
however, of the undersigned that very likely the opposite expresses the correct view. While under the national
law of the husband the absolute divorce will be valid, still one of the exceptions to the application of the proper
foreign law (one of the exceptions to comity) is when the foreign law will work an injustice or injury to the
people or residents of the forum. Consequently since to recognize the absolute divorce as valid on the part of the Footnotes
husband would be injurious or prejudicial to the Filipino wife whose marriage would be still valid under her
national law, it would seem that under our law existing before the new Family Code (which took effect on 1 Rollo, 5, 29.
August 3, 1988) the divorce should be considered void both with respect to the American husband and the
Filipino wife.
2 Ibid., 6, 29.

The recent case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. (139 SCRA [1985]) cannot apply despite the fact that the husband 3 Ibid., 7.
was an American can with a Filipino wife because in said case the validity of the divorce insofar as the Filipino
wife is concerned was NEVER put in issue.
4 Ibid., 7, 29-30; Annexes A and A-1, Petition.

5 Ibid., 7, 178.
Separate Opinions
6 Ibid., 8; Annexes B, B-1 and B-2, id.
PARAS, J., concurring:
7 Ibid., 8-9, 178.
It is my considered opinion that regardless of whether We consider the German absolute divorce as valid also in
the Philippines, the fact is that the husband in the instant case, by the very act of his obtaining an absolute 8 Ibid., 9, 178; Annex C, id.
divorce in Germany can no longer be considered as the offended party in case his former wife actually has
carnal knowledge with another, because in divorcing her, he already implicitly authorized the woman to have 9 Ibid., 9-10, 178; Annex D, id.
sexual relations with others. A contrary ruling would be less than fair for a man, who is free to have sex will be
allowed to deprive the woman of the same privilege. 10 Ibid., 9; Annexes E and E-1, id.

In the case of Recto v. Harden (100 Phil. 427 [1956]), the Supreme Court considered the absolute divorce 11 Ibid., 10; Annex F, id.
between the American husband and his American wife as valid and binding in the Philippines on the theory that
their status and capacity are governed by their National law, namely, American law. There is no decision yet of 12 Ibid., 9, 179; Annex G, id.
the Supreme Court regarding the validity of such a divorce if one of the parties, say an American, is married to a
Filipino wife, for then two (2) different nationalities would be involved.
13 Ibid., 10 Annex H, id.
In the book of Senate President Jovito Salonga entitled Private International Law and precisely because of
14 Ibid, 105.
the National law doctrine, he considers the absolute divorce as valid insofar as the American husband is
concerned but void insofar as the Filipino wife is involved. This results in what he calls a "socially grotesque
situation," where a Filipino woman is still married to a man who is no longer her husband. It is the opinion 15 Ibid., 11.
however, of the undersigned that very likely the opposite expresses the correct view. While under the national
law of the husband the absolute divorce will be valid, still one of the exceptions to the application of the proper 16 Ibid., 311-313.
foreign law (one of the exceptions to comity) is when the foreign law will work an injustice or injury to the
people or residents of the forum. Consequently since to recognize the absolute divorce as valid on the part of the 17 Cf. Sec. 5, Rule 110, Rules of Court.
husband would be injurious or prejudicial to the Filipino wife whose marriage would be still valid under her
national law, it would seem that under our law existing before the new Family Code (which took effect on 18 People vs. Mandia, 60 Phil. 372, 375 (1934); People vs. Zurbano, 37 SCRA 565, 569
August 3, 1988) the divorce should be considered void both with respect to the American husband and the (1971); People vs. Lingayen, G.R. No. 64556, June 10, 1988.
Filipino wife.
19 Valdepeñas vs. People, 16 SCRA 871 (1966); People vs. Babasa, 97 SCRA 672 (1980).
The recent case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. (139 SCRA [1985]) cannot apply despite the fact that the husband
was an American can with a Filipino wife because in said case the validity of the divorce insofar as the Filipino
wife is concerned was NEVER put in issue.
 20 Samilin vs. Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, 57 Phil. 298 (1932); Donio-Teves, et al. For review1 is a dismissal2 of a suit to enforce a post-foreign divorce child custody agreement for lack of
vs. Vamenta, et al., 133 SCRA 616 (1984). jurisdiction.

21 Rollo, 289. The Facts

22 2 Am. Jur. 2d., 973 citing State vs. Loftus, 104 NW 906, 907; Re Smith, 2 Okla. 153, 37 p. Petitioner Herald Dacasin (petitioner), American, and respondent Sharon Del Mundo Dacasin (respondent),
1099; State vs. Russell, 90 Iowa 569, 58 NW 915. Filipino, were married in Manila in April 1994. They have one daughter, Stephanie, born on 21 September
1995. In June 1999, respondent sought and obtained from the Circuit Court, 19th Judicial Circuit, Lake County,
23 Recto vs. Harden, 100 Phil. 427 (1956). Illinois (Illinois court) a divorce decree against petitioner. 3 In its ruling, the Illinois court dissolved the marriage
of petitioner and respondent, awarded to respondent sole custody of Stephanie and retained jurisdiction over the
case for enforcement purposes.
24 139 SCRA 139,140 (1985).

On 28 January 2002, petitioner and respondent executed in Manila a contract (Agreement 4 ) for the joint
25 The said pronouncements foreshadowed and are adopted in the Family Code of the
custody of Stephanie. The parties chose Philippine courts as exclusive forum to adjudicate disputes arising from
Philippines (Executive Order No. 209, as amended by Executive Order No. 227, effective on
the Agreement. Respondent undertook to obtain from the Illinois court an order "relinquishing" jurisdiction to
August 3, 1988), Article 26 whereof provides that "(w)here marriage between a Filipino
Philippine courts.
citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad
by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have
capacity to re under Philippine law. In 2004, petitioner sued respondent in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 60 (trial court) to
enforce the Agreement. Petitioner alleged that in violation of the Agreement, respondent exercised sole custody
over Stephanie.
26 U.S. vs. Mata, 18 Phil. 490 (1911).

27 Footnote 20, ante. Respondent sought the dismissal of the complaint for, among others, lack of jurisdiction because of the Illinois
court’s retention of jurisdiction to enforce the divorce decree.
18. Dacasin vs Dacasin G.R. No. 168785 February 5, 2010
The Ruling of the Trial Court
Republic of the Philippines
In its Order dated 1 March 2005, the trial court sustained respondent’s motion and dismissed the case for lack of
SUPREME COURT
jurisdiction. The trial court held that: (1) it is precluded from taking cognizance over the suit considering the
Manila
Illinois court’s retention of jurisdiction to enforce its divorce decree, including its order awarding sole custody
of Stephanie to respondent; (2) the divorce decree is binding on petitioner following the "nationality rule"
SECOND DIVISION prevailing in this jurisdiction;5 and (3) the Agreement is void for contravening Article 2035, paragraph 5 of the
Civil Code6 prohibiting compromise agreements on jurisdiction.7
G.R. No. 168785 February 5, 2010
Petitioner sought reconsideration, raising the new argument that the divorce decree obtained by respondent is
HERALD BLACK DACASIN, Petitioner, void. Thus, the divorce decree is no bar to the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the case.
vs.
SHARON DEL MUNDO DACASIN, Respondent. In its Order dated 23 June 2005, the trial court denied reconsideration, holding that unlike in the case of
respondent, the divorce decree is binding on petitioner under the laws of his nationality.
DECISION
Hence, this petition.
CARPIO, J.:
Petitioner submits the following alternative theories for the validity of the Agreement to justify its enforcement
The Case by the trial court: (1) the Agreement novated the valid divorce decree, modifying the terms of child custody
from sole (maternal) to joint;8 or (2) the Agreement is independent of the divorce decree obtained by
respondent.
The Issue
The question is whether the trial court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of petitioner’s suit and enforce the
Agreement on the joint custody of the parties’ child.
The Ruling of the Court
The trial court has jurisdiction to entertain petitioner’s suit but not to enforce the Agreement which is void.
However, factual and equity considerations militate against the dismissal of petitioner’s suit and call for the
remand of the case to settle the question of Stephanie’s custody.
Regional Trial Courts Vested With Jurisdiction
to Enforce Contracts
Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law. At the time petitioner filed his suit in the trial court, statutory
law vests on Regional Trial Courts exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions incapable of pecuniary
estimation.9 An action for specific performance, such as petitioner’s suit to enforce the Agreement on joint child
custody, belongs to this species of actions.10 Thus, jurisdiction-wise, petitioner went to the right court.
Indeed, the trial court’s refusal to entertain petitioner’s suit was grounded not on its lack of power to do so but
on its thinking that the Illinois court’s divorce decree stripped it of jurisdiction. This conclusion is unfounded.
What the Illinois court retained was "jurisdiction x x x for the purpose of enforcing all and sundry the various
provisions of [its] Judgment for Dissolution." 11 Petitioner’s suit seeks the enforcement not of the "various
provisions" of the divorce decree but of the post-divorce Agreement on joint child custody. Thus, the action lies
beyond the zone of the Illinois court’s so-called "retained jurisdiction."
Petitioner’s Suit Lacks Cause of Action
The foregoing notwithstanding, the trial court cannot enforce the Agreement which is contrary to law.
In this jurisdiction, parties to a contract are free to stipulate the terms of agreement subject to the minimum ban
on stipulations contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. 12 Otherwise, the contract is
denied legal existence, deemed "inexistent and void from the beginning." 13 For lack of relevant stipulation in the
Agreement, these and other ancillary Philippine substantive law serve as default parameters to test the validity
of the Agreement’s joint child custody stipulations.14
At the time the parties executed the Agreement on 28 January 2002, two facts are undisputed: (1) Stephanie was
under seven years old (having been born on 21 September 1995); and (2) petitioner and respondent were no
longer married under the laws of the United States because of the divorce decree. The relevant Philippine law
on child custody for spouses separated in fact or in law15 (under the second paragraph of Article 213 of the
Family Code) is also undisputed: "no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother x x
x."16 (This statutory awarding of sole parental custody17 to the mother is mandatory,18 grounded on sound policy
consideration,19subject only to a narrow exception not alleged to obtain here. 20 ) Clearly then, the Agreement’s
object to establish a post-divorce joint custody regime between respondent and petitioner over their child under
seven years old contravenes Philippine law.
The Agreement is not only void ab initio for being contrary to law, it has also been repudiated by the mother
when she refused to allow joint custody by the father. The Agreement would be valid if the spouses have not
divorced or separated because the law provides for joint parental authority when spouses live
together.21 However, upon separation of the spouses, the mother takes sole custody under the law if the child is
below seven years old and any agreement to the contrary is void. Thus, the law suspends the joint custody
regime for (1) children under seven of (2) separated or divorced spouses. Simply put, for a child within this age
bracket (and for commonsensical reasons), the law decides for the separated or divorced parents how best to
take care of the child and that is to give custody to the separated mother. Indeed, the separated parents cannot
contract away the provision in the Family Code on the maternal custody of children below seven years anymore
than they can privately agree that a mother who is unemployed, immoral, habitually drunk, drug addict, insane
or afflicted with a communicable disease will have sole custody of a child under seven as these are reasons
deemed compelling to preclude the application of the exclusive maternal custody regime under the second
paragraph of Article 213.22
It will not do to argue that the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code applies only to judicial
custodial agreements based on its text that "No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the
mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise." To limit this provision’s enforceability to
court sanctioned agreements while placing private agreements beyond its reach is to sanction a double standard
in custody regulation of children under seven years old of separated parents. This effectively empowers
separated parents, by the simple expedient of avoiding the courts, to subvert a legislative policy vesting to the
separated mother sole custody of her children under seven years of age "to avoid a tragedy where a mother has
seen her baby torn away from her." 23 This ignores the legislative basis that "[n]o man can sound the deep
sorrows of a mother who is deprived of her child of tender age." 24
It could very well be that Article 213’s bias favoring one separated parent (mother) over the other (father)
encourages paternal neglect, presumes incapacity for joint parental custody, robs the parents of custodial
options, or hijacks decision-making between the separated parents.25 However, these are objections which
question the law’s wisdom not its validity or uniform enforceability. The forum to air and remedy these
grievances is the legislature, not this Court. At any rate, the rule’s seeming harshness or undesirability is
tempered by ancillary agreements the separated parents may wish to enter such as granting the father visitation
and other privileges. These arrangements are not inconsistent with the regime of sole maternal custody under
the second paragraph of Article 213 which merely grants to the mother final authority on the care and custody
of the minor under seven years of age, in case of disagreements.1avvphi1
Further, the imposed custodial regime under the second paragraph of Article 213 is limited in duration, lasting
only until the child’s seventh year. From the eighth year until the child’s emancipation, the law gives the
separated parents freedom, subject to the usual contractual limitations, to agree on custody regimes they see fit
to adopt. Lastly, even supposing that petitioner and respondent are not barred from entering into the Agreement
for the joint custody of Stephanie, respondent repudiated the Agreement by asserting sole custody over
Stephanie. Respondent’s act effectively brought the parties back to ambit of the default custodial regime in the
second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code vesting on respondent sole custody of Stephanie.
Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce decree’s alleged invalidity - not because the Illinois court lacked
jurisdiction or that the divorce decree violated Illinois law, but because the divorce was obtained by his Filipino
spouse26 - to support the Agreement’s enforceability. The argument that foreigners in this jurisdiction are not
bound by foreign divorce decrees is hardly novel. Van Dorn v. Romillo27 settled the matter by holding that an
alien spouse of a Filipino is bound by a divorce decree obtained abroad. 28 There, we dismissed the alien
divorcee’s Philippine suit for accounting of alleged post-divorce conjugal property and rejected his submission
that the foreign divorce (obtained by the Filipino spouse) is not valid in this jurisdiction in this wise:
consistent with the settled doctrine that in child custody proceedings, equity may be invoked to serve the child’s
best interest.31
WHEREFORE, we REVERSE the Orders dated 1 March 2005 and 23 June 2005 of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 60. The case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this ruling.
SO ORDERED.

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue
Associate Justice
petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not
valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy.
WE CONCUR:
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept ARTURO D. BRION
of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Associate Justice
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released
private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ROBERTO A. ABAD
marriage. Associate Justice Associate Justice

xxxx JOSE P. PEREZ

Associate Justice
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no
standing to sue in the case below as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he ATTESTATION
is bound by the Decision of his own country’s Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose
decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
right over the alleged conjugal property. (Emphasis supplied)
to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
We reiterated Van Dorn in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera29 to dismiss criminal complaints for adultery filed by the alien
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
divorcee (who obtained the foreign divorce decree) against his former Filipino spouse because he no longer
Associate Justice
qualified as "offended spouse" entitled to file the complaints under Philippine procedural rules. Thus, it should
Chairperson
be clear by now that a foreign divorce decree carries as much validity against the alien divorcee in this
jurisdiction as it does in the jurisdiction of the alien’s nationality, irrespective of who obtained the divorce.
CERTIFICATION
The Facts of the Case and Nature of Proceeding
Justify Remand Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
Instead of ordering the dismissal of petitioner’s suit, the logical end to its lack of cause of action, we remand the
case for the trial court to settle the question of Stephanie’s custody. Stephanie is now nearly 15 years old, thus
removing the case outside of the ambit of the mandatory maternal custody regime under Article 213 and REYNATO S. PUNO
bringing it within coverage of the default standard on child custody proceedings – the best interest of the Chief Justice
child.30 As the question of custody is already before the trial court and the child’s parents, by executing the
Agreement, initially showed inclination to share custody, it is in the interest of swift and efficient rendition of
justice to allow the parties to take advantage of the court’s jurisdiction, submit evidence on the custodial
arrangement best serving Stephanie’s interest, and let the trial court render judgment. This disposition is
Footnotes
1
Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
2
In the Orders dated 1 March 2005 and 23 June 2005 issued by the Trial Court of Makati City, Branch
60.
3
Petitioner did not contest the proceedings.
4
Denominated "Compromise Agreement on Child Custody and Support."
5
Under Article 15 of the Civil Code which provides: "Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to
the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even
though living abroad."
6
This provides: "No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid: x x x (5) The jurisdiction
of courts[.]"
7
The trial court held (Records, pp. 157-158):
[H]aving expressly recognized the validity of the Illinois Court’s judgment [petitioner] is
bound by its provisions including the provision that the Court would maintain sole jurisdiction
to implement and enforce the provisions of the said judgment which necessarily included
guidelines for the child’s custody.
[Petitioner] being admittedly an American, following the nationality rule which Philippine
civil laws adhere to, the Judgment of the Illinois Court would be binding upon him since the
judicial disposition refers to matters of status or legal capacity of a person.
xxxx
Moreover, this Court cannot act upon [petitioner’s] prayer to enforce the terms of the said
Compromise Agreement the said agreement being invalid and therefore, void, precisely
because it seeks to transfer jurisdiction over the issue of child custody from the Illinois Court
to this Court by agreement of the parties, when the previous Court had already effectively
asserted its authority to act upon all matters relating to the said issue.
In this regard, Art. 2035 of the Civil Code expressly states that no compromise upon the
questions of civil status of persons, validity of marriage, or legal separation, future support,
jurisdiction of courts and future legitimate shall be valid.
8 Perez v. Court of Appeals, 325 Phil. 1014 (1996). For children over seven, custody decisions are
As a corollary claim, petitioner submits that the stipulation in the Agreement "vesting" exclusive
jurisdiction to Philippine courts over conflicts arising from the Agreement, even if void for being
contrary to Article 2035, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code, is severable from and does not affect the
validity of the other terms of the Agreement on joint custody.
9
Section 19, paragraph 1, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, provides:
"Jurisdiction in civil cases.- Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: (1) In
all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation; x x x x"
10
See Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership v. Herrera, 205 Phil. 61 (1983).
11
Records, p. 17 (emphasis supplied).
12
Article 1306 of the Civil Code provides: "The contracting parties may establish such stipulations,
clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order, or public policy."
13
Article 1409, paragraph 1 of the Civil Code provides: "The following contracts are inexistent and
void from the beginning: (1) Those whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy; x x x x"
14
It can be inferred from the terms of the Agreement that the parties intended to be bound by
Philippine law on its intrinsic validity (this is evident, for instance, from the stipulation selecting
Philippine courts as exclusive forum to settle "any legal issue or dispute that may arise from the
provisions of [the] Agreement and its interpretation x x x" (Records, p. 19; emphasis supplied). At any
rate, Philippine law has the most substantial connection to the contract, considering its object (custody
of a Filipino-American child), subject (Filipino-American child under seven years of age, born of a
Filipino mother, both of whom reside in the country) and parties (Filipina mother and alien father).
15
Including those marriages whose vinculum has been severed (see Sempio-Dy, Handbook on the
Family Code of the Philippines 67-68 [1988]).
16
The provision states: "In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by
the parent designated by the Court. The Court shall take into account all relevant considerations,
especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit.
No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise." (Emphasis supplied)
17
Gamboa-Hirsch v. Court of Appeals (Res.), G.R. No. 174485, 11 July 2007, 527 SCRA 320
(reversing the Court of Appeals’ ruling mandating joint custody and awarding sole custody to the
mother).
18
guided by the standard of "best interest of the child."
19
Our discussion in Pablo-Gualberto v. Gualberto V, G.R. No. 154994, 28 June 2005, 461 SCRA 450,
471-472, on the statutory genealogy and policy grounding of the second paragraph of Article 213 is
enlightening:
[A]rticle 213 takes its bearing from Article 363 of the Civil Code, which reads:
Art. 363. In all questions on the care, custody, education and property of children, the latter’s
welfare shall be paramount. No mother shall be separated from her child under seven years of
age, unless the court finds compelling reasons for such measure.
The general rule that children under seven years of age shall not be separated from their
mother finds its raison d’etre in the basic need of minor children for their mother’s loving
care. In explaining the rationale for Article 363 of the Civil Code, the Code Commission
stressed thus:
The general rule is recommended in order to avoid a tragedy where a mother has seen her
baby torn away from her. No man can sound the deep sorrows of a mother who is deprived of
her child of tender age. The exception allowed by the rule has to be for compelling reasons for
the good of the child: those cases must indeed be rare, if the mother’s heart is not to be unduly
hurt. If she has erred, as in cases of adultery, the penalty of imprisonment and the (relative)
divorce decree will ordinarily be sufficient punishment for her. Moreover, her moral
dereliction will not have any effect upon the baby who is as yet unable to understand the
situation. (Report of the Code Commission, p. 12)
20
Sole maternal custody is denied only for "compelling reasons" such as "neglect, abandonment,
unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity
or affliction with a communicable disease" (Id. at 476; internal citation omitted).
21
Civil Code, Article 211, as amended.
22
See note 20.
23
See note 19.
24
Id.
25
This line of argument can be subsumed under the rubric of "unfair state intervention" but this
complaint can very well be leveled against the entire field of family law where the state injects itself on
a host of areas impinging on the decision-making capacity and autonomy of individuals ranging from
the intensely personal (e.g. who can marry [Article 5, Family Code], where to marry [Article 5, Family
Code], who can celebrate the marriage [Article 5, Family Code], and how to relate to one’s spouse
[Articles 68-72]) to proprietary (e.g. Articles 74-125, Family Code, on property relations of spouses
and Articles 194-208, Family Code, on support) to familial (e.g. Articles 209-233, Family Code, on
parental authority).1avvph!1
26
Petitioner hooks his argument on Gonzales v. Gonzales (58 Phil. 67 [1933]), Arca v. Javier (95 Phil.
579 [1954]) and Tenchavez v. Escaño (122 Phil. 752 [1965]). These cases, involving Filipino spouses,
merely applied the "nationality rule" (now embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code) to reject
validating foreign divorce decrees obtained by Filipino spouses to circumvent the no-divorce rule in
this jurisdiction. They are no authority to support petitioner’s submission that as to aliens, foreign
divorce decrees are void here.
27
223 Phil. 357 (1985).
28
Id. at 361-363.Van Dornspawned the second paragraph of Article 26 granting to Filipino spouses of
aliens who obtain foreign divorce decrees the right to remarry. (Republic v. Orbecido III, G.R. No.
154380, 5 October 2005, 472 SCRA 114).
29
G.R. No. 80116, 30 June 1989, 174 SCRA 653.
30
Bagtas v. Santos, G.R. No. 166682, 27 November 2009.
31
Thus, in habeas corpus proceedings involving child custody, judicial resolutions extend beyond the
custodial right of persons exercising parental authority over the child and reach issues on custodial
arrangements serving the child’s best interest (see Bagtas v. Santos, id., remanding a habeas corpus
petition to determine the fitness of the legal custodians notwithstanding that the question of illegal
withholding of custody has been mooted by the transfer of the child’s physical custody to the habeas
corpus petitioners).
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
SEPARATE OPINION
ABAD, J.:
I agree with the reasons that the majority of the Court gave in support of the decision, except one. I am
uncomfortable with the proposition that an agreement between the mother and the father on a joint custody over
a child below seven years of age is void for being contrary to law and public policy. True, the law provides in
Article 363 of the Civil Code that "No mother shall be separated from her child under seven years of age, unless
the court finds compelling reasons for such measure." The State can think up ways of protecting the child. But
the 1987 Constitution acknowledges in Article II, Section 12, the natural and primary right and duty of parents
to nurture their children and that the State must support them in this respect.1
I submit that, in the matter of child custody, the mutual will of the child’s parents takes precedence in the
absence of circumstances that justify recourse to the law. The law becomes relevant, only as a default, if a
separated couple cannot agree on the custody of their child. The law should not supplant parental discretion or
unnecessarily infringe on parental authority.
Parents have a natural and fundamental right to autonomy in the care, custody, and upbringing of their children.
The Family Code recognizes this in Article 209:
Art. 209. Pursuant to the natural right and duty of parents over the person and property of their unemancipated
children, parental authority and responsibility shall include the caring for and rearing them for civic
consciousness and efficiency and the development of their moral, mental and physical character and well-being.
(n)
The State ought not to interfere with the right of parents to bring up their child unless its exercise causes
potential harm to him. The State steps in, through the law, only if there are compelling reasons to do so. State
intrusion is uncalled for where the welfare of a child is not jeopardized.
Regardless of marital circumstances, the mother and the father are presumed to be fit and competent to act in
the best interest of their child. They can agree to share parental authority or, if you will, parental custody even
as they decide to live under separate roofs. In a voluntary joint custody the mother might want to keep the child
in her home during schooldays but allow the father to have him on weekends. And they could agree on some
device for arriving at a consensus on where the child will study and how his spiritual needs are to be attended
to.
The law does not take away from a separating couple the authority and competence to determine what is best for
their child. If they resolve on their own that shared parental custody is in their child’s best interest, then the law
and the courts have no business vetoing their decision. The parents enjoy a primary right to make such decision.
I cannot concede that, where the child is below seven years of age, any agreement that diminishes the mother’s
absolute custody over him is void.
The second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code should not be read as prohibiting separated couples
from agreeing to a custody arrangement, other than sole maternal custody, for their child of tender age. The
statutory preference for the mother’s custody comes into play only when courts are compelled to resolve
custody fights between separated parents. Where the parents settle the matter out of court by mutual agreement,
the statutory preference reserved to the mother should not apply.
A reading of the entire text of Article 213 shows that the second paragraph applies only to custody disputes that
have reached the courtroom. Thus:
Article 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated
by the Court. The Court shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child
over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit.
No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons
to order otherwise.
It is unmistakable that the legislative policy is to vest the separated mother with physical custody of the child
under seven years old, in cases where the courts are called upon to designate a parent for the exercise of parental
authority. The second sentence of the first paragraph and the second paragraph itself merely qualify the general
rule expressed in the first sentence that "parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the
Court," in case of parental separation.
In choosing the parent who will exercise parental authority, the court must take into account all relevant
considerations. One of these is the child’s age, as the court is directed to give due regard to the child’s choice, if
the child is more than seven years of age. If the child, however, is below seven years of age, the court cannot
separate the child from the mother, except for compelling reasons. This is the import of the entire provision.
Thus, no legislative policy is violated if separated parents are allowed to voluntarily agree to a child custody
arrangement other than sole maternal custody. It is not the policy of the state to prohibit separated parents from
compromising on child custody even if the child is of tender age. On the contrary, voluntary custody agreements
are generally favored as it can only work for the best interest of the child.
It is not logical to say that the Court would be subverting the legislative policy of avoiding "a tragedy where a
mother has seen her baby torn away from her" if separated parents are allowed to enter into a joint custody
agreement. It can hardly be said that a child is being "torn away" from the mother, if the mother sees the
wisdom and benefit of sharing custody of the child with the father. The voluntary nature of the agreement
negates any "deep sorrow" or sense of deprivation that the mother may experience on account of her separation
from the child.
Consequently, if separated parents mutually stipulate to uphold some form of joint authority over their children
of tender age, it cannot in any way be regarded as illegal or contrary to public policy. Joint parental authority
and custody is the norm and should be viewed as the more desirable custody arrangement. It encourages
continuing contact with and involvement of both parents in the lives of their children. It can only redound to the
minor’s greater well-being and should thus be favored.
To declare that a joint custody agreement over minors of tender age contravenes Philippine laws will only
discourage separating couples from sharing parental duties and responsibilities. It will render shared parenthood
illegal and unduly promote paternal alienation. It also presumes that separated parents cannot cooperate and
compromise for the welfare of their children. It constitutes undue interference in the parents’ intrinsic right to
direct their relations with their child.
A joint custody agreement can of course never be regarded as permanent and unbending. The situations of the
mother or the father and even of the child can change and render performance of such agreement no longer in
the latter’s best interest. If the parents disagree on what they think is best for the child, recourse to the Court
may be inevitable. But I suggest that the parent who wants the joint custody agreement changed or set aside
bears the burden of showing to the court the new situations of the parties and how such arrangement have
become unfavorable or detrimental to the child under the circumstances. This is a consequence of the
presumption that contracts that are valid remain valid unless shown otherwise.
Here, the agreement between petitioner Herald and his estranged wife providing for joint custody of their then
six-year-old child is a valid exercise of parental discretion and authority. It is independent of the foreign divorce
decree and may be enforced or repudiated in this jurisdiction, since its object is the custody of a Filipino-
American minor residing in the Philippines. Although Herald’s complaint before the trial court appears to be
one for specific performance, it is, at heart, an action for custody and enforcement of parental rights. Being so,
the Regional Trial Courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over the action.
I concur in the decision subject to my above reservations.
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
Footnotes
1
Article II, Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the
family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the
life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of
the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government.
19. Republic of the Philippines Vs. Marelyn Tanedo Manalo G.R. No. 221029. April 24, 2018
EN BANC
G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. MARELYN TANEDO MANALO, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Rules) seeks to reverse and set aside
the September 18, 2014 Decision1 and October 12, 2015 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CV No. 100076. The dispositive portion of the Decision states:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 15 October 2012 of the Regional Trial
Court of Dagupan City, First Judicial Region, Branch 43, in SPEC. PROC. NO. 2012-0005
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Let a copy of this Decision be served on the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila.
SO ORDERED.3
The facts are undisputed.
On January 10, 2012, respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed a petition for cancellation of entry of
marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila, by virtue of a judgment of divorce rendered by a
Japanese court.
Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and in substance, Branch 43 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Dagupan City set the case for initial hearing on April 25, 2012. The petition and the notice of initial hearing
were published once a week for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation. During the
initial hearing, counsel for Manalo marked the documentary evidence (consisting of the trial court's Order dated
January 25, 2012, affidavit of publication, and issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012,
February 28 - March 5, 2012, and March 6-12, 2012) for purposes of compliance with the jurisdictional
requirements.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance for petitioner Republic of the Philippines
authorizing the Office of the City Prosecutor of Dagupan to appear on its behalf. Likewise, a Manifestation and
Motion was filed questioning the title and/or caption of the petition considering that, based on the allegations
therein, the proper action should be a petition for recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment.
As a result, Manalo moved to admit an Amended Petition, which the court granted. The Amended Petition,
which captioned that it is also a petition for recognition and enforcement of foreign judgment, alleged:
2. That petitioner is previously married in the Philippines to a Japanese national named YOSHINO MINORO as
shown by their Marriage Contract x x x;
3. That recently, a case for divorce was filed by herein [petitioner] in Japan and after due proceedings, a divorce
decree dated December 6, 2011 was rendered by the Japanese Court x x x;
4. That at present, by virtue of the said divorce decree, petitioner and her divorced Japanese husband are no
longer living together and in fact, petitioner and her daughter are living separately from said Japanese former
husband;
5. That there is an imperative need to have the entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila
cancelled, where the petitioner and the former Japanese husband's marriage was previously registered, in order
that it would not appear anymore that petitioner is still married to the said Japanese national who is no longer
her husband or is no longer married to her; furthermore, in the event that petitioner decides to be remarried, she
shall not be bothered and disturbed by said entry of marriage;
6. That this petition is filed principally for the purpose of causing the cancellation of entry of the marriage
between the petitioner and the said Japanese national, pursuant to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court,
which marriage was already dissolved by virtue of the aforesaid divorce decree; [and]
7. That petitioner prays, among others, that together with the cancellation of the said entry of her marriage, that
she be allowed to return and use. her maiden surname, MANALO.4
Manalo was allowed to testify in advance as she was scheduled to leave for Japan for her employment. Among
the documents that were offered and admitted were:
1. Court Order dated January 25, 2012, finding the petition and its attachments to be sufficient in form and in
substance;
2. Affidavit of Publication;
3. Issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February 28 - March 5, 2012, and March 6-12,
2012;
4. Certificate of Marriage between Manalo and her former Japanese husband;
5. Divorce Decree of the Japanese court;
6. Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippine Consulate General in Osaka, Japan of the Notification of
Divorce; and
7. Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce.5
The OSG did not present any controverting evidence to rebut the allegations of Manalo.
On October 15, 2012, the trial court denied the petition for lack of merit. In ruling that the divorce obtained by
Manalo in Japan should not be recognized, it opined that, based on Article 15 of the New Civil Code, the
Philippine law "does not afford Filipinos the right to file for a divorce, whether they are in the country or living
abroad, if they are married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated their marriage in the Philippines or
in another country" and that unless Filipinos "are naturalized as citizens of another country, Philippine laws
shall have control over issues related to Filipinos' family rights and duties, together with the determination of
their condition and legal capacity to enter into contracts and civil relations, including marriages." 6
On appeal, the CA overturned the RTC decision. It held that Article 26 of the Family Code of the Philippines
(Family Code) is applicable even if it was Manalo who filed for divorce against her Japanese husband because
the decree they obtained makes the latter no longer married to the former, capacitating him to remarry.
Conformably with Navarro, et al. v. Exec. Secretary Ermita, et al.7 ruling that the meaning of the law should be
based on the intent of the lawmakers and in view of the legislative intent behind Article 26, it would be the
height of injustice to consider Manalo as still married to the Japanese national, who, in turn, is no longer
married to her. For the appellate court, the fact that it was Manalo who filed the divorce case is inconsequential.
Cited as similar to this case was Van Dorn v. Judge Romillo, Jr.8 where the marriage between a foreigner and a
Filipino was dissolved through a divorce filed abroad by the latter.
The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied; hence, this petition.
We deny the petition and partially affirm the CA decision.
Divorce, the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage, are of two types: (1) absolute
divorce or a vinculo matrimonii, which terminates the marriage, and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro,
which suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.9 In this jurisdiction, the following rules exist:
1. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. 10
2. Consistent with Articles 1511 and 1712 of the New Civil Code, the marital bond between two Filipinos cannot
be dissolved even by an absolute divorce obtained abroad. 13
3. An absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided it is consistent with their respective national laws.14
4. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, the former is allowed to contract a subsequent
marriage in case the absolute divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry.15
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino signed into law Executive Order (E.O.) No. 209, otherwise
known as The Family Code of the Philippines, which took effect on August 3, 1988.16 Shortly thereafter, E.O.
No. 227 was issued on July 17, 1987.17 Aside from amending Articles 36 and 39 of the Family Code, a second
paragraph was added to Article 26.18 This provision was originally deleted by the Civil Code Revision
Committee (Committee), but it was presented and approved at a Cabinet meeting after Pres. Aquino signed E.O.
No. 209.19 As modified, Article 26 now states:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country
where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited
under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall
likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce
decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the
marriage.20 It authorizes our courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the
Philippines does not allow divorce.21 Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount
to trying a divorce case.22 Under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained
by a spouse of foreign nationality, but the legal effects thereof, e.g., on custody, care and support of the children
or property relations of the spouses, must still be determined by our courts. 23
According to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Committee, the idea of the amendment is to avoid the
absurd situation of a Filipino as still being married to his or her alien spouse, although the latter is no longer
married to the former because he or she had obtained a divorce abroad that is recognized by his or her national
law.24 The aim was that it would solve the problem of many Filipino women who, under the New Civil Code,
are still considered married to their alien husbands even after the latter have already validly divorced them
under their (the husbands') national laws and perhaps have already married again. 25
In 2005, this Court concluded that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 applies to a case where, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them acquired foreign
citizenship by naturalization, initiated a divorce proceeding, and obtained a favorable decree. We held
in Republic of the Phils. v. Orbecido III:26
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals. In Quita, the parties were,
as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became a naturalized American citizen in 1954
and obtained a divorce in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino
divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2
of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the
marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a
divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner
at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice.
xxx
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse,
then the instant case must be deemed as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner;
and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.27
Now, the Court is tasked to resolve whether, under the same provision, a Filipino citizen has the capacity to
remarry under Philippine law after initiating a divorce proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable judgment
against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry. Specifically, Manalo pleads for the recognition
and enforcement of the divorce decree rendered by the Japanese court and for the cancellation of the entry of
marriage in the local civil registry "in order that it would not appear anymore that [she] is still married to the
said Japanese national who is no longer her husband or is no longer married to her; [and], in the event that [she]
decides to be remarried, she shall not be bothered and disturbed by said entry of marriage," and to return and to
use her maiden surname.
We rule in the affirmative.
Both Dacasin v. Dacasin28 and Van Dorn29 already recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and
obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody and property
relation, respectively.
In Dacasin, post-divorce, the former spouses executed an Agreement for the joint custody of their minor
daughter. Later on, the husband, who is a US citizen, sued his Filipino wife to enforce the Agreement, alleging
that it was only, the latter who exercised sole custody of their child. The trial court dismissed the action for lack
of jurisdiction, on the ground, among others, that the divorce decree is binding following the "nationality rule"
prevailing in this jurisdiction. The husband moved to reconsider, arguing that the divorce decree obtained by his
former wife is void, but it was denied. In ruling that the trial court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit but not to
enforce the Agreement, which is void, this Court said:
Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce decree's alleged invalidity - not because the Illinois court lacked
jurisdiction or that the divorce decree violated Illinois law, but because the divorce was obtained by his Filipino
spouse - to support the Agreement's enforceability. The argument that foreigners in this jurisdiction are not
bound by foreign divorce decrees is hardly novel. Van Dorn v. Romillo settled the matter by holding that an
alien spouse of a Filipino is bound by a divorce decree obtained abroad. There, we dismissed the alien
divorcee's Philippine suit for accounting of alleged post-divorce conjugal property and rejected his submission
that the foreign divorce (obtained by the Filipino spouse) is not valid in this jurisdiction x x x.30
Van Dorn was decided before the Family Code took into effect. There, a complaint was filed by the ex-husband,
who is a US citizen, against his Filipino wife to render an accounting of a business that was alleged to be a
conjugal property and to be declared with right to manage the same. Van Dorn moved to dismiss the case on the
ground that the cause of action was barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings that she initiated,
but the trial court denied the motion. On his part, her ex-husband averred that the divorce decree issued by the
Nevada court could not prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that
the acts and declaration of a foreign court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest
Philippine courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction. In dismissing the case filed by the
alien spouse, the Court discussed the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their conjugal property in
the Philippines. Thus:
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The
decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue
petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is
not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept
of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released
private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the
marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794,
799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court of competent jurisdiction
are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond.
The marriage tie, when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife
without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty, that the guilty
party shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former
marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no
standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he
is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose
decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his
right over the alleged conjugal property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to
private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be
just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to
private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal
property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served. 31
In addition, the fact that a validly obtained foreign divorce initiated by the Filipino spouse can be recognized
and given legal effects in the Philippines is implied from Our rulings in Fujiki v. Marinay, et al.32 and Medina v.
Koike.33
In Fujiki, the Filipino wife, with the help of her first husband, who is a Japanese national, was able to obtain a
judgment from Japan's family court, which declared the marriage between her and her second husband, who is a
Japanese national, void on the ground of bigamy. In resolving the issue of whether a husband or wife of a prior
marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or
her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy, We ruled:
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil
status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to
cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the
Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the integrity of the
marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in
the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the public record
of his marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in
limited instances) his most intimate human relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by
operation of law the moment he contracts marriage. These property interests in marriage include the right to be
supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of the family" and preserving the property regime of the
marriage.
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution, but a spouse's right in a marriage
extends further to relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations between Husband and
Wife") of the Family Code. x x x34
On the other hand, in Medina, the Filipino wife and her Japanese husband jointly filed for divorce, which was
granted. Subsequently, she filed a petition before the RTC for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and
declaration of capacity to remarry pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Article 26. The RTC denied the petition on the
ground that the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien spouse recognizing his capacity to
obtain a divorce decree must be proven in accordance with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules
on Evidence. This Court agreed and ruled that, consistent with Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, et al.35 and Garcia v.
Recio,36 the divorce decree and the national law of the alien spouse must be proven. Instead of dismissing the
case, We referred it to the CA for appropriate action including the reception of evidence to determine and
resolve the pertinent factual issues.
There is no compelling reason to deviate from the above-mentioned rulings. When this Court recognized a
foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended its legal effects on
the issues of child custody and property relation, it should not stop short in likewise acknowledging that one of
the usual and necessary consequences of absolute divorce is the right to remarry. Indeed, there is no longer a
mutual obligation to live together and observe fidelity. When the marriage tie is severed and ceased to exist, the
civil status and the domestic relation of the former spouses change as both of them are freed from the marital
bond.
The dissent is of the view that, under the nationality principle, Manalo's personal status is subject to Philippine
law, which prohibits absolute divorce. Hence, the divorce decree which she obtained under Japanese law cannot
be given effect, as she is, without dispute, a national not of Japan, but of the Philippines. It is said that a contrary
ruling will subvert not only the intention of the framers of the law, but also that of the Filipino people, as
expressed in the Constitution. The Court is, therefore, bound to respect the prohibition until the legislature
deems it fit to lift the same.
We beg to differ.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry. " Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only requires that there be a
divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one
who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether the
Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. The Court is bound by the
words of the statute; neither can We put words in the mouths of the lawmakers. 37 "The legislature is presumed
to know the meaning of the words, to have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the use of
such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there
should be no departure."38
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should be interpreted to mean that the divorce
proceeding must be actually initiated by the alien spouse, still, the Court will not follow the letter of the statute
when to do so would depart from the true intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions
inconsistent with the general purpose of the act.39 Laws have ends to achieve, and statutes should be so
construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and purposes. 40 As held in League of Cities of the Phils., et
al. v. COMELEC, et al.:41
The legislative intent is not at all times accurately reflected in the manner in which the resulting law is couched.
Thus, applying a verba legis or strictly literal interpretation of a statute may render it meaningless and lead to
inconvenience, an absurd situation or injustice. To obviate this aberration, and bearing in mind the principle that
the intent or the spirit of the law is the law itself, resort should be to the rule that the spirit of the law controls its
letter.
To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country where it
was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The provision is a corrective measure to address an
anomaly where the Filipino spouse is tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the
laws of his or her country.42 Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a
favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the
same result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign
divorce proceeding is in the same place and in "like circumstance as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an
alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision should not make a distinction. In both instance, it is
extended as a means to recognize the residual effect of the foreign divorce decree on Filipinos whose marital
ties to their alien spouses are severed by operation of the latter's national law.
Conveniently invoking the nationality principle is erroneous. Such principle, found under Article 15 of the Civil
Code, is not an absolute and unbending rule. In fact, the mere existence of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is a
testament that the State may provide for an exception thereto. Moreover, blind adherence to the nationality
principle must be disallowed if it would cause unjust discrimination and oppression to certain classes of
individuals whose rights are equally protected by law. The courts have the duty to enforce the laws of divorce as
written by the Legislature only if they are constitutional.43
While the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification and that its decision is
accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice, such classification may be subjected to judicial
review.44 The deference stops where the classification violates a fundamental right, or prejudices persons
accorded special protection by the Constitution.45 When these violations arise, this Court must discharge its
primary role as the vanguard of constitutional guaranties, and require a stricter and more exacting adherence to
constitutional limitations.46 If a legislative classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a
fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class strict judicial scrutiny is required
since it is presumed unconstitutional, and the burden is upon the government to prove that the classification is
necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that it is the least restrictive means to protect such interest. 47
"Fundamental rights" whose infringement leads to strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause are those
basic liberties explicitly or implicitly guaranteed in the Constitution.48 It includes the right of procreation,
the right to marry, the right to exercise free speech, political expression, press, assembly, and so forth, the
right to travel, and the right to vote.49 On the other hand, what constitutes compelling state interest is measured
by the scale of rights and powers arrayed in the Constitution and calibrated by history.50 It is akin to the
paramount interest of the state for which some individual liberties must give way, such as the promotion of
public interest, public safety or the general welfare.51 It essentially involves a public right or interest that,
because of its primacy, overrides individual rights, and allows the former to take precedence over the latter. 52
Although the Family Code was not enacted by the Congress, the same principle applies with respect to the acts
of the President, which have the force and effect of law unless declared otherwise by the court. In this case, We
find that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 violates one of the essential requisites 53 of the equal protection
clause.54 Particularly, the limitation of the provision only to a foreign divorce decree initiated by the alien
spouse is unreasonable as it is based on superficial, arbitrary, and whimsical classification.
A Filipino who is married to another Filipino is not similarly situated with a Filipino who is married to a foreign
citizen. There are real, material and substantial differences between them. Ergo, they should not be treated alike,
both as to rights conferred and liabilities imposed. Without a doubt, there are political, economic, cultural, and
religious dissimilarities as well as varying legal systems and procedures, all too unfamiliar, that a Filipino
national who is married to an alien spouse has to contend with. More importantly, while a divorce decree
obtained abroad by a Filipino against another Filipino is null and void, a divorce decree obtained by an alien
against his or her Filipino spouse is recognized if made in accordance with the national law of the foreigner. 55
On the contrary, there is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce
proceedings and a Filipino who obtained a divorce decree upon the instance of his or her alien spouse. In the
eyes of the Philippine and foreign laws, both are considered as Filipinos who have the same rights and
obligations in a alien land. The circumstances surrounding them are alike. Were it not for Paragraph 2 of Article
26, both are still married to their foreigner spouses who are no longer their wives/husbands. Hence, to make a
distinction between them based merely on the superficial difference of whether they initiated the divorce
proceedings or not is utterly unfair. Indeed, the treatment gives undue favor to one and unjustly discriminate
against the other.
Further, the differentiation in Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is arbitrary. There is inequality in treatment because a
foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by a Filipino citizen against his or her alien spouse would
not be recognized even if based on grounds similar to Articles 35, 36, 37 and 38 of the Family Code. 56 In filing
for divorce based on these grounds, the Filipino spouse cannot be accused of invoking foreign law at whim,
tantamount to insisting that he or she should be governed with whatever law he or she chooses. The dissent's
comment that Manalo should be "reminded that all is not lost, for she may still pray for the severance of her
marital ties before the RTC in accordance with the mechanisms now existing under the Family Code" is
anything but comforting. For the guidance of the bench and the bar, it would have been better if the dissent
discussed in detail what these "mechanisms" are and how they specifically apply in Manalo's case as well as
those who are similarly situated. If the dissent refers to a petition for declaration of nullity or annulment of
marriage, the reality is that there is no assurance that our courts will automatically grant the same. Besides, such
proceeding is duplicitous, costly, and protracted. All to the prejudice of our kababayan.
It is argued that the Court's liberal interpretation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 encourages Filipinos to marry
foreigners, opening the floodgate to the indiscriminate practice of Filipinos marrying foreign nationals or
initiating divorce proceedings against their alien spouses.
The supposition is speculative and unfounded.
First, the dissent falls into a hasty generalization as no data whatsoever was shown to support what he intends to
prove. Second, We adhere to the presumption of good faith in this jurisdiction. Under the rules on evidence, it is
disputably presumed (i.e., satisfactory if uncontradicted and overcome by other evidence) that a person is
innocent of crime or wrong,57 that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts, 58 that a
person takes ordinary care of his concerns,59 that acquiescence resulted from a belief that the thing acquiesced in
was conformable to the law and fact,60that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have
entered into a lawful contract of marriage,61 and that the law has been obeyed.62 It is whimsical to easily
attribute any illegal, irregular or immoral conduct on the part of a Filipino just because he or she opted to marry
a foreigner instead of a fellow Filipino. It is presumed that interracial unions are entered into out of genuine
love and affection, rather than prompted by pure lust or profit. Third, We take judicial notice of the fact that
Filipinos are relatively more forbearing and conservative in nature and that they are more often the victims or at
the losing end of mixed marriages. And Fourth, it is not for Us to prejudge the motive behind a Filipino's
decision to marry an alien national. In one case, it was said:
Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot dictate on the kind
of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm of their right
to privacy and would raise serious constitutional questions. The right to marital privacy allows married couples
to structure their marriages in almost any way they see fit, to live together or live apart, to have children or no
children, to love one another or not, and so on. Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or
otherwise, such as convenience, companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the
legal requisites, are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only
valid cause for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a marriage.63
The 1987 Constitution expresses that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family
and shall be protected by the State.64 Nevertheless, it was not meant to be a general prohibition on divorce
because Commissioner Jose Luis Martin C. Gascon, in response to a question by Father Joaquin G. Bernas
during the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, was categorical about this point. 65 Their
exchange reveal as follows:
MR. RAMA. Mr. Presiding Officer, may I ask that Commissioner Bernas be recognized.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Colayco). Commissioner Bernas is recognized.
FR. BERNAS. Just one question, and I am not sure if it has been categorically answered. I refer specifically to
the proposal of Commissioner Gascon. Is this to be understood as a prohibition of a general law on divorce? His
intention is to make this a prohibition so that the legislature cannot pass a divorce law.
MR. GASCON. Mr. Presiding Officer, that was not primarily my intention. My intention was primarily to
encourage the social institution of marriage, but not necessarily discourage divorce. But now that he mentioned
the issue of divorce, my personal opinion is to discourage it, Mr. Presiding Officer.
FR. BERNAS. No. my question is more categorical. Does this carry the meaning of prohibiting a divorce law?
MR. GASCON. No. Mr. Presiding Officer.
FR. BERNAS. Thank you.66
Notably, a law on absolute divorce is not new in our country. Effective March 11, 1917, Philippine courts could
grant an absolute divorce on the grounds of adultery on the part of the wife or concubinage on the part of the
husband by virtue of Act No. 2710 of the Philippine Legislature. 67 On March 25, 1943, pursuant to the authority
conferred upon him by the Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines and with the
approval of the latter, the Chairman of the Philippine Executive Commission promulgated an E.O. No. 141
("New Divorce Law"), which repealed Act No. 2710 and provided eleven grounds for absolute divorce, such as
intentional or unjustified desertion continuously for at least one year prior to the filing of the action, slander by
deed or gross insult by one spouse against the other to such an extent as to make further living together
impracticable, and a spouse's incurable insanity.68 When the Philippines was liberated and the Commonwealth
Government was restored, it ceased to have force and effect and Act No. 2710 again prevailed. 69 From August
30, 1950, upon the effectivity of Republic Act No. 386 or the New Civil Code, an absolute divorce obtained by
Filipino citizens, whether here or abroad, is no longer recognized. 70
Through the years, there has been constant clamor from various sectors of the Philippine society to re-institute
absolute divorce. As a matter of fact, in the current 17th Congress, House Bill (H.B.) Nos.
116,71 1062,72 238073 and 602774 were filed in the House of Representatives. In substitution of these bills, H.B.
No. 7303 entitled "An Act Instituting Absolute Divorce and Dissolution of Marriage in the Philippines" or
the Absolute Divorce Act of 2018 was submitted by the House Committee on Population and Family Relations
on February 28, 2018. It was approved on March 19, 2018 on Third Reading - with 134 in favor, 57 against, and
2 abstentions. Under the bill, the grounds for a judicial decree of absolute divorce are as follows:
1. The grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code, modified or amended, as
follows:
a. Physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the
petitioner;
b. Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious or political affiliation;
c. Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner, to
engage in prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or inducement;
d. Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six (6) years, even if pardoned;
e. Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism or chronic gambling of the respondent;
f. Homosexuality of the respondent;
g. Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in the Philippines or abroad;
h. Marital infidelity or perversion or having a child with another person other than one's spouse during the
marriage, except when upon the mutual agreement of the spouses, a child is born to them by in vitro or a similar
procedure or when the wife bears a child after being a victim of rape;
i. Attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner, a common child or a child of the petitioner; and
j. Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one (1) year.
When the spouses are legally separated by judicial decree for more than two (2) years, either or both spouses
can petition the proper court for an absolute divorce based on said judicial decree of legal separation.
1. Grounds for annulment of marriage under Article 45 of the Family Code, restated as follows:
 a. The party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen (18) years
of age or over but below twenty-one (21), and the marriage was solemnized without the
consent of the parents, guardian or person having substitute parental authority over the party,
in that order, unless after attaining the age of twenty-one (21), such party freely cohabited
with the other and both lived together as husband or wife;
b. either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely cohabited
with the other as husband and wife;
c. The consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards with full
knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband and
wife;
d. The consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence, unless the
same having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the other as
husband and wife;
e. Either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other and such
incapacity continues or appears to be incurable; and
f. Either party was afflicted with a sexually transmissible infection found to be serious or
appears to be incurable.
Provided, That the grounds mentioned in b, e and f existed either at the time of the marriage or supervening
after the marriage.
1. When the spouses have been separated in fact for at least five (5) years at the time the petition
for absolute divorce is filed, and reconciliation is highly improbable;
2. Psychological incapacity of either spouse as provided for in Article 36 of the Family Code,
whether or not the incapacity was present at the time of the celebration of the marriage or
later;
3. When one of the spouses undergoes a gender reassignment surgery or transitions from one sex
to another, the other spouse is entitled to petition for absolute divorce with the transgender or
transsexual as respondent, or vice-versa;
4. Irreconcilable marital differences and conflicts which have resulted in the total breakdown of
the marriage beyond repair, despite earnest and repeated efforts at reconciliation.
To be sure, a good number of the Filipinos led by the Roman Catholic Church react adversely to any attempt to
enact a law on absolute divorce, viewing it as contrary to our customs, morals, and traditions that has looked
upon marriage and family as an institution and their nature of permanence, inviolability, and solidarity.
However, none of our laws should be based on any religious law, doctrine, or teaching; otherwise, the
separation of Church and State will be violated.75
In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do with religion, it also limits
what religious sects can or cannot do. They can neither cause the government to adopt their particular doctrines
as policy for everyone, nor can they cause the government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms,
would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion and, thus, establish a state religion. 76
The Roman Catholic Church can neither impose its beliefs and convictions on the State and the rest of the
citizenry nor can it demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it sincerely believes that they are good for
the country.77 While marriage is considered a sacrament, it has civil and legal consequences which are governed
by the Family Code.78 It is in this aspect, bereft of any ecclesiastical overtone, that the State has a legitimate
right and interest to regulate.
The declared State policy that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and
shall be protected by the State, should not be read in total isolation but must be harmonized with other
constitutional provisions. Aside from strengthening the solidarity of the Filipino family, the State is equally
mandated to actively promote its total development.79 It is also obligated to defend, among others, the right of
children to special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions
prejudicial to their development.80 To Our mind, the State cannot effectively enforce these obligations if We
limit the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 only to those foreign divorce initiated by the alien spouse. It is
not amiss to point that the women and children are almost always the helpless victims of all forms of domestic
abuse and violence. In fact, among the notable legislation passed in order to minimize, if not eradicate, the
menace are R.A. No. 6955 (prohibiting mail order bride and similar practices), R.A. No. 9262 ("Anti-Violence
Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004"), R.A. No. 9710 ("The Magna Carta of Women"), R.A. No.
10354 ("The Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012"), and R.A. No. 9208 ("Anti-
Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003"), as amended by R.A. No. 10364 ("Expanded Anti-Trafficking in Persons
Act of 2012"). Moreover, in protecting and strengthening the Filipino family as a basic autonomous social
institution, the Court must not lose sight of the constitutional mandate to value the dignity of every human
person, guarantee full respect for human rights, and ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women
and men.81
A prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 would do more harm than good. If We disallow a Filipino
citizen who initiated and obtained a foreign divorce from the coverage of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 and still
require him or her to first avail of the existing "mechanisms" under the Family Code, any subsequent
relationship that he or she would enter in the meantime shall be considered as illicit in the eyes of the Philippine
law. Worse, any child born out of such "extra-marital" affair has to suffer the stigma of being branded as
illegitimate. Surely, these are just but a few of the adverse consequences, not only to the parent but also to the
child, if We are to hold a restrictive interpretation of the subject provision. The irony is that the principle of
inviolability of marriage under Section 2, Article XV of the Constitution is meant to be tilted in favor of
marriage and against unions not formalized by marriage, but without denying State protection and assistance to
live-in arrangements or to families formed according to indigenous customs. 82
This Court should not turn a blind eye to the realities of the present time. With the advancement of
communication and information technology, as well as the improvement of the transportation system that
almost instantly connect people from all over the world, mixed marriages have become not too uncommon.
Likewise, it is recognized that not all marriages are made in heaven and that imperfect humans more often than
not create imperfect unions.83 Living in a flawed world, the unfortunate reality for some is that the attainment of
the individual's full human potential and self-fulfillment is not found and achieved in the context of a marriage.
Thus, it is hypocritical to safeguard the quantity of existing marriages and, at the same time, brush aside the
truth that some of them are of rotten quality.
Going back, We hold that marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two parties, cannot
possibly be productive of any good to the society where one is considered released from the marital bond while
the other remains bound to it.84 In reiterating that the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in his
or her own country if the ends of justice are to be served, San Luis v. San Luis85 quoted:
x x x In Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, the Court stated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is
a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should be to discover in its
provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as to
cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we
presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law and justice are
inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem
arbitrary when applied in a particular case because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not
bound, because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their
language. What we do instead is find a balance between the word and the will, that justice may be done even as
the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded, yielding
like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking
too closely to the words of a law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes again, "where these words import a
policy that goes beyond them."
xxxx
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual wish to render every
one his due." That wish continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and the law in every case
brought to it for decision. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrant,
we interpret the law in a way that will render justice, presuming that it was the intention of the lawmaker, to
begin with, that the law be dispensed with justice.86
Indeed, where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous
results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and
reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. 87 A statute may, therefore, be extended to cases not
within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent.88
The foregoing notwithstanding, We cannot yet write finis to this controversy by granting Manalo's petition to
recognize and enforce the divorce decree rendered by the Japanese court and to cancel the entry of marriage in
the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila.
Jurisprudence has set guidelines before Philippine courts recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Presentation solely of the divorce decree will
not suffice.89 The fact of divorce must still first be proven.90 Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized
by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the
foreign law allowing it.91
x x x Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be presented
and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best
evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an
official body or tribunal of a foreign country.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a public or
official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the
officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign
service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his
office.92
In granting Manalo's petition, the CA noted:
In this case, Petitioner was able to submit before the court a quo the 1) Decision of the Japanese Court allowing
the divorce; 2) the Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippine Consulate General in Osaka, Japan of
the Decree of Divorce; and 3) Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce by Petitioner and the Japanese national.
Under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48 (b) of the Rules of Court, these
documents sufficiently prove the subject Divorce Decree as a fact. Thus, We are constrained to recognize the
Japanese Court's judgment decreeing the divorce.93
If the opposing party fails to properly object, as in this case, the divorce decree is rendered admissible as a
written act of the foreign court.94 As it appears, the existence of the divorce decree was not denied by the OSG;
neither was the jurisdiction of the divorce court impeached nor the validity of its proceedings challenged on the
ground of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law, albeit an opportunity to do so. 95
Nonetheless, the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved.
x x x The burden of proof lies with the "party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the
prosecution or defense of an action." In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material allegations
of the complaint when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the material
allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters. x x x
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other
facts, they must be alleged and proved. x x x The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and
every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative. 96
Since the divorce was raised by Manalo, the burden of proving the pertinent Japanese law validating it, as well
as her former husband's capacity to remarry, fall squarely upon her. Japanese laws on persons and family
relations are not among those matters that Filipino judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial
function.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The September 18, 2014 Decision and
October 12, 2015 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 100076, are AFFIRMED IN PART.
The case is REMANDED to the court of origin for further proceedings and reception of evidence as to the
relevant Japanese law on divorce.
SO ORDERED. When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the
Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their
Carpio,* Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, Martires, Tijam, Reyes, Jr., and Gesmundo, JJ., concur. execution.
Leonen, J., concur. See separate opinion.
Del Castillo and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., join the dissent of J. Caguioa. Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order,
Caguioa, J., see dissenting opinion. public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by
Sereno, C.J., on leave. determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.(11a)
Jardeleza, J., no part.
13
Tenchavez v. Escano, et al., 22 Phil. 752, 759-760 (1965), as cited in Cang v. Court of Appeals, 357 Phil. 129,
162 (1998); Llorente v. Court of Appeals, 399 Phil. 342, 356 (2000); and Perez v. Court of Appeals, 516 Phil.
204, 211 (2006). See also Garcia v. Recio, supra note 9, at 730; Republic v. Iyoy, 507 Phil. 485, 504 (2005);
Endnotes: and Lavadia v. Heirs of Juan Luces Luna, 739 Phil. 331, 341-342 (2014).

14
Garcia v. Recio, supra note 9, at 730-731.
*
Acting Chief Justice per Special Order No. 2539 dated February 28, 2018.
15
FAMILY CODE, Article 26 Paragraph 2. See also Garcia v. Recio, supra note 9, at 730 and Medina v.
1 Koike, supra note 10.
Penned by Associate Justice Jane Aurora C. Lantion, with Associate Justices Vicente S.E. Veloso and Nina G.
Antonio-Valenzuela concurring; rollo, pp. 23-31.
16
Republic of the Phils. v. Orbecido III, 509 Phil. 108, 112 (2005), as cited in San Luis v. San Luis, 543 Phil.
2 275, 291 (2007).
Rollo, pp. 32-33.

3 17
Id. at 30. (Emphasis in the original) Id. at 112-113, as cited in San Luis v. San Luis, supra.

4 18
Id. at 42-43. Id. at 113, as cited in San Luis v. San Luis, supra.

5 19
Id. at 25, 37-38. Sempio-Diy, Alicia V., HANDBOOK ON THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, 1988, pp. 26-27.

6 20
Id. at 40-41. Medina v. Koike, supra note 10 and Fujiki v. Marinay, 712 Phil. 524, 555 (2013).

7 21
663 Phil. 546 (2011). Fujiki v. Marinay, supra.

8 22
223 Phil. 357 (1985). Id.

9 23
Amor-Catalan v. Court of Appeals, 543 Phil. 568, 575 (2007), citing Garcia v. Recio, 418 Phil. 723, 735-736 See Vda. de Catalan v. Catalan-Lee, 681 Phil. 493, 498 (2012); Roehr v. Rodriguez, 452 Phil. 608, 617-618
(2001). (2003); and Llorente v. Court of Appeals, supra note 13.

10 24
Garcia v. Redo, supra, at 730 and Medina v. Koike, G.R. No. 215723, July 27, 2016, 798 SCRA 733, 739. Supra note 19, at 27. See also Republic of the Phils. v. Orbecido III, supra note 16, at 114, as cited in Fujiki v.
Marinay, supra note 20, at 555 and San Luis v. San Luis, supranote 16, at 292.
11
Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are
25
binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. (9a) Supra note 19, at 27.

12 26
Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by the Supra note 16.
laws of the country in which they are executed.
27 45
Id. at 114-115. (Citations omitted). Central Bank Employees Assn., Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 487 Phil. 531, 597 (2004) as cited
in Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., 601 Phil. 245, 436 (2009). See also Puno, C.J., Separate
28
625 Phil. 494 (2010). Concurring Opinion, Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC, 632 Phil. 32, 100 (2010); Brion, J., Separate
Opinion, Biraogo v. Phil. Truth Commission of 2010, 651 Phil. 374, 550 (2010); and Leonardo-De Castro, J.,
29 Concurring Opinion, Garcia v. Judge Drilon, et al., 712 Phil. 44, 125 (2013).
Supra note 8.
46
30
Dacasin v. Dacasin, supra, at 507. (Citations omitted; underscoring ours) Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, supra.

47
31 Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., et al., 601 Phil. 245, 282 (2009) and Mosqueda v. Pilipino Banana
Van Dorn v. Judge Romillo, Jr., supra note 8, at 361-363. (Citations omitted).
Growers & Exporters Association, Inc., G.R. Nos. 189185 & 189305, August 16, 2016, 800 SCRA 313, 360.
32
See also Brion, J., Separate Opinion, Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, supra; Velasco, Jr., J.,
Supra note 20. Concurring Opinion, International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications, Inc. v. Greenpeace
Southeast Asia (Phils.), et al., 774 Phil. 508, 706 (2015); and Jardeleza, J., Concurring Opinion, Poe-
33
Supra note 10. Llamanzares v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 221697 & 221698-700, March 8, 2016, 786 SCRA 1, 904.

34
Fujiki v. Marinay, et al., supra note 20, at 549-550. (Citations omitted). 48
Brion, J., Separate Opinion, Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, supra note 45, at 553.

35
642 Phil. 420 (2010). 49
See Morales, J., Dissenting Opinion, Central Bank Employees Assn., Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 487
Phil. 531, 697-698 (2004) as cited by Brion, J., Separate Opinion, Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of
36 2010, supra note 45, at 553, and Leonen, J., Separate Opinion, Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan v.
Supra note 9.
Quezon City, G.R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017.
37
Commissioner of Customs v. Manila Star Ferry, Inc., 298 Phil. 79, 86 (1993).
50
Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., et al., 601 Phil. 245, 298 (2009).
38
Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. v. NLRC, 283 Phil. 649, 660 (1992), as cited in Victoria v. Commission
51
on Elections, 299 Phil. 263, 268 (1994); Enjay Inc. v. NLRC, 315 Phil. 648, 656 (1995); and Pioneer Id.
Texturizing Corp. v. NLRC, 345 Phil. 1057, 1073 (1997). See also National Food Authority v. Masada Security
Agency, Inc., 493 Phil. 241, 251 (2005); Rural Bank of San Miguel, Inc. v. Monetary Board, 545 Phil. 62, 72 52
Brion, J., Separate Concurring Opinion, Sps. Imbong v. Hon. Ochoa, Jr., et al., 732 Phil. 1, 326- 327 (2014).
(2007); Rep. of the Phils. v. Lacap, 546 Phil. 87, 100 (2007); and Phil. Amusement and Gaming Corp.
(PAGCOR) v. Phil. Gaming Jurisdiction Inc. (PEJI), et al., 604 Phil. 547, 553 (2009). 53
To be valid, the classification must conform to the following requirements:
39
Mariano, Jr. v. COMELEC, 312 Phil. 259, 268 (1995). 1.) It must rest on substantial distinctions.
2.) It must be germane to the purpose of the law.
40
Id. 3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only.
4) It must apply equally to all members of the same class. (See PAGCOR v. Bureau of Internal Revenue, 660
41 Phil. 636, 648 [2011]; Maj. Gen. Garcia v. The Executive Secretary, et al., 692 Phil. 114, 141-142
623 Phil. 531, 564-565 (2009).
[2012]; Corpuz v. People, 734 Phil. 353, 405 [2014]; Ferrer, Jr. v. Mayor Bautista, 762 Phil. 233, 277
42
Fujiki v. Marinay, supra note 20, at 555. (2015); Drugstores Association of the Philippines, Inc. v. National Council on Disability Affairs, G.R. No.
194561, September 14, 2016, 803 SCRA 25, 55; Ocampo v. Enriquez, G.R. Nos. 225973, 225984, 226097,
43 226116, 226117, 226120 & 226294, November 8, 2016; and Mindanao Shopping Destination Corp. v. Duterte,
See Barretto Gonzalez v. Gonzalez, 58 Phil. 67, 72 (1933), as cited in Tenchavez v. Escaño, et al., supra note
G.R. No. 211093, June 6, 2017).
13, at 762.
54
44 Section 1, Article III of the Constitution states:
See Assn. of Small Landowners in the Phils., Inc. v. Hon. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 256 Phil. 777, 808
(1989) and Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc. v. Cabiles, 740 Phil. 403, 436 (2014).
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
55
Tenchavez v. Escano, et al., supra note 13, as cited in Cang v. Court of Appeals, supranote 13;; Llorente v.
Court of Appeals, supra note 13; and Perez v. Court of Appeals, supra note 13. See also Garcia v. Recio,
supra note 9, at 730; Republic v. Iyoy supra note 13; and Lavadia v. Heirs of Juan Luces Luna, supra note 13.
FAMILY CODE, Article 26 Paragraph 2. See also Garcia v. Recio, supra note 9, at 730 and Medina v. Koike,
supranote 10.
56
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
(1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with the consent of parents or guardians;
(2) Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages unless such marriages were
contracted with either or both parties believing in good faith that the solemnizing officer had the legal authority
to do so;
(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by the preceding Chapter;
(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under Article 41;
(5) Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the identity of the other; and
(6) Those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53.
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. (As amended by E.O. 227)
consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In
case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of
Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must
institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. (83a)
Art. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the children's presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the
appropriate civil registry and registries of property; otherwise, the same shall not affect third persons, (n)
Art. 53. Either of the former spouses may marry again after complying with the requirements of the
immediately preceding Article; otherwise, the subsequent marriage shall be null and void.
57
RULE 131, Section 3(a).
58
Id., Section 3(c).
59
Id., Section 3(d).
60
Id., Section 3(x).

61
Art. 37. Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from the beginning, whether the relationship Id., Section 3(aa).
between the parties be legitimate or illegitimate:
62
Id., Section 3(ff).
(1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and
63
(2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood. Rep. of the Phils. v. Albios, 719 Phil. 622, 636 (2013).

64
Art. 38. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning for reasons of public policy: 1987 CONSTITUTION, Article XV, Section 2. This echoed the Family Code provision, which provides:

(1) Between collateral blood relatives, whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the fourth civil degree;
(2) Between step-parents and step-children;
(3) Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;
(4) Between the adopting parent and the adopted child;
(5) Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child;
(6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter;
(7) Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter;
(8) Between the adopted children of the same adopter; and
(9) Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed that other person's spouse or his or
her own spouse. (82)
Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an
inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits
provided by this Code.
65
Bernas, Joaquin G, S.J., THE INTENT OF THE 1986 CONSTITUTION WRITERS, 1995 Edition, pp. 1132,
citing V RECORD 41.
66
Record of the Constitutional Commission: Proceedings and Debates, Volume V, September 24, 1986, p. 41.

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and
void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four
67 81
See Garcia Valdez v. Soteraña Tuason, 40 Phil. 943, 944 (1920); Francisco v. Tayao, 50 Phil. 42 Article II, Sections 11, 12 and 14. See also Republic Act Nos. 7192 ("Women in Development and Nation
(1927); People v. Bitdu, 58 Phil. 817 (1933); Sikat v. Canson, 61 Phil. 207 (1939); and Arca, et al. v. Javier, 95 Building Act") and 9710 ("The Magna Carta of Women").
Phil. 579 (1954).
82
Bernas, Joaquin G, S.J., THE INTENT OF THE 1986 CONSTITUTION WRITERS, 1995 Edition, pp. 1132,
68
See Baptista v. Castañeda, 16 Phil. 461 (1946); Luz v. Court of First Instance of Tacloban, 77 Phil. 679 citing V RECORD 40, 44.
(1946); and Antonio v. Reyes, 519 Phil. 337 (2006).
83
See Paras v. Paras, 555 Phil. 786, 804 (2007)
69
Baptista v. Castañeda, supra, at 463.
84
San Luis v. San Luis, supra note 16, at 292-293.
70
Tenchavezv. Escano, et al.,supra note 13, at 759-760, as cited in Cang v. Court of Appeals, supra note
13; Llorente v. Court of Appeals, supra note 13; and Perez v. Court of Appeals, supra note 13. See also Garcia 85
Supra note 16.
v. Recio, supra note 9, at 730; Republic v. Iyoy, supra note 13; and Lavadia v. Heirs of Juan Luces Luna, 739
Phil. 331, 341-342 (2014). 86
San Luis v. San Luis, supra note 16, at 293-294.
71
Entitled "Instituting Absolute Divorce in the Philippines And For Other Purposes," with Representative Edcel 87
Republic of the Phils. v. Orbecido III, supra note 16, at 115.
C. Lagman as Principal Author.
88
72 Id.
Entitled "An Act Amending Title I, Chapter 3, of Executive Order No. 209, Otherwise Known as the Family
Code of the Philippines, Prescribing Additional Ground for Annulment," with Representative Robert Ace S. 89
Barbers as Principal Author. Garcia v. Recio, supra note 9, at 731, as cited in Vda. de Catalan v. Catalan-Lee, supranote 23, at 501.

90
73
Entitled "An Act Introducing Divorce in the Philippines, Amending for the Purpose Articles 26, 55 to 66 and Fujiki v. Marinay, supra note 20, at 544 and Vda. de Catalan v. Catalan-Lee, supra note 23, at 499.
Repealing Article 36 Under Title II of Executive Order No. 209, As Amended, Otherwise Known as the Family
91
Code of the Philippines, and For Other Purposes," with Gabriela Women's Party Representatives Emmi A. De Garcia v. Recio, supra note 9, at 731, as cited in Medina v. Koike, supra note 10 and Republic of the Phils. v.
Jesus and Arlene D. Brosas as principal authors. Orbecido III, supra note 16, at 116. See also Bayot v. The Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., 591 Phil. 452, 470
(2008).
74
Entitled "An Act Providing for Grounds for the Dissolution of a Marriage," with Representatives Teddy B.
92
Baguilat, Jr., Rodel M. Batocabe, Arlene D. Brosas, Ariel B. Casilao, France L. Castro, Nancy A. Catamco, Pia Garcia v. Recio, supra note 9, at 732-733. (Citations omitted). See also Vda. de Catalan v. Catalan-Lee,
S. Cayetano, Emmi A. De Jesus, Sarah Jane I. Elago, Gwendolyn F. Garcia, Ana Cristina Siquian Go, Edcel C. supra note 23, at 499 and 501-502 and San Luis v. San Luis, supra note 16, at 294.
Lagman, Pantaleon D. Alvarez, Antonio L. Tinio, and Carlos Isagani T. Zarate as Principal Authors.
93
Rollo, pp. 29-30.
75
See Leonen, J., dissenting in Matudan v. Republic, G.R. No. 203284, November 14, 2016.
94
Garcia v. Recio, supra note 9, at 733-734.
76
Re: Letter of Tony Q. Valenciano, A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC (Resolution), March 7, 2017.
95
See Bayot v. The Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., supra note 75, at 470-471; and Roehr v. Rodriguez,
77
See Sps. Imbong, et al. v. Hon. Ochoa, Jr., et al., 732 Phil. 1, 167 (2014). supra note, 23, at 617.

96
78
Tilar v. Tilar, G.R. No. 214529, July 12, 2017. Garcia v. Recio, supra note 9, at 735. (Citations omitted). See also Vda. de Catalan v. Catalan- Lee,
supra note 23, at 500-501; San Luis v. San Luis, supra note 16, at 295; Republic of the Phils. v. Orbecido III,
79
Article XV, Section 1. supra note 16, at 116; and Llorente v. Court of Appeals, supra note 13, at 354.

80
Article XV, Section 3(2).
 Article III, Section 1 simply states that "nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws."
NOTICE OF JUDGMENT Traditionally, this means that the State has no duty to find ways and means to ensure equality. It is only a
prescription that whatever legal burdens and benefits are given to men should likewise be given to women. It
Sirs/Mesdames: does not require the State, through any of its organs, to find affirmative ways and means to battle the
patriarchy—that complex of political, cultural, and economic factors that ensure women's disempowerment.
Please take notice that on April 24, 2018 a Decision/Resolution, copy attached herewith, was rendered by the
Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was received by this Office on May 17, 2018 at By enacting our Constitution and signing on to our political obligations to the Convention on the Elimination of
3:15 p.m. All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, we have legally committed to do better.

We likewise note that the Family Code was followed by Republic Act No. 7192 or the Women in Development
Very truly yours, and Nation Building Act. Within this law are provisions which ensure equal treatment between men and
women, thus:
(SGD.) EDGAR O. ARICHETA
Clerk of Court Section 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State recognizes the role of women in nation building and shall ensure
the fundamental equality before the law of women and men. The State shall provide women rights and
opportunities equal to that of men.

....

Section 5. Equality in Capacity to Act. - Women of legal age, regardless of civil status, shall have the capacity
to act and enter into contracts which shall in every respect be equal to that of men under similar circumstances.
CONCURRING OPINION
In all contractual obligations where married men have the capacity to act, married women shall have equal
rights.
LEONEN, J.:
To this end:
I concur with the ponencia of Justice Peralta, adding the following points.

I (1) Women shall have the capacity to borrow and obtain loans and execute security and credit arrangements
under the same conditions as men;
The proposal of the Solicitor General is to give Article 26 1 of our Family Code an interpretation which
capacitates and empowers the Japanese husband the option to divorce and how such choice has effects in our
country while, at the same time, disallowing the Filipina wife from being able to do the same simply because (2) Women shall have equal access to all government and private sector programs granting agricultural
she is a Filipina. credit, loans and non- material resources and shall enjoy equal treatment in agrarian reform and land
resettlement programs;
That interpretation may be unconstitutional. Article II, Section 14 of our Constitution provides:

Section 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental (3) Women shall have equal rights to act as incorporators and enter into insurance contracts; and
equality before the law of women and men.

This constitutional fiat advances the notion of gender equality from its passive formulation in Article III, (4) Married women shall have the rights equal to those of married men in applying for passports, secure
Section 12 to its more active orientation. visas and other travel documents, without need to secure the consent of their spouses.
In all other similar contractual relations, women shall enjoy equal rights and shall have the capacity to act which
shall in every respect be equal to those of men under similar circumstances. (Underscoring supplied)
Republic Act No. 9710 or the Magna Carta of Women reflects the state policy to "[abolish]. . . the unequal
structures and practices that perpetuate discrimination and inequality" 3between the sexes, and Section 19 of the
law is specific on the equality of women and men as to rights relating to marriage and family relations:
Section 19. Equal Rights in All Matters Relating to Marriage and Family Relations. - The State shall take all
appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and family
relations and shall ensure:
(a) the same rights to enter into and leave marriages or common law relationships referred to under the
Family Code without prejudice to personal and religious beliefs;
(b) the same rights to choose freely a spouse and to enter into marriage only with their free and full consent.
The betrothal and the marriage of a child shall have no legal effect;
(c) the joint decision on the number and spacing of their children and to have access to the information,
education and means to enable them to exercise these rights;
(d) the same personal rights between spouses or common law spouses including the right to choose freely a
profession and an occupation;
(e) the same rights for both spouses or common law spouses in respect of the ownership, acquisition,
management, administration, enjoyment, and disposition of property;
(f) the same rights to properties and resources, whether titled or not, and inheritance, whether formal or
customary; and
(g) women shall have equal rights with men to acquire, change, or retain their nationality. The State shall
ensure in particular that neither marriage to an alien nor change of nationality by the husband during
marriage shall automatically change the nationality of the wife, render her stateless or force upon her the
nationality of the husband. Various statutes of other countries concerning dual citizenship that may be
enjoyed equally by women and men shall likewise be considered.
Customary laws shall be respected: Provided, however, That they do not discriminate against women.
(Underscoring supplied)
Section 19 is straightforward: the State shall ensure that men and women are to have "the same rights to enter
into and leave marriages."
Following section 19 of Republic Act No. 9710, Article 26 of the Family Code should be read to mean that who
initiates the divorce proceedings abroad is immaterial. Once a divorce decree is issued, the foreign spouse is
deemed to have "obtained" a divorce which capacitates him or her to remarry. The same status should therefore
be afforded to the Filipino spouse.
Besides, in many jurisdictions, the foreign spouse is given the option to divorce on the basis of a mutual
recognition that irreconcilable differences have surfaced in the context of their relationship. Some foreign laws,
therefore, allow joint filing for a divorce decree to ensure that there be less incrimination among the spouses, a
more civil and welcoming atmosphere for their children, and less financial burden for the families affected. The
interpretation proposed by the Solicitor General does not accommodate this possibility. It is blind to the actual
complexities experienced by our citizens in mixed marriages.
II
Justice Caguioa provides the argument that interpreting Article 26 of the Family Code in the manner provided in
the ponencia violates the nationality principle enshrined in Article 15 of the Civil Code.
I disagree.
Article 15 of the Civil Code provides:
Article 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are
binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
Clearly, it is not only Article 26 of the Family Code or the Civil Code that applies. It should also include the
Constitution, which is the bedrock of rights of any citizen. Thus, the State's obligation to "ensure the
fundamental equality before the law of women and men" 4applies with equal if not greater force. In my view,
this is the full extent of the nationality principle. It is borne of rational interpretation, not judicial legislation.
III
Finally, my agreement with the ponencia is also impelled by my understanding that divorce is more consistent
with the constitutionally entrenched fundamental freedoms inherent in individuals as human beings. It is also
most consistent with the constitutional command for the State to ensure human dignity.
The restrictive nature of our marriage laws tends to reify the concept of a family which is already far from the
living realities of many couples and children. For instance, orthodox insistence on heteronormativity may not
compare with the various types of care that various other "non-traditional" arrangements present in many loving
households.
The worst thing we do in a human relationship is to regard the commitment of the other formulaic. That is, that
it is shaped alone by legal duty or what those who are dominant in government regard as romantic. In truth,
each commitment is unique, borne of its own personal history, ennobled by the sacrifices it has gone through,
and defined by the intimacy which only the autonomy of the parties creates.
In other words, words that describe when we love or are loved will always be different for each couple. It is that
which we should understand: intimacies that form the core of our beings should be as free as possible, bound
not by social expectations but by the care and love each person can bring.
Yet, the present form and the present interpretation we have on the law on marriage constrains. In love, there
are no guarantees. In choosing our most intimate partners, we can commit mistakes. It is but part of being
human.
Our law cruelly defines the normal. The legal is coated in a false sense of morality poorly reasoned. It
condemns those who have made bad choices into a living inferno.
In my view, this case is a step forward in the right direction.
IV
As I stated in a dissent5 I wrote in 2016, we had absolute divorce laws in the past. Act No. 2710, 6 enacted in
1917, allowed the filing of a petition for divorce on the ground of adultery on the part of the wife, or
concubinage on the part of the husband.7
Eleven grounds for divorce were provided in Executive Order No. 141, 8 effective during the Japanese
occupation. These grounds included "intentional or unjustified desertion continuously for at least one year prior
to the filing of a [petition] for divorce" and "slander by deed or gross insult by one spouse against the other to
such an extent as to make further living impracticable." 9
After the Japanese left, the laws they enacted were declared void.10 Act No. 2710 again took effect until the
Civil Code's enactment in 1950. Since then, absolute divorce has been prohibited in our jurisdiction.
A world whose borders are increasingly becoming permeable with the ease of travel as well as with the
technological advances will definitely foster more inter-cultural relationships. These relationships can become
more intimate.
I am of the belief that the law never intended for the Filipino to be at a disadvantage. For so long as the
Constitution itself guarantees fundamental equality, the absurd result from a literal and almost frigid and
unfeeling interpretation of our laws should not hold. To say that one spouse may divorce and the other may not
contributes to the patriarchy. It fosters an unequal relationship prone to abuse in such intimate relationships.
The law is far from frigid. It should passionately guarantee equality and I stand with this Court in ensuring that
it does.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to deny the Petition for Review on Certiorari and to affirm, with modification, the
Court of Appeals' Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 100076. The case should be remanded to the court of origin for
further proceedings and reception of evidence as to the relevant Japanese law on divorce.
1
FAMILY CODE, art. 26 provides:
Article 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country
where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited
under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 3637 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
2
CONST, art. III, sec. 1 provides:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
3
Rep. Act No. 9710, sec. 2 provides:
Section 2. Declaration of Policy. - Recognizing that the economic, political, and sociocultural realities affect
women's current condition, the State affirms the role of women in nation building and ensures the substantive
equality of women and men. It shall promote empowerment of women and pursue equal opportunities for
women and men and ensure equal access to resources and to development results and outcome. Further, the
State realizes that equality of men and women entails the abolition of the unequal structures and practices that
perpetuate discrimination and inequality. To realize this, the State shall endeavor to develop plans, policies,
programs, measures, and mechanisms to address discrimination and inequality in the economic, political, social,
and cultural life of women and men. The State condemns discrimination against women in all its forms and
pursues by all appropriate means and without delay the policy of eliminating discrimination against women in
keeping with the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)
and other international instruments consistent with Philippine law. The State shall accord women the rights,
protection, and opportunities available to every member of society.
The State affirms women's rights as human rights and shall intensify its efforts to fulfill its duties under
international and domestic law to recognize, respect, protect, fulfill, and promote all human rights and
fundamental freedoms of women, especially marginalized women, in the economic, social, political, cultural,
and other fields without distinction or discrimination on account of class, age, sex, gender, language, ethnicity,
religion, ideology, disability, education, and status. The State shall provide the necessary mechanisms to enforce
women's rights and adopt and undertake all legal measures necessary to foster and promote the equal
opportunity for women to participate in and contribute to the development of the political, economic, social, and
cultural realms.
The State, in ensuring the full integration of women's concerns in the mainstream of development, shall provide
ample opportunities to enhance and develop their skills, acquire productive employment and contribute to their
families and communities to the fullest of their capabilities.
In pursuance of this policy, the State reaffirms the right of women in all sectors to participate in policy
formulation, planning, organization, implementation, management, monitoring, and evaluation of all programs,
projects, and services. It shall support policies, researches, technology, and training programs and other support
services such as financing, production, and marketing to encourage active participation of women in national
development.
4
CONST., art. II, sec. 14.
5
See Dissenting Opinion in Matudan v. Republic, G.R. No. 203284, November 14, 2016, <
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2016/november2016/203284. pdf > [Per J.
Del Castillo, Second Division].
6
An Act to Establish Divorce (1917).
7 currently stands until the passage of an amendatory law on the subject.
Act. No. 2710, sec. 1 provides:
The Supreme Court x x x aims to adopt a liberal construction of statutes. By liberal construction of statutes is
meant that method by which courts from the language used, the subject matter, and the purposes of those
framing laws, are able to find out their true meaning. There is a sharp distinction, however, between
construction of this nature and the act of a court in engrafting upon a law something that has been omitted
which someone believes ought to have been embraced. The former is liberal construction and is a legitimate
exercise of judicial power. The latter is judicial legislation forbidden by the tripartite division of powers
among the three departments of government, the executive, the legislative, and the judicial. 1
On the basis of the Court's rulings in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.2(Van Dorn), Republic of the Philippines v.
Orbecido III3(Orbecido), and Dacasin v. Dacasin4(Dacasin), the ponencia holds that Article 26(2) of the
Family Code permits the blanket recognition, under Philippine law, of a divorce decree obtained abroad by a
Filipino citizen against the latter's foreigner spouse.
I disagree.
At the outset, it bears to emphasize that the public policy against absolute divorce remains in force. At present,
there exists no legal mechanism under Philippine law through which a Filipino may secure a divorce decree
upon his own initiative. Accordingly, it is the Court's duty to uphold such policy and apply the law as it

As members of the Court, ours is the duty to interpret the law; this duty does not carry with it the power to
Section 1. A petition for divorce can only be filed for adultery on the part of the wife or concubinage on the part
of the husband, committed in any of the forms described in article four hundred and thirty-seven of the Penal determine what the law should be in the face of changing times, which power, in turn, lies solely within the
Code. province of Congress.

See Valdez v. Tuazon, 40 Phil. 943, 948 (1920) [Per J. Street, En Banc]. Article 26(2) of the Family Code is an exception to the nationality principle under Article 15 of the Civil
Code.
8
Otherwise known as "The New Divorce Law."
Article 26(2) was introduced during the meetings of the Joint Civil Code and Family Law Committee (the
9
Baptista v. Castañeda, 76 Phil. 461, 462 (1946) [Per J. Ozaeta, En Banc]. Committee) to address the effect of foreign divorce decrees on mixed marriages between Filipinos and
foreigners. The provision, as originally worded, and the rationale for its introduction, appear in the
10
Id. at 462-463. deliberations:

[Professor Esteban B. Bautista (Prof. Bautista)]'s position, even under the present law, was that the Filipina wife
should be allowed to remarry as long as the divorce is valid under the national law of the husband, with which
[Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy (Judge Diy)] and [Justice Leonor Ines-Luciano (Justice Luciano)] concurred.

After further deliberation, [Justice Ricardo C. Puno (Justice Puno)] suggested that they formulate the base to
cover the above situation. Judge Diy and [Justice Eduardo P. Caguioa (Justice Caguioa)] formulated the base as
DISSENTING OPINION follows:

CAGUIOA, J.: In a mixed marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner, both capacitated to marry under Philippine law,
in case the foreigner should obtain a valid divorce abroad, capacitating him to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall
likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. 5
However, subsequent deliberations show that the Committee ultimately resolved to delete the provision and
defer action until absolute divorce is determined in future legislation:
On Article [26(2)], [Justice Jose B.L. Reyes (Justice Reyes)] commented that it seems to discriminate against
Filipinos, who are married to Filipinos, since the provision governs only Filipinos married to foreigners.
Justice Puno suggested that, in line with Justice Caguioa's view that xxx they should make the Proposed Family
Code as acceptable as possible and since they are not touching on divorce which is one of the big issues and
they are leaving it to future legislation, they omit Article 126(2)] temporarily and take it up when they take
up the matter of absolute divorce.
Prof. Bautista remarked that it is a matter of equity, justice and fairness that Article [26(2)] should be retained.
On the point raised by Justice Reyes, Prof. Bautista opined that there is no unfairness in the case of a Filipino,
who is married to a Filipino, because in the case of a Filipino who is married to a foreigner, the foreigner is
already free, and yet the Filipino is still married to nobody. [Dean Bartolome S. Carale (Dean Carale)] added
that if two Filipinos are married anywhere, they are both covered by the Philippine prohibitory laws because
they are nationals of the Philippines. Justice Caguioa, however, pointed out that, in effect, there is preferential
treatment in the case of Filipinos married to foreigners, since if the foreigner gets a divorce, the Filipino spouse
also automatically gets a divorce. Dean Carale remarked that Article [26(2)] will in effect encourage Filipinos to
marry foreigners. Prof. Bautista disagreed since it is the foreigner and not the Filipino, who will seek
divorce.
xxxx
Justice Reyes remarked that this article is an implicit recognition of foreign divorce, with which Justice
Caguioa concurred. Prof. Bautista and [Professor Flerida Ruth P. Romero (Prof. Romero)] pointed out
that the article will only cover exceptional cases and special situations and that there is a reasonable and
substantial basis for making it an exception.
After further discussion, Justice Puno rephrased Article [26(2)] in accordance with Dr. Cortes' suggestion as
follows:
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated abroad and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad capacitating such foreigner to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
xxxx
Having sufficiently discussed the matter, the Committee decided to put the issue to a vote.
The members voted as follows:
(1) Justice Puno, Justice Caguioa, Dr. Cortes, Dean Carale, Dean Gupit and Prof. Baviera were for the deletion
of Article [26(2)].
(2) Justice Diy, Prof. Bautista, Prof. Romero and [Director Flora C. Eufemio] were for its retention.
Hence, the Committee agreed that x x x Article [26(2)] shall be deleted x x x.6(Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Accordingly, Article 26(2) did not appear in the initial version of the Family Code under Executive Order (EO)
209 which was signed into law by then President Corazon Aquino on July 6, 1987. Days later, or on July 17,
1987, President Aquino issued EO 227 which incorporated, among others, Article 26(2). Thus, when the Family
Code finally took effect on August 3, 1988, Article 26, in its entirety, read as follows:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country
where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited
under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall
likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
While Article 26(2) was reinstated by executive fiat, it is nevertheless clear that the true spirit behind the
provision remains explicit in the Committee deliberations — Article 26(2) had been crafted to serve as an
exception to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, which states:
ART. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are
binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
The deliberations show that Article 26(2) has the effect of (i) enforcing divorce decrees which are binding on
foreign nationals under their national law; and (ii) recognizing the residual effect of such foreign divorce
decrees on their Filipino spouses who are bound by the prohibition against absolute divorce under the Civil
Code.7
To be sure, Article 26(2) had not been crafted to dilute the Philippines' policy against absolute divorce. In fact,
this perceived possible dilution is precisely what prompted the majority of the Committee members to vote for
the deletion of Article 26(2) in the initial version of the Family Code found in EO 209. As the deliberations
indicate, the exception provided in Article 26(2) is narrow, and intended only to address the unfair
situation that results when a foreign national obtains a divorce decree against a Filipino citizen, leaving
the latter stuck in a marriage without a spouse, thus:
Justice Caguioa explained that the intention of the provision is to legalize foreign divorces for the Filipino so
that in the case of a Filipina, who was married to an American, who in turn later secured a divorce, said Filipina
will be allowed to remarry. Justice Puno and Judge Diy remarked that this is not clear in the provision [Article
26(2)]. Justice Puno, however, commented that it will open the gates to practically invalidating the
Philippine laws by the simple expedient of marrying a foreigner, and that it will be an additional cause
for the breakage of families, with which Justice Caguioa concurred. Judge Diy stated that, on the other
hand, it is an absurdity for a Filipina to be married without a husband. 8 (Emphasis supplied)
I believe that this view is consistent with the Court's rulings in Van Dorn, Orbecido, and Dacasin. the enforceability of the Joint Custody Agreement against the American husband, and not the validity of the
foreign divorce decree as against the Filipino wife.
In Van Dorn, a case decided prior to the enactment of the Family Code, an American citizen sought to compel
his former Filipina wife to render an accounting of their alleged conjugal business in Manila. The American Thus, rather than serving as bases for the blanket recognition of foreign divorce decrees in the
citizen argued that he retained the right to share in the proceeds of the disputed business, as the divorce decree Philippines, I believe that the Court's rulings in Van Dorn, Orbecido and Dacasin merely clarify the
issued by the Nevada District Court cannot be given effect in the Philippines. Ruling against the American parameters for the application of the nationality principle found in Article 15 of the Civil Code, and the
citizen, the Court held that the divorce decree issued by a United States court is binding against him as an exception thereto found in Article 26(2) the Family Code. These parameters may be summarized as follows:
American citizen.9As a residual effect of such divorce, the American citizen no longer had standing to sue
as the husband of his former Filipina wife.10Hence, in Van Dorn, the Court held: 1. Owing to the nationality principle, all Filipino citizens are covered by the prohibition against absolute
divorce. As a consequence of such prohibition, a divorce decree obtained abroad by a Filipino
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine citizen cannot be enforced in the Philippines. To allow otherwise would be to permit a Filipino
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept citizen to invoke foreign law to evade an express prohibition under Philippine law.
of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. x x x11 (Emphasis supplied) 2. Nevertheless, the effects of a divorce decree obtained by a foreign national may be extended to the
Filipino spouse, provided the latter is able to prove (i) the issuance of the divorce decree, and (ii) the
In Orbecido, a Filipino citizen sought permission to remarry before the courts, claiming that his former Filipina personal law of the foreign spouse allowing such divorce.14 This exception, found under Article 26(2)
wife had obtained a divorce decree against him from an American court after she had become a naturalized of the Family Code, respects the binding effect of the divorce decree on the foreign national, and
American citizen. The Court held that the effects of the divorce decree should be recognized in the merely recognizes the residual effect of such decree on the Filipino spouse.
Philippines since it was obtained by the former wife as an American citizen in accordance with her
national law, and that as a consequence, the Filipino husband should be allowed to remarry pursuant to It should be emphasized, however, that the prohibition against absolute divorce only applies to Filipino citizens.
Article 26(2). In so ruling, the Court laid down elements for the application of Article 26(2), thus: Accordingly, it cannot be invoked by a foreign national to evade the effects of a divorce decree issued pursuant
to his national law. To reiterate, a divorce decree issued by a foreign court remains binding on the foreign
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows: spouse in the Philippines, regardless of the party who obtained the same provided that such decree is valid
and effective under the foreign spouse's national law.
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
In essence, the applicable rule (whether Article 15 of the Civil Code on one hand, or Article 26[2] of the Family
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. Code on the other), is determined by (i) the law upon which the divorce decree had been issued; (ii) the party
who obtained the divorce decree; (iii) the nature of the action brought before the Philippine courts; and (iv) the
law governing the personal status of the party seeking relief.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
The corresponding effect of these determining factors are, in turn, illustrated by the relevant cases involving the
issue at hand, decided after the issuance of EO 227:
In this case, when [the Filipino spouse's] wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid
marriage that has been celebrated between [them]. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife
subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application Incidents of Action in
Case Incidents of Divorce Court's Resolution
of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus x x x the "divorced" Filipino spouse, should be the Philippines
allowed to remarry.12 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Pilapil v. Ibay-
Divorce obtained in German spouse filed The divorce decree is
Somera15(Pilapil)
Still, in Dacasin, a Filipino wife secured a divorce decree against her American husband from an Illinois court. Germany by German two (2) complaints binding on the German
The decree awarded sole custody over the parties' daughter in favor of the Filipino wife. While the parties spouse charging Filipino spouse pursuant to the
subsequently executed a Joint Custody Agreement, the Filipino wife refused to honor the agreement, prompting spouse with adultery nationality principle.
the American husband to seek redress before the Philippine courts. The Court held that the Illinois divorce Accordingly, the German
decree is binding on the American citizen, and that the latter cannot be permitted to evade the terms of the spouse lacks standing to
custodial award. Citing the nationality principle, the Court stressed that "a foreign divorce decree carries file the complaints as
as much validity against the alien divorcee in this jurisdiction as it does in the jurisdiction of the alien's "offended spouse", having
nationality, irrespective of who obtained the divorce."13 It bears stressing that the issue raised in Dacasin was
 obtained the divorce decree presupposes a subsisting
prior to the filing of said marriage.
complaints.
Fujiki v. Divorce obtained in Japan First husband (also a The effect of the divorce
Republic v. Divorce obtained in the Filipino husband The divorce decree cannot Marinay18(Fujiki) by Filipina wife against Japanese national) decree issued pursuant to
Iyoy16(Iyoy)
United States by Filipino invokes the divorce be recognized in the her second husband, who sought recognition of Japanese law may be
wife prior to her decree secured by his Philippines since the is a Japanese national the divorce obtained recognized in the
naturalization as an Filipino wife as Filipino wife obtained the by his Filipina wife Philippines in order to
American citizen additional ground to same while still a Filipino against her second affect the status of the first
grant his petition for citizen, and was, at such husband through a husband, who, pursuant to
declaration of nullity time, bound by Philippine Petition for Judicial the nationality principle, is
laws on family rights and Recognition of Foreign governed by Japanese law.
duties, pursuant to the Judgment (or Decree Such recognition is in line
nationality principle. of Absolute Nullity of with the Philippines' public
Marriage) filed before policy, which characterizes
Orbecido the RTC bigamous marriages as
Divorce obtained in the Filipino spouse sought The effects of the divorce
void ab initio.
United States by enforcement of divorce decree must be recognized
naturalized American in the Philippines in favor of the Filipino
Medina v.
spouse spouse pursuant to Article Divorcejointlyobtained in Filipina wife sought to The case was remanded to
Koike19(Medina)
26(2) of the Family Code. Japan by Filipina wife and enforce the divorce in the CA to allow Filipina
Accordingly, the Filipino Japanese husband the Philippines through wife to prove that the
spouse should be allowed a Petition for Judicial divorce obtained abroad by
to re-marry. Recognition of Foreign her andher Japanese
Divorce and husband is valid according
Dacasin Declaration of to the latter's national law.
Divorce obtained in the American spouse The divorce decree is
Capacity to Remarry
United States by Filipino sought enforcement of binding on the American
before the RTC
spouse the Joint Custody spouse, pursuant to the
Agreement he had nationality principle.
executed with his Accordingly, he cannot be
former Filipino wife, allowed to evade the same The factual circumstances in the foregoing cases illustrate and confirm the legislative intent behind Article
26(2), that is, primarily, to recognize foreign divorce decrees secured by foreign nationals insofar as they affect
which bore terms by invoking the terms of
Filipinos who would otherwise be precluded from invoking such decrees in our jurisdiction, and, as well, to
contrary to those in the the Joint Custody
divorce decree Agreement. recognize those foreign divorce decrees obtained by Filipinos insofar as they affect their foreign spouses whose
national laws allow divorce. For emphasis, I quote the relevant portion of the deliberations:
Bayot v. Court, of
Divorce obtained in the Naturalized American The divorce decree is Prof. Bautista remarked that it is a matter of equity, justice and fairness that Article [26(2)] should be retained, x
Appeals17(Bayot)
Dominican Republic by spouse sought binding on the naturalized x x Dean Carale added that if two Filipinos are married anywhere, they are both covered by the Philippine
naturalized American annulment of her American spouse, pursuant prohibitory laws because they are nationals of the Philippines. Justice Caguioa, however, pointed out that, in
spouse marriage with her to the nationality principle. effect, there is preferential treatment in the case of Filipinos married to foreigners, since if the foreigner gets a
Filipino spouse Accordingly, she is left divorce, the Filipino spouse also automatically gets a divorce. Dean Carale remarked that Article [26(2)] will in
through a petition for without any cause of action effect encourage Filipinos to marry foreigners. Prof. Bautista disagreed since it is the foreigner and not the
annulment filed before before the RTC, as a Filipino, who will seek divorce.
the Regional Trial petition for annulment
Court (RTC)
xxxx
Justice Reyes remarked that this article is an implicit recognition of foreign divorce, with which Justice
Caguioa concurred. Prof. Bautista and Prof. Romero pointed out that the article will only cover
exceptional cases and special situations and that there is a reasonable and substantial basis for making it
an exception.20 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Consistent with the foregoing, the Court held in Iyoy:
As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the [parties in the marriage]
is a foreigner who divorces his or her Filipino spouse. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision
cannot be applied to the case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her
divorce, she was still, a Filipino citizen. x x x At the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino
citizen, and pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal
capacity, even when she was already living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow
and recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce
from respondent Crasus.21 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Article 26(2) of the Family Code merely recognizes the classification previously made pursuant to the
nationality principle.
The ponencia characterizes Article 26(2) of the Family Code as unconstitutional, as it proceeds from a
"superficial [and] arbitrary" classification.22 This position appears to be based on the premise that Article 26(2)
creates new distinctions in itself. This premise, however, is simply erroneous.
The classification under Article 26(2), (that is, between Filipinos in mixed marriages and Filipinos married to
fellow Filipinos) was created as a matter of necessity, in recognition of the classification between Filipinos and
foreign nationals which had been created by Article 15 of the Civil Code decades prior.
In his Separate Opinion in Pilapil, Justice Paras highlights the interplay between these two provisions, thus:
In the case of Recto v. Harden (100 Phil. 427 [1956]), the Supreme Court considered the absolute divorce
between the American husband and his American wife as valid and binding in the Philippines on the theory that
their status and capacity are governed by their National law, namely, American law. There is no decision yet of
the Supreme Court regarding the validity of such a divorce if one of the parties, say an American, is married to a
Filipino wife, for then two (2) different nationalities would be involved.
In the book of Senate President Jovito Salonga entitled Private International Law and precisely because of
the National law doctrine, he considers the absolute divorce as valid insofar as the American husband is
concerned but void insofar as the Filipino wife is involved. This results in what he calls a "socially grotesque
situation," where a Filipino woman is still married to a man who is no longer her husband. It is the opinion
however, of the undersigned that very likely the opposite expresses the correct view. While under the national
law of the husband the absolute divorce will be valid, still one of the exceptions to the application of the
proper foreign law (one of the exceptions to comity) is when the foreign law will work an injustice or
injury to the people or residents of the forum. Consequently since to recognize the absolute divorce as
valid on the part of the husband would be injurious or prejudicial to the Filipino wife whose marriage
would be still valid under her national law, it would seem that under our law existing before the new
Family Code (which took effect on August 3, 1988) the divorce should be considered void both with
respect to the American husband and the Filipino wife. 23 (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, to characterize Article 26(2) as unconstitutional in such respect would be to disregard the nationality
principle and the reasons which render the adoption thereof necessary; it would be tantamount to insisting that
Filipinos should be governed with whatever law they choose.
Article 26(2) of the Family Code rests on substantial and reasonable distinctions.
It has been argued that the verba legis interpretation of Article 26(2) of the Family Code violates the equal
protection clause, and that the application of the provision in this manner would not only be oppressive, but
likewise unconstitutional.
These reservations appear to proceed from three different classifications which, in turn, have been called into
question — first, that between Filipinos in mixed marriages and Filipinos who are married to fellow
Filipinos; second, that between Filipinos and foreigners; and finally, that between men and women.
As earlier discussed, the ponencia finds the first classification "superficial [and] arbitrary" 24 insofar as it limits
the scope of recognition to cover only those divorce decrees obtained by foreign nationals.
It bears to stress, however, that the guarantee of equal protection under the Constitution does not require that all
laws indiscriminately operate with equal force with respect to all subjects at all times; 25the guarantee does not
preclude classification provided they are reasonable and based on substantial distinctions.26
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon all
citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against
inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of
statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according to
the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does
not require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same. The
equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It does not prohibit
legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is
to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as in the
other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because they
agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of
classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner
determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be
reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make
for real differences, that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to
existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. This Court has held
that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or
rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.27 (Emphasis supplied)
There should be no dispute on the existence of substantial distinctions between Filipinos in mixed marriages
and those who are married to fellow Filipinos. In fact, several of these distinctions were highlighted in
the ponencia, thus:
A Filipino who is married to another Filipino is not similarly situated with a Filipino who is married to a foreign
citizen. There are real, material and substantial differences between them. Ergo, they should not be treated alike,
both as to rights conferred and liabilities imposed. Without a doubt, there are political, economic, cultural, and
religious dissimilarities as well as varying legal systems and procedures, all too unfamiliar, that a Filipino
national who is married to an alien spouse has to contend with. More importantly, while a divorce decree
obtained abroad by a Filipino against another Filipino is null and void, a divorce decree obtained by an
alien against his or her Filipino spouse is recognized if made in accordance with the national law of the
foreigner.28 (Emphasis supplied)
As observed by the ponencia, the most important distinction between Filipinos in mixed marriages and those
who are married to fellow Filipinos is their exposure to the absurdity for which Article 26(2) had been precisely
crafted, as only Filipinos in mixed marriages may find themselves married without a spouse due to the effects of
a foreign divorce decree. This distinction is "substantial" as to necessitate a difference in treatment before the
law.
To disregard these substantial distinctions for the sake of liberality would empower Filipinos in mixed
marriages to obtain divorce decrees by invoking foreign law at whim, and effectively sanction a legal preference
in their favor at the expense of those Filipinos who happen to be married to their fellow Filipinos. A liberal
interpretation of Article 26(2) would, in Dean Carale's words, "encourage Filipinos to marry foreigners." 29
To stress, all Filipinos are bound by the prohibition against absolute divorce. The recognition afforded to
foreign divorce under Article 26(2) is extended only as a means to recognize its residual effect on Filipinos
whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by operation of the latter's national laws. The
provision was not intended to grant any preferential right in favor of Filipinos in mixed marriages, but
intended merely to recognize the operation of foreign divorce on foreigners whose national laws permit
divorce.
Equally apparent is the fundamental distinction between foreigners and Filipinos under the second
classification, the former being subject to their respective national laws and the latter being bound by the laws
of the Philippines regardless of their place of residence. Clearly, foreigners and Filipinos are not similarly
situated. Hence, the determination of their legal status, among others, cannot be made subject to the same
parameters. In any case, I emphasize, at the sake of being repetitious, that such classification had been created
not by Article 26(2) of the Family Code, but rather, the nationality principle under Article 15 of the Civil Code:
ART. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are
binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
Finally, I find that Article 26(2) does not make any discernable distinction between men and women, as the
exception therein may be invoked by both men and women with equal force to attain the same end, provided
that the requirements for its application obtain. While I am certainly aware that the respondent in this case is
one of the many Filipino women who find themselves in unsuccessful marriages with foreign nationals, I am
equally aware that this unfortunate circumstance is similarly faced by Filipino men, who, like their female
counterparts, are precluded from obtaining an absolute divorce under Philippine law.
Respondent's case falls outside of the scope of Article 26(2) of the Family Code.
In this case, it has been established that (i) the respondent is a Filipino citizen who married a Japanese national;
(ii) it was the respondent who subsequently obtained a divorce decree against her Japanese husband from
a Japanese court; and (iii) the respondent thereafter filed a Petition for Recognition and Enforcement of a
Foreign Judgment30 before the RTC.31 It is clear that respondent is, and has always been, a Filipino citizen.
Pursuant to the nationality principle, respondent's personal status is subject to Philippine law which, in turn,
prohibits absolute divorce.
Hence, the divorce decree which respondent obtained under Japanese law cannot be given effect, as she is,
without dispute, a national not of Japan, but of the Philippines. Nevertheless, the verba legisapplication of
Article 26(2) does not deprive the respondent of legal remedies, as she may pray for the severance of her marital
ties before the RTC in accordance with the mechanisms now existing under the Family Code.
The Constitution mandates the protection of the family as a basic autonomous social institution. 32 In this
connection, the Family Code characterizes marriage as a special contract of permanent union, and regards the
family as "an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law" and
generally, not subject to stipulation.33 Upon these fundamental principles rests the prohibition against absolute
divorce, which had remained effective and unchanged since the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950. 34
Adherence to this prohibition is met with much reservation, as it purportedly forces Filipinos to play second-
fiddle to their foreign spouses, and places said Filipinos at a disadvantage. Moreover, it had been argued in the
deliberations of the Court that such adherence sanctions various forms of abuse that plague mixed marriages,
and deprives Filipinos in such marriages of a way out. I find that these observations, pressing as they are,
already delve into the wisdom of statutes governing marriage and personal status with which the Court cannot
interfere.
To note, Article 26(2) of the Family Code has remained unchanged since the issuance of EO 227. The blanket
recognition of absolute divorce overturns the Court's unequivocal interpretation of the provision as laid down in
the cases of Pilapil, Iyoy, Orbecido, Dacasin, Bayot, Fujiki and Medina, which span a period of nearly three
decades. Ascribing a contradictory interpretation to the provision, under the guise of equal protection,
essentially re-writes Article 26(2) and gives it a meaning completely different from the framers' intention.
While I am not oblivious to the difficulty that results from the prohibition on absolute divorce and commiserate
totally with the respondent in this regard, I find that the prohibition remains, and thus, must be faithfully
applied. To my mind, a contrary ruling will subvert not only the intention of the framers of the law, but also that
 3
of the Filipino people, as expressed in the Constitution. The Court is bound to respect the prohibition, until 509 Phil. 108 (2005) [Per J. Quisumbing, First Division].
the legislature deems it lit to lift the same through the passage of a statute permitting absolute divorce.
4
625 Phil. 494 (2010) [Per J. Carpio, Second Division].
As recognized by the ponencia, there are currently four bills on the subject of divorce and severance of marriage
pending before the 17th Congress: (i) House Bill No. 116 (HB 116) and House Bill No. 2380 (HB 2380) which 5
Minutes of the 146th joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees dated July 12, 1986, p. 5.
propose different grounds for the issuance of a judicial decree of absolute divorce; (ii) House Bill No. 1062 (HB
1062) which proposes the inclusion of separation in fact as an additional ground for annulment of marriage; and 6
Minutes of the 149th Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees dated August 2, 1986, pp.
(iii) House Bill No. 6027 (HB 6027) which proposes additional grounds for dissolution of marriage. These bills 14-15.
have been consolidated and substituted by House Bill No. 7303 35(HB 7303), which, at present, is awaiting
deliberations before the Senate.36 7
See CIVIL CODE, Arts. 15 and 17.
HB 7303 proposes the issuance of divorce decrees on the basis of the following grounds: 8
Supra note 5.
1. The existing grounds for legal separation and annulment of marriage under Articles 55 and 45 of the 9
Family Code; Supra note 2, at 361.
2. Separation in fact for at least five years;
10
3. Psychological incapacity, whether or not present at the time of the celebration of the marriage; Id. at 362.
4. Gender reassignment surgery or transition from one sex to another undertaken by either spouse; and
5. Irreconcilable marital differences.37 11
Id.

These movements towards the passage of a divorce law illustrate that the difficulty which results from the 12
Supra note 3, at 115-116.
absolute prohibition against marriage is being addressed by the 17th Congress through a statute specifically
crafted for the purpose. That the legislature has seen it necessary to initiate these proposed laws is a clear 13
Supra note 4, at 508; emphasis and underscoring supplied.
delineation of the Court's role — that is, to simply apply the current law and not for it to indulge in
judicial legislation. 14
See Medina v. Koike, 791 Phil. 645, 651-652 (2016) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, First Division]; Garcia v. Recio,
418 Phil. 723, 725 and 730-731 (2001) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
Indeed, it is desirable, if not imperative, that statutes in a progressive democracy remain responsive to the
realities of the present time. However, responsiveness is a matter of policy which requires a determination of 15
256 Phil. 407 (1989) [Per J. Regalado, Second Division].
what the law ought to be, and not what the law actually is.38 Widening the scope of the exception found in
Article 26(2) so as to indiscriminately recognize foreign divorce in this jurisdiction is doing, in Justice Elias
16
Finley Johnson's39 words, "exactly what the Legislature itself [has] refused to do." 40 It not only subverts the 507 Phil. 485 (2005) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Second Division].
standing public policy against absolute divorce; worse, it sanctions a violation of the fundamental principle of
separation of powers — a violation which cannot be undone by any subsequent law. To wield judicial power in 17
591 Phil. 452 (2008) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Second Division].
this manner is to arrogate unto the Court a power which it does not possess; it is to forget that this State, is
foremost governed by the rule of law and not of men, however wise such men are or purport to be. 18
712 Phil. 524 (2013) [Per J. Carpio, Second Division].

Considering the foregoing, I submit that the Court of Appeals erred when it reversed the RTC's order denying 19
Supra note 14.
respondent's Petition for Enforcement. Hence, I vote to GRANT the instant Petition for Review.
20
Supra note 6.
Endnotes:
21
Supra note 16, at 503-504.
1
See Tañada v. Yulo, 61 Phil. 515-516, 519 (1935) [Per J. Malcolm, En Banc]; emphasis supplied. 22
Ponencia, p. 14.
2
223 Phil. 357 (1985) [Per J. Melencio-Herrera, First Division].
23
Supra note 15, at 421. 20. Ancheta v Guersey-Dalaygon G.R. No. 139868 June 8, 2006

24
Ponencia, p. 14. FIRST DIVISION

25
See generally Department of Education, Culture and Sports v. San Diego, 259 Phil. 1016 (1989) [Per J. Cruz, G.R. No. 139868 June 8, 2006
En Banc].
ALONZO Q. ANCHETA, Petitioner,
26
See Fariñas v. Executive Secretary, 463 Phil. 179, 206-208 (2003) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., En Banc]. vs.
CANDELARIA GUERSEY-DALAYGON, Respondent.
27
Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 487 Phil. 531, 559-560 (2004) [Per
J. Puno, En Banc]. DECISION

28
Ponencia, p. 14. AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

29
Supra note 6, at 14. Spouses Audrey O’Neill (Audrey) and W. Richard Guersey (Richard) were American citizens who have resided
in the Philippines for 30 years. They have an adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill (Kyle). On July 29, 1979,
30
Formerly captioned as Petition for Cancellation of Entry of Marriage; see ponencia, p. 2. Audrey died, leaving a will. In it, she bequeathed her entire estate to Richard, who was also designated as
executor.1 The will was admitted to probate before the Orphan’s Court of Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A, which
31 named James N. Phillips as executor due to Richard’s renunciation of his appointment. 2 The court also named
Ponencia, p. 2.
Atty. Alonzo Q. Ancheta (petitioner) of the Quasha Asperilla Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law Offices as ancillary
32
administrator.3
CONSTITUTION, Art. II, Sec. 12.

33
In 1981, Richard married Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon (respondent) with whom he has two children, namely,
FAMILY CODE, Title I, Art. 1. Kimberly and Kevin.
34
See generally Raymundo v. Peñas, 96 Phil. 311 (1954) [Per J. J.B.L. Reyes, En Banc]. On October 12, 1982, Audrey’s will was also admitted to probate by the then Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch 25, Seventh Judicial District, Pasig, in Special Proceeding No. 9625. 4 As administrator of Audrey’s
35
AN ACT INSTITUTING ABSOLUTE DIVORCE AND DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE IN THE estate in the Philippines, petitioner filed an inventory and appraisal of the following properties: (1) Audrey’s
PHILIPPINES. conjugal share in real estate with improvements located at 28 Pili Avenue, Forbes Park, Makati, Metro Manila,
valued at P764,865.00 (Makati property); (2) a current account in Audrey’s name with a cash balance
36
HB 7303 passed its second reading on March 14, 2018, and was likewise approved on its third and final of P12,417.97; and (3) 64,444 shares of stock in A/G Interiors, Inc. worth P64,444.00.5
reading before the lower house on March 19, 2018. See "House passes divorce bill on second reading,"
< http://www.sunstar.com.ph/article/423557 > (last accessed on March 19, 2018) and "House approves divorce On July 20, 1984, Richard died, leaving a will, wherein he bequeathed his entire estate to respondent, save for
bill on 3rd reading," < https://www.rappler.com/nation/198516-divorce-bill-philippines-passes-third-reading- his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc. shares, which he left to Kyle.6 The will was also admitted to
house-representatives > (last accessed on March 22, 2018). probate by the Orphan’s Court of Ann Arundel, Maryland, U.S.A, and James N. Phillips was likewise appointed
as executor, who in turn, designated Atty. William Quasha or any member of the Quasha Asperilla Ancheta
37 Pena & Nolasco Law Offices, as ancillary administrator.
See HB 7303, Sec. 5.

38
See generally People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937) [Per J. Laurel, En Banc]. Richard’s will was then submitted for probate before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 138, docketed
as Special Proceeding No. M-888.7 Atty. Quasha was appointed as ancillary administrator on July 24, 1986. 8
39
Justice Elias Finley Johnson served as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippines from 1903 to
1933. On October 19, 1987, petitioner filed in Special Proceeding No. 9625, a motion to declare Richard and Kyle as
heirs of Audrey.9 Petitioner also filed on October 23, 1987, a project of partition of Audrey’s estate, with
40
See Nicolas v. Alberto, 51 Phil. 370, 380 (1928) [Dissenting Opinion, J. Johnson] Richard being apportioned the ¾ undivided interest in the Makati property, 48.333 shares in A/G Interiors, Inc.,
and P9,313.48 from the Citibank current account; and Kyle, the ¼ undivided interest in the Makati property,
16,111 shares in A/G Interiors, Inc., and P3,104.49 in cash.10
The motion and project of partition was granted and approved by the trial court in its Order dated February 12,
1988.11 The trial court also issued an Order on April 7, 1988, directing the Register of Deeds of Makati to
cancel TCT No. 69792 in the name of Richard and to issue a new title in the joint names of the Estate of W.
Richard Guersey (¾ undivided interest) and Kyle (¼ undivided interest); directing the Secretary of A/G
Interiors, Inc. to transfer 48.333 shares to the Estate of W. Richard Guersey and 16.111 shares to Kyle; and
directing the Citibank to release the amount of P12,417.97 to the ancillary administrator for distribution to the
heirs.12
Consequently, the Register of Deeds of Makati issued on June 23, 1988, TCT No. 155823 in the names of the
Estate of W. Richard Guersey and Kyle.13
Meanwhile, the ancillary administrator in Special Proceeding No. M-888 also filed a project of partition
wherein 2/5 of Richard’s ¾ undivided interest in the Makati property was allocated to respondent,
while 3/5 thereof were allocated to Richard’s three children. This was opposed by respondent on the ground that
under the law of the State of Maryland, "a legacy passes to the legatee the entire interest of the testator in
the property subject of the legacy."14 Since Richard left his entire estate to respondent, except for his rights
and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc, shares, then his entire ¾ undivided interest in the Makati property
should be given to respondent.
The trial court found merit in respondent’s opposition, and in its Order dated December 6, 1991, disapproved
the project of partition insofar as it affects the Makati property. The trial court also adjudicated Richard’s entire
¾ undivided interest in the Makati property to respondent. 15
On October 20, 1993, respondent filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) an amended complaint for the annulment
of the trial court’s Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, issued in Special Proceeding No.
9625.16Respondent contended that petitioner willfully breached his fiduciary duty when he disregarded the laws
of the State of Maryland on the distribution of Audrey’s estate in accordance with her will. Respondent argued
that since Audrey devised her entire estate to Richard, then the Makati property should be wholly adjudicated to
him, and not merely ¾ thereof, and since Richard left his entire estate, except for his rights and interests over
the A/G Interiors, Inc., to respondent, then the entire Makati property should now pertain to respondent.
Petitioner filed his Answer denying respondent’s allegations. Petitioner contended that he acted in good faith in
submitting the project of partition before the trial court in Special Proceeding No. 9625, as he had no knowledge
of the State of Maryland’s laws on testate and intestate succession. Petitioner alleged that he believed that it is
to the "best interests of the surviving children that Philippine law be applied as they would receive their just
shares." Petitioner also alleged that the orders sought to be annulled are already final and executory, and cannot
be set aside.
On March 18, 1999, the CA rendered the assailed Decision annulling the trial court’s Orders dated February 12,
1988 and April 7, 1988, in Special Proceeding No. 9625. 17 The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision
provides:
WHEREFORE, the assailed Orders of February 12, 1998 and April 7, 1988 are hereby ANNULLED and, in
lieu thereof, a new one is entered ordering:
(a) The adjudication of the entire estate of Audrey O’Neill Guersey in favor of the estate of W. Richard
Guersey; and
(b) The cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15583 of the Makati City Registry and the
issuance of a new title in the name of the estate of W. Richard Guersey.
SO ORDERED.18
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but this was denied by the CA per Resolution dated August 27,
1999.19
Hence, the herein petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court alleging that the CA
gravely erred in not holding that:
A) THE ORDERS OF 12 FEBRUARY 1988 AND 07 APRIL 1988 IN SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
NO. 9625 "IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR PROBATE OF THE WILL OF THE
DECEASED AUDREY GUERSEY, ALONZO Q. ANCHETA, ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATOR",
ARE VALID AND BINDING AND HAVE LONG BECOME FINAL AND HAVE BEEN FULLY
IMPLEMENTED AND EXECUTED AND CAN NO LONGER BE ANNULLED.
B) THE ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATOR HAVING ACTED IN GOOD FAITH, DID NOT
COMMIT FRAUD, EITHER EXTRINSIC OR INTRINSIC, IN THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS
DUTIES AS ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATOR OF AUDREY O’NEIL GUERSEY’S ESTATE IN
THE PHILIPPINES, AND THAT NO FRAUD, EITHER EXTRINSIC OR INTRINSIC, WAS
EMPLOYED BY [HIM] IN PROCURING SAID ORDERS. 20
Petitioner reiterates his arguments before the CA that the Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988 can
no longer be annulled because it is a final judgment, which is "conclusive upon the administration as to all
matters involved in such judgment or order, and will determine for all time and in all courts, as far as the parties
to the proceedings are concerned, all matters therein determined," and the same has already been executed. 21
Petitioner also contends that that he acted in good faith in performing his duties as an ancillary administrator.
He maintains that at the time of the filing of the project of partition, he was not aware of the relevant laws of the
State of Maryland, such that the partition was made in accordance with Philippine laws. Petitioner also imputes
knowledge on the part of respondent with regard to the terms of Aubrey’s will, stating that as early as 1984, he
already apprised respondent of the contents of the will and how the estate will be divided. 22
Respondent argues that petitioner’s breach of his fiduciary duty as ancillary administrator of Aubrey’s estate
amounted to extrinsic fraud. According to respondent, petitioner was duty-bound to follow the express terms of
Aubrey’s will, and his denial of knowledge of the laws of Maryland cannot stand because petitioner is a senior
partner in a prestigious law firm and it was his duty to know the relevant laws.
Respondent also states that she was not able to file any opposition to the project of partition because she was not
a party thereto and she learned of the provision of Aubrey’s will bequeathing entirely her estate to Richard only
after Atty. Ancheta filed a project of partition in Special Proceeding No. M-888 for the settlement of Richard’s
estate.
A decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land of the estate in the
distributees, which, if erroneous may be corrected by a timely appeal. Once it becomes final, its binding effect
is like any other judgment in rem.23 However, in exceptional cases, a final decree of distribution of the estate
may be set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud. 24 Further, in Ramon v. Ortuzar,25 the Court ruled that a party
interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside when he is left out by reason of
circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence. 26
The petition for annulment was filed before the CA on October 20, 1993, before the issuance of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure; hence, the applicable law is Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (B.P. 129) or the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980. An annulment of judgment filed under B.P. 129 may be based on the ground that a
judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or that the judgment was obtained by extrinsic fraud. 27 For fraud to
become a basis for annulment of judgment, it has to be extrinsic or actual,28 and must be brought within four
years from the discovery of the fraud.29
In the present case, respondent alleged extrinsic fraud as basis for the annulment of the RTC Orders dated
February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988. The CA found merit in respondent’s cause and found that petitioner’s
failure to follow the terms of Audrey’s will, despite the latter’s declaration of good faith, amounted to extrinsic
fraud. The CA ruled that under Article 16 of the Civil Code, it is the national law of the decedent that is
applicable, hence, petitioner should have distributed Aubrey’s estate in accordance with the terms of her will.
The CA also found that petitioner was prompted to distribute Audrey’s estate in accordance with Philippine
laws in order to equally benefit Audrey and Richard Guersey’s adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill.
Petitioner contends that respondent’s cause of action had already prescribed because as early as 1984,
respondent was already well aware of the terms of Audrey’s will, 30 and the complaint was filed only in 1993.
Respondent, on the other hand, justified her lack of immediate action by saying that she had no opportunity to
question petitioner’s acts since she was not a party to Special Proceeding No. 9625, and it was only after Atty.
Ancheta filed the project of partition in Special Proceeding No. M-888, reducing her inheritance in the estate of
Richard that she was prompted to seek another counsel to protect her interest. 31
It should be pointed out that the prescriptive period for annulment of judgment based on extrinsic fraud
commences to run from the discovery of the fraud or fraudulent act/s. Respondent’s knowledge of the terms
of Audrey’s will is immaterial in this case since it is not the fraud complained of. Rather, it is petitioner’s failure
to introduce in evidence the pertinent law of the State of Maryland that is the fraudulent act, or in this case,
omission, alleged to have been committed against respondent, and therefore, the four-year period should be
counted from the time of respondent’s discovery thereof.
Records bear the fact that the filing of the project of partition of Richard’s estate, the opposition thereto, and the
order of the trial court disallowing the project of partition in Special Proceeding No. M-888 were all done in
1991.32Respondent cannot be faulted for letting the assailed orders to lapse into finality since it was only
through Special Proceeding No. M-888 that she came to comprehend the ramifications of petitioner’s acts.
Obviously, respondent had no other recourse under the circumstances but to file the annulment case. Since the
action for annulment was filed in 1993, clearly, the same has not yet prescribed.
Fraud takes on different shapes and faces. In Cosmic Lumber Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 33 the Court
stated that "man in his ingenuity and fertile imagination will always contrive new schemes to fool the unwary."
There is extrinsic fraud within the meaning of Sec. 9 par. (2), of B.P. Blg. 129, where it is one the effect of
which prevents a party from hearing a trial, or real contest, or from presenting all of his case to the court, or
where it operates upon matters, not pertaining to the judgment itself, but to the manner in which it was procured
so that there is not a fair submission of the controversy. In other words, extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent
act of the prevailing party in the litigation which is committed outside of the trial of the case, whereby the
defeated party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his side of the case by fraud or deception practiced on
him by his opponent. Fraud is extrinsic where the unsuccessful party has been prevented from exhibiting fully
his case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent, as by keeping him away from court, a false
promise of a compromise; or where the defendant never had any knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance
by the acts of the plaintiff; or where an attorney fraudulently or without authority connives at his defeat; these
and similar cases which show that there has never been a real contest in the trial or hearing of the case are
reasons for which a new suit may be sustained to set aside and annul the former judgment and open the case for
a new and fair hearing.34
The overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing
litigant prevented a party from having his day in court.35
Petitioner is the ancillary administrator of Audrey’s estate. As such, he occupies a position of the highest trust
and confidence, and he is required to exercise reasonable diligence and act in entire good faith in the
performance of that trust. Although he is not a guarantor or insurer of the safety of the estate nor is he expected
to be infallible, yet the same degree of prudence, care and judgment which a person of a fair average capacity
and ability exercises in similar transactions of his own, serves as the standard by which his conduct is to be
judged.36
Petitioner’s failure to proficiently manage the distribution of Audrey’s estate according to the terms of her will
and as dictated by the applicable law amounted to extrinsic fraud. Hence the CA Decision annulling the RTC
Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, must be upheld.
It is undisputed that Audrey Guersey was an American citizen domiciled in Maryland, U.S.A. During the
reprobate of her will in Special Proceeding No. 9625, it was shown, among others, that at the time of Audrey’s
death, she was residing in the Philippines but is domiciled in Maryland, U.S.A.; her Last Will and Testament
dated August 18, 1972 was executed and probated before the Orphan’s Court in Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A.,
which was duly authenticated and certified by the Register of Wills of Baltimore City and attested by the Chief
Judge of said court; the will was admitted by the Orphan’s Court of Baltimore City on September 7, 1979; and
the will was authenticated by the Secretary of State of Maryland and the Vice Consul of the Philippine
Embassy.
Being a foreign national, the intrinsic validity of Audrey’s will, especially with regard as to who are her heirs, is
governed by her national law, i.e., the law of the State of Maryland, as provided in Article 16 of the Civil Code,
to wit:
Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession and to the
amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated
by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of
the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 1039 of the Civil Code further provides that "capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of
the decedent."
As a corollary rule, Section 4, Rule 77 of the Rules of Court on Allowance of Will Proved Outside the
Philippines and Administration of Estate Thereunder, states:
SEC. 4. Estate, how administered.—When a will is thus allowed, the court shall grant letters testamentary, or
letters of administration with the will annexed, and such letters testamentary or of administration, shall extend
to all the estate of the testator in the Philippines. Such estate, after the payment of just debts and expenses of
administration, shall be disposed of according to such will, so far as such will may operate upon it; and the
residue, if any, shall be disposed of as is provided by law in cases of estates in the Philippines belonging to
persons who are inhabitants of another state or country. (Emphasis supplied)
While foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial
notice of them;37 however, petitioner, as ancillary administrator of Audrey’s estate, was duty-bound to introduce
in evidence the pertinent law of the State of Maryland.38
Petitioner admitted that he failed to introduce in evidence the law of the State of Maryland on Estates and
Trusts, and merely relied on the presumption that such law is the same as the Philippine law on wills and
succession. Thus, the trial court peremptorily applied Philippine laws and totally disregarded the terms of
Audrey’s will. The obvious result was that there was no fair submission of the case before the trial court or a
judicious appreciation of the evidence presented.
Petitioner insists that his application of Philippine laws was made in good faith. The Court cannot accept
petitioner’s protestation. How can petitioner honestly presume that Philippine laws apply when as early as the
reprobate of Audrey’s will before the trial court in 1982, it was already brought to fore that Audrey was a U.S.
citizen, domiciled in the State of Maryland. As asserted by respondent, petitioner is a senior partner in a
prestigious law firm, with a "big legal staff and a large library." 39 He had all the legal resources to determine the
applicable law. It was incumbent upon him to exercise his functions as ancillary administrator with reasonable
diligence, and to discharge the trust reposed on him faithfully. Unfortunately, petitioner failed to perform his
fiduciary duties.
Moreover, whether his omission was intentional or not, the fact remains that the trial court failed to consider
said law when it issued the assailed RTC Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, declaring Richard
and Kyle as Audrey’s heirs, and distributing Audrey’s estate according to the project of partition submitted by
petitioner. This eventually prejudiced respondent and deprived her of her full successional right to the Makati
property.
In GSIS v. Bengson Commercial Bldgs., Inc.,40 the Court held that when the rule that the negligence or mistake
of counsel binds the client deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes a great hindrance and chief
enemy, its rigors must be relaxed to admit exceptions thereto and to prevent a miscarriage of justice, and the
court has the power to except a particular case from the operation of the rule whenever the purposes of justice
require it.
The CA aptly noted that petitioner was remiss in his responsibilities as ancillary administrator of Audrey’s
estate. The CA likewise observed that the distribution made by petitioner was prompted by his concern over
Kyle, whom petitioner believed should equally benefit from the Makati property. The CA correctly stated,
which the Court adopts, thus:
In claiming good faith in the performance of his duties and responsibilities, defendant Alonzo H. Ancheta
invokes the principle which presumes the law of the forum to be the same as the foreign law (Beam vs. Yatco,
82 Phil. 30, 38) in the absence of evidence adduced to prove the latter law (Slade Perkins vs. Perkins, 57 Phil.
205, 210). In defending his actions in the light of the foregoing principle, however, it appears that the defendant
lost sight of the fact that his primary responsibility as ancillary administrator was to distribute the subject estate
in accordance with the will of Audrey O’Neill Guersey. Considering the principle established under Article 16
of the Civil Code of the Philippines, as well as the citizenship and the avowed domicile of the decedent, it goes
without saying that the defendant was also duty-bound to prove the pertinent laws of Maryland on the matter.
The record reveals, however, that no clear effort was made to prove the national law of Audrey O’Neill Guersey
during the proceedings before the court a quo. While there is claim of good faith in distributing the subject
estate in accordance with the Philippine laws, the defendant appears to put his actuations in a different light as
indicated in a portion of his direct examination, to wit:
xxx
It would seem, therefore, that the eventual distribution of the estate of Audrey O’Neill Guersey was prompted
by defendant Alonzo H. Ancheta’s concern that the subject realty equally benefit the plaintiff’s adopted
daughter Kyle Guersey.
Well-intentioned though it may be, defendant Alonzo H. Ancheta’s action appears to have breached his duties
and responsibilities as ancillary administrator of the subject estate. While such breach of duty admittedly
cannot be considered extrinsic fraud under ordinary circumstances, the fiduciary nature of the said
defendant’s position, as well as the resultant frustration of the decedent’s last will, combine to create a
circumstance that is tantamount to extrinsic fraud. Defendant Alonzo H. Ancheta’s omission to prove the
national laws of the decedent and to follow the latter’s last will, in sum, resulted in the procurement of the
subject orders without a fair submission of the real issues involved in the case.41 (Emphasis supplied)
This is not a simple case of error of judgment or grave abuse of discretion, but a total disregard of the law as a
result of petitioner’s abject failure to discharge his fiduciary duties. It does not rest upon petitioner’s pleasure as
to which law should be made applicable under the circumstances. His onus is clear. Respondent was thus
excluded from enjoying full rights to the Makati property through no fault or negligence of her own, as
petitioner’s omission was beyond her control. She was in no position to analyze the legal implications of
petitioner’s omission and it was belatedly that she realized the adverse consequence of the same. The end result
was a miscarriage of justice. In cases like this, the courts have the legal and moral duty to provide judicial aid to
parties who are deprived of their rights.42
The trial court in its Order dated December 6, 1991 in Special Proceeding No. M-888 noted the law of the State
of Maryland on Estates and Trusts, as follows:
Under Section 1-301, Title 3, Sub-Title 3 of the Annotated Code of the Public General Laws of Maryland on
Estates and Trusts, "all property of a decedent shall be subject to the estate of decedents law, and upon his death
shall pass directly to the personal representative, who shall hold the legal title for administration and
distribution," while Section 4-408 expressly provides that "unless a contrary intent is expressly indicated in the
will, a legacy passes to the legatee the entire interest of the testator in the property which is the subject of the
legacy". Section 7-101, Title 7, Sub-Title 1, on the other hand, declares that "a personal representative is a
fiduciary" and as such he is "under the general duty to settle and distribute the estate of the decedent in
accordance with the terms of the will and the estate of decedents law as expeditiously and with as little sacrifice
of value as is reasonable under the circumstances".43
In her will, Audrey devised to Richard her entire estate, consisting of the following: (1) Audrey’s conjugal share
in the Makati property; (2) the cash amount of P12,417.97; and (3) 64,444 shares of stock in A/G Interiors, Inc.
worth P64,444.00. All these properties passed on to Richard upon Audrey’s death. Meanwhile, Richard, in his
will, bequeathed his entire estate to respondent, except for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc.
shares, which he left to Kyle. When Richard subsequently died, the entire Makati property should have then
passed on to respondent. This, of course, assumes the proposition that the law of the State of Maryland which
allows "a legacy to pass to the legatee the entire estate of the testator in the property which is the subject of the
legacy," was sufficiently proven in Special Proceeding No. 9625. Nevertheless, the Court may take judicial
notice thereof in view of the ruling in Bohanan v. Bohanan. 44 Therein, the Court took judicial notice of the law
of Nevada despite failure to prove the same. The Court held, viz.:
We have, however, consulted the records of the case in the court below and we have found that during the
hearing on October 4, 1954 of the motion of Magdalena C. Bohanan for withdrawal of P20,000 as her share, the
foreign law, especially Section 9905, Compiled Nevada Laws, was introduced in evidence by appellants'
(herein) counsel as Exhibit "2" (See pp. 77-79, Vol. II, and t.s.n. pp. 24-44, Records, Court of First Instance).
Again said law was presented by the counsel for the executor and admitted by the Court as Exhibit "B" during
the hearing of the case on January 23, 1950 before Judge Rafael Amparo (see Records, Court of First Instance,
Vol. 1).
In addition, the other appellants, children of the testator, do not dispute the above-quoted provision of the laws
of the State of Nevada. Under all the above circumstances, we are constrained to hold that the pertinent law of
Nevada, especially Section 9905 of the Compiled Nevada Laws of 1925, can be taken judicial notice of by us,
without proof of such law having been offered at the hearing of the project of partition.
In this case, given that the pertinent law of the State of Maryland has been brought to record before the CA, and
the trial court in Special Proceeding No. M-888 appropriately took note of the same in disapproving the
proposed project of partition of Richard’s estate, not to mention that petitioner or any other interested person for
that matter, does not dispute the existence or validity of said law, then Audrey’s and Richard’s estate should be
distributed according to their respective wills, and not according to the project of partition submitted by
petitioner. Consequently, the entire Makati property belongs to respondent.
Decades ago, Justice Moreland, in his dissenting opinion in Santos v. Manarang, 45 wrote:
A will is the testator speaking after death. Its provisions have substantially the same force and effect in the
probate court as if the testator stood before the court in full life making the declarations by word of mouth as
they appear in the will. That was the special purpose of the law in the creation of the instrument known as the
last will and testament. Men wished to speak after they were dead and the law, by the creation of that
instrument, permitted them to do so x x x All doubts must be resolved in favor of the testator's having meant
just what he said.
Honorable as it seems, petitioner’s motive in equitably distributing Audrey’s estate cannot prevail over
Audrey’s and Richard’s wishes. As stated in Bellis v. Bellis: 46
x x x whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress has not
intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter
alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national Law. Specific provisions must prevail over
general ones.47
Before concluding, the Court notes the fact that Audrey and Richard Guersey were American citizens who
owned real property in the Philippines, although records do not show when and how the Guerseys acquired the
Makati property.
Under Article XIII, Sections 1 and 4 of the 1935 Constitution, the privilege to acquire and exploit lands of the
public domain, and other natural resources of the Philippines, and to operate public utilities, were reserved to
Filipinos and entities owned or controlled by them. In Republic v. Quasha,48 the Court clarified that the Parity
Rights Amendment of 1946, which re-opened to American citizens and business enterprises the right in the
acquisition of lands of the public domain, the disposition, exploitation, development and utilization of natural
resources of the Philippines, does not include the acquisition or exploitation of private agricultural lands. The
prohibition against acquisition of private lands by aliens was carried on to the 1973 Constitution under Article
XIV, Section 14, with the exception of private lands acquired by hereditary succession and when the transfer
was made to a former natural-born citizen, as provided in Section 15, Article XIV. As it now stands, Article
XII, Sections 7 and 8 of the 1986 Constitution explicitly prohibits non-Filipinos from acquiring or holding title
to private lands or to lands of the public domain, except only by way of legal succession or if the acquisition
was made by a former natural-born citizen.
In any case, the Court has also ruled that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a
citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the
transferee is rendered valid.49 In this case, since the Makati property had already passed on to respondent who is
a Filipino, then whatever flaw, if any, that attended the acquisition by the Guerseys of the Makati property is
 1
now inconsequential, as the objective of the constitutional provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands has CA rollo, pp. 84-88.
been achieved.
2
Id. at 89-91.
WHEREFORE, the petition is denied. The Decision dated March 18, 1999 and the Resolution dated August 27,
1999 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. 3
Id. at 92.

Petitioner is ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in the performance of his duties as an official of the 4
Supra, note 2.
court.
5
CA rollo, pp. 93-94.
No pronouncement as to costs.
6
Id. at 95-98.
SO ORDERED.
7
Id. at 99-100.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice 8
Id. at 101.

WE CONCUR: 9
Id. at 102-103.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN 10
Id. at 104-106.
Chief Justice
Chairperson 11
Id. at 107.

(On leave) 12
Id. at 108-109.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice Asscociate Justice 13
Id. at 114-116.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO 14
RTC Order dated December 6, 1991, CA rollo, p. 48.
Associate Justice
15
CA rollo, pp. 117-121.
CERTIFICATION
16
Id. at 71-81.
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s 17
Division. Penned by Associate Justice Fermin A. Martin, Jr. (retired), and concurred in by Associate Justices
Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. (now Associate Justice of this Court) and Mariano M. Umali (retired).
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN 18
Chief Justice CA rollo, p. 553.

19
Id. at 617-618.

20
Rollo, p. 36.
Footnotes
21
Id. at 174.
22 43
Id. at 183. CA rollo, p. 48.

23 44
Reyes v. Barretto-Datu, 125 Phil 501 (1967). Supra., Bohanan case, note 38.

24 45
Kilayko v. Tengco, G.R. No. L-45425, March 27, 1992, 207 SCRA 600. 27 Phil. 209 (1914).

25 46
89 Phil. 730 (1951). 126 Phil. 726 (1967).

26 47
Id. at 741. Id. at 732.

27 48
Ybañez v. Court of Appeals, 323 Phil. 643 (1996). 150-B Phil. 140 (1972).

28 49
Stilianpulos v. The City of Legaspi, 374 Phil. 879 (1999). United Church Board of World Ministries v. Sebastian, No. L-34672, March 30, 1988, 159 SCRA
446; Halili v. Court of Appeals, 350 Phil. 906 (1998); Lee v. Republic, 418 Phil. 793 (2001).
29
Article 1391, Civil Code.
21. Globe Mckay vs CA G.R. No. 81262, August 25, 1989
30
Rollo, p. 46, 183.
Republic of the Philippines
31
Id. at 157-158. SUPREME COURT
Manila
32
See RTC-Branch 138 Order dated December 6, 1991, pp. 194-198, CA rollo.
THIRD DIVISION
33
332 Phil. 948 (1996).
G.R. No. 81262 August 25, 1989
34
Id. at 961-962.
GLOBE MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORP., and HERBERT C. HENDRY, petitioners,
35
Teodoro v. Court of Appeals, 437 Phil. 336 (2002). vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and RESTITUTO M. TOBIAS, respondents.
36
Lao v. Genato, G.R. No. L-56451, June 19, 1985, 137 SCRA 77.
Atencia & Arias Law Offices for petitioners.
37
Llorente v. Court of Appeals, 399 Phil. 342 (2000).
Romulo C. Felizmena for private respondent.
38
Bohanan v. Bohanan, 106 Phil. 997 (1960).

39
Rollo, p. 156.
CORTES, J.:
40
426 Phil. 111 (2002).
Private respondent Restituto M. Tobias was employed by petitioner Globe Mackay Cable and Radio
41
Corporation (GLOBE MACKAY) in a dual capacity as a purchasing agent and administrative assistant to the
CA rollo, pp. 551-553. engineering operations manager. In 1972, GLOBE MACKAY discovered fictitious purchases and other
fraudulent transactions for which it lost several thousands of pesos.
42
Pael v. Court of Appeals, 382 Phil. 222 (2000).
According to private respondent it was he who actually discovered the anomalies and reported them on
November 10, 1972 to his immediate superior Eduardo T. Ferraren and to petitioner Herbert C. Hendry who
was then the Executive Vice-President and General Manager of GLOBE MACKAY.
On November 11, 1972, one day after private respondent Tobias made the report, petitioner Hendry confronted
him by stating that he was the number one suspect, and ordered him to take a one week forced leave, not to
communicate with the office, to leave his table drawers open, and to leave the office keys.
On November 20, 1972, when private respondent Tobias returned to work after the forced leave, petitioner
Hendry went up to him and called him a "crook" and a "swindler." Tobias was then ordered to take a lie detector
test. He was also instructed to submit specimen of his handwriting, signature, and initials for examination by the
police investigators to determine his complicity in the anomalies.
On December 6,1972, the Manila police investigators submitted a laboratory crime report (Exh. "A") clearing
private respondent of participation in the anomalies.
Not satisfied with the police report, petitioners hired a private investigator, retired Col. Jose G. Fernandez, who
on December 10, 1972, submitted a report (Exh. "2") finding Tobias guilty. This report however expressly
stated that further investigation was still to be conducted.
Nevertheless, on December 12, 1972, petitioner Hendry issued a memorandum suspending Tobias from work
preparatory to the filing of criminal charges against him.
On December 19,1972, Lt. Dioscoro V. Tagle, Metro Manila Police Chief Document Examiner, after
investigating other documents pertaining to the alleged anomalous transactions, submitted a second laboratory
crime report (Exh. "B") reiterating his previous finding that the handwritings, signatures, and initials appearing
in the checks and other documents involved in the fraudulent transactions were not those of Tobias. The lie
detector tests conducted on Tobias also yielded negative results.
Notwithstanding the two police reports exculpating Tobias from the anomalies and the fact that the report of the
private investigator, was, by its own terms, not yet complete, petitioners filed with the City Fiscal of Manila a
complaint for estafa through falsification of commercial documents, later amended to just estafa. Subsequently
five other criminal complaints were filed against Tobias, four of which were for estafa through Falsification of
commercial document while the fifth was for of Article 290 of' the Revised Penal Code (Discovering Secrets
Through Seizure of Correspondence).lâwphî1.ñèt Two of these complaints were refiled with the Judge
Advocate General's Office, which however, remanded them to the fiscal's office. All of the six criminal
complaints were dismissed by the fiscal. Petitioners appealed four of the fiscal's resolutions dismissing the
criminal complaints with the Secretary of Justice, who, however, affirmed their dismissal.
In the meantime, on January 17, 1973, Tobias received a notice (Exh. "F") from petitioners that his employment
has been terminated effective December 13, 1972. Whereupon, Tobias filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.
The labor arbiter dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
reversed the labor arbiter's decision. However, the Secretary of Labor, acting on petitioners' appeal from the
NLRC ruling, reinstated the labor arbiter's decision. Tobias appealed the Secretary of Labor's order with the
Office of the President. During the pendency of the appeal with said office, petitioners and private respondent
Tobias entered into a compromise agreement regarding the latter's complaint for illegal dismissal.
Unemployed, Tobias sought employment with the Republic Telephone Company (RETELCO). However,
petitioner Hendry, without being asked by RETELCO, wrote a letter to the latter stating that Tobias was
dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due to dishonesty.
Private respondent Tobias filed a civil case for damages anchored on alleged unlawful, malicious, oppressive,
and abusive acts of petitioners. Petitioner Hendry, claiming illness, did not testify during the hearings. The
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch IX, through Judge Manuel T. Reyes rendered judgment in favor
of private respondent by ordering petitioners to pay him eighty thousand pesos (P80,000.00) as actual damages,
two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) as moral damages, twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) as
exemplary damages, thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as attorney's fees, and costs. Petitioners appealed the
RTC decision to the Court of Appeals. On the other hand, Tobias appealed as to the amount of damages.
However, the Court of Appeals, an a decision dated August 31, 1987 affirmed the RTC decision in toto.
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration having been denied, the instant petition for review on certiorari was
filed.
The main issue in this case is whether or not petitioners are liable for damages to private respondent.
Petitioners contend that they could not be made liable for damages in the lawful exercise of their right to
dismiss private respondent.
On the other hand, private respondent contends that because of petitioners' abusive manner in dismissing him as
well as for the inhuman treatment he got from them, the Petitioners must indemnify him for the damage that he
had suffered.
One of the more notable innovations of the New Civil Code is the codification of "some basic principles that are
to be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the stability of the social order."
[REPORT ON THE CODE COMMISSION ON THE PROPOSED CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, p.
39]. The framers of the Code, seeking to remedy the defect of the old Code which merely stated the effects of
the law, but failed to draw out its spirit, incorporated certain fundamental precepts which were "designed to
indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain of good conscience" and which were also meant to serve as
"guides for human conduct [that] should run as golden threads through society, to the end that law may
approach its supreme ideal, which is the sway and dominance of justice" (Id.) Foremost among these principles
is that pronounced in Article 19 which provides:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties,
act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain
standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's
duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty
and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the
norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because
recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is
exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to
another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while
Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human relations and for the maintenance of social
order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or
Article 21 would be proper.
Article 20, which pertains to damage arising from a violation of law, provides that:
Art. 20. Every person who contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another,
shall indemnify the latter for the same.
However, in the case at bar, petitioners claim that they did not violate any provision of law since they were
merely exercising their legal right to dismiss private respondent. This does not, however, leave private
respondent with no relief because Article 21 of the Civil Code provides that:
Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
This article, adopted to remedy the "countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many victims of moral
wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury" [Id.] should "vouchsafe
adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to
provide for specifically in the statutes" [Id. it p. 40; See also PNB v. CA, G.R. No. L-27155, May 18,1978, 83
SCRA 237, 247].
In determining whether or not the principle of abuse of rights may be invoked, there is no rigid test which can
be applied. While the Court has not hesitated to apply Article 19 whether the legal and factual circumstances
called for its application [See for e.g., Velayo v. Shell Co. of the Phil., Ltd., 100 Phil. 186 (1956); PNB v.
CA, supra; Grand Union Supermarket, Inc. v. Espino, Jr., G.R. No. L-48250, December 28, 1979, 94 SCRA
953; PAL v. CA, G.R. No. L-46558, July 31,1981,106 SCRA 391; United General Industries, Inc, v. Paler G.R.
No. L-30205, March 15,1982,112 SCRA 404; Rubio v. CA, G.R. No. 50911, August 21, 1987, 153 SCRA 183]
the question of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated resulting in damages under
Article 20 or Article 21 or other applicable provision of law, depends on the circumstances of each case. And in
the instant case, the Court, after examining the record and considering certain significant circumstances, finds
that all petitioners have indeed abused the right that they invoke, causing damage to private respondent and for
which the latter must now be indemnified.
The trial court made a finding that notwithstanding the fact that it was private respondent Tobias who reported
the possible existence of anomalous transactions, petitioner Hendry "showed belligerence and told plaintiff
(private respondent herein) that he was the number one suspect and to take a one week vacation leave, not to
communicate with the office, to leave his table drawers open, and to leave his keys to said defendant (petitioner
Hendry)" [RTC Decision, p. 2; Rollo, p. 232]. This, petitioners do not dispute. But regardless of whether or not
it was private respondent Tobias who reported the anomalies to petitioners, the latter's reaction towards the
former upon uncovering the anomalies was less than civil. An employer who harbors suspicions that an
employee has committed dishonesty might be justified in taking the appropriate action such as ordering an
investigation and directing the employee to go on a leave. Firmness and the resolve to uncover the truth would
also be expected from such employer. But the high-handed treatment accorded Tobias by petitioners was
certainly uncalled for. And this reprehensible attitude of petitioners was to continue when private respondent
returned to work on November 20, 1972 after his one week forced leave. Upon reporting for work, Tobias was
confronted by Hendry who said. "Tobby, you are the crook and swindler in this company." Considering that the
first report made by the police investigators was submitted only on December 10, 1972 [See Exh. A] the
statement made by petitioner Hendry was baseless. The imputation of guilt without basis and the pattern of
harassment during the investigations of Tobias transgress the standards of human conduct set forth in Article 19
of the Civil Code. The Court has already ruled that the right of the employer to dismiss an employee should not
be confused with the manner in which the right is exercised and the effects flowing therefrom. If the dismissal is
done abusively, then the employer is liable for damages to the employee [Quisaba v. Sta. Ines-Melale Veneer
and Plywood Inc., G.R. No. L-38088, August 30, 1974, 58 SCRA 771; See also Philippine Refining Co., Inc. v.
Garcia, G.R. No. L-21871, September 27,1966, 18 SCRA 107] Under the circumstances of the instant case, the
petitioners clearly failed to exercise in a legitimate manner their right to dismiss Tobias, giving the latter the
right to recover damages under Article 19 in relation to Article 21 of the Civil Code.
But petitioners were not content with just dismissing Tobias. Several other tortious acts were committed by
petitioners against Tobias after the latter's termination from work. Towards the latter part of January, 1973, after
the filing of the first of six criminal complaints against Tobias, the latter talked to Hendry to protest the actions
taken against him. In response, Hendry cut short Tobias' protestations by telling him to just confess or else the
company would file a hundred more cases against him until he landed in jail. Hendry added that, "You Filipinos
cannot be trusted." The threat unmasked petitioner's bad faith in the various actions taken against Tobias. On the
other hand, the scornful remark about Filipinos as well as Hendry's earlier statements about Tobias being a
"crook" and "swindler" are clear violations of 'Tobias' personal dignity [See Article 26, Civil Code].
The next tortious act committed by petitioners was the writing of a letter to RETELCO sometime in October
1974, stating that Tobias had been dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due to dishonesty. Because of the letter,
Tobias failed to gain employment with RETELCO and as a result of which, Tobias remained unemployed for a
longer period of time. For this further damage suffered by Tobias, petitioners must likewise be held liable for
damages consistent with Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Petitioners, however, contend that they have a "moral,
if not legal, duty to forewarn other employers of the kind of employee the plaintiff (private respondent herein)
was." [Petition, p. 14; Rollo, p. 15]. Petitioners further claim that "it is the accepted moral and societal
obligation of every man to advise or warn his fellowmen of any threat or danger to the latter's life, honor or
property. And this includes warning one's brethren of the possible dangers involved in dealing with, or
accepting into confidence, a man whose honesty and integrity is suspect" [Id.]. These arguments, rather than
justify petitioners' act, reveal a seeming obsession to prevent Tobias from getting a job, even after almost two
years from the time Tobias was dismissed.
Finally, there is the matter of the filing by petitioners of six criminal complaints against Tobias. Petitioners
contend that there is no case against them for malicious prosecution and that they cannot be "penalized for
exercising their right and prerogative of seeking justice by filing criminal complaints against an employee who
was their principal suspect in the commission of forgeries and in the perpetration of anomalous transactions
which defrauded them of substantial sums of money" [Petition, p. 10, Rollo, p. 11].
While sound principles of justice and public policy dictate that persons shall have free resort to the courts for
redress of wrongs and vindication of their rights [Buenaventura v. Sto. Domingo, 103 Phil. 239 (1958)], the
right to institute criminal prosecutions can not be exercised maliciously and in bad faith [Ventura v. Bernabe,
G.R. No. L-26760, April 30, 1971, 38 SCRA 5871.] Hence, in Yutuk V. Manila Electric Co., G.R. No. L-13016,
May 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 337, the Court held that the right to file criminal complaints should not be used as a
weapon to force an alleged debtor to pay an indebtedness. To do so would be a clear perversion of the function
of the criminal processes and of the courts of justice. And in Hawpia CA, G.R. No. L-20047, June 30, 1967. 20
SCRA 536 the Court upheld the judgment against the petitioner for actual and moral damages and attorney's
fees after making a finding that petitioner, with persistence, filed at least six criminal complaints against
respondent, all of which were dismissed.
To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a design to vex
and humiliate a person and that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that the charges were
false and groundless [Manila Gas Corporation v. CA, G.R. No. L-44190, October 30,1980, 100 SCRA 602].
Concededly, the filing of a suit by itself, does not render a person liable for malicious prosecution [Inhelder
Corporation v. CA, G.R. No. 52358, May 301983122 SCRA 576]. The mere dismissal by the fiscal of the
criminal complaint is not a ground for an award of damages for malicious prosecution if there is no competent
evidence to show that the complainant had acted in bad faith [Sison v. David, G.R. No. L-11268, January
28,1961, 1 SCRA 60].
In the instant case, however, the trial court made a finding that petitioners acted in bad faith in filing the
criminal complaints against Tobias, observing that:
xxx
Defendants (petitioners herein) filed with the Fiscal's Office of Manila a total of six (6)
criminal cases, five (5) of which were for estafa thru falsification of commercial document
and one for violation of Art. 290 of the Revised Penal Code "discovering secrets thru seizure
of correspondence," and all were dismissed for insufficiency or lack of evidence." The
dismissal of four (4) of the cases was appealed to the Ministry of Justice, but said Ministry
invariably sustained the dismissal of the cases. As above adverted to, two of these cases were
refiled with the Judge Advocate General's Office of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to
railroad plaintiffs arrest and detention in the military stockade, but this was frustrated by a
presidential decree transferring criminal cases involving civilians to the civil courts.
xxx
To be sure, when despite the two (2) police reports embodying the findings of Lt. Dioscoro
Tagle, Chief Document Examiner of the Manila Police Department, clearing plaintiff of
participation or involvement in the fraudulent transactions complained of, despite the negative
results of the lie detector tests which defendants compelled plaintiff to undergo, and although
the police investigation was "still under follow-up and a supplementary report will be
submitted after all the evidence has been gathered," defendants hastily filed six (6) criminal
cases with the city Fiscal's Office of Manila, five (5) for estafa thru falsification of
commercial document and one (1) for violation of Art. 290 of the Revised Penal Code, so
much so that as was to be expected, all six (6) cases were dismissed, with one of the
investigating fiscals, Asst. Fiscal de Guia, commenting in one case that, "Indeed, the
haphazard way this case was investigated is evident. Evident likewise is the flurry and haste in
the filing of this case against respondent Tobias," there can be no mistaking that defendants
would not but be motivated by malicious and unlawful intent to harass, oppress, and cause
damage to plaintiff.
xxx
[RTC Decision, pp. 5-6; Rollo, pp. 235-236].
In addition to the observations made by the trial court, the Court finds it significant that the criminal complaints
were filed during the pendency of the illegal dismissal case filed by Tobias against petitioners. This explains the
haste in which the complaints were filed, which the trial court earlier noted. But petitioners, to prove their good
faith, point to the fact that only six complaints were filed against Tobias when they could have allegedly filed
one hundred cases, considering the number of anomalous transactions committed against GLOBE MACKAY.
However, petitioners' good faith is belied by the threat made by Hendry after the filing of the first complaint
that one hundred more cases would be filed against Tobias. In effect, the possible filing of one hundred more
cases was made to hang like the sword of Damocles over the head of Tobias. In fine, considering the haste in
which the criminal complaints were filed, the fact that they were filed during the pendency of the illegal
dismissal case against petitioners, the threat made by Hendry, the fact that the cases were filed notwithstanding
the two police reports exculpating Tobias from involvement in the anomalies committed against GLOBE
MACKAY, coupled by the eventual dismissal of all the cases, the Court is led into no other conclusion than that
petitioners were motivated by malicious intent in filing the six criminal complaints against Tobias.
Petitioners next contend that the award of damages was excessive. In the complaint filed against petitioners,
Tobias prayed for the following: one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) as actual damages; fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00) as exemplary damages; eight hundred thousand pesos (P800,000.00) as moral damages; fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as attorney's fees; and costs. The trial court, after making a computation of the
damages incurred by Tobias [See RTC Decision, pp. 7-8; Rollo, pp. 154-1551, awarded him the following:
eighty thousand pesos (P80,000.00) as actual damages; two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) as moral
damages; twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) as exemplary damages; thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as
attorney's fees; and, costs. It must be underscored that petitioners have been guilty of committing several
actionable tortious acts, i.e., the abusive manner in which they dismissed Tobias from work including the
baseless imputation of guilt and the harassment during the investigations; the defamatory language heaped on
Tobias as well as the scornful remark on Filipinos; the poison letter sent to RETELCO which resulted in Tobias'
loss of possible employment; and, the malicious filing of the criminal complaints. Considering the extent of the
damage wrought on Tobias, the Court finds that, contrary to petitioners' contention, the amount of damages
awarded to Tobias was reasonable under the circumstances.
Yet, petitioners still insist that the award of damages was improper, invoking the principle of damnum
absque injuria. It is argued that "[t]he only probable actual damage that plaintiff (private respondent herein)
could have suffered was a direct result of his having been dismissed from his employment, which was a valid
and legal act of the defendants-appellants (petitioners herein).lâwphî1.ñèt " [Petition, p. 17; Rollo, p. 18].
According to the principle of damnum absque injuria, damage or loss which does not constitute a violation of a
legal right or amount to a legal wrong is not actionable [Escano v. CA, G.R. No. L-47207, September 25, 1980,
100 SCRA 197; See also Gilchrist v. Cuddy 29 Phil, 542 (1915); The Board of Liquidators v. Kalaw, G.R. No.
L-18805, August 14, 1967, 20 SCRA 987]. This principle finds no application in this case. It bears repeating
that even granting that petitioners might have had the right to dismiss Tobias from work, the abusive manner in
which that right was exercised amounted to a legal wrong for which petitioners must now be held liable.
Moreover, the damage incurred by Tobias was not only in connection with the abusive manner in which he was
dismissed but was also the result of several other quasi-delictual acts committed by petitioners.
Petitioners next question the award of moral damages. However, the Court has already ruled in Wassmer v.
Velez, G.R. No. L-20089, December 26, 1964, 12 SCRA 648, 653, that [p]er express provision of Article 2219
(10) of the New Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code."
Hence, the Court of Appeals committed no error in awarding moral damages to Tobias.
Lastly, the award of exemplary damages is impugned by petitioners. Although Article 2231 of the Civil Code
provides that "[i]n quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross
negligence," the Court, in Zulueta v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., G.R. No. L- 28589, January 8, 1973,
49 SCRA 1, ruled that if gross negligence warrants the award of exemplary damages, with more reason is its
imposition justified when the act performed is deliberate, malicious and tainted with bad faith. As in
the Zulueta case, the nature of the wrongful acts shown to have been committed by petitioners against Tobias is
sufficient basis for the award of exemplary damages to the latter.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
09055 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr. and Bidin, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., took no part.
Footnotes
** Penned by Justice Jorge R. Coquia and concurred in be Justice Josue N. Bellosillo and
Justice Venancio D. Aldecoa Jr.
22. In The Matter of the Testate Estate of Edward E. Christensen vs. Garcia, G.R. No. L-16749, Jan. 31, 1963
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-16749 January 31, 1963
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the deceased, Executor and Heir-
appellees, vs. HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.
M. R. Sotelo for executor and heir-appellees.
Leopoldo M. Abellera and Jovito Salonga for oppositor-appellant.
LABRADOR, J.:chanrobles virtual law library
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Hon. Vicente N. Cusi, Jr., presiding,
in Special Proceeding No. 622 of said court, dated September 14, 1949, approving among things the final
accounts of the executor, directing the executor to reimburse Maria Lucy Christensen the amount of P3,600 paid
by her to Helen Christensen Garcia as her legacy, and declaring Maria Lucy Christensen entitled to the residue
of the property to be enjoyed during her lifetime, and in case of death without issue, one-half of said residue to
be payable to Mrs. Carrie Louise C. Borton, etc., in accordance with the provisions of the will of the testator
Edward E. Christensen. The will was executed in Manila on March 5, 1951 and contains the following
provisions:
3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs. Bernard
Daney), who was born in the Philippines about twenty-eight years ago, and who is now residing at No. 665
Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants, and no descendants except my above named daughter,
MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY.
xxx xxx x x xchanrobles virtual law library
7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN, now married to Eduardo Garcia, about
eighteen years of age and who, notwithstanding the fact that she was baptized Christensen, is not in any way
related to me, nor has she been at any time adopted by me, and who, from all information I have now resides in
Egpit, Digos, Davao, Philippines, the sum of THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P3,600.00),
Philippine Currency the same to be deposited in trust for the said Maria Helen Christensen with the Davao
Branch of the Philippine National Bank, and paid to her at the rate of One Hundred Pesos (P100.00), Philippine
Currency per month until the principal thereof as well as any interest which may have accrued thereon, is
exhausted..
xxx xxx x x xchanrobles virtual law library
12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-beloved daughter, the said MARIA LUCY
CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs. Bernard Daney), now residing as aforesaid at No. 665 Rodger Young Village,
Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., all the income from the rest, remainder, and residue of my property and estate,
real, personal and/or mixed, of whatsoever kind or character, and wheresoever situated, of which I may be
possessed at my death and which may have come to me from any source whatsoever, during her lifetime: ....
It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions that the executor in his final account and project of
partition ratified the payment of only P3,600 to Helen Christensen Garcia and proposed that the residue of the
estate be transferred to his daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen Christensen Garcia, insofar as it
deprives her (Helen) of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child, she having been declared by Us in G.R.
Nos. L-11483-84 an acknowledged natural child of the deceased Edward E. Christensen. The legal grounds of
opposition are (a) that the distribution should be governed by the laws of the Philippines, and (b) that said order
of distribution is contrary thereto insofar as it denies to Helen Christensen, one of two acknowledged natural
children, one-half of the estate in full ownership. In amplification of the above grounds it was alleged that the
law that should govern the estate of the deceased Christensen should not be the internal law of California alone,
but the entire law thereof because several foreign elements are involved, that the forum is the Philippines and
even if the case were decided in California, Section 946 of the California Civil Code, which requires that the
domicile of the decedent should apply, should be applicable. It was also alleged that Maria Helen Christensen
having been declared an acknowledged natural child of the decedent, she is deemed for all purposes legitimate
from the time of her birth.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the State of
California at the time of his death, the successional rights and intrinsic validity of the provisions in his will are
to be governed by the law of California, in accordance with which a testator has the right to dispose of his
property in the way he desires, because the right of absolute dominion over his property is sacred and inviolable
(In re McDaniel's Estate, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952, and In re Kaufman, 117 Cal. 286, 49 Pac. 192,
cited in page 179, Record on Appeal). Oppositor Maria Helen Christensen, through counsel, filed various
motions for reconsideration, but these were denied. Hence, this appeal.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
The most important assignments of error are as follows:
Ichanrobles virtual law library
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME
COURT THAT HELEN IS THE ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILD OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN
AND, CONSEQUENTLY, IN DEPRIVING HER OF HER JUST SHARE IN THE INHERITANCE.
IIchanrobles virtual law library
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY IGNORING AND/OR FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THE
EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL FACTORS, ELEMENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES CALLING FOR THE
APPLICATION OF INTERNAL LAW.
IIIchanrobles virtual law library
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW,
PARTICULARLY UNDER THE RENVOI DOCTRINE, THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE
TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED
EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY THE LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINES.
IVchanrobles virtual law library
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE SCHEDULE OF DISTRIBUTION
SUBMITTED BY THE EXECUTOR IS CONTRARY TO THE PHILIPPINE LAWS.
Vchanrobles virtual law library
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT UNDER THE PHILIPPINE LAWS HELEN
CHRISTENSEN GARCIA IS ENTITLED TO ONE-HALF (1/2) OF THE ESTATE IN FULL OWNERSHIP.
There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the State of California
at the time of his death. But there is also no question that at the time of his death he was domiciled in the
Philippines, as witness the following facts admitted by the executor himself in appellee's brief:
In the proceedings for admission of the will to probate, the facts of record show that the deceased Edward E.
Christensen was born on November 29, 1875 in New York City, N.Y., U.S.A.; his first arrival in the
Philippines, as an appointed school teacher, was on July 1, 1901, on board the U.S. Army Transport "Sheridan"
with Port of Embarkation as the City of San Francisco, in the State of California, U.S.A. He stayed in the
Philippines until 1904.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to the United States and stayed there for the following nine years
until 1913, during which time he resided in, and was teaching school in Sacramento,
California.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Mr. Christensen's next arrival in the Philippines was in July of the year 1913. However, in 1928, he again
departed the Philippines for the United States and came back here the following year, 1929. Some nine years
later, in 1938, he again returned to his own country, and came back to the Philippines the following year, 1939.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this
Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by
this stipulation of facts.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen was interned by the Japanese Military Forces in the Philippines
during World War II. Upon liberation, in April 1945, he left for the United States but returned to the Philippines
in December, 1945. Appellees Collective Exhibits "6", CFI Davao, Sp. Proc. 622, as Exhibits "AA", "BB" and
"CC-Daney"; Exhs. "MM", "MM-l", "MM-2-Daney" and p. 473, t.s.n., July 21, 1953.)chanrobles virtual law
library
In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen returned once more to California shortly after the making of his last will
and testament (now in question herein) which he executed at his lawyers' offices in Manila on March 5, 1951.
He died at the St. Luke's Hospital in the City of Manila on April 30, 1953. (pp. 2-3)
In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the deceased is the Philippines, we are persuaded by the fact
that he was born in New York, migrated to California and resided there for nine years, and since he came to the
Philippines in 1913 he returned to California very rarely and only for short visits (perhaps to relatives), and
considering that he appears never to have owned or acquired a home or properties in that state, which would
indicate that he would ultimately abandon the Philippines and make home in the State of California.
Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with many shades of meaning from mere temporary presence to the most
permanent abode. Generally, however, it is used to denote something more than mere physical presence.
(Goodrich on Conflict of Laws, p. 29)
As to his citizenship, however, We find that the citizenship that he acquired in California when he resided in
Sacramento, California from 1904 to 1913, was never lost by his stay in the Philippines, for the latter was a
territory of the United States (not a state) until 1946 and the deceased appears to have considered himself as a
citizen of California by the fact that when he executed his will in 1951 he declared that he was a citizen of that
State; so that he appears never to have intended to abandon his California citizenship by acquiring another. This
conclusion is in accordance with the following principle expounded by Goodrich in his Conflict of Laws.
The terms "'residence" and "domicile" might well be taken to mean the same thing, a place of permanent abode.
But domicile, as has been shown, has acquired a technical meaning. Thus one may be domiciled in a place
where he has never been. And he may reside in a place where he has no domicile. The man with two homes,
between which he divides his time, certainly resides in each one, while living in it. But if he went on business
which would require his presence for several weeks or months, he might properly be said to have sufficient
connection with the place to be called a resident. It is clear, however, that, if he treated his settlement as
continuing only for the particular business in hand, not giving up his former "home," he could not be a
domiciled New Yorker. Acquisition of a domicile of choice requires the exercise of intention as well as physical
presence. "Residence simply requires bodily presence of an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires
bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile." Residence, however, is a term
used with many shades of meaning, from the merest temporary presence to the most permanent abode, and it is
not safe to insist that any one use et the only proper one. (Goodrich, p. 29)
The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article 16 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines, which is as follows:
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is
situated.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount
of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national
law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country where said property may be found.
The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the meaning of the term "national
law" is used therein.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United States, each
state of the Union having its own private law applicable to its citizens only and in force only within the state.
The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted can not, therefore, possibly mean or
apply to any general American law. So it can refer to no other than the private law of the State of
California.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of personal property? The decision
of the court below, sustains the contention of the executor-appellee that under the California Probate Code, a
testator may dispose of his property by will in the form and manner he desires, citing the case of Estate of
McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952. But appellant invokes the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil
Code of California, which is as follows:
If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow the
person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile.
The existence of this provision is alleged in appellant's opposition and is not denied. We have checked it in the
California Civil Code and it is there. Appellee, on the other hand, relies on the case cited in the decision and
testified to by a witness. (Only the case of Kaufman is correctly cited.) It is argued on executor's behalf that as
the deceased Christensen was a citizen of the State of California, the internal law thereof, which is that given in
the abovecited case, should govern the determination of the validity of the testamentary provisions of
Christensen's will, such law being in force in the State of California of which Christensen was a citizen.
Appellant, on the other hand, insists that Article 946 should be applicable, and in accordance therewith and
following the doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the validity of the testamentary provision in question should
be referred back to the law of the decedent's domicile, which is the
Philippines.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been defined by various authors, thus:
The problem has been stated in this way: "When the Conflict of Laws rule of the forum refers a jural matter to a
foreign law for decision, is the reference to the purely internal rules of law of the foreign system; i.e., to the
totality of the foreign law minus its Conflict of Laws rules?"chanrobles virtual law library
On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The Michigan court chose to accept the renvoi, that is, applied the
Conflict of Laws rule of Illinois which referred the matter back to Michigan law. But once having determined
the the Conflict of Laws principle is the rule looked to, it is difficult to see why the reference back should not
have been to Michigan Conflict of Laws. This would have resulted in the "endless chain of references" which
has so often been criticized be legal writers. The opponents of the renvoi would have looked merely to the
internal law of Illinois, thus rejecting the renvoi or the reference back. Yet there seems no compelling logical
reason why the original reference should be the internal law rather than to the Conflict of Laws rule. It is true
that such a solution avoids going on a merry-go-round, but those who have accepted the renvoi theory avoid
this inextricabilis circulas by getting off at the second reference and at that point applying internal law. Perhaps
the opponents of the renvoi are a bit more consistent for they look always to internal law as the rule of
reference.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the objectors to the renvoi plead that greater uniformity will result
from adoption of their respective views. And still more strange is the fact that the only way to achieve
uniformity in this choice-of-law problem is if in the dispute the two states whose laws form the legal basis of
the litigation disagree as to whether the renvoi should be accepted. If both reject, or both accept the doctrine, the
result of the litigation will vary with the choice of the forum. In the case stated above, had the Michigan court
rejected the renvoi, judgment would have been against the woman; if the suit had been brought in the Illinois
courts, and they too rejected the renvoi, judgment would be for the woman. The same result would happen,
though the courts would switch with respect to which would hold liability, if both courts accepted
the renvoi.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory in two instances: where the title to land is in question, and where the
validity of a decree of divorce is challenged. In these cases the Conflict of Laws rule of the situs of the land, or
the domicile of the parties in the divorce case, is applied by the forum, but any further reference goes only to the
internal law. Thus, a person's title to land, recognized by the situs, will be recognized by every court; and every
divorce, valid by the domicile of the parties, will be valid everywhere. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 7, pp.
13-14.)chanrobles virtual law library
X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate, domiciled in France, leaving movable property in Massachusetts,
England, and France. The question arises as to how this property is to be distributed among X's next of
kin.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Assume (1) that this question arises in a Massachusetts court. There the rule of the conflict of laws as to
intestate succession to movables calls for an application of the law of the deceased's last domicile. Since by
hypothesis X's last domicile was France, the natural thing for the Massachusetts court to do would be to turn to
French statute of distributions, or whatever corresponds thereto in French law, and decree a distribution
accordingly. An examination of French law, however, would show that if a French court were called upon to
determine how this property should be distributed, it would refer the distribution to the national law of the
deceased, thus applying the Massachusetts statute of distributions. So on the surface of things the Massachusetts
court has open to it alternative course of action: (a) either to apply the French law is to intestate succession, or
(b) to resolve itself into a French court and apply the Massachusetts statute of distributions, on the assumption
that this is what a French court would do. If it accepts the so-called renvoi doctrine, it will follow the latter
course, thus applying its own law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented which the conflict-of-laws rule of the forum refers to a
foreign law, the conflict-of-laws rule of which, in turn, refers the matter back again to the law of the forum. This
is renvoi in the narrower sense. The German term for this judicial process is 'Ruckverweisung.'" (Harvard Law
Review, Vol. 31, pp. 523-571.)chanrobles virtual law library
After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign law is to be resorted to as governing a particular case, the
further question may arise: Are the rules as to the conflict of laws contained in such foreign law also to be
resorted to? This is a question which, while it has been considered by the courts in but a few instances, has been
the subject of frequent discussion by textwriters and essayists; and the doctrine involved has been descriptively
designated by them as the "Renvoyer" to send back, or the "Ruchversweisung", or the "Weiterverweisung",
since an affirmative answer to the question postulated and the operation of the adoption of the foreign law in
toto would in many cases result in returning the main controversy to be decided according to the law of the
forum. ... (16 C.J.S. 872.)chanrobles virtual law library
Another theory, known as the "doctrine of renvoi", has been advanced. The theory of the doctrine of renvoi is
that the court of the forum, in determining the question before it, must take into account the whole law of the
other jurisdiction, but also its rules as to conflict of laws, and then apply the law to the actual question which the
rules of the other jurisdiction prescribe. This may be the law of the forum. The doctrine of the renvoi has
generally been repudiated by the American authorities. (2 Am. Jur. 296)
The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been defined and the reasons for its application in a country
explained by Prof. Lorenzen in an article in the Yale Law Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-1918, pp. 529-531. The
pertinent parts of the article are quoted herein below:
The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the rules of the conflict of laws are to be understood as
incorporating not only the ordinary or internal law of the foreign state or country, but its rules of the conflict of
laws as well. According to this theory 'the law of a country' means the whole of its law.
xxx xxx x x xchanrobles virtual law library
Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the Institute of International Law, at Neuchatel, in 1900, in the
form of the following theses:chanrobles virtual law library
(1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as regards the application of foreign
laws.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
(2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary exists, the court shall respect:
(a) The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims the right to bind its nationals abroad as regards their
personal statute, and desires that said personal statute shall be determined by the law of the domicile, or even by
the law of the place where the act in question occurred.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
(b) The decision of two or more foreign systems of law, provided it be certain that one of them is necessarily
competent, which agree in attributing the determination of a question to the same system of law.
xxx xxx x x xchanrobles virtual law library
If, for example, the English law directs its judge to distribute the personal estate of an Englishman who has died
domiciled in Belgium in accordance with the law of his domicile, he must first inquire whether the law of
Belgium would distribute personal property upon death in accordance with the law of domicile, and if he finds
that the Belgian law would make the distribution in accordance with the law of nationality - that is the English
law - he must accept this reference back to his own law.
We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, while the rule applied in In re
Kaufman, Supra, its internal law. If the law on succession and the conflict of laws rules of California are to be
enforced jointly, each in its own intended and appropriate sphere, the principle cited In re Kaufman should acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
apply to citizens living in the State, but Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens as are not domiciled in library
California but in other jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to the law of the domicile in the
determination of matters with foreign element involved is in accord with the general principle of American law The Philippine cases (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156; Riera vs. Palmaroli, 40 Phil. 105; Miciano vs.
that the domiciliary law should govern in most matters or rights which follow the person of the owner. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867; Babcock Templeton vs. Rider Babcock, 52 Phil. 130; and Gibbs vs. Government, 59 Phil.
293.) cited by appellees to support the decision can not possibly apply in the case at bar, for two important
When a man dies leaving personal property in one or more states, and leaves a will directing the manner of reasons, i.e., the subject in each case does not appear to be a citizen of a state in the United States but with
distribution of the property, the law of the state where he was domiciled at the time of his death will be looked domicile in the Philippines, and it does not appear in each case that there exists in the state of which the subject
to in deciding legal questions about the will, almost as completely as the law of situs is consulted in questions is a citizen, a law similar to or identical with Art. 946 of the California Civil
about the devise of land. It is logical that, since the domiciliary rules control devolution of the personal estate in Code.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
case of intestate succession, the same rules should determine the validity of an attempted testamentary
dispostion of the property. Here, also, it is not that the domiciliary has effect beyond the borders of the We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen of California, is the Philippines, the
domiciliary state. The rules of the domicile are recognized as controlling by the Conflict of Laws rules at the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child, the appellant, should be
situs property, and the reason for the recognition as in the case of intestate succession, is the general governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the
convenience of the doctrine. The New York court has said on the point: 'The general principle that a dispostiton internal law of California..chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
of a personal property, valid at the domicile of the owner, is valid anywhere, is one of the universal application.
It had its origin in that international comity which was one of the first fruits of civilization, and it this age, when
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case returned to the lower court with
business intercourse and the process of accumulating property take but little notice of boundary lines, the
instructions that the partition be made as the Philippine law on succession provides. Judgment reversed, with
practical wisdom and justice of the rule is more apparent than ever. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 164, pp. costs against appellees.
442-443.)
Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out as the national law is the
Bengzon, C.J., took no part.
internal law of California. But as above explained the laws of California have prescribed two sets of laws for its
citizens, one for residents therein and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions. Reason demands that
We should enforce the California internal law prescribed for its citizens residing therein, and enforce the 23. Baksh vs CA G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993
conflict of laws rules for the citizens domiciled abroad. If we must enforce the law of California as in comity we
are bound to go, as so declared in Article 16 of our Civil Code, then we must enforce the law of California in Republic of the Philippines
accordance with the express mandate thereof and as above explained, i.e., apply the internal law for residents SUPREME COURT
therein, and its conflict-of-laws rule for those domiciled abroad.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual Manila
law library
THIRD DIVISION
It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if there is no law to the contrary in the place where the property
is situated" in Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and
that the law to the contrary in the Philippines is the provision in said Article 16 that the national law of the
deceased should govern. This contention can not be sustained. As explained in the various authorities cited G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993
above the national law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in the California
Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the reference or return of the question to the law of the testator's
GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner,
domicile. The conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when a
vs.
decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The court
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T. GONZALES, respondents.
of the domicile can not and should not refer the case back to California; such action would leave the issue
incapable of determination because the case will then be like a football, tossed back and forth between the two
states, between the country of which the decedent was a citizen and the country of his domicile. The Philippine Public Attorney's Office for petitioner.
court must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if the question
has to be decided, especially as the application of the internal law of California provides no legitime for children Corleto R. Castro for private respondent.
while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines, makes natural children legally
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to review and set aside the
Decision1 of the respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 24256 which affirmed in toto the 16 October
1939 Decision of Branch 38 (Lingayen) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pangasinan in Civil Case No.
16503. Presented is the issue of whether or not damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on
the basis of Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The antecedents of this case are not complicated:
On 27 October 1987, private respondent, without the assistance of counsel, filed with the aforesaid trial court a
complaint2 for damages against the petitioner for the alleged violation of their agreement to get married. She
alleges in said complaint that: she is twenty-two (22) years old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral
character and reputation duly respected in her community; petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen
residing at the Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange student taking a medical course at
the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City; before 20 August 1987, the latter courted and proposed to
marry her; she accepted his love on the condition that they would get married; they therefore agreed to get
married after the end of the school semester, which was in October of that year; petitioner then visited the
private respondent's parents in Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan to secure their approval to the marriage; sometime
in 20 August 1987, the petitioner forced her to live with him in the Lozano Apartments; she was a virgin before
she began living with him; a week before the filing of the complaint, petitioner's attitude towards her started to
change; he maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a result of such maltreatment, she sustained injuries; during
a confrontation with a representative of the barangay captain of Guilig a day before the filing of the complaint,
petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and; the petitioner is
already married to someone living in Bacolod City. Private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the
petitioner to pay her damages in the amount of not less than P45,000.00, reimbursement for actual expenses
amounting to P600.00, attorney's fees and costs, and granting her such other relief and remedies as may be just
and equitable. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 16503.
3
In his Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner admitted only the personal circumstances of the parties as averred
in the complaint and denied the rest of the allegations either for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to the truth thereof or because the true facts are those alleged as his Special and Affirmative
Defenses. He thus claimed that he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married with the private
respondent; he neither sought the consent and approval of her parents nor forced her to live in his apartment; he
did not maltreat her, but only told her to stop coming to his place because he discovered that she had deceived
him by stealing his money and passport; and finally, no confrontation took place with a representative of the
barangay captain. Insisting, in his Counterclaim, that the complaint is baseless and unfounded and that as a
result thereof, he was unnecessarily dragged into court and compelled to incur expenses, and has suffered
mental anxiety and a besmirched reputation, he prayed for an award of P5,000.00 for miscellaneous expenses
and P25,000.00 as moral damages.
After conducting a pre-trial on 25 January 1988, the trial court issued a Pre-Trial Order4 embodying the
stipulated facts which the parties had agreed upon, to wit:
1. That the plaintiff is single and resident (sic) of Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, while the
defendant is single, Iranian citizen and resident (sic) of Lozano Apartment, Guilig, Dagupan
City since September 1, 1987 up to the present;
2. That the defendant is presently studying at Lyceum Northwestern, Dagupan City, College
of Medicine, second year medicine proper;
3. That the plaintiff is (sic) an employee at Mabuhay Luncheonette , Fernandez Avenue,
Dagupan City since July, 1986 up to the present and a (sic) high school graduate;
4. That the parties happened to know each other when the manager of the Mabuhay
Luncheonette, Johhny Rabino introduced the defendant to the plaintiff on August 3, 1986.
After trial on the merits, the lower court, applying Article 21 of the Civil Code, rendered on 16 October 1989 a
decision5 favoring the private respondent. The petitioner was thus ordered to pay the latter damages and
attorney's fees; the dispositive portion of the decision reads:
IN THE LIGHT of the foregoing consideration, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendant.
1. Condemning (sic) the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of twenty thousand
(P20,000.00) pesos as moral damages.
2. Condemning further the defendant to play the plaintiff the sum of three thousand
(P3,000.00) pesos as atty's fees and two thousand (P2,000.00) pesos at (sic) litigation
expenses and to pay the costs.
3. All other claims are denied.6
The decision is anchored on the trial court's findings and conclusions that (a) petitioner and private respondent
were lovers, (b) private respondent is not a woman of loose morals or questionable virtue who readily submits
to sexual advances, (c) petitioner, through machinations, deceit and false pretenses, promised to marry private
respondent, d) because of his persuasive promise to marry her, she allowed herself to be deflowered by him, (e)
by reason of that deceitful promise, private respondent and her parents — in accordance with Filipino customs
and traditions — made some preparations for the wedding that was to be held at the end of October 1987 by
looking for pigs and chickens, inviting friends and relatives and contracting sponsors, (f) petitioner did not
fulfill his promise to marry her and (g) such acts of the petitioner, who is a foreigner and who has abused
Philippine hospitality, have offended our sense of morality, good customs, culture and traditions. The trial court
gave full credit to the private respondent's testimony because, inter alia, she would not have had the temerity
and courage to come to court and expose her honor and reputation to public scrutiny and ridicule if her claim
was false.7
The above findings and conclusions were culled from the detailed summary of the evidence for the private
respondent in the foregoing decision, digested by the respondent Court as follows:
 According to plaintiff, who claimed that she was a virgin at the time and that she never had a
boyfriend before, defendant started courting her just a few days after they first met. He later
proposed marriage to her several times and she accepted his love as well as his proposal of
marriage on August 20, 1987, on which same day he went with her to her hometown of
Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, as he wanted to meet her parents and inform them of their
relationship and their intention to get married. The photographs Exhs. "A" to "E" (and their
submarkings) of defendant with members of plaintiff's family or with plaintiff, were taken
that day. Also on that occasion, defendant told plaintiffs parents and brothers and sisters that
he intended to marry her during the semestral break in October, 1987, and because plaintiff's
parents thought he was good and trusted him, they agreed to his proposal for him to marry
their daughter, and they likewise allowed him to stay in their house and sleep with plaintiff
during the few days that they were in Bugallon. When plaintiff and defendant later returned to
Dagupan City, they continued to live together in defendant's apartment. However, in the early
days of October, 1987, defendant would tie plaintiff's hands and feet while he went to school,
and he even gave her medicine at 4 o'clock in the morning that made her sleep the whole day
and night until the following day. As a result of this live-in relationship, plaintiff became
pregnant, but defendant gave her some medicine to abort the fetus. Still plaintiff continued to
live with defendant and kept reminding him of his promise to marry her until he told her that
he could not do so because he was already married to a girl in Bacolod City. That was the
time plaintiff left defendant, went home to her parents, and thereafter consulted a lawyer who
accompanied her to the barangay captain in Dagupan City. Plaintiff, her lawyer, her
godmother, and a barangay tanod sent by the barangay captain went to talk to defendant to
still convince him to marry plaintiff, but defendant insisted that he could not do so because he
was already married to a girl in Bacolod City, although the truth, as stipulated by the parties at
the pre-trial, is that defendant is still single.
Plaintiff's father, a tricycle driver, also claimed that after defendant had informed them of his
desire to marry Marilou, he already looked for sponsors for the wedding, started preparing for
the reception by looking for pigs and chickens, and even already invited many relatives and
friends to the forthcoming wedding. 8
Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the respondent Court of Appeals which docketed the case as CA-
G.R. CV No. 24256. In his Brief,9 he contended that the trial court erred (a) in not dismissing the case for lack
of factual and legal basis and (b) in ordering him to pay moral damages, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and
costs.
On 18 February 1991, respondent Court promulgated the challenged decision 10 affirming in toto the trial court's
ruling of 16 October 1989. In sustaining the trial court's findings of fact, respondent Court made the following
analysis:
First of all, plaintiff, then only 21 years old when she met defendant who was already 29 years
old at the time, does not appear to be a girl of loose morals. It is uncontradicted that she was a
virgin prior to her unfortunate experience with defendant and never had boyfriend. She is, as
described by the lower court, a barrio lass "not used and accustomed to trend of modern urban
life", and certainly would (sic) not have allowed
"herself to be deflowered by the defendant if there was no persuasive promise made by the
defendant to marry her." In fact, we agree with the lower court that plaintiff and defendant
must have been sweethearts or so the plaintiff must have thought because of the deception of
defendant, for otherwise, she would not have allowed herself to be photographed with
defendant in public in so (sic) loving and tender poses as those depicted in the pictures Exhs.
"D" and "E". We cannot believe, therefore, defendant's pretense that plaintiff was a nobody to
him except a waitress at the restaurant where he usually ate. Defendant in fact admitted that
he went to plaintiff's hometown of Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, at least thrice; at (sic) the
town fiesta on February 27, 1987 (p. 54, tsn May 18, 1988), at (sic) a beach party together
with the manager and employees of the Mabuhay Luncheonette on March 3, 1987 (p. 50,
tsn id.), and on April 1, 1987 when he allegedly talked to plaintiff's mother who told him to
marry her daughter (pp. 55-56, tsn id.). Would defendant have left Dagupan City where he
was involved in the serious study of medicine to go to plaintiff's hometown in Bañaga,
Bugallon, unless there was (sic) some kind of special relationship between them? And this
special relationship must indeed have led to defendant's insincere proposal of marriage to
plaintiff, communicated not only to her but also to her parents, and (sic) Marites Rabino, the
owner of the restaurant where plaintiff was working and where defendant first proposed
marriage to her, also knew of this love affair and defendant's proposal of marriage to plaintiff,
which she declared was the reason why plaintiff resigned from her job at the restaurant after
she had accepted defendant's proposal (pp. 6-7, tsn March 7, 1988).
Upon the other hand, appellant does not appear to be a man of good moral character and must
think so low and have so little respect and regard for Filipino women that he openly admitted
that when he studied in Bacolod City for several years where he finished his B.S. Biology
before he came to Dagupan City to study medicine, he had a common-law wife in Bacolod
City. In other words, he also lived with another woman in Bacolod City but did not marry that
woman, just like what he did to plaintiff. It is not surprising, then, that he felt so little
compunction or remorse in pretending to love and promising to marry plaintiff, a young,
innocent, trustful country girl, in order to satisfy his lust on her. 11
and then concluded:
In sum, we are strongly convinced and so hold that it was defendant-appellant's fraudulent and
deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her
virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he
would keep said promise, and it was likewise these (sic) fraud and deception on appellant's
part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to
their supposed marriage. And as these acts of appellant are palpably and undoubtedly against
morals, good customs, and public policy, and are even gravely and deeply derogatory and
insulting to our women, coming as they do from a foreigner who has been enjoying the
hospitality of our people and taking advantage of the opportunity to study in one of our
institutions of learning, defendant-appellant should indeed be made, under Art. 21 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, to compensate for the moral damages and injury that he had caused
plaintiff, as the lower court ordered him to do in its decision in this case. 12
Unfazed by his second defeat, petitioner filed the instant petition on 26 March 1991; he raises therein the single
issue of whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the case at bar. 13
It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21 is not applicable because he had not committed any moral wrong or
injury or violated any good custom or public policy; he has not professed love or proposed marriage to the
private respondent; and he has never maltreated her. He criticizes the trial court for liberally invoking Filipino
customs, traditions and culture, and ignoring the fact that since he is a foreigner, he is not conversant with such
Filipino customs, traditions and culture. As an Iranian Moslem, he is not familiar with Catholic and Christian
ways. He stresses that even if he had made a promise to marry, the subsequent failure to fulfill the same is
excusable or tolerable because of his Moslem upbringing; he then alludes to the Muslim Code which
purportedly allows a Muslim to take four (4) wives and concludes that on the basis thereof, the trial court erred
in ruling that he does not posses good moral character. Moreover, his controversial "common law life" is now
his legal wife as their marriage had been solemnized in civil ceremonies in the Iranian Embassy. As to his
unlawful cohabitation with the private respondent, petitioner claims that even if responsibility could be pinned
on him for the live-in relationship, the private respondent should also be faulted for consenting to an illicit
arrangement. Finally, petitioner asseverates that even if it was to be assumed arguendo that he had professed his
love to the private respondent and had also promised to marry her, such acts would not be actionable in view of
the special circumstances of the case. The mere breach of promise is not actionable. 14
On 26 August 1991, after the private respondent had filed her Comment to the petition and the petitioner had
filed his Reply thereto, this Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their
respective Memoranda, which they subsequently complied with.
As may be gleaned from the foregoing summation of the petitioner's arguments in support of his thesis, it is
clear that questions of fact, which boil down to the issue of the credibility of witnesses, are also raised. It is the
rule in this jurisdiction that appellate courts will not disturb the trial court's findings as to the credibility of
witnesses, the latter court having heard the witnesses and having had the opportunity to observe closely their
deportment and manner of testifying, unless the trial court had plainly overlooked facts of substance or value
which, if considered, might affect the result of the case. 15
Petitioner has miserably failed to convince Us that both the appellate and trial courts had overlooked any fact of
substance or values which could alter the result of the case.
Equally settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence
introduced by the parties before the lower court. There are, however, recognized exceptions to this rule. Thus,
in Medina vs.Asistio, Jr., 16 this Court took the time, again, to enumerate these exceptions:
xxx xxx xxx
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or
conjectures (Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257 [1953]); (2) When the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurb or impossible (Luna v. Linatok, 74 Phil. 15 [1942]); (3) Where
there is a grave abuse of discretion (Buyco v. People, 95 Phil. 453 [1955]); (4) When the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts (Cruz v. Sosing,
L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953); (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting (Casica v. Villaseca, L-
9590 Ap. 30, 1957; unrep.) (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went
beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellate and
appellee (Evangelista v. Alto Surety and Insurance Co., 103 Phil. 401 [1958]);
(7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court (Garcia v.
Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 622 [1970]; Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]); (8)
When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they
are based (Ibid.,); (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main
and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents (Ibid.,); and (10) The finding of fact of
the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by
the evidence on record (Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 242 [1970]).
Petitioner has not endeavored to joint out to Us the existence of any of the above quoted exceptions in this case.
Consequently, the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts must be respected.
And now to the legal issue.
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. 17 Congress deliberately
eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the provisions that would have made it so. The reason therefor
is set forth in the report of the Senate Committees on the Proposed Civil Code, from which We quote:
The elimination of this chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to marry is not actionable
has been definitely decided in the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia. 18 The history of breach of
promise suits in the United States and in England has shown that no other action lends itself
more readily to abuse by designing women and unscrupulous men. It is this experience which
has led to the abolition of rights of action in the so-called Heart Balm suits in many of the
American states. . . . 19
This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is designed to expand the concept of
torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral
wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books. 20
As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report:
But the Code Commission had gone farther than the sphere of wrongs defined or determined
by positive law. Fully sensible that there are countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so
many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and
moral injury, the Commission has deemed it necessary, in the interest of justice, to
incorporate in the proposed Civil Code the following rule:
Art. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: "A" seduces the nineteen-year
old daughter of "X". A promise of marriage either has not been made, or can not be proved.
The girl becomes pregnant. Under the present laws, there is no crime, as the girl is above
nineteen years of age. Neither can any civil action for breach of promise of marriage be filed.
 Therefore, though the grievous moral wrong has been committed, and though the girl and
family have suffered incalculable moral damage, she and her parents cannot bring action for
damages. But under the proposed article, she and her parents would have such a right of
action.
Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is approved, would vouchsafe adequate
legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for human
foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes. 21
Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict thus:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.
is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of willfulness or intent. Quasi-delict,
known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law concept while torts is an Anglo-
American or common law concept. Torts is much broader than culpa aquiliana because it includes not
only negligence, but international criminal acts as well such as assault and battery, false imprisonment
and deceit. In the general scheme of the Philippine legal system envisioned by the Commission
responsible for drafting the New Civil Code, intentional and malicious acts, with certain exceptions,
are to be governed by the Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or omissions are to be covered by
Article 2176 of the Civil Code. 22 In between these opposite spectrums are injurious acts which, in the
absence of Article 21, would have been beyond redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is even
postulated that together with Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly broadened the
scope of the law on civil wrongs; it has become much more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-
American law on torts. 23
In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion, and so hold, that where a man's
promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation
to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual
congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle
scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act,
could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of
the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is
essential, however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy.
In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive protestations of
love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live
with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise these fraud and
deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory
to their supposed marriage." 24 In short, the private respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished
possession of every single Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral seduction — the kind illustrated by
the Code Commission in its example earlier adverted to. The petitioner could not be held liable for criminal
seduction punished under either Article 337 or Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code because the private
respondent was above eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the seduction.
Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21 may be applied in a breach of promise to marry
where the woman is a victim of moral seduction. Thus, in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals,25 this Court
denied recovery of damages to the woman because:
. . . we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of seduction, not only
because he is approximately ten (10) years younger than the complainant — who was around
thirty-six (36) years of age, and as highly enlightened as a former high school teacher and a
life insurance agent are supposed to be — when she became intimate with petitioner, then a
mere apprentice pilot, but, also, because the court of first instance found that, complainant
"surrendered herself" to petitioner because, "overwhelmed by her love" for him, she "wanted
to bind" him by having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy.
In Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, 26 while this Court likewise hinted at possible recovery if there had been
moral seduction, recovery was eventually denied because We were not convinced that such seduction existed.
The following enlightening disquisition and conclusion were made in the said case:
The Court of Appeals seem to have overlooked that the example set forth in the Code
Commission's memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who had been seduced. The
essential feature is seduction, that in law is more than mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of
a promise of marriage; it connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or
abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded (U.S. vs.
Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121; U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595).
It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that —
To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or
inducement and the woman must yield because of the promise or other
inducement. If she consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is
from mutual desire, there is no seduction (43 Cent. Dig. tit. Seduction, par.
56) She must be induced to depart from the path of virtue by the use of
some species of arts, persuasions and wiles, which are calculated to have
and do have that effect, and which result in her person to ultimately
submitting her person to the sexual embraces of her seducer (27 Phil. 123).
And in American Jurisprudence we find:
On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the enticement, persuasion or
deception is the essence of the injury; and a mere proof of intercourse is
insufficient to warrant a recovery.
 Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out of sexual
desire of curiosity of the female, and the defendant merely affords her the
needed opportunity for the commission of the act. It has been emphasized
that to allow a recovery in all such cases would tend to the demoralization
of the female sex, and would be a reward for unchastity by which a class of
adventuresses would be swift to profit. (47 Am. Jur. 662)
xxx xxx xxx
Over and above the partisan allegations, the fact stand out that for one whole year, from 1958
to 1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age, maintain intimate sexual relations with
appellant, with repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of
seduction. Plainly there is here voluntariness and mutual passion; for had the appellant been
deceived, had she surrendered exclusively because of the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles
of the defendant, she would not have again yielded to his embraces, much less for one year,
without exacting early fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage, and would have cut
short all sexual relations upon finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his defendant did
not intend to fulfill his promise. Hence, we conclude that no case is made under article 21 of
the Civil Code, and no other cause of action being alleged, no error was committed by the
Court of First Instance in dismissing the complaint. 27
In his annotations on the Civil Code, 28 Associate Justice Edgardo L. Paras, who recently retired from this
Court, opined that in a breach of promise to marry where there had been carnal knowledge, moral damages may
be recovered:
. . . if there be criminal or moral seduction, but not if the intercourse was due to mutual lust.
(Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals,
L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960; Estopa vs. Piansay, Jr., L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960; Batarra vs. Marcos,
7 Phil. 56 (sic); Beatriz Galang vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-17248, Jan. 29, 1962). (In other
words, if the CAUSE be the promise to marry, and the EFFECT be the carnal knowledge,
there is a chance that there was criminal or moral seduction, hence recovery of moral
damages will prosper. If it be the other way around, there can be no recovery of moral
damages, because here mutual lust has intervened). . . .
together with "ACTUAL damages, should there be any, such as the expenses for the wedding
presentations (See Domalagon v. Bolifer, 33 Phil. 471).
Senator Arturo M. Tolentino 29 is also of the same persuasion:
It is submitted that the rule in Batarra vs. Marcos, 30 still subsists, notwithstanding the
incorporation of the present article31 in the Code. The example given by the Code
Commission is correct, if there was seduction, not necessarily in the legal sense, but in the
vulgar sense of deception. But when the sexual act is accomplished without any deceit or
qualifying circumstance of abuse of authority or influence, but the woman, already of age, has
knowingly given herself to a man, it cannot be said that there is an injury which can be the
basis for indemnity.
But so long as there is fraud, which is characterized by willfulness (sic), the action lies. The
court, however, must weigh the degree of fraud, if it is sufficient to deceive the woman under
the circumstances, because an act which would deceive a girl sixteen years of age may not
constitute deceit as to an experienced woman thirty years of age. But so long as there is a
wrongful act and a resulting injury, there should be civil liability, even if the act is not
punishable under the criminal law and there should have been an acquittal or dismissal of the
criminal case for that reason.
We are unable to agree with the petitioner's alternative proposition to the effect that granting, for argument's
sake, that he did promise to marry the private respondent, the latter is nevertheless also at fault. According to
him, both parties are in pari delicto; hence, pursuant to Article 1412(1) of the Civil Code and the doctrine laid
down in Batarra vs. Marcos, 32 the private respondent cannot recover damages from the petitioner. The latter
even goes as far as stating that if the private respondent had "sustained any injury or damage in their
relationship, it is primarily because of her own doing, 33 for:
. . . She is also interested in the petitioner as the latter will become a doctor sooner or later.
Take notice that she is a plain high school graduate and a mere employee . . . (Annex "C") or
a waitress (TSN, p. 51, January 25, 1988) in a luncheonette and without doubt, is in need of a
man who can give her economic security. Her family is in dire need of financial assistance.
(TSN, pp. 51-53, May 18, 1988). And this predicament prompted her to accept a proposition
that may have been offered by the petitioner. 34
These statements reveal the true character and motive of the petitioner. It is clear that he harbors a
condescending, if not sarcastic, regard for the private respondent on account of the latter's ignoble birth, inferior
educational background, poverty and, as perceived by him, dishonorable employment. Obviously then, from the
very beginning, he was not at all moved by good faith and an honest motive. Marrying with a woman so
circumstances could not have even remotely occurred to him. Thus, his profession of love and promise to marry
were empty words directly intended to fool, dupe, entice, beguile and deceive the poor woman into believing
that indeed, he loved her and would want her to be his life's partner. His was nothing but pure lust which he
wanted satisfied by a Filipina who honestly believed that by accepting his proffer of love and proposal of
marriage, she would be able to enjoy a life of ease and security. Petitioner clearly violated the Filipino's concept
of morality and brazenly defied the traditional respect Filipinos have for their women. It can even be said that
the petitioner committed such deplorable acts in blatant disregard of Article 19 of the Civil Code which directs
every person to act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his obligations.
No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws, customs and traditions.
The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for while indeed, the private respondent may not have been
impelled by the purest of intentions, she eventually submitted to the petitioner in sexual congress not out of lust,
but because of moral seduction. In fact, it is apparent that she had qualms of conscience about the entire episode
for as soon as she found out that the petitioner was not going to marry her after all, she left him. She is not,
therefore, in pari delicto with the petitioner. Pari delicto means "in equal fault; in a similar offense or crime;
equal in guilt or in legal fault." 35At most, it could be conceded that she is merely in delicto.
Equity often interferes for the relief of the less guilty of the parties, where his transgression
has been brought about by the imposition of undue influence of the party on whom the burden
of the original wrong principally rests, or where his consent to the transaction was itself
procured by
fraud. 36
In Mangayao vs. Lasud, 37 We declared:
Appellants likewise stress that both parties being at fault, there should be no action by one
against the other (Art. 1412, New Civil Code). This rule, however, has been interpreted as
applicable only where the fault on both sides is, more or less, equivalent. It does not apply
where one party is literate or intelligent and the other one is not. (c.f. Bough vs. Cantiveros,
40 Phil. 209).
We should stress, however, that while We find for the private respondent, let it not be said that this Court
condones the deplorable behavior of her parents in letting her and the petitioner stay together in the same room
in their house after giving approval to their marriage. It is the solemn duty of parents to protect the honor of
their daughters and infuse upon them the higher values of morality and dignity.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the challenged decision, the instant petition is hereby DENIED,
with costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Bidin, Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., is on leave.
# Footnotes
1 Annex "G" of Petition; Rollo, 53-62. Per Associate Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, concurred
in by Associate Justices Jose C. Campos, Jr. and Jaime M. Lantin.
2 Annex "A" of Petition; Rollo, 20-22.
3 Annex "B" of Petition; Rollo, 23-24.
4 Annex "C", Id.; Id., 25.
5 Annex "D" of Petition; Rollo, 26-33. Per Judge Antonio M. Belen.
6 Id., 33.
7 Rollo, 31-33.
8 Rollo, 54-55.
9 Exhibit "E" of Petition; Rollo, 34-50.
10 Annex "G", Id.; Id.; 53-62.
11 Rollo, 58-59.
12 Rollo, 61.
13 Id., 11.
14 In support thereof, he cites Despi vs. Aliosco, [CA] 64 O.G.; Wassmer vs. Velez, 12
SCRA 648 [1964]; Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, 109 Phil. 629 [1960]; and Estopa vs.
Piansay, 109 Phil. 640 [1960].
15 People vs. Garcia, 89 SCRA 440 [1979]; People vs. Bautista, 92 SCRA 465 [1979]; People
vs. Abejuela, 92 SCRA 503 [1979]; People vs. Arciaga, 98 SCRA 1 [1980]; People vs.
Marzan, 128 SCRA 203 [1984]; People vs. Alcid, 135 SCRA 280 [1985]; People vs. Sanchez,
199 SCRA 414 [1991]; and People vs. Atilano, 204 SCRA 278 [1991].
16 191 SCRA 218 [1990], footnote omitted; see also, Remalante vs. Tibe, 158 SCRA 138
[1988].
17 Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, 109 Phil. 629 [1960]; Estopa vs. Piansay, 109 Phil. 640
[1960].
18 58 Phil. 866 [1933].
19 Congressional Record, vol. IV, No. 79, Thursday, 14 May 1949, 2352.
20 Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals, 83 SCRA 237 [1978].
21 Report of the Code Commission, 39-40. This passage is quoted, except for the last
paragraph, in Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, 18 SCRA 994, 996-997 [1966]; the Article 23
referred to is now Article 21.
 22 Report of the Code Commission, 161-162. G.R. No. L-39110 November 28, 1933

23 TOLENTINO, A.M., Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the ANTONIA L. DE JESUS, ET AL., plaintiff-appellant,
Philippines, vol. 1, 1985 ed., 72. vs.
CESAR SYQUIA, defendant-appellant.
24. Rollo, 61.
Jose Sotelo for plaintiffs-appellants.
25. Supra. Vicente J. Francisco for defendant-appellant.

26. Supra.

27 At pages 997-999.
STREET, J.:
28 Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated, vol. I, Eleventh ed., (1984), 91-92.
This action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila by Antonia Loanco de Jesus in her own right
29 Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, vol. 1, 1985 ed., and by her mother, Pilar Marquez, as next friend and representative of Ismael and Pacita Loanco, infants,
children of the first-named plaintiff, for the purpose of recovering from the defendant, Cesar Syquia, the sum of
76-77, omitting footnotes.
thirty thousand pesos as damages resulting to the first-named plaintiff from breach of a marriage promise, to
compel the defendant to recognize Ismael and Pacita as natural children begotten by him with Antonia, and to
30 7 Phil. 156 [1906]. pay for the maintenance of the three the amount of five hundred pesos per month, together with costs. Upon
hearing the cause, after answer of the defendant, the trial court erred a decree requiring the defendant to
31 Article 21. recognize Ismael Loanco as his natural child and to pay maintenance for him at the rate of fifty pesos per
month, with costs, dismissing the action in other respects. From this judgment both parties appealed, the
32 Supra. plaintiffs from so much of the decision as denied part of the relief sought by them, and the defendant from that
feature of the decision which required him to recognize Ismael Loanco and to pay for his maintenance.
33 Rollo, 16.
At the time with which we are here concerned, the defendant, Cesar Syquia was of the age of twenty-three
34 Id., 16-17. years, and an unmarried scion of the prominent family in Manila, being possessed of a considerable property in
his own right. His brother-in-law, Vicente Mendoza is the owner of a barber shop in Tondo, where the
defendant was accustomed to go for tonsorial attention. In the month of June Antonia Loanco, a likely
35 Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth ed., 1004.
unmarried girl of the age of twenty years, was taken on as cashier in this barber shop. Syquia was not long in
making her acquaintance and amorous relations resulted, as a consequence of which Antonia was gotten with
36 37 Am Jur 2d, 401, omitting citations. child and a baby boy was born on June 17, 1931. The defendant was a constant visitor at the home of Antonia in
the early months of her pregnancy, and in February, 1931, he wrote and placed in her hands a note directed to
37 11 SCRA 158 [1964]; see also, Liguez vs. Court of Appeals 102 Phil. 577 [1975]. the padre who has expected to christen the baby. This note was as follows:

24. De Jesus vs Syguia G.R. No. L-39110 November 28, 1933 Saturday, 1:30 p. m.
February 14, 1931
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT Rev. FATHER,
Manila
The baby due in June is mine and I should like for my name to be given to it.
EN BANC
CESAR SYQUIA
The occasion for writing this note was that the defendant was on the eve of his departure on a trip to China and
Japan; and while he was abroad on this visit he wrote several letters to Antonia showing a paternal interest in
the situation that had developed with her, and cautioning her to keep in good condition in order
that "junior" (meaning the baby to be, "Syquia, Jr.") might be strong, and promising to return to them soon. The
baby arrived at the time expected, and all necessary anticipatory preparations were made by the defendant. To
this he employed his friend Dr. Crescenciano Talavera to attend at the birth, and made arrangements for the
hospitalization of the mother in Saint Joseph's Hospital of the City of Manila, where she was cared for during
confinement.
When Antonio was able to leave the hospital, Syquia took her, with her mother and the baby, to a house at No.
551 Camarines Street, Manila, where they lived together for about a year in regular family style, all household
expenses, including gas and electric light, being defrayed by Syquia. In course of time, however, the defendant's
ardor abated and, when Antonia began to show signs of a second pregnancy the defendant decamped, and he is
now married to another woman. A point that should here be noted is that when the time came for christening the
child, the defendant, who had charge of the arrangement for this ceremony, caused the name Ismael Loanco to
be given to him, instead of Cesar Syquia, Jr., as was at first planned.
The first question that is presented in the case is whether the note to the padre, quoted above, in connection with
the letters written by the defendant to the mother during pregnancy, proves an acknowledgment of paternity,
within the meaning of subsection 1 of article 135 of the Civil Code. Upon this point we have no hesitancy in
holding that the acknowledgment thus shown is sufficient. It is a universal rule of jurisprudence that a child,
upon being conceived, becomes a bearer of legal rights and capable of being dealt with as a living person. The
fact that it is yet unborn is no impediment to the acquisition of rights. The problem here presented of the
recognition of unborn child is really not different from that presented in the ordinary case of the recognition of a
child already born and bearing a specific name. Only the means and resources of identification are different.
Even a bequest to a living child requires oral evidence to connect the particular individual intended with the
name used.
It is contended however, in the present case that the words of description used in the writings before us are not
legally sufficient to indemnify the child now suing as Ismael Loanco. This contention is not, in our opinion,
well founded. The words of recognition contained in the note to the padre are not capable of two constructions.
They refer to a baby then conceived which was expected to be born in June and which would thereafter be
presented for christening. The baby came, and though it was in the end given the name of Ismael Loanco instead
of Cesar Syquia, Jr., its identity as the child which the defendant intended to acknowledge is clear. Any doubt
that might arise on this point is removed by the letters Exhibit F, G, H, and J. In these letters the defendant
makes repeated reference to junior as the baby which Antonia, to whom the letters were addressed, was then
carrying in her womb, and the writer urged Antonia to eat with good appetite in order that junior might be
vigorous. In the last letter (Exhibit J) written only a few days before the birth of the child, the defendant urged
her to take good care of herself and ofjunior also.
It seems to us that the only legal question that can here arise as to the sufficiency of acknowledgment is whether
the acknowledgment contemplated in subsection 1 of article 135 of the Civil Code must be made in a single
document or may be made in more than one document, of indubitable authenticity, written by the recognizing
father. Upon this point we are of the opinion that the recognition can be made out by putting together the
admissions of more than one document, supplementing the admission made in one letter by an admission or
admissions made in another. In the case before us the admission of paternity is contained in the note to
the padre and the other letters suffice to connect that admission with the child then being carried by Antonia L.
de Jesus. There is no requirement in the law that the writing shall be addressed to one, or any particular
individual. It is merely required that the writing shall be indubitable.
The second question that presents itself in this case is whether the trial court erred in holding that Ismael Loanco
had been in the uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural child, justified by the conduct of the father
himself, and that as a consequence, the defendant in this case should be compelled to acknowledge the said
Ismael Loanco, under No. 2 of article 135 of the Civil Code. The facts already stated are sufficient, in our
opinion, to justify the conclusion of the trial court on this point, and we may add here that our conclusion upon
the first branch of the case that the defendant had acknowledged this child in writings above referred to must be
taken in connection with the facts found by the court upon the second point. It is undeniable that from the birth
of this child the defendant supplied a home for it and the mother, in which they lived together with the
defendant. This situation continued for about a year, and until Antonia became enciente a second time, when the
idea entered the defendant's head of abandoning her. The law fixes no period during which a child must be in
the continuous possession of the status of a natural child; and the period in this case was long enough to evince
the father's resolution to concede the status. The circumstance that he abandoned the mother and child shortly
before this action was started is unimportant. The word "continuous" in subsection 2 of article 135 of the Civil
Code does not mean that the concession of status shall continue forever, but only that it shall not be of an
intermittent character while it continues.
What has been said disposes of the principal feature of the defendant's appeal. With respect to the appeal of the
plaintiffs, we are of the opinion that the trial court was right in refusing to give damages to the plaintiff, Antonia
Loanco, for supposed breach of promise to marry. Such promise is not satisfactorily proved, and we may add
that the action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover
money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise. This case exhibits none of the
features necessary to maintain such an action. Furthermore, there is no proof upon which a judgment could be
based requiring the defendant to recognize the second baby, Pacita Loanco.
Finally, we see no necessity or propriety in modifying the judgment as to the amount of the maintenance which
the trial court allowed to Ismael Loanco. And in this connection we merely point out that, as conditions change,
the Court of First Instance will have jurisdiction to modify the order as to the amount of the pension as
circumstances will require.
The judgment appealed from is in all respects affirmed, without costs. So ordered.
Malcolm, Abad Santos, Hull, Vickers, and butte, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions

VILLA-REAL, J., dissenting:
The majority opinion is predicated on two grounds: First, that the defendant-appellant Cesar Syquia has
expressly acknowledged his paternity of the child Ismael Loanco in an indubitable writing of his; and secondly,
that said child has enjoyed the uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural son of said defendant-appellant
Cesar Syquia, justified by his acts, as required by article 135 of the Civil Code.
The first conclusion is drawn from Exhibits C, F, G, H, and J.
Exhibit C, which is in the handwriting of any signed by the defendant-appellant Cesar Syquia, reads as follows:
Sabado, 1.30 p. m. — 14 febrero, 1931
Rev. PADRE:
La criatura que vendra el junio es mio y que yo quisiera mi nombre que se de a la criatura.
(Fdo.) CESAR SYQUIA
Exhibit F, G, H, and j, which are letters written by the said defendant-appellant Cesar Syquia to plaintiff-
appellee Antonia L. de Jesus prior to the birth of the child contain the following expressions:
Exhibit F, Feb. 18, 1931: "No hagas nada malo; ni manches mi nombre y el de junior tambien no lo manches. A
cuerdate muy bien Toni que es por ti y por junior volvere alli pronto. ..."
Exhibit G. Feb. 24, 1931: "Toni por favor cuida bien a junior eh? . ..."
Exhibit H, March 25, 1931: "Toni, cuida tu bien a junior y cuidate bien, y come tu mucho. ... ."
Exhibit J, June 1, 1931: "Cuidate bien y junior tambien . ..."
Article 135, number 1, provides as follows:
ART. 135. The father may be compelled to acknowledge his natural child in the following cases:
1. When an indisputable paper written by him, expressly acknowledging his paternity, is in existence.
Maresa (Codigo Civil, Vol. 1, page 596, 4th ed.) commenting on said article, says:
Con arreglo al articulo que comentamos, no puede haber cuestion acerca de si es posible admitir por
otro medio la prueba de la paternidad natural. Entendemos que no, porquel el articulo es terminante y
la intencion de la ley mas terminante aun. Se establecio en la base 5.a que "no se admitira investigacion
de la paternidad sino en los casos de delito, o cuando exista escrito del padre en el que conste su
voluntad indubitada de reconocer por suyo al hijo, deliberadamente expresada con ese fin, o cuando
medie posesion de estado", y esto mismo es lo que se ordena en el presente articulo.
No puede, pues, prosperar la demanda para obligar al padre al reconocimiento de un hijo natural,
aunque solo se limite a pedir alimentos, si no se funda en el reconocimiento expreso del padre hecho
por escrito, en la posesion constante de estado de hijo natural o en sentencia firme recaida en causa por
de delito violacin, estupro o rapto. El escrito y la sentencia habran de acompañarse a la demandada, y
no puede admitirse otra prueba que la conducente a justificar que el escrito es indubitadamente del
padre que en el reconozca su paternidad, o la relativa a los actos directos del mismo padre o de su
familia, que demuestren la posesion continua de dicho estado. Para la prueba de estos dos hechos
podran utilizarse todos los medios que permite la Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil, debiendo el juez
rechazar la que por cualquier otro concepto se dirija a la investigacion de la paternidad.
xxx xxx xxx
En cuanto al otro requisito de ser expreso el reconocimiento, tengase presente que no basta hacerlo por
incidencia; es indespensable que se consigne en el escrito la voluntad indubitada, clara y terminante del
padre, de reconocer por suyo al hijo, deliberadamente expresada con este fin, como se ordena an la
base 5.a antes citada, de las aprobadas por la Ley de 11 de mayo de 1888; de suerte que el escrito,
aunque contenga otros particulares, como sucede en los testamentos, ha de tener por objecto el
reconocimiento deliberado y expreso del hijo natural. No llena, pues, ese objecto la manifestacion que
incidentalmente haga el padre de ser hijo natural suyo la persona a quien se refiera, y mucho menos el
dar a una persona el titulo y tratamiento de hijo en cartas familiares. Sin embrago, en cada caso
decidiran los un modo suficientemente expresivo la paternidad, servira de base para acreditar, en union
con otros datos, la posesion contante del estado del hijo a los efectos de este articulo, y con arreglo a su
numero 2.º
Let it first be noted that the law prohibits the investigation of paternity (Borres and Barza vs. Municipality of
Panay, 42 Phil., 643; Donado vs. Menendez Donado, 55 Phil., 861). The only exceptions to this rule are those
established in article 135 of the Civil Code quoted above, the first of which is that the father may be compelled
to acknowledge his paternity, "When an indubitable writing of his exists in which he expressly acknowledge his
paternity." The writing that is required by said provision must be complete in itself and by itself, and must
contain all the statements that are necessary to constitute a full and clear acknowledgment by a father of his
paternity of a child, in order that it may serve as a basis for compelling him to acknowledge said child should be
afterwards deny his paternity. If several writings put together, each not being complete in itself, should be
necessary in order to obtain a full and complete expression of acknowledgment by a father of his paternity of a
child, the general prohibition to investigate paternity would be violated.
By the mere reading of all said letters, the one addressed to a priest and the others to the herein plaintiff-
appellee, Antonia L. de Jesus, the reader cannot ascertain which is the "creature that is coming on June", which
the defendant- appellant, Cesar Syquia, says in the said letter addressed to the priest is his, nor who is the
"junior" that he recommends to said Antonia L. de Jesus to take good care of, as there is nothing in anyone of
said letters from which it may be inferred that Antonia L. de Jesus was enciente at the time, that
the "junior" was the being she was carrying in her womb, and that it was the "creature that is coming in June."
To connect all these facts it was necessary to prove that Cesar Syquia had had illicit relations with Antonia L. de
Jesus, that as a result of such relations the woman became pregnant, and that she gave birth to a boy in June
1931. All this certainly constitutes an investigation of the paternity of Cesar Syquia of said child outside of the
documents, which is prohibited by law.
Either taken alone therefore, or in connection with Exhibits F, G, H, and J, Exhibit C is insufficient to constitute
a "indubitable writing of Cesar Syquia, in which he expressly acknowledges his paternity of the child Ismael
Loanco," as required by number 1 of article 135 of the Civil Code.
As to the second ground of the decision of the majority, number 2 of article 135 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 135. The father may be compelled to acknowledge his natural child in the following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
2. When the child has been in the uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural child of the
defendant father, justified by the conduct of the father himself or that of his family.
The majority decision bases its connection on the second point on Exhibits C, F, G, H, and J and the following
facts, as found by the lower court in its decision:
Cuando la demandante Antonia L. de Jesus estaba para dar a luz, el demandado Cesar Syquia llamo a
su comprovinciano Dr. Crescenciano Talavera, medico que entonces ejercia su profesion en la Ciudad
de Manila, para que asistiera a aquella en su parto y a ese efecto llevo a la demandante Antonia L. de
Jesus acompañado del Dr. Talavera al Hospital San Jose, de esta Ciudad, donde ella dio a luz el 17 de
junio de 1931 asistida por dicho Dr. Talavera, que firmo el certificado de necimiento Exhibit E.
Despues del nacimiento del demandante Ismael Loanco, el demandado estuvo viviendo con este y con
la demandante Antonio L. de Jesus en la casa No. 551 de la Calle Camarines, Manila, entregando a
dicha demandante el dinero para los gastos de casa y el pago del consumo de gas y luz electrica,
habiendo firmado el contrato para el suministro del fluido electrico en dicha casa.
Exhibit, C, F, G, H, and J, are inadmissible in evidence the purpose of showing that Ismael Loanco has enjoyed
the continuous possession of the status of a natural child, because being of prior date to the birth of said child
they can not be considered as direct acts of Cesar Syquia showing possession of the status of natural child, as no
human being can enjoy such possession until he be born with legal capacity for acquiring civil rights (Infante vs.
Figueras, 4 Phil., 738; Granados vs. Leynes, G.R. No. 31224, promulgated September 9, 1929, not reported).
It must also be stated that Cesar Syquia refused to allow his name to be given to the child Ismael when it was
baptized, so that the name of its mother, Loanco, had to be given to it.
The facts which were found by the court below to have been proved by the testimony of the witnesses during
the trial, are not sufficient to constitute the uninterrupted possession of the status of Ismael Loanco as natural
child of said Cesar Syquia, in the light of the following authorities:
In the case of Buenaventura vs. Urbano (5 Phil., 1, 9), this court said:
. . . Confining ourselves to the acts proved to have been performed by Don Telesforo, we find that he
visited the mother of the plaintiff; that he paid money for her support; that he paid money for the
support of the plaintiff; that he hold one witness that the plaintiff was his son; that the plaintiff called
him "Papa," and that Don Telesforo answered to this designation; that when the plaintiff visited Don
Telesforo he kissed his hand; that Don Telesforo wrote letters to him; that he paid his fees for
instruction in school, and secured him a position in a commercial house.
xxx xxx xxx
All these facts taken together are not sufficient to show that plaintiff possesses continuously the status
of a natural child. They may have a tendency to show that Don Telesforo was the father of the child,
but that it is not sufficient. It is not sufficient that the father recognize the child as his. By the express
terms of article 135 that recognition must appear either in writing, made by the father, or it must appear
in acts which show that the son has possessed continuously the status of a natural child. No recognition
by the father of the child which comes short of the requirements of these two paragraphs is sufficient.
It must appear that it was the intention of the father to recognize the child as to give him that status,
and that the acts performed by him were done with that intention.
Manresa (Codigo Civil, Vol. 1, page 602, 4th ed.) in citing some decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain says:
En la sentencia de 5 de junio de 1906 declarase que para justificar la posesion de estado de hijo natural
se requiere que los actos sean de tal naturaleza que revelen, a la vez que el convencimiento de la
paternidad, la voluntad ostensible de tener y tratar al hijo como tal en las relaciones sociales y de la
vida, y esto no accidentalmente, sino continuedamente, porque en tal supuesto los actos tiene el mismo
valor que el reconocimiento expreso.lawphil.net
En el mismo criterio restrictivo se inspira la de 12 de octubre de 1907, que estima que el hecho de que
dos nodrizas criaron a otros tantos niños, sufragando el gasto el demandado, quien ademas iba a casa
de la demandante, los besada, los llamaba hijos y encargaba para los mismos el mayor cuidado; el de
que subvenia a las necesidades de la madre y de los seis hijos que la nacieron, el primero de los cuales
se llamaba como el padre; y el de que los porteros de la casa donde vivio la actora sabian que el finado
visitaba a esta, se lamentaba de la mucha familia que tenia y era tenido en el concepto publico como
padre de los menores, no son suficientes para fundar la declaracion de paternidad, pues no es legal
confundir actos que puedan revelar mas o menos la presuncion o convencimiento en que una persona
este de su paternidad con relacion a hijos naturales, con los que demuestren su proposito de poner a
estos hijos en la posesion de tal estado.
It will thus be seen from the foregoing discussion and authorities that the herein defendant-appellant Cesar
Syquia cannot be compelled to acknowledge the child Ismael Loanco as his natural son because there exists not
an indubitable writing of his in which he expressly acknowledges his paternity of said child, and because the
said child has not enjoyed the uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural child of the said
defendant-appellant, justified by his own conduct or that of his family, as required by article 135 of the Civil
Code.
The decision appealed from should, therefore, be reversed and the complaint dismissed.
Avanceña, C.J. and Imperial, J., concur.
25. Wassmer vs Velez G.R. No. L-20089 December 26, 1964
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-20089. December 26, 1964.]
BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, Defendant-Appellant.
Jalandoni & Jamir, for Defendant-Appellant.
Samson S. Alcantara for Plaintiff-Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. DAMAGES; BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY; WHEN ACTIONABLE WRONG. — Ordinarily, a
mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all
the necessary preparations and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized,
is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs, for which the erring promisor
must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 of the New Civil Code.
2. ID.; ID.; MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES MAY BE AWARDED IN AN ACTIONABLE
BREACH OF PROMISE SUIT. — When a breach of promise to marry is actionable under Article 21 of the
Civil Code, moral damages may be awarded under Article 2219 (10) of the said Code. Exemplary damages may
also be awarded under Article 2232 of said Code where it is proven that the defendant clearly acted in a wanton,
reckless and oppressive manner.
3. PLEADINGS AND PRACTICE; AFFIDAVIT OF MERITS IN PETITION FOR BELIEF MUST STATE
FACTS CONSTITUTING DEFENSE. — An affidavit of merits supporting a petition for relief from judgment
must state facts constituting a valid defense. Where such an affidavit merely states conclusions or opinions, it is
not valid.
4. ID.; TRIAL BY COMMISSIONER; CLERK OF COURT MAY BE VALIDLY DESIGNATED. — The
procedure of designating the clerk of court as commissioner to receive evidence is sanctioned by Rule 34 (now
Rule 33) of the Rules of Court.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; DEFENDANT’S CONSENT TO DESIGNATION OF COMMISSIONER NOT NECESSARY
WHERE HE IS IN DEFAULT. — The defendant’s consent to the designation of the clerk of court as
commissioner to receive evidence is not necessary where he was declared in default and thus had no standing in
court.
6. AFFIDAVITS OF MERIT; MUST CONTAIN FACTS AND NOT CONCLUSIONS OF FACT. —
Affidavits of merit to be valid must contain facts and not mere conclusions of facts.
7. ID.; ID.; WHEN CONCLUSION OF FACT, NOT A FACT, DEEMED CONTAINED IN AFFIDAVIT. —
An affidavit of merit stating no facts, but merely an inference that defendant’s failure was due to fortuitous
events and/or circumstances beyond his control, is held to contain a conclusion of fact, not a fact.
DECISION
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
The facts that culminated in this case started with dreams and hopes, followed by appropriate planning and
serious endeavors, but terminated in frustration and, what is worse, complete public humiliation.
Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love, decided to get married and
set September 4, 1954 as the big day. On September 2, 1954 Velez left this note for his bride-to-be:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
Dear Bet —
"Will have to postpone wedding. My mother oppose it. Am leaving on the Convair today.
"Please do not ask too many people about the reason why — That would only create a scandal.
Paquing"
But the next day, September 3, he sent her the following telegram:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"NOTHING CHANGED REST ASSURED RETURNING VERY SOON APOLOGIZE MAMA PAPA LOVE.
PAKING"
Thereafter Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again.
Sued by Beatriz for damages, Velez filed no answer and was declared in default. Plaintiff adduced evidence
before the clerk of court as commissioner, and on April 29, 1955, judgment was rendered ordering defendant to
pay plaintiff P2,000.00 as actual damages; P25,000.09 as moral and exemplary damages; P2,500.00 as
attorney’s fees; and the costs.
On June 21, 1955 defendant filed a "petition for relief from orders, judgment and proceedings and motion for
new trial and reconsideration." Plaintiff moved to strike it out. But the court, on August 2, 1955, ordered the
parties and their attorneys to appear before it on August 23, 1955 "to explore at this stage of the proceedings the
possibility of arriving at an amicable settlement." It added that should any of them fail to appear "the petition for
relief and the opposition thereto will be deemed submitted for resolution."cralaw virtua1aw library
On August 23, 1955 defendant failed to appear before the court. Instead, on the following day his counsel filed
a motion to defer for two weeks the resolution on defendant’s petition for relief. The counsel stated that he
would confer with defendant in Cagayan de Oro City — the latter’s residence — on the possibility of an
amicable settlement. The court granted two weeks counted from August 25, 1955.
Plaintiff manifested on June 15, 1956 that the two weeks given by the court had expired on September 8, 1955
but that defendant and his counsel had failed to appear.
Another chance for amicable settlement was given by the court in its order of July 6, 1956 calling the parties
and their attorneys to appear on July 13, 1956. This time, however, defendant’s counsel informed the court that
chances of settling the case amicably were nil.
On July 20, 1956 the court issued an order denying defendant’s aforesaid petition. Defendant has appealed to
this Court.
In his petition of June 21, 1955 in the court a quo defendant alleged excusable negligence as ground to set aside
the judgment by default. Specifically, it was stated that defendant filed no answer in the belief that an amicable
settlement was being negotiated.
A petition for relief from judgment on grounds of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, must be
duly supported by an affidavit of merit stating facts constituting a valid defense. (Sec. 3, Rule 38, Rules of
Court.) Defendant’s affidavit of merits attached to his petition of June 21, 1955 stated: "That he has a good and
valid defense against plaintiff’s cause of action, his failure to marry the plaintiff as scheduled having been due
to fortuitous event and/or circumstances beyond his control." An affidavit of merits like this, stating mere
conclusions or opinions instead of facts is not valid. (Cortes v. Co Bun Kim, L-3926, Oct. 10, 1951; Vaswani v.
P. Tarrachand Bros., L-15800, December 29, 1960.)
Defendant, however, would contend that the affidavit of merits was in fact unnecessary, or a mere surplusage,
because the judgment sought to be set aside was null and void, it having been based on evidence adduced before
the clerk of court. In Province of Pangasinan v. Palisoc, L-16519, October 30, 1962, this Court pointed out that
the procedure of designating the clerk of court as commissioner to receive evidence is sanctioned by Rule 34
(now Rule 33) of the Rules of Court. Now as to defendant’s consent to said procedure, the same did not have to
be obtained for he was declared in default and thus had no standing in court (Velez v. Ramas, 40 Phil., 787;
Alano v. Court of First Instance, L-14557, October 30, 1959).
In support of his "motion for new trial and reconsideration," defendant asserts that the judgment is contrary to
law. The reason given is that "there is no provision of the Civil Code authorizing" an action for breach of
promise to marry. Indeed, our ruling in Hermosisima v. Court of Appeals (L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960) as
reiterated in Estopa v. Biansay (L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960), is that "mere breach of a promise to marry" is not an
actionable wrong. We pointed out that Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the new Civil Code
the provisions that would have it so.
It must not be overlooked, however, that the extent to which acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated with
impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of said Code provides that "Any person who wilfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the
latter for the damage."cralaw virtua1aw library
The record reveals that on August 23, 1954 plaintiff and defendant applied for a license to contract marriage,
which was subsequently issued. (Exhs. A, A-1). Their wedding was set for September 4, 1954. Invitations were
printed and distributed to relatives, friends and acquaintances (Tsn., 5; Exh. C). The bride-to- be’s trousseau,
party dresses and other apparel for the important occasion were purchased (Tsn., 7-8). Dresses for the maid of
honor and the flower girl were prepared. A matrimonial bed, with accessories, was bought. Bridal showers were
given and gifts received (Tsn., 6; Exh. E). And then, with but two days before the wedding, defendant, who was
then 28 years old, simply left a note for plaintiff stating: "Will have to postpone wedding — My mother opposes
it . . ." He enplaned to his home city in Mindanao, and the next day, the day before the wedding, he wired
plaintiff: "Nothing changed rest assured returning soon." But he never returned and was never heard from again.
Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not
an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the above-described preparation and
publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is
palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs, for which defendant must be held answerable in damages
in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid.
Defendant urges in his aforestated petition that the damages awarded were excessive. No question is raised as to
the award of actual damages. What defendant would really assert hereunder is that the award of moral and
exemplary damages, in the amount of P25,000.00, should be totally eliminated.
Per express provision of Article 2219(10) of the new Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable in the cases
mentioned in Article 21 of said Code. As to exemplary damages, defendant contends that the same could not be
adjudged against him because under Article 2232 of the new Civil Code the condition precedent is that "the
defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner." The argument is devoid
of merit as under the above-narrated circumstances of this case defendant clearly acted in a "wanton . . . reckless
[and] oppressive manner." This Court’s opinion, however, is that considering the particular circumstances of
this case, P15,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages is deemed to be a reasonable award.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, with the above-indicated modification, the lower court’s judgment is hereby
affirmed, with costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal and Zaldivar, JJ.,
concur.
26. Manantan vs CA [G.R. No. 107125. January 29, 2001]
 SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 107125 January 29, 2001
GEORGE MANANTAN, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES MARCELINO NICOLAS and MARIA NICOLAS, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision dated January 31, 1992 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
19240, modifying the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Santiago, Isabela, Branch 21, in Criminal Case
No. 066. Petitioner George Manantan was acquitted by the trial court of homicide through reckless imprudence
without a ruling on his civil liability. On appeal from the civil aspect of the judgment in Criminal Case No. 066,
the appellate court found petitioner Manantan civilly liable and ordered him to indemnify private respondents
Marcelino Nicolas and Maria Nicolas P104,400.00 representing loss of support, P50,000.00 as death indemnity,
and moral damages of P20,000.00 or a total of P174,400.00 for the death of their son, Ruben Nicolas.
The facts of this case are as follows:
On June 1, 1983, the Provincial Fiscal of Isabela filed an information charging petitioner Manantan with
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 25th day of September 1982, in the municipality of Santiago, province of Isabela,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, being then the driver
and person-in-charge of an automobile bearing Plate No. NGA-816, willfully and unlawfully drove and
operated the same while along the Daang Maharlika at Barangay Malvar, in said municipality, in a
negligent, careless and imprudent manner, without due regard to traffic laws, regulations and
ordinances and without taking the necessary precaution to prevent accident to person and damage to
property, causing by such negligence, carelessness and imprudence said automobile driven and
operated by him to sideswipe a passenger jeep bearing plate No. 918-7F driven by Charles Codamon,
thereby causing the said automobile to turn down (sic) resulting to the death of Ruben Nicolas a
passenger of said automobile.
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
On arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution's evidence, as summarized by the trial court and adopted by the appellate court, showed that:
[I]n the morning of September 25, 1982, Fiscal Wilfredo Ambrocio… decided to catch shrimps at the
irrigation canal at his farm. He invited the deceased who told him that they (should) borrow the Ford
Fiera of the accused George Manantan who is also from Cordon. The deceased went to borrow the
Ford Fiera but…said that the accused also wanted to (come) along. So Fiscal Ambrocio and the
deceased dropped by the accused at the Manantan Technical School. They drank beer there before they
proceeded to the farm using the Toyota Starlet of the accused. At the farm they consumed one (more)
case of beer. At about 12:00 o'clock noon they went home. Then at about 2:00 or 3:00 o'clock that
afternoon, (defense witness Miguel) Tagangin and (Ruben) Nicolas and the accused returned to the
house of Fiscal Ambrocio with a duck. They cooked the duck and ate the same with one more case of
beer. They ate and drank until about 8:30 in the evening when the accused invited them to go bowling.
They went to Santiago, Isabela on board the Toyota Starlet of the accused who drove the same. They
went to the Vicap Bowling Lanes at Mabini, Santiago, Isabela but unfortunately there was no vacant
alley. While waiting for a vacant alley they drank one beer each. After waiting for about 40 minutes
and still no alley became vacant the accused invited his companions to go to the LBC Night Club.
They had drinks and took some lady partners at the LBC. After one hour, they left the LBC and
proceeded to a nearby store where they ate arroz caldo…and then they decided to go home. Again the
accused drove the car. Miguel Tabangin sat with the accused in the front seat while the deceased and
Fiscal Ambrocio sat at the back seat with the deceased immediately behind the accused. The accused
was driving at a speed of about 40 kilometers per hour along the Maharlika Highway at Malvar,
Santiago, Isabela, at the middle portion of the highway (although according to Charles Cudamon, the
car was running at a speed of 80 to 90 kilometers per hours on [the] wrong lane of the highway
because the car was overtaking a tricycle) when they met a passenger jeepney with bright lights on.
The accused immediately tried to swerve the car to the right and move his body away from the steering
wheel but he was not able to avoid the oncoming vehicle and the two vehicles collided with each other
at the center of the road.
xxx
As a result of the collision the car turned turtle twice and landed on its top at the side of the highway
immediately at the approach of the street going to the Flores Clinic while the jeep swerved across the
road so that one half front portion landed on the lane of the car while the back half portion was at its
right lane five meters away from the point of impact as shown by a sketch (Exhibit "A") prepared by
Cudamon the following morning at the Police Headquarters at the instance of his lawyer. Fiscal
Ambrocio lost consciousness. When he regained consciousness he was still inside the car (lying) on his
belly with the deceased on top of him. Ambrocio pushed (away) the deceased and then he was pulled
out of the car by Tabangin. Afterwards, the deceased who was still unconscious was pulled out from
the car. Both Fiscal Ambrocio and the deceased were brought to the Flores Clinic. The deceased died
that night (Exhibit "B") while Ambrocio suffered only minor injuries to his head and legs. 2
The defense version as to the events prior to the incident was essentially the same as that of the prosecution,
except that defense witness Miguel Tabangin declared that Manantan did not drink beer that night. As to the
accident, the defense claimed that:
…The accused was driving slowly at the right lane [at] about 20 inches from the center of the road at
about 30 kilometers per hour at the National Highway at Malvar, Santiago, Isabela, when suddenly a
passenger jeepney with bright lights which was coming from the opposite direction and running very
fast suddenly swerve(d) to the car's lane and bumped the car which turned turtle twice and rested on its
top at the right edge of the road while the jeep stopped across the center of the road as shown by a
picture taken after the incident (Exhibit "1") and a sketch (Exhibit "3") drawn by the accused during his
rebuttal testimony. The car was hit on the driver's side. As a result of the collision, the accused and
 Miguel Tabangin and Fiscal Ambrocio were injured while Ruben Nicolas died at the Flores Clinic
where they were all brought for treatment.3
In its decision dated June 30, 1988, promulgated on August 4, 1988, the trial court decided Criminal Case No.
066 in petitioner's favor, thus:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the accused NOT GUILTY
of the crime charged and hereby acquits him.
SO ORDERED.4
On August 8, 1988, private respondents filed their notice of appeal on the civil aspect of the trial court's
judgment. In their appeal, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 19240, the Nicolas spouses prayed that the decision
appealed from be modified and that appellee be ordered to pay indemnity and damages.
On January 31, 1992, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. CV No. 19240 in favor of the Nicolas spouses, thus:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED in that defendant-appellee is hereby held
civilly liable for his negligent and reckless act of driving his car which was the proximate cause of the
vehicular accident, and sentenced to indemnify plaintiffs-appellants in the amount of P174,400.00 for
the death of Ruben Nicolas,
SO ORDERED.5
In finding petitioner civilly liable, the court a quo noted that at the time the accident occurred, Manantan was in
a state of intoxication, due to his having consumed "all in all, a total of at least twelve (12) bottles of
beer…between 9 a.m. and 11 p.m." 6 It found that petitioner's act of driving while intoxicated was a clear
violation of Section 53 of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code (R.A. No. 4136) 7 and pursuant to Article
2185 of the Civil Code,8 a statutory presumption of negligence existed. It held that petitioner's act of violating
the Traffic Code is negligence in itself "because the mishap, which occurred, was the precise injury sought to be
prevented by the regulation."9
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the appellate court in its resolution of August 24, 1992 denied the
motion.
Hence, the present case. Petitioner, in his memorandum, submits the following issues for our consideration:
FIRST – THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT ACQUITTING THE PETITIONER OF THE
CRIME OF RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING TO HOMICIDE FORECLOSED ANY
FURTHER INQUIRY ON THE ACCUSED'S (PETITIONER'S) NEGLIGENCE OR RECKLESS
IMPRUDENCE BECAUSE BY THEN HE WILL BE PLACED IN "DOUBLE JEOPARDY" AND
THEREFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN PASSING UPON THE SAME ISSUE
AGAIN.
SECOND – THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO AWARD
DAMAGES AND INDEMNITY TO THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS CONSIDERING THAT THE
NON-DECLARATION OF ANY INDEMNITY OR AWARD OF DAMAGES BY THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF ISABELA, BRANCH XXI, WAS ITSELF CONSISTENT WITH THE
PETITIONER'S ACQUITTAL FOR THE REASON THAT THE CIVIL ACTION WAS IMPLIEDLY
INSTITUTED WITH THE CRIMINAL ACTION AND THERE WAS NO EXPRESS WAIVER OF
THE CIVIL ACTION OR RESERVATION TO INSTITUTE IT SEPARATELY BY THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS IN THE TRIAL COURT.
THIRD – THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE
OF THE CASE CA-G.R. CV No. 19240 ENTITLED: SPOUSES MARCELINO NICOLAS AND
MARIA NICOLAS v. GEORGE MANANTAN, AND RENDER THE DECISION SOUGHT TO BE
REVIEWED WHEN THE SAME WAS PROSECUTED BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IN
THEIR PERSONAL CAPACITIES AND THE FILING FEES NOT HAVING BEEN PAID, THUS
VIOLATING THE MANCHESTER DOCTRINE.
In brief, the issues for our resolution are:
(1) Did the acquittal of petitioner foreclose any further inquiry by the Court of Appeals as to his
negligence or reckless imprudence?
(2) Did the court a quo err in finding that petitioner's acquittal did not extinguish his civil liability?
(3) Did the appellate court commit a reversible error in failing to apply the Manchester doctrine to CA-
G.R. CV No. 19240?
On the first issue, petitioner opines that the Court of Appeals should not have disturbed the findings of the trial
court on the lack of negligence or reckless imprudence under the guise of determining his civil liability. He
argues that the trial court's finding that he was neither imprudent nor negligent was the basis for his acquittal,
and not reasonable doubt. He submits that in finding him liable for indemnity and damages, the appellate court
not only placed his acquittal in suspicion, but also put him in "double jeopardy."
Private respondents contend that while the trial court found that petitioner's guilt had not been proven beyond
reasonable doubt, it did not state in clear and unequivocal terms that petitioner was not recklessly imprudent or
negligent. Hence, impliedly the trial court acquitted him on reasonable doubt. Since civil liability is not
extinguished in criminal cases, if the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt, the Court of Appeals had to review
the findings of the trial court to determine if there was a basis for awarding indemnity and damages.1âwphi1.nêt
Preliminarily, petitioner's claim that the decision of the appellate court awarding indemnity placed him in
double jeopardy is misplaced. The constitution provides that "no person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the
same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall
constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act." 10 When a person is charged with an offense and the
case is terminated either by acquittal or conviction or in any other manner without the consent of the accused,
the latter cannot again be charged with the same or identical offense. 11 This is double jeopardy. For double
jeopardy to exist, the following elements must be established: (a) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the
second; (2) the first jeopardy must have terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as
the first.12 In the instant case, petitioner had once been placed in jeopardy by the filing of Criminal Case No.
066 and the jeopardy was terminated by his discharge. The judgment of acquittal became immediately final.
Note, however, that what was elevated to the Court of Appeals by private respondents was the civil aspect of
Criminal Case No. 066. Petitioner was not charged anew in CA-G.R. CV No. 19240 with a second criminal
offense identical to the first offense. The records clearly show that no second criminal offense was being
imputed to petitioner on appeal. In modifying the lower court's judgment, the appellate court did not modify the
judgment of acquittal. Nor did it order the filing of a second criminal case against petitioner for the same
offense. Obviously, therefore, there was no second jeopardy to speak of. Petitioner's claim of having been
placed in double jeopardy is incorrect.
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the accused. First is an
acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the act or omission complained of. This instance
closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission
cannot and can never be held liable for such act or omission. 13 There being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is
out of the question, and the civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds other than
the delictcomplained of. This is the situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. 14 The second
instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of
the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by
preponderance of evidence only.15 This is the situation contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code, 16 where the
civil action for damages is "for the same act or omission." Although the two actions have different purposes, the
matters discussed in the civil case are similar to those discussed in the criminal case. However, the judgment in
the criminal proceeding cannot be read in evidence in the civil action to establish any fact there determined,
even though both actions involve the same act or omission.17 The reason for this rule is that the parties are not
the same and secondarily, different rules of evidence are applicable. Hence, notwithstanding herein petitioner's
acquittal, the Court of Appeals in determining whether Article 29 applied, was not precluded from looking into
the question of petitioner's negligence or reckless imprudence.
On the second issue, petitioner insists that he was acquitted on a finding that he was neither criminally negligent
nor recklessly imprudent. Inasmuch as his civil liability is predicated on the criminal offense, he argues that
when the latter is not proved, civil liability cannot be demanded. He concludes that his acquittal bars any civil
action.
Private respondents counter that a closer look at the trial court's judgment shows that the judgment of acquittal
did not clearly and categorically declare the non-existence of petitioner's negligence or imprudence. Hence, they
argue that his acquittal must be deemed based on reasonable doubt, allowing Article 29 of the Civil Code to
come into play.
Our scrutiny of the lower court's decision in Criminal Case No. 066 supports the conclusion of the appellate
court that the acquittal was based on reasonable doubt; hence, petitioner's civil liability was not extinguished by
his discharge. We note the trial court's declaration that did not discount the possibility that "the accused was
really negligent." However, it found that "a hypothesis inconsistent with the negligence of the accused presented
itself before the Court" and since said "hypothesis is consistent with the record…the Court's mind cannot rest on
a verdict of conviction."18 The foregoing clearly shows that petitioner's acquittal was predicated on the
conclusion that his guilt had not been established with moral certainty. Stated differently, it is an acquittal based
on reasonable doubt and a suit to enforce civil liability for the same act or omission lies.
On the third issue, petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals erred in awarding damages and indemnity, since
private respondents did not pay the corresponding filing fees for their claims for damages when the civil case
was impliedly instituted with the criminal action. Petitioner submits that the non-payment of filing fees on the
amount of the claim for damages violated the doctrine in Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, 149 SCRA 562 (1987) and Supreme Court Circular No. 7 dated March 24, 1988. 19 He avers that
since Manchester held that "The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon payment of the prescribed
docket fees," the appellate court was without jurisdiction to hear and try CA-G.R. CV No. 19240, much less
award indemnity and damages.
Private respondents argue that the Manchester doctrine is inapplicable to the instant case. They ask us to note
that the criminal case, with which the civil case was impliedly instituted, was filed on July 1, 1983, while
the Manchesterrequirements as to docket and filing fees took effect only with the promulgation of Supreme
Court Circular No. 7 on March 24, 1988. Moreover, the information filed by the Provincial Prosecutor of
Isabela did not allege the amount of indemnity to be paid. Since it was not then customarily or legally required
that the civil damages sought be stated in the information, the trial court had no basis in assessing the filing fees
and demanding payment thereof. Moreover, assuming that the Manchester ruling is applied retroactively, under
the Rules of Court, the filing fees for the damages awarded are a first lien on the judgment. Hence, there is no
violation of the Manchester doctrine to speak of.
At the time of the filing of the information in 1983, the implied institution of civil actions with criminal actions
was governed by Rule 111, Section 1 of the 1964 Rules of Court. 20 As correctly pointed out by private
respondents, under said rule, it was not required that the damages sought by the offended party be stated in the
complaint or information. With the adoption of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the amendment of
Rule 111, Section 1 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure by a resolution of this Court dated July 7, 1988, it
is now required that:
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral, nominal,
temperate or exemplary damages, the filing fees for such civil action as provided in these Rules shall
constitute a first lien on the judgment except in an award for actual damages.
In cases wherein the amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in the complaint or information,
the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in court for
trial.
The foregoing were the applicable provisions of the Rules of Criminal Procedure at the time private respondents
appealed the civil aspect of Criminal Case No. 066 to the court a quo in 1989. Being in the nature of a curative
statute, the amendment applies retroactively and affects pending actions as in this case.
Thus, where the civil action is impliedly instituted together with the criminal action, the actual damages claimed
by the offended parties, as in this case, are not included in the computation of the filing fees. Filing fees are to
be paid only if other items of damages such as moral, nominal, temporate, or exemplary damages are alleged in
the complaint or information, or if they are not so alleged, shall constitute a first lien on the judgment. 21 Recall
that the information in Criminal Case No. 066 contained no specific allegations of damages. Considering that
the Rules of Criminal Procedure effectively guarantee that the filing fees for the award of damages are a first
lien on the judgment, the effect of the enforcement of said lien must retroact to the institution of the criminal
 13 Almeida, et al. V. Abaroa, 8 Phil. 178, 181 (1907). See also Almeida Chantangco and Lete v. Abaroa, 40 Phil. 1056 (1910), 218 US 476, 54 l. Ed. 1116
action. The filing fees are deemed paid from the filing of the criminal complaint or information. We therefore
(1910); Wise & Co. v. Larion, 45 Phil. 314 (1923), Francisco v. Onrubia, 46 Phil. 327 (1924). Article 29 of the Civil Code serves only to limit and qualify the
find no basis for petitioner's allegations that the filing fees were not paid or improperly paid and that the
application of the Almeida doctrine.
appellate court acquired no jurisdiction.

14 Rules of Court, Rule 111, Sec. 2. Institution of Separate civil action. –

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 19240 promulgated on January 31, 1992, as well as its resolution dated August 24,
1992, denying herein petitioner's motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED. Costs against xxx
petitioner.1âwphi1.nêt
(b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final
SO ORDERED. judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. (stress supplied)

Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur. 15 Manahan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 255 SCRA 202, 214 (1996), citing Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 558 (1984).

16 Civil Code, ART. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a
civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted (stress supplied). Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion
of the defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.

Footnotes:
If in a criminal case, the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may
1 Records, p. 1. be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.

2 CA Rollo, pp. 53-55. 17 Almeida Chantangco and Lete v. Abaroa, supra note 13, at 1061.

3 Id. at 56-57. 18 Supra note 4.

4 Records, p. 429. 19 The subject of which reads: ALL COMPLAINTS MUST SPECIFY THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES SOUGHT NOT ONLY IN THE BODY OF THE
PLEADINGS, BUT ALSO IN THE PRAYER IN ORDER TO BE ACCEPTED AND ADMITTED FOR FILING. THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES SO

5 CA Rollo, p. 60. SPECIFIED IN THE COMPLAINT SHALL BE THE BASIS FOR ASSESSING THE AMOUNT OF THE FILING FEES.

6 Id. at 57. 20 Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. – When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense
charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute it
separately.
7 SEC. 53. Driving while under the influence of liquor or narcotic drug. – No person shall drive a motor vehicle while under the influence of liquor or narcotic
drug.
21 People v. Escano, Jr., 193 SCRA 662, 665 (1991).

8 Civil Code, ART. 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the
mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. 27. Safeguard Security Agency vs Tangco G.R. NO. 165732, December 14, 2006

9 Supra note 6, at 58. FIRST DIVISION

10 Const., Art. III, Sec. 21. G.R. No. 165732 December 14, 2006

11 Melo v. People, 85 Phil. 766, 768 (1950). SAFEGUARD SECURITY AGENCY, INC., and ADMER PAJARILLO, petitioners,
vs.
12 People v. Bocar, 138 SCRA 166, 171 (1985).
LAURO TANGCO, VAL TANGCO, VERN LARRY TANGCO, VAN LAURO TANGCO, VON
LARRIE TANGCO, VIEN LARI TANGCO and VIVIEN LAURIZ TANGCO, respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. (Safeguard) and Admer
Pajarillo (Pajarillo) assailing the Decision1 dated July 16, 2004 and the Resolution2 dated October 20, 2004
issued by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 77462.
On November 3, 1997, at about 2:50 p.m., Evangeline Tangco (Evangeline) went to Ecology Bank, Katipunan
Branch, Quezon City, to renew her time deposit per advise of the bank's cashier as she would sign a specimen
card. Evangeline, a duly licensed firearm holder with corresponding permit to carry the same outside her
residence, approached security guard Pajarillo, who was stationed outside the bank, and pulled out her firearm
from her bag to deposit the same for safekeeping. Suddenly, Pajarillo shot Evangeline with his service shotgun
hitting her in the abdomen instantly causing her death.
Lauro Tangco, Evangeline's husband, together with his six minor children (respondents) filed with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, a criminal case of Homicide against Pajarillo, docketed as Criminal Case
No. 0-97-73806 and assigned to Branch 78. Respondents reserved their right to file a separate civil action in the
said criminal case. The RTC of Quezon City subsequently convicted Pajarillo of Homicide in its Decision dated
January 19, 2000.3 On appeal to the CA, the RTC decision was affirmed with modification as to the penalty in a
Decision4 dated July 31, 2000. Entry of Judgment was made on August 25, 2001.
Meanwhile, on January 14, 1998, respondents filed with RTC, Branch 273, Marikina City, a complaint 5 for
damages against Pajarillo for negligently shooting Evangeline and against Safeguard for failing to observe the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage committed by its security guard. Respondents
prayed for actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
In their Answer,6 petitioners denied the material allegations in the complaint and alleged that Safeguard
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Pajarillo; that
Evangeline's death was not due to Pajarillo's negligence as the latter acted only in self-defense. Petitioners set
up a compulsory counterclaim for moral damages and attorney's fees.
Trial thereafter ensued. On January 10, 2003, the RTC rendered its Decision,7 the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, the heirs of Evangeline Tangco,
and against defendants Admer Pajarillo and Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. ordering said defendants
to pay the plaintiffs, jointly and severally, the following:
1. ONE HUNDRED FIFTY SEVEN THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY PESOS
(P157,430.00), as actual damages
2. FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as death indemnity;
3. ONE MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000.00), as moral damages;
4. THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P300,000.00), as exemplary damages;
5. THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00), as attorney's fees; and
6. costs of suit.
For lack of merit, defendants' counterclaim is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED. 8
The RTC found respondents to be entitled to damages. It rejected Pajarillo's claim that he merely acted in self-
defense. It gave no credence to Pajarillo's bare claim that Evangeline was seen roaming around the area prior to
the shooting incident since Pajarillo had not made such report to the head office and the police authorities. The
RTC further ruled that being the guard on duty, the situation demanded that he should have exercised proper
prudence and necessary care by asking Evangeline for him to ascertain the matter instead of shooting her
instantly; that Pajarillo had already been convicted of Homicide in Criminal Case No. 0-97-73806; and that he
also failed to proffer proof negating liability in the instant case.
The RTC also found Safeguard as employer of Pajarillo to be jointly and severally liable with Pajarillo. It ruled
that while it may be conceded that Safeguard had perhaps exercised care in the selection of its employees,
particularly of Pajarillo, there was no sufficient evidence to show that Safeguard exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family in the supervision of its employee; that Safeguard's evidence simply showed that it
required its guards to attend trainings and seminars which is not the supervision contemplated under the law;
that supervision includes not only the issuance of regulations and instructions designed for the protection of
persons and property, for the guidance of their servants and employees, but also the duty to see to it that such
regulations and instructions are faithfully complied with.
Petitioners appealed the RTC decision to the CA. On July 16, 2004, the CA issued its assailed Decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with the
modification that Safeguard Security Agency, Inc.'s civil liability in this case is only subsidiary under
Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code. No pronouncement as to costs. 9
In finding that Safeguard is only subsidiarily liable, the CA held that the applicable provisions are not Article
2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code, on quasi-delicts, but the provisions on civil liability arising
from felonies under the Revised Penal Code; that since Pajarillo had been found guilty of Homicide in a final
and executory judgment and is said to be serving sentence in Muntinlupa, he must be adjudged civilly liable
under the provisions of Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code since the civil liability recoverable in the
criminal action is one solely dependent upon conviction, because said liability arises from the offense charged
and no other; that this is also the civil liability that is deemed extinguished with the extinction of the penal
liability with a pronouncement that the fact from which the civil action might proceed does not exist; that unlike
in civil liability arising from quasi-delict, the defense of diligence of a good father of a family in the
employment and supervision of employees is inapplicable and irrelevant in civil liabilities based on crimes
or ex-delicto; that Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the liability of an employer for the civil
liability of their employees is only subsidiary, not joint or solidary.
Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration which the CA denied in a Resolution dated October 20, 2004.
Hence, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari with the following assignment of errors, to wit:
The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in finding petitioner Pajarillo liable to respondents for
the payment of damages and other money claims.
The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred when it applied Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code
in holding petitioner Safeguard solidarily [sic] liable with petitioner Pajarillo for the payment of
damages and other money claims.
The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in failing to find that petitioner Safeguard Security
Agency, Inc. exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees, hence, should
be excused from any liability.10
The issues for resolution are whether (1) Pajarillo is guilty of negligence in shooting Evangeline; and (2)
Safeguard should be held solidarily liable for the damages awarded to respondents.
Safeguard insists that the claim for damages by respondents is based on culpa aquiliana under Article 217611 of
the Civil Code, in which case, its liability is jointly and severally with Pajarillo. However, since it has
established that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of Pajarillo, it should be
exonerated from civil liability.
We will first resolve whether the CA correctly held that respondents, in filing a separate civil action against
petitioners are limited to the recovery of damages arising from a crime or delict, in which case the liability of
Safeguard as employer under Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code12 is subsidiary and the defense of
due diligence in the selection and supervision of employee is not available to it.
The CA erred in ruling that the liability of Safeguard is only subsidiary.
The law at the time the complaint for damages was filed is Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure,
as amended, to wit:
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. - When a criminal action is instituted, the civil
action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under
Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission
of the accused.
Respondents reserved the right to file a separate civil action and in fact filed the same on January 14, 1998.
The CA found that the source of damages in the instant case must be the crime of homicide, for which he had
already been found guilty of and serving sentence thereof, thus must be governed by the Revised Penal Code.
We do not agree.
An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the
offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex delicto, under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2) independent
civil liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or omission complained of as a
felony, e.g., culpa contractual or obligations arising from law under Article 31 of the Civil Code, intentional
torts under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code; or (b) where the
injured party is granted a right to file an action independent and distinct from the criminal action under Article
33 of the Civil Code. Either of these liabilities may be enforced against the offender subject to the caveat under
Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission or under both causes.13
It is important to determine the nature of respondents' cause of action. The nature of a cause of action is
determined by the facts alleged in the complaint as constituting the cause of action. 14 The purpose of an action
or suit and the law to govern it is to be determined not by the claim of the party filing the action, made in his
argument or brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for relief. 15
The pertinent portions of the complaint read:
7. That Defendant Admer A. Pajarillo was the guard assigned and posted in the Ecology Bank –
Katipunan Branch, Quezon City, who was employed and under employment of Safeguard Security
Agency, Inc. hence there is employer-employee relationship between co-defendants.
The Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. failed to observe the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage to herein plaintiffs.
 8. That defendant Admer Pajarillo upon seeing Evangeline Tangco, who brought her firearm out of her
bag, suddenly without exercising necessary caution/care, and in idiotic manner, with the use of his
shotgun, fired and burst bullets upon Evangeline M. Tangco, killing her instantly. x x x
xxxx
16. That defendants, being employer and the employee are jointly and severally liable for the death of
Evangeline M. Tangco.16
Thus, a reading of respondents' complaint shows that the latter are invoking their right to recover damages
against Safeguard for their vicarious responsibility for the injury caused by Pajarillo's act of shooting and killing
Evangeline under Article 2176, Civil Code which provides:
ARTICLE 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter.
The scope of Article 2176 is not limited to acts or omissions resulting from negligence. In Dulay v. Court of
Appeals,17 we held:
x x x Well-entrenched is the doctrine that Article 2176 covers not only acts committed with
negligence, but also acts which are voluntary and intentional. As far back as the definitive case of
Elcano v. Hill (77 SCRA 98 [1977]), this Court already held that:
"x x x Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only acts "not punishable
by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or
negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or
not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not
allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be
entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two
cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111,
refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil
liability for the same act considered as quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by
a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been
committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana
includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law." (Emphasis supplied)
The civil action filed by respondents was not derived from the criminal liability of Pajarillo in the criminal case
but one based on culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict which is separate and distinct from the civil liability arising
from crime.18 The source of the obligation sought to be enforced in the civil case is a quasi-delict not an act or
omission punishable by law.
In Bermudez v. Melencio-Herrera,19 where the issue involved was whether the civil action filed by plaintiff-
appellants is founded on crime or on quasi-delict, we held:
x x x The trial court treated the case as an action based on a crime in view of the reservation made by
the offended party in the criminal case (Criminal Case No. 92944), also pending before the court, to
file a separate civil action. Said the trial court:
It would appear that plaintiffs instituted this action on the assumption that defendant Pontino's
negligence in the accident of May 10, 1969 constituted a quasi-delict. The Court cannot accept the
validity of that assumption. In Criminal Case No. 92944 of this Court, plaintiffs had already appeared
as complainants. While that case was pending, the offended parties reserved the right to institute a
separate civil action. If, in a criminal case, the right to file a separate civil action for damages is
reserved, such civil action is to be based on crime and not on tort. That was the ruling in Joaquin vs.
Aniceto, L-18719, Oct. 31, 1964.
We do not agree. The doctrine in the case cited by the trial court is inapplicable to the instant case x x
x.
xxxx
In cases of negligence, the injured party or his heirs has the choice between an action to enforce the
civil liability arising from crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code and an action for quasi-
delict under Article 2176-2194 of the Civil Code. If a party chooses the latter, he may hold the
employer solidarily liable for the negligent act of his employee, subject to the employer's defense of
exercise of the diligence of a good father of the family.
In the case at bar, the action filed by appellant was an action for damages based on quasi-delict. The
fact that appellants reserved their right in the criminal case to file an independent civil action did
not preclude them from choosing to file a civil action for quasi-delict.20 (Emphasis supplied)
Although the judgment in the criminal case finding Pajarillo guilty of Homicide is already final and executory,
such judgment has no relevance or importance to this case. 21 It would have been entirely different if
respondents' cause of action was for damages arising from a delict, in which case the CA is correct in finding
Safeguard to be only subsidiary liable pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. 22
As clearly shown by the allegations in the complaint, respondents' cause of action is based on quasi-delict.
Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, when the injury is caused by the negligence of the employee, there
instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or the employer either
in the selection of the servant or employee, or in the supervision over him after selection or both. The liability of
the employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate. Therefore, it is incumbent upon petitioners to prove
that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employee.
We must first resolve the issue of whether Pajarillo was negligent in shooting Evangeline.
The issue of negligence is factual in nature. Whether a person is negligent or not is a question of fact, which, as
a general rule, we cannot pass upon in a petition for review on certiorari, as our jurisdiction is limited to
reviewing errors of law.23 Generally, factual findings of the trial court, affirmed by the CA, are final and
conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal. The established exceptions are: (1) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the findings
are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the CA is based on
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the CA, in making its findings,
went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7)
when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (8)
when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion; and (9) when the findings of fact of the CA are premised on
the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record. [24]
A thorough review of the records of the case fails to show any cogent reason for us to deviate from the factual
finding of the trial court and affirmed by the CA that petitioner Pajarillo was guilty of negligence in shooting
Evangeline.
Respondents' evidence established that Evangeline's purpose in going to the bank was to renew her time
deposit.25On the other hand, Pajarillo claims that Evangeline drew a gun from her bag and aimed the same at
him, thus, acting instinctively, he shot her in self-defense.
Pajarillo testified that when Evangeline aimed the gun at him at a distance of about one meter or one arm's
length26he stepped backward, loaded the chamber of his gun and shot her.27 It is however unimaginable that
petitioner Pajarillo could still make such movements if indeed the gun was already pointed at him. Any
movement could have prompted Evangeline to pull the trigger to shoot him.
Petitioner Pajarillo would like to justify his action in shooting Evangeline on his mere apprehension that
Evangeline will stage a bank robbery. However, such claim is befuddled by his own testimony. Pajarillo
testified that prior to the incident, he saw Evangeline roaming under the fly over which was about 10 meters
away from the bank28 and saw her talking to a man thereat;29 that she left the man under the fly-over, crossed
the street and approached the bank. However, except for the bare testimony of Pajarillo, the records do not show
that indeed Evangeline was seen roaming near the vicinity of the bank and acting suspiciously prior to the
shooting incident. In fact, there is no evidence that Pajarillo called the attention of his head guard or the bank's
branch manager regarding his concerns or that he reported the same to the police authorities whose outpost is
just about 15 meters from the bank.
Moreover, if Evangeline was already roaming the vicinity of the bank, she could have already apprised herself
that Pajarillo, who was posted outside the bank, was armed with a shotgun; that there were two guards inside the
bank30manning the entrance door. Thus, it is quite incredible that if she really had a companion, she would leave
him under the fly-over which is 10 meters far from the bank and stage a bank robbery all by herself without a
back-up. In fact, she would have known, after surveying the area, that aiming her gun at Pajarillo would not
ensure entrance to the bank as there were guards manning the entrance door.
Evidence, to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but it must be credible in
itself — such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the
circumstances. We have no test of the truth of human testimony, except its conformity to our knowledge,
observation and experience. Whatever is repugnant to these belongs to the miraculous and is outside judicial
cognizance.31
That Evangeline just wanted to deposit her gun before entering the bank and was actually in the act of pulling
her gun from her bag when petitioner Pajarillo recklessly shot her, finds support from the contentions raised in
petitioners' petition for review where they argued that when Evangeline approached the bank, she was seen
pulling a gun from inside her bag and petitioner Pajarillo who was suddenly beset by fear and perceived the act
as a dangerous threat, shot and killed the deceased out of pure instinct; 32 that the act of drawing a gun is a
threatening act, regardless of whether or not the gun was intended to be used against petitioner Pajarillo; 33 that
the fear that was created in the mind of petitioner Pajarillo as he saw Evangeline Tangco drawing a gun from
her purse was suddenly very real and the former merely reacted out of pure self-preservation.34
Considering that unlawful aggression on the part of Evangeline is absent, Pajarillo's claim of self-defense
cannot be accepted specially when such claim was uncorroborated by any separate competent evidence other
than his testimony which was even doubtful. Pajarillo's apprehension that Evangeline will shoot him to stage a
bank robbery has no basis at all. It is therefore clear that the alleged threat of bank robbery was just a figment of
Pajarillo's imagination which caused such unfounded unlawful aggression on his part.
Petitioners argue that Evangeline was guilty of contributory negligence. Although she was a licensed firearm
holder, she had no business bringing the gun in such establishment where people would react instinctively upon
seeing the gun; that had Evangeline been prudent, she could have warned Pajarillo before drawing the gun and
did not conduct herself with suspicion by roaming outside the vicinity of the bank; that she should not have held
the gun with the nozzle pointed at Pajarillo who mistook the act as hold up or robbery.
We are not persuaded.
As we have earlier held, Pajarillo failed to substantiate his claim that Evangeline was seen roaming outside the
vicinity of the bank and acting suspiciously prior to the shooting incident. Evangeline's death was merely due to
Pajarillo's negligence in shooting her on his imagined threat that Evangeline will rob the bank.
Safeguard contends that it cannot be jointly held liable since it had adequately shown that it had exercised the
diligence required in the selection and supervision of its employees. It claims that it had required the guards to
undergo the necessary training and to submit the requisite qualifications and credentials which even the RTC
found to have been complied with; that the RTC erroneously found that it did not exercise the diligence required
in the supervision of its employee. Safeguard further claims that it conducts monitoring of the activities of its
personnel, wherein supervisors are assigned to routinely check the activities of the security guards which
include among others, whether or not they are in their proper post and with proper equipment, as well as regular
evaluations of the employees' performances; that the fact that Pajarillo loaded his firearm contrary to
Safeguard's operating procedure is not sufficient basis to say that Safeguard had failed its duty of proper
supervision; that it was likewise error to say that Safeguard was negligent in seeing to it that the procedures and
policies were not properly implemented by reason of one unfortunate event.
We are not convinced.
Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
 xxxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or
industry.
xxxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that
they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
As the employer of Pajarillo, Safeguard is primarily and solidarily liable for the quasi-delict committed by the
former. Safeguard is presumed to be negligent in the selection and supervision of his employee by operation of
law. This presumption may be overcome only by satisfactorily showing that the employer exercised the care and
the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and the supervision of its employee.
In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as to their qualifications,
experience, and service records.35 On the other hand, due diligence in the supervision of employees includes the
formulation of suitable rules and regulations for the guidance of employees and the issuance of proper
instructions intended for the protection of the public and persons with whom the employer has relations through
his or its employees and the imposition of necessary disciplinary measures upon employees in case of breach or
as may be warranted to ensure the performance of acts indispensable to the business of and beneficial to their
employer. To this, we add that actual implementation and monitoring of consistent compliance with said rules
should be the constant concern of the employer, acting through dependable supervisors who should regularly
report on their supervisory functions.36 To establish these factors in a trial involving the issue of vicarious
liability, employers must submit concrete proof, including documentary evidence.
We agree with the RTC's finding that Safeguard had exercised the diligence in the selection of Pajarillo since
the record shows that Pajarillo underwent a psychological and neuro-psychiatric evaluation conducted by the St.
Martin de Porres Center where no psychoses ideations were noted, submitted a certification on the Pre-licensing
training course for security guards, as well as police and NBI clearances.
The RTC did not err in ruling that Safeguard fell short of the diligence required in the supervision of its
employee, particularly Pajarillo. In this case, while Safeguard presented Capt. James Camero, its Director for
Operations, who testified on the issuance of company rules and regulations, such as the Guidelines of Guards
Who Will Be Assigned To Banks,37 Weapons Training,38 Safeguard Training Center Marksmanship Training
Lesson Plan,39Disciplinary/Corrective Sanctions,40 it had also been established during Camero's cross-
examination that Pajarillo was not aware of such rules and regulations. 41 Notwithstanding Camero's clarification
on his re-direct examination that these company rules and regulations are lesson plans as a basis of guidelines of
the instructors during classroom instructions and not necessary to give students copy of the same,42 the records
do not show that Pajarillo had attended such classroom instructions.
The records also failed to show that there was adequate training and continuous evaluation of the security
guard's performance. Pajarillo had only attended an in-service training on March 1, 1997 conducted by Toyota
Sta. Rosa, his first assignment as security guard of Safeguard, which was in collaboration with Safeguard. It was
established that the concept of such training was purely on security of equipments to be guarded and protection
of the life of the employees.43
It had not been established that after Pajarillo's training in Toyota, Safeguard had ever conducted further
training of Pajarillo when he was later assigned to guard a bank which has a different nature of business with
that of Toyota. In fact, Pajarillo testified that being on duty in a bank is different from being on duty in a factory
since a bank is a very sensitive area.44
Moreover, considering his reactions to Evangeline's act of just depositing her firearm for safekeeping, i.e., of
immediately shooting her, confirms that there was no training or seminar given on how to handle bank clients
and on human psychology.
Furthermore, while Safeguard would like to show that there were inspectors who go around the bank two times
a day to see the daily performance of the security guards assigned therein, there was no record ever presented of
such daily inspections. In fact, if there was really such inspection made, the alleged suspicious act of Evangeline
could have been taken noticed and reported.
Turning now to the award of damages, we find that the award of actual damages in the amount P157,430.00
which were the expenses incurred by respondents in connection with the burial of Evangeline were supported
by receipts. The award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of Evangeline is likewise in order.
As to the award of moral damages, Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides that the spouse, legitimate children
and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by
reason of the death of the deceased. Moral damages are awarded to enable the injured party to obtain means,
diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he/she has undergone, by reason of the
defendant's culpable action. Its award is aimed at restoration, as much as possible, of the spiritual status quo
ante; thus it must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted. 45 The intensity of the pain experienced by the
relatives of the victim is proportionate to the intensity of affection for him and bears no relation whatsoever
with the wealth or means of the offender.46
In this case, respondents testified as to their moral suffering caused by Evangeline's death was so sudden
causing respondent Lauro to lose a wife and a mother to six children who were all minors at the time of her
death. In People v. Teehankee, Jr.,47 we awarded one million pesos as moral damages to the heirs of a
seventeen-year-old girl who was murdered. In Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals,48 we
likewise awarded the amount of one million pesos as moral damages to the parents of a third year high school
student and who was also their youngest child who died in a vehicular accident since the girl's death left a void
in their lives. Hence, we hold that the respondents are also entitled to the amount of one million pesos as
Evangeline's death left a void in the lives of her husband and minor children as they were deprived of her love
and care by her untimely demise.
We likewise uphold the award of exemplary damages in the amount of P300,000.00. Under Article 2229 of the
Civil Code, exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to
moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. 49 It is awarded as a deterrent to socially deleterious
actions. In quasi-delict, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence. 50

Pursuant to Article 2208 of the Civil Code, attorney's fees may be recovered when, as in the instant case,
exemplary damages are awarded. Hence, we affirm the award of attorney's fees in the amount of P30,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The Decision dated July 16, 2004 of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the civil liability of petitioner Safeguard Security Agency, Inc.
is SOLIDARYand PRIMARY under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, (Working Chairperson), Callejo Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
Panganiban, C.J., Retired as of December 7, 2006.
12
Revised Penal Code, Art. 102. Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavern-keepers and
proprietors of establishments. - In default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavern-keepers,
and any other persons or corporations shall be civilly liable for crimes committed in their
establishments, in all cases where a violation of municipal ordinances or some general or special police
regulations shall have been committed by them or their employees.
Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft within their
houses from guests lodging therein, or for the payment of the value thereof, provided that such guests
shall have notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or the person representing him, of the deposits of
such goods within the inn; and shall furthermore have followed the directions which such innkeeper or
his representative may have given them with respect to the care of and vigilance over such goods. No
liability shall attach in case of robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons unless
committed by the innkeeper's employees.

Art. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. — The subsidiary liability established in the next
preceding article shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any
Footnotes kind of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees
in the discharge of their duties.
1
CA rollo, pp. 127-135; Penned by Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and concurred in by Justices
Josefina Guevara-Salonga and Fernanda Lampas Peralta. 13
Cancio, Jr. v. Isip, 440 Phil. 29, 34-36 (2002).
2
Id. at 158. 14
Dulay v. Court of Appeals, 313 Phil. 8, 20 (1995), citing Republic v. Estenzo, G.R. No. L-35512,
February 29, 1988, 158 SCRA 282, 285.
3
Penned by Judge Percival Mandap Lopez.
15
Id. citing De Tavera v. Philippine Tuberculosis Society, Inc., 197 Phil. 919, 926 (1982).
4
Docketed as G.R. CR No. 23947; Penned by Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis and concurred in by
Justices Godardo A. Jacinto (retired) and Eliezer R. delos Santos. 16
Records, pp. 3-4.
5
Records, pp. 1-5; Docketed as Case No. 98-417-MK. 17
Supra note 14, at 20-21.
6
Id. at 21-30. 18
Bordas v. Canadalla, G.R. No. L-30036, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 37, 39.
7
Id. at 320-336. 19
G.R. No. L-32055, February 26, 1988, 158 SCRA 168.
8
Id. at 336. 20
Id. at 170-171.
9
CA rollo, p.134. 21
McKee v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 68102, July 16, 1992, 211 SCRA 517, 536.
10
Rollo, p. 16. 22
Id.
11
Civil Code, Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or 23
Yambao v. Zuñiga, 463 Phil. 650, 657 (2003).
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of
this Chapter.
24 44
Child Learning Center Inc. v. Tagorio, G.R. No. 150920, November 25, 2005, 476 SCRA 236, 241- TSN, April 4, 2002, p. 83.
242.
45
Pleyto v. Lomboy, G.R. No. 148737, June 16, 2004, 432 SCRA 329, 342.
25
TSN, October 1, 1998, p. 33; TSN, November 12, 1998, p. 6.
46
Secosa v. Heirs of Erwin Suarez Francisco, G.R. No. 160039, June 29, 2004, 433 SCRA 273, 282.
26
TSN, April 4, 2002, p. 36.
47
319 Phil. 128, 216 (1995).
27
Id. at 79.
48
Supra note 35, at 44.
28
Id. at 42.
49
Civil Code, Art. 2229.
29
Id. at 40-41.
50
Civil Code, Art. 2231.
30
Id. at 99.

31
Castañares v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. L-41269-70, August 6, 1979, 92 SCRA 568, 580.

32
Rollo, p.17.

33
Id. at 18.

34
Id. at 19.

35
Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 359 Phil. 18, 32 (1998).

36
Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104408, June 21, 1993, 223 SCRA
521, 540-541.

37
Records, pp. 263-267, Exhibit "10".

38
Id. at 268-270, Exhibit "11".

39
Id. at 271-274, Exhibit "12".

40
Id. at 275-279, Exhibit "13.

41
TSN, April 11, 2000, p. 26.

42
Id. at 30-31.

43
TSN, May 19, 1999, pp. 15-16.