Thomas Aquinas - Contra Gentiles - English - Our GOD

5/4/2016 Thomas Aquinas: Contra Gentiles: English
CONTRA GENTILES
BOOK ONE: GOD
translated by
Anton C. Pegis

CONTENTS
1. The office of the wise man 50. That God has a proper knowledge
2. The author’s intention in the of all things
present work 51. Arguments inquiring how a
3. On the way in which divine truth is multitude of intellectual objects is in
to be made known the divine intellect
4. That the truth about God to which 52. Continued
the natural reason reaches is 53. The solution of the above difficulty
fittingly proposed to men for belief 54. How the divine essence, being one
5. That the truths the human reason and simple, is the proper likeness of
is not able to investigate are all intelligible objects
fittingly proposed to men for belief 55. That God understands all things
6. That to give assent to the truths of together
faith is not foolishness even 56. That God’s knowledge is not
though they are above reason habitual
7. That the truth of reason is not 57. That God’s knowledge is not
opposed to the truth of the discursive
Christian faith 58. That God does not understand by
8. How the human reason is related composing and dividing
to the truth of faith 59. That the truth of enunciables; is not
9. The order and manner of excluded from God
procedure in the present work 60. That God is truth
10. The opinion of those who say that 61. That God is the purest truth
the existence of God, being self 62. That the divine truth is the first and
evident, cannot be demonstrated highest truth
11. A refutation of the above 63. The arguments of those who wish to
mentioned opinion and a solution take away the knowledge of
of the arguments singulars from God
12. The opinion of those who say that 64. The order of what is to be said on
the existence of God cannot be the divine knowledge
demonstrated but is held by faith 65. That God knows singulars
alone 66. That God knows the things that are
13. Arguments in proof of the not
existence of God 67. That God knows future contingent
14. That to know God we must use the singulars;
way of remotion 68. That God knows the motions of the
15. That God is eternal will
16. That there is no passive potency in 69. That God knows infinite things
God 70. That God knows lowly things
http://dhspriory.org/thomas/ContraGentiles1.htm 1/270
17. That there is no matter in God 71. That God knows evils
18. That there is no composition in 72. That God has will
God 73. That the will of God is His essence
19. That in God there is nothing violent 74. That the principal object of the
or unnatural divine will is the divine essence
20. That God is not a body 75. That in willing Himself God also wills
21. That God is His essence other things
22. That in God being and essence 76. That God wills Himself and other
are the same things by one act of will
23. That no accident is found in God 77. That the multitude of the objects of
24. That the divine being cannot be the will is not opposed to the divine
determined by the addition of simplicity
some substantial difference 78. That the divine will extends to
25. That God is not in some genus singular goods
26. That God is not the formal being of 79. That God wills even the things that
all things are not yet
27. That God is not the form of any 80. That His own being and His own
body goodness God wills necessarily
28. The divine perfection 81. That God does not will other things
29. The likeness of creatures to God in a necessary way
30. The names that can be predicated 82. Arguments leading to awkward
of God consequences if God does not
31. That the divine perfection and the necessarily will things other than
plurality of divine names are not Himself
opposed to the divine simplicity 83. That God wills something other than
32. That nothing is predicated Himself with the necessity of
univocally of God and other things supposition
33. That not all names are said of God 84. That the will of God is not of what is
and creatures in a purely equivocal in itself impossible
way 85. That the divine will does not remove
34. That names said of God and contingency from things, nor does it
creatures are said analogically impose absolute necessity on them
35. That many names said of God are 86. That a reason can be assigned to
not synonyms the divine Will
36. How our intellect forms a 87. That nothing can be the cause of
proposition about God the divine Will
37. That God is good 88. That in God there is free choice
38. That God is goodness itself 89. That in God there are not the
39. That there cannot be evil in God passions of the appetites
40. That God is the good of every 90. That in God there are delight and
good joy, but they are not opposed to the
41. That God is the highest good divine perfection
42. That God is one 91. That in God there is love
43. That God is infinite 92. How virtues may be held to be in
44. That God is intelligent God
45. That God’s act of understanding is 93. That in God there are the moral
His essence virtues that deal with actions
46. That God understands through 94. That in God there are contemplative
nothing other than through His virtues
essence 95. That God cannot will evil
47. That God understands Himself 96. That God hates nothing, and the
perfectly hatred of no thing befits Him
48. That primarily and essentially God 97. That God is living
knows only Himself 98. That God is His life
49. That God understands things other 99. That the life of God is everlasting
than Himself 100. That God is blessed
101. That God is His blessedness
102. That the perfect and unique
blessedness of God excels every
other blessedness
Caput 1 Chapter 1
Quod sit officium sapientis THE OFFICE OF THE WISE MAN
Veritatem meditabitur guttur meum, “My mouth shall meditate truth, and my

et labia mea detestabuntur impium. lips shall hate impiety” (Prov. 8:7).
Prov. 87.
Multitudinis usus, quem in rebus [1] The usage of the multitude, which
nominandis sequendum according to the Philosopher is to be
philosophus censet, communiter followed in giving names to things, has
obtinuit ut sapientes dicantur qui commonly held that they are to be called
res directe ordinant et eas bene wise who order things rightly and govern
gubernant. Unde inter alia quae them well. Hence, among other things
homines de sapiente concipiunt, a that men have conceived about the wise
philosopho ponitur quod sapientis man, the Philosopher includes the notion
est ordinare. Omnium autem that “it belongs to the wise man to order.”
ordinatorum ad finem, Now, the rule of government and order
gubernationis et ordinis regulam ex for all things directed to an end must be
fine sumi necesse est: tunc enim taken from the end. For, since the end of
unaquaeque res optime disponitur each thing is its good, a thing is then
cum ad suum finem convenienter best disposed when it is fittingly ordered
ordinatur; finis enim est bonum to its end. And so we see among the arts
uniuscuiusque. Unde videmus in that one functions as the governor and
artibus unam alterius esse the ruler of another because it controls
gubernativam et quasi principem, its end. Thus, the art of medicine rules
ad quam pertinet eius finis: sicut and orders the art of the chemist
medicinalis ars pigmentariae because health, with which medicine is
principatur et eam ordinat, propter concerned, is the end of all the
hoc quod sanitas, circa quam medications prepared by the art of the
medicinalis versatur, finis est chemist. A similar situation obtains in the
omnium pigmentorum, quae arte art of ship navigation in relation to
pigmentaria conficiuntur. Et simile shipbuilding, and in the military art with
apparet in arte gubernatoria respect to the equestrian art and the
respectu navifactivae; et in militari equipment of war. The arts that rule
respectu equestris et omnis bellici other arts are called architectonic, as
apparatus. Quae quidem artes aliis being the ruling arts. That is why the

principantes architectonicae artisans devoted to these arts, who are
nominantur, quasi principales called master artisans, appropriate to
artes: unde et earum artifices, qui themselves the name of wise men.
architectores vocantur, nomen sibi But, since these artisans are concerned,
vindicant sapientum. in each case, with the ends of certain
Quia vero praedicti artifices, particular things, they do not reach to the
singularium quarundam rerum universal end of all things. They are
fines pertractantes, ad finem therefore said to be wise with respect to
universalem omnium non this or that thing; in which sense it is said
pertingunt, dicuntur quidem that “as a wise architect, I have laid the
sapientes huius vel illius rei, foundation” (1 Cor. 3:10). The name of
secundum quem modum dicitur 1 the absolutely wise man, however, is
Cor. 310, ut sapiens architectus, reserved for him whose consideration is
fundamentum posui; nomen autem directed to the end of the universe, which
simpliciter sapientis illi soli is also the origin of the universe. That is
reservatur cuius consideratio circa why, according to the Philosopher, it
finem universi versatur, qui item est belongs to the wise man to consider the
universitatis principium; unde highest causes.
secundum philosophum, sapientis
est causas altissimas considerare.
Finis autem ultimus uniuscuiusque [2] Now, the end of each thing is that
rei est qui intenditur a primo which is intended by its first author or
auctore vel motore ipsius. Primus mover. But the first author and mover of
autem auctor et motor universi est the universe is an intellect, as will be
intellectus, ut infra ostendetur. later shown. The ultimate end of the
Oportet igitur ultimum finem universe must, therefore, be the good of
universi esse bonum intellectus. an intellect. This good is truth. Truth
Hoc autem est veritas. Oportet must consequently be the ultimate end of
igitur veritatem esse ultimum finem the whole universe, and the
totius universi; et circa eius consideration of the wise man aims
considerationem principaliter principally at truth. So it is that, according
sapientiam insistere. Et ideo ad to His own statement, divine Wisdom
veritatis manifestationem divina testifies that He has assumed flesh and
sapientia carne induta se venisse come into the world in order to make the
in mundum testatur, dicens, Ioan. truth known: “For this was I born, and for
1837: ego in hoc natus sum, et ad this came I into the world, that I should
hoc veni in mundum, ut give testimony to the truth” (John 18:37).
testimonium perhibeam veritati. The Philosopher himself establishes that
Sed et primam philosophiam first philosophy is the science of truth,
philosophus determinat esse not of any truth, but of that truth which is
scientiam veritatis; non cuiuslibet, the origin of all truth, namely, which
sed eius veritatis quae est origo belongs to the first principle whereby all
omnis veritatis, scilicet quae things are. The truth belonging to such a
pertinet ad primum principium principle is, clearly, the source of all
essendi omnibus; unde et sua truth; for things have the same
veritas est omnis veritatis disposition in truth as in being.
principium; sic enim est dispositio
rerum in veritate sicut in esse.
Eiusdem autem est unum [3] It belongs to one and the same
contrariorum prosequi et aliud science, however, both to pursue one of
refutare sicut medicina, quae two contraries and to oppose the other.
sanitatem operatur, aegritudinem Medicine, for example, seeks to effect
excludit. Unde sicut sapientis est health and to eliminate illness. Hence,
veritatem praecipue de primo just as it belongs to the wise man to
principio meditari et aliis disserere, meditate especially on the truth
ita eius est falsitatem contrariam belonging to the first principle and to
impugnare. teach it to others, so it belongs to him to
refute the opposing falsehood.
Convenienter ergo ex ore [4] Appropriately, therefore, is the twofold

sapientiae duplex sapientis office of the wise man shown from the
officium in verbis propositis mouth of Wisdom in our opening words:
demonstratur: scilicet veritatem to meditate and speak forth of the divine
divinam, quae antonomastice est truth, which is truth in person (Wisdom
veritas, meditatam eloqui, quod touches on this in the words my mouth
tangit cum dicit, veritatem shall meditate truth), and to refute the
meditabitur guttur meum; et opposing error (which Wisdom touches
errorem contra veritatem on in the words and my lips shall hate
impugnare, quod tangit cum dicit, impiety). By impiety is here meant
et labia mea detestabuntur impium, falsehood against the divine truth. This
per quod falsitas contra divinam falsehood is contrary to religion, which is
veritatem designatur, quae religioni likewise named piety. Hence, the
contraria est, quae etiam pietas falsehood contrary to it is called impiety.
nominatur, unde et falsitas
contraria ei impietatis sibi nomen
assumit.
Caput 2 Chapter 2
Quae sit in hoc opere THE AUTHOR’S INTENTION IN THE
auctoris intentio PRESENT WORK
Inter omnia vero hominum [1] Among all human pursuits, the pursuit of
studia sapientiae studium est wisdom is more perfect, more noble, more
perfectius, sublimius, utilius et useful, and more full of joy.
iucundius.
Perfectius quidem, quia It is more perfect because, in so far as a man

inquantum homo sapientiae gives himself to the pursuit of wisdom, so far
studium dat, intantum verae does he even now have some share in true
beatitudinis iam aliquam beatitude. And so a wise man has said:
partem habet unde sapiens “Blessed is the man that shall continue in
dicit, beatus vir qui in sapientia wisdom” (Sirach 14:22).
morabitur, Eccli. 1422.
Sublimius autem est quia per It is more noble because through this pursuit

ipsum homo praecipue ad man especially approaches to a likeness to
divinam similitudinem accedit, God Who “made all things in wisdom” (Ps.
quae omnia in sapientia fecit: 103:24). And since likeness is the cause of
unde, quia similitudo causa love, the pursuit of wisdom especially joins
est dilectionis, sapientiae man to God in friendship. That is why it is
studium praecipue Deo per said of wisdom that “she is an infinite treasure
amicitiam coniungit; propter to men! which they that use become the
quod Sap. 714 dicitur quod friends of God” (Wis. 7:14).
sapientia infinitus thesaurus
est hominibus, quo qui usi
sunt, facti sunt participes
amicitiae Dei.
Utilius autem est quia per It is more useful because through wisdom we

ipsam sapientiam ad arrive at the kingdom of immortality. For “the
immortalitatis regnum desire of wisdom leads to the everlasting
pervenitur: concupiscentia kingdom” (Wis. 6:21).
enim sapientiae deducet ad
regnum perpetuum, Sap. 621.
Iucundius autem est quia non It is more full of joy because “her
habet amaritudinem conversation has no bitterness, nor her
conversatio illius nec taedium company any tediousness, but joy and
convictus illius, sed laetitiam gladness” (Wis. 7:16).
et gaudium, Sap. 816.
Assumpta igitur ex divina [2] And so, in the name of the divine Mercy, I

pietate fiducia sapientis have the confidence to embark upon the work
officium prosequendi, quamvis of a wise man, even though this may surpass
proprias vires excedat, my powers, and I have set myself the task of
propositum nostrae intentionis making known, as far as my limited powers
est veritatem quam fides will allow, the truth that the Catholic faith
Catholica profitetur, pro nostro professes, and of setting aside the errors that
modulo manifestare, errores are opposed to it. To use the words of Hilary:
eliminando contrarios: ut enim “I am aware that I owe this to God as the
verbis Hilarii utar, ego hoc vel chief duty of my life, that my every word and
praecipuum vitae meae sense may speak of Him” [De Trinitate I, 37].
officium debere me Deo
conscius sum, ut eum omnis
sermo meus et sensus
loquatur.
Contra singulorum autem [3] To proceed against individual errors,

errores difficile est procedere, however, is a difficult business, and this for
propter duo. Primo, quia non two reasons. In the first place, it is difficult
ita sunt nobis nota singulorum because the sacrilegious remarks of
errantium dicta sacrilega ut ex individual men who have erred are not so well
his quae dicunt possimus known to us so that we may use what they
rationes assumere ad eorum say as the basis of proceeding to a refutation
errores destruendos. Hoc of their errors. This is, indeed, the method
enim modo usi sunt antiqui that the ancient Doctors of the Church used
doctores in destructionem in the refutation of the errors of the Gentiles.
errorum gentilium quorum For they could know the positions taken by
positiones scire poterant quia the Gentiles since they themselves had been
et ipsi gentiles fuerant, vel Gentiles, or at least had lived among the
saltem inter gentiles Gentiles and had been instructed in their
conversati et in eorum teaching.
doctrinis eruditi.
In the second place, it is difficult because

Secundo, quia quidam eorum, some of them, such as the Mohammedans
ut Mahumetistae et Pagani, and the pagans, do not agree with us in
non conveniunt nobiscum in accepting the authority of any Scripture, by
auctoritate alicuius Scripturae, which they may be convinced of their error.
per quam possint convinci, Thus, against the Jews we are able to argue
sicut contra Iudaeos disputare by means of the Old Testament, while against
possumus per vetus heretics we are able to argue by means of the
testamentum, contra New Testament. But the Muslims and the
haereticos per novum. Hi vero pagans accept neither the one nor the other.
neutrum recipiunt. Unde We must, therefore, have recourse to the
necesse est ad naturalem natural reason, to which all men are forced to
rationem recurrere, cui omnes give their assent. However, it is true, in divine
assentire coguntur. Quae matters the natural reason has its failings.
tamen in rebus divinis
deficiens est.
Simul autem veritatem [4] Now, while we are investigating some
aliquam investigantes given truth, we shall also show what errors
ostendemus qui errores per are set aside by it; and we shall likewise
eam excludantur: et quomodo show how the truth that we come to know by
demonstrativa veritas, fidei demonstration is in accord with the Christian
Christianae religionis religion.
concordet.
Caput 3 Chapter 3
Quis modus sit possibilis ON THE WAY IN WHICH DIVINE TRUTH
divinae veritatis manifestandae IS TO BE MADE KNOWN
Quia vero non omnis veritatis [1] The way of making truth known is not
manifestandae modus est idem; always the same, and, as the Philosopher
disciplinati autem hominis est has very well said, “it belongs to an
tantum de unoquoque fidem educated man to seek such certitude in
capere tentare, quantum natura each thing as the nature of that thing
rei permittit, ut a philosopho, allows.” The remark is also introduced by
optime dictum Boetius introducit, Boethius [De Trinitate II]. But, since such is
necesse est prius ostendere quis the case, we must first show what way is

modus sit possibilis ad veritatem open to us in order that we may make
propositam manifestandam. known the truth which is our object.
Est autem in his quae de Deo [2] There is a twofold mode of truth in what

confitemur duplex veritatis we profess about God. Some truths about
modus. Quaedam namque vera God exceed all the ability of the human
sunt de Deo quae omnem reason. Such is the truth that God is
facultatem humanae rationis triune. But there are some truths which the
excedunt, ut Deum esse trinum natural reason also is able to reach. Such
et unum. Quaedam vero sunt ad are that God exists, that He is one, and
quae etiam ratio naturalis the like. In fact, such truths about God
pertingere potest, sicut est Deum have been proved demonstratively by the
esse, Deum esse unum, et alia philosophers, guided by the light of the
huiusmodi; quae etiam philosophi natural reason.
demonstrative de Deo
probaverunt, ducti naturalis
lumine rationis.
Quod autem sint aliqua [3] That there are certain truths about God

intelligibilium divinorum quae that totally surpass man’s ability appears
humanae rationis penitus with the greatest evidence.
excedant ingenium, Since, indeed, the principle of all
evidentissime apparet. knowledge that the reason perceives
Cum enim principium totius about some thing is the understanding of
scientiae quam de aliqua re ratio the very substance of that being (for
percipit, sit intellectus substantiae according to Aristotle “what a thing is” is
ipsius, eo quod, secundum the principle of demonstration) [Posterior
doctrinam philosophi Analytics II, 3], it is necessary that the way
demonstrationis principium est in which we understand the substance of a
quod quid est; oportet quod thing determines the way in which we
secundum modum quo know what belongs to it. Hence, if the
substantia rei intelligitur, sit human intellect comprehends the
modus eorum quae de re illa substance of some thing, for example, that
cognoscuntur. Unde si intellectus of a stone or of a triangle, no intelligible
humanus, alicuius rei characteristic belonging to that thing
substantiam comprehendit, puta surpasses the grasp of the human reason.
lapidis vel trianguli, nullum But this does not happen to us in the case
intelligibilium illius rei facultatem of God. For the human intellect is not able
humanae rationis excedet. Quod to reach a comprehension of the divine
quidem nobis circa Deum non substance through its natural power. For,
accidit. Nam ad substantiam according to its manner of knowing in the
ipsius capiendam intellectus present life, the intellect depends on the
humanus naturali virtute sense for the origin of knowledge; and so
pertingere non potest: cum those things that do not fall under the
intellectus nostri, secundum senses cannot be grasped by the human
modum praesentis vitae, cognitio intellect except in so far as the knowledge
a sensu incipiat; et ideo ea quae of them is gathered from sensible things.
in sensu non cadunt, non Now, sensible things cannot lead the
possunt humano intellectu capi, human intellect to the point of seeing in
nisi quatenus ex sensibilibus them the nature of the divine substance;
earum cognitio colligitur. for sensible things are effects that fall short
Sensibilia autem ad hoc ducere of the power of their cause. Yet, beginning
intellectum nostrum non possunt with sensible things, our intellect is led to
ut in eis divina substantia the point of knowing about God that He
videatur quid sit: cum sint exists, and other such characteristics that
effectus causae virtutem non must be attributed to the First Principle.
aequantes. Ducitur tamen ex There are, consequently, some intelligible
sensibilibus intellectus noster in truths about God that are open to the
divinam cognitionem ut human reason; but there are others that
cognoscat de Deo quia est, et absolutely surpass its power.
alia huiusmodi quae oportet
attribui primo principio. Sunt igitur
quaedam intelligibilium divinorum
quae humanae rationi sunt
pervia; quaedam vero quae
omnino vim humanae rationis
excedunt.
Adhuc ex intellectuum gradibus [4] We may easily see the same point from

idem facile est videre. Duorum the gradation of intellects. Consider the
enim quorum unus alio rem case of two persons of whom one has a
aliquam intellectu subtilius more penetrating grasp of a thing by his
intuetur, ille cuius intellectus est intellect than, does the other. He who has
elevatior, multa intelligit quae the superior intellect understands many
alius omnino capere non potest: things that the other cannot grasp at all.
sicut patet in rustico, qui nullo Such is the case with a very simple person
modo philosophiae subtiles who cannot at all grasp the subtle
considerationes capere potest. speculations of philosophy. But the
Intellectus autem Angeli plus intellect of an angel surpasses the human
excedit intellectum humanum intellect much more than the intellect of
quam intellectus optimi the greatest philosopher surpasses the
philosophi intellectum rudissimi intellect of the most uncultivated simple
idiotae: quia haec distantia inter person; for the distance between the best
speciei humanae limites philosopher and a simple person is
continetur, quos angelicus contained within the limits of the human
intellectus excedit. Cognoscit species, which the angelic intellect
quidem Angelus Deum ex surpasses. For the angel knows God on
nobiliori effectu quam homo: the basis of a more noble effect than does
quanto ipsa substantia Angeli, man; and this by as much as the
per quam in Dei cognitionem substance of an angel, through which the
ducitur naturali cognitione, est angel in his natural knowledge is led to the
dignior rebus sensibilibus et knowledge of God, is nobler than sensible
etiam ipsa anima, per quam things and even than the soul itself,
intellectus humanus in Dei through which the human intellect mounts
cognitionem ascendit. Multoque to the knowledge of God. The divine
amplius intellectus divinus intellect surpasses the angelic intellect
excedit angelicum quam much more than the angelic surpasses the
angelicus humanum. Ipse enim human. For the divine intellect is in its
intellectus divinus sua capacitate capacity equal to its substance, and
substantiam suam adaequat, et therefore it understands fully what it is,
ideo perfecte de se intelligit quid including all its intelligible attributes. But by
est, et omnia cognoscit quae de his natural knowledge the angel does not
ipso intelligibilia sunt: non autem know what God is, since the substance
naturali cognitione Angelus de itself of the angel, through which he is led
Deo cognoscit quid est, quia et to the knowledge of God, is an effect that
ipsa substantia Angeli, per quam is not equal to the power of its cause.
in Dei cognitionem ducitur, est Hence, the angel is not able, by means of
effectus causae virtutem non his natural knowledge, to grasp all the
adaequans. Unde non omnia things that God understands in Himself;
quae in seipso Deus intelligit, nor is the human reason sufficient to grasp
Angelus naturali cognitione all the things that the angel understands
capere potest: nec ad omnia through his own natural power. Just as,
quae Angelus sua naturali virtute therefore, it would he the height of folly for
intelligit, humana ratio sufficit a simple person to assert that what a
capienda. Sicut igitur maximae philosopher proposes is false on the
amentiae esset idiota qui ea ground that he himself cannot understand
quae a philosopho proponuntur it, so (and even more so) it is the acme of
falsa esse assereret propter hoc stupidity for a man to suspect as false
quod ea capere non potest, ita, et what is divinely revealed through the
multo amplius, nimiae stultitiae ministry of the angels simply because it
est homo si ea quae divinitus cannot be investigated by reason.
Angelorum ministerio revelantur
falsa esse suspicatur ex hoc
quod ratione investigari non
possunt.
Adhuc idem manifeste apparet ex [5] The same thing, moreover, appears

defectu quem in rebus quite clearly from the defect that we
cognoscendis quotidie experimur. experience every day in our knowledge of
Rerum enim sensibilium plurimas things. We do not know a great many of
proprietates ignoramus, the properties of sensible things, and in
earumque proprietatum quas most cases we are not able to discover
sensu apprehendimus rationes fully the natures of those properties that
perfecte in pluribus invenire non we apprehend by the sense. Much more is
possumus. Multo igitur amplius it the case, therefore, that the human
illius excellentissimae reason is not equal to the task of
substantiae omnia intelligibilia investigating all the intelligible
humana ratio investigare non characteristics of that most excellent
sufficit. substance.
Huic etiam consonat dictum [6] The remark of Aristotle likewise agrees

philosophi, qui in II Metaphys. with this conclusion. He says that “our
asserit quod intellectus noster se intellect is related to the prime beings,
habet ad prima entium, quae sunt which are most evident in their nature, as
manifestissima in natura, sicut the eye of an owl is related to the sun”
oculus vespertilionis ad solem. [Metaphysics Ia, 1]
Huic etiam veritati sacra [7] Sacred Scripture also gives testimony
Scriptura testimonium perhibet. to this truth. We read in Job: “Do you think

Dicitur enim Iob 117: forsitan you can comprehend the depths of God,
vestigia Dei comprehendes, et and find the limit of the Almighty?” (11:7).
omnipotentem usque ad And again: “Behold, God is great,
perfectum reperies? Et 3626: exceeding our knowledge” (Job 36:26).
ecce, Deus magnus, vincens And St. Paul: “We know in part” (1 Cor.
scientiam nostram. Et 1 Cor. 13 13:9).
9: ex parte cognoscimus.
Non igitur omne quod de Deo [8] We should not, therefore, immediately
dicitur, quamvis ratione reject as false, following the opinion of the
investigari non possit, statim Manicheans and many unbelievers,
quasi falsum abiiciendum est, ut everything that is said about God even
Manichaei et plures infidelium though it cannot be investigated by
putaverunt. reason.
Caput 4 Chapter 4
Quod veritas divinorum ad THAT THE TRUTH ABOUT GOD TO
quam naturalis ratio pertingit WHICH THE NATURAL REASON
convenienter hominibus REACHES
credenda proponitur IS FITTINGLY PROPOSED TO MEN
FOR BELIEF
Duplici igitur veritate divinorum [1] Since, therefore, there exists a twofold

intelligibilium existente, una ad truth concerning the divine being, one to
quam rationis inquisitio pertingere which the inquiry of the reason can reach,
potest, altera quae omne the other which surpasses the whole
ingenium humanae rationis ability of the human reason, it is fitting that
excedit, utraque convenienter both of these truths be proposed to man
divinitus homini credenda divinely for belief.
proponitur. This point must first be shown concerning
Hoc autem de illa primo the truth that is open to the inquiry of the
ostendendum est quae inquisitioni reason; otherwise, it might perhaps seem
rationis pervia esse potest: ne to someone that, since such a truth can
forte alicui videatur, ex quo be known by the reason, it was uselessly
ratione haberi potest, frustra id given to men through a supernatural
supernaturali inspiratione inspiration as an object of belief.
credendum traditum esse.
Sequerentur autem tria [2] Yet, if this truth were left solely as a
inconvenientia si huiusmodi matter of inquiry for the human reason,
veritas solummodo rationi three awkward consequences would
inquirenda relinqueretur. follow.
Unum est quod paucis hominibus [3] The first is that few men would

Dei cognitio inesset. A fructu enim possess the knowledge of God. For there
studiosae inquisitionis, qui est are three reasons why most men are cut
inventio veritatis, plurimi off from the fruit of diligent inquiry which is
impediuntur tribus de causis. the discovery of truth. Some do not have
Quidam siquidem propter the physical disposition for such work. As
complexionis indispositionem, ex a result, there are many who are naturally
qua multi naturaliter sunt not fitted to pursue knowledge; and so,
indispositi ad sciendum: unde however much they tried, they would be
nullo studio ad hoc pertingere unable to reach the highest level of
possent ut summum gradum human knowledge which consists in
humanae cognitionis attingerent, knowing God. Others are cut off from
qui in cognoscendo Deum pursuing this truth by the necessities
consistit. Quidam vero imposed upon them by their daily lives.
impediuntur necessitate rei For some men must devote themselves to
familiaris. Oportet enim esse inter taking care of temporal matters. Such
homines aliquos qui temporalibus men would not be able to give so much
administrandis insistant, qui time to the leisure of contemplative inquiry
tantum tempus in otio as to reach the highest peak at which
contemplativae inquisitionis non human investigation can arrive, namely,
possent expendere ut ad the knowledge of God. Finally, there are
summum fastigium humanae some who are cut off by indolence. In
inquisitionis pertingerent, scilicet order to know the things that the reason
Dei cognitionem. Quidam autem can investigate concerning God, a
impediuntur pigritia. Ad knowledge of many things must already
cognitionem enim eorum quae de be possessed. For almost all of
Deo ratio investigare potest, multa philosophy is directed towards the
praecognoscere oportet: cum fere knowledge of God, and that is why
totius philosophiae consideratio metaphysics, which deals with divine
ad Dei cognitionem ordinetur; things, is the last part of philosophy to be
propter quod metaphysica, quae learned. This means that we are able to
circa divina versatur, inter arrive at the inquiry concerning the
philosophiae partes ultima aforementioned truth only on the basis of
remanet addiscenda. Sic ergo a great deal of labor spent in study. Now,
non nisi cum magno labore studii those who wish to undergo such a labor
ad praedictae veritatis for the mere love of knowledge are few,
inquisitionem perveniri potest. even though God has inserted into the
Quem quidem laborem pauci minds of men a natural appetite for
subire volunt pro amore scientiae, knowledge.
cuius tamen mentibus hominum
naturalem Deus inseruit
appetitum.
Secundum inconveniens est quod [4] The second awkward effect is that

illi qui ad praedictae veritatis those who would come to discover the
inventionem pervenirent, vix post abovementioned truth would barely reach
longum tempus pertingerent. Tum it after a great deal of time. The reasons
propter huius veritatis are several. There is the profundity of this
profunditatem, ad quam truth, which the human intellect is made
capiendam per viam rationis non capable of grasping by natural inquiry only
nisi post longum exercitium after a long training. Then, there are many
intellectus humanus idoneus things that must be presupposed, as we
invenitur. Tum etiam propter multa have said. There is also the fact that, in

quae praeexiguntur, ut dictum est. youth, when the soul is swayed by the
Tum etiam propter hoc quod various movements of the passions, it is
tempore iuventutis, dum diversis not in a suitable state for the knowledge of
motibus passionum anima such lofty truth. On the contrary, “one
fluctuat, non est apta ad tam altae becomes wise and knowing in repose,” as
veritatis cognitionem, sed in it is said in the Physics [VII, 3]. The result
quiescendo fit prudens et sciens, is this. If the only way open to us for the
ut dicitur in VII Physic. Remaneret knowledge of God were solely that of the
igitur humanum genus, si sola reason, the human race would remain in
rationis via ad Deum the blackest shadows of ignorance. For
cognoscendum pateret, in then the knowledge of God, which
maximis ignorantiae tenebris: cum especially renders men perfect and good,
Dei cognitio, quae homines would come to be possessed only by a
maxime perfectos et bonos facit, few, and these few would require a great
non nisi quibusdam paucis, et his deal of time in order to reach it.
etiam post temporis longitudinem
proveniret.
Tertium inconveniens est quod [5] The third awkward effect is this. The
investigationi rationis humanae investigation of the human reason for the
plerumque falsitas admiscetur, most part has falsity present within it, and
propter debilitatem intellectus this is due partly to the weakness of our
nostri in iudicando, et intellect in judgment, and partly to the
phantasmatum permixtionem. Et admixture of images. The result is that
ideo apud multos in dubitatione many, remaining ignorant of the power of
remanerent ea quae sunt etiam demonstration, would hold in doubt those
verissime demonstrata, dum vim things that have been most truly
demonstrationis ignorant; et demonstrated. This would be particularly
praecipue cum videant a diversis the case since they see that, among those
qui sapientes dicuntur, diversa who are reputed to be wise men, each
doceri. Inter multa etiam vera one teaches his own brand of doctrine.
quae demonstrantur, immiscetur Furthermore, with the many truths that are
aliquando aliquid falsum, quod demonstrated, there sometimes is
non demonstratur, sed aliqua mingled something that is false, which is
probabili vel sophistica ratione not demonstrated but rather asserted on
asseritur, quae interdum the basis of some probable or sophistical
demonstratio reputatur. Et ideo argument, which yet has the credit of
oportuit per viam fidei fixam being a demonstration. That is why it was
certitudinem et puram veritatem necessary that the unshakeable certitude
de rebus divinis hominibus and pure truth concerning divine things
exhiberi. should be presented to men by way of
faith.
Salubriter ergo divina providit [6] Beneficially, therefore, did the divine
clementia ut ea etiam quae ratio Mercy provide that it should instruct us to
investigare potest, fide tenenda hold by faith even those truths that the
praeciperet: ut sic omnes de facili human reason is able to investigate. In
possent divinae cognitionis this way, all men would easily be able to
participes esse et absque have a share in the knowledge of God,
dubitatione et errore. and this without uncertainty and error.
Hinc est quod Ephes. 417 dicitur: [7] Hence it is written: “Henceforward walk
iam non ambuletis sicut et gentes not as the Gentiles walk in the vanity of
ambulant in vanitate sensus sui, their mind, having their understanding
tenebris obscuratum habentes darkened” (Eph. 4:1718). And again: “All
intellectum. Et Isaiae 5413: your children shall be taught of the Lord”
ponam universos filios tuos (Is. 54:13).
doctos a domino.
Caput 5 Chapter 5
Quod ea quae ratione THAT THE TRUTHS THE HUMAN
investigari non possunt REASON IS NOT ABLE TO
convenienter fide tenenda INVESTIGATE ARE FITTINGLY
hominibus proponuntur PROPOSED TO MEN FOR BELIEF
Videtur autem quibusdam [1] Now, perhaps some will think that men
fortasse non debere homini ad should not be asked to believe what the
credendum proponi illa quae reason is not adequate to investigate, since
ratio investigare non sufficit cum the divine Wisdom provides in the case of
divina sapientia unicuique each thing according to the mode of its
secundum modum suae naturae nature. We must therefore prove that it is
provideat. Et ideo necessary for man to receive from God as
demonstrandum est quod objects of belief even those truths that are
necessarium sit homini divinitus above the human reason.
credenda proponi etiam illa quae
rationem excedunt.
Nullus enim desiderio et studio [2] No one tends with desire and zeal
in aliquid tendit nisi sit ei towards something that is not already
praecognitum. Quia ergo ad known to him. But, as we shall examine
altius bonum quam experiri in later on in this work, men are ordained by
praesenti vita possit humana the divine Providence towards a higher
fragilitas, homines per divinam good than human fragility can experience in
providentiam ordinantur, ut in the present life. That is why it was
sequentibus investigabitur, necessary for the human mind to be called
oportuit mentem evocari in to something higher than the human reason
aliquid altius quam ratio nostra here and now can reach, so that it would
in praesenti possit pertingere, ut thus learn to desire something and with
sic disceret aliquid desiderare, et zeal tend towards something that
studio tendere in aliquid quod surpasses the whole state of the present
totum statum praesentis vitae life. This belongs especially to the Christian
excedit. Et hoc praecipue religion, which in a unique way promises
Christianae religioni competit, spiritual and eternal goods. And so there
quae singulariter bona spiritualia are many things proposed to men in it that
et aeterna promittit: unde et in transcend human sense. The Old Law, on
ea plurima humanum sensum the other hand, whose promises were of a
excedentia proponuntur. Lex temporal character, contained very few
autem vetus, quae temporalia proposals that transcended the inquiry of
promissa habebat, pauca the human reason. Following this same
proposuit quae humanae direction, the philosophers themselves, in
rationis inquisitionem order that they might lead men from the
excederent. Secundum etiam pleasure of sensible things to virtue, were
hunc modum philosophis cura concerned to show that there were in
fuit, ad hoc ut homines a existence other goods of a higher nature
sensibilium delectationibus ad than these things of sense, and that those
honestatem perducerent, who gave themselves to the active or
ostendere esse alia bona his contemplative virtues would find much
sensibilibus potiora, quorum sweeter enjoyment in the taste of these
gustu multo suavius qui vacant higher goods.
activis vel contemplativis
virtutibus delectantur.
Est etiam necessarium [3] It is also necessary that such truth be
huiusmodi veritatem ad proposed to men for belief so that they may
credendum hominibus proponi have a truer knowledge of God. For then
ad Dei cognitionem veriorem only do we know God truly when we
habendam. Tunc enim solum believe Him to be above everything that it is
Deum vere cognoscimus possible for man to think about Him; for, as
quando ipsum esse credimus we have shown, the divine substance
supra omne id quod de Deo surpasses the natural knowledge of which
cogitari ab homine possibile est: man is capable. Hence, by the fact that
eo quod naturalem hominis some things about God are proposed to
cognitionem divina substantia man that surpass his reason, there is
excedit, ut supra ostensum est. strengthened in man the view that God is
Per hoc ergo quod homini de something above what he can think.
Deo aliqua proponuntur quae
rationem excedunt, firmatur in
homine opinio quod Deus sit
aliquid supra id quod cogitare
potest.
Alia etiam utilitas inde provenit, [4] Another benefit that comes from the
scilicet praesumptionis revelation to men of truths that exceed the
repressio, quae est mater reason is the curbing of presumption, which
erroris. Sunt enim quidam is the mother of error. For there are some
tantum de suo ingenio who have such a presumptuous opinion of
praesumentes ut totam rerum their own ability that they deem themselves
naturam se reputent suo able to measure the nature of everything; I
intellectu posse metiri, mean to say that, in their estimation,
aestimantes scilicet totum esse everything is true that seems to them so,
verum quod eis videtur et falsum and everything is false that does not. So
quod eis non videtur. Ut ergo ab that the human mind, therefore, might be
hac praesumptione humanus freed from this presumption and come to a
animus liberatus ad modestam humble inquiry after truth, it was necessary
inquisitionem veritatis perveniat, that some things should be proposed to

necessarium fuit homini proponi man by God that would completely surpass
quaedam divinitus quae omnino his intellect.
intellectum eius excederent.
Apparet etiam alia utilitas ex [5] A still further benefit may also be seen
dictis philosophi in X Ethicor. in what Aristotle says in the Ethics [X, 7].
Cum enim Simonides quidam There was a certain Simonides who
homini praetermittendam exhorted people to put aside the knowledge
divinam cognitionem of divine things and to apply their talents to
persuaderet et humanis rebus human occupations. He said that “he who
ingenium applicandum, oportere is a man should know human things, and
inquiens humana sapere he who is mortal, things that are mortal.”
hominem et mortalia mortalem; Against Simonides Aristotle says that “man
contra eum philosophus dicit should draw himself towards what is
quod homo debet se ad immortal and divine as much as he can.”
immortalia et divina trahere And so he says in the De animalibus [I, 5]
quantum potest. Unde in XI de that, although what we know of the higher
Animal. dicit, quod, quamvis substances is very little, yet that little is
parum sit quod de substantiis loved and desired more than all the
superioribus percipimus, tamen knowledge that we have about less noble
illud modicum est magis amatum substances. He also says in the De caelo
et desideratum omni cognitione et mundo [II, 12] that when questions about
quam de substantiis inferioribus the heavenly bodies can be given even a
habemus. Dicit etiam in II Cael. modest and merely plausible solution, he
et Mund. quod cum de who hears this experiences intense joy.
corporibus caelestibus From all these considerations it is clear that
quaestiones possint solvi parva even the most imperfect knowledge about
et topica solutione, contingit the most noble realities brings the greatest
auditori ut vehemens sit perfection to the soul.
gaudium eius. Ex quibus Therefore, although the human reason
omnibus apparet quod de rebus cannot grasp fully the truths that are above
nobilissimis quantumcumque it, yet, if it somehow holds these truths at
imperfecta cognitio maximam least by faith, it acquires great perfection
perfectionem animae confert. for itself.
Et ideo, quamvis ea quae supra
rationem sunt ratio humana
plene capere non possit, tamen
multum sibi perfectionis
acquiritur si saltem ea
qualitercumque teneat fide.
Et ideo dicitur Eccli. 325: [6] Therefore it is written: “For many things

plurima supra sensum hominis are shown to you above the understanding
ostensa sunt tibi. Et 1 Cor. 211 of men” (Sirach 3:75). Again: “So the things
quae sunt Dei nemo novit nisi that are of God no man knows but the Spirit
spiritus Dei; nobis autem of God. But to us God has revealed them
revelavit Deus per spiritum by His Spirit” (1 Cor. 2:11, 10).
suum.
Caput 6 Chapter 6.
Quod assentire his quae sunt THAT TO GIVE ASSENT TO THE
fidei non est levitatis quamvis TRUTHS OF FAITH IS NOT
supra rationem sint FOOLISHNESS EVEN THOUGH THEY
ARE ABOVE REASON
Huiusmodi autem veritati, cui [1] Those who place their faith in this truth,

ratio humana experimentum non however, “for which the human reason
praebet, fidem adhibentes non offers no experimental evidence,” do not
leviter credunt, quasi indoctas believe foolishly, as though “following
fabulas secuti, ut 2 Petr. 116, artificial fables” (2 Peter 2:16).
dicitur. For these “secrets of divine Wisdom” (Job
Haec enim divinae sapientiae 11:6) the divine Wisdom itself, which
secreta ipsa divina sapientia, knows all things to the full, has deigned to
quae omnia plenissime novit, reveal to men. It reveals its own presence,
dignata est hominibus revelare: as well as the truth of its teaching and
quae sui praesentiam et inspiration, by fitting arguments; and in
doctrinae et inspirationis order to confirm those truths that exceed
veritatem, convenientibus natural knowledge, it gives visible
argumentis ostendit, dum ad manifestation to works that surpass the
confirmandum ea quae ability of all nature. Thus, there are the
naturalem cognitionem excedunt, wonderful cures of illnesses, there is the
opera visibiliter ostendit quae raising of the dead, and the wonderful
totius naturae superant immutation in the heavenly bodies; and
facultatem; videlicet in mirabili what is more wonderful, there is the
curatione languorum, mortuorum inspiration given to human minds, so that
suscitatione, caelestium simple and untutored persons, filled with
corporum mirabili immutatione; the gift of the Holy Spirit, come to possess
et, quod est mirabilius, instantaneously the highest wisdom and
humanarum mentium the readiest eloquence.
inspiratione, ut idiotae et When these arguments were examined,
simplices, dono spiritus sancti through the efficacy of the
repleti, summam sapientiam et abovementioned proof, and not the violent
facundiam in instanti assault of arms or the promise of pleasure,
consequerentur. and (what is most wonderful of all) in the
Quibus inspectis, praedictae midst of the tyranny of the persecutors, an
probationis efficacia, non innumerable throng of people, both simple
armorum violentia, non and most learned, flocked to the Christian
voluptatum promissione, et, quod faith. In this faith there are truths preached
est mirabilissimum, inter that surpass every human intellect; the
persecutorum tyrannidem, pleasures of the flesh are curbed; it is
innumerabilis turba non solum taught that the things of the world should
simplicium, sed be spurned. Now, for the minds of mortal
sapientissimorum hominum, ad men to assent to these things is the
fidem Christianam convolavit, in greatest of miracles, just as it is a manifest
qua omnem humanum work of divine inspiration that, spurning
intellectum excedentia visible things, men should seek only what
praedicantur, voluptates carnis is invisible.

cohibentur et omnia quae in Now, that this has happened neither
mundo sunt contemni docentur; without preparation nor by chance, but as
quibus animos mortalium a result of the disposition of God, is clear
assentire et maximum from the fact that through many
miraculorum est, et manifestum pronouncements of the ancient prophets
divinae inspirationis opus, ut, God had foretold that He would do this.
contemptis visibilibus, sola The books of these prophets are held in
invisibilia cupiantur. veneration among us Christians, since
Hoc autem non subito neque a they give witness to our faith.
casu, sed ex divina dispositione
factum esse, manifestum est ex
hoc quod hoc se facturum Deus
multis ante prophetarum praedixit
oraculis, quorum libri penes nos
in veneratione habentur, utpote
nostrae fidei testimonium
adhibentes.
Huius quidem confirmationis [2] The manner of this confirmation is

modus tangitur Hebr. 23 quae, touched on by St. Paul: “Which,” that is,
scilicet humana salus, cum human salvation, “having begun to be
initium accepisset enarrari per declared by the Lord, was confirmed to us
dominum, ab eis qui audierunt in by them that hear Him: God also bearing
nos confirmata est, contestante them witness of signs, and wonders, and
Deo signis et portentis et variis divers miracles, and distributions of the
spiritus sancti distributionibus. Holy Spirit” (Heb. 7:34).
Haec autem tam mirabilis mundi [3] This wonderful conversion of the world

conversio ad fidem Christianam to the Christian faith is the clearest witness
indicium certissimum est of the signs given in the past; so that it is
praeteritorum signorum: ut ea not necessary that they should be further
ulterius iterari necesse non sit, repeated, since they appear most clearly
cum in suo effectu appareant in their effect. For it would be truly more
evidenter. Esset enim omnibus wonderful than all signs if the world had
signis mirabilius si ad credendum been led by simple and humble men to
tam ardua, et ad operandum tam believe such lofty truths, to accomplish
difficilia, et ad sperandum tam such difficult actions, and to have such
alta, mundus absque mirabilibus high hopes. Yet it is also a fact that, even
signis inductus fuisset a in our own time, God does not cease to
simplicibus et ignobilibus work miracles through His saints for the
hominibus. Quamvis non cesset confirmation of the faith.
Deus etiam nostris temporibus,
ad confirmationem fidei, per
sanctos suos miracula operari.
Hi vero qui sectas errorum [4] On the other hand, those who founded

introduxerunt processerunt via sects committed to erroneous doctrines
contraria: ut patet in Mahumeto proceeded in a way that is opposite to this,
qui carnalium voluptatum The point is clear in the case of
promissis, ad quorum desiderium Muhammad. He seduced the people by
carnalis concupiscentia instigat, promises of carnal pleasure to which the
populus illexit. Praecepta etiam concupiscence of the flesh goads us. His
tradidit promissis conformia, teaching also contained precepts that were
voluptati carnali habenas in conformity with his promises, and he
relaxans, in quibus in promptu gave free rein to carnal pleasure. In all
est a carnalibus hominibus this, as is not unexpected, he was obeyed
obediri. Documenta etiam by carnal men. As for proofs of the truth of
veritatis non attulit nisi quae de his doctrine, he brought forward only such
facili a quolibet mediocriter as could be grasped by the natural ability
sapiente naturali ingenio of anyone with a very modest wisdom.
cognosci possint: quin potius Indeed, the truths that he taught he
vera quae docuit multis fabulis et mingled with many fables and with
falsissimis doctrinis immiscuit. doctrines of the greatest falsity. He did not
Signa etiam non adhibuit bring forth any signs produced in a
supernaturaliter facta, quibus supernatural way, which alone fittingly
solis divinae inspirationi gives witness to divine inspiration; for a
conveniens testimonium visible action that can be only divine
adhibetur, dum operatio visibilis reveals an invisibly inspired teacher of
quae non potest esse nisi divina, truth. On the contrary, Muhammad said
ostendit doctorem veritatis that he was sent in the power of his arms
invisibiliter inspiratum: sed dixit —which are signs not lacking even to
se in armorum potentia missum, robbers and tyrants. What is more, no wise
quae signa etiam latronibus et men, men trained in things divine and
tyrannis non desunt. Ei etiam non human, believed in him from the
aliqui sapientes, in rebus divinis beginning, Those who believed in him
et humanis exercitati, a principio were brutal men and desert wanderers,
crediderunt: sed homines utterly ignorant of all divine teaching,
bestiales in desertis morantes, through whose numbers Muhammad
omnis doctrinae divinae prorsus forced others to become his followers by
ignari, per quorum multitudinem the violence of his arms. Nor do divine
alios armorum violentia in suam pronouncements on the part of preceding
legem coegit. Nulla etiam divina prophets offer him any witness. On the
oracula praecedentium contrary, he perverts almost all the
prophetarum ei testimonium testimonies of the Old and New
perhibent: quin potius quasi Testaments by making them into
omnia veteris et novi testamenti fabrications of his own, as can be. seen by
documenta fabulosa narratione anyone who examines his law. It was,
depravat, ut patet eius legem therefore, a shrewd decision on his part to
inspicienti. Unde astuto consilio forbid his followers to read the Old and
libros veteris et novi testamenti New Testaments, lest these books convict
suis sequacibus non reliquit him of falsity. It is thus clear that those who
legendos, ne per eos falsitatis place any faith in his words believe
argueretur. Et sic patet quod eius foolishly.
dictis fidem adhibentes leviter
credunt.
Caput 7 Chapter 7
Quod veritati fidei Christianae THAT THE TRUTH OF REASON IS NOT
non contrariatur veritas rationis OPPOSED TO THE TRUTH OF THE
CHRISTIAN FAITH
Quamvis autem praedicta veritas [1] Now, although the truth of the
fidei Christianae humanae rationis Christian faith which we have discussed
capacitatem excedat, haec tamen surpasses the capacity of the reason,
quae ratio naturaliter indita habet, nevertheless that truth that the human
huic veritati contraria esse non reason is naturally endowed to know
possunt. cannot be opposed to the truth of the
Ea enim quae naturaliter rationi Christian faith.
sunt insita, verissima esse For that with which the human reason is
constat: in tantum ut nec esse naturally endowed is clearly most true; so
falsa sit possibile cogitare. Nec id much so, that it is impossible for us to
quod fide tenetur, cum tam think of such truths as false. Nor is it
evidenter divinitus confirmatum permissible to believe as false that which
sit, fas est credere esse falsum. we hold by faith, since this is confirmed in
Quia igitur solum falsum vero a way that is so clearly divine. Since,
contrarium est, ut ex eorum therefore, only the false is opposed to the
definitionibus inspectis manifeste true, as is clearly evident from an
apparet, impossibile est illis examination of their definitions, it is
principiis quae ratio naturaliter impossible that the truth of faith should be
cognoscit, praedictam veritatem opposed to those principles that the
fidei contrariam esse. human reason knows naturally.
Item. Illud idem quod inducitur in [2] Furthermore, that which is introduced
animam discipuli a docente, into the soul of the student by the teacher
doctoris scientia continet: nisi is contained in the knowledge of the
doceat ficte, quod de Deo nefas teacher—unless his teaching is fictitious,
est dicere. Principiorum autem which it is improper to say of God. Now,
naturaliter notorum cognitio nobis the knowledge of the principles that are
divinitus est indita: cum ipse Deus known to us naturally has been implanted
sit nostrae auctor naturae. Haec in us by God; for God is the Author of our
ergo principia etiam divina nature. These principles, therefore, are
sapientia continet. Quicquid igitur also contained by the divine Wisdom.
principiis huiusmodi contrarium Hence, whatever is opposed to them is
est, divinae sapientiae opposed to the divine Wisdom, and,
contrariatur. Non igitur a Deo esse therefore, cannot come from God. That
potest. Ea igitur quae ex which we hold by faith as divinely
revelatione divina per fidem revealed, therefore, cannot be contrary to
tenentur, non possunt naturali our natural knowledge.
cognitioni esse contraria.
Adhuc. Contrariis rationibus [3] Again. In the presence of contrary
intellectus noster ligatur, ut ad veri arguments our intellect is chained, so that
cognitionem procedere nequeat. it cannot proceed to the knowledge of the
Si igitur contrariae cognitiones truth. If, therefore, contrary knowledges
nobis a Deo immitterentur, ex hoc were implanted in us by God, our intellect
a veritatis cognitione noster would be hindered from knowing truth by

intellectus impediretur. Quod a this very fact. Now, such an effect cannot
Deo esse non potest. come from God.
Amplius. Ea quae sunt naturalia [4] And again. What is natural cannot
mutari non possunt, natura change as long as nature does not. Now,
manente. Contrariae autem it is impossible that contrary opinions
opiniones simul eidem inesse non should exist in the same knowing subject
possunt. Non igitur contra at the same time. No opinion or belief,
cognitionem naturalem aliqua therefore, is implanted in man by God
opinio vel fides homini a Deo which is contrary to man’s natural
immittitur. knowledge.
Et ideo apostolus dicit, Rom. 108: [5] Therefore, the Apostle says: “The

prope est verbum in corde tuo et word is nigh thee, even in thy mouth and
in ore tuo: hoc est verbum fidei, in thy heart. This is the word of faith,
quod praedicamus. Sed quia which we preach” (Rom. 10:8). But
superat rationem, a nonnullis because it overcomes reason, there are
reputatur quasi contrarium. Quod some who think that it is opposed to it:
esse non potest. which is impossible.
Huic etiam auctoritas Augustini [6] The authority of St. Augustine also
concordat, qui in II super Gen. ad agrees with this. He writes as follows:
Litt. dicit sic: illud quod veritas “That which truth will reveal cannot in any
patefaciet, libris sanctis sive way be opposed to the sacred books of
testamenti veteris sive novi nullo the Old and the New Testament” [De
modo potest esse adversum. genesi ad litteram II, 18].
Ex quo evidenter colligitur, [7] From this we evidently gather the
quaecumque argumenta contra following conclusion: whatever arguments
fidei documenta ponantur, haec ex are brought forward against the doctrines
principiis primis naturae inditis per of faith are conclusions incorrectly derived
se notis non recte procedere. from the first and selfevident principles
Unde nec demonstrationis vim imbedded in nature. Such conclusions do
habent, sed vel sunt rationes not have the force of demonstration; they
probabiles vel sophisticae. Et sic are arguments that are either probable or
ad ea solvenda locus relinquitur. sophistical. And so, there exists the
possibility to answer them.
Caput 8 Chapter 8
Qualiter se habeat humana ratio HOW THE HUMAN REASON IS
ad veritatem fidei RELATED TO THE TRUTH OF FAITH
Considerandum etiam videtur quod [1] There is also a further consideration.

res quidem sensibiles, ex quibus Sensible things, from which the human
humana ratio cognitionis principium reason takes the origin of its
sumit, aliquale vestigium in se knowledge, retain within themselves
divinae imitationis retinent, ita some sort of trace of a likeness to God.
tamen imperfectum quod ad This is so imperfect, however, that it is
declarandam ipsius Dei substantiam absolutely inadequate to manifest the
omnino insufficiens invenitur. substance of God. For effects bear
Habent enim effectus suarum within themselves, in their own way, the
causarum suo modo similitudinem, likeness of their causes, since an agent
cum agens agat sibi simile: non produces its like; yet an effect does not
tamen effectus ad perfectam always reach to the full likeness of its
agentis similitudinem semper cause. Now, the human reason is
pertingit. Humana igitur ratio ad related to the knowledge of the truth of
cognoscendum fidei veritatem, quae faith (a truth which can be most evident
solum videntibus divinam only to those who see the divine
substantiam potest esse notissima, substance) in such a way that it can
ita se habet quod ad eam potest gather certain likenesses of it, which are
aliquas verisimilitudines colligere, yet not sufficient so that the truth of faith
quae tamen non sufficiunt ad hoc may be comprehended as being
quod praedicta veritas quasi understood demonstratively or through
demonstrative vel per se intellecta itself.
comprehendatur. Yet it is useful for the human reason to
Utile tamen est ut in huiusmodi exercise itself in such arguments,
rationibus, quantumcumque however weak they may be, provided
debilibus, se mens humana only that there be present no
exerceat, dummodo desit presumption to comprehend or to
comprehendendi vel demonstrandi demonstrate. For to be able to see
praesumptio: quia de rebus something of the loftiest realities,
altissimis etiam parva et debili however thin and weak the sight may
consideratione aliquid posse be, is, as our previous remarks indicate,
inspicere iucundissimum est, ut ex a cause of the greatest joy.
dictis apparet.
Cui quidem sententiae auctoritas [2] The testimony of Hilary agrees with
Hilarii concordat, qui sic dicit in libro this. Speaking of this same truth, he
de Trin., loquens de huiusmodi writes as follows in his De Trinitate [II,
veritate: haec credendo incipe, 10, ii]: “Enter these truths by believing,
procurre, persiste: etsi non press forward, persevere. And though I
perventurum sciam, gratulabor may know that you will not arrive at an
tamen profecturum. Qui enim pie end, yet I will congratulate you in your
infinita prosequitur, etsi non progress. For, though he who pursues
contingat aliquando, semper tamen the infinite with reverence will never
proficiet prodeundo. Sed ne te finally reach the end, yet he will always
inferas in illud secretum, et arcano progress by pressing onward. But do
interminabilis nativitatis non te not intrude yourself into the divine
immergas, summam intelligentiae secret, do not, presuming to
comprehendere praesumens: sed comprehend the sum total of
intellige incomprehensibilia esse. intelligence, plunge yourself into the
mystery of the unending nativity; rather,
understand that these things are
incomprehensible.”
Caput 9 Chapter 9
De ordine et modo procedendi THE ORDER AND MANNER OF
in hoc opere PROCEDURE IN THE PRESENT WORK
Ex praemissis igitur evidenter [1] It is clearly apparent, from what has
apparet sapientis intentionem been said, that the intention of the wise
circa duplicem veritatem man ought to be directed toward the
divinorum debere versari, et twofold truth of divine things, and toward
circa errores contrarios the destruction of the errors that are
destruendos: ad quarum unam contrary to this truth. One kind of divine
investigatio rationis pertingere truth the investigation of the reason is
potest, alia vero omnem rationis competent to reach, whereas the other
excedit industriam. Dico autem surpasses every effort of the reason. I am
duplicem veritatem divinorum, speaking of a “twofold truth of divine
non ex parte ipsius Dei, qui est things,” not on the part of God Himself,
una et simplex veritas; sed ex Who is truth one and simple, but from the
parte cognitionis nostrae, quae point of view of our knowledge, which is
ad divina cognoscenda variously related to the knowledge of divine
diversimode se habet. things.
Ad primae igitur veritatis [2] Now, to make the first kind of divine
manifestationem per rationes truth known, we must proceed through
demonstrativas, quibus demonstrative arguments, by which our
adversarius convinci possit, adversary may become convinced.
procedendum est. Sed quia However, since such arguments are not
tales rationes ad secundam available for the second kind of divine truth,
veritatem haberi non possunt, our intention should not be to convince our
non debet esse ad hoc intentio adversary by arguments: it should be to
ut adversarius rationibus answer his arguments against the truth; for,
convincatur: sed ut eius as we have shown, the natural reason
rationes, quas contra veritatem cannot be contrary to the truth of faith.
habet, solvantur; cum veritati The sole way to overcome an adversary of
fidei ratio naturalis contraria divine truth is from the authority of Scripture
esse non possit, ut ostensum —an authority divinely confirmed by
est. miracles. For that which is above the
Singularis vero modus human reason we believe only because
convincendi adversarium contra God has revealed it.
huiusmodi veritatem est ex Nevertheless, there are certain likely
auctoritate Scripturae divinitus arguments that should be brought forth in
confirmata miraculis: quae enim order to make divine truth known. This
supra rationem humanam sunt, should be done for the training and
non credimus nisi Deo revelante. consolation of the faithful, and not with any
Sunt tamen ad huiusmodi idea of refuting those who are adversaries.
veritatem manifestandam For the very inadequacy of the arguments
rationes aliquae verisimiles would rather strengthen them in their error,
inducendae, ad fidelium quidem since they would imagine that our
exercitium et solatium, non acceptance of the truth of faith was based
autem ad adversarios on such weak arguments.
convincendos: quia ipsa
rationum insufficientia eos magis
in suo errore confirmaret, dum
aestimarent nos propter tam
debiles rationes veritati fidei
consentire.
Modo ergo proposito procedere [3] This, then, is the manner of procedure
intendentes, primum nitemur ad we intend to follow. We shall first seek to
manifestationem illius veritatis make known that truth which faith
quam fides profitetur et ratio professes and reason investigates. This we
investigat, inducentes rationes shall do by bringing forward both
demonstrativas et probabiles, demonstrative and probable arguments,
quarum quasdam ex libris some of which were drawn from the books
philosophorum et sanctorum of the philosophers and of the saints,
collegimus per quas veritas through which truth is strengthened and its
confirmetur et adversarius adversary overcome [Books IIII].
convincatur. Then, in order to follow a development from
Deinde, ut a manifestioribus ad the more manifest to the less manifest, we
minus manifesta fiat processus, shall proceed to make known that truth
ad illius veritatis which surpasses reason, answering the
manifestationem procedemus objections of its adversaries and setting
quae rationem excedit, forth the truth of faith by probable
solventes rationes arguments and by authorities, to the best of
adversariorum et rationibus our ability [Book IV].
probabilibus et auctoritatibus,
quantum Deus dederit, veritatem
fidei declarantes.
Intendentibus igitur nobis per [4] We are aiming, then, to set out following

viam rationis prosequi ea quae the way of the reason and to inquire into
de Deo ratio humana investigare what the human reason can investigate
potest, primo, occurrit about God. In this aim the first
consideratio de his quae Deo consideration that confronts us is of that
secundum seipsum conveniunt; which belongs to God in Himself [Book I].
secundo, vero, de processu The second consideration concerns the
creaturarum ab ipso; tertio, coming forth of creatures from God [Book
autem, de ordine creaturarum in II]. The third concerns the ordering of
ipsum sicut in finem. creatures to God as to their end [Book III].
Inter ea vero quae de Deo [5] Now, among the inquiries that we must
secundum seipsum undertake concerning God in Himself, we
consideranda sunt, must set down in the beginning that
praemittendum est, quasi totius whereby His Existence is demonstrated, as
operis necessarium the necessary foundation of the whole
fundamentum, consideratio qua work. For, if we do not demonstrate that
demonstratur Deum esse. Quo God exists, all consideration of divine
non habito, omnis consideratio things is necessarily suppressed.

de rebus divinis tollitur.
Caput 10 Chapter 10
De opinione dicentium quod THE OPINION OF THOSE WHO SAY
Deum esse demonstrari non THAT THE EXISTENCE OF GOD, BEING
potest cum sit per se notum SELFEVIDENT, CANNOT BE
DEMONSTRATED
Haec autem consideratio qua [1] There are some persons to whom the
quis nititur ad demonstrandum inquiry seeking to demonstrate that God
Deum esse, superflua fortasse exists may perhaps appear superfluous.
quibusdam videbitur, qui These are the persons who assert that the
asserunt quod Deum esse per existence of God is selfevident, in such
se notum est, ita quod eius wise that its contrary cannot be entertained
contrarium cogitari non possit, et in the mind. It thus appears that the
sic Deum esse demonstrari non existence of God cannot be demonstrated,
potest. Quod quidem videtur ex as may be seen from the following
his. arguments.
Illa enim per se esse nota [2] Those propositions are said to be self
dicuntur quae statim notis evident that are known immediately upon
terminis cognoscuntur: sicut, the knowledge of their terms. Thus, as
cognito quid est totum et quid soon as you know the nature of a whole
est pars, statim cognoscitur and the nature of a part, you know
quod omne totum est maius sua immediately that every whole is greater
parte. Huiusmodi autem est hoc than its part. The proposition God exists is
quod dicimus Deum esse. Nam of this sort. For by the name God we
nomine Dei intelligimus aliquid understand something than which a greater
quo maius cogitari non potest. cannot be thought. This notion is formed in
Hoc autem in intellectu formatur the intellect by one who hears and
ab eo qui audit et intelligit nomen understands the name God. As a result,
Dei: ut sic saltem in intellectu God must exist already at least in the
iam Deum esse oporteat. Nec intellect. But He cannot exist solely in the
potest in intellectu solum esse: intellect, since that which exists both in the
nam quod in intellectu et re est, intellect and in reality is greater than that
maius est eo quod in solo which exists in the intellect alone. Now, as
intellectu est; Deo autem nihil the very definition of the name points out,
esse maius ipsa nominis ratio nothing can be greater than God.
demonstrat. Unde restat quod Consequently, the proposition that God
Deum esse per se notum est, exists is selfevident, as being evident from
quasi ex ipsa significatione the very meaning of the name God.
nominis manifestum.
Item. Cogitari quidem potest [3] Again, it is Possible to think that
quod aliquid sit quod non possit something exists whose nonexistence
cogitari non esse. Quod maius cannot be thought. Clearly, such a being is

est evidenter eo quod potest greater than the being whose non
cogitari non esse. Sic ergo Deo existence can be thought. Consequently, if
aliquid maius cogitari posset, si God Himself could be thought not to be,
ipse posset cogitari non esse. then something greater than God could be
Quod est contra rationem thought. This, however, is contrary to the
nominis. Relinquitur quod Deum definition of the name God. Hence, the
esse per se notum est. proposition that God exists is selfevident.
Adhuc. Propositiones illas [4] Furthermore, those propositions ought

oportet esse notissimas in to be the most evident in which the same
quibus idem de seipso thing is predicated of itself, for example,
praedicatur, ut, homo est homo; man is man, or whose predicates are
vel quarum praedicata in included in the definition of their subjects,
definitionibus subiectorum for example, Man is an animal. Now, in
includuntur, ut, homo est animal. God, as will be shown in a later chapter, it
In Deo autem hoc prae aliis is preeminently the case that His being is
invenitur, ut infra ostendetur, His essence, so that to the question what is
quod suum esse est sua He? and to the question is He? the answer
essentia, ac si idem sit quod is one and the same. Thus, in the
respondetur ad quaestionem proposition God exists, the predicate is
quid est, et ad quaestionem an consequently either identical with the
est. Sic ergo cum dicitur, Deus subject or at least included in the definition
est, praedicatum vel est idem of the subject. Hence, that God exists is
subiecto, vel saltem in selfevident.
definitione subiecti includitur. Et
ita Deum esse per se notum erit.
Amplius. Quae naturaliter sunt [5] What is naturally known is known
nota, per se cognoscuntur: non through itself, for we do not come to such
enim ad ea cognoscenda propositions through an effort of inquiry. But
inquisitionis studio pervenitur. At the proposition that God exists is naturally
Deum esse naturaliter notum known since, as will be shown later on, the
est: cum in Deum naturaliter desire of man naturally tends towards God
desiderium hominis tendat sicut as towards the ultimate end. The
in ultimum finem, ut infra patebit. proposition that God exists is, therefore,
Est igitur per se notum Deum selfevident.
esse.
Item. Illud per se notum oportet [6] There is also the consideration that that

esse quo omnia alia through which all the rest are known ought
cognoscuntur. Deus autem itself to be selfevident. Now, God is of this
huiusmodi est. Sicut enim lux sort. For just as the light of the sun is the
solis principium est omnis principle of all visible perception, so the
visibilis perceptionis, ita divina divine light is the principle of all intelligible
lux omnis intelligibilis cognitionis knowledge; since the divine light is that in
principium est: cum sit in quo which intelligible illumination is found first
primum maxime lumen and in its highest degree. That God exists,
intelligibile invenitur. Oportet therefore, must be selfevident.
igitur quod Deum esse per se

notum sit.
Ex his igitur et similibus aliqui [7] These, then, and others like them are
opinantur Deum esse sic per se the arguments by which some think that the
notum existere ut contrarium proposition God exists is so selfevident
mente cogitari non possit. that its contrary cannot be entertained by
the mind.
Caput 11 Chapter 11
Reprobatio praemissae A REFUTATION OF THE
opinionis et solutio rationum ABOVEMENTIONED OPINION AND A
praemissarum SOLUTION OF THE ARGUMENTS
Praedicta autem opinio provenit. [1] In part, the above opinion arises from
Partim quidem ex consuetudine the custom by which from their earliest
qua ex principio assueti sunt days people are brought up to hear and to
nomen Dei audire et invocare. call upon the name of God. Custom, and
Consuetudo autem, et praecipue especially custom in a child comes to have
quae est a puero, vim naturae the force of nature. As a result, what the
obtinet: ex quo contingit ut ea mind is steeped in from childhood it clings
quibus a pueritia animus to very firmly, as something known
imbuitur, ita firmiter teneat ac si naturally and selfevidently.
essent naturaliter et per se nota.
Partim vero contingit ex eo quod [2] In part, however, the above opinion

non distinguitur quod est notum comes about because of a failure to
per se simpliciter, et quod est distinguish between that which is self
quoad nos per se notum. Nam evident in an absolute sense and that
simpliciter quidem Deum esse which is selfevident in relation to us. For
per se notum est: cum hoc ipsum assuredly that God exists is, absolutely
quod Deus est, sit suum esse. speaking, selfevident, since what God is is
Sed quia hoc ipsum quod Deus His own being. Yet, because we are not
est mente concipere non able to conceive in our minds that which
possumus, remanet ignotum God is, that God exists remains unknown
quoad nos. Sicut omne totum in relation to us. So, too, that every whole
sua parte maius esse, per se is greater than its part is, absolutely
notum est simpliciter: ei autem speaking, selfevident; but it would
qui rationem totius mente non perforce be unknown to one who could not
conciperet, oporteret esse conceive the nature of a whole. Hence it
ignotum. Et sic fit ut ad ea quae comes about, as it is said in Metaphysics II
sunt notissima rerum, noster [Ia, 1], that “our intellect is related to the
intellectus se habeat ut oculus most knowable things in reality as the eye
noctuae ad solem, ut II of an owl is related to the sun.”’
Metaphys. dicitur.
Nec oportet ut statim, cognita [3] And, contrary to the Point made by the

huius nominis Deus first argument, it does not follow
significatione, Deum esse sit immediately that, as soon as we know the
notum, ut prima ratio intendebat. meaning of the name God, the existence of
Primo quidem, quia non omnibus God is known. It does not follow first
notum est, etiam concedentibus because it is not known to all, even
Deum esse, quod Deus sit id quo including those who admit that God exists,
maius cogitari non possit: cum that God is that than which a greater
multi antiquorum mundum istum cannot be thought. After all, many ancients
dixerint Deum esse. Nec etiam said that this world itself was God.
ex interpretationibus huius Furthermore, no such inference can be
nominis Deus, quas drawn from the interpretations of the name
Damascenus ponit, aliquid God to be found in Damascene [De fide
huiusmodi intelligi datur. Deinde orthodoxa I, 9]. What is more, granted that
quia, dato quod ab omnibus per everyone should understand by the name
hoc nomen Deus intelligatur God something than which a greater
aliquid quo maius cogitari non cannot be thought, it will still not be
possit, non necesse erit aliquid necessary that there exist in reality
esse quo maius cogitari non something than which a greater cannot be
potest in rerum natura. Eodem thought. For a thing and the definition of a
enim modo necesse est poni name are posited in the same way. Now,
rem, et nominis rationem. Ex hoc from the fact that that which is indicated by
autem quod mente concipitur the name God is conceived by the mind, it
quod profertur hoc nomine Deus, does not follow that God exists save only
non sequitur Deum esse nisi in in the intellect. Hence, that than which a
intellectu. Unde nec oportebit id greater cannot be thought will likewise not
quo maius cogitari non potest have to exist save only in the intellect.
esse nisi in intellectu. Et ex hoc From this it does not follow that there
non sequitur quod sit aliquid in exists in reality something than which a
rerum natura quo maius cogitari greater cannot be thought. No difficulty,
non possit. Et sic nihil consequently, befalls anyone who posits
inconveniens accidit ponentibus that God does not exist. For that
Deum non esse: non enim something greater can be thought than
inconveniens est quolibet dato anything given in reality or in the intellect is
vel in re vel in intellectu aliquid a difficulty only to him who admits that
maius cogitari posse, nisi ei qui there is something than which a greater
concedit esse aliquid quo maius cannot be thought in reality.
cogitari non possit in rerum
natura.
Nec etiam oportet, ut secunda [4] Nor, again, is it necessary, as the
ratio proponebat, Deo posse second argument advanced, that
aliquid maius cogitari si potest something greater than God can be
cogitari non esse. Nam quod thought if God can be thought not to be.
possit cogitari non esse, non ex For that He can be thought not to be does
imperfectione sui esse est vel not arise either from the imperfection or the
incertitudine, cum suum esse sit uncertainty of His own being, since this is
secundum se manifestissimum: in itself most manifest. It arises, rather,
sed ex debilitate nostri from the weakness of our intellect, which
intellectus, qui eum intueri non cannot behold God Himself except through

potest per seipsum, sed ex His effects and which is thus led to know
effectibus eius, et sic ad His existence through reasoning.
cognoscendum ipsum esse
ratiocinando perducitur.
Ex quo etiam tertia ratio solvitur. [5] This enables us to solve the third
Nam sicut nobis per se notum argument as well. For just as it is evident
est quod totum sua parte sit to us that a whole is greater than a part of
maius, sic videntibus ipsam itself, so to those seeing the divine
divinam essentiam per se essence in itself it is supremely self
notissimum est Deum esse, ex evident that God exists because His
hoc quod sua essentia est suum essence is His being. But, because we are
esse. Sed quia eius essentiam not able to see His essence, we arrive at
videre non possumus, ad eius the knowledge of His being, not through
esse cognoscendum non per God Himself, but through His effects.
seipsum, sed per eius effectus
pervenimus.
Ad quartam etiam patet solutio. [6] The answer to the fourth argument is
Sic enim homo naturaliter Deum likewise clear. For man naturally knows
cognoscit sicut naturaliter ipsum God in the same way as he naturally
desiderat. Desiderat autem desires God. Now, man naturally desires
ipsum homo naturaliter God in so far as he naturally desires
inquantum desiderat naturaliter beatitude, which is a certain likeness of the
beatitudinem, quae est quaedam divine goodness. On this basis, it is not
similitudo divinae bonitatis. Sic necessary that God considered in Himself
igitur non oportet quod Deus ipse be naturally known to man, but only a
in se consideratus sit naturaliter likeness of God. It remains, therefore, that
notus homini, sed similitudo man is to reach the knowledge of God
ipsius. Unde oportet quod per through reasoning by way of the
eius similitudines in effectibus likenesses of God found in His effects.
repertas in cognitionem ipsius
homo ratiocinando perveniat.
Ad quintam etiam de facili patet [7] So, too, with the fifth argument, an easy

solutio. Nam Deus est quidem solution is available. For God is indeed that
quo omnia cognoscuntur, non ita by which all things are known, not in the
quod alia non cognoscantur nisi sense that they are not known unless He is
eo cognito, sicut in principiis per known (as obtains among selfevident
se notis accidit: sed quia per eius principles), but because all our knowledge
influentiam omnis causatur in is caused in us through His influence.
nobis cognitio.
Caput 12 Chapter 12
De opinione dicentium quod THE OPINION OF THOSE WHO SAY
Deum esse demonstrari non THAT THE EXISTENCE OF GOD
potest sed sola fide tenetur CANNOT BE DEMONSTRATED BUT IS
HELD BY FAITH ALONE
Est autem quaedam aliorum [1] There are others who hold a certain
opinio praedictae positioni opinion, contrary to the position mentioned
contraria, per quam etiam above, through which the efforts of those
inutilis redderetur conatus seeking to prove the existence of God
probare intendentium Deum would likewise be rendered futile. For they
esse. Dicunt enim quod Deum say that we cannot arrive at the existence
esse non potest per rationem of God through the reason; it is received by
inveniri, sed per solam viam way of faith and revelation alone.
fidei et revelationis est
acceptum.
Ad hoc autem dicendum moti [2] What led some persons to hold this view

sunt quidam propter debilitatem was the weakness of the arguments which
rationum quas aliqui inducebant had been brought forth by others to prove
ad probandum Deum esse. that God exists.
Posset tamen hic error [3] Nevertheless, the present error might
fulcimentum aliquod falso sibi erroneously find support in its behalf in the
assumere ex quorundam words of some philosophers who show that
philosophorum dictis, qui in God essence and being are identical,
ostendunt in Deo idem esse that is, that that which answers to the
essentiam et esse, scilicet id question what is it? is identical with that
quod respondetur ad quid est, et which answers to the question is it? Now,
ad quaestionem an est. Via following the way of the reason we cannot
autem rationis perveniri non arrive at a knowledge of what God is.
potest ut sciatur de Deo quid Hence, it seems likewise impossible to
est. Unde nec ratione videtur demonstrate by the reason that God exists.
posse demonstrari an Deus sit.
Item. Si principium ad [4] Furthermore, according to the logic of

demonstrandum an est, the Philosopher, as a principle to
secundum artem philosophi, demonstrate whether a thing is we must
oportet accipere quid significet take the signification of the name of that
nomen; ratio vero significata per thing [Posterior Analytics II, 9]; and, again
nomen est definitio, secundum according to the Philosopher [Metaphysics
philosophum, in IV Metaph.; IV, 7], the meaning signified by a name is its
nulla remanebit via ad definition. If this be so, if we set aside a
demonstrandum Deum esse, knowledge of the divine essence or
remota divinae essentiae vel quiddity, no means will be available
quidditatis cognitione. whereby to demonstrate that God exists.
Item. Si demonstrationis [5] Again, if, as is shown in the Posterior
principia a sensu cognitionis Analytics [I, 18], the knowledge of the
originem sumunt, ut in principles of demonstration takes its origin
posterioribus ostenditur, ea from sense, whatever transcends all sense

quae omnem sensum et and sensibles seems to be indemonstrable.
sensibilia excedunt, videntur That God exists appears to be a proposition
indemonstrabilia esse. of this sort and is therefore indemonstrable.
Huiusmodi autem est Deum
esse. Est igitur indemonstrabile.
Huius autem sententiae falsitas [6] The falsity of this opinion is shown to us,

nobis ostenditur, tum ex first, from the art of demonstration which
demonstrationis arte, quae ex teaches us to arrive at causes from their
effectibus causas concludere effects. Then, it is shown to us from the
docet. Tum ex ipso scientiarum order of the sciences. For, as it is said in
ordine. Nam, si non sit aliqua the Metaphysics [IV, 3], if there is no
scibilis substantia supra knowable substance higher than sensible
substantiam sensibilem, non erit substance, there will be no science higher
aliqua scientia supra naturalem, than physics. It is shown, thirdly, from the
ut dicitur in IV Metaph. Tum ex pursuit of the philosophers, who have
philosophorum studio, qui Deum striven to demonstrate that God exists.
esse demonstrare conati sunt. Finally, it is shown to us by the truth in the
Tum etiam apostolica veritate words of the Apostle Paul: “For the invisible
asserente, Rom. 120: invisibilia things of God... are clearly seen, being
Dei per ea quae facta sunt understood by the things that are made”
intellecta conspiciuntur. (Rom. 1:20).
Nec hoc debet movere, quod in [7] Nor, contrary to the first argument, is

Deo idem est essentia et esse, there any problem in the fact that in God
ut prima ratio proponebat. Nam essence and being are identical. For this is
hoc intelligitur de esse quo understood of the being by which God
Deus in seipso subsistit, quod subsists in Himself. But we do not know of
nobis quale sit ignotum est, what sort this being is, just as we do not
sicut eius essentia. Non autem know the divine essence. The reference is
intelligitur de esse quod not to the being that signifies the
significat compositionem composition of intellect. For thus the
intellectus. Sic enim esse Deum existence of God does fall under
sub demonstratione cadit, dum demonstration; this happens when our mind
ex rationibus demonstrativis is led from demonstrative arguments to
mens nostra inducitur huiusmodi form such a proposition of God whereby it
propositionem de Deo formare expresses that He exists.
qua exprimat Deum esse.
In rationibus autem quibus [8] Now, in arguments proving the existence

demonstratur Deum esse, non of God, it is not necessary to assume the
oportet assumi pro medio divine essence or quiddity as the middle
divinam essentiam sive term of the demonstration. This was the
quidditatem, ut secunda ratio second view proposed above. In place of
proponebat: sed loco quidditatis the quiddity, an effect is taken as the middle
accipitur pro medio effectus, term, as in demonstrations quia. It is from
sicut accidit in such effects that the meaning of the name
demonstrationibus quia; et ex God is taken. For all divine names are
huiusmodi effectu sumitur ratio imposed either by removing the effects of
huius nominis Deus. Nam omnia God from Him or by relating God in some
divina nomina imponuntur vel ex way to His effects.
remotione effectuum divinorum
ab ipso, vel ex aliqua habitudine
Dei ad suos effectus.
Patet etiam ex hoc quod, etsi [9] It is thereby likewise evident that,
Deus sensibilia omnia et although God transcends all sensible things
sensum excedat, eius tamen and the sense itself, His effects, on which
effectus, ex quibus demonstratio the demonstration proving His existence is
sumitur ad probandum Deum based, are nevertheless sensible things.
esse, sensibiles sunt. Et sic And thus, the origin of our knowledge in the
nostrae cognitionis origo in sense applies also to those things that
sensu est etiam de his quae transcend the sense.
sensum excedunt.
Caput 13 Chapter 13
Rationes ad probandum ARGUMENTS IN PROOF OF THE
Deum esse EXISTENCE OF GOD
Ostenso igitur quod non est [1] We have now shown that the effort to
vanum niti ad demonstrandum demonstrate the existence of God is not a
Deum esse, procedamus ad vain one. We shall therefore proceed to set
ponendum rationes quibus tam forth the arguments by which both
philosophi quam doctores philosophers and Catholic teachers have
Catholici Deum esse proved that God exists.
probaverunt.
Primo autem ponemus rationes [2] We shall first set forth the arguments by

quibus Aristoteles procedit ad which Aristotle proceeds to prove that God
probandum Deum esse. Qui exists. The aim of Aristotle is to do this in
hoc probare intendit ex parte two ways, beginning with motion.
motus duabus viis.
Quarum prima talis est: omne [3] Of these ways the first is as follows.
quod movetur, ab alio movetur. Everything that is moved is moved by
Patet autem sensu aliquid another. That some things are in motion—
moveri, utputa solem. Ergo alio for example, the sun—is evident from
movente movetur. Aut ergo illud sense. Therefore, it is moved by something
movens movetur, aut non. Si else that moves it. This mover is itself either
non movetur, ergo habemus moved or not moved. If it is not, we have
propositum, quod necesse est reached our conclusion—namely, that we
ponere aliquod movens must posit some unmoved mover. This we
immobile. Et hoc dicimus Deum. call God. If it is moved, it is moved by
Si autem movetur, ergo ab alio another mover. We must, consequently,
movente movetur. Aut ergo est either proceed to infinity, or we must arrive
procedere in infinitum: aut est at some unmoved mover. Now, it is not
devenire ad aliquod movens possible to proceed to infinity. Hence, we
immobile. Sed non est must posit some prime unmoved mover.
procedere in infinitum. Ergo
necesse est ponere aliquod
primum movens immobile.
In hac autem probatione sunt [4] In this proof, there are two propositions
duae propositiones probandae: that need to be proved, namely, that
scilicet, quod omne motum everything that is moved is moved by
movetur ab alio; et quod in another, and that in movers and things
moventibus et motis non sit moved one cannot proceed to infinity.
procedere in infinitum.
Quorum primum probat [5] The first of these propositions Aristotle
philosophus tribus modis. proves in three ways. The first way is as
Primo, sic. Si aliquid movet follows. If something moves itself, it must
seipsum, oportet quod in se have within itself the principle of its own
habeat principium motus sui: motion; otherwise, it is clearly moved by
alias, manifeste ab alio another. Furthermore, it must be primarily
moveretur. Oportet etiam quod moved. This means that it must be moved
sit primo motum: scilicet quod by reason of itself, and not by reason of a
moveatur ratione sui ipsius, et part of itself, as happens when an animal is
non ratione suae partis, sicut moved by the motion of its foot. For, in this
movetur animal per motum sense, a whole would not be moved by
pedis; sic enim totum non itself, but a part, and one part would be
moveretur a se, sed sua pars, moved by another. It is also necessary that
et una pars ab alia. Oportet a selfmoving being be divisible and have
etiam ipsum esse divisibile, et parts, since, as it is proved in the Physics
habere partes: cum omne quod [VI, 4], whatever is moved is divisible.
movetur sit divisibile, ut
probatur in VI Physic.
His suppositis sic arguit. Hoc [6] On the basis of these suppositions
quod a seipso ponitur moveri, Aristotle argues as follows. That which is
est primo motum. Ergo ad held to be moved by itself is primarily
quietem unius partis eius, moved. Hence, when one of its parts is at
sequitur quies totius. Si enim, rest, the whole is then at rest. For if, while
quiescente una parte, alia pars one part was at rest, another part in it were
eius moveretur, tunc ipsum moved, then the whole itself would not be
totum non esset primo motum, primarily moved; it would be that part in it
sed pars eius quae movetur alia which is moved while another part is at rest.
quiescente. Nihil autem quod But nothing that is at rest because
quiescit quiescente alio, something else is at rest is moved by itself;
movetur a seipso: cuius enim for that being whose rest follows upon the
quies ad quietem sequitur rest of another must have its motion follow
alterius, oportet quod motus ad upon the motion of another. It is thus not
motum alterius sequatur; et sic moved by itself. Therefore, that which was
non movetur a seipso. Ergo hoc posited as being moved by itself is not

quod ponebatur a seipso moved by itself. Consequently, everything
moveri, non movetur a seipso. that is moved must be moved by another.
Necesse est ergo omne quod
movetur, ab alio moveri.
Nec obviat huic rationi quod [7] Nor is it an objection to this argument if
forte aliquis posset dicere quod one might say that, when something is held
eius quod ponitur movere to move itself, a part of it cannot be at rest;
seipsum, pars non potest or, again, if one might say that a part is not
quiescere; et iterum quod partis subject to rest or motion except accidentally,
non est quiescere vel moveri which is the unfounded argument of
nisi per accidens; ut Avicenna Avicenna. For, indeed, the force of
calumniatur. Quia vis rationis in Aristotle’s argument lies in this: if something
hoc consistit, quod, si aliquid moves itself primarily and through itself,
seipsum moveat primo et per rather than through its parts, that it is moved
se, non ratione partium, oportet cannot depend on another. But the moving
quod suum moveri non of the divisible itself, like its being, depends
dependeat ab aliquo; moveri on its parts; it cannot therefore move itself
autem ipsius divisibilis, sicut et primarily and through itself. Hence, for the
eius esse, dependet a partibus; truth of the inferred conclusion it is not
et sic non potest seipsum necessary to assume as an absolute truth
movere primo et per se. Non that a part of a being moving itself is at rest.
requiritur ergo ad veritatem What must rather be true is this conditional
conclusionis inductae quod proposition: if the part were at rest, the
supponatur partem moventis whole would be at rest. Now, this
seipsum quiescere quasi proposition would be true even though its
quoddam verum absolute: sed antecedent be impossible. In the same way,
oportet hanc conditionalem the following conditional proposition is true:
esse veram, quod, si quiesceret if man is an ass, he is irrational.
pars, quod quiesceret totum.
Quae quidem potest esse vera
etiam si antecedens sit
impossibile: sicut ista
conditionalis est vera, si homo
est asinus, est irrationalis.
Secundo, probat per [8] In the second way, Aristotle proves the
inductionem, sic. Omne quod proposition by induction [Physics VIII, 4].
movetur per accidens, non Whatever is moved by accident is not
movetur a seipso. Movetur enim moved by itself, since it is moved upon the
ad motum alterius. Similiter motion of another. So, too, as is evident,
neque quod movetur per what is moved by violence is not moved by
violentiam: ut manifestum est. itself. Nor are those beings moved by
Neque quae moventur per themselves that are moved by their nature
naturam ut ex se mota, sicut as being moved from within; such is the
animalia, quae constat ab case with animals, which evidently are
anima moveri. Nec iterum quae moved by the soul. Nor, again, is this true of
moventur per naturam ut gravia those beings, such as heavy and light
et levia. Quia haec moventur a bodies, which are moved through nature.
generante et removente For such beings are moved by the
prohibens. Omne autem quod generating cause and the cause removing
movetur, vel movetur per se, vel impediments. Now, whatever is moved is
per accidens. Et si per se, vel moved through itself or by accident. If it is
per violentiam, vel per naturam. moved through itself, then it is moved either
Et hoc, vel motum ex se, ut violently or by nature; if by nature, then
animal; vel non motum ex se, ut either through itself, as the animal, or not
grave et leve. Ergo omne quod through itself, as heavy and light bodies.
movetur, ab alio movetur. Therefore, everything that is moved is
moved by another.
Tertio, probat sic. Nihil idem est [9] In the third way, Aristotle proves the

simul actu et potentia respectu proposition as follows [VIII, 5]. The same
eiusdem. Sed omne quod thing cannot be at once in act and in
movetur, inquantum huiusmodi, potency with respect to the same thing. But
est in potentia: quia motus est everything that is moved is, as such, in
actus existentis in potentia potency. For motion is the act of something
secundum quod huiusmodi. that is in potency inasmuch as it is in
Omne autem quod movet est in potency. That which moves, however, is as
actu, inquantum huiusmodi: such in act, for nothing acts except
quia nihil agit nisi secundum according as it is in act. Therefore, with
quod est in actu. Ergo nihil est respect to the same motion, nothing is both
respectu eiusdem motus mover and moved. Thus, nothing moves
movens et motum. Et sic nihil itself.
movet seipsum.
Sciendum autem quod Plato qui [10] It is to be noted, however, that Plato,
posuit omne movens moveri, who held that every mover is moved
communius accepit nomen [Phaedrus], understood the name motion in
motus quam Aristoteles. a wider sense than did Aristotle. For
Aristoteles enim proprie accepit Aristotle understood motion strictly,
motum secundum quod est according as it is the act of what exists in
actus existentis in potentia potency inasmuch as it is such. So
secundum quod huiusmodi: understood, motion belongs only to divisible
qualiter non est nisi divisibilium bodies, as it is proved in the Physics [VI, 4].
et corporum, ut probatur in VI According to Plato, however, that which
Physic. Secundum Platonem moves itself is not a body. Plato understood
autem movens seipsum non est by motion any given operation, so that to
corpus: accipiebat enim motum understand and to judge are a kind of
pro qualibet operatione, ita motion. Aristotle likewise touches upon this
quod intelligere et opinari sit manner of speaking in the De anima [III, 7].
quoddam moveri; quem etiam Plato accordingly said that the first mover
modum loquendi Aristoteles moves himself because he knows himself
tangit in III de anima. and wills or loves himself. In a way, this is
Secundum hoc ergo dicebat not opposed to the reasons of Aristotle.
primum movens seipsum There is no difference between reaching a
movere quod intelligit se et vult first being that moves himself, as
vel amat se. Quod in aliquo non understood by Plato, and reaching a first
repugnat rationibus Aristotelis: being that is absolutely unmoved, as
nihil enim differt devenire ad understood by Aristotle.

aliquod primum quod moveat
se, secundum Platonem; et
devenire ad primum quod
omnino sit immobile, secundum
Aristotelem.
Aliam autem propositionem, [11] The second proposition, namely, that

scilicet quod in moventibus et there is no procession to infinity among
motis non sit procedere in movers and things moved, Aristotle proves
infinitum, probat tribus in three ways.
rationibus.
Quarum prima talis est. Si in [12] The first is as follows [VII, 1]. If among

motoribus et motis proceditur in movers and things moved we proceed to
infinitum, oportet omnia infinity, all these infinite beings must be
huiusmodi infinita corpora esse: bodies. For whatever is moved is divisible
quia omne quod movetur est and a body, as is proved in the Physics [VI,
divisibile et corpus, ut probatur 4]. But every body that moves some thing
in VI Physic. Omne autem moved is itself moved while moving it.
corpus quod movet motum, Therefore, all these infinites are moved
simul dum movet movetur. Ergo together while one of them is moved. But
omnia ista infinita simul one of them, being finite, is moved in a finite
moventur dum unum eorum time. Therefore, all those infinites are
movetur. Sed unum eorum, cum moved in a finite time. This, however, is
sit finitum, movetur tempore impossible. It is, therefore, impossible that
finito. Ergo omnia illa infinita among movers and things moved one can
moventur tempore finito. Hoc proceed to infinity.
autem est impossibile. Ergo
impossibile est quod in
motoribus et motis procedatur in
infinitum.
Quod autem sit impossibile [13] Furthermore, that it is impossible for the

quod infinita praedicta abovementioned infinites to be moved in a
moveantur tempore finito, sic finite time Aristotle proves as follows. The
probat. Movens et motum mover and the thing moved must exist
oportet simul esse: ut probat simultaneously. This Aristotle proves by
inducendo in singulis speciebus induction in the various species of motion.
motus. Sed corpora non But bodies cannot be simultaneous except
possunt simul esse nisi per through continuity or contiguity. Now, since,
continuitatem vel as has been proved, all the aforementioned
contiguationem. Cum ergo movers and. things moved are bodies, they
omnia praedicta moventia et must constitute by continuity or contiguity a
mota sint corpora, ut probatum sort of single mobile. In this way, one infinite
est, oportet quod sint quasi is moved in a finite time. This is impossible,
unum mobile per as is proved in the Physics [VII, 1].
continuationem vel
contiguationem. Et sic unum
infinitum movetur tempore finito.
Quod est impossibile, ut
probatur in VI physicorum.
Secunda ratio ad idem [14] The second argument proving the same

probandum talis est. In conclusion is the following. In an ordered
moventibus et motis ordinatis, series of movers and things moved (this is a
quorum scilicet unum per series in which one is moved by another
ordinem ab alio movetur, hoc according to an order), it is necessarily the
necesse est inveniri, quod, fact that, when the first mover is removed or
remoto primo movente vel ceases to move, no other mover will move
cessante a motione, nullum or be moved. For the first mover is the
aliorum movebit neque cause of motion for all the others. But, if
movebitur: quia primum est there are movers and things moved
causa movendi omnibus aliis. following an order to infinity, there will be no
Sed si sint moventia et mota per first mover, but all would be as intermediate
ordinem in infinitum, non erit movers. Therefore, none of the others will
aliquod primum movens, sed be able to be moved, and thus nothing in
omnia erunt quasi media the world will be moved.
moventia. Ergo nullum aliorum
poterit moveri. Et sic nihil
movebitur in mundo.
Tertia probatio in idem redit, nisi [15] The third proof comes to the same

quod est ordine transmutato, conclusion, except that, by beginning with
incipiendo scilicet a superiori. Et the superior, it has a reversed order. It is as
est talis. Id quod movet follows. That which moves as an
instrumentaliter, non potest instrumental cause cannot move unless
movere nisi sit aliquid quod there be a principal moving cause. But, if we
principaliter moveat. Sed si in proceed to infinity among movers and things
infinitum procedatur in moved, all movers will be as instrumental
moventibus et motis, omnia causes, because they will be moved movers
erunt quasi instrumentaliter and there will be nothing as a principal
moventia, quia ponentur sicut mover. Therefore, nothing will be moved.
moventia mota, nihil autem erit
sicut principale movens. Ergo
nihil movebitur.
Et sic patet probatio utriusque [16] Such, then, is the proof of both
propositionis quae propositions assumed by Aristotle in the first
supponebatur in prima demonstrative way by which he proved that
demonstrationis via, qua probat a first unmoved mover exists.
Aristoteles esse primum
motorem immobilem.
Secunda via talis est. Si omne [17] The second way is this. If every mover

movens movetur, aut haec is moved, this proposition is true either by
propositio est vera per se, aut itself or by accident. If by accident, then it is
per accidens. Si per accidens, not necessary, since what is true by
ergo non est necessaria: quod accident is not necessary. It is something
enim est per accidens verum, possible, therefore, that no mover is moved.
non est necessarium. But if a mover is not moved, it does not
Contingens est ergo nullum move: as the adversary says. It is therefore
movens moveri. Sed si movens possible that nothing is moved. For, if
non movetur, non movet: ut nothing moves, nothing is moved. This,
adversarius dicit. Ergo however, Aristotle considers to be
contingens est nihil moveri: impossible—namely, that at any time there
nam, si nihil movet, nihil be no motion. Therefore, the first
movetur. Hoc autem habet proposition was not possible, since from a
Aristoteles pro impossibili, quod false possible, a false impossible does not
scilicet aliquando nullus motus follow. Hence, this proposition, every mover
sit. Ergo primum non fuit is moved by another, was not true by
contingens: quia ex falso accident.
contingenti non sequitur falsum
impossibile. Et sic haec
propositio, omne movens ab
alio movetur, non fuit per
accidens vera.
Item, si aliqua duo sunt [18] Again, if two things are accidentally
coniuncta per accidens in joined in some being, and one of them is
aliquo; et unum illorum invenitur found without the other, it is probable that
sine altero, probabile est quod the other can be found without it. For
alterum absque illo inveniri example, if white and musical are found in
possit: sicut, si album et Socrates, and in Plato we find musical but
musicum inveniuntur in Socrate, not white, it is probable that in some other
et in Platone invenitur musicum being we can find the white without the
absque albo, probabile est quod musical. Therefore, if mover and thing
in aliquo alio possit inveniri moved are accidentally joined in some
album absque musico. Si igitur being, and the thing moved be found
movens et motum coniunguntur without the mover in some being, it is
in aliquo per accidens, motum probable that the mover is found without
autem invenitur in aliquo that which is moved. Nor can the example
absque eo quod moveat, of two things, of which one depends on the
probabile est quod movens other, be brought as an objection against
inveniatur absque eo quod this. For the union we are speaking of is not
moveatur. Nec contra hoc essential, but accidental.
potest ferri instantia de duobus
quorum unum ab altero
dependet: quia haec non
coniunguntur per se, sed per
accidens.
Si autem praedicta propositio [19] But, if the proposition that every mover

est vera per se, similiter is moved is true by itself, something
sequitur impossibile vel impossible or awkward likewise follows. For
inconveniens. Quia vel oportet the mover must be moved either by the
quod movens moveatur eadem same kind of motion as that by which he
specie motus qua movet, vel moves, or by another. If the same, a cause
alia. Si eadem, ergo oportebit of alteration must itself be altered, and
quod alterans alteretur, et further, a healing cause must itself be
ulterius quod sanans sanetur, et healed, and a teacher must himself be
quod docens doceatur, et taught and this with respect to the same
secundum eandem scientiam. knowledge. Now, this is impossible. A
Hoc autem est impossibile: nam teacher must have science, whereas he
docentem necesse est habere who is a learner of necessity does not have
scientiam, addiscentem vero it. So that, if the proposition were true, the
necesse est non habere; et sic same thing would be possessed and not
idem habebitur ab eodem et possessed by the same being—which is
non habebitur, quod est impossible. If, however, the mover is moved
impossibile. Si autem by another species of motion, so that
secundum aliam speciem motus (namely) the altering cause is moved
movetur, ita scilicet quod according to place, and the cause moving
alterans moveatur secundum according to place is increased, and so
locum, et movens secundum forth, since the genera and species of
locum augeatur, et sic de aliis; motion are finite in number, it will follow that
cum sint finita genera et species we cannot proceed to infinity. There will thus
motus, sequetur quod non sit be a first mover, which is not moved by
abire in infinitum. Et sic erit another. Will someone say that there will be
aliquod primum movens quod a recurrence, so that when all the genera
non movetur ab alio. Nisi forte and species of motion have been completed
aliquis dicat quod fiat reflexio the series will be repeated and return to the
hoc modo quod, completis first motion? This would involve saying, for
omnibus generibus et example, that a mover according to place
speciebus motus, iterum would be altered, the altering cause would
oporteat redire ad primam: ut, si be increased, and the increasing cause
movens secundum locum would be moved according to place. Yet this
alteretur et alterans augeatur, whole view would arrive at the same
iterum augens moveatur conclusion as before: whatever moves
secundum locum. Sed ex hoc according to a certain species of motion is
sequetur idem quod prius: itself moved according to the same species
scilicet quod id quod movet of motion, though mediately and not
secundum aliquam speciem immediately.
motus, secundum eandem
moveatur, licet non immediate
sed mediate.
Ergo relinquitur quod oportet [20] It remains, therefore, that we must posit

ponere aliquod primum quod some first mover that is not moved by any
non movetur ab alio exteriori. exterior moving cause.
Quia vero, hoc habito quod sit [21] Granted this conclusion—namely, that
primum movens quod non there is a first mover that is not moved by
movetur ab alio exteriori, non an exterior moving cause—it yet does not
sequitur quod sit penitus follow that this mover is absolutely
immobile, ideo ulterius procedit unmoved. That is why Aristotle goes on to
Aristoteles, dicendo quod hoc say that the condition of the first mover may
potest esse dupliciter. Uno be twofold [VIII, 5]. The first mover can be
modo, ita quod illud primum sit absolutely unmoved. If so, we have the
penitus immobile. Quo posito, conclusion we are seeking: there is a first
habetur propositum: scilicet, unmoved mover. On the other hand, the first
quod sit aliquod primum mover can be selfmoved. This may be
movens immobile. Alio modo, argued, because that which is through itself
quod illud primum moveatur a is prior to what is through another. Hence,
seipso. Et hoc videtur probabile: among things moved as well, it seems
quia quod est per se, semper reasonable that the first moved is moved
est prius eo quod est per aliud; through itself and not by another.
unde et in motis primum motum
rationabile est per seipsum
moveri, non ab alio.
Sed, hoc dato, iterum idem [22] But, on this basis, the same conclusion

sequitur. Non enim potest dici again follows. For it cannot be said that,
quod movens seipsum totum when a mover moves himself, the whole is
moveatur a toto: quia sic moved by the whole. Otherwise, the same
sequerentur praedicta difficulties would follow as before: one
inconvenientia, scilicet quod person would both teach and be taught, and
aliquis simul doceret et the same would be true among other
doceretur, et similiter in aliis motions. It would also follow that a being
motibus; et iterum quod aliquid would be both in potency and in act; for a
simul esset in potentia et actu, mover is, as such, in act, whereas the thing
nam movens, inquantum moved is in potency. Consequently, one part
huiusmodi, est actu, motum of the selfmoved mover is solely moving,
vero in potentia. Relinquitur and the other part solely moved. We thus
igitur quod una pars eius est reach the same conclusion as before: there
movens tantum et altera mota. exists an unmoved mover.
Et sic habetur idem quod prius:
scilicet quod aliquid sit movens
immobile.
Non autem potest dici quod [23] Nor can it be held that both parts of the

utraque pars moveatur, ita quod selfmoved mover are moved, so that one is
una ab altera; neque quod una moved by the other, or that one moves both
pars moveat seipsam et moveat itself and the other, or that the whole moves
alteram; neque quod totum a part, or that a part moves the whole. All
moveat partem; neque quod this would involve the return of the
pars moveat totum: quia aforementioned difficulties: something
sequerentur praemissa would both move and be moved according
inconvenientia, scilicet quod to the same species of motion; something
aliquid simul moveret et would be at once in potency and in act; and,
moveretur secundum eandem furthermore, the whole would not be
speciem motus; et quod simul primarily moving itself, it would move
esset in potentia et actu; et through the motion of a part. The conclusion
ulterius quod totum non esset thus stands: one part of a selfmoved mover
primo movens se, sed ratione must be unmoved and moving the other
partis. Relinquitur ergo quod part.
moventis seipsum oportet unam
partem esse immobilem et
moventem aliam partem.
Sed quia in moventibus se quae [24] But there is another point to consider.

sunt apud nos, scilicet in Among selfmoved beings known to us,
animalibus, pars movens, namely, animals, although the moving part,
scilicet anima, etsi sit immobilis which is to say the soul, is unmoved through
per se, movetur tamen per itself, it is yet moved by accident. That is
accidens; ulterius ostendit quod why Aristotle further shows that the moving
primi moventis seipsum pars part of the first selfmoving being is not
movens non movetur neque per moved either through itself or by accident
se neque per accidens. [VIII, 6].
Moventia enim se quae sunt For, since selfmoving beings known to us,
apud nos, scilicet animalia, cum namely, animals, are corruptible, the moving
sint corruptibilia, pars movens in part in them is moved by accident. But
eis movetur per accidens. corruptible selfmoving beings must be
Necesse est autem moventia se reduced to some first selfmoving being that
corruptibilia reduci ad aliquod is everlasting. Therefore, some selfmoving
primum movens se quod sit being must have a mover that is moved
sempiternum. Ergo necesse est neither through itself nor by accident.
aliquem motorem esse alicuius
moventis seipsum qui neque
per se neque per accidens
moveatur.
Quod autem necesse sit, [25] It is further evident that, according to
secundum suam positionem, the position of Aristotle, some selfmoved
aliquod movens se esse being must be everlasting. For if, as
sempiternum, patet. Si enim Aristotle supposes, motion is everlasting,
motus est sempiternus, ut ipse the generation of selfmoving beings (this
supponit, oportet quod means beings that are generable and
generatio moventium seipsa corruptible) must be endless. But the cause
quae sunt generabilia et of this endlessness cannot be one of the
corruptibilia, sit perpetua. Sed selfmoving beings, since it does not always
huius perpetuitatis non potest exist. Nor can the cause be all the self
esse causa aliquod ipsorum moving beings together, both because they
moventium se: quia non semper would be infinite and because they would
est. Nec simul omnia: tum quia not be simultaneous. There must therefore
infinita essent; tum quia non be some endlessly selfmoving being,
simul sunt. Relinquitur igitur causing the endlessness of generation
quod oportet esse aliquod among these sublunary selfmovers. Thus,
movens seipsum perpetuum, the mover of the selfmoving being is not
quod causat perpetuitatem moved, either through itself or by accident.
generationis in istis inferioribus
moventibus se. Et sic motor
eius non movetur neque per se
neque per accidens.
Item, in moventibus se videmus [26] Again, we see that among beings that

quod aliqua incipiunt de novo move themselves some initiate a new
moveri propter aliquem motum motion as a result of some motion. This new
quo non movetur a seipso motion is other than the motion by which an
animal, sicut cibo digesto aut animal moves itself, for example, digested
aere alterato: quo quidem motu food or altered air. By such a motion the
ipse motor movens seipsum selfmoving mover is moved by accident.
movetur per accidens. Ex quo From this we may infer that no selfmoved
potest accipi quod nullum being is moved everlastingly whose mover
movens seipsum movetur is moved either by itself or by accident. But
semper cuius motor movetur the first selfmover is everlastingly in
per se vel per accidens. Sed motion; otherwise, motion could not be
primum movens seipsum everlasting, since every other motion is
movetur semper: alias non caused by the motion of the selfmoving first
posset motus esse mover. Ile first selfmoving being, therefore,
sempiternus, cum omnis alius is moved by a mover who is himself moved
motus a motu primi moventis neither through himself nor by accident.
seipsum causetur. Relinquitur
igitur quod primum movens
seipsum movetur a motore qui
non movetur neque per se
neque per accidens.
Nec est contra hanc rationem [27] Nor is it against this argument that the
quod motores inferiorum orbium movers of the lower spheres produce an
movent motum sempiternum, et everlasting motion and yet are said to be
tamen dicuntur moveri per moved by accident. For they are said to be
accidens. Quia dicuntur moveri moved by accident, not on their own
per accidens non ratione sui account, but on account of their movable
ipsorum, sed ratione suorum subjects, which follow the motion of the
mobilium, quae sequuntur higher sphere.
motum superioris orbis.
Sed quia Deus non est pars [28] Now, God is not part of any selfmoving

alicuius moventis seipsum, mover. In his Metaphysics [XII, 7], therefore,
ulterius Aristoteles, in sua Aristotle goes on from the mover who is a
metaphysica, investigat ex hoc part of the selfmoved mover to seek
motore qui est pars moventis another mover—God—who is absolutely
seipsum, alium motorem separate. For, since everything moving itself
separatum omnino, qui est is moved through appetite, the mover who is
Deus. Cum enim omne movens part of the selfmoving being moves
seipsum moveatur per because of the appetite of some appetible
appetitum, oportet quod motor object. This object is higher, in the order of
qui est pars moventis seipsum, motion, than the mover desiring it; for the
moveat propter appetitum one desiring is in a manner a moved mover,
alicuius appetibilis. Quod est eo whereas an appetible object is an absolutely
superius in movendo: nam unmoved mover. There must, therefore, be
appetens est quodammodo an absolutely unmoved separate first mover.
movens motum; appetibile This is God.

autem est movens omnino non
motum. Oportet igitur esse
primum motorem separatum
omnino immobilem, qui Deus
est.
Praedictos autem processus [29] Two considerations seem to invalidate

duo videntur infirmare. Quorum these arguments. The first consideration is
primum est, quod procedunt ex that, as arguments, they presuppose the
suppositione aeternitatis motus: eternity of motion, which Catholics consider
quod apud Catholicos to be false.
supponitur esse falsum.
Et ad hoc dicendum quod via [30] To this consideration the reply is as
efficacissima ad probandum follows. The most efficacious way to prove
Deum esse est ex suppositione that God exists is on the supposition that
aeternitatis mundi, qua posita, the world is eternal. Granted this
minus videtur esse manifestum supposition, that God exists is less
quod Deus sit. Nam si mundus manifest. For, if the world and motion have
et motus de novo incoepit, a first beginning, some cause must clearly
planum est quod oportet poni be posited to account for this origin of the
aliquam causam quae de novo world and of motion. That which comes to
producat mundum et motum: be anew must take its origin from some
quia omne quod de novo fit, ab innovating cause; since nothing brings itself
aliquo innovatore oportet from potency to act, or from nonbeing to
sumere originem; cum nihil being.
educat se de potentia in actum
vel de non esse in esse.
Secundum est, quod supponitur [31] The second consideration is that the

in praedictis demonstrationibus demonstrations given above presuppose
primum motum, scilicet corpus that the first moved being, namely, a
caeleste, esse motum ex se. Ex heavenly body, is selfmoved. This means
quo sequitur ipsum esse that it is animated, which many do not
animatum. Quod a multis non admit.
conceditur.
Et ad hoc dicendum est quod, si [32] The reply to this consideration is that, if
primum movens non ponitur the prime mover is not held to be self
motum ex se, oportet quod moved, then it must be moved immediately
moveatur immediate a penitus by something absolutely unmoved. Hence,
immobili. Unde etiam Aristoteles even Aristotle himself proposed this
sub disiunctione hanc conclusion as a disjunction: it is necessary
conclusionem inducit: quod either to arrive immediately at an unmoved
scilicet oporteat vel statim separate first mover, or to arrive at a self
devenire ad primum movens moved mover from whom, in turn, an
immobile separatum, vel ad unmoved separate first mover is reached.
movens seipsum, ex quo iterum
devenitur ad movens primum
immobile separatum.
Procedit autem philosophus alia [33] In Metaphysics II [Ia, 2] Aristotle also

via in II Metaphys., ad uses another argument to show that there is
ostendendum non posse no infinite regress in efficient causes and
procedi in infinitum in causis that we must reach one first cause—God.
efficientibus, sed esse devenire This way is as follows. In all ordered
ad unam causam primam: et efficient causes, the first is the cause of the
hanc dicimus Deum. Et haec via intermediate cause, whether one or many,
talis est. In omnibus causis and this is the cause of the last cause. But,
efficientibus ordinatis primum when you suppress a cause, you suppress
est causa medii, et medium est its effect. Therefore, if you suppress the first
causa ultimi: sive sit unum, sive cause, the intermediate cause cannot be a
plura media. Remota autem cause. Now, if there were an infinite regress
causa, removetur id cuius est among efficient causes, no cause would be
causa. Ergo, remoto primo, first. Therefore, all the other causes, which
medium causa esse non poterit. are intermediate, will be suppressed. But
Sed si procedatur in causis this is manifestly false. We must, therefore,
efficientibus in infinitum, nulla posit that there exists a first efficient cause.
causarum erit prima. Ergo This is God.
omnes aliae tollentur, quae sunt
mediae. Hoc autem est
manifeste falsum. Ergo oportet
ponere primam causam
efficientem esse. Quae Deus
est.
Potest etiam alia ratio colligi ex [34] Another argument may also be
verbis Aristotelis. In II enim gathered from the words of Aristotle. In
Metaphys. ostendit quod ea Metaphysics II [Ia, 1] he shows that what is
quae sunt maxime vera, sunt et most true is also most a being. But in
maxime entia. In IV autem Metaphysics IV [4] he shows the existence
Metaphys. ostendit esse aliquid of something supremely true from the
maxime verum, ex hoc quod observed fact that of two false things one is
videmus duorum falsorum unum more false than the other, which means that
altero esse magis falsum, unde one is more true than the other. This
oportet ut alterum sit etiam comparison is based on the nearness to
altero verius; hoc autem est that which is absolutely and supremely true.
secundum approximationem ad From these Aristotelian texts we may further
id quod est simpliciter et infer that there is something that is
maxime verum. Ex quibus supremely being. This we call God.
concludi potest ulterius esse
aliquid quod est maxime ens. Et
hoc dicimus Deum.
Ad hoc etiam inducitur a [35] Damascene proposes another

Damasceno alia ratio sumpta ex argument for the same conclusion taken

rerum gubernatione: quam from the government of the world [De fide
etiam innuit Commentator in II orthodoxa I, 3]. Averroes likewise hints at it
physicorum. Et est talis. [In II Physicorum]. The argument runs thus.
Impossibile est aliqua contraria Contrary and discordant things cannot,
et dissonantia in unum ordinem always or for the most part, be parts of one
concordare semper vel pluries order except under someone’s government,
nisi alicuius gubernatione, ex which enables all and each to tend to a
qua omnibus et singulis tribuitur definite end. But in the world we find that
ut ad certum finem tendant. Sed things of diverse natures come together
in mundo videmus res under one order, and this not rarely or by
diversarum naturarum in unum chance, but always or for the most part.
ordinem concordare, non ut raro There must therefore be some being by
et a casu, sed ut semper vel in whose providence the world is governed.
maiori parte. Oportet ergo esse This we call God.
aliquem cuius providentia
mundus gubernetur. Et hunc
dicimus Deum.
Caput 14 Chapter 14
Quod ad cognitionem Dei oportet THAT TO KNOW GOD WE MUST
uti via remotionis USE THE WAY OF REMOTION
Ostenso igitur quod est aliquod [1] We have shown that there exists a
primum ens, quod Deum dicimus, first being, whom we call God. We
oportet eius conditiones investigare. must, accordingly, now investigate the
properties of this being.
Est autem via remotionis utendum [2] Now, in considering the divine
praecipue in consideratione divinae substance, we should especially make
substantiae. Nam divina substantia use of the method of remotion. For, by
omnem formam quam intellectus its immensity, the divine substance
noster attingit, sua immensitate surpasses every form that our intellect
excedit: et sic ipsam apprehendere reaches. Thus we are unable to
non possumus cognoscendo quid apprehend it by knowing what it is. Yet
est. Sed aliqualem eius habemus we are able to have some knowledge
notitiam cognoscendo quid non est. of it by knowing what it is not.
Tantoque eius notitiae magis Furthermore, we approach nearer to a
appropinquamus, quanto plura per knowledge of God according as
intellectum nostrum ab eo poterimus through our intellect we are able to
removere. Tanto enim unumquodque remove more and more things from
perfectius cognoscimus, quanto Him. For we know each thing more
differentias eius ad alia plenius perfectly the more fully we see its
intuemur: habet enim res differences from other things; for each
unaquaeque in seipsa esse proprium thing has within itself its own being,
ab omnibus aliis rebus distinctum. distinct from all other things. So, too, in
Unde et in rebus quarum definitiones the case of the things whose
cognoscimus, primo eas in genere definitions we know. We locate them in

collocamus, per quod scimus in a genus, through which we know in a
communi quid est; et postmodum general way what they are. Then we
differentias addimus, quibus a rebus add differences to each thing, by which
aliis distinguatur; et sic perficitur it may be distinguished from other
substantiae rei completa notitia. things. In this way, a complete
knowledge of a substance is built up.
Sed quia in consideratione [3] However, in the consideration of the

substantiae divinae non possumus divine substance we cannot take a
accipere quid, quasi genus; nec what as a genus; nor can we derive the
distinctionem eius ab aliis rebus per distinction of God from things by
affirmativas differentias accipere differences affirmed of God. For this
possumus, oportet eam accipere per reason, we must derive the distinction
differentias negativas. Sicut autem in of God from other beings by means of
affirmativis differentiis una aliam negative differences. And just as
contrahit, et magis ad completam among affirmative differences one
designationem rei appropinquat contracts the other, so one negative
secundum quod a pluribus differre difference is contracted by another that
facit; ita una differentia negativa per makes it to differ from many beings.
aliam contrahitur, quae a pluribus For example, if we say that God is not
differre facit. Sicut, si dicamus Deum an accident, we thereby distinguish
non esse accidens, per hoc ab Him from all accidents. Then, if we add
omnibus accidentibus distinguitur; that He is not a body, we shall further
deinde si addamus ipsum non esse distinguish Him from certain
corpus, distinguemus ipsum etiam substances. And thus, proceeding in
ab aliquibus substantiis; et sic per order, by such negations God will be
ordinem ab omni eo quod est praeter distinguished from all that He is not.
ipsum, per negationes huiusmodi Finally, there will then be a proper
distinguetur; et tunc de substantia consideration of God’s substance when
eius erit propria consideratio cum He will be known as distinct from all
cognoscetur ut ab omnibus things. Yet, this knowledge will not be
distinctus. Non tamen erit perfecta: perfect, since it will not tell us what
quia non cognoscetur quid in se sit. God is in Himself.
Ad procedendum igitur circa Dei [4] As a principle of procedure in
cognitionem per viam remotionis, knowing God by way of remotion,
accipiamus principium id quod ex therefore, let us adopt the proposition
superioribus iam manifestum est, which, from what we have said, is now
scilicet quod Deus sit omnino manifest, namely, that God is
immobilis. Quod etiam auctoritas absolutely unmoved. The authority of
sacrae Scripturae confirmat. Dicitur Sacred Scripture also confirms this.
enim Malach. 36: ego Deus, et non For it is written: “I am the Lord and I
mutor; Iac. 117: apud quem non est change not” (Mal. 3:6); ...“with whom
transmutatio; et Num. 2319: non est there is no change” (James 2:17).
Deus quasi homo, ut mutetur. Again: “God is not man... that He
should be changed (Num. 23:19).
Caput 15 Chapter 15
Quod Deus sit aeternus THAT GOD IS ETERNAL
Ex hoc autem apparet ulterius [1] From what we have said it is further

Deum esse aeternum. apparent that God is eternal.
Nam omne quod incipit esse vel [2] Everything that begins to be or
desinit, per motum vel mutationem ceases to be does so through motion or
hoc patitur. Ostensum autem est change. Since, however, we have
Deum esse omnino immutabilem. shown that God is absolutely
Est igitur aeternus, carens principio immutable, He is eternal, lacking all
et fine. beginning or end.
Item. Illa sola tempore mensurantur [3] Again. Those beings alone are
quae moventur: eo quod tempus est measured by time that are moved. For
numerus motus, ut patet in IV time, as is made clear in Physics IV
physicorum. Deus autem est [11], is “the number of motion.” But
omnino absque motu, ut iam God, as has been proved, is absolutely
probatum est. Tempore igitur non without motion, and is consequently not
mensuratur. Igitur in ipso non est measured by time. There is, therefore,
prius et posterius accipere. Non no before and after in Him; He does not
ergo habet esse post non esse, nec have being after nonbeing, nor non
non esse post esse potest habere, being after being, nor can any
nec aliqua successio in esse ipsius succession be found in His being. For
inveniri potest: quia haec sine none of these characteristics can be
tempore intelligi non possunt. Est understood without time. God,
igitur carens principio et fine, totum therefore, is without beginning and end,
esse suum simul habens. In quo having His whole being at once. In this
ratio aeternitatis consistit. consists the nature of eternity.
Adhuc. Si aliquando non fuit et [4] What is more, if it were true that
postmodum fuit, ab aliquo eductus there was a time when He existed after
est de non esse in esse. Non a not existing, then He must have been
seipso: quia quod non est non brought by someone from nonbeing to
potest aliquid agere. Si autem ab being. Not by Himself, since what does
alio, illud est prius eo. Ostensum not exist cannot act. If by another, then
autem est Deum esse primam this other is prior to God. But we have
causam. Non igitur esse incoepit. shown that God is the first cause.
Unde nec esse desinet: quia quod Hence, He did not begin to be, nor
semper fuit, habet virtutem semper consequently will He cease to be, for
essendi. Est igitur aeternus. that which has been everlastingly has
the power to be everlastingly. God is,
therefore, eternal.
Amplius. Videmus in mundo [5] We find in the world, furthermore,
quaedam quae sunt possibilia esse certain beings, those namely that are
et non esse, scilicet generabilia et subject to generation and corruption,
corruptibilia. Omne autem quod est which can be and notbe. But what can

possibile esse, causam habet: quia, be has a cause because, since it is
cum de se aequaliter se habeat ad equally related to two contraries,
duo, scilicet esse et non esse, namely, being and nonbeing, it must be
oportet, si ei approprietur esse, owing to some cause that being
quod hoc sit ex aliqua causa. Sed in accrues to it. Now, as we have proved
causis non est procedere in by the reasoning of Aristotle, one
infinitum, ut supra probatum est per cannot proceed to infinity among
rationem Aristotelis. Ergo oportet causes. We must therefore posit
ponere aliquid quod sit necesse something that is a necessary being.
esse. Omne autem necessarium vel Every necessary being, however, either
habet causam suae necessitatis has the cause of its necessity in an
aliunde; vel non, sed est per outside source or, if it does not, it is
seipsum necessarium. Non est necessary through itself. But one
autem procedere in infinitum in cannot proceed to infinity among
necessariis quae habent causam necessary beings the cause of whose
suae necessitatis aliunde. Ergo necessity lies in an outside source. We
oportet ponere aliquod primum must therefore posit a first necessary
necessarium, quod est per seipsum being, which is necessary through itself.
necessarium. Et hoc Deus est: cum This is God, since, as we have shown,
sit causa prima, ut ostensum est. He is the first cause. God, therefore, is
Est igitur Deus aeternus: cum omne eternal, since whatever is necessary
necessarium per se sit aeternum. through itself is eternal.
Ostendit etiam Aristoteles ex [6] From the everlastingness of time,

sempiternitate temporis likewise, Aristotle shows the
sempiternitatem motus. Ex quo everlastingness of motion [Physics VIII,
iterum ostendit sempiternitatem 1], from which he further shows the
substantiae moventis. Prima autem everlastingness of the moving
substantia movens Deus est. Est substance [VIII, 6]. Now, the first
igitur sempiternus. Negata autem moving substance is God. God is
sempiternitate temporis et motus, therefore everlasting. If we deny the
adhuc manet ratio ad everlastingness of time and motion, we
sempiternitatem substantiae. Nam, are still able to prove the
si motus incoepit, oportet quod ab everlastingness of the moving
aliquo movente incoeperit. Qui si substance. For, if motion had a
incoepit, aliquo agente incoepit. Et beginning, it must have done so
sic vel in infinitum ibitur; vel through some moving cause. If this
devenietur ad aliquid quod non moving cause began, it did so through
incoepit. the action of some cause. Hence, either
one will proceed to infinity, or he will
arrive at a moving cause that had no
beginning.
Huic autem veritati divina auctoritas [7] To this truth divine authority offers

testimonium perhibet. Unde witness. The Psalmist says: “But You,
Psalmus: tu autem, domine, in Lord, endure forever”; and he goes on
aeternum permanes. Et idem: tu to say: “But You art always the
autem idem ipse es, et anni tui non selfsame: and Your years shall not fail”
deficient. (Ps. 101:13, 28).
Caput 16 Chapter 16
Quod in Deo non est potentia passiva THAT THERE IS NO PASSIVE
POTENCY IN GOD
Si autem Deus aeternus est, necesse [1] If God is eternal, of necessity
est ipsum non esse in potentia. there is no potency in Him.
Omne enim id in cuius substantia [2] The being whose substance has

admiscetur potentia, secundum id quod an admixture of potency is liable not
habet de potentia potest non esse: quia to be by as much as it has potency;
quod potest esse, potest non esse. for that which can be, can notbe.
Deus autem secundum se non potest But, God, being everlasting, in His
non esse: cum sit sempiternus. In Deo substance cannot notbe. In God,
igitur non est potentia ad esse. therefore, there is no potency to
being.
Adhuc. Quamvis id quod quandoque est [3] Though a being that is sometime
in potentia quandoque actu, prius sit in potency and sometime in act is in
tempore in potentia quam in actu, tamen time in potency before being in act,
simpliciter actus est prior potentia: quia absolutely speaking act is prior to
potentia non educit se in actum, sed potency. For potency does not raise
oportet quod educatur in actum per itself to act; it must be raised to act
aliquid quod sit in actu. Omne igitur by something that is in act. Hence,
quod est aliquo modo in potentia, habet whatever is in some way in potency
aliquid prius se. Deus autem est primum has something prior to it. But, as is
ens et prima causa, ut ex supra dictis evident from what was said above,
patet. Non igitur habet in se aliquid God is the first being and the first
potentiae admixtum. cause. Hence, He has no admixture
of potency in Himself.
Item. Illud quod est per se necesse [4] Moreover, that which is a
esse, nullo modo est possibile esse: necessary being through itself is in
quia quod est per se necesse esse, non no way a possible being, since that
habet causam; omne autem quod est which is through itself a necessary
possibile esse, habet causam, ut supra being has no cause, whereas, as
ostensum est. Deum autem est per se we have shown above, whatever is
necesse esse. Nullo igitur modo est a possible being has a cause. But
possibile esse. Nihil ergo potentiae in God is through Himself a necessary
sua substantia invenitur. being. He is, therefore, in no way a
possible being, and so no potency
is found in His substance.
Item. Unumquodque agit secundum [5] Again, each thing acts in so far
quod est actu. Quod igitur non est totus as it is in act. Therefore, what is not
actus, non toto se agit, sed aliquo sui. wholly act acts, not with the whole
Quod autem non toto se agit, non est of itself, but with part of itself. But
primum agens: agit enim alicuius what does not act with the whole of
participatione, non per essentiam suam. itself is not the first agent, since it
Primum igitur agens, quod Deus est, does not act through its essence
nullam habet potentiam admixtam, sed but through participation in
est actus purus. something. The first agent,
therefore, namely, God, has no
admixture of potency but is pure
act.
Adhuc. Unumquodque, sicut natum est [6] Further, just as each thing
agere inquantum est actu, ita natum est naturally acts in so far as it is in act,
pati inquantum est potentia: nam motus so it is naturally receptive in so far
est actus potentia existentis. Sed Deus as it is in potency; for motion is the
est omnino impassibilis ac immutabilis, act of that which exists in potency.
ut patet ex dictis. Nihil ergo habet de But God is absolutely impassible
potentia, scilicet passiva. and immutable, as is clear from
what we have said. He has,
therefore, no part of potency—that
is, passive potency.
Item. Videmus aliquid esse in mundo [7] Then, too, we see something in
quod exit de potentia in actum. Non the world that emerges from
autem educit se de potentia in actum: potency to act. Now, it does not
quia quod est potentia, nondum est; educe itself from potency to act,
unde nec agere potest. Ergo oportet since that which is in potency, being
esse aliquid aliud prius, qui educatur de still in potency, can therefore not
potentia in actum. Et iterum, si hoc est act. Some prior being is therefore
exiens de potentia in actum, oportet needed by which it may be brought
ante hoc aliquid aliud poni, quo forth from potency to act. This
reducatur in actum. Hoc autem in cannot go on to infinity. We must,
infinitum procedere non potest. Ergo therefore, arrive at some being that
oportet devenire ad aliquid quod est is only in act and in no wise in
tantum actu et nullo modo in potentia. Et potency. This being we call God.
hoc dicimus Deum.
Caput 17 Chapter 17
Quod in Deo non est materia THAT THERE IS NO MATTER IN GOD
Apparet etiam ex hoc Deum non [1] From this it is likewise evident that
esse materiam. God is not matter.
Quia materia id quod est, in [2] Whatever matter is, it is in potency.

potentia est.
Item. Materia non est agendi [3] Matter, furthermore, is not a principle
principium: unde efficiens et of acting. That is why, according to
materia in idem non incidunt, Aristotle, the efficient cause and matter
secundum philosophum. Deo do not coincide [Physics II, 7]. But, as we
autem convenit esse primam have said, it belongs to God to be the
causam effectivam rerum, ut supra first efficient cause of things. Therefore,
dictum est. Ipse igitur materia non He is not matter.
est.
Amplius. Sequitur res naturales [4] Moreover, for those who reduced all
casu existere his qui omnia in things to matter as to the first cause it
materiam reducebant sicut in follows that natural things exist by
causam primam: contra quos chance. Aristotle argues against these
agitur in II physicorum. Si igitur thinkers in Physics II [8]. Hence, if God,
Deus, qui est prima causa, sit Who is the first cause, is the material
causa materialis rerum, sequitur cause of things, it follows that all things
omnia a casu existere. exist by chance.
Item. Materia non fit causa alicuius [5] Again, matter does not become the

in actu nisi secundum quod cause of something actual except by
alteratur et mutatur. Si igitur Deus being altered and changed. But if, as we
est immobilis, ut probatum est, have proved, God is absolutely immobile,
nullo modo potest esse rerum He cannot in any way be the cause of
causa per modum materiae. things according to the mode of matter.
Hanc autem veritatem fides [6] Now, the Catholic faith professes this

Catholica confitetur, qua Deum non truth, namely, it asserts that God has
de sua substantia, sed de nihilo created all things, not out of His own
asserit cuncta creasse. substance, but out of nothing.
In hoc autem insania David de [7] On this point, however, the madness
Dinando confunditur, qui ausus est of David of Dinant stands confounded.
dicere Deum esse idem quod He dared to assert that God is the same
prima materia, ex hoc quod, si non as prime matter on the ground that, if He
esset idem, oporteret differre ea were not, He would have to differ from it
aliquibus differentiis, et sic non by some differences, and thus they
essent simplicia; nam in eo quod would not be simple. For in the being that
per differentiam ab alio differt, ipsa differs from another by a difference, the
differentia compositionem facit. difference itself produces a composition.
Hoc autem processit ex ignorantia David’s position was the result of
qua nescivit quid inter differentiam ignorance. He did not know how to
et diversitatem intersit. Differens distinguish between difference and
enim, ut in X Metaph. determinatur, diversity. The different, as is determined
dicitur ad aliquid, nam omne in Metaphysics X [3], is said relationally,
differens aliquo est differens: for every different is different by
diversum autem aliquid absolute something. Something is called diverse,
dicitur, ex hoc quod non est idem. however, absolutely, from the fact that it
Differentia igitur in his quaerenda is not the same. Difference, therefore,
est quae in aliquo conveniunt: must be sought among those things that
oportet enim aliquid in eis assignari agree in something, for we must point to
secundum quod differant; sicut something in them according to which
duae species conveniunt in they differ: for example, two species
genere, unde oportet quod agree in genus and must therefore be
differentiis distinguantur. In his distinguished by differences. But in
autem quae in nullo conveniunt, things that agree in nothing we need not
non est quaerendum quo differant, seek the whereby they differ; they are
sed seipsis diversa sunt. Sic enim diverse by themselves. In the same way,
et oppositae differentiae ab opposite differences are distinguished
invicem distinguuntur: non enim from one another. For they do not share
participant genus quasi partem in the genus as a part of their essence,
suae essentiae: et ideo non est and therefore, since they are by
quaerendum quibus differant, themselves diverse, there is no need to
seipsis enim diversa sunt. Sic seek that by which they differ. In this way,
etiam Deus et materia prima too, God and prime matter are
distinguuntur, quorum unus est distinguished: one is pure act, the other
actus purus, aliud potentia pura, in is pure potency, and they agree in
nullo convenientiam habentes. nothing.
Caput 18 Chapter 18
Quod in Deo nulla est compositio THAT THERE IS NO COMPOSITION
IN GOD
Ex praemissis autem concludi potest [1] From what we have set down we

quod in Deo nulla sit compositio. can conclude that there is no
composition in God.
Nam in omni composito oportet esse [2] In every composite there must be

actum et potentiam. Non enim plura act and potency. For several things
possunt simpliciter unum fieri nisi cannot become absolutely one unless
aliquid sit ibi actus, et aliud potentia. among them something is act and
Quae enim actu sunt, non uniuntur something potency. Now, beings in act
nisi quasi colligata vel congregata, are not united except by being, so to
quae non sunt unum simpliciter. In speak, bound or joined together, which
quibus etiam ipsae partes means that they are not absolutely one.
congregatae sunt sicut potentia Their parts, likewise, are brought
respectu unionis: sunt enim unitae in together as being in potency with
actu postquam fuerint in potentia respect to the union, since they are
unibiles. In Deo autem nulla est united in act after being potentially
potentia. Non est igitur in eo aliqua unitable. But in God there is no
compositio. potency. Therefore, there is no
composition in Him.
Item. Omne compositum posterius [3] Every composite, moreover, is

est suis componentibus. Primum subsequent to its components. The first

ergo ens, quod Deus est, ex nullis being, therefore, which is God, has no
compositum est. components.
Adhuc. Omne compositum est [4] Every composite, furthermore, is

potentia dissolubile, quantum est ex potentially dissoluble. This arises from
ratione compositionis: licet in the nature of composition, although in
quibusdam sit aliquid aliud some composites there is another
dissolutioni repugnans. Quod autem element that resists dissolution. Now,
est dissolubile, est in potentia ad what is dissoluble can notbe. This
non esse. Quod Deo non competit: does not befit God, since He is through
cum sit per se necesseesse. Non Himself the necessary being. There is,
est igitur in eo aliqua compositio. therefore, no composition in God.
Amplius. Omnis compositio indiget [5] Every composition, likewise, needs

aliquo componente: si enim some composer. For, if there is
compositio est, ex pluribus est; quae composition, it is made up of a plurality,
autem secundum se sunt plura, in and a plurality cannot be fitted into a
unum non convenirent nisi ab aliquo unity except by some composer. If,
componente unirentur. Si igitur then, God were composite, He would
compositus esset Deus, haberet have a composer. He could not
componentem: non enim ipse compose Himself, since nothing is its
seipsum componere posset, quia own cause, because it would be prior
nihil est causa sui ipsius; esset enim to itself, which is impossible. Now, the
prius seipso, quod est impossibile. composer is the efficient cause of the
Componens autem est causa composite. Thus, God would have an
efficiens compositi. Ergo Deus efficient cause. Thus, too, He would not
haberet causam efficientem. Et sic be the first cause—which was proved
non esset causa prima, quod supra above.
habitum est.
Item. In quolibet genere tanto aliquid [6] Again, in every genus the simpler a
est nobilius quanto simplicius: sicut being, the more noble it is: e.g., in the
in genere calidi ignis, qui non habet genus of the hot, Ere, which has no
aliquam frigidi permixtionem. Quod admixture of cold. That, therefore,
igitur est in fine nobilitatis omnium which is at the peak of nobility among
entium, oportet esse in fine all beings must be at the peak of
simplicitatis. Hoc autem quod est in simplicity. But the being that is at the
fine nobilitatis omnium entium, peak of nobility among all beings we
dicimus Deum, cum sit prima causa: call God, since He is the first cause.
causa enim est nobilior effectu. Nulla For a cause is nobler than an effect.
igitur compositio ei accidere potest. God can, therefore, have no
composition.
Praeterea. In omni composito [7] Furthermore, in every composite the

bonum non est huius vel illius partis, good belongs, not to this or that part,
sed totius, et dico bonum secundum but to the whole—and I say good
illam bonitatem quae est propria according to the goodness that is
totius et perfectio eius: nam partes proper to the whole and its perfection.
sunt imperfectae respectu totius: For parts are imperfect in comparison
sicut partes hominis non sunt homo, with the whole, as the parts of man are
partes etiam numeri senarii non not a man, the parts of the number six
habent perfectionem senarii, et do not have the perfection of six, and
similiter partes lineae non perveniunt similarly the parts of a line do not reach
ad perfectionem mensurae quae in the perfection of the measure found in
tota linea invenitur. Si ergo Deus est the whole line. If, then, God is
compositus, perfectio et bonitas eius composite, His proper perfection and
propria invenitur in toto, non autem goodness is found in the whole, not in
in aliqua eius partium. Et sic non erit any part of the whole. Thus, there will
in eo pure illud bonum quod est not be in God purely that good which is
proprium ei. Non est ergo ipse proper to Him. God, then, is not the first
primum et summum bonum. and highest good.
Item. Ante omnem multitudinem [8] Again, prior to all multitude we must

oportet invenire unitatem. In omni find unity. But there is multitude in
autem composito est multitudo. Igitur every composite. Therefore, that which
oportet id quod est ante omnia, is before all things, namely, God, must
scilicet Deum, omni compositione be free of all composition.
carere.
Caput 19 Chapter 19
Quod in Deo nihil est violentum THAT IN GOD THERE IS NOTHING
neque praeter naturam VIOLENT OR UNNATURAL
Ex hoc autem philosophus concludit [1] From this Aristotle concludes that
quod in Deo nihil potest esse in God there can be nothing violent or
violentum neque extra naturam. unnatural.
Omne enim illud in quo aliquid [2] Everything in which there is found
violentum et praeter naturam something violent and outside nature
invenitur, aliquid sibi additum habet: has something added to itself, for
nam quod est de substantia rei non what belongs to the substance of a
potest esse violentum neque praeter thing can be neither violent nor
naturam. Nullum autem simplex habet outside nature. Now, nothing simple
in se aliquid additum: ex hoc enim has anything added to itself, since this
compositio relinqueretur. Cum igitur would render it composite. Since,
Deus sit simplex, ut ostensum est, then, God is simple, as we have
nihil in eo potest esse violentum shown, nothing in Him can be violent
neque praeter naturam. or outside nature.
Amplius. Necessitas coactionis est [3] Furthermore, the necessity of

necessitas ex alio. In Deo autem non coaction is a necessity from another.
est necessitas ex alio, sed est per But in God there is no necessity from
seipsum necessarium, et causa another; He is necessary through

necessitatis aliis. Igitur nihil in eo est Himself and the cause of necessity for
coactum. other things. Therefore, nothing in
God is due to coaction.
Adhuc. Ubicumque est aliquid [4] Again, wherever there is

violentum, ibi potest esse aliquid something violent, there can be
praeter id quod rei per se convenit: something beyond what befits a thing
nam violentum contrariatur ei quod through itself; for the violent is
est secundum naturam. Sed in Deo opposed to what is according to
non est possibile esse aliquid praeter nature. But in God there cannot be
id quod secundum se ei convenit: anything beyond what befits Him
cum secundum se sit necesseesse, according to Himself; for God, as we
ut ostensum est. Non potest igitur in have shown, is of Himself the
eo esse aliquid violentum. necessary being. There can,
therefore, be nothing violent in God.
Item. Omne in quo est aliquid [5] Then, too, everything in which
violentum vel innaturale, natum est ab there can be something violent or
alio moveri: nam violentum est cuius unnatural is by nature able to be
principium est extra nil conferente vim moved by another. For the violent is
passo. Deus autem est omnino “that whose source is from the
immobilis, ut ostensum est. Igitur non outside, the receiver being completely
potest in eo esse aliquid violentum vel passive.” Now, as we have shown,
innaturale. God is absolutely immobile. There
can, therefore, be nothing violent or
unnatural in Him.
Caput 20 Chapter 20
Quod Deus non est corpus THAT GOD IS NOT A BODY
Ex praemissis etiam ostenditur quod [1] From the preceding remarks it is
Deus non est corpus. also shown that God is not a body.
Omne enim corpus, cum sit [2] Every body, being a continuum, is

continuum, compositum est et partes composite and has parts. But, as we
habens. Deus autem non est have shown, God is not composite,
compositus, ut ostensum est. Igitur and is, therefore, not a body.
corpus non est.
Praeterea. Omne quantum est aliquo [3] Again, everything possessed of

modo in potentia: nam continuum est quantity is in a certain manner in
potentia divisibile in infinitum; numerus potency. For a continuum is
autem in infinitum est augmentabilis. potentially divisible to infinity, while
Omne autem corpus est quantum. numbers can be increased to infinity.
Ergo omne corpus est in potentia. But every body has quantity and is
Deus autem non est in potentia, sed therefore in potency. But God is not in
actus purus, ut ostensum est. Ergo potency, being pure act, as has been
Deus non est corpus. shown. Therefore, God is not a body.
Adhuc. Si Deus est corpus, oportet [4] Furthermore, if God is a body, He

quod sit aliquod corpus naturale: nam must be some natural body, since, as
corpus mathematicum non est per se the Philosopher proves, a
existens, ut philosophus probat, eo mathematical body is not something
quod dimensiones accidentia sunt. selfexisting, since dimensions are
Non autem est corpus naturale: cum accidents. But God is not a natural
sit immobilis, ut ostensum est; omne body, being immobile, as we have
autem corpus naturale mobile est. shown, whereas every natural body is
Deus igitur non est corpus. movable. God is, therefore, not a
body.
Amplius. Omne corpus finitum est: [5] Again, every body is finite, as is
quod tam de corpore circulari quam de proved in De caelo I [I, 5] of a circular
recto probatur in I caeli et mundi. body and a rectilinear body. Now, we
Quodlibet autem corpus finitum can transcend any given finite body
intellectu et imaginatione transcendere by means of the intellect and the
possumus. Si igitur Deus est corpus, imagination. If, then, God is a body,
intellectus et imaginatio nostra aliquid our intellect and imagination can think
maius Deo cogitare possunt. Et sic of something greater than God. God
Deus non est maior intellectu nostro. is thus not greater than our intellect—
Quod est inconveniens. Non est igitur which is awkward. God is, therefore,
corpus. not a body.
Adhuc. Cognitio intellectiva certior est [6] Intellectual knowledge, moreover,

quam sensitiva. Invenitur autem is more certain than sensitive
aliquid subiectum sensui in rerum knowledge. In nature we find an
natura. Igitur et intellectui. Sed object for the sense and therefore for
secundum ordinem obiectorum est the intellect as well. But the order and
ordo potentiarum, sicut et distinctio. distinction of powers is according to
Ergo super omnia sensibilia est aliquid the order of objects. Therefore, above
intelligibile in rerum natura existens. all sensible things there is something
Omne autem corpus in rebus existens intelligible among things. Now, every
est sensibile. Igitur super omnia body having actual existence is
corpora est aliquid accipere nobilius. sensible. Therefore, we can find
Si igitur Deus est corpus, non erit something nobler above all bodies.
primum et maximum ens. Hence, if God is a body, He will not
be the first and greatest being.
Praeterea. Quolibet corpore non [7] A living thing, likewise, is nobler
vivente res vivens est nobilior. than any nonliving body, and the life
Quolibet autem corpore vivente sua of a living body is nobler than it, since
vita est nobilior: cum per hoc habeat it is this life that gives to the living
supra alia corpora nobilitatem. Id igitur body its nobility above other bodies.
quo nihil est nobilius, corpus non est. Therefore, that than which nothing is
Hoc autem est Deus. Igitur non est nobler is not a body. Ibis is God. God
corpus. is, therefore, not a body.
Item. Inveniuntur rationes [8] Then, too, there are the

philosophorum ad idem ostendendum arguments of the philosophers to the
procedentes ex aeternitate motus, in same effect, based on the eternity of
hunc modum. In omni motu motion. They are as follows. In every
sempiterno oportet quod primum everlasting motion, the first mover
movens non moveatur neque per se cannot be moved either through
neque per accidens, sicut ex supra Himself or by accident, as is clear
dictis patet. Corpus autem caeli from the above. Now, the body of the
movetur circulariter motu sempiterno. heavens is moved in a circle with an
Ergo primus motor eius non movetur everlasting motion. Therefore, its first
neque per se neque per accidens. mover is not moved either through
Nullum autem corpus movet localiter Himself or by accident. Now, no body
nisi moveatur: eo quod oportet moves locally unless it be moved,
movens et motum esse simul; et sic since the mover and the moved must
corpus movens moveri oportet, ad hoc be together. The moving body must
quod sit simul cum corpore moto. thus be moved in order to be together
Nulla etiam virtus in corpore movet nisi with the moved body. But no power in
per accidens moveatur: quia, moto a body moves unless it itself be
corpore, movetur per accidens virtus moved by accident, since, when a
corporis. Ergo primus motor caeli non body is moved, its power is by
est corpus neque virtus in corpore. accident moved. The first mover of
Hoc autem ad quod ultimo reducitur the heavens, therefore, is neither a
motus caeli sicut ad primum movens body nor a power in a body. Now, that
immobile, est Deus. Deus igitur non to which the motion of the heavens is
est corpus. ultimately reduced as to its first
unmoved mover is God. God is,
therefore, not a body.
Adhuc. Nulla potentia infinita est [9] Again, no infinite power is a power

potentia in magnitudine. Potentia primi in a magnitude. But the power of the
motoris est potentia infinita. Ergo non prime mover is an infinite power.
est in aliqua magnitudine. Et sic Deus, Therefore, it is not in any magnitude.
qui est primus motor, neque est Therefore, God, Who is the prime
corpus neque est virtus in corpore. mover, is neither a body nor a power
in a body.
Prima sic probatur. Si potentia [10] The first proposition is proved
magnitudinis alicuius est infinita, aut thus. If the power of some magnitude
ergo erit magnitudinis finitae; aut is infinite, it will be the power either of
infinitae. Magnitudo infinita nulla est, a finite magnitude or an infinite one.
ut probatur in III Physic. et in I caeli et But there is no infinite magnitude, as
mundi. Magnitudinis autem finitae non is proved in Physics III [5] and De
est possibile esse potentiam infinitam. caelo I [5]. But a finite magnitude
Et sic in nulla magnitudine potest esse cannot have an infinite power.
potentia infinita. Therefore, an infinite power cannot
Quod autem in magnitudine finita non reside in any magnitude.

possit esse potentia infinita, sic That an infinite power cannot reside
probatur. Aequalem effectum quem in a finite magnitude is proved thus. A
facit potentia minor in tempore maiori, greater power produces an equal
facit potentia maior in tempore minori: effect in a shorter time than a lesser
qualiscumque sit ille effectus, sive sit power does in a longer time. This is
secundum alterationem, sive true whether that effect be according
secundum motum localem, sive to alteration, local motion, or any
secundum quemcumque alium other motion whatever. But an infinite
motum. Sed potentia infinita est maior power is greater than every finite
omni potentia finita. Ergo oportet quod power. Therefore, by moving more
in minori perficiat effectum, velocius swiftly, it should produce its effect in a
movendo, quam potentia quaecumque shorter time than any finite power.
finita. Nec potest esse quod in minori Nor can it be in something lesser that
quod sit tempus. Relinquitur igitur still is in time, Therefore, this will be
quod hoc erit in indivisibili temporis. Et in an indivisible point of time. And
sic movere et moveri et motus erunt in thus to move, to be moved, and
instanti. Cuius contrarium motion will take place in an instant—
demonstratum est in VI physicorum. of which the contrary has been
Quod autem non possit potentia proved in Physics VI [3].
infinita magnitudinis finitae movere in That an infinite power in a finite
tempore, sic iterum probatur. Sit magnitude cannot move in time is
potentia infinita quae est a. Accipiatur likewise proved as follows. Let there
pars eius quae est ab. Pars igitur ista be an infinite power A. Let us assume
movebit in tempore maiori. Oportebit a part of that power to be AB. This
tamen esse aliquam proportionem part will, therefore, move in a greater
huius temporis ad tempus in quo time. Yet there must be some
movet tota potentia: cum utrumque proportion of this time to the time in
tempus sit finitum. Sint igitur haec duo which the whole power moves, since
tempora in decupla proportione se ad both times are finite. Let these two
invicem habentia: non enim quantum times be related to one another in the
ad hanc rationem differt istam vel proportion of one to ten, since for the
aliam proportionem dicere. Si autem present argument this proportion will
addatur ad potentiam praedictam do as well as any other. Now, if we
finitam, diminui oportebit de tempore add to the aforementioned finite
secundum proportionem additionis ad power, we must diminish its time
potentiam: cum maior potentia in according to the proportion of the
minori tempore moveat. Si ergo addition to the power; for a greater
addatur decuplum, illa potentia power moves in a lesser time. If the
movebit in tempore quod erit decima decuple be added, that power will
pars temporis in quo movebat prima move in a time that will be a tenth
pars accepta infinitae potentiae, part of the time in which the first
scilicet ab. Et tamen haec potentia assumed part of the infinite power,
quae est decuplum eius, est potentia namely, AB, moved. And yet this
finita: cum habeat proportionem power, which is its decuple, is a finite
determinatam ad potentiam finitam. power, since it has a determinate
Relinquitur igitur quod in aequali proportion to the finite power.
tempore movet potentia finita et Therefore, the finite and the infinite
infinita. Quod est impossibile. Non power will move in the same time—
igitur potentia infinita magnitudinis which is impossible. Therefore, the
finitae potest movere in tempore infinite power of a finite magnitude
aliquo. cannot move in time.
Quod autem potentia primi motoris sit [11] That the power of the first mover

infinita, sic probatur. Nulla potentia is infinite is proved thus. No finite
finita potest movere tempore infinito. power can move in an infinite time.
Sed potentia primi motoris movet in But the power of the first mover
tempore infinito: quia motus primus est moves in an infinite time because the
sempiternus. Ergo potentia primi first motion is endless. Therefore, the
motoris est infinita. Prima sic probatur. power of the prime mover is infinite.
Si aliqua potentia finita alicuius Ile first proposition is proved thus. If
corporis movet tempore infinito, pars the finite power of some body moves
illius corporis, habens partem in an infinite time, a part of that body,
potentiae, movebit in tempore minori: having a part of the power, will move
quia quanto aliquid est maioris in a shorter time; for the greater the
potentiae, tanto in maiori tempore power of a mover, the more it will be
motum continuare poterit; et sic pars able to keep up its motion in a longer
praedicta movebit tempore finito, time. Thus, the aforementioned part
maior autem pars in maiori tempore will move in a finite time, and a
movere poterit. Et sic semper, greater part will be able to move in a
secundum quod addetur ad potentiam longer time. Thus, as we add to the
motoris, addetur ad tempus secundum power of the mover, we shall always
eandem proportionem. Sed additio add to the time according to the same
aliquoties facta perveniet ad proportion. But after a certain addition
quantitatem totius, vel etiam excedet. has been made, the addition win
Ergo et additio ex parte temporis reach the quantity of the whole or
perveniet ad quantitatem temporis in even exceed it. So, too, an addition of
quo movet totum. Tempus autem in time will reach the quantity of time in
quo totum movebat, dicebatur esse which it moves the whole. But the
infinitum. Ergo tempus finitum metietur time in which it moved the whole was
tempus infinitum. Quod est said to be infinite. Therefore, a finite
impossibile. time will measure an infinite time—
which is impossible.
Sed contra hunc processum plures [12] But against this reasoning there
sunt obiectiones. are several objections.
Quarum una est, quia potest poni [13] One objection is this. It can be
quod illud corpus quod movet primum assumed that the body that moves
motum, non est divisibile: sicut patet the first moved is not divisible, as is
de corpore caelesti. Praedicta autem the case with a heavenly body. But
probatio procedit ex divisione eius. the preceding proof is based on the
division of the first body.
Sed ad hoc dicendum quod [14] The reply to this objection is as
conditionalis potest esse vera cuius follows. There can be a true
antecedens est impossibile. Et si quid conditional proposition whose
est quod destruat veritatem talis antecedent is impossible. If there is
conditionalis, est impossibile: sicut, si something that destroys the truth of
aliquis destrueret veritatem huius this conditional proposition, it is then
conditionalis, si homo volat, habet impossible. For example, if someone
alas, esset impossibile. Et secundum destroys the truth of the conditional
modum hunc intelligendus est proposition, If man flies, he has
processus probationis praedictae. wings, it would be impossible. It is in
Quia haec conditionalis est vera, si this manner that the above proof is to
corpus caeleste dividitur, pars eius erit be understood. For the following
minoris potentiae quam totum. Huius conditional proposition is true: If a
autem conditionalis veritas tollitur si heavenly body is divided, a part of it
ponatur primum movens esse corpus, will have less power than the whole.
propter impossibilia quae sequuntur. Now, the truth of this conditional
Unde patet hoc esse impossibile. Et proposition is taken away if it be
similiter potest responderi si fiat posited that the first mover is a body;
obiectio de augmento potentiarum and the reason is the impossibilities
finitarum. Quia non est accipere in that follow from it. Therefore, to posit
rerum natura potentias secundum this is impossible. A similar reply can
omnem proportionem quam habet be given if objection is made
tempus ad tempus quodcumque. Est concerning the increase of finite
tamen conditionalis vera, qua in powers. We cannot assume powers
praedicta probatione indigetur. in nature according to all proportions
of time to any given time.
Nevertheless, the proposition
required in the above proof is a true
conditional proposition.
Secunda obiectio est quia, etsi corpus [15] The second objection is this.

dividitur, aliqua virtus potest esse Although a body is divided, it is
alicuius corporis quae non dividitur possible to find in a given body a
diviso corpore: sicut anima rationalis power that is not divided when the
non dividitur diviso corpore. body is divided. For example, the
rational soul is not divided if the body
is divided.
Et ad hoc est dicendum quod per [16] The reply is as follows. The
processum praedictum non probatur above argument does not prove that
quod non sit Deus coniunctus corpori God is not joined to a body as the
sicut anima rationalis corpori humano: rational soul is joined to the human
sed quod non est virtus in corpore body; it proves that He is not a power
sicut virtus materialis, quae dividitur ad in a body in the manner of a material
divisionem corporis. Unde etiam dicitur power, which is divided upon the
de intellectu humano quod non est division of the body. So, too, it is said
corpus neque virtus in corpore. Quod of the human intellect that it is not a
autem Deus, non sit unitus corpori body or a power in a body. However,
sicut anima, alterius rationis est. that God is not joined to a body as
the soul is, this is another issue.
Tertia obiectio est quia, si cuiuslibet [17] The third objection is this. If
corporis est potentia finita, ut in some given body has a finite power,
praedicto processu ostenditur; per as the above argument shows, and if
potentiam autem finitam non potest through a finite power nothing can
aliquid durare tempore infinito: endure through an infinite time, it will
sequetur quod nullum corpus possit follow that no body can endure
durare tempore infinito. Et sic corpus through an infinite time. Thus, a
caeleste de necessitate corrumpetur. heavenly body will of necessity be
corrupted.
Ad hoc autem a quibusdam [18] To this objection some reply that,

respondetur quod corpus caeleste as far as its own power is concerned,
secundum potentiam suam potest a heavenly body can fail, but it
deficere, sed perpetuitatem durationis acquires an eternal duration from
acquirit ab alio quod est potentiae another being of an infinite power.
infinitae. Et huic solutioni videtur Plato [Timaeus] seems to speak for
attestari Plato, qui de corporibus this solution when he introduces God
caelestibus Deum loquentem inducit in addressing the heavenly bodies as
hunc modum: natura vestra estis follows: “By your natures you are
dissolubilia, voluntate autem mea dissoluble, but through my will you
indissolubilia: quia voluntas mea maior are indissoluble; for my will is greater
est nexu vestro. than your bond.”
Hanc autem solutionem improbat [19] The Commentator attacks this

Commentator, in XI Metaph. Nam position in Metaphysics XI. According
impossibile est, secundum eum, quod to him, it is impossible that what can
id quod est de se possibile non esse, of itself notbe should acquire a
acquirat perpetuitatem essendi ab alio. perpetuity of being from another. This
Sequeretur enim quod corruptibile would mean that something
mutetur in incorruptibilitatem. Quod est corruptible becomes incorruptible,
impossibile secundum ipsum. Et ideo which according to him is impossible.
ipse in hunc modum respondet: quod Hence, Averroes answers the
in corpore caelesti omnis potentia objection as follows. All the potency
quae est, finita est: non tamen oportet that is in a heavenly body is finite, but
quod habeat omnem potentiam; est there is no reason why a heavenly
enim in corpore caelesti, secundum body should have every potency. For,
Aristotelem, in VIII Metaph., potentia according to Aristotle in Metaphysics
ad ubi, sed non ad esse. Et sic non VIII, there is in a heavenly body
oportet quod insit ei potentia ad non potency with respect to place, but not
esse. with respect to being. Hence, a
heavenly body need not have a
potency to nonbeing.
Sciendum tamen quod haec responsio [20] This reply of the Commentator,

Commentatoris non est sufficiens. however, is not sufficient. Even if we
Quia, etsi detur quod in corpore should grant that in a heavenly body
caelesti non sit potentia quasi passiva there is no sort of a passive potency
ad esse, quae est potentia materiae, to being, which is the potency of
est tamen in eo potentia quasi activa, matter, yet there is in it a potency of
quae est virtus essendi: cum expresse an active kind, which is the power of
Aristoteles dicat, in I caeli et mundi, being. For Aristotle expressly says in
quod caelum habet virtutem ut sit De caelo I [I, 3] that the heavens
semper. have the power to be forever.”
Et ideo melius dicendum est quod, [21] Hence, it is better to reply as
cum potentia dicatur ad actum, oportet follows. Since potency is said
iudicare de potentia secundum relatively to act, we must judge of
modum actus. Motus autem de sui potency according to the mode of the
ratione quantitatem habet et act. Now, according to its nature,
extensionem: unde duratio eius infinita motion has quantity and extension,
requirit quod potentia movens sit and hence its infinite duration
infinita. Esse autem non habet requires that the potency moving it be
aliquam extensionem quantitatis: infinite. But being does not have any
praecipue in re cuius esse est quantitative extension, especially in
invariabile, sicut caelum. Et ideo non the case of a thing, such as the
oportet quod virtus essendi sit infinita heavens, whose being is without
in corpore finito, licet in infinitum duret: change. Hence, the power of being
quia non differt quod per illam virtutem need not be infinite in a finite body,
aliquid duret in uno instanti vel even though it will endure to infinity.
tempore infinito, cum esse illud For it is one and the same whether
invariabile non attingatur a tempore through that power something will
nisi per accidens. endure for an instant or for an infinite
time, since its changeless being is
not touched by time except by
accident.
Quarta obiectio est de hoc quod non [22] The fourth objection is this. In
videtur esse necessarium quod id those beings that in moving are not
quod movet tempore infinito, habeat themselves altered, it does not seem
potentiam infinitam, in illis moventibus necessary that what moves in an
quae movendo non alterantur. Quia infinite time should have an infinite
talis motus nihil consumit de potentia power. For such a motion consumes
eorum: unde non minore tempore nothing of their power, so that after
movere possunt postquam aliquo they have moved for a time they are
tempore moverunt quam ante; sicut able to move for no less a time than
solis virtus finita est, et, quia in agendo before. Thus, the power of the sun is
eius virtus activa non minuitur, infinito finite, and because its active power is
tempore potest agere in haec inferiora, not lessened by acting, it is able,
secundum naturam. according to its nature, to act on the
sublunary world during an infinite
time.
Et ad hoc dicendum est quod corpus [23] To this the reply is, as we have
non movet nisi motum, ut probatum proved, that a body does not move
est. Et ideo, si contingat corpus unless it be moved. If, then, it should
aliquod non moveri, sequetur ipsum happen that a certain body is not
non movere. In omni autem quod moved, that body will consequently
movetur est potentia ad opposita: quia not move. But in everything that is
termini motus sunt oppositi. Et ideo, moved there is a potency towards
quantum est de se, omne corpus quod opposites, since the termini of motion
movetur possibile est non moveri. Et are opposites. Therefore, of itself,
quod possibile est non moveri, non every body that is moved can also
habet de se ut perpetuo tempore notbemoved. But what can notbe
moveatur. Et sic nec quod in perpetuo moved is not of itself able to be
tempore moveat. moved through endless time, and
hence neither to move through
endless time.
Procedit ergo praedicta demonstratio [24] The above demonstration,

de potentia finita corporis finiti, quae consequently, holds of the finite
non potest de se movere tempore power of a finite body, which power of
infinito. Sed corpus quod de se itself cannot move in an infinite time.
possibile est moveri et non moveri, But a body that of itself can be moved
movere et non movere, acquirere and notmoved, move and notmove,
potest perpetuitatem motus ab aliquo. can acquire perpetuity of motion from
Quod oportet esse incorporeum. Et another. This must be incorporeal.
ideo oportet primum movens esse The first mover must, therefore, be
incorporeum. Et sic nihil prohibet incorporeal. Thus, according to its
secundum naturam corpus finitum, nature, nothing prevents a finite body,
quod acquirit ab alio perpetuitatem in which acquires from another a
moveri, habere etiam perpetuitatem in perpetuity in being moved, from
movere: nam et ipsum primum corpus likewise having a perpetuity in
caeleste, secundum naturam, potest moving. For the first heavenly body
perpetuo motu inferiora corpora itself, according to its nature, can
caelestia revolvere, secundum quod revolve the lower heavenly bodies
sphaera movet sphaeram. with a perpetual motion, according as
Nec est inconveniens secundum sphere moves sphere.
Commentatorem quod illud quod de Nor, according to the Commentator,
se est in potentia moveri et non is it impossible (as it was impossible
moveri, acquirat ab alio perpetuitatem in the me of perpetuity of being) that
motus, sicut ponebatur esse what of itself can be moved and not
impossibile de perpetuitate essendi. moved should acquire perpetuity of
Nam motus est quidam defluxus a motion from another. For motion is a
movente in mobile: et ideo potest certain flow out of the mover to the
aliquod mobile acquirere ab alio thing moved, and hence something
perpetuitatem motus, quam non habet moved can acquire from another a
de se. Esse autem est aliquid fixum et perpetuity of motion that it does not
quietum in ente: et ideo quod de se have of itself. To be, on the other
est in potentia ad non esse, non hand, is something fixed and at rest
potest, ut ipse dicit, secundum viam in being, and, therefore, that which of
naturae acquirere ab alio itself is in potency to nonbeing
perpetuitatem essendi. cannot, as Averroes himself says [In
XII Metaphysicorum], following the
course of nature acquire from another
a perpetuity of being.
Quinta obiectio est quod per [25] The fifth objection is that,
praedictum processum non videtur following the above reasoning, there
maior ratio quare non sit potentia does not seem to be a greater reason
infinita in magnitudine quam extra why an infinite power is not in a
magnitudinem: nam utrobique magnitude rather than outside a

sequetur quod moveat non in tempore. magnitude. For in either case it will
follow that it moves in null time.
Et ad hoc dicendum quod finitum et [26] To this the reply is that, in
infinitum in magnitudine et tempore et magnitude, time, and motion, finite
motu inveniuntur secundum unam and infinite are found according to
rationem, sicut probatur in III et in VI one and the same notion, as is
Physic.: et ideo infinitum in uno eorum proved in Physics III [4] and VI [2, 7].
aufert proportionem finitam in aliis. In Therefore, the infinite in one of them
his autem quae carent magnitudine, removes a finite proportion in the
non est finitum et infinitum nisi others. But in beings without
aequivoce. Unde praedictus modus magnitude there is no finite or infinite
demonstrandi in talibus potentiis except equivocally. Hence, the
locum non habet. aforementioned method of
demonstration is not applicable
among such potencies.
Aliter autem respondetur et melius, [27] There is, however, another and
quod caelum habet duos motores: better answer. The heavens have two
unum proximum, qui est finitae virtutis, movers, a proximate one with a finite
et ab hoc habet quod motus eius sit power, which is responsible for the
finitae velocitatis; et alium remotum, fact that they have a finite velocity,
qui est infinitae virtutis, a quo habet and a remote mover with an infinite
quod motus eius possit esse infinitae power, which is responsible for the
durationis. Et sic patet quod potentia fact that their motion can be of an
infinita quae non est in magnitudine, infinite duration. And thus it is evident
potest movere corpus non immediate that an infinite power that is not in a
in tempore. Sed potentia quae est in magnitude can move a body in time,
magnitudine oportet quod moveat but not immediately. But a power that
immediate: cum nullum corpus moveat is in a magnitude must move
nisi motum. Unde, si moveret, immediately, since no body moves
sequeretur quod moveret in non except by being moved. Hence, if it
tempore. did move, it would follow that it would
move in null time.
Potest adhuc melius dici quod potentia [28] An even better reply is this. A

quae non est in magnitudine est power that is not in a magnitude is an
intellectus, et movet per voluntatem. intellect, and moves by will. For we
Unde movet secundum exigentiam have proved that the intellect is not a
mobilis, et non secundum corporeal power. Therefore, it moves
proportionem suae virtutis. Potentia according to the needs of the
autem quae est in magnitudine non movable body and not the proportion
potest movere nisi per necessitatem of its power; whereas a power that is
naturae: quia probatum est quod in a magnitude can move only
intellectus non est virtus corporea. Et through the necessity of nature.
sic movet de necessitate secundum Thus, of necessity, it moves
proportionem suae quantitatis. Unde according to the proportion of its
sequitur, si movet, quod moveat in quantity. Hence, if it moves, it moves
instanti. in an instant.
Secundum hoc ergo, remotis [29] Thus, with the removal of the
praedictis obiectionibus, procedit preceding objections, we see that the
demonstratio Aristotelis. argumentation of Aristotle stands.
Amplius. Nullus motus qui est a [30] No motion, furthermore, which is

movente corporeo potest esse from a corporeal mover can be
continuus et regularis: eo quod continuous and regular, because in
movens corporale in motu locali movet local motion a corporeal mover
attrahendo vel expellendo; id autem moves by pulling and pushing. Now,
quod attrahitur vel expellitur non in what is pulled or pushed is not
eadem dispositione se habet ad uniformly disposed towards its mover
moventem a principio motus usque ad from the beginning to the end of the
finem, cum quandoque sit propinquius, motion, since at times it will be nearer
quandoque remotius; et sic nullum and at other times farther away.
corpus potest movere motum Thus, no body can move with a
continuum et regularem. Motus autem continuous and regular motion. But
primus est continuus et regularis, ut the first motion is continuous and
probatur in VIII Physic. Igitur movens regular, as is proved in Physics VIII
primum motum non est corpus. [7]. Therefore, the mover of the first
motion is not a body.
Item. Nullus motus qui est ad finem [31] Again, no motion to an end that
qui exit de potentia in actum, potest passes from potency to act can be
esse perpetuus: quia, cum perventum endless, since when it reaches act
fuerit ad actum, motus quiescit. Si the motion comes to rest. If, then, the
ergo motus primus est perpetuus, first motion is endless, it must aim at
oportet quod sit ad finem qui sit an end that is always and in all ways
semper et omnibus modis in actu. Tale in act. But such an end is not a body
autem non est aliquod corpus neque or a power in a body, since all such
aliqua virtus in corpore: cum omnia things are movable either through
huiusmodi sint mobilia per se vel per themselves or by accident. Therefore,
accidens. Igitur finis primi motus non the end of the first motion is neither a
est corpus neque virtus in corpore. body nor a power in a body. But the
Finis autem primi motus est primum end of the first motion is the first
movens, quod movet sicut mover, which moves as something
desideratum. Hoc autem est Deus. desired. This, however, is God. God,
Deus igitur neque est corpus neque therefore, is neither a body nor a
virtus in corpore. power in a body.
Quamvis autem falsum sit, secundum [32] However, although according to

fidem nostram, quod motus caeli sit our faith it is false that the motion of
perpetuus, ut infra patebit; tamen the heavens is perpetual, as will be
verum est quod motus ille non deficiet made evident later on, yet it is true
neque propter impotentiam motoris, that it will not fail either through a
neque propter corruptionem failure of power in the mover or
substantiae mobilis, cum non videatur through the corruption of the
motus caeli per diuturnitatem temporis substance in the moved; for there is
lentescere. Unde demonstrationes no evidence that the passing of time
praedictae suam efficaciam non has slowed down the motion of the
perdunt. heavens. Hence, the above
demonstrations do not lose their
force.
Huic autem veritati demonstratae [33] With this demonstrated truth

concordat divina auctoritas. Dicitur divine authority stands in agreement.
enim Ioan. 424: spiritus est Deus, et For it is said in John (4:24): “God is a
eos qui eum adorant, in spiritu et spirit, and they that adore Him must
veritate adorare oportet. Dicitur etiam adore Him in spirit and in truth.” It is
1 Tim. 117: regi saeculorum likewise said: “To the King of ages.
immortali, invisibili, soli Deo. Et Rom. immortal, invisible, the only God” (1
120: invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta Tim. 1:17). Again: “The invisible
sunt intellecta conspiciuntur: quae things of God... are clearly seen,
enim non visu sed intellectu being understood by the things that
conspiciuntur, incorporea sunt. are made” (Rom. 1:20); for what is
seen, not by sight, but by the intellect,
is incorporeal.
Per hoc autem destruitur error [34] Thereby is destroyed the error of

primorum philosophorum naturalium, the early natural philosophers, who
qui non ponebant nisi causas posited only material causes, such as
materiales, ut ignem vel aquam vel fire or water or the like, and who thus
aliquid huiusmodi; et sic prima rerum said that the first principles of things
principia corpora dicebant, et eadem were bodies and called them gods.
vocabant deos. Among them there were some who
Inter quos etiam quidam fuerunt further posited friendship and strife as
ponentes causas moventes amicitiam moving causes. (They, too, were
et litem. Qui etiam propter praedictas refuted through the above
rationes confutantur. Nam, cum lis et arguments.) For since, according to
amicitia sint in corporibus secundum them, strife and friendship are in
eos, sequetur prima principia moventia bodies, it will follow that the first
esse virtutes in corpore. moving principles are bodily powers.
Ipsi etiam ponebant Deum esse They also held that God is composed
compositum ex quatuor elementis et of the four elements and friendship,
amicitia. Per quod datur intelligi quod which would give us to understand
posuerunt Deum esse corpus that for them God was a heavenly
caeleste. body.
Inter antiquos autem solus Among the early thinkers,
Anaxagoras ad veritatem accessit, Anaxagoras alone approached the
ponens intellectum moventem omnia. truth by positing that an intellect
moved all things.
Hac etiam veritate redarguuntur [35] By this truth, too, are refuted the

gentiles ponentes ipsa elementa Gentiles, who, taking their beginning
mundi et virtutes in eis existentes deos in the errors of the philosophers we
esse, ut solem, lunam, terram, aquam have listed, posited that the elements
et huiusmodi, occasionem habentes of the world and the powers in them
ex praedictis philosophorum erroribus. are gods; for example, the sun, the

moon, the earth, water, and the like.
Praedictis etiam rationibus excluduntur [36] By the same arguments,

deliramenta Iudaeorum simplicium, moreover, are set aside the wild
Tertulliani, Vadianorum sive fantasies of the simple Jews,
Anthropomorphitarum haereticorum Tertullian, the Vodiani or
qui Deum corporalibus lineamentis Anthropomorphite heretics, who
figurabant: necnon et Manichaeorum, endowed God with a bodily figure;
qui quandam infinitam lucis and also of the Manicheans, who
substantiam per infinitum spatium thought that God was a certain
distentam Deum aestimabant. infinite substance of light, stretched
out through an infinite space.
Quorum omnium errorum fuit occasio [37] The occasion of all these errors
quod de divinis cogitantes ad was that, in thinking of divine things,
imaginationem deducebantur, per men were made the victims of their
quam non potest accipi nisi corporis imagination, through which it is not
similitudo. Et ideo eam in incorporeis possible to receive anything except
meditandis derelinquere oportet. the likeness of a body. This is why, in
meditating on what is incorporeal, we
must stop following the imagination.
Caput 21 Chapter 21
Quod Deus est sua essentia THAT GOD IS HIS ESSENCE
Ex praemissis autem haberi potest [1] From what has been laid down we

quod Deus est sua essentia, can infer that God is His essence,
quidditas seu natura. quiddity, or nature.
In omni enim eo quod non est sua [2] There must be some composition in

essentia sive quidditas, oportet every being that is not its essence or
aliquam esse compositionem. Cum quiddity. Since, indeed, each thing
enim in unoquoque sit sua possesses its own essence, if there were
essentia, si nihil in aliquo esset nothing in a thing outside its essence all
praeter eius essentiam, totum quod that the thing is would be its essence;
res est esset eius essentia: et sic which would mean that the thing is its
ipsum esset sua essentia. Si igitur essence. But, if some thing were not its
aliquid non esset sua essentia, essence, there should be something in it
oportet aliquid in eo esse praeter outside its essence. Thus, there must be
eius essentiam. Et sic oportet in eo composition in it. Hence it is that the
esse compositionem. Unde etiam essence in composite things is signified
essentia in compositis significatur as a part, for example, humanity in man.
per modum partis, ut humanitas in Now, it has been shown that there is no
homine. Ostensum est autem in composition in God. God is, therefore,
Deo nullam esse compositionem. His essence.
Deus igitur est sua essentia.
Adhuc. Solum illud videtur esse [3] Moreover, only that which does not
praeter essentiam vel quidditatem enter the definition of a thing seems to
rei quod non intrat definitionem be outside its essence or quiddity; for the
ipsius: definitio enim significat quid definition signifies what a thing is. But it
est res. Sola autem accidentia rei is only the accidents of a thing that do
sunt quae in definitione non not fall in the definition; and therefore
cadunt. Sola igitur accidentia sunt only the accidents in any thing are
in re aliqua praeter essentiam eius. outside its essence. But, as will be
In Deo autem non sunt aliqua shown, in God there are no accidents.
accidentia, ut ostendetur. Nihil There is, therefore, nothing in God
igitur est in eo praeter essentiam outside His essence; and hence He is
eius. Est igitur ipse sua essentia. His essence.
Amplius. Formae quae de rebus [4] Furthermore, forms that are not
subsistentibus non praedicantur, predicated of subsisting things, whether
sive in universali sive in singulari these be considered universally or each
acceptis, sunt formae quae non per is taken singly, are forms that do not
se singulariter subsistunt in seipsis subsist through themselves as singulars
individuatae. Non enim dicitur quod individuated in themselves. We do not
Socrates aut homo aut animal sit say that Socrates, or man, or animal is
albedo, quia albedo non est per se whiteness, because whiteness does not
singulariter subsistens, sed subsist as a singular through itself but is
individuatur per subiectum individuated through its subsisting
subsistens. Similiter etiam formae subjects. In the same way, also, natural
naturales non subsistunt per se forms do not subsist as singulars through
singulariter, sed individuantur in themselves but are individuated in their
propriis materiis: unde non dicimus proper matters. That is why we do not
quod hic ignis, aut ignis, sit sua say that this fire, or fire, is its own form.
forma. Ipsae etiam essentiae vel The very essences or quiddities of
quidditates generum vel specierum genera and species are individuated
individuantur per materiam through the designated matter of this or
signatam huius vel illius individui, that individual, even though the quiddity
licet etiam quidditas generis vel of the genus or the species should
speciei formam includat et include common form and matter. That is
materiam in communi: unde non why we do not say that Socrates or man
dicitur quod Socrates, vel homo, sit is humanity. But the divine essence
humanitas. Sed divina essentia est exists through itself as a singular existent
per se singulariter existens et in and individuated through itself; for, as we
seipsa individuata: cum non sit in have shown, it is not in any matter. The
aliqua materia, ut ostensum est. divine essence is predicated of God,
Divina igitur essentia praedicatur therefore, so that we may say: God is
de Deo, ut dicatur: Deus est sua His essence.
essentia.
Praeterea. Essentia rei vel est res [5] Again, the essence of a thing is either

ipsa vel se habet ad ipsam aliquo the thing itself or is related to the thing in
modo ut causa: cum res per suam some way as its cause; for a thing
essentiam speciem sortiatur. Sed derives its species through its essence.
nullo modo potest esse aliquid But nothing can in any way be the cause
causa Dei: cum sit primum ens, ut of God, since, as we have shown, He is
ostensum est. Deus igitur est sua the first being. God is, therefore, His
essentia. essence.
Item. Quod non est sua essentia, [6] Then, too, what is not its essence is
se habet secundum aliquid sui ad related to its essence, according to some
ipsam ut potentia ad actum. Unde part of itself, as potency to act. That is
et per modum formae significatur why the essence is signified in the
essentia, ut puta, humanitas. Sed manner of a form, for example, humanity.
in Deo nulla est potentialitas, ut But, as was shown above, there is no
supra ostensum est. Oportet igitur potentiality in God. He must, therefore,
quod ipse sit sua essentia. be His essence.
Caput 22 Chapter 22
Quod in Deo idem est esse et THAT IN GOD BEING AND ESSENCE
essentia ARE THE SAME
Ex his autem quae supra ostensa [1] From what was proved above,
sunt, ulterius probari potest quod in however, we can further prove that His
Deo non est aliud essentia vel essence or quiddity is not something
quidditas quam suum esse. other than His being.
Ostensum est enim supra aliquid [2] For it was shown above that there is

esse quod per se necesse est some being that must be through itself,
esse, quod Deus est. Hoc igitur and this is God. If, then, this being that
esse quod necesse est, si est alicui must be belongs to an essence that is
quidditati quae non est quod ipsum not that which it is, either it is
est, aut est dissonum illi quidditati incompatible with that essence or
seu repugnans, sicut per se repugnant to it, as to exist through itself
existere quidditati albedinis: aut ei is repugnant to the quiddity of whiteness,
consonum sive affine, sicut albedini or it is compatible with it or appropriate
esse in alio. Si primo modo, illi to it, as to be in another is to whiteness.
quidditati non conveniet esse quod If the first alternative be the case, the
est per se necesse: sicut nec being that is through itself necessary will
albedini per se existere. Si autem not befit that quiddity, just as it does not
secundo modo, oportet quod vel befit whiteness to exist through itself. If
esse huiusmodi dependeat ab the second alternative be the case,
essentia; vel utrumque ab alia either such being must depend on the
causa; vel essentia ab esse. Prima essence, or both must depend on
duo sunt contra rationem eius quod another cause, or the essence must
est per se necesseesse: quia, si depend on the being. The first two
ab alio dependet, iam non est alternatives are contrary to the nature of
necesse esse. Ex tertio vero that which is through itself a necessary
sequitur quod illa quidditas being; for if it depends on another, it is
accidentaliter adveniat ad rem no longer a necessary being. From the
quae per se necesse est esse: quia third alternative it follows that that
omne quod sequitur ad esse rei, quiddity is added accidentally to the
est ei accidentale. Et sic non erit thing that is through itself a necessary
eius quidditas. Deus igitur non being; for what follows upon a thing’s
habet essentiam quae non sit being is accidental to it and hence not its
suum esse. quiddity. God, therefore, does not have
an essence that is not His being.
Sed contra hoc potest dici quod [3] But against this conclusion it can be
illud esse non absolute dependet objected that that being does not
ab essentia illa, ut omnino non sit absolutely depend on that essence, so
nisi illa esset: sed dependet as not to be unless the essence existed;
quantum ad coniunctionem qua ei it depends, rather, on the essence with
coniungitur. Et sic illud esse per se reference to the union by which it is
necesse est, sed ipsum coniungi joined to it. Thus, that being is through
non per se necesse est. itself necessary, but its union with the
essence is not.
Haec autem responsio praedicta [4] However, this reply does not escape
inconvenientia non evadit. Quia si the aforementioned difficulties. For, if
illud esse potest intelligi sine illa that being can be understood without
essentia, sequetur quod illa that essence, it will follow that the
essentia accidentaliter se habet ad essence is related to that being in an
illud esse. Sed id quod est per se accidental way. But that being is that
necesseesse est illud esse. Ergo which is through itself a necessary
illa essentia se habet accidentaliter being. Therefore, that essence is related
ad id quod est per se necesse in an accidental way to that which is
esse. Non ergo est quidditas eius. through itself a necessary being. It is,
Hoc autem quod est per per se therefore, not its essence. But that which
necesseesse, est Deus. Non igitur is through itself a necessary being is
illa est essentia Dei, sed aliqua God. That essence, then, is not the
essentia Deo posterior. Si autem essence of God, but some essence
non potest intelligi illud esse sine below God. On the other hand, if that
illa essentia, tunc illud esse being cannot be understood without that
absolute dependet ab eo a quo essence, it depends absolutely on that
dependet coniunctio sua ad on which its union to that essence
essentiam illam. Et sic redit idem depends. We then reach the same
quod prius. impasse as before.
Item. Unumquodque est per suum 15] Another argument. Each thing is
esse. Quod igitur non est suum through its own being. Hence, that which
esse, non est per se necesseesse. is not its own being is not through itself a
Deus autem est per se necesse necessary being. But God is through
esse. Ergo Deus est suum esse. Himself a necessary being. He is,
therefore, His own being.
Amplius. Si esse Dei non est sua [6] Again, if God’s being is not His
essentia, non autem pars eius esse essence, and cannot be part of that

potest, cum essentia divina sit essence, since, as we have shown, the
simplex, ut ostensum est, oportet divine essence is simple, such a being
quod huiusmodi esse sit aliquid must be something outside the divine
praeter essentiam eius. Omne essence. But whatever belongs to a
autem quod convenit alicui quod thing and is yet not of its essence
non est de essentia eius, convenit belongs to it through some cause; for, if
ei per aliquam causam: ea enim things that are not through themselves
quae per se non sunt unum, si one are joined, they must be joined
coniungantur, oportet per aliquam through some cause. Being, therefore,
causam uniri. Esse igitur convenit belongs to that quiddity through some
illi quidditati per aliquam causam. cause. This is either through something
Aut igitur per aliquid quod est de that is part of the essence of that thing,
essentia illius rei, sive per or the essence itself, or through
essentiam ipsam, aut per aliquid something else. If we adopt the first
aliud. Si primo modo, essentia alternative, and it is a fact that the
autem est secundum illud esse, essence is through that being, it follows
sequitur quod aliquid sit sibi ipsi that something is the cause of its own
causa essendi. Hoc autem est being. This is impossible, because, in
impossibile: quia prius secundum their notions, the existence of the cause
intellectum est causam esse quam is prior to that of the effect. If, then,
effectum; si ergo aliquid sibi ipsi something were its own cause of being,
esset causa essendi, intelligeretur it would be understood to be before it
esse antequam haberet esse, quod had being—which is impossible, unless
est impossibile: nisi intelligatur we understand that something is the
quod aliquid sit sibi causa essendi cause of its own being in an accidental
secundum esse accidentale, quod order, which is being in an accidental
esse est secundum quid. Hoc enim way. This is not impossible. It is possible
non est impossibile: invenitur enim that there be an accidental being that is
aliquod ens accidentale causatum caused by the principles of its subject
ex principiis sui subiecti, ante quod before the substantial being of its subject
esse intelligitur esse substantiale is understood as given. Here, however,
subiecti. Nunc autem non loquimur we are speaking of substantial being, not
de esse accidentali, sed de accidental being. On the other hand, if
substantiali. Si autem illi conveniat the being belongs to the essence
per aliquam aliam causam; omne through some other cause, then this
autem quod acquirit esse ab alia follows: given that what acquires its
causa, est causatum, et non est being from another cause is something
causa prima; Deus autem est caused, and is not the first cause,
prima causa non habens causam, whereas God, as was demonstrated
ut supra demonstratum est: igitur above, is the first cause and has no
ista quidditas quae acquirit esse cause, the quiddity that acquires its
aliunde, non est quidditas Dei. being from another is not the quiddity of
Necesse est igitur quod Dei esse God. God's being must, therefore, be His
quidditas sua sit. quiddity.
Amplius. Esse actum quendam [7] Being, furthermore, is the name of an

nominat: non enim dicitur esse act, for a thing is not said to be because
aliquid ex hoc quod est in potentia, it is in potency but because it is in act.
sed ex eo quod est in actu. Omne Everything, however, that has an act
autem cui convenit actus aliquis diverse from it is related to that act as
diversum ab eo existens, se habet potency to act; for potency and act are
ad ipsum ut potentia ad actum: said relatively to one another. If, then,
actus enim et potentia ad se the divine essence is something other
invicem dicuntur. Si ergo divina than its being, the essence and the
essentia est aliud quam suum being are thereby related as potency and
esse, sequitur quod essentia et act. But we have shown that in God
esse se habeant sicut potentia et there is no potency, but that He is pure
actus. Ostensum est autem in Deo act. God's essence, therefore, is not
nihil esse de potentia, sed ipsum something other than His being.
esse purum actum. Non igitur Dei
essentia est aliud quam suum
esse.
Item. Omne illud quod non potest [8] Moreover, if something can exist only

esse nisi concurrentibus pluribus, when several elements come together, it
est compositum. Sed nulla res in is composite. But no thing in which the
qua est aliud essentia et aliud essence is other than the being can exist
esse, potest esse nisi unless several elements come together,
concurrentibus pluribus, scilicet namely, the essence and the being.
essentia et esse. Ergo omnis res in Hence, every thing in which the essence
qua est aliud essentia et aliud is other than the being is composite. But,
esse, est composita. Deus autem as we have shown, God is not
non est compositus, ut ostensum composite. Therefore, God's being is His
est. Ipsum igitur esse Dei est sua essence.
essentia.
Amplius. Omnis res est per hoc [9] Every thing, furthermore, exists
quod habet esse. Nulla igitur res because it has being. A thing whose
cuius essentia non est suum esse, essence is not its being, consequently, is
est per essentiam suam, sed not through its essence but by
participatione alicuius, scilicet participation in something, namely, being
ipsius esse. Quod autem est per itself. But that which is through
participationem alicuius, non potest participation in something cannot be the
esse primum ens: quia id quod first being, because prior to it is the
aliquid participat ad hoc quod sit, being in which it participates in order to
est eo prius. Deus autem est be. But God is the first being, with
primum ens, quo nihil est prius. Dei nothing prior to Him. His essence is,
igitur essentia est suum esse. therefore, His being.
Hanc autem sublimem veritatem [10] This sublime truth Moses was taught

Moyses a domino est edoctus, qui by our Lord. When Moses asked our
cum quaereret a domino, Exod. 3 Lord: “If the children of Israel say to me:
dicens: si dixerint ad me filii Israel, what is His name? What shall I say to
quod nomen eius? Quid dicam eis? them?” The Lord replied: “I AM WHO
Dominus respondit: ego sum qui AM.... You shall say to the children of
sum. Sic dices filiis Israel: qui est Israel: HE WHO IS has sent me to you”
misit me ad vos, ostendens suum (Exod. 3:13, 14). By this our Lord
proprium nomen esse qui est. showed that His own proper name is HE
Quodlibet autem nomen est WHO IS. Now, names have been
institutum ad significandum devised to signify the natures or
naturam seu essentiam alicuius rei. essences of things. It remains, then, that
Unde relinquitur quod ipsum the divine being is God's essence or
divinum esse est sua essentia vel nature.
natura.
Hanc etiam veritatem Catholici [11] Catholic teachers have likewise

doctores professi sunt. Ait namque professed this truth. For Hilary writes in
Hilarius, in libro de Trin.: esse non his book De Trinitate [II]: “Being is not an
est accidens Deo, sed subsistens accident in God but subsisting truth, the
veritas, et manens causa, et abiding cause and the natural property
naturalis generis proprietas. His nature.” Boethius also says in his
Boetius etiam dicit, in libro de Trin., own work De Trinitate [II]: “The divine
quod divina substantia est ipsum substance is being itself, and from it
esse et ab ea est esse. comes being.”
Caput 23 Chapter 23
Quod in Deo non est accidens THAT NO ACCIDENT IS FOUND IN
GOD
Ex hac etiam veritate de [1] It follows necessarily from this truth
necessitate sequitur quod Deo that nothing can come to God beyond His
supra eius essentiam nihil essence, nor can there be anything in
supervenire possit, neque aliquid Him in an accidental way.
ei accidentaliter inesse.
Ipsum enim esse non potest [2] For being cannot participate in
participare aliquid quod non sit de anything that is not of its essence,
essentia sua: quamvis id quod est although that which is can participate in
possit aliquid aliud participare. something. The reason is that nothing is
Nihil enim est formalius aut more formal or more simple than being,
simplicius quam esse. Et sic which thus participates in nothing. But the
ipsum esse nihil participare potest. divine substance is being itself, and
Divina autem substantia est ipsum therefore has nothing that is not of its
esse. Ergo nihil habet quod non sit substance. Hence, no accident can
de sua substantia. Nullum ergo reside in it.
accidens ei inesse potest.
Amplius. Omne quod inest alicui [3] Furthermore, what is present in a
accidentaliter, habet causam thing accidentally has a cause of its
quare insit: cum sit praeter presence, since it is outside the essence
essentiam eius cui inest. Si igitur of the thing in which it is found. If, then,
aliquid accidentaliter sit in Deo, something is found in God accidentally,
oportet quod hoc sit per aliquam this must be through some cause. Now,
causam. Aut ergo causa the cause of the accident is either the
accidentis est ipsa divina divine essence itself or something else. If

substantia, aut aliquid aliud. Si something else, it must act on the divine
aliquid aliud, oportet quod illud essence, since nothing will cause the
agat in divinam substantiam: nihil introduction of some form, substantial or
enim inducit aliquam formam, vel accidental, in some receiving subject
substantialem vel accidentalem, in except by acting on it in some way. For to
aliquo recipiente, nisi aliquo modo act is nothing other than to make
agendo in ipsum; eo quod agere something actual, which takes place
nihil aliud est quam facere aliquid through a form. Thus, God will suffer and
actu, quod quidem est per receive the action of some cause—which
formam. Ergo Deus patietur et is contrary to what we already
movebitur ab alio agente. Quod established. On the other hand, let us
est contra praedeterminata. Si suppose that the divine substance is the
autem ipsa divina substantia est cause of the accident inhering in it. Now it
causa accidentis quod sibi inest; is impossible that it be, as receiving it, the
impossibile est autem quod sit cause of the accident, for then one and
causa illius secundum quod est the same thing would make itself to be
recipiens ipsum, quia sic idem actual in the same respect. Therefore, if
secundum idem faceret seipsum there is an accident in God, it will be
in actu; ergo oportet, si in Deo est according to different respects that He
aliquod accidens, quod secundum receives and causes that accident, just
aliud et aliud recipiat et causet as bodily things receive their accidents
accidens illud, sicut corporalia through the nature of their matter and
recipiunt propria accidentia per cause them through their form. Thus,
naturam materiae et causant per God will be composite. But, we have
formam. Sic igitur Deus erit proved the contrary of this proposition
compositus. Cuius contrarium above.
superius probatum est.
Item. Omne subiectum accidentis [4] Every subject of an accident,
comparatur ad ipsum ut potentia moreover, is related to it as potency to
ad actum: eo quod accidens act, since the accident is a certain form
quaedam forma est faciens esse making the subject to be actual according
actu secundum esse accidentale. to an accidental being. But, as we have
Sed in Deo nulla est potentialitas, shown above, there is no potentiality in
ut supra ostensum est. In eo igitur God. There can, therefore, be no
nullum accidens esse potest. accident in Him.
Adhuc. Cuicumque inest aliquid [5] Then, too, when a being has an
accidentaliter, est aliquo modo accident inhering in it, it is in some way
secundum suam naturam mutable according to its nature, since an
mutabile: accidens enim de se accident can inhere or notinhere. If,
natum est inesse et non inesse. Si then, God has something belonging to
igitur Deus habet aliquid Him in an accidental way, He will
accidentaliter sibi conveniens, consequently be mutable. But the
sequetur quod ipse sit mutabilis. contrary of this was demonstrated above.
Cuius contrarium supra
demonstratum est.
Amplius. Cuicumque inest aliquod [6] Again, that which has an accident
accidens, non est quidquid habet inhering in it is not whatever it has in
in se: quia accidens non est de itself, since an accident is not part of the
essentia subiecti. Sed Deus est essence of the subject. But God is what
quidquid in se habet. In Deo igitur He has in Himself. There is, therefore, no
nullum est accidens. Media sic accident in God. The minor proposition is
probatur. Unumquodque nobilius proved thus. Everything is found in a
invenitur in causa quam in effectu. more noble way in the cause than in an
Deus autem est omnium causa. effect. But God is the cause of all things.
Ergo quidquid est in eo, Hence, whatever is in Him is there in the
nobilissimo modo in eo invenitur. most noble way. Now, what a thing itself
Perfectissime autem convenit is, this belongs to it in a most perfect way.
aliquid alicui quod est ipsummet: For this is some thing more perfectly one
hoc enim perfectius est unum than when something is joined to
quam cum aliquid alteri something else substantially as form to
substantialiter unitur ut forma matter; just as substantial union is more
materiae; quae etiam unio perfect than when something inheres in
perfectior est quam cum aliquid something else as an accident. God,
accidentaliter inest. Relinquitur then, is whatever He has.
ergo quod Deus sit quidquid
habet.
Item. Substantia non dependet ab [7] It is also a fact that a substance does
accidente: quamvis accidens not depend on an accident, although an
dependeat a substantia. Quod accident depends on a substance. But
autem non dependet ab aliquo, what does not depend on something can
potest aliquando inveniri sine illo. sometimes be found without it. Some
Ergo potest aliqua substantia substance, then, can be found without an
inveniri sine accidente. Hoc autem accident. This seems especially to fit the
praecipue videtur simplicissimae substance that is most simple, such as
substantiae convenire, qualis est the divine substance is. The divine
substantia divina. Divinae igitur substance, therefore, has no accidents
substantiae omnino accidens non whatever.
inest.
In hanc autem sententiam etiam [8] In dealing with this problem, Catholics

Catholici tractatores conveniunt. likewise give assent to this opinion.
Unde Augustinus, in libro de Trin., Whence Augustine says in his De
dicit quod in Deo nullum est Trinitate [V, 4] that “there is no accident in
accidens. God.”
Ex hac autem veritate ostensa, [9] The proof of this truth serves as a
error quorundam in lege refutation of the error of some Saracen
Sarracenorum loquentium theologians “who posit certain intentions
confutatur, qui ponunt quasdam superadded to the divine essence.
intentiones divinae essentiae
superadditas.
Caput 24 Chapter 24
Quod divinum esse non potest THAT THE DIVINE BEING CANNOT
designari per additionem alicuius BE DETERMINED BY THE ADDITION
differentiae substantialis OF SOME SUBSTANTIAL
DIFFERENCE
Ostendi etiam ex praedictis potest [1] We can likewise show from what we

quod supra ipsum divinum esse non have said that nothing can be added to
potest aliquid superaddi quod the divine being to determine it with an
designet ipsum designatione essential determination, as a genus is
essentiali, sicut designatur genus determined by its differences.
per differentias.
Impossibile est enim aliquid esse in [2] Nothing can be in act unless

actu nisi omnibus existentibus everything that determines its
quibus esse substantiale substantial act of being exists. Thus,
designatur: non enim potest esse there cannot be an actual animal unless
animal in actu quin sit animal it be a rational or an irrational animal.
rationale vel irrationale. Unde etiam Hence, the Platonists themselves, in
Platonici, ponentes ideas, non positing the Ideas, did not posit self
posuerunt ideas per se existentes existing Ideas of genera, which are
generum, quae designantur ad esse determined to the being of their species
speciei per differentias essentiales; through essential differences; rather,
sed posuerunt ideas per se they posited selfexisting Ideas solely of
existentes solarum specierum, quae species, which for their determination
ad sui designationem non indigent need no essential differences. If, then,
essentialibus differentiis. Si igitur the divine being is determined
divinum esse per aliquid aliud essentially through something else
superadditum designetur superadded to it, it will be in act only if
designatione essentiali, ipsum esse what is superadded is present. But the
non erit in actu nisi illo superaddito divine being, as we have shown, is the
existente. Sed ipsum esse divinum divine substance itself. Therefore the
est sua substantia, ut ostensum est. divine substance cannot be in act
Ergo substantia divina non potest without the presence of something
esse in actu nisi aliquo added; from which it can be concluded
superveniente. Ex quo potest that it is not through itself a necessary
concludi quod non sit per se being. But, we have proved the contrary
necesseesse. Cuius contrarium of this proposition above.
supra ostensum est.
Item. Omne illud quod indiget aliquo [3] Moreover, what needs an addition in
superaddito ad hoc quod possit order to be is in potency in relation to
esse, est in potentia respectu illius. this addition. But, as we have shown,
Sed divina substantia non est aliquo the divine substance is not in any way in
modo in potentia, ut supra potency; rather, the divine substance is
ostensum est. Sed sua substantia its being. The divine being, therefore,
est suum esse. Igitur esse suum cannot be determined in its substance
non potest designari aliqua through something superadded to it.
designatione substantiali per aliquid
sibi superadditum.
Amplius. Omne illud per quod res [4] Again, that through which a thing
consequitur esse in actu et est derives being in act and is intrinsic to it
intrinsecum rei, vel est tota essentia is either the whole essence of that thing
rei, vel pars essentiae. Quod autem or a part of the essence. But that which
designat aliquid designatione determines something in an essential
essentiali, facit rem esse actu et est way makes that thing to be in act and is
intrinsecum rei designatae: alias per intrinsic to the determined thing;
id designari non posset otherwise, the thing could not be
substantialiter. Ergo oportet quod sit determined substantially by it. It must
vel ipsa essentia rei, vel pars therefore be either the essence itself or
essentiae. Sed si aliquid a part of the essence. But, if something
superadditur ad esse divinum, hoc is added to the divine being, this cannot
non potest esse tota essentia Dei: be the whole essence of God, since it
quia iam ostensum est quod esse has already been shown that God’s
Dei non est aliud ab essentia eius. being is not other than His essence. It
Relinquitur ergo quod sit pars must, then, be a part of the essence,
essentiae divinae. Et sic Deus erit which means that God will be
compositus ex partibus essentialiter. composed of essential parts. But, we
Cuius contrarium supra ostensum have proved the contrary of this above.
est.
Item. Quod additur alicui ad [5] Furthermore, what is added to a
designationem alicuius thing to give it a certain essential
designatione essentiali, non determination does not constitute its
constituit eius rationem, sed solum nature but only its being in act. For
esse in actu: rationale enim additum rational added to animal gains for
animali acquirit animali esse in actu, animal being in act, but it does not
non autem constituit rationem constitute the nature of animal as
animalis inquantum est animal; nam animal, since the difference does not
differentia non intrat definitionem enter the definition of the genus. But, if
generis. Sed si in Deo addatur something is added in God by which He
aliquid per quod designetur is determined in His essence, that
designatione essentiali, oportet addition must constitute for the being to
quod illud constituat ei cui additur which it is added the nature of its own
rationem propriae eius quidditatis quiddity or essence, since what is thus
seu naturae: nam quod sic additur, added gains for a thing its being in act.
acquirit rei esse in actu; hoc autem, But in God this “being in act” is the
scilicet esse in actu, est ipsa divina divine essence itself, as we have shown
essentia, ut supra ostensum est. above. It remains, then, that to the
Relinquitur ergo quod supra divine being nothing can be added that
divinum esse nihil possit addi quod determines it in an essential way, as the
designet ipsum designatione difference determines the genus.
essentiali, sicut differentia designat
genus.
Caput 25 Chapter 25
Quod Deus non est in aliquo THAT GOD IS NOT IN SOME GENUS
genere
Ex hoc autem de necessitate [1] From this we infer necessarily that
concluditur quod Deus non sit in God is not in some genus.
aliquo genere.
Nam omne quod est in aliquo [2] Every thing in a genus has something

genere, habet aliquid in se per within it by which the nature of the genus
quod natura generis designatur ad is determined to its species; for nothing is
speciem: nihil enim est in genere in a genus that is not in some species of
quod non sit in aliqua eius specie. that genus. But, as we have shown, this
Hoc autem in Deo est impossibile, determination cannot take place in God.
ut ostensum est. Impossibile est God cannot, then, be in some genus.
igitur Deum esse in aliquo genere.
Amplius. Si Deus sit in genere, aut [3] If, moreover, God is in a genus, either
est in genere accidentis, aut in He is in the genus of accident or in that of
genere substantiae. In genere substance. He is not in the genus of
accidentis non est: accidens enim accident, since the first being and the first
non potest esse primum ens et cause cannot be an accident. Neither can
prima causa. In genere etiam God be in the genus of substance, since
substantiae esse non potest: quia the substance that is a genus is not being
substantia quae est genus, non itself; otherwise, every substance would
est ipsum esse; alias omnis be its being and would thus not be
substantia esset esse suum, et sic caused by another—which is impossible,
non esset causata ab alio, quod as is evident from what we have said.
esse non potest, ut patet ex dictis. Therefore, God is not in some genus.
Deus autem est ipsum esse. Igitur
non est in aliquo genere.
Item. Quicquid est in genere [4] Again, whatever is in a genus differs in

secundum esse differt ab aliis being from the other things in that genus;
quae in eodem genere sunt. Alias otherwise, the genus would not be
genus de pluribus non predicated of many things. But all the
praedicaretur. Oportet autem things that are in the same genus must
omnia quae sunt in eodem agree in the quiddity of the genus, since
genere, in quidditate generis the genus is predicated of all things in it in
convenire quia de omnibus genus terms of what they are. In other words,
in quod quid est praedicatur. Esse the being of each thing found in a genus
igitur cuiuslibet in genere is outside the quiddity of the genus. This
existentis est praeter generis is impossible in God. God, therefore, is
quidditatem. Hoc autem in Deo not in a genus.
impossibile est. Deus igitur in
genere non est.
Amplius. Unumquodque collocatur [5] Then, too, each thing is placed in a

in genere per rationem suae genus through the nature of its quiddity,
quidditatis: genus enim for the genus is a predicate expressing
praedicatur in quid est. Sed what a thing is. But the quiddity of God is
quidditas Dei est ipsum suum His very being. Accordingly, God is not
esse. Secundum quod non located in a genus, because then being,
collocatur aliquid in genere: quia which signifies the act of being, would be
sic ens esset genus, quod a genus. Therefore, God is not in a
significat ipsum esse. Relinquitur genus.
igitur quod Deus non sit in genere.
Quod autem ens non possit esse [6] Now, that being cannot be a genus is
genus, probatur per philosophum proved by the Philosopher in the following
in hunc modum. Si ens esset way [Metaphysics III, 3]. If being were a
genus, oporteret differentiam genus we should have to find a difference
aliquam inveniri per quam through which to contract it to a species.
traheretur ad speciem. Nulla But no difference shares in the genus in
autem differentia participat genus, such a way that the genus is included in
ita scilicet quod genus sit in the notion of the difference, for thus the
ratione differentiae, quia sic genus genus would be included twice in the
poneretur bis in definitione definition of the species. Rather, the
speciei: sed oportet differentiam difference is outside what is understood in
esse praeter id quod intelligitur in the nature of the genus. But there can be
ratione generis. Nihil autem potest nothing that is outside that which is
esse quod sit praeter id quod understood by being, if being is included
intelligitur per ens, si ens sit de in the concept of the things of which it is
intellectu eorum de quibus predicated. Thus, being cannot be
praedicatur. Et sic per nullam contracted by any difference. Being is,
differentiam contrahi potest. therefore, not a genus. From this we
Relinquitur igitur quod ens non sit conclude necessarily that God is not in a
genus. Unde ex hoc de genus.
necessitate concluditur quod Deus
non sit in genere.
Ex quo etiam patet quod Deus [7] From this it is likewise evident that
definiri non potest: quia omnis God cannot be defined, for every
definitio est ex genere et definition is constituted from the genus
differentiis. and the differences.
Patet etiam quod non potest [8] It is also clear that no demonstration is

demonstratio de ipso fieri, nisi per possible about God, except through an
effectum: quia principium effect; for the principle of demonstration is
demonstrationis est definitio eius the definition of that of which the
de quo fit demonstratio. demonstration is made.
Potest autem alicui videri quod, [9] Now it can seem to someone that,
quamvis nomen substantiae Deo although the name substance cannot
proprie convenire non possit, quia properly apply to God because God does
Deus non substat accidentibus; not substand accidents, yet the thing
res tamen significata per nomen ei signified by the name is appropriate and
conveniat, et ita sit in genere thus God is in the genus of substance.
substantiae. Nam substantia est For a substance is a being through itself.
ens per se: quod Deo constat Now, this is appropriate to God, since we
convenire, ex quo probatum est have proved that He is not an accident.
ipsum non esse accidens.
Sed ad hoc dicendum est ex dictis [10] To this contention we must reply, in

quod in definitione substantiae accord with what we have said, that being
non est ens per se. Ex hoc enim through itself is not included in the
quod dicitur ens non posset esse definition of substance. For, if something
genus: quia iam probatum est is called being, it cannot be a genus,
quod ens non habet rationem since we have already proved that being
generis. Similiter nec ex hoc quod does not have the nature of a genus.
dicitur per se. Quia hoc non Neither can what is through itself be a
videtur importare nisi negationem genus, since the expression seems to
tantum: dicitur enim ens per se ex indicate nothing more than a negation.
hoc quod non est in alio; quod est Something is said to be a being through
negatio pura. Quae nec potest itself because it is not in another. This is a
rationem generis constituere: quia pure negation, which likewise cannot
sic genus non diceret quid est res, constitute the nature of a genus; for a
sed quid non est. Oportet igitur genus would then say, not what a thing is,
quod ratio substantiae intelligatur but what it is not. The nature of
hoc modo, quod substantia sit res substance, therefore, must be understood
cui conveniat esse non in as follows. A substance is a thing to
subiecto; nomen autem rei a which it belongs to be not in a subject.
quidditate imponitur, sicut nomen The name thing takes its origin from the
entis ab esse; et sic in ratione quiddity, just as the name being comes
substantiae intelligitur quod from to be. In this way, the definition of
habeat quidditatem cui conveniat substance is understood as that which
esse non in alio. Hoc autem Deo has a quiddity to which it belongs to be
non convenit: nam non habet not in another. Now, this is not
quidditatem nisi suum esse. Unde appropriate to God, for He has no quiddity
relinquitur quod nullo modo est in save His being. In no way, then, is God in
genere substantiae. Et sic nec in the genus of substance. Thus, He is in no
aliquo genere: cum ostensum sit genus, since we have shown that He is
ipsum non esse in genere not in the genus of accident.
accidentis.
Caput 26 Chapter 26
Quod Deus non est esse formale THAT GOD IS NOT THE FORMAL
omnium BEING OF ALL THINGS
Ex his autem confutatur quorundam [1] We are now able to refute the error

error qui dixerunt Deum nihil aliud of certain persons who said that God is
esse quam esse formale nothing other than the formal being of
uniuscuiusque rei. each thing.
Nam esse hoc dividitur per esse [2] This being is divided into the being
substantiae et esse accidentis. of substance and the being of accident.
Divinum autem esse neque est esse Now, we have proved that the divine
substantiae neque esse accidentis, being is neither the being of substance
ut probatum est. Impossibile est nor that of accident. God, therefore,
igitur Deum esse illud esse quo cannot be that being by which each
formaliter unaquaeque res est. thing formally is.
Item. Res ad invicem non [3] Furthermore, things are not
distinguuntur secundum quod distinguished from one another in
habent esse: quia in hoc omnia having being, for in this they agree. If,
conveniunt. Si ergo res differunt ad then, things differ from one another,
invicem, oportet quod vel ipsum either their being must be specified
esse specificetur per aliquas through certain added differences, so
differentias additas, ita quod rebus that diverse things have a diverse
diversis sit diversum esse secundum being according to their species, or
speciem: vel quod res differant per things must differ in that the being itself
hoc quod ipsum esse diversis is appropriate to natures that are
naturis secundum speciem convenit. diverse in species. The first of these
Sed primum horum est impossibile: alternatives is impossible, since, as we
quia enti non potest fieri aliqua have said, no addition can be made to
additio secundum modum quo a being in the manner in which a
differentia additur generi, ut dictum difference is added to a genus. It
est. Relinquitur ergo quod res remains, then, that things differ
propter hoc differant quod habent because they have diverse natures, to
diversas naturas, quibus acquiritur which being accrues in a diverse way.
esse diversimode. Esse autem Now, the divine being does not accrue
divinum non advenit alii naturae, sed to a nature that is other than it; it is the
est ipsa natura, ut ostensum est. Si nature itself, as we have said. If,
igitur esse divinum esset formale therefore, the divine being were the
esse omnium, oporteret omnia formal being of all things, all things
simpliciter esse unum. would have to be absolutely one.
Amplius. Principium naturaliter prius [4] Then, too, a principle is naturally
est eo cuius est principium. Esse prior to that whose principle it is. Now,
autem in quibusdam rebus habet in certain things being has something
aliquid quasi principium: forma enim that is as its principle. For the form is
dicitur esse principium essendi; et said to be a principle of being, and so
similiter agens, quod facit aliqua is the agent, that makes things to be in
esse actu. Si igitur esse divinum sit act. If, therefore, the divine being is the
esse uniuscuiusque rei, sequetur being of each thing, it will follow that
quod Deus, qui est suum esse, God, Who is His own being, has some
habeat aliquam causam; et sic non cause. Thus, He is not through Himself
sit necesseesse per se. Cuius a necessary being. But, we have
contrarium supra ostensum est. proved the contrary of this conclusion
above.
Adhuc. Quod est commune multis, [5] Moreover, that which is common to
non est aliquid praeter multa nisi many is not outside the many except
sola ratione: sicut animal non est by the reason alone. Thus, animal is
aliud praeter Socratem et Platonem not something outside Socrates and
et alia animalia nisi intellectu, qui Plato and the other animals except in
apprehendit formam animalis the intellect that apprehends the form
expoliatam ab omnibus of animal stripped of all its individuating
individuantibus et specificantibus; and specifying characteristics. For man
homo enim est quod vere est is that which truly is animal; otherwise,
animal; alias sequeretur quod in it would follow that in Socrates and
Socrate et Platone essent plura Plato there are several animals,
animalia, scilicet ipsum animal namely, common animal itself, common
commune, et homo communis, et man, and Plato himself. Much less,
ipse Plato. Multo igitur minus et then, is common being itself something
ipsum esse commune est aliquid outside all existing things, save only for
praeter omnes res existentes nisi in being in the intellect. Hence, if God is
intellectu solum. Si igitur Deus sit common being, the only thing that will
esse commune, Deus non erit aliqua exist is that which exists solely in the
res nisi quae sit in intellectu tantum. intellect. But we showed above that
Ostensum autem est supra Deum God is something not only in the
esse aliquid non solum in intellectu, intellect but also in reality. Therefore,
sed in rerum natura. Non est igitur God is not the common being of all
Deus ipsum esse commune things.
omnium.
Item. Generatio per se loquendo est [6] Again, strictly speaking, generation

via in esse, et corruptio via in non is the way to being and corruption the
esse: non enim generationis way to nonbeing. For form is not the
terminus est forma et corruptionis terminus of generation, and privation is
privatio, nisi quia forma facit esse et not the terminus of corruption, except
privatio non esse; dato enim quod because a form causes being and
aliqua forma non faceret esse, non privation nonbeing. If a form did not
diceretur generari quod talem cause being, a thing which received
formam acciperet. Si igitur Deus sit such a form would not be said to be
omnium rerum esse formale, generated. Hence, if God is the formal
sequetur quod sit terminus being of all things, He will consequently
generationis. Quod est falsum: cum be the terminus of generation. This is
ipse sit aeternus, ut supra ostensum false, since, as we have shown above,
est. God is eternal.
Praeterea. Sequetur quod esse [7] It will also follow that the being of
cuiuslibet rei fuerit ab aeterno. Non each thing has existed from eternity.
igitur potest esse generatio vel Generation or corruption is therefore
corruptio. Si enim sit, oportet quod impossible. If it does exist, preexisting
esse praeexistens alicui rei de novo being must accrue to something anew.
acquiratur. Aut ergo alicui prius It will therefore accrue either to
existenti: aut nullo modo prius something preexisting or to something
existenti. Si primo modo, cum unum in no way preexisting. In the first
sit esse omnium existentium instance, since according to the above
secundum positionem praedictam, position the being of all existing things
sequetur quod res quae generari is one, it will follow that a thing that is
dicitur, non accipiat novum esse, sed said to be generated acquires, not a
novum modum essendi: quod non new being, but a new mode of being.
facit generationem, sed The result is alteration, not generation.
alterationem. Si autem nullo modo But, if the generated thing in no way
prius existebat, sequetur quod fiat ex preexisted, it will follow that it is
nihilo: quod est contra rationem produced from nothing—which is
generationis. Igitur haec positio contrary to the nature of generation.
omnino generationem et This position, therefore, entirely ruins
corruptionem destruit. Et ideo patet generation and corruption and, as a
eam esse impossibilem. consequence, is evidently impossible.
Hunc etiam errorem sacra doctrina [8] Sacred Teaching as well casts aside

repellit, dum confitetur Deum this error in confessing that God is
excelsum et elevatum, ut dicitur “high and elevated,” according to Isaiah
Isaiae 61; et eum super omnia (6:1), and that He is “over all,”
esse, ut Rom. 95 habetur. Si enim according to Romans (9:5). For, if He is
esse omnium, tunc est aliquid the being of all things, He is part of all
omnium, non autem super omnia. things, but not over them.
Hi etiam errantes eadem sententia [9] So, too, those who committed this
procelluntur qua et idolatrae, qui error are condemned by the same
incommunicabile nomen, scilicet judgment as are the idolaters who
Dei, lignis et lapidibus imposuerunt, “gave the incommunicable name,” that
ut habetur Sap. 1421. Si enim Deus is, of God, “to wood and stones,” as it
est esse omnium, non magis dicetur is written (Wis. 14:21). If, indeed, God
vere lapis est ens, quam lapis est is the being of all things, there will be
Deus. no more reason to say truly that a
stone is a being than to say that a
stone is God.
Huic autem errori quatuor sunt quae [10] Four factors seem to have

videntur praestitisse fomentum. contributed to the rise of this error.
Primum est quarundam auctoritatum The first is the warped interpretation of
intellectus perversus. Invenitur enim certain authoritative texts. There is in
a Dionysio dictum, IV cap. Cael. Dionysius this remark [De caelesti
Hier.: esse omnium est hierarchia IV, 1]: “The being of all
superessentialis divinitas. Ex quo things is the superessential divinity.”
intelligere voluerunt ipsum esse From this remark they wished to infer
formale omnium rerum Deum esse, that God is the formal being of all
non considerantes hunc intellectum things, without considering that this
ipsis verbis consonum esse non interpretation could not square with the
posse. Nam si divinitas est omnium words themselves. For, if the divinity is
esse formale, non erit super omnia, the formal being of all things, it will not
sed inter omnia, immo aliquid be over all but among all, indeed a part
omnium. Cum ergo divinitatem super of all. Now, since Dionysius said that
omnia dixit, ostendit secundum the divinity was above all things, he
suam naturam ab omnibus showed that according to its nature it
distinctum et super omnia was distinct from all things and raised
collocatum. Ex hoc vero quod dixit above all things. And when he said that
quod divinitas est esse omnium, the divinity is the being of all things, he
ostendit quod a Deo in omnibus showed that there was in all things a
quaedam divini esse similitudo certain likeness of the divine being,
reperitur. Hunc etiam eorum coming from God. Elsewhere Dionysius
perversum intellectum alibi apertius has rather openly set aside this warped
excludens, dixit in II cap. de Div. interpretation. He has said: “God
Nom., quod ipsius Dei neque tactus neither touches nor is in any way
neque aliqua commixtio est ad res mingled with other things, as a point
alias, sicut est puncti ad lineam vel touches a line or the figure of a seal
figurae sigilli ad ceram. touches wax” [De divinis nominibus II,
5].
Secundum quod eos in hunc [11] The second cause leading them to

errorem promovit, est rationis this error is a failure of reason. For,
defectus. Quia enim id quod since that which is common is specified
commune est per additionem or individuated through addition, they
specificatur vel individuatur, thought that the divine being, which
aestimaverunt divinum esse, cui receives no addition, was not some
nulla fit additio, non esse aliquod proper being but the common being of
esse proprium, sed esse commune all things. They ignored the fact that
omnium; non considerantes quod id what is common or universal cannot
quod commune est vel universale exist without addition, but is considered
sine additione esse non potest, sed without addition. For animal cannot be
sine additione consideratur: non without the difference rational or the
enim animal potest esse absque difference irrational, although it is
rationali differentia, quamvis absque considered without these differences.
his differentiis cogitetur. Licet etiam What is more, although a universal may
cogitetur universale absque be considered without addition, it is not
additione, non tamen absque without the receptibility of addition; for,
receptibilitate additionis: nam si if no difference could be added to
animali nulla differentia addi posset, animal, it would not be a genus. The
genus non esset; et similiter est de same is true of all other names. But the
omnibus aliis nominibus. Divinum divine being is without addition not only
autem esse est absque additione in thought but also in reality; and not
non solum in cogitatione, sed etiam only without addition but also without
in rerum natura: nec solum absque the receptibility of addition. From the
additione, sed etiam absque fact, then, that it neither receives nor
receptibilitate additionis. Unde ex can receive addition we can rather
hoc ipso quod additionem, non conclude that God is not common
recipit nec recipere potest, magis being but proper being; for His being is
concludi potest quod Deus non sit distinguished from all the rest by the
esse commune, sed proprium: etiam fact that nothing can be added to it.
ex hoc ipso suum esse ab omnibus Hence the Commentator says in the
aliis distinguitur quod nihil ei addi Book of Causes that, out of the purity
potest. Unde Commentator in libro of its goodness, the first cause is
de causis dicit quod causa prima ex distinguished from the rest and in a
ipsa puritate suae bonitatis ab aliis manner individuated.
distinguitur et quodammodo
individuatur.
Tertium quod eos in hunc errorem [12] The third factor that led them into
induxit, est divinae simplicitatis this error concerns the divine simplicity.
consideratio. Quia enim Deus in fine God is at the peak of simplicity. They
simplicitatis est, aestimaverunt illud therefore thought that the last point of
quod in ultimo resolutionis invenitur resolution in our way of seeing things is
eorum quae fiunt in nobis, Deum God, as being absolutely simple. For it
esse, quasi simplicissimum: non is not possible to proceed to infinity in
enim est in infinitum procedere in composition among the things we
compositione eorum quae sunt in know. Their reason also failed because
nobis. In hoc etiam eorum defecit they did not observe that what is most
ratio, dum non attenderunt id quod in simple in our understanding of things is
nobis simplicissimum invenitur, non not so much a complete thing as a part
tam rem completam, quam rei of a thing. But, simplicity is predicated
aliquid esse. Deo autem simplicitas of God as of some perfect subsisting
attribuitur sicut rei alicui perfectae thing.
subsistenti.
Quartum etiam quod eos ad hoc [13] A fourth factor that could have led

inducere potuit, est modus loquendi them to their error is the mode of
quo dicimus Deum in omnibus rebus expression we use when we say that
esse: non intelligentes quod non sic God is in all things. By this we do not
est in rebus quasi aliquid rei, sed mean that God is in things as a part of
sicut rei causa quae nullo modo suo a thing, but as the cause of a thing that
effectui deest. Non enim similiter is never lacking to its effect. For we do
dicimus esse formam in corpore, et not say that a form is in matter as a
nautam in navi. sailor is in a ship.
Caput 27 Chapter 27
Quod Deus non sit forma THAT GOD IS NOT THE FORM OF ANY
alicuius corporis BODY
Ostenso igitur quod Deus non sit [1] Having shown that God is not the being
esse omnium, similiter ostendi of all things, we can likewise show that He
potest quod Deus non sit alicuius is not the form of any thing.
rei forma.
Nam divinum esse non potest [2] As we have shown, the divine being
esse alicuius quidditatis quae cannot belong to any quiddity that is not
non sit ipsum esse, ut ostensum being itself. Now, only God is the divine
est. Quod autem est ipsum esse being itself. It is impossible, therefore, for
divinum, non est aliud quam God to be the form of some other being.
Deus. Impossibile est igitur Deum
esse alicuius alterius formam.
Amplius. Forma corporis non est [3] Furthermore, the form of a body is not
ipsum esse, sed essendi the being itself, but a principle of being.
principium. Deus autem est But God is being itself. He is, therefore,
ipsum esse. Non ergo est Deus not the form of a body.
forma corporis.
Item. Ex unione formae et [4] Again, the union of form and matter
materiae resultat aliquid results in a composite, which is a whole
compositum, quod est totum with respect to the matter and the form.
respectu materiae et formae. But the parts are in potency in relation to
Partes autem sunt in potentia the whole. In God, however, there is no
respectu totius. In Deo autem potentiality. Therefore, God cannot be a
nulla est potentialitas. Impossibile form united to some thing.
est igitur Deum esse formam
unitam alicui rei.
Adhuc. Quod per se habet esse, [5] Moreover, that which has being through

nobilius est eo quod habet esse itself is nobler than that which has being in
in alio. Omnis autem forma another. But every form of a body has
alicuius corporis habet esse in being in another. Since, then, God, as the
alio. Cum igitur Deus sit ens first cause of being, is the noblest being,
nobilissimum, quasi prima He cannot be the form of any being.
essendi causa, non potest esse
alicuius forma.
Praeterea. Hoc idem potest [6] The same conclusion can also be
ostendi ex aeternitate motus, sic. reached in the following way from the
Si Deus est forma alicuius eternity of motion. If God is the form of
mobilis, cum ipse sit primum some movable body, since He is the first
movens, compositum erit movens mover, the composite will be selfmoving.
seipsum. Sed movens seipsum But something selfmoving can be moved
potest moveri et non moveri. and notmoved. Both possibilities are
Utrumque igitur in ipso est. Quod found in it. But such a being does not of
autem est huiusmodi, non habet itself have an indefectibility of motion.
motus indeficientiam ex seipso. Above the selfmoving being, therefore,
Oportet igitur supra movens we must posit another first mover, which
seipsum ponere aliud primum gives to the selfmoving being the
movens, quod largiatur ei endlessness of its motion. Thus, God,
perpetuitatem motus. Et sic Who is the first mover, is not the form of a
Deus, qui est primum movens, selfmoving body.
non est forma corporis moventis
seipsum.
Est autem hic processus utilis [7] This argumentation is suitable for those

ponentibus aeternitatem motus. who posit the eternity of motion. Those
Quo non posito, eadem conclusio who do not posit it can reach the same
haberi potest ex regularitate conclusion from the regularity of the
motus caeli. Sicut enim movens motion of the heavens. For just as a self
seipsum potest quiescere et mover can be at rest and in motion, so it
moveri, ita potest velocius et can be moved more swiftly and less so.
tardius moveri. Necessitas igitur The necessity in the uniformity of the
uniformitatis motus caeli motion of the heavens, therefore, depends
dependet ex aliquo principio on some higher and absolutely immobile
superiori omnino immobili, quod principle, which is not a part of a self
non est pars corporis moventis moving body as the form of that body.
seipsum quasi aliqua forma eius.
Huic autem veritati Scripturae [8] The authority of Scripture is in
concordat auctoritas. Dicitur enim agreement with this truth. For it is said in a
in Psalmo: elevata est Psalm (8:2): “Your magnificence is
magnificentia tua super caelos, elevated above the heavens”; and in Job
Deus. Et Iob 8: excelsior caelo (11:8, 9): “He is higher than heaven, and
est et quid facies? Longior terra what will you do?... His measure is longer
mensura eius est et profundior than the earth and deeper than the sea.”
mari.
Sic igitur gentilium error [9] Thus, then, is removed the error of the

evacuatur, qui dicebant Deum Gentiles, who said that God is the soul of
esse animam caeli vel etiam the heavens, or even the soul of the whole
animam totius mundi, et ex hoc world. Thereby they defended the error of
errore, idolatriam defendebant, idolatry, by saying that the whole world
dicentes totum mundum esse was God not by reason of the body but by
Deum, non ratione corporis, sed reason of the soul; just as man is said to
ratione animae, sicut homo be wise not by reason of the body but by
dicitur sapiens non ratione reason of the soul. On the basis of this
corporis sed animae: quo error the Gentiles thought it to follow that,
supposito, sequi opinabantur not unfittingly, divine worship should be
quod mundo et partibus eius non shown to the world and its parts. The
indebite divinus cultus Commentator also says that this point was
exhibeatur. Commentator etiam the place where the Zabii stumbled and
dicit, in XI Metaphys., quod hic fell from wisdom—because, namely, they
locus fuit lapsus sapientum posited that God is the form of the
gentis Zabiorum, idest heavens [In XII Metaphysicorum].
idolatrarum quia scilicet
posuerunt Deum esse formam
caeli.
Caput 28 Chapter 28
De perfectione divina ON THE DIVINE PERFECTION
Licet autem ea quae sunt et vivunt, [1] Although the things that exist and live
perfectiora sint quam ea quae are more perfect than the things that
tantum sunt, Deus tamen qui non merely exist, nevertheless, God, Who is

est aliud quam suum esse, est not other than His being, is a universally
universaliter ens perfectum. Et dico perfect being. And I call universally
universaliter perfectum, cui non perfect that to which the excellence of
deest alicuius generis nobilitas. no genus is lacking.
Omnis enim nobilitas cuiuscumque [2] Every excellence in any given thing
rei est sibi secundum suum esse: belongs to it according to its being. For
nulla enim nobilitas esset homini ex man would have no excellence as a
sua sapientia nisi per eam sapiens result of his wisdom unless through it he
esset, et sic de aliis. Sic ergo were wise. So, too, with the other
secundum modum quo res habet excellences. Hence, the mode of a
esse, est suus modus in nobilitate: thing’s excellence is according to the
nam res secundum quod suum mode of its being. For a thing is said to
esse contrahitur ad aliquem be more or less excellent according as
specialem modum nobilitatis its being is limited to a certain greater or
maiorem vel minorem, dicitur esse lesser mode of excellence. Therefore, if
secundum hoc nobilior vel minus there is something to which the whole
nobilis. Igitur si aliquid est cui power of being belongs, it can lack no
competit tota virtus essendi, ei nulla excellence that is proper to some thing.
nobilitatum deesse potest quae But for a thing that is its own being it is
alicui rei conveniat. Sed rei quae proper to be according to the whole
est suum esse, competit esse power of being. For example, if there
secundum totam essendi were a separately existing whiteness, it
potestatem: sicut, si esset aliqua could not lack any of the power of
albedo separata, nihil ei de virtute whiteness. For a given white thing lacks
albedinis deesse posset; nam alicui something of the power of whiteness
albo aliquid de virtute albedinis through a defect in the receiver of the
deest ex defectu recipientis whiteness, which receives it according
albedinem, quae eam secundum to its mode and perhaps not according
modum suum recipit, et fortasse to the whole power of whiteness. God,
non secundum totum posse therefore, Who is His being, as we have
albedinis. Deus igitur, qui est suum proved above, has being according to
esse, ut supra probatum est, habet the whole power of being itself. Hence,
esse secundum totam virtutem He cannot lack any excellence that
ipsius esse. Non potest ergo carere belongs to any given thing.
aliqua nobilitate quae alicui rei
conveniat.
Sicut autem omnis nobilitas et [3] But just as every excellence and
perfectio inest rei secundum quod perfection is found in a thing according
est, ita omnis defectus inest ei as that thing is, so every defect is found
secundum quod aliqualiter non est. in it according as in some way it is not.
Deus autem, sicut habet esse Now, just as God bas being wholly, so
totaliter, ita ab eo totaliter absistit nonbeing is wholly absent from Him.
non esse: quia per modum per For as a thing has being, in that way is it
quem habet aliquid esse, deficit a removed from nonbeing. Hence, all
non esse. A Deo ergo omnis defect is absent from God. He is,
defectus absistit. Est igitur therefore, universally perfect.
universaliter perfectus.
Illa vero quae tantum sunt, non sunt [4] Those things that merely exist are

imperfecta propter imperfectionem not imperfect because of an
ipsius esse absoluti: non enim ipsa imperfection in absolute being. For they
habent esse secundum suum totum do not possess being according to its
posse, sed participant esse per whole power; rather, they participate in it
quendam particularem modum et through a certain particular and most
imperfectissimum. imperfect mode.
Item. Omne imperfectum ab aliquo [5] Furthermore, everything that is

perfecto necesse est ut imperfect must be preceded by
praecedatur: semen enim est ab something perfect. Thus, the seed is
animali vel a planta. Igitur primum from the animal or the plant. The first
ens oportet esse perfectissimum. being must, therefore, be most perfect.
Ostensum est autem Deum esse But we have shown that God is the first
primum ens. Est igitur being. He is, therefore, most perfect.
perfectissimus.
Amplius. Unumquodque perfectum [6] Again, each thing is perfect

est inquantum est actu; according as it is in act, and imperfect
imperfectum autem secundum according as it is in potency and lacking
quod est potentia cum privatione act. Hence, that which is in no way in
actus. Id igitur quod nullo modo est potency, but is pure act, must be most
potentia sed est actus purus, perfect. Such, however, is God. God is,
oportet perfectissimum esse. Tale therefore, most perfect.
autem Deus est. Est igitur
perfectissimus.
Amplius. Nihil agit nisi secundum [7] Nothing, moreover, acts except as it
quod est in actu. Actio igitur is in act. Hence, action follows the mode
consequitur modum actus in of act in the agent. It is therefore
agente. Impossibile est igitur impossible that an effect brought forth
effectum qui per actionem educitur, by an action be of a more excellent act
esse in nobiliori actu quam sit actus than is the act of the agent. On the other
agentis: possibile est tamen actum hand, it is possible that the act of the
effectus imperfectiorem esse quam effect be less perfect than the act of the
sit actus causae agentis, eo quod efficient cause, since an action can
actio potest debilitari ex parte eius become weakened through the effect in
in quod terminatur. In genere autem which it terminates. Now, in the genus of
causae efficientis fit reductio ad the efficient cause there is a reduction to
unam primam quae Deus dicitur, ut one cause, called God, as is evident
ex dictis patet, a quo sunt omnes from what we have said; and from this
res, ut in sequentibus ostendetur. cause, as we shall show later on, all
Oportet igitur quicquid actu est in things come. Hence, it is necessary that
quacumque re alia, inveniri in Deo whatever is found in act in any thing
multo eminentius quam sit in re illa, whatever must be found in God in a
non autem e converso. Est igitur more eminent way than in that thing
Deus perfectissimus. itself. But the converse is not true. God,
therefore, is most perfect.
Item. In unoquoque genere est [8] In every genus, furthermore, there is

aliquid perfectissimum in genere something that is most perfect for that
illo, ad quod omnia quae sunt illius genus, acting as a measure for all other
generis mensurantur: quia ex eo things in the genus. For each thing is
unumquodque ostenditur magis vel shown to be more or less perfect
minus perfectum esse, quod ad according as it approaches more or less
mensuram sui generis magis vel to the measure of its genus. Thus, white
minus appropinquat; sicut album is said to be the measure among all
dicitur esse mensura in omnibus colors, and the virtuous man among all
coloribus, et virtuosus inter omnes men. Now, the measure of all beings
homines. Id autem quod est cannot be other than God, Who is His
mensura omnium entium non own being. No perfection, consequently,
potest esse aliud quam Deus, qui that is appropriate to this or that thing is
est suum esse. Ipsi igitur nulla lacking to Him; otherwise, He would not
deest perfectionum quae aliquibus be the common measure of all things.
rebus conveniat: alias non esset
omnium communis mensura.
Hinc est quod, cum quaereret [9] This is why, when Moses asked to
Moyses divinam videre faciem seu see the divine countenance or glory, he
gloriam, responsum est ei a received this reply from the Lord: “I will
domino, ego ostendam tibi omne show you all good,” as it is written in
bonum, ut habetur Exod. 3319, per Exodus (33:18, 19); by which the Lord
hoc dans intelligere in se omnis gave Moses to understand that the
bonitatis plenitudinem esse. fullness of all goodness was in Him.
Dionysius etiam, in V cap. de Div. Dionysius likewise says: “God does not
Nom. dicit: Deus non quodam exist in a certain way; He possesses,
modo est existens, sed simpliciter and this before all others, all being
et incircumscriptive totum esse in within Himself absolutely and limitlessly”
seipso accepit et praeaccepit. [De div. nom. V, 4].
Sciendum tamen est quod perfectio [10] We must note, however, that

Deo convenienter attribui non perfection cannot be attributed to God
potest si nominis significatio appropriately if we consider the
quantum ad sui originem signification of the name according to its
attendatur: quod enim factum non origin; for it does not seem that what is
est, nec perfectum posse dici not made [factum] can be called perfect
videtur. Sed quia omne quod fit, de [perfectum]. But everything that comes
potentia in actum deductum est et to be is brought forth from potency to act
de non esse in esse quando factum and from nonbeing to being when it has
est, tunc recte perfectum esse been made. That is why it is rightly said
dicitur, quasi totaliter factum, to be perfect, as being completely
quando potentia totaliter est ad made, at that moment when the potency
actum reducta, ut nihil de non esse is wholly reduced to act, so that it
retineat, sed habeat esse retains no nonbeing but has a
completum. Per quandam igitur completed being. By a certain extension
nominis extensionem perfectum of the name, consequently, perfect is
dicitur non solum quod fiendo said not only of that which by way of
pervenit ad actum completum, sed becoming reaches a completed act, but
id etiam quod est in actu completo also of that which, without any making
absque omni factione. Et sic Deum whatever, is in complete act. It is thus
perfectum esse dicimus, secundum that, following the words of Matthew
illud Matth. 548: estote perfecti (5:48), we say that God is perfect: “Be
sicut et pater vester caelestis perfect as your heavenly Father is
perfectus est. perfect.”
Caput 29 Chapter 29
De similitudine creaturarum ON THE LIKENESS OF CREATURES
TO GOD
Ex hoc autem quomodo in rebus [1] In the light of what we have said, we

possit similitudo ad Deum inveniri are able to consider how a likeness to
vel non possit, considerari potest. God is and is not possible in things.
Effectus enim a suis causis [2] Effects that fall short of their causes

deficientes non conveniunt cum eis do not agree with them in name and
in nomine et ratione, necesse est nature. Yet, some likeness must be
tamen aliquam inter ea similitudinem found between them, since it belongs to
inveniri: de natura enim actionis est the nature of action that an agent
ut agens sibi simile agat cum produce its like, since each thing acts
unumquodque agat secundum quod according as it is in act. The form of an
actu est. Unde forma effectus in effect, therefore, is certainly found in
causa excedente invenitur quidem some measure in a transcending
aliqualiter, sed secundum alium cause, but according to another mode
modum et aliam rationem, ratione and another way. For this reason the
cuius causa aequivoca dicitur. Sol cause is called an equivocal cause.
enim in corporibus inferioribus Thus, the sun causes heat among
calorem causat agendo secundum these sublunary bodies by acting
quod actu est; unde oportet quod according as it is in act. Hence, the
calor a sole generatus aliqualem heat generated by the sun must bear
similitudinem obtineat ad virtutem some likeness to the active power of
activam solis, per quam calor in istis the sun, through which beat is caused
inferioribus causatur, ratione cuius in this sublunary world; and because of
sol calidus dicitur, quamvis non una this beat the sun is said to be hot, even
ratione. Et sic sol omnibus illis though not in one and the same way.
similis aliqualiter dicitur in quibus And so the sun is said to be somewhat
suos effectus efficaciter inducit: a like those things in which it produces its
quibus tamen rursus omnibus effects as an efficient cause. Yet the
dissimilis est, inquantum huiusmodi sun is also unlike all these things in so
effectus non eodem modo possident far as such effects do not possess heat
calorem et huiusmodi quo in sole and the like in the same way as they
invenitur. Ita etiam et Deus omnes are found in the sun. So, too, God gave
perfectiones rebus tribuit, ac per hoc things all their perfections and thereby
cum omnibus similitudinem habet et is both like and unlike all of them.
dissimilitudinem simul.
Et inde est quod sacra Scriptura [3] Hence it is that Sacred Scripture
aliquando similitudinem inter eum et recalls the likeness between God and
creaturam commemorat, ut cum creatures, as when it is said in Genesis
dicitur Gen. 126: faciamus (1:26): “Let us make man to our image
hominem ad imaginem et and likeness.” At times the likeness is
similitudinem nostram; aliquando denied, as in the text of Isaiah (40:18):
similitudo negatur, secundum illud “To whom then have you likened God,
Isaiae 4018: cui ergo similem and what image will you make for
fecistis Deum, aut quam imaginem Him?” or in the Psalm (82:1) [Vulgate]:
ponetis ei? Et in Psalmo: Deus, quis “O God, who is like You?”
similis erit tibi?
Huic autem rationi Dionysius [4] Dionysius is in agreement with this
concordat, qui in IX cap. de Div. argument when he says: “The same
Nom. dicit: eadem similia sunt Deo things are both like and unlike God.
et dissimilia: similia quidem, They are like according as they imitate
secundum imitationem eius qui non as much as they can Him Who is not
est perfecte imitabilis, qualem in eis perfectly imitable, they are unlike
contingit esse; dissimilia autem, according as effects are lesser than
secundum quod causata habent their causes” [De div. nom. IX, 7].
minus suis causis.
Secundum tamen hanc [5] In the light of this likeness,
similitudinem convenientius dicitur nevertheless, it is more fitting to say
Deo creatura similis quam e that a creature is like God rather than
converso. Simile enim alicui dicitur the converse. For that is called like
quod eius possidet qualitatem vel something which possesses a quality or
formam. Quia igitur id quod in Deo form of that thing. Since, then, that
perfecte est, in rebus aliis per which is found in God perfectly is found
quandam deficientem in other things according to a certain
participationem invenitur, illud diminished participation, the basis on
secundum quod similitudo attenditur, which the likeness is observed belongs
Dei quidem simpliciter est, non to God absolutely, but not to the
autem creaturae. Et sic creatura creature. Thus, the creature has what
habet quod Dei est: unde et Deo belongs to God and, consequently, is
recte similis dicitur. Non autem sic rightly said to be like God. But we
potest dici Deum habere quod cannot in the same way say that God
creaturae est. Unde nec has what belongs to the creature.
convenienter dicitur Deum creaturae Neither, then, can we appropriately say
similem esse: sicut nec hominem that God is like a creature, just as we
dicimus suae imagini esse similem, do not say that man is like his image,
cui tamen sua imago recte similis although the image is rightly said to be
enuntiatur. like him.
Multo etiam minus proprie dicitur [6] All the less proper, moreover, is the

quod Deus creaturae similetur. Nam expression that God is likened to a

assimilatio motum ad similitudinem creature. For likening expresses a
dicit et sic competit et quod ab alio motion towards likeness and thus
accipit unde simile sit. Creatura belongs to the being that receives from
autem accipit a Deo unde ei sit another that which makes it like. But a
similis: non autem e converso. Non creature receives from God that which
igitur Deus creaturae assimilatur, makes it like Him. The converse,
sed magis e converso. however, does not hold. God, then, is
not likened to a creature; rather, the
converse is true.
Caput 30 Chapter 30
Quae nomina de Deo possint THE NAMES THAT CAN BE
praedicari PREDICATED OF GOD
Ex his etiam considerari potest [1] From what we have said we can further

quid de Deo dici vel non dici consider what it is possible to say or not to
possit, quidve de eo tantum say of God, what is said of Him alone, and
dicatur, quid etiam de eo simul et also what is said of Him and other things
aliis rebus. together.
Quia enim omnem perfectionem [2] Since it is possible to find in God every

creaturae est in Deo invenire sed perfection of creatures, but in another and
per alium modum eminentiorem, more eminent way, whatever names
quaecumque nomina absolute unqualifiedly designate a perfection
perfectionem absque defectu without defect are predicated of God and
designant, de Deo praedicantur of other things: for example, goodness,
et de aliis rebus: sicut est wisdom, being, and the like. But when any
bonitas, sapientia, esse, et alia name expresses such perfections along
huiusmodi. Quodcumque vero with a mode that is proper to a creature, it
nomen huiusmodi perfectiones can be said of God only according to
exprimit cum modo proprio likeness and metaphor. According to
creaturis, de Deo dici non potest metaphor, what belongs to one thing is
nisi per similitudinem et transferred to another, as when we say
metaphoram, per quam quae that a man is a stone because of the
sunt unius rei alteri solent hardness of his intellect. Such names are
adaptari, sicut aliquis homo used to designate the species of a created
dicitur lapis propter duritiam thing, for example, man and stone, for to
intellectus. Huiusmodi autem each species belongs its own mode of
sunt omnia nomina imposita ad perfection and being. The same is true of
designandum speciem rei whatever names designate the properties
creatae, sicut homo et lapis: nam of things, which are caused by the proper
cuilibet speciei debetur proprius principles of their species. Hence, they
modus perfectionis et esse. can be said of God only metaphorically.
Similiter etiam quaecumque But the names that express such
nomina proprietates rerum perfections along with the mode of
designant quae ex propriis supereminence with which they belong to
principiis specierum causatur. God are said of God alone. Such names
Unde de Deo dici non possunt are the highest good, the first being, and
nisi metaphorice. Quae vero the like.
huiusmodi perfectiones
exprimunt cum supereminentiae
modo quo Deo conveniunt, de
solo Deo dicuntur: sicut summum
bonum, primum ens, et alia
huiusmodi.
Dico autem aliqua praedictorum [3] I have said that some of the
nominum perfectionem absque aforementioned names signify a perfection
defectu importare, quantum ad without defect. This is true with reference
illud ad quod significandum to that which the name was imposed to
nomen fuit impositum: quantum signify; for as to the mode of signification,
enim ad modum significandi, every name is defective. For by means of
omne nomen cum defectu est. a name we express things in the way in
Nam nomine res exprimimus eo which the intellect conceives them. For our
modo quo intellectu concipimus. intellect, taking the origin of its knowledge
Intellectus autem noster, ex from the senses, does not transcend the
sensibus cognoscendi initium mode which is found in sensible things, in
sumens, illum modum non which the form and the subject of the form
transcendit qui in rebus are not identical owing to the composition
sensibilibus invenitur, in quibus of form and matter. Now, a simple form is
aliud est forma et habens indeed found among such things, but one
formam, propter formae et that is imperfect because it is not
materiae compositionem. Forma subsisting; on the other hand, though a
vero in his rebus invenitur subsisting subject of a form is found
quidem simplex, sed imperfecta, among sensible things, it is not simple but
utpote non subsistens: habens rather concreted. Whatever our intellect
autem formam invenitur quidem signifies as subsisting, therefore, it
subsistens, sed non simplex, signifies in concretion; but what it signifies
immo concretionem habens. as simple, it signifies, not as that which is,
Unde intellectus noster, quidquid but as that by which something is. As a
significat ut subsistens, significat result, with reference to the mode of
in concretione: quod vero ut signification there is in every name that we
simplex, significat non ut quod use an imperfection, which does not befit
est, sed ut quo est. Et sic in omni God, even though the thing signified in
nomine a nobis dicto, quantum some eminent way does befit God. This is
ad modum significandi, clear in the name goodness and good. For
imperfectio invenitur, quae Deo goodness has signification as something
non competit, quamvis res not subsisting, while good has signification
significata aliquo eminenti modo as something concreted. And so with
Deo conveniat: ut patet in nomine reference to the mode of signification no
bonitatis et boni; nam bonitas name is fittingly applied to God; this is
significat ut non subsistens, done only with reference to that which the
bonum autem ut concretum. Et name has been imposed to signify. Such
quantum ad hoc nullum nomen names, therefore, as Dionysius teaches
Deo convenienter aptatur, sed [De divinis nominibus I, 5, De caelesti
solum quantum ad id ad quod hierarchia II, 3], can be both affirmed and
significandum nomen imponitur. denied of God. They can be affirmed
Possunt igitur, ut Dionysius because of the meaning of the name; they
docet, huiusmodi nomina et can be denied because of the mode of
affirmari de Deo et negari: signification.
affirmari quidem, propter nominis
rationem; negari vero, propter
significandi modum.
Modus autem supereminentiae [4] Now, the mode of supereminence in

quo in Deo dictae perfectiones which the abovementioned perfections are
inveniuntur, per nomina a nobis found in God can be signified by names
imposita significari non potest nisi used by us only through negation, as
vel per negationem, sicut cum when we say that God is eternal or infinite,
dicimus Deum aeternum vel or also through a relation of God to other
infinitum; vel etiam per things, as when He is called the first cause
relationem ipsius ad alia, ut cum or the highest good. For we cannot grasp
dicitur prima causa, vel summum what God is, but only what He is not and
bonum. Non enim de Deo capere how other things are related to Him, as is
possumus quid est, sed quid non clear from what we said above.
est, et qualiter alia se habeant ad
ipsum, ut ex supra dictis patet.
Caput 31 Chapter 31
Quod divina perfectio et THAT THE DIVINE PERFECTION AND
pluralitas nominum divinorum THE PLURALITY OF DIVINE NAMES
divinae simplicitati non ARE NOT OPPOSED TO THE DIVINE
repugnant SIMPLICITY
Ex praedictis etiam videri potest [1] From what has been said it can
quod divina perfectio et plura likewise be seen that the divine perfection
nomina dicta de Deo ipsius and the plurality of names said of God
simplicitati non repugnant. are not opposed to His simplicity.
Sic enim omnes perfectiones in [2] We have said that all the perfections
rebus aliis inventas Deo attribui found in other things are attributed to God
diximus sicut effectus in suis in the same way as effects are found in
causis aequivocis inveniuntur. Qui their equivocal causes. These effects are
quidem effectus in suis causis in their causes virtually, as heat is in the
sunt virtute, ut calor in sole. Virtus sun. For, unless the power of the sun
autem huiusmodi nisi aliqualiter belonged to some extent to the genus of
esset de genere caloris, sol per heat, the sun acting through this power
eam agens non sibi simile would not generate anything like itself.
generaret. Ex hac igitur virtute sol The sun, then, is said to be hot through
calidus dicitur, non solum quia this power not only because it produces
calorem facit, sed quia virtus per heat, but also because the power through
quam hoc facit, est aliquid which it does this has some likeness to
conforme calori. Per eandem heat. But through the same power
autem virtutem per quam sol facit through which it produces heat, the sun
calorem, facit et multos alios produces also many other effects among
effectus in inferioribus corporibus, sublunary bodiesfor example, dryness.
utpote siccitatem. Et sic calor et And thus heat and dryness, which in fire
siccitas, quae in igne sunt are diverse qualities, belong to the sun
qualitates diversae, soli through one and the same power. So,
attribuuntur per unam virtutem. Ita too, the perfections of all things, which
et omnium perfectiones, quae belong to the rest of things through
rebus aliis secundum diversas diverse forms, must be attributed to God
formas conveniunt, Deo through one and the same power in Him.
secundum unam eius virtutem This power is nothing other than His
attribui est necesse. Quae item essence, since, as we have proved, there
virtus non est aliud a sua essentia: can be no accident in God. Thus,
cum ei nihil accidere possit, ut therefore, God is called wise not only in
probatum est. Sic igitur sapiens so far as He produces wisdom, but also
Deus dicitur non solum secundum because, in so far as we are wise, we
hoc quod sapientiam efficit, sed imitate to some extent the power by
quia, secundum quod sapientes which He makes us wise. On the other
sumus, virtutem eius, qua hand, God is not called a stone, even
sapientes nos facit, aliquatenus though He has made stones, because in
imitamur. Non autem dicitur lapis, the name stone there is understood a
quamvis lapides fecerit, quia in determinate mode of being according to
nomine lapidis intelligitur modus which a stone is distinguished from God.
determinatus essendi, secundum But the stone imitates God as its cause in
quem lapis a Deo distinguitur. being and goodness, and other such
Imitatur autem lapis Deum ut characteristics, as do also the rest of
causam secundum esse, creatures.
secundum bonitatem, et alia
huiusmodi, sicut et aliae
creaturae.
Huius autem simile inveniri potest [3] A similar situation obtains among the
in potentiis cognoscitivis et in knowing and operative powers of man.
virtutibus operativis humanis. For by its single power the intellect knows
Intellectus enim unica virtute all the things that the sensitive part of the
cognoscit omnia quae pars soul grasps through a diversity of powers
sensitiva diversis potentiis and many other things as well. So, too,
apprehendit, et etiam alia multa. the higher an intellect is, the more it can
Intellectus etiam, quanto fuerit know more things through one likeness,
altior, tanto aliquo uno plura while a lesser intellect manages to know
cognoscere potest, ad quae many things only through many
cognoscenda intellectus inferior likenesses. So, too, a ruling power
non pertingit nisi per multa. extends to all those things to which
Potestas etiam regia ad omnia illa diverse powers under it are ordered. In
extenditur ad quae diversae sub this way, therefore, through His one
ipso potestates ordinem habent. simple being God possesses every kind
Sic igitur et Deus per unum of perfection that all other things come to
simplex suum esse omnimodam possess, but in a much more diminished
perfectionem possidet, quam res way, through diverse principles.
aliae, immo multo minorem, per

quaedam diversa consequuntur.
Ex quo patet necessitas plura [4] From this we see the necessity of
nomina Deo dandi. Quia enim giving to God many names. For, since we
eum non possumus cognoscere cannot know Him naturally except by
naturaliter nisi ex effectibus arriving at Him from His effects, the
deveniendo in ipsum, oportet quod names by which we signify His perfection
nomina quibus perfectionem must be diverse, just as the perfections
ipsius significamus, diversa sint, belonging to things are found to be
sicut et perfectiones in rebus diverse. Were we able to understand the
inveniuntur diversae. Si autem divine essence itself as it is and give to it
ipsam essentiam prout est the name that belongs to it, we would
possemus intelligere et ei nomen express it by only one name. This is
proprium adaptare, uno nomine promised to those who will see God
tantum eam exprimeremus. Quod through His essence: “In that day there
promittitur his qui eum per shall be one Lord, and His name shall be
essentiam videbunt, Zach. ult.: in one” (Zach. 14:9).
die illa erit dominus unus et
nomen eius unum.
Caput 32 Chapter 32
Quod nihil de Deo et rebus aliis THAT NOTHING IS PREDICATED
univoce praedicatur UNIVOCALLY OF GOD AND OTHER
THINGS
Ex his autem patet quod nihil de [1] It is thereby evident that nothing can be

Deo et rebus aliis potest univoce predicated univocally of God and other
praedicari. things.
Nam effectus qui non recipit [2] An effect that does not receive a form
formam secundum speciem specifically the same as that through
similem ei per quam agens agit, which the agent acts cannot receive
nomen ab illa forma sumptum according to a univocal predication the
secundum univocam name arising from that form. Thus, the
praedicationem recipere non heat generated by the sun and the sun
potest: non enim univoce dicitur itself are not called univocally hot. Now,
calidus ignis a sole generatus, et the forms of the things God has made do
sol. Rerum quarum Deus est not measure up to a specific likeness of
causa, formae ad speciem the divine power; for the things that God
divinae virtutis non perveniunt: has made receive in a divided and
cum divisim et particulariter particular way that which in Him is found
recipiant quod in Deo simpliciter in a simple and universal way. It is
et universaliter invenitur. Patet evident, then, that nothing can be said
igitur quod de Deo et rebus aliis univocally of God and other things.
nihil univoce dici potest.
Amplius. Si aliquis effectus ad [3] If, furthermore, an effect should
speciem causae pertingat, measure up to the species of its cause, it
praedicationem nominis univoce will not receive the univocal predication of
non consequetur nisi secundum the name unless it receives the same
eundem essendi modum eandem specific form according to the same mode
specie formam suscipiat: non of being. For the house that is in the art of
enim univoce dicitur domus quae the maker is not univocally the same
est in arte, et in materia, propter house that is in matter, for the form of the
hoc quod forma domus habet house does not have the same being in
esse dissimile utrobique. Res the two locations. Now, even though the
autem aliae, etiam si omnino rest of things were to receive a form that is
similem formam consequerentur, absolutely the same as it is in God, yet
non tamen consequuntur they do not receive it according to the
secundum eundem modum same mode of being. For, as is clear from
essendi: nam nihil est in Deo what we have said, there is nothing in God
quod non sit ipsum esse divinum, that is not the divine being itself, which is
ut ex dictis patet, quod in aliis not the case with other things. Nothing,
rebus non accidit. Impossibile est therefore, can be predicated of God and
igitur aliquid univoce de Deo et other things univocally.
rebus aliis praedicari.
Adhuc. Omne quod de pluribus [4] Moreover, whatever is predicated of
univoce praedicatur, vel est many things univocally is either a genus, a
genus, vel species, vel differentia, species, a difference, an accident, or a
vel accidens aut proprium. De property. But, as we have shown, nothing
Deo autem nihil praedicatur ut is predicated of God as a genus or a
genus nec ut differentia, ut supra difference; and thus neither is anything
ostensum est; et sic nec ut predicated as a definition, nor likewise as
definitio, nec etiam ut species, a species, which is constituted of genus
quae ex genere et differentia and difference. Nor, as we have shown,
constituitur. Nec aliquid ei can there be any accident in God, and
accidere potest, ut supra therefore nothing is predicated of Him
demonstratum est: et ita nihil de either as an accident or a property, since
eo praedicatur neque ut accidens property belongs to the genus of
neque ut proprium; nam proprium accidents. It remains, then, that nothing is
de genere accidentium est. predicated univocally of God and other
Relinquitur igitur nihil de Deo et things.
rebus aliis univoce praedicari.
Item. Quod univoce de pluribus [5] Again, what is predicated of many
praedicatur, utroque illorum ad things univocally is simpler than both of
minus secundum intellectum them, at least in concept. Now, there can
simplicius est. Deo autem neque be nothing simpler than God either in
secundum rem neque secundum reality or in concept. Nothing, therefore, is
intellectum potest esse aliquid predicated univocally of God and other
simplicius. Nihil igitur univoce de things.
Deo et rebus aliis praedicatur.
Amplius. Omne quod de pluribus [6] Everything, likewise, that is predicated

praedicatur univoce, secundum univocally of many things belongs through
participationem cuilibet eorum participation to each of the things of which
convenit de quo praedicatur: nam it is predicated; for the species is said to
species participare dicitur genus, participate in the genus and the individual
et individuum speciem. De Deo in the species. But nothing is said of God
autem nihil dicitur per by participation, since whatever is
participationem: nam omne quod participated is determined to the mode of
participatur determinatur ad that which is participated and is thus
modum participati, et sic possessed in a partial way and not
partialiter habetur et non according to every mode of perfection.
secundum omnem perfectionis Nothing, therefore, can be predicated
modum. Oportet igitur nihil de univocally of God and other things.
Deo et rebus aliis univoce
praedicari.
Adhuc. Quod praedicatur de [7] Then, too, what is predicated of some
aliquibus secundum prius et things according to priority and posteriority
posterius, certum est univoce non is certainly not predicated univocally. For
praedicari: nam prius in the prior is included in the definition of the
definitione posterioris includitur: posterior, as substance is included in the
sicut substantia in definitione definition of accident according as an
accidentis secundum quod est accident is a being. If, then, being were
ens. Si igitur diceretur univoce said univocally of substance and accident,
ens de substantia et accidente, substance would have to be included in
oporteret quod substantia etiam the definition of being in so far as being is
poneretur in definitione entis predicated of substance. But this is clearly
secundum quod de substantia impossible. Now nothing is predicated of
praedicatur. Quod patet esse God and creatures as though they were in
impossibile. Nihil autem de Deo the same order, but, rather, according to
et rebus aliis praedicatur eodem priority and posteriority. For all things are
ordine, sed secundum prius et predicated of God essentially. For God is
posterius: cum de Deo omnia called being as being entity itself, and He
praedicentur essentialiter, dicitur is called good as being goodness itself.
enim ens quasi ipsa essentia, et But in other beings predications are made
bonus quasi ipsa bonitas; de aliis by participation, as Socrates is said to be
autem praedicationes fiunt per a man, not because he is humanity itself,
participationem, sicut Socrates but because he possesses humanity. It is
dicitur homo non quia sit ipsa impossible, therefore, that anything be
humanitas, sed humanitatem predicated univocally of God and other
habens. Impossibile est igitur things.
aliquid de Deo et rebus aliis
univoce dici.
Caput 33 Chapter 33
Quod non omnia nomina dicuntur THAT NOT ALL NAMES ARE SAID
de Deo et creaturis pure OF GOD AND CREATURES IN A
aequivoce PURELY EQUIVOCAL WAY
Ex praemissis etiam patet quod non [1] From what we have said it likewise

quicquid de Deo et rebus aliis appears that not everything predicated
praedicatur, secundum puram of God and other things is said in a
aequivocationem dicitur, sicut ea purely equivocal way, in the manner of
quae sunt a casu aequivoca. equivocals by chance.
Nam in his quae sunt a casu [2] For in equivocals by chance there is

aequivoca, nullus ordo aut respectus no order or reference of one to another,
attenditur unius ad alterum, sed but it is entirely accidental that one
omnino per accidens est quod unum name is applied to diverse things: the
nomen diversis rebus attribuitur: non application of the name to one of them
enim nomen impositum uni significat does not signify that it has an order to
ipsum habere ordinem ad aliud. Sic the other. But this is not the situation
autem non est de nominibus quae with names said of God and creatures,
de Deo dicuntur et creaturis. since we note in the community of such
Consideratur enim in huiusmodi names the order of cause and effect, as
nominum communitate ordo causae is clear from what we have said. It is
et causati, ut ex dictis patet. Non not, therefore, in the manner of pure
igitur secundum puram equivocation that something is
aequivocationem aliquid de Deo et predicated of God and other things.
rebus aliis praedicatur.
Amplius. Ubi est pura aequivocatio, [3] Furthermore, where there is pure
nulla similitudo in rebus attenditur, equivocation, there is no likeness in
sed solum unitas nominis. Rerum things themselves; there is only the
autem ad Deum est aliquis modus unity of a name. But, as is clear from
similitudinis, ut ex supra dictis patet. what we have said, there is a certain
Relinquitur igitur quod non dicuntur mode of likeness of things to God. It
de Deo secundum puram remains, then, that names are not said
aequivocationem. of God in a purely equivocal way.
Item. Quando unum de pluribus [4] Moreover, when one name is
secundum puram aequivocationem predicated of several things in a purely
praedicatur, ex uno eorum non equivocal way, we cannot from one of
possumus duci in cognitionem them be led to the knowledge of
alterius: nam cognitio rerum non another; for the knowledge of things
dependet ex vocibus, sed ex does not depend on words, but on the
nominum ratione. Ex his autem quae meaning of names. Now, from what we
in rebus aliis inveniuntur in find in other things, we do arrive at a
divinorum cognitionem pervenimus, knowledge of divine things, as is
ut ex dictis patet. Non igitur evident from what we have said. Such
secundum puram aequivocationem names, then, are not said of God and
dicuntur huiusmodi de Deo et aliis other things in a purely equivocal way.
rebus.
Adhuc. Aequivocatio nominis [5] Again, equivocation in a name

processum argumentationis impedit. impedes the process of reasoning. If,

Si igitur nihil diceretur de Deo et then, nothing was said of God and
creaturis nisi pure aequivoce, nulla creatures except in a purely equivocal
argumentatio fieri posset way, no reasoning proceeding from
procedendo de creaturis ad Deum. creatures to God could take place. But,
Cuius contrarium patet ex omnibus the contrary is evident from all those
loquentibus de divinis. who have spoken about God.
Amplius. Frustra aliquod nomen de [6] It is also a fact that a name is
aliquo praedicatur nisi per illud predicated of some being uselessly
nomen aliquid de eo intelligamus. unless through that name we
Sed si nomina dicuntur de Deo et understand something of the being.
creaturis omnino aequivoce, nihil per But, if names are said of God and
illa nomina de Deo intelligimus: cum creatures in a purely equivocal way, we
significationes illorum nominum understand nothing of God through
notae sint nobis solum secundum those names; for the meanings of those
quod de creaturis dicuntur. Frustra names are known to us solely to the
igitur diceretur aut probaretur de extent that they are said of creatures. In
Deo quod Deus est ens, bonus, vel vain, therefore, would it be said or
si quid aliud huiusmodi est. proved of God that He is a being, good,
or the like.
Si autem dicatur quod per huiusmodi [7] Should it be replied that through

nomina solum de Deo cognoscimus such names we know only what God is
quid non est, ut scilicet ea ratione not, namely, that God is called living
dicatur vivens quia non est de because He does not belong to the
genere rerum inanimatarum et sic genus of lifeless things, and so with the
de aliis; ad minus oportebit quod other names, it will at least have to be
vivum de Deo et creaturis dictum the case that living said of God and
conveniat in negatione inanimati. Et creatures agrees in the denial of the
sic non erit pure aequivocum. lifeless. Thus, it will not be said in a
purely equivocal way.
Caput 34 Chapter 34
Quod ea quae dicuntur de Deo THAT NAMES SAID OF GOD AND
et creaturis dicuntur analogice CREATURES ARE SAID
ANALOGICALLY
Sic igitur ex dictis relinquitur quod [1] From what we have said, therefore, it

ea quae de Deo et rebus aliis remains that the names said of God and
dicuntur, praedicantur neque creatures are predicated neither
univoce neque aequivoce, sed univocally nor equivocally but
analogice: hoc est, secundum analogically, that is, according to an order
ordinem vel respectum ad aliquid or reference to something one.
unum.
Quod quidem dupliciter contingit: [2] This can take place in two ways. In
uno modo, secundum quod multa one way, according as many things have
habent respectum ad aliquid reference to something one. Thus, with
unum: sicut secundum respectum reference to one health we say that an
ad unam sanitatem animal dicitur animal is healthy as the subject of health,
sanum ut eius subiectum, medicine is healthy as its cause, food as
medicina ut eius effectivum, cibus its preserver, urine as its sign.
ut conservativum, urina ut signum.
Alio modo, secundum quod [3] In another way, the analogy can obtain

duorum attenditur ordo vel according as the order or reference of
respectus, non ad aliquid alterum, two things is not to something else but to
sed ad unum ipsorum: sicut ens one of them. Thus, being is said of
de substantia et accidente dicitur substance and accident according as an
secundum quod accidens ad accident has reference to a substance,
substantiam respectum habet, non and not according as substance and
quod substantia et accidens ad accident are referred to a third thing.
aliquid tertium referantur.
Huiusmodi igitur nomina de Deo et [4] Now, the names said of God and

rebus aliis non dicuntur analogice things are not said analogically according
secundum primum modum, to the first mode of analogy, since we
oporteret enim aliquid Deo ponere should then have to posit something prior
prius: sed modo secundo. to God, but according to the second
mode.
In huiusmodi autem analogica [5] In this second mode of analogical
praedicatione ordo attenditur idem predication the order according to the
secundum nomen et secundum name and according to reality is
rem quandoque, quandoque vero sometimes found to be the same and
non idem. Nam ordo nominis sometimes not. For the order of the name
sequitur ordinem cognitionis: quia follows the order of knowledge, because
est signum intelligibilis it is the sign of an intelligible conception.
conceptionis. Quando igitur id When, therefore, that which is prior in
quod est prius secundum rem, reality is found likewise to be prior in
invenitur etiam cognitione prius, knowledge, the same thing is found to be
idem invenitur prius et secundum prior both according to the meaning of
nominis rationem et secundum rei the name and according to the nature of
naturam: sicut substantia est prior the thing. Thus, substance is prior to
accidente et natura, inquantum accident both in nature, in so far as
substantia est causa accidentis; et substance is the cause of accident, and
cognitione, inquantum substantia in knowledge, in so far as substance is
in definitione accidentis ponitur. Et included in the definition of accident.
ideo ens dicitur prius de substantia Hence, being is said of substance by
quam de accidente et secundum priority over accident both according to
rei naturam et secundum nominis the nature of the thing and according to
rationem. Quando vero id quod est the meaning of the name. But when that
prius secundum naturam, est which is prior in nature is subsequent in
posterius secundum cognitionem, our knowledge, then there is not the
tunc in analogicis non est idem same order in analogicals according to
ordo secundum rem et secundum reality and according to the meaning of
nominis rationem: sicut virtus the name. Thus, the power to heal, which
sanandi quae est in sanativis, prior is found in all healthgiving things, is by
est naturaliter sanitate quae est in nature prior to the health that is in the
animali, sicut causa effectu; sed animal, as a cause is prior to an effect;
quia hanc virtutem per effectum but because we know this healing power
cognoscimus, ideo etiam ex through an effect, we likewise name it
effectu nominamus. Et inde est from its effect. Hence it is that the health
quod sanativum est prius ordine giving is prior in reality, but animal is by
rei, sed animal dicitur per prius priority called healthy according to the
sanum secundum nominis meaning of the name.
rationem.
Sic igitur, quia ex rebus aliis in Dei [6] Thus, therefore, because we come to
cognitionem pervenimus, res a knowledge of God from other things,
nominum de Deo et rebus aliis the reality in the names said of God and
dictorum per prius est in Deo other things belongs by priority in God
secundum suum modum, sed ratio according to His mode of being, but the
nominis per posterius. Unde et meaning of the name belongs to God by
nominari dicitur a suis causatis. posteriority. And so He is said to be
named from His effects.
Caput 35 Chapter 35
Quod plura nomina dicta de Deo THAT MANY NAMES SAID OF GOD
non sunt synonyma ARE NOT SYNONYMS
Ostenditur etiam ex dictis quod, [1] It is likewise shown from what has
quamvis nomina de Deo dicta been said that, although names said of
eandem rem significent, non God signify the same reality, they are yet
tamen sunt synonyma: quia non not synonyms because they do not
significant rationem eandem. signify the same notion.
Nam sicut diversae res uni simplici [2] For just as diverse things are likened

rei quae Deus est similantur per through their diverse forms to the one
formas diversas, ita intellectus simple reality that God is, so our intellect
noster per diversas conceptiones through its diverse conceptions is to
ei aliqualiter similatur, inquantum some extent likened to God in so far as it
per diversas perfectiones is led through the diverse perfections of
creaturarum in ipsum creatures to know Him. Therefore, in
cognoscendum perducitur. Et ideo forming many conceptions of one thing,
de uno, intellectus noster multa our intellect is neither false nor futile,
concipiens non est falsus neque because the simple being of God, as we
vanus: quia illud simplex esse have shown, is such that things can be
divinum huiusmodi est ut ei likened to it according to the multiplicity
secundum formas multiplices of their forms. But in accord with its
aliqua similari possint, ut supra diverse conceptions our intellect devises
ostensum est. Secundum autem diverse names that it attributes to God.
diversas conceptiones diversa Hence, since these names are not
nomina intellectus adinvenit quae attributed to God according to the same
Deo attribuit. Et ita, cum non notion, it is evident that they are not
secundum eandem rationem synonyms, even though they signify a
attribuantur, constat ea non esse reality that is absolutely one. For the
synonyma, quamvis rem omnino signification of the name is not the same,
unam significent: non enim est since a name signifies the conception of
eadem nominis significatio, cum the intellect before it signifies the thing
nomen per prius conceptionem itself understood by the intellect.
intellectus quam rem intellectam
significet.
Caput 36 Chapter 36
Qualiter intellectus noster de HOW OUR INTELLECT FORMS A
Deo propositionem formet PROPOSITION ABOUT GOD
Ex hoc etiam ulterius patet quod [1] From this it is further evident that,
intellectus noster de Deo simplici although God is absolutely simple, it is not
non in vanum enuntiationes futile for our intellect to form enunciations
format componendo et dividendo, concerning God in His simplicity by means
quamvis Deus omnino sit simplex. of composition and division.
Quamvis namque intellectus [2] For although, as we have said, our
noster in Dei cognitionem per intellect arrives at the knowledge of God
diversas conceptiones deveniat, through diverse conceptions, it yet
ut dictum est, intelligit tamen id understands that what corresponds to all
quod omnibus eis respondet of them is absolutely one. For the intellect
omnino unum esse: non enim does not attribute its mode of
intellectus modum quo intelligit understanding to the things that it
rebus attribuit intellectis; sicut nec understands; for example, it does not
lapidi immaterialitatem, quamvis attribute immateriality to a stone even
eum immaterialiter cognoscat. Et though it knows the stone immaterially. It
ideo rei unitatem proponit per therefore sets forth the unity of a thing by
compositionem verbalem, quae a composition of words, which is a mark of
est identitatis nota, cum dicit, identity, when it says, God is good or
Deus est bonus vel bonitas: ita goodness. The result is that if there is
quod si qua diversitas in some diversity in the composition, it is
compositione est, ad intellectum referred to the intellect, whereas the unity
referatur, unitas vero ad rem is referred to the thing understood by the
intellectam. Et ex hac ratione intellect. On the same basis, our intellect
quandoque intellectus noster sometimes forms an enunciation about
enuntiationem de Deo format cum God with a certain mark of diversity in it,
aliqua diversitatis nota, through the use of a preposition, as when
praepositionem interponendo, ut we say, there is goodness in God. Here,
cum dicitur, bonitas est in Deo: too, there is indicated a certain diversity,
quia et hic designatur aliqua which belongs to the intellect, and a
diversitas, quae competit certain unity, which must be referred to
intellectui, et aliqua unitas, quam the reality.
oportet ad rem referre.
p align=center>Chapter 37
THAT GOD IS GOOD
Ex perfectione autem divina, quam [1] From the divine perfection, which we

ostendimus, bonitas ipsius have shown, we can conclude to the
concludi potest. goodness of God.
Id enim quo unumquodque bonum [2] For that by which each thing is called
dicitur, est propria virtus eius: nam good is the virtue that belongs to it; for
virtus est uniuscuiusque quae “the virtue of each thing is what makes
bonum facit habentem et opus eius its possessor and his work good.” Now,
bonum reddit. Virtus autem est virtue “is a certain perfection, for each
perfectio quaedam: tunc enim thing is then called perfect when it
unumquodque perfectum dicimus reaches the virtue belonging to it,” as
quando attingit propriam virtutem, may be seen in Physics VII [3]. Hence,
ut patet in VII physicorum. Ex hoc each thing is good from the fact that it is
igitur unumquodque bonum est perfect. That is why each thing seeks its
quod perfectum est. Et inde est perfection as the good belonging to it.
quod unumquodque suam But we have shown that God is perfect.
perfectionem appetit sicut proprium Therefore, He is good.
bonum. Ostensum est autem
Deum esse perfectum. Est igitur
bonus.
Item. Ostensum est supra esse [3] Again, it was shown above that there

aliquod primum movens immobile, is a certain first unmoved mover, namely,
quod Deus est. Movet autem sicut God’s This mover moves as a completely
movens omnino immobile. Quod unmoved mover, which is as something
movet sicut desideratum. Deus desired. Therefore, since God is the first
igitur, cum sit primum movens unmoved mover, He is the first desired.
immobile, est primum desideratum. But something is desired in two ways,
Desideratur autem dupliciter namely, either because it is good or
aliquid: aut quia est bonum; aut because it appears to be good. The first
quia apparet bonum. Quorum desired is what is good, since the
primum est quod est bonum: nam apparent good does not move through
apparens bonum non movet per itself but according as it has a certain
seipsum, sed secundum quod appearance of the good, whereas the
habet aliquam speciem boni; good moves through itself. The first
bonum vero movet per seipsum. desired, therefore, God, is truly good.
Primum igitur desideratum, quod
Deus est, est vere bonum.
Adhuc. Bonum est quod omnia [4] Furthermore, “the good is that which
appetunt: ut philosophus optime all things desire.” The Philosopher
dictum introducit, I Ethicorum. introduces this remark as a “felicitous
Omnia autem appetunt esse actu saying” in Ethics I [1]. But all things, each
secundum suum modum: quod according to its mode, desire to be in act;
patet ex hoc quod unumquodque this is clear from the fact that each thing
secundum naturam suam repugnat according to its nature resists corruption.
corruptioni. Esse igitur actu boni To be in act, therefore, constitutes the
rationem constituit: unde et per nature of the good. Hence it is that evil,
privationem actus a potentia which is opposed to the good, follows
consequitur malum, quod est bono when potency is deprived of act, as is
oppositum, ut per philosophum clear from the Philosopher in
patet, in IX metaphysicae. Deus Metaphysics IX [9]. But, as we have
autem est ens actu non in potentia, shown, God is being in act without
ut supra ostensum est. Est igitur potency. Therefore, He is truly good.
vere bonus.
Amplius. Communicatio esse et [5] Moreover, the communication of

bonitatis ex bonitate procedit. being and goodness arises from
Quod quidem patet et ex ipsa goodness. This is evident from the very
natura boni, et ex eius ratione. nature and definition of the good. By
Naturaliter enim bonum nature, the good of each thing is its act
uniuscuiusque est actus et and perfection. Now, each thing acts in
perfectio eius. Unumquodque so far as it is in act, and in acting it
autem ex hoc agit quod actu est. diffuses being and goodness to other
Agendo autem esse et bonitatem things. Hence, it is a sign of a being’s
in alia diffundit. Unde et signum perfection that it “can produce its like,” as
perfectionis est alicuius quod may be seen from the Philosopher in
simile possit producere: ut patet Meteorologica IV [3]. Now, the nature of
per philosophum in IV Meteororum. the good comes from its being something
Ratio vero boni est ex hoc quod appetible. This is the end, which also
est appetibile. Quod est finis. Qui moves the agent to act. That is why it is
etiam movet agentem ad said that the good is diffusive of itself and
agendum. Propter quod dicitur of being. But this diffusion befits God
bonum esse diffusivum sui et esse. because, as we have shown above,
Haec autem diffusio Deo competit: being through Himself the necessary
ostensum enim est supra quod being, God is the cause of being for
aliis est causa essendi, sicut per other things. God is, therefore, truly
se ens necesse. Est igitur vere good.
bonus.
Hinc est quod in Psalmo dicitur: [6] That is why it is written in a Psalm
quam bonus Israel Deus his qui (72:1): “How good is God to Israel, to
recto sunt corde. Et Thren. 325 those who are of a right heart!” And
dicitur: bonus est dominus again: “The Lord is good to those who
sperantibus in se, animae hope in Him, to the soul that seeks Him”
quaerenti illum. (Lam. 3:25).
Caput 38 Chapter 38
Quod Deus est ipsa bonitas THAT GOD IS GOODNESS ITSELF
Ex his autem haberi potest quod [1] From this we can conclude that God

Deus sit sua bonitas. is His goodness.
Esse enim actu in unoquoque est [2] To be in act is for each being its
bonum ipsius. Sed Deus non solum good. But God is not only a being in
est ens actu, sed est ipsum suum act; He is His very act of being, as we
esse, ut supra ostensum est. Est have shown. God is, therefore,
igitur ipsa bonitas, non tantum goodness itself, and not only good.
bonus.
Praeterea. Perfectio uniuscuiusque [3] Again, as we have shown, the
est bonitas eius, ut ostensum est. perfection of each thing is its
Perfectio autem divini esse non goodness. But the perfection of the
attenditur secundum aliquid additum divine being is not affirmed on the
supra ipsum, sed quia ipsum basis of something added to it, but
secundum seipsum perfectum est, ut because the divine being, as was
supra ostensum est. Bonitas igitur shown above, is perfect in itself. The
Dei non est aliquid additum suae goodness of God, therefore, is not
substantiae, sed sua substantia est something added to His substance; His
sua bonitas. substance is His goodness.
Item. Unumquodque bonum quod [4] Moreover, each good thing that is
non est sua bonitas, participative not its goodness is called good by
dicitur bonum. Quod autem per participation. But that which is named
participationem dicitur, aliquid ante by participation has something prior to
se praesupponit, a quo rationem it from which it receives the character
suscipit bonitatis. Hoc autem in of goodness. This cannot proceed to
infinitum non est possibile abire: quia infinity, since among final causes there
in causis finalibus non proceditur in is no regress to infinity, since the
infinitum, infinitum enim repugnat infinite is opposed to the end [finis]. But
fini; bonum autem rationem finis the good has the nature of an end. We
habet. Oportet igitur devenire ad must, therefore, reach some first good,
aliquod bonum primum, quod non that is not by participation good
participative sit bonum per ordinem through an order toward some other
ad aliquid aliud, sed sit per good, but is good through its own
essentiam suam bonum. Hoc autem essence. This is God. God is,
Deus est. Est igitur Deus sua therefore, His own goodness.
bonitas.
Item. Id quod est participare aliquid [5] Again, that which is can participate
potest, ipsum autem esse nihil: quod in something, but the act of being can
enim participat potentia est, esse participate in nothing. For that which
autem actus est. Sed Deus est participates is in potency, and being is
ipsum esse, ut probatum est. Non an act. But God is being itself, as we
est igitur bonus participative, sed have proved. He is not, therefore, by
essentialiter. participation good; He is good
essentially.
Amplius. Omne simplex suum esse [6] Furthermore, in a simple being,
et id quod est unum habet: nam, si being and that which is are the same.
sit aliud et aliud, iam simplicitas For, if one is not the other, the
tolletur. Deus autem est omnino simplicity is then removed. But, as we
simplex, ut ostensum est. Igitur have shown, God is absolutely simple.
ipsum esse bonum non est aliud Therefore, for God to be good is
quam ipse. Est igitur sua bonitas. identical with God. He is, therefore, His
goodness.
Per eadem etiam patet quod nullum [7] It is thereby likewise evident that no

aliud bonum est sua bonitas. Propter other good is its goodness. Hence it is
quod dicitur Matth. 1917: nemo said in Matthew (19:17): “One is good,
bonus nisi solus Deus. God.”
Caput 39 Chapter 39
Quod in Deo non potest esse THAT THERE CANNOT BE EVIL IN
malum GOD
Ex hoc autem manifeste apparet [1] From this it is quite evident that there

quod in Deo non potest esse cannot be evil in God.
malum.
Esse enim et bonitas, et omnia [2] For being and goodness, and all
quae per essentiam dicuntur, nihil names that are predicated essentially,
praeter se habent admixtum: licet id have nothing extraneous mixed with
quod est vel bonum possit aliquid them, although that which is or good can
praeter esse et bonitatem habere. have something besides being and
Nihil enim prohibet quod est uni goodness. For nothing prevents the
perfectioni suppositum, etiam alii subject of one perfection from being the
supponi, sicut quod est corpus subject of another, just as that which is a
potest esse album et dulce: body can be white and sweet. Now,
unaquaeque autem natura suae each nature is enclosed within the limits
rationis termino concluditur, ut nihil of its notion, so that it cannot include
extraneum intra se capere possit. anything extraneous within itself. But, as
Deus autem est bonitas, non solum we have proved, God is goodness, and
bonus, ut ostensum est. Non potest not simply good. There cannot,
igitur in eo esse aliquid non bonitas. therefore, be any nongoodness in Him.
Et ita malum in eo omnino esse non Thus, there cannot possibly be evil in
potest. God.
Amplius. Id quod est oppositum [3] Moreover, what is opposed to the
essentiae alicuius rei, sibi omnino essence of a given thing cannot befit
convenire non potest dum manet: that thing so long as its essence
sicut homini non potest convenire remains. Thus, irrationality or
irrationalitas vel insensibilitas nisi insensibility cannot befit man unless he
homo esse desistat. Sed divina ceases to be a man. But the divine
essentia est ipsa bonitas, ut essence is goodness itself, as we have
ostensum est. Ergo malum, quod shown. Therefore, evil, which is the
est bono oppositum, in eo locum opposite of good, could have no place in
habere non potest nisi esse God—unless He ceased to be God,
desisteret. Quod est impossibile: which is impossible, since He is eternal,
cum sit aeternus, ut supra as we have shown.
ostensum est.
Adhuc. Cum Deus sit suum esse, [4] Furthermore, since God is His own
nihil participative de ipso dici being, nothing can be said of Him by
potest, ut patet ex ratione supra participation, as is evident from the
inducta. Si igitur malum de ipso above argument. If, then, evil is said of
dicatur; non dicetur participative, God, it will not be said by participation,
sed essentialiter. Sic autem malum but essentially. But evil cannot be so
de nullo dici potest ut sit essentia said of anything as to be its essence, for
alicuius: ei enim esse deficeret, it would lose its being, which is a good,
quod bonum est, ut ostensum est; as we have shown. In evil, however,
in malitia autem non potest esse there can be nothing extraneous mixed
aliquid extraneum admixtum, sicut with it, as neither in goodness. Evil,
nec in bonitate. Malum igitur de therefore, cannot be said of God.
Deo dici non potest.
Item. Malum bono oppositum est. [5] Again, evil is the opposite of good.
Ratio autem boni in perfectione But the nature of the good consists in
consistit. Ergo ratio mali in perfection, which means that the nature
imperfectione. Defectus autem vel of evil consists in imperfection. Now, in
imperfectio in Deo, qui est God, Who is universally perfect, as we
universaliter perfectus, esse non have shown above, there cannot be
potest, ut supra ostensum est. In defect or imperfection. Therefore, evil
Deo igitur malum esse non potest. cannot be in God.
Praeterea. Perfectum est aliquid [6] Then, too, a thing is perfect
secundum quod est actu. Ergo according as it is in act. A thing will
imperfectum erit secundum quod therefore be imperfect according as it
est deficiens ab actu. Ergo malum falls short of act. Hence, evil is either a
vel privatio est, vel privationem privation or includes privation. But the
includit. Privationis autem subject of privation is potency, which
subiectum est potentia. Haec cannot be in God. Neither, therefore,
autem in Deo esse non potest. can evil.
Igitur nec malum.
Praeterea. Si bonum est quod ab [7] If, moreover, the good is “that which
omnibus appetitur, igitur malum is sought by all,” it follows that every
unaquaeque natura refugit nature flees evil as such. Now, what is in
inquantum huiusmodi. Quod autem a thing contrary to the motion of its
inest alicui contra motum naturalis natural appetite is violent and unnatural.
appetitus, est violentum et praeter Evil in each thing, consequently, is
naturam. Malum igitur in violent and unnatural, so far as it is an
unoquoque est violentum et praeter evil for that thing; although, among
naturam secundum quod est ei composite things, evil may he natural to
malum: etsi possit ei esse naturale a thing according to something within it.
secundum aliquid eius in rebus But God is not composite, nor, as we
compositis. Deus autem have shown, can there be anything
compositus non est, nec aliquid violent or unnatural in Him. Evil,
esse potest in eo violentum vel therefore, cannot be in God.
praeter naturam, ut ostensum est.
Malum igitur in Deo esse non
potest.
Hoc etiam sacra Scriptura [8] Scripture likewise confirms this. For it

confirmat. Dicitur enim prima is said in the canonic Epistle of John (I,
canonica Ioannis: Deus lux est, et 1:5): “God is light and in Him there is no
tenebrae in eo non sunt ullae. Et in darkness”; and in Job (34:10) it is
Iob 3410: absit a Deo impietas, et written: “Far from God be wickedness;
ab omnipotente iniquitas. and iniquity from the Almighty.”
Caput 40 Chapter 40
Quod Deus est omnis boni THAT GOD IS THE GOOD OF EVERY
bonum GOOD
Ostenditur etiam ex praedictis [1] From the foregoing it is also shown
quod Deus sit omnis boni bonum. that God is “the good of every good.”’
Bonitas enim uniuscuiusque est [2] For the goodness of each thing is its
perfectio ipsius, ut dictum est. perfection, as we have said. But, since
Deus autem, cum sit simpliciter God is absolutely perfect, in His
perfectus, sua perfectione omnes perfection He comprehends the
rerum perfectiones comprehendit, perfections of all things, as has been
ut ostensum est. Sua igitur bonitas shown. His goodness, therefore,
omnes bonitates comprehendit. Et comprehends every goodness. Thus, He
ita est omnis boni bonum. is the good of every good.
Item. Quod per participationem [3] Moreover, that which is said to be of a

dicitur aliquale, non dicitur tale nisi certain sort by participation is said to be
inquantum habet quandam such only so far as it has a certain
similitudinem eius quod per likeness to that which is said to be such
essentiam dicitur: sicut ferrum by essence. Thus iron is said to be on
dicitur ignitum inquantum fire in so far as it participates in a certain

quandam similitudinem ignis likeness of fire. But God is good through
participat. Sed Deus est bonus per His essence, whereas all other things are
essentiam, omnia vero alia per good by participation, as has been
participationem, ut ostensum est. shown. Nothing, then, will be called good
Igitur nihil dicetur bonum nisi except in so far as it has a certain
inquantum habet aliquam likeness of the divine goodness. Hence,
similitudinem divinae bonitatis. Est God is the good of every good.
igitur ipse bonum omnis boni.
Adhuc. Cum unumquodque [4] Since, furthermore, each thing is

appetibile sit propter finem; boni appetible because of the end, and since
autem ratio consistat in hoc quod the nature of the good consists in its
est appetibile: oportet quod being appetible, each thing must be
unumquodque dicatur bonum vel called good either because it is the end
quia est finis, vel quia ordinatur ad or because it is ordered to the end. It is
finem. Finis igitur ultimus est a quo the last end, then, from which all things
omnia rationem boni accipiunt. receive the nature of good. As will be
Hoc autem Deus est, ut infra proved later on, this is God. God is,
probabitur. Est igitur Deus omnis therefore, the good of every good.
boni bonum.
Hinc est quod dominus, suam [5] Hence it is that God, promising to
visionem Moysi promittens, dicit, Moses a vision of Himself, says: “I will
Exodi 3319: ego ostendam tibi show you all good” (Exod. 33:19). And in
omne bonum. Et Sap. 8, dicitur de Wisdom (7:11), it is said of the divine
divina sapientia: venerunt mihi wisdom: “All good things come to me
omnia bona pariter cum illa. together with her.”
Caput 41 Chapter 41
Quod Deus sit summum THAT GOD IS THE HIGHEST GOOD
bonum
Ex hoc autem ostenditur quod [1] From this conclusion we prove that
Deus sit summum bonum. God is the highest good.
Nam bonum universale [2] For the universal good stands higher
praeminet cuilibet bono than any particular good, just as “the good
particulari, sicut bonum gentis est of the people is better than the good of an
melius quam bonum unius: individual,” since the goodness and
bonitas enim totius et perfectio perfection of the whole stand higher than
praeminet bonitati et perfectioni the goodness and perfection of the part.
partis. Sed divina bonitas But the divine goodness is compared to all
comparatur ad omnia alia sicut others as the universal good to a particular
universale bonum ad particulare: good, being, as we have shown, the good
cum sit omnis boni bonum, ut of every good. God is, therefore, the
ostensum est. Est igitur ipse highest good.

summum bonum.
Praeterea. Id quod per essentiam [3] Furthermore, what is said essentially is
dicitur, verius dicitur quam id said more truly than what is said by
quod est per participationem participation. But God is good essentially,
dictum. Sed Deus est bonus per while other things are good by
suam essentiam, alia vero per participation, as we have shown. God is,
participationem, ut ostensum est. therefore, the highest good.
Est igitur ipse summum bonum.
Item. Quod est maximum in [4] Again, “what is greatest in any genus is

unoquoque genere est causa the cause of the rest in that genus,” for a
aliorum quae sunt in illo genere: cause ranks higher than an effect. But, as
causa enim potior est effectu. Ex we have shown, it is from God that all
Deo autem omnia habent things have the nature of good. God is,
rationem boni, ut ostensum est. therefore, the highest good.
Est igitur ipse summum bonum.
Amplius. Sicut albius est quod [5] Moreover, just as what is not mixed
est nigro impermixtius, ita melius with black is more white, so what is not
est quod est malo impermixtius. mixed with evil is more good. But Cod is
Sed Deus est maxime malo most unmixed with evil, because evil can
impermixtus: quia in eo nec actu be in God neither in act nor in potency;
nec potentia malum esse potest, and this belongs to God according to His
et hoc ei ex sua natura competit, nature, as we have shown. God is,
ut ostensum est. Est igitur ipse therefore, the highest good.
summum bonum.
[23860] Contra Gentiles, lib. 1 [6] Hence what is written in 1 Samuel
cap. 41 n. 6 Hinc est quod dicitur (2:2): “There is none holy as the Lord is.”
1 Reg. 22: non est sanctus ut
est dominus.
Caput 42 Chapter 42
Quod Deus est unus THAT GOD IS ONE
Ex hoc autem ostenditur quod [1] From what has been shown it is
Deus sit summum bonum. evident that God is one.
Non enim possibile est esse duo [2] For it is not possible that there be two

summe bona. Quod enim per highest goods, since that which is said
superabundantiam dicitur, in uno by superabundance is found in only one
tantum invenitur. Deus autem est being. But God, as we have shown, is
summum bonum, ut ostensum est. the highest good. God is, therefore, one.

Deus igitur est unus.
Praeterea. Ostensum est Deum [3] Again, it has been shown that God is

esse omnino perfectum, cui nulla absolutely perfect, lacking no perfection.
perfectio desit. Si igitur sunt plures If, then, there are many gods, there must
dii, oportet esse plura huiusmodi be many such perfect beings. But this is
perfecta. Hoc autem est impossible. For, if none of these perfect
impossibile: nam si nulli eorum beings lacks some perfection, and does
deest aliqua perfectio, nec aliqua not have any admixture of imperfection,
imperfectio admiscetur, quod which is demanded for an absolutely
requiritur ad hoc quod aliquid sit perfect being, nothing will be given in
simpliciter perfectum, non erit in which to distinguish the perfect beings
quo ad invicem distinguantur. from one another. It is impossible,
Impossibile est igitur plures deos therefore, that there be many gods.
ponere.
Item. Quod sufficienter fit uno [4] Again, that which is accomplished
posito, melius est per unum fieri adequately through one supposition is
quam per multa. Sed rerum ordo better done through one than through
est sicut melius potest esse: non many. But the order of things is the best
enim potentia agentis primi deest it can be, since the power of the first
potentiae quae est in rebus ad cause does not fail the potency in things
perfectionem. Sufficienter autem for perfection. Now, all things are
omnia complentur reducendo in sufficiently fulfilled by a reduction to one
unum primum principium. Non est first principle. There is, therefore, no
igitur ponere plura principia. need to posit many principles.
Amplius. Impossibile est unum [5] Moreover, it is impossible that there
motum continuum et regularem a be one continuous and regular motion
pluribus motoribus esse. Nam, si from many movers. For, if they move
simul movent, nullus eorum est together, none of them is a perfect
perfectus motor, sed omnes se mover, but all together rather take the
habent loco unius perfecti motoris: place of one perfect mover. This is not
quod non competit in primo motore, befitting in the first mover, for the perfect
perfectum enim est prius is prior to the imperfect. If, however, they
imperfecto. Si autem non simul do not move together, each of them at
moveant, quilibet eorum est times moves and at times does not. It
quandoque movens et quandoque follows from this that motion is neither
non. Ex quo sequitur quod motus continuous nor regular. For a motion that
non sit continuus neque regularis. is continuous and one is from one
Motus enim continuus et unus est mover. Furthermore, a mover that is not
ab uno motore. Motor etiam qui always moving is found to move
non semper movet, irregulariter irregularly, as is evident among lesser
invenitur movere: sicut patet in movers among whom a violent motion is
motoribus inferioribus, in quibus stronger in the beginning and weaker at
motus violentus in principio the end, whereas a natural motion
intenditur et in fine remittitur, motus proceeds conversely. But, as the
autem naturalis e converso. Sed philosophers have proved, the first
primus motus est unus et motion is one and continuous.

continuus, ut a philosophis Therefore, its first mover must be one.
probatum est. Ergo oportet eius
motorem primum esse unum.
Adhuc. Substantia corporalis [6] Furthermore, a corporeal substance

ordinatur ad spiritualem sicut ad is ordered to a spiritual substance as to
suum bonum: nam est in ista its good. For there is in the spiritual
bonitas plenior, cui corporalis substance a fuller goodness to which the
substantia intendit assimilari, cum corporeal substance seeks to liken itself,
omne quod est desideret optimum since whatever exists desires the best
quantum possibile est. Sed omnes so far as this is possible. But all the
motus corporalis creaturae motions of the corporeal creature are
inveniuntur reduci ad unum seen to be reduced to one first motion,
primum, praeter quem non est alius beyond which there is no other first
primus qui nullo modo reducatur in motion that is not in some way reduced
ipsum. Ergo praeter substantiam to it. Therefore, outside the spiritual
spiritualem quae est finis primi substance that is the end of the first
motus, non est aliqua quae non motion, there is none that is not reduced
reducatur in ipsam. Hoc autem to it. But this is what we understand by
nomine Dei intelligimus. Non est the name of God. Hence, there is only
igitur nisi unus Deus. one God.
Amplius. Omnium diversorum [7] Among all the things that are ordered

ordinatorum ad invicem, ordo to one another, furthermore, their order
eorum ad invicem est propter to one another is for the sake of their
ordinem eorum ad aliquid unum: order to something one; just as the order
sicut ordo partium exercitus ad of the parts of an army among
invicem est propter ordinem totius themselves is for the sake of the order of
exercitus ad ducem. Nam quod the whole army to its general. For that
aliqua diversa in habitudine aliqua some diverse things should be united by
uniuntur, non potest esse ex some relationship cannot come about
propriis naturis secundum quod from their own natures as diverse things,
sunt diversa: quia ex hoc magis since on this basis they would rather be
disiungerentur. Nec potest esse ex distinguished from one another. Nor can
diversis ordinantibus: quia non this unity come from diverse ordering
posset esse quod unum ordinem causes, because they could not possibly
intenderent ex seipsis secundum intend one order in so far as among
quod sunt diversi. Et sic vel ordo themselves they are diverse. Thus,
multorum ad invicem est per either the order of many to one another
accidens: vel oportet reducere ad is accidental, or we must reduce it to
aliquod unum primum ordinans, qui some one first ordering cause that
ad finem quem intendit omnia alia orders all other things to the end it
ordinat. Omnes autem partes huius intends. Now, we find that all the parts of
mundi inveniuntur ordinatae ad this world are ordered to one another
invicem, secundum quod quaedam according as some things help some
a quibusdam iuvantur sicut corpora other things. Thus, lower bodies are
inferiora moventur per superiora, et moved by higher bodies, and these by
haec per substantias incorporeas, incorporeal substances, as appears from
ut ex supra dictis patet. Nec hoc what was said above. Nor is this
est per accidens: cum sit semper something accidental, since it takes
vel in maiori parte. Igitur totus hic place always or for the most part.
mundus non habet nisi unum Therefore, this whole world has only one
ordinatorem et gubernatorem. Sed ordering cause and governor. But there
praeter hunc mundum non est is no other world beyond this one.
alius. Non est igitur nisi unus Hence, there is only one governor for all
omnium rerum gubernator, quem things, whom we call God.
Deum dicimus.
Adhuc. Si sunt duo quorum [8] Then, too, if there are two beings of
utrumque est necesseesse, which both are necessary beings, they
oportet quod conveniant in must agree in the notion of the necessity
intentione necessitatis essendi. of being. Hence, they must be
Oportet igitur quod distinguantur distinguished by something added either
per aliquid quod additur uni tantum, to one of them only, or to both. This
vel utrique. Et sic oportet vel means that one or both of them must be
alterum vel utrumque esse composite. Now, as we have shown, no
compositum. Nullum autem composite being is through itself a
compositum est necesseesse, per necessary being. It is impossible
seipsum, sicut supra ostensum est. therefore that there be many beings of
Impossibile est igitur esse plura which each is a necessary being. Hence,
quorum utrumque sit necesse neither can there be many gods.
esse. Et sic nec plures deos.
Amplius. Illud in quo differunt, ex [9] Furthermore, given two gods that are

quo ponuntur convenire in posited as agreeing in the necessity of
necessitate essendi, aut requiritur being, either that in which they differ is in
ad complementum necessitatis some way required for the completion of
essendi aliquo modo, aut non. Si their necessity of being, or it is not. If it is
non requiritur, ergo est aliquid not, then it is something accidental,
accidentale: quia omne quod because that which accrues to a thing
advenit rei nihil faciens ad esse without contributing to its being is an
ipsius, est accidens. Ergo hoc accident. Hence, this accident has a
accidens habet causam. Aut ergo cause, which is, consequently, either the
essentiam eius quod est necesse essence of the necessary being or
esse, aut aliquid aliud. Si something else. If its essence, then,
essentiam eius, cum ipsa since the necessity itself of being is its
necessitas essendi sit essentia essence, as is evident from what was
eius, ut ex supra dictis patet, said above, the necessity of being will be
necessitas essendi erit causa illius the cause of that accident. But the
accidentis. Sed necessitas essendi necessity of being is found in both gods.
invenitur in utroque. Ergo utrumque Therefore, both will have that accident,
habebit illud accidens. Et sic non and thus will not be distinguished with
distinguentur secundum illud. Si reference to it. If, however, the cause of
autem causa illius accidentis sit the accident is something else, it follows
aliquid aliud, nisi ergo illud aliud that, unless that something else existed,
esset, hoc accidens non esset. Et this accident would not exist; and unless
nisi hoc accidens esset, distinctio this accident existed, the aforesaid
praedicta non esset. Ergo, nisi distinction would not exist. Therefore,
esset illud aliud, ista duo quae unless that something else existed,
ponuntur necesseesse, non these two supposed necessary beings

essent duo sed unum. Ergo esse would not be two but one. Therefore, the
proprium utriusque est dependens proper being of each depends on the
ab altero. Et sic neutrum est other, and thus neither of them is
necesseesse per seipsum. through itself a necessary being.
Si autem illud in quo distinguuntur [10] If, however, that in which they are
sit necessarium ad necessitatem distinguished is required to complete the
essendi complendam, aut hoc erit necessity of their being, either this will
quia illud includitur in ratione be because it is included in the nature of
necessitatis essendi, sicut this necessity of being, as animate is
animatum includitur in definitione included in the definition of animal, or
animalis: aut hoc erit quia this will be because their necessity of
necessitas essendi specificatur per being is specified by it, as animal is
illud, sicut animal completur per completed by rational. If the first is the
rationale. Si primo modo, oportet case, wherever the necessity of being is
quod, ubicumque sit necessitas found there must be present that which
essendi, sit illud quod in eius is included in its nature, just as animate
ratione includitur: sicut cuicumque belongs to whatever being to which
convenit animal, convenit animal belongs. And thus, since the
animatum. Et sic, cum ambobus necessity of being is attributed to both
praedictis attribuatur necessitas the aforementioned beings, they will not
essendi, secundum illud distingui thereby be distinguished. If the second is
non poterunt. Si autem secundo the case, this too is impossible. A
modo, hoc iterum esse non potest. difference specifying a genus does not
Nam differentia specificans genus complete the nature of the genus, but
non complet generis rationem, sed rather through it the genus comes to be
per eam acquiritur generi esse in in act. For the nature of animal is
actu: ratio enim animalis completa complete before the addition of rational.
est ante additionem rationalis, sed Rather, the fact is that there cannot be
non potest esse animal actu nisi sit an animal in act that is not rational or
rationale vel irrationale. Sic ergo irrational. Thus, therefore, something
aliquid complet necessitatem completes the necessity of being as to
essendi quantum ad esse in actu et being in act, and not as to the notion of
non quantum ad intentionem the necessity of being. This is impossible
necessitatis essendi. Quod est on two counts. First, because the
impossibile, propter duo. Primo, quiddity of a necessary being is its
quia eius quod est necesseesse, being, as was proved above. Second,
sua quidditas est suum esse, ut because, were it true, the necessary
supra probatum est. Secundo, quia being would acquire being through
sic necesseesse acquireret esse something else, which is impossible.
per aliquid aliud: quod est
impossibile.
Non est igitur possibile ponere [11] It is, therefore, not possible to posit

plura quorum quodlibet sit many beings of which each is through
necesseesse per seipsum. itself a necessary being.
Adhuc. Si sunt duo dii, aut hoc [12] What is more, if there are two gods,

nomen Deus de utroque either the name God is predicated of
praedicatur univoce, aut aequivoce. both univocally, or equivocally. If
Si aequivoce, hoc est praeter equivocally, this is outside our present
intentionem praesentem: nam nihil purpose. Nothing prevents any given
prohibet rem quamlibet quolibet thing from being equivocally named by
nomine aequivoce nominari, si any given name, provided we admit the
usus loquentium admittat. Si autem usage of those who express the name.
dicatur univoce, oportet quod de But if it be used univocally, it must be
utroque praedicetur secundum predicated of both according to one
unam rationem. Et sic oportet quod notion, which means that, in notion,
in utroque sit una natura secundum there must be in both one nature. Either,
rationem. Aut igitur haec natura est therefore, this nature is in both according
in utroque secundum unum esse, to one being, or according to a being
aut secundum aliud et aliud. Si that is other in each case. If according to
secundum unum, ergo non erunt one, there will not be two gods, but only
duo sed unum tantum: duorum one, since there cannot be one being for
enim non est unum esse si two things that are substantially
substantialiter distinguantur. Si distinguished. If each has its own being,
autem est aliud et aliud esse in therefore in neither being will the
utroque, ergo neutri erit sua quiddity be its being. Yet this must be
quidditas suum esse. Sed hoc posited in God, as we have proved.
oportet in Deo ponere, ut probatum Therefore, neither of these two beings is
est. Ergo neutrum illorum duorum what we understand by the name God. It
est hoc quod intelligimus nomine is, therefore, impossible to posit two
Dei. Sic igitur impossibile est gods.
ponere duos deos.
Amplius. Nihil eorum quae [13] Again, nothing that belongs to this
conveniunt huic signato inquantum designated thing as such can belong to
est hoc signatum, possibile est alii another, for the singularity of some thing
convenire: quia singularitas alicuius belongs to none other than to that
rei non est alteri praeter ipsum singular thing. But its necessity of being
singulare. Sed ei quod est belongs to the necessary being so far as
necesseesse sua necessitas it is this designated being. Therefore, it
essendi convenit inquantum est cannot belong to another, and therefore
hoc signatum. Ergo impossibile est there cannot be several beings of which
quod alicui alteri conveniat. Et sic each is a necessary being. It is,
impossibile est quod sint plura consequently, impossible that there be
quorum quodlibet sit necesseesse. several gods.
Et per consequens impossibile est
esse plures deos.
Probatio mediae: si enim illud quod [14] The proof of the minor. If the

est necesseesse non est hoc necessary being is not this designated
signatum inquantum est necesse being as a necessary being, the
esse, oportet quod designatio sui designation of its being is not necessary
esse non sit necessaria secundum through itself but depends on another.
se, sed ex alio dependeat. But so far as each thing is in act it is
Unumquodque autem secundum distinct from all other things; this is to be
quod est actu est distinctum ab this designated thing. Therefore, the
omnibus aliis: quod est esse hoc necessary being depends on another to
signatum. Ergo quod est necesse be in act; which is against the nature of
esse dependet ab alio quantum ad the necessary being. Therefore, the
hoc quod est esse in actu. Quod necessary being must be necessary
est contra rationem eius quod est according as it is this designated being.
necesseesse. Oportet igitur quod
id quod est necesseesse sit
necesseesse secundum hoc quod
est hoc signatum.
Adhuc. Natura significata hoc [15] Furthermore, either the nature

nomine Deus aut est per seipsam signified by the name God is
individuata in hoc Deo, aut per individuated through itself in this God, or
aliquid aliud. Si per aliud oportet it is individuated through something else.
quod sit ibi compositio. Si per If through something else, composition
seipsam, ergo impossibile est quod must result. If through itself, then it
alteri conveniat: illud enim quod est cannot possibly belong to another, since
individuationis principium, non the principle of individuation cannot be
potest esse pluribus commune. common to several, It is impossible,
Impossibile igitur est esse plures therefore, that there be several gods.
deos.
Amplius. Si sunt plures dii, oportet [16] If, again, there are several gods, the

quod natura deitatis non sit una nature of the godhead cannot be
numero in utroque. Oportet igitur numerically one in two of them. There
esse aliquid distinguens naturam must, therefore, be something
divinam in hoc et in illo. Sed hoc distinguishing the divine nature in this
est impossibile: quia natura divina and in that god. But this is impossible,
non recipit additionem neque because, as we have shown above, the
differentiarum essentialium neque divine nature receives the addition
accidentium, ut supra ostensum neither of essential differences nor of
est; nec etiam natura divina est accidents. Nor yet is the divine nature
forma alicuius materiae, ut possit the form of any matter, to be capable of
dividi ad materiae divisionem. being divided according to the division of
Impossibile est igitur esse plures matter. It is impossible, therefore, that
deos. there be two gods.
Item. Esse proprium uniuscuiusque [17] Then, too, the proper being of each
rei est tantum unum. Sed ipse thing is only one. But God is His being,
Deus est esse suum, ut supra as we have shown. There can, therefore,
ostensum est. Impossibile est igitur be only one God.
esse nisi unum Deum.
Adhuc. Secundum hunc modum [18] Moreover, a thing has being in the
res habet esse quo possidet manner it possesses unity. Hence, each
unitatem: unde unumquodque suae thing struggles as much as it can against
divisioni pro posse repugnat, ne any division of itself, lest thereby it tend
per hoc in non esse tendat. Sed to nonbeing. But the divine nature has
divina natura est potissime habens being most powerfully. There is
esse. Est igitur in ea maxima therefore, in it the greatest unity, and
unitas. Nullo igitur modo in plura hence no plurality is in any way
distinguitur. distinguished within it.
Amplius. In unoquoque genere [19] Furthermore, we notice in each
videmus multitudinem ab aliqua genus that multitude proceeds from
unitate procedere: et ideo in some unity. This is why in every genus
quolibet genere invenitur unum there is found a prime member that is
primum, quod est mensura omnium the measure of all the things found in
quae in illo genere inveniuntur. that genus. In whatever things,
Quorumcumque igitur invenitur in therefore, we find that there is an
aliquo uno convenientia, oportet agreement in one respect, it is
quod ab aliquo uno principio necessary that this depend upon one
dependeant. Sed omnia in esse source. But all things agree in being.
conveniunt. Oportet igitur esse There must, therefore, be only one being
unum tantum quod est rerum that is the source of all things. This is
omnium principium. Quod Deus God.
est.
Item. In quolibet principatu ille qui [20] Again, in every rulership he who
praesidet unitatem desiderat: unde rules desires unity. That is why among
inter principatus est potissima the forms of rulership the main one is
monarchia, sive regnum. Multorum monarchy or kingship. So, too, for many
etiam membrorum unum est caput: members there is one head, whereby we
ac per hoc evidenti signo apparet ei see by an evident sign that he to whom
cui convenit principatus, unitatem rulership belongs should have unity.
deberi. Unde et Deum, qui est Hence, we must admit that God, Who is
omnium causa, oportet unum the cause of all things, is absolutely one.
simpliciter confiteri.
Hanc autem confessionem divinae [21] This confession of the divine unity
unitatis etiam ex sacris eloquiis we can likewise gather from holy
accipere possumus. Nam Deut. 64 Scripture. For it is said in Deuteronomy
dicitur: audi, Israel, dominus Deus (6:4): “Hear, O Israel: the Lord our God
tuus Deus unus est; et Exod. 203: is one God”; and in Exodus (20:3): “You
non erunt tibi dii alii praeter me; et shall not have strange gods before Me”;
Ephes. 45: unus dominus, una and in Ephesians (4:5): “One Lord, one
fides, et cetera. faith, one baptism.”
Hac autem veritate repelluntur [22] Now by this truth are refuted those
gentiles deorum multitudinem Gentiles who accepted a multitude of
confitentes. Quamvis plures eorum gods. However, many of them said that
unum Deum summum esse there was one highest God, by whom all
dicerent, a quo omnes alios quos the others whom they named gods were
deos nominabant causatos esse according to them caused. For they
asserebant, omnibus substantiis attributed the name of divinity to all
sempiternis divinitatis nomen everlasting substances, and this
adscribentes, et praecipue ratione especially because of their wisdom and
sapientiae et felicitatis et rerum felicity and the rulership of things. This
gubernationis. Quae quidem manner of speaking is found also in
consuetudo loquendi etiam in sacra Sacred Scripture, in which the holy
Scriptura invenitur, dum sancti angels, or even men, or judges, are
Angeli, aut etiam homines vel called gods. Thus, this verse of the
iudices, dii nominantur; sicut illud Psalms (85:8): “There is none among
Psalmi: non est similis tibi in diis, the gods like You, O Lord”; and
domine; et alibi, ego dixi, dii estis; elsewhere: “I have said: You are gods”
et multa huiusmodi per varia (Ps. 81:6). Many such expressions are
Scripturae loca inveniuntur. found in different places in Scripture.
Unde magis huic veritati videntur [23] Hence, it is mainly the Manicheans
contrarii Manichaei, duo prima who seem opposed to this truth, in that
ponentes principia, quorum alterum they posit two first principles of which
alterius causa non sit. one is not the cause of the other.
Hanc etiam veritatem Ariani suis [24] The Arians likewise attacked this
erroribus impugnaverunt, dum truth by their errors, in confessing that
confitentur patrem et filium non the Father and the Son are not one but
unum, sed plures deos esse: cum several gods; although the authority of
tamen filium verum Deum Scripture forces e to believe that the Son
auctoritate Scripturae credere is true God.
cogantur.
Caput 43 Chapter 43
Quod Deus est infinitus THAT GOD IS INFINITE
Cum autem infinitum quantitatem [1] Since, as the philosophers teach, “the

sequatur, ut philosophi tradunt, non infinite accompanies quantity,” infinity
potest infinitas Deo attribui ratione cannot be attributed to God on the
multitudinis: cum ostensum sit ground of multitude. For we have shown
solum unum Deum esse, that there is only one God and that no
nullamque in eo compositionem vel composition of parts or accidents is
partium vel accidentium inveniri. found in Him. Nor, again, according to
Secundum etiam quantitatem continuous quantity can God be called
continuam infinitus dici non potest: infinite, since we have shown that He is
cum ostensum sit eum incorporeal. It remains, then, to
incorporeum esse. Relinquitur igitur investigate whether according to spiritual
investigare an secundum magnitude it befits God to be infinite.
spiritualem magnitudinem esse
infinitum ei conveniat.
Quae quidem spiritualis magnitudo [2] We speak of spiritual magnitude with

quantum ad duo attenditur: scilicet reference to two points: namely, power
quantum ad potentiam; et quantum and the goodness or completeness of

ad propriae naturae bonitatem sive one’s own nature. For something is said
completionem. Dicitur enim aliquid to be more or less white according to the
magis vel minus album secundum mode in which its whiteness is
modum quo in eo sua albedo completed. The magnitude of its power
completur. Pensatur etiam likewise is measured from the magnitude
magnitudo virtutis ex magnitudine of its action or its works. Of these
actionis vel factorum. Harum autem magnitudes one follows the other. For,
magnitudinem una aliam from the fact that something is in act it is
consequitur: nam ex hoc ipso quo active, and hence the mode of the
aliquid actu est, activum est; magnitude of its power is according to
secundum igitur modum quo in the mode in which it is completed in its
actu suo completur, est modus act. Thus, it remains that spiritual beings
magnitudinis suae virtutis. Et sic are called great according to the mode
relinquitur res spirituales magnas of their completion. Augustine himself
dici secundum modum suae says that “in beings that are great but
completionis: nam et Augustinus not in bulk, to be greater is the same as
dicit quod in his quae non mole to be better.”
magna sunt, idem est esse maius
quod melius.
Ostendendum est igitur secundum [3] We must therefore show that God is
huius magnitudinis modum Deum infinite according to the mode of this sort
infinitum esse. Non autem sic ut of magnitude. The infinite here will not
infinitum privative accipiatur, sicut be taken in the sense of privation, as in
in quantitate dimensiva vel the case of dimensive or numerical
numerali: nam huiusmodi quantitas quantity. For this quantity is of a nature
nata est finem habere; unde to have a limit, so that such things are
secundum subtractionem eius quod called infinites according as there is
sunt nata habere, infinita dicuntur; removed from them the limits they have
et propter hoc in eis infinitum by nature; which means that in their
imperfectionem designat. Sed in case the infinite designates an
Deo infinitum negative tantum imperfection. But in God the infinite is
intelligitur: quia nullus est understood only in a negative way,
perfectionis suae terminus sive because there is no terminus or limit to
finis, sed est summe perfectum. Et His perfection: He is supremely perfect.
sic Deo infinitum attribui debet. It is thus that the infinite ought to be
attributed to God.
Omne namque quod secundum [4] For everything that according to its
suam naturam finitum est, ad nature is finite is determined to the
generis alicuius rationem nature of some genus. God, however, is
determinatur. Deus autem non est not in any genus; His perfection, as was
in aliquo genere, sed eius perfectio shown above, rather contains the
omnium generum perfectiones perfections of all the genera. God is,
continet, ut supra ostensum est. therefore, infinite.
Est igitur infinitus.
Amplius. Omnis actus alteri [5) Again, every act inhering in another
inhaerens terminationem recipit ex is terminated by that in which it inheres,

eo in quo est: quia quod est in since what is in another is in it according
altero, est in eo per modum to the mode of the receiver. Hence, an
recipientis. Actus igitur in nullo act that exists in nothing is terminated by
existens nullo terminatur: puta, si nothing. Thus, if whiteness were self
albedo esset per se existens, existing, the perfection of whiteness in it
perfectio albedinis in ea non would not be terminated so as not to
terminaretur, quominus haberet have whatever can be had of the
quicquid de perfectione albedinis perfection of whiteness. But God is act in
haberi potest. Deus autem est no way existing in another, for neither is
actus nullo modo in alio existens: He a form in matter, as we have proved,
quia nec est forma in materia, ut nor does His being inhere in some form
probatum est; nec esse suum or nature, since He is His own being, as
inhaeret alicui formae vel naturae, was proved above. It remains, then, that
cum ipse sit suum esse, ut supra God is infinite.
ostensum est. Relinquitur igitur
ipsum esse infinitum.
Adhuc. In rebus invenitur aliquid [6] Furthermore, in reality we find
quod est potentia tantum, ut something that is potency alone, namely,
materia prima; aliquid quod est prime matter, something that is act
actus tantum, ut Deus, sicut supra alone, namely, God, as was shown
ostensum est; aliquid quod est actu above, and something that is act and
et potentia, sicut res ceterae. Sed potency, namely, the rest of things. But,
potentia, cum dicatur ad actum, since potency is said relatively to act, it
non potest actum excedere, sicut cannot exceed act either in a particular
nec in unoquoque, ita nec case or absolutely. Hence, since prime
simpliciter. Cum igitur materia matter is infinite in its potentiality, it
prima sit infinita in sua remains that God, Who is pure act, is
potentialitate, relinquitur quod infinite in His actuality.
Deus, qui est actus purus, sit
infinitus in sua actualitate.
Item. Tanto actus aliquis perfectior [7] Moreover, an act is all the more
est, quanto minus habet potentiae perfect by as much as it has less of
permixtum. Unde omnis actus cui potency mixed with it. Hence, every act
permiscetur potentia, habet with which potency is mixed is
terminum suae perfectionis: cui terminated in its perfection. But, as was
autem non permiscetur aliqua shown above, God is pure act without
potentia, est absque termino any potency. He is, therefore, infinite.
perfectionis. Deus autem est actus
purus absque omni potentia, ut
supra ostensum est. Est igitur
infinitus.
Amplius. Ipsum esse absolute [8] Again, considered absolutely, being is

consideratum infinitum est: nam ab infinite, since there are infinite and
infinitis et infinitis modis participari infinite modes in which it can be
possibile est. Si igitur alicuius esse participated. If, then, the being of some
sit finitum, oportet quod limitetur thing is finite, that being must be limited

esse illud per aliquid aliud quod sit by something other that is somehow its
aliqualiter causa illius esse. Sed cause. But there can be no cause of the
esse divini non potest esse aliqua divine being, for God is a necessary
causa: quia ipse est necesse per being through Himself. Therefore, His
seipsum. Igitur esse suum est being is infinite, and so is He.
infinitum, et ipse infinitus.
Adhuc. Omne quod habet aliquam [9] Then, too, what has a certain
perfectionem, tanto est perfectius perfection is the more perfect as it
quanto illam perfectionem plenius participates in that perfection more fully.
participat. Sed non potest esse But there cannot be a mode of
aliquis modus, nec etiam cogitari, perfection, nor is one thinkable, by which
quo plenius habeatur aliqua a given perfection is possessed more
perfectio quam ab eo quod per fully than it is possessed by the being
suam essentiam est perfectum et that is perfect through its essence and
cuius essentia est sua bonitas. Hoc whose being is its goodness. In no way,
autem Deus est. Nullo igitur modo therefore, is it possible to think of
potest cogitari aliquid melius vel anything better or more perfect than
perfectius Deo. Est igitur infinitus in God. Hence, God is infinite in goodness.
bonitate.
Amplius. Intellectus noster ad [10] Our intellect, furthermore, extends

infinitum in intelligendo extenditur: to the infinite in understanding; and a
cuius signum est quod, qualibet sign of this is that, given any finite
quantitate finita data, intellectus quantity, our intellect can think of a
noster maiorem excogitare potest. greater one. But this ordination of the
Frustra autem esset haec ordinatio intellect would be in vain unless an
intellectus ad infinitum nisi esset infinite intelligible reality existed. There
aliqua res intelligibilis infinita. must, therefore, be some infinite
Oportet igitur esse aliquam rem intelligible reality, which must be the
intelligibilem infinitam, quam greatest of beings. This we call God.
oportet esse maximam rerum. Et God is, therefore, infinite.
hanc dicimus Deum. Deus igitur est
infinitus.
Item. Effectus non potest extendi [11] Again, an effect cannot transcend its

ultra suam causam. Intellectus cause. But our intellect can be only from
autem noster non potest esse nisi a God, Who is the first cause of all things.
Deo, qui est prima omnium causa. Our intellect, therefore, cannot think of
Non igitur potest aliquid cogitare anything greater than God. If, then, it
intellectus noster maius Deo. Si can think of something greater than
igitur omni finito potest aliquid every finite thing, it remains that God is
maius cogitare, relinquitur Deum not finite.
finitum non esse.
Amplius. Virtus infinita non potest [12] There is also the argument that an
esse in essentia finita: quia infinite power cannot reside in a finite
unumquodque agit per suam essence. For each thing acts through its

formam, quae vel est essentia eius form, which is either its essence or a
vel pars essentiae; virtus autem part of the essence, whereas power is
principium actionis nominat. Sed the name of a principle of action. But
Deus non habet virtutem activam God does not have a finite active power.
finitam: movet enim in tempore For He moves in an infinite time, which
infinito, quod non potest esse nisi a can be done only by an infinite power, as
virtute infinita, ut supra ostensum we have proved above. It remains, then,
est. Relinquitur igitur Dei essentiam that God’s essence is infinite.
esse infinitam.
Haec autem ratio est secundum [13] This argument, however, is

ponentes aeternitatem mundi. Qua according to those who posit the eternity
non posita, adhuc magis of the world. If we do not posit it, there is
confirmatur opinio de infinitate all the greater confirmation for the view
divinae virtutis. Nam unumquodque that the power of God is infinite. For
agens tanto est virtuosius in each agent is the more powerful in
agendo quanto potentiam magis acting according as it reduces to act a
remotam ab actu in actum reducit: potency more removed from act; just as
sicut maiori virtute opus est ad a greater power is needed to heat water
calefaciendum aquam quam than air. But that which in no way exists
aerem. Sed id quod omnino non is infinitely distant from act, nor is it in
est, infinite distat ab actu, nec est any way in potency. If, then, the world
aliquo modo in potentia. Igitur, si was made after previously not being at
mundus factus est postquam all, the power of its maker must be
omnino prius non erat, oportet infinite.
factoris virtutem esse infinitam.
Haec autem ratio, etiam secundum [14] This argument holds in proving the

eos qui ponunt aeternitatem mundi, infinity of the divine power even
valet ad probandum infinitatem according to those who posit the eternity
divinae virtutis. Confitentur enim of the world. For they acknowledge that
Deum esse causam mundanae God is the cause of the substance of the
substantiae, quamvis eam world, though they consider this
sempiternam arbitrentur, dicentes substance to be everlasting. They say
hoc modo Deum aeternum that God is the cause of an everlasting
sempiterni mundi causam existere world in the same way as a foot would
sicut pes ab aeterno fuisset causa have been the cause of an imprint if it
vestigii si ab aeterno fuisset had been pressed on sand from all
impressus in pulvere. Hac autem eternity. If we adopt this position,
positione facta, secundum rationem according to our previous argumentation
praedictam nihilominus sequitur it still follows that the power of God is
Dei virtutem esse infinitam. Nam infinite. For, whether God produced
sive ex tempore, secundum nos, things in time, as we hold, or from all
sive ab aeterno, secundum eos, eternity, according to them, nothing can
produxerit, nihil esse potest in re be in reality that God did not produce; for
quod ipse non produxerit: cum sit God is the universal source of being.
universale essendi principium. Et Thus, God produced the world without
sic, nulla praesupposita materia vel the supposition of any preexistent
potentia, produxit. Oportet autem matter or potency. Now, we must gather
proportionem virtutis activae the proportion of an active power

accipere secundum proportionem according to the proportion of a passive
potentiae passivae: nam, quanto potency, for the greater the potency that
potentia passiva maior praeexistit preexists or is presupposed, by so much
vel praeintelligitur, tanto maiori the greater active power will it be
virtute activa in actum completur. brought to actual fulfillment. It remains,
Relinquitur igitur, cum virtus finita therefore, that, since a finite power
producat aliquem effectum produces a given effect by presupposing
praesupposita potentia materiae, the potency of matter, the power of God,
quod Dei virtus, quae nullam which presupposes no potency, is
potentiam praesupponit, non sit infinite, not finite. Thus, so is His
finita, sed infinita: et ita essentia essence infinite.
infinita.
Amplius. Unaquaeque res tanto est [15] Each thing, moreover, is more

diuturnior quanto eius esse causa enduring according as its cause is more
est efficacior. Illud igitur cuius efficacious. Hence, that being whose
diuturnitas est infinita, oportet quod duration is infinite must have been from
habeat esse per causam efficaciae a cause of infinite efficaciousness. But
infinitae. Sed diuturnitas Dei est the duration of God is infinite, for we
infinita: ostensum est enim supra have shown above that He is eternal.
ipsum esse aeternum. Cum igitur Since, then, He has no other cause of
non habeat, aliam causam sui esse His being than Himself, He must be
praeter seipsum, oportet ipsum infinite.
esse infinitum.
Huic autem veritati sacrae [16] The authority of Sacred Scripture is

Scripturae auctoritas testimonium witness to this truth. For the psalmist
perhibet. Ait namque Psalmista: says: “Great is the Lord, and greatly to
magnus dominus et laudabilis be praised: and of His greatness there is
nimis, et magnitudinis eius non est no end” (Ps. 144:3).
finis.
Huic etiam veritati attestantur [17] The sayings of the most ancient
antiquissimorum philosophorum philosophers are likewise a witness to
dicta, qui omnes infinitum this truth. They all posited an infinite first
posuerunt primum rerum principle of things, as though compelled
principium, quasi ab ipsa veritate by truth itself.” Yet they did not recognize
coacti. Propriam enim vocem their own voice. They judged the infinity
ignorabant, aestimantes, infinitatem of the first principle in terms of discrete
primi principii ad modum quantitatis quantity, following Democritus, who
discretae, secundum Democritum, posited infinite atoms as the principles of
qui posuit atomos infinitos rerum things, and also Anaxagoras, who
principia, et secundum posited infinite similar parts as the
Anaxagoram, qui posuit infinitas principles of things. Or they judged
partes consimiles principia rerum; infinity in terms of continuous quantity,
vel ad modum quantitatis following those who posited that the first
continuae, secundum illos qui principle of all things was some element
posuerunt aliquod elementum, vel or a confused infinite body. But, since it
confusum aliquod infinitum corpus, was shown by the effort of later
esse primum omnium principium. philosophers that there is no infinite
Sed cum ostensum sit per body, given that there must be a first
sequentium philosophorum studium principle that is in some way infinite, we
quod non est aliquod corpus conclude that the infinite which is the
infinitum; et huic coniungatur quod first principle is neither a body nor a
oportet esse primum principium power in a body.
aliquo modo infinitum: concluditur
quod neque est corpus neque
virtus in corpore infinitum quod est
primum principium.
Caput 44 Chapter 44
Quod Deus est intelligens THAT GOD IS INTELLIGENT
Ex praemissis autem ostendi potest [1] From what has been said we can
quod Deus sit intelligens. show that God is intelligent.
Ostensum enim est supra quod in [2] We have shown above that among
moventibus et motis non est movers and things moved we cannot
possibile in infinitum procedere, sed proceed to infinity, but must reduce all
oportet mobilia omnia reducere, ut movable things, as is demonstrable, to
probabile est, in unum primum one first selfmoving being. The self
movens seipsum. Movens autem moving being moves itself only by
seipsum se movet per appetitum et appetite and knowledge, for only such
apprehensionem: sola enim beings are found to move themselves,
huiusmodi inveniuntur seipsa because to be moved and not moved
movere, utpote in quibus est moveri lies in their power. The moving part in
et non moveri. Pars igitur movens in the first selfmoving being must he
primo movente seipsum oportet et appetitive and apprehending. Now, in a
quod sit appetens et apprehendens. motion that takes place through
In motu autem qui est per appetitum appetite and apprehension, he who has
et apprehensionem, appetens et the appetite and the apprehension is a
apprehendens est movens motum: moved mover, while the appetible and
appetibile autem et apprehensum apprehended is the unmoved mover.
est movens non motum. Cum igitur Since, therefore, the first mover of all
id quod est omnium primum things, whom we call God, is an
movens, quod Deum dicimus, sit absolutely unmoved mover, He must be
movens omnino non motum, oportet related to the mover that is a part of the
quod comparetur ad motorem qui selfmoving being as the appetible is to
est pars moventis seipsum sicut the one who has the appetite. Not,
appetibile ad appetentem. Non however, as something appetible by
autem sicut appetibile sensuali sensible appetite, since sensible
appetitu: nam appetitus sensibilis appetite is not of that which is good
non est boni simpliciter, sed huius absolutely but of this particular good,
particulati boni, cum et apprehensio since the apprehension of the sense is
sensus non sit nisi particularis; id likewise particular; whereas that which
autem quod est bonum et appetibile is good and appetible absolutely is prior
simpliciter, est prius eo quod est to that which is good and appetible
bonum et appetibile ut hic et nunc. here and now. The first mover, then,
Oportet igitur primum movens esse must be appetible as an object of
appetibile ut intellectum. Et ita intellect, and thus the mover that
oportet movens quod appetit ipsum, desires it must be intelligent. All the
esse intelligens. Multo igitur magis more, therefore, will the first appetible
et ipsum primum appetibile erit be intelligent, since the one desiring it
intelligens: quia appetens ipsum fit is intelligent in act by being joined to it
intelligens actu per hoc quod ei as an intelligible. Therefore, making the
tamquam intelligibili unitur. Oportet supposition that the first mover moves
igitur Deum esse intelligentem facta himself, as the philosophers intended,
suppositione quod primum motum we must say that God is intelligent.
moveat seipsum, ut philosophi
voluerunt.
Adhuc. Idem necesse est sequi si [3] Moreover, the same conclusion
fiat reductio mobilium non in aliquod must follow if the reduction of movable
primum movens seipsum, sed in beings is, not to a first selfmoving
movens omnino immobile. Nam being, but to an absolutely unmoved
primum movens est universale mover. For the first mover is the
principium motus. Oportet igitur, cum universal source of motion. Therefore,
omne movens moveat per aliquam since every mover moves through a
formam quam intendit in movendo, form at which it aims in moving, the
quod forma per quam movet primum form through which the first mover
movens, sit universalis forma et moves must be a universal form and a
universale bonum. Forma autem per universal good. But a form does not
modum universalem non invenitur have a universal mode except in the
nisi in intellectu. Oportet igitur intellect. Consequently, the first mover,
primum movens, quod Deus est, God, must be intelligent.
esse intelligens.
Amplius. In nullo ordine moventium [4] In no order of movers, furthermore,
invenitur quod movens per is it the case that an intellectual mover
intellectum sit instrumentum eius is the instrument of a mover without an
quod movet absque intellectu, sed intellect. Rather, the converse is true.
magis e converso. Omnia autem But all movers in the world are to the
moventia quae sunt in mundo, first mover, God, as instruments are
comparantur ad primum movens, related to a principal agent. Since, then,
quod Deus est, sicut instrumenta ad there are in the world many movers
agens principale. Cum igitur in endowed with intelligence, it is
mundo inveniantur multa moventia impossible that the first mover move
per intellectum, impossibile est quod without an intellect. Therefore, God
primum movens moveat absque must be intelligent.
intellectu. Necesse est igitur Deum
esse intelligentem.
Item. Ex hoc aliqua res est [5] Again, a thing is intelligent because

intelligens quod est sine materia: it is without matter. A sign of this is the

cuius signum est quod formae fiunt fact that forms are made understood in
intellectae in actu per abstractionem act by abstraction from matter. And
a materia. Unde et intellectus est hence the intellect deals with universals
universalium et non singularium: and not singulars, for matter is the
quia materia est individuationis principle of individuation. But forms that
principium. Formae autem are understood in act become one with
intellectae in actu fiunt unum cum the intellect that understands them in
intellectu actu intelligente. Unde, si act. Therefore, if forms are understood
ex hoc sunt formae intellectae in in act because they are without matter,
actu quod sunt sine materia, oportet a thing must be intelligent because it is
rem aliquam ex hoc esse without matter. But we have shown that
intelligentem quod est sine materia. God is absolutely immaterial. God is,
Ostensum est autem supra Deum therefore, intelligent.
esse omnino immaterialem. Est
igitur intelligens.
Adhuc. Deo nulla perfectio deest [6] Then, too, as was shown above, no

quae in aliquo genere entium perfection found in any genus of things
inveniatur, ut supra ostensum est: is lacking to God. Nor on this account
nec ex hoc aliqua compositio in eo does any composition follow in Him.
consequitur, ut etiam ex superioribus But among the perfections; of things
patet. Inter perfectiones autem the greatest is that something be
rerum potissima est quod aliquid sit intelligent, for thereby it is in a manner
intellectivum: nam per hoc ipsum est all things, having within itself the
quodammodo omnia, habens in se perfections of all things. God is,
omnium perfectionem. Deus igitur therefore, intelligent.
est intelligens.
Item. Omne quod tendit determinate [7] Again, that which tends

in aliquem finem, aut ipsum determinately to some end either has
praestituit sibi finem, aut praestituitur set itself that end or the end has been
ei finis ab alio: alias non magis in set for it by another. Otherwise, it would
hunc quam in illum finem tenderet. tend no more to this end than to that.
Naturalia autem tendunt in fines Now, natural things tend to determinate
determinatos: non enim a casu ends. They do not fulfill their natural
naturales utilitates consequuntur: sic needs by chance, since they would not
enim non essent semper aut in do so always or for the most part, but
pluribus, sed raro; horum enim est rarely, which is the domain of chance.
casus. Cum ergo ipsa non Since, then, things do not set for
praestituant sibi finem, quia themselves an end, because they have
rationem finis non cognoscunt; no notion of what an end is, the end
oportet quod eis praestituatur finis must be set for them by another, who is
ab alio, qui sit naturae institutor. Hic the author of nature. He it is who gives
autem est qui praebet omnibus being to all things and is through
esse, et est per seipsum necesse Himself the necessary being. We call
esse, quem Deum dicimus, ut ex Him God, as is clear from what we
supra dictis patet. Non autem posset have said. But God could not set an
naturae finem praestituere nisi end for nature unless He had
intelligeret. Deus igitur est understanding. God is, therefore,

intelligens. intelligent.
Amplius. Omne quod est [8] Furthermore, everything imperfect

imperfectum, derivatur ab aliquo derives from something perfect; for the
perfecto: nam perfecta naturaliter perfect is naturally prior to the
sunt priora imperfectis, sicut actus imperfect, as is act to potency. But the
potentia. Sed formae in rebus forms found in particular things are
particularibus existentes sunt imperfect because they are there in a
imperfectae: quia partialiter, et non particular way and not according to the
secundum communitatem suae community of their natures. They must
rationis. Oportet igitur quod therefore be derived from some forms
deriventur ab aliquibus formis that are perfect and not particular. But
perfectis et non particulatis. Tales such forms cannot exist unless by
autem formae esse non possunt nisi being understood, since no form is
intellectae: cum non inveniatur found in its universality except in the
aliqua forma in sua universalitate intellect. Consequently, these forms
nisi in intellectu. Et per consequens must be intelligent, if they be
oportet eas esse intelligentes, si sint subsistent; for only thus do they have
subsistentes: sic enim solum operation. God, then, Who is the first
possunt esse operantes. Deum subsistent act, from whom all other
igitur, qui est actus primus things are derived, must be intelligent.
subsistens, a quo omnia alia
derivantur, oportet esse
intelligentem.
Hanc autem veritatem etiam fides [9] This truth the Catholic faith likewise

Catholica confitetur. Dicitur enim Iob confesses. For it is said of God in Job
94 de Deo: sapiens corde est et (9:4): “He is wise of heart, and mighty
fortis robore. Et 1216: apud ipsum in strength”; and later on (12:16): “With
est fortitudo et sapientia. In Psalmo: Him is strength and wisdom.” So, too,
mirabilis facta est scientia tua ex in the Psalms (138:6): “Your knowledge
me. Et Rom. 1133: o altitudo has become wonderful to me”; and
divitiarum sapientiae et scientiae Romans (21:33): “O the depth of the
Dei. riches of the wisdom and of the
knowledge of God.”
Huius autem fidei veritas in tantum [10] The truth of this faith was so strong

apud homines invaluit ut ab among men that they named God from
intelligendo nomen Dei imponerent: the act of understanding. For theos
nam Theos, quod secundum [θεος], which among the Greeks
Graecos Deum significat, dicitur a signifies God, comes from theaste
theasthe, quod est considerare vel [θεασθαι], which means to consider or
videre. to see.
Caput 45 Chapter 45
Quod intelligere Dei est sua THAT GOD’S ACT OF
essentia UNDERSTANDING IS HIS ESSENCE
Ex hoc autem quod Deus est [1] From the fact that God is intelligent it

intelligens, sequitur quod suum follows that His act of understanding is
intelligere sit sua essentia. His essence.
Intelligere enim est actus [2] To understand is the act of one
intelligentis in ipso existens, non in understanding, residing in him, not
aliud extrinsecum transiens, sicut proceeding to something outside as
calefactio transit in calefactum: non heating proceeds to the heated thing.
enim aliquid patitur intelligibile ex For, by being understood, the intelligible
hoc quod intelligitur, sed intelligens suffers nothing; rather, the one
perficitur. Quicquid autem est in understanding is perfected. Now,
Deo, est divina essentia. Intelligere whatever is in God is the divine essence.
ergo Dei est divina essentia, et God’s act of understanding, therefore, is
divinum esse, et ipse Deus: nam His essence, it is the divine being, God
Deus est sua essentia et suum Himself. For God is His essence and His
esse. being.
Praeterea. Intelligere comparatur [3] Furthermore, the act of understanding

ad intellectum sicut esse ad is to the intellect as being [esse] is to
essentiam. Sed esse divinum est essence [essentia]. But, as we have
eius essentia, ut supra probatum proved, God’s being is His essence.
est. Ergo et intelligere divinum eius Therefore, God’s understanding is His
intellectus. Intellectus autem intellect. But the divine intellect is God’s
divinus est Dei essentia: alias essence; otherwise, it would be an
esset accidens Deo. Oportet igitur accident in God. Therefore, the divine
quod intelligere divinum sit eius understanding is His essence.
essentia.
Amplius. Actus secundus est [4] Again, second act is more perfect
perfectior quam actus primus: sicut than first act, as consideration is more
consideratio quam scientia. perfect than knowledge. But the
Scientia autem vel intellectus Dei knowledge or intellect of God is His
est ipsa eius essentia, si est essence, if, as we have proved, He is
intelligens, ut ostensum est: cum intelligent; for, as is clear from the above,
nulla perfectio conveniat ei no perfection belongs to Him by
participative, sed per essentiam, ut participation but rather by essence. If,
ex superioribus patet. Si igitur sua therefore, His consideration is not His
consideratio non sit sua essentia, essence, something will be nobler and
aliquid erit sua essentia nobilius et more perfect than His essence. Thus,
perfectius. Et sic non erit in fine God will not be at the summit of
perfectionis et bonitatis. Unde non perfection and goodness and hence will
erit primum. not be first.
Adhuc. Intelligere est actus [5] Moreover, to understand is the act of
intelligentis. Si igitur Deus the one understanding. If, therefore, God

intelligens non sit suum intelligere, in understanding is not His
oportet quod comparetur ad ipsum understanding, God must be related to it
sicut potentia ad actum. Et ita in as potency to act. Thus, there will be
Deo erit potentia et actus. Quod est potency and act in God, which is
impossibile, ut supra probatum est. impossible, as we proved above.
Item. Omnis substantia est propter [6] Then, too, every substance exists for

suam operationem. Si igitur the sake of its operation. If, then, the
operatio Dei sit aliud quam divina operation of God is other than the divine
substantia, erit finis eius aliquid substance, the end of God will be
aliud a se. Et sic Deus non erit sua something other than God. Thus, God
bonitas: cum bonum cuiuslibet sit will not be His goodness, since the good
finis eius. of each thing is its end.
Si autem divinum intelligere est [7] If, however, God’s understanding is
eius esse, necesse est quod His being, His understanding must be
intelligere eius sit simplex, simple, eternal and unchangeable,
aeternum et invariabile, et actu existing only in act, and including all the
tantum existens, et omnia quae de perfections that have been proved of the
divino esse probata sunt. Non est divine being. Hence, God is not
igitur Deus in potentia intelligens, potentially understanding, nor does He
aut de novo aliquid intelligere begin to understand something anew,
incipiens, vel quamcumque nor still does He have any change or
mutationem aut compositionem in composition in understanding.
intelligendo habens.
Caput 46 Chapter 46
Quod Deus per nihil aliud THAT GOD UNDERSTANDS THROUGH
intelligit quam per suam NOTHING OTHER THAN THROUGH HIS
essentiam ESSENCE
Ex his autem quae supra ostensa [1] From what has been shown above it

sunt, evidenter apparet quod appears with evidence that the divine
intellectus divinus nulla alia intellect understands through no other
specie intelligibili intelligat quam intelligible species than through His
sua essentia. essence.
Species enim intelligibilis [2] The intelligible species is the formal
principium formale est principle of intellectual operation, just as
intellectualis operationis: sicut the form of any agent is the principle of its
forma cuiuslibet agentis own operation. Now, as we have shown,
principium est propriae the divine intellectual operation is God’s
operationis. Divina autem essence. If, then, the divine intellect
operatio intellectualis est eius understood by an intelligible species other
essentia, ut ostensum est. Esset than the divine essence, something other
igitur aliquid aliud divinae would be added to the divine essence as
essentiae principium et causa si principle and cause. This is opposed to
alia intelligibili specie quam sua what was shown above.
essentia intellectus divinus
intelligeret. Quod supra ostensis
repugnat.
Adhuc. Per speciem intelligibilem [3] Furthermore, the intellect becomes

fit intellectus intelligens actu: understanding in act through an intelligible
sicut per speciem sensibilem species, just as the sense becomes
sensus actu sentiens. sensing in act through a sensible species.
Comparatur igitur species The intelligible species is to the intellect,
intelligibilis ad intellectum sicut therefore, as act to potency. If, then, the
actus ad potentiam. Si igitur divine intellect understood through some
intellectus divinus aliqua alia intelligible species other than itself, it
specie intelligibili intelligeret would be in potency with respect to
quam seipso, esset in potentia something. This is impossible, as we
respectu alicuius. Quod esse non proved above.
potest, ut supra ostensum est.
Amplius. Species intelligibilis in [4] Moreover, an intelligible species in the
intellectu praeter essentiam eius intellect that is other than the intellect’s
existens esse accidentale habet: essence has an accidental being, which is
ratione cuius scientia nostra inter why our knowledge is numbered among
accidentia computatur. In Deo the accidents. But in God, as we have
autem non potest aliquod esse shown, there can be no accident.
accidens, ut supra ostensum est. Therefore, there is not in the divine
Igitur non est in intellectu eius intellect any species other than the divine
aliqua species praeter ipsam essence itself.
divinam essentiam.
Adhuc. Species intelligibilis [5] Again, the intelligible species is the
similitudo est alicuius intellecti. Si likeness of something understood. If, then,
igitur in intellectu divino sit aliqua there is in the divine intellect an intelligible
intelligibilis species praeter species other than the divine essence, it
essentiam ipsius, similitudo will be the likeness of something
alicuius intellecti erit. Aut igitur understood. It will thus be the likeness
divinae essentiae: aut alterius rei. either of the divine essence or of some
Ipsius quidem divinae essentiae other thing. It cannot be the likeness of the
non potest esse: quia sic divina divine essence, because then the divine
essentia non esset intelligibilis essence would not be intelligible through
per seipsam, sed illa species itself, but that species would make it
faceret eam intelligibilem. Nec intelligible. Nor can there be in the divine
etiam potest esse in intellectu intellect a species other than the divine
divino species alia praeter intellect that is the likeness of some other
essentiam ipsius quae sit alterius being. For that likeness would then be
rei similitudo. Illa enim similitudo impressed on the divine intellect by some
imprimeretur ei ab aliquo. Non being. Not by itself, since then the same
autem a seipso: quia sic idem being would be agent and receiver, and
esset agens et patiens; essetque also because there would be an agent that
aliquod agens quod non suam impressed, not its own likeness, but that of
sed alterius similitudinem another on the receiver, and thus it would
induceret patienti, et sic non not be true that every agent produced its
omne agens sibi simile ageret. like. Nor by another, for there would then
Nec ab alio: esset enim aliquod be an agent prior to God. It is, therefore,
agens prius eo. Ergo impossibile impossible that there be in God an
est quod in ipso sit aliqua species intelligible species other than His essence.
intelligibilis praeter ipsius
essentiam.
Praeterea. Intelligere Dei est eius [6] Furthermore, God’s understanding, as

esse, ut ostensum est. Si igitur we have shown, is His essence. If,
intelligeret per aliquam speciem therefore, God understood through a
quae non sit sua essentia, esset species that was not His essence, it would
per aliquod aliud a sua essentia. be through something other than His
Quod est impossibile. Non igitur essence. This is impossible. Therefore,
intelligit per aliquam speciem God does not understand through a
quae non sit sua essentia. species that is not His essence.
Caput 47 Chapter 47
Quod Deus intelligit perfecte THAT GOD UNDERSTANDS HIMSELF
seipsum PERFECTLY
Ex hoc autem ulterius patet quod [1] From this it further appears that God
ipse seipsum perfecte intelligit. understands Himself perfectly.
Cum enim per speciem [2] Since through the intelligible species
intelligibilem intellectus in rem the intellect is directed to the thing
intellectam feratur, ex duobus understood, the perfection of intellectual
perfectio intellectualis operationis operation depends on two things. One is
dependet. Unum est ut species that the intelligible species be perfectly
intelligibilis perfecte rei intellectae conformed to the thing understood. The
conformetur. Aliud est ut perfecte second is that it be perfectly joined to the
intellectui coniungatur: quod intellect, which is realized more fully
quidem tanto fit amplius quanto according as the intellect has greater
intellectus in intelligendo maiorem power in understanding. Now, the divine
efficaciam habet. Ipsa autem essence, which is the intelligible species
divina essentia quae est species by which the divine intellect understands,
intelligibilis qua intellectus divinus is absolutely identical with God and it is
intelligit, est ipsi Deo penitus idem; also absolutely identical with His intellect.
estque intellectui ipsius idem Therefore, God understands Himself
omnino. Seipsum igitur Deus most perfectly.
perfectissime cognoscit.
Adhuc. Res materialis intelligibilis [3] Furthermore, a material thing is made

efficitur per hoc quod a materia et intelligible by being separated from
materialibus conditionibus matter and the conditions of matter.
separatur. Quod ergo est per sui Therefore, that which is through its
naturam ab omni materia et nature separate from all matter and
materialibus conditionibus material conditions is intelligible in its
separatum, hoc est intelligibile nature. Now every intelligible is
secundum suam naturam. Sed understood by being one in act with the
omne intelligibile intelligitur one understanding. But, as we have
secundum quod est unum actu proved, God is intelligent. Therefore,
cum intelligente. Ipse autem Deus since He is absolutely immaterial, and
intelligens est, ut probatum est. most one with Himself, He understands
Igitur, cum sit immaterialis omnino, Himself perfectly.
et sibi ipsi maxime sit unum,
maxime seipsum intelligit.
Item. Ex hoc aliquid actu intelligitur [4] Again, a thing is Understood in act

quod intellectus in actu et because the intellect in act and the
intellectum in actu unum sunt. understood in act are one. But the divine
Divinus autem intellectus est intellect is always an intellect in act,
semper intellectus in actu: nihil since there is no potency or imperfection
enim est in potentia et imperfectum in God. On the other hand, the divine
in Deo. Essentia autem Dei essence is through itself perfectly
secundum seipsam perfecte intelligible, as is clear from what we have
intelligibilis est, ut ex dictis patet. said. Since, therefore, the divine intellect
Cum igitur intellectus divinus et and the divine essence are one, it is
essentia divina sint unum, ex evident from what we have said that God
dictis, manifestum est quod Deus understands Himself perfectly. For God
perfecte seipsum intelligat: Deus is His intellect and His essence.
enim est et suus intellectus et sua
essentia.
Adhuc. Omne quod est in aliquo [5] Moreover, what is in something in an

per modum intelligibilem, intelligitur intelligible way is understood by it. The
ab eo. Essentia autem divina est in divine essence is in God in an intelligible
Deo per modum intelligibilem: nam way, for the natural being of God and His
esse naturale Dei et esse intelligible being are one and the same,
intelligibile unum et idem est, cum since His being is His understanding.
esse suum sit suum intelligere. God, therefore, understands His
Deus igitur intelligit essentiam essence, and hence Himself, since He is
suam. Ergo seipsum: cum ipse sit His essence.
sua essentia.
Amplius. Actus intellectus, sicut et [6] The acts of the intellect, furthermore,

aliarum animae potentiarum, like those of the other powers of the soul,
secundum obiecta distinguuntur. are distinguished according to their
Tanto igitur erit perfectior objects. The operation of the intellect will
intellectus operatio quanto erit be more perfect as the intelligible object
perfectius intelligibile. Sed is more perfect. But the most perfect
perfectissimum intelligibile est intelligible object is the divine essence,
essentia divina: cum sit since it is the most perfect and the first
perfectissimus actus et prima truth. The operation of the divine intellect
veritas. Operatio autem intellectus is likewise the most noble, since, as we
divini est etiam nobilissima: cum sit have shown, it is the divine being.
ipsum esse divinum, ut ostensum Therefore, God understands Himself.
est. Deus igitur seipsum intelligit.
Adhuc. Rerum omnium [7] Again, the perfections of all things are

perfectiones in Deo maxime found supremely in God. Now, among
inveniuntur. Inter alias autem other perfections found in created things
perfectiones in rebus creatis the greatest is to understand God. For
inventas maxima est intelligere the intellectual nature, whose perfection
Deum: cum natura intellectualis is understanding, excels all the others;
aliis praemineat, cuius perfectio est and the most noble intelligible object is
intelligere; nobilissimum autem God. God, therefore, knows Himself
intelligibile Deus est. Deus igitur supremely.
maxime seipsum intelligit.
Hoc autem auctoritate divina [8] This is confirmed by divine authority.
confirmatur. Ait namque apostolus, For the Apostle says: “The spirit
I Cor. 210, quod spiritus Dei searches all things, yea, the deep things
scrutatur etiam profunda Dei. of God” (1 Cor. 2:10).
Caput 48 Chapter 48
Quod Deus primo et per se THAT PRIMARILY AND ESSENTIALLY
solum seipsum cognoscit GOD KNOWS ONLY HIMSELF
Ex praemissis autem apparet [1] Now, it appears from what we have
quod Deus primo et per se solum said that primarily. and essentially God
seipsum cognoscit. knows only Himself.
Illa enim solum res est primo et [2] That thing alone is primarily and
per se ab intellectu cognita cuius essentially known by the intellect by
specie intelligit: operatio enim whose species the intellect understands;
formae quae est operationis for an operation is proportioned to the
principium proportionatur. Sed id form that is the principle of the operation.
quod Deus intelligit nihil est aliud But, as we have proved, that by which
quam sua essentia, ut probatum God understands is nothing other than
est. Igitur intellectum ab ipso His essence. Therefore, the primary and
primo et per se nihil est aliud essential object of His intellect is nothing
quam ipsemet. other than Himself.
Adhuc. Impossibile est simul multa [3] It is, furthermore, impossible to

primo et per se intelligere: una understand a multitude primarily and
enim operatio non potest simul essentially, since one operation cannot
multis terminari. Deus autem be terminated by many. But, as we have

seipsum quandoque intelligit, ut proved, God at some time understands
probatum est. Si igitur intelligat Himself. If, therefore, He understands
aliquid aliud quasi primo et per se something other than Himself as the
intellectum, oportet quod primary and essential object of His
intellectus eius mutetur de understanding, His intellect must change
consideratione sui in from a consideration of Himself to the
considerationem illius. Illud autem consideration of this something else. This
est eo ignobilius. Sic igitur something else is less noble than God.
intellectus divinus mutatur in The divine intellect is thus changed for
peius. Quod est impossibile. the worse, which is impossible.
Amplius. Operationes intellectus [4] Moreover, the operations of the

distinguuntur penes obiecta. Si intellect are distinguished according to
igitur Deus intelligit se et aliud a se their objects. If, then, God understands
quasi principale obiectum, habebit Himself and something other than
plures operationes intellectuales. Himself as the principal object, He will
Ergo vel sua essentia erit in plura have several intellectual operations.
divisa: vel aliquam operationem Therefore, either His essence will be
intellectualem habebit quae non divided into several parts, or He will have
est sua substantia. Quorum an intellectual operation that is not His
utrumque impossibile esse substance. Both of these positions have
monstratum est. Restat igitur nihil been proved to be impossible. It remains,
a Deo esse cognitum quasi primo then, that nothing other than the divine
et per se intellectum, nisi suam essence is known by God as the primary
essentiam. and essential object of His intellect.
Item. Intellectus, secundum quod [5] Again, in so far as the intellect is
est differens a suo intellecto, est in different from its object, it is in potency to
potentia respectu illius. Si igitur it. If, then, something other than Himself
aliquid aliud sit intellectum a Deo is God's primary and essential object, it
primo et per se, sequetur quod will follow that He is in potency to
ipse sit in potentia respectu something else. This is impossible, as is
alicuius alterius. Quod est clear from what we have said.
impossibile, ut ex dictis patet.
Praeterea. Intellectum est [6] The thing understood, likewise, is the

perfectio intelligentis: secundum perfection of the one understanding. For
enim hoc intellectus perfectus est the intellect is perfect according as it
quod actu intelligit; quod quidem understands in act, and this obtains
est per hoc quod est unum cum eo through the fact that the intellect is one
quod intelligitur. Si igitur aliquid with what is understood. If, then,
aliud a Deo sit primo intellectum something other than Himself is primarily
ab ipso, erit aliquid aliud perfectio understood by God, something else will
ipsius, et eo nobilius. Quod est be His perfection, and more noble than
impossibile. He. This is impossible.
Amplius. Ex multis intellectis [7] Furthermore, the knowledge of the
intelligentis scientia integratur. Si one understanding is comprised of many

igitur sunt multa scita a Deo quasi things understood. If, then, God knows
principaliter cognita et per se, many things as the principal and
sequitur quod scientia Dei sit ex essential objects of His knowledge, it will
multis composita. Et sic vel erit follow that the knowledge of God is
divina essentia composita: vel composed of many things. Thus, either
scientia erit accidens Deo. the divine essence will be composite, or
Quorum utrumque impossibile knowledge will be an accident in God.
esse ex dictis manifestum est. From what we have said, it is clear that
Relinquitur igitur quod id quod est both of these suppositions are
primo et per se intellectum a Deo, impossible. It remains, therefore, that
nihil est aliud quam sua what is primarily and essentially
substantia. understood by God is nothing other than
His substance.
Adhuc. Operatio intellectualis [8] Again, intellectual operation derives its

speciem et nobilitatem habet specification and nobility from that which
secundum id quod est per se et is essentially and primarily understood by
primo intellectum: cum hoc sit eius it. If, then, God understood something
obiectum. Si igitur Deus aliud a se other than Himself as His essential and
intelligeret quasi per se et primo primary object, His intellectual operation
intellectum, eius operatio would have its specification and nobility
intellectualis speciem et according to something other than God.
nobilitatem haberet secundum id This, however, is impossible, since, as
quod est aliud ab ipso. Hoc autem we have shown, God’s operation is His
est impossibile: cum sua operatio essence. Thus, it is impossible that what
sit eius essentia, ut ostensum est. is understood primarily and essentially by
Sic igitur impossibile est quod God be other than He.
intellectum a Deo primo et per se
sit aliud ab ipso.
Caput 49 Chapter 49
Quod Deus cognoscit alia a se THAT GOD UNDERSTANDS THINGS
OTHER THAN HIMSELF
Ex hoc autem quod seipsum [1] From the fact that God understands
cognoscit primo et per se, quod alia Himself primarily and essentially we
a se in seipso cognoscat ponere must posit that He knows in Himself
oportet. things other than Himself.
Effectus enim cognitio sufficienter [2] An effect is adequately known when

habetur per cognitionem suae its cause is known. So “we are said to
causae: unde et scire dicimur know each thing when we know the
unumquodque cum causam cause.” But God Himself is through His
cognoscimus. Ipse autem Deus est essence the cause of being for other
per suam essentiam causa essendi things. Since He has a most full
aliis. Cum igitur suam essentiam knowledge of His essence, we must
plenissime cognoscat, oportet posit that God also knows other things.
ponere quod etiam alia cognoscat.
Adhuc. Omnis effectus in sua causa [3] Moreover, the likeness of every

aliqualiter praeexistit similitudo: cum effect somehow preexists in its cause;
omne agens agat sibi simile. Omne for every agent produces its like. But
autem quod est in aliquo, est in eo whatever is in something is in it
per modum eius in quo est. Si igitur according to the mode of that in which it
Deus aliquarum rerum est causa, is. If, then, God is the cause of certain
cum ipse sit secundum suam things, since according to His nature He
naturam intellectualis, similitudo is intellectual, the likeness of what He
causati sui in eo erit intelligibiliter. causes will exist in Him in an intelligible
Quod autem est in aliquo per way. But what is in something in an
modum intelligibilem, ab eo intelligible way is understood by it. God,
intelligitur. Deus igitur res alias a se therefore, understands within Himself
in seipso intelligit. things other than Himself.
Amplius. Quicumque cognoscit [4] Again, whoever knows perfectly a

perfecte rem aliquam, cognoscit given thing knows whatever can be truly
omnia quae de re illa vere possunt said of it and whatever befits it
dici et quae ei conveniunt according to its nature. But it befits God
secundum suam naturam. Deo according to His nature to be the cause
autem secundum suam naturam of other things. Since, then, God knows
convenit quod sit aliorum causa. Himself perfectly, He knows Himself to
Cum igitur perfecte seipsum be a cause. This cannot be unless He
cognoscat, cognoscit se esse somehow knows what He causes. This
causam. Quod esse non potest nisi is other than He, since nothing is the
cognoscat aliqualiter causatum. cause of itself. Therefore, God knows
Quod est aliud ab ipso: nihil enim things other than Himself.
sui ipsius causa est. Ergo Deus
cognoscit alia a se.
Colligentes igitur has duas [5] If we put together these two
conclusiones, apparet Deum conclusions, it appears that God knows
cognoscere seipsum quasi primo et Himself as primarily and essentially
per se notum, alia vero sicut in known, whereas He knows other things
essentia sua visa. as seen in His essence.
Quam quidem veritatem expresse [6] This truth is expressly taught by
Dionysius tradit, in VII cap. de Div. Dionysius. He says: “In seeing them,
Nom., dicens: non secundum God does not insert Himself in
visionem singulis se immittit, sed singulars, but He knows them as
secundum unam causae contained within a single cause” [De
continentiam scit omnia. Et infra: dev. nom. VII, 2]. And later on: “the
divina sapientia seipsam divine wisdom, knowing itself, knows
cognoscens scit alia. other things.”
Cui etiam sententiae attestari [7] To this judgment, too, the authority of

videtur Scripturae sacrae auctoritas. Sacred Scripture bears witness. For it is
Nam in Psalmo de Deo dicitur: said of God in the Psalms (101:20): “He
prospexit de excelso sancto suo, looked forth from His high sanctuary”;
quasi de seipso excelso alia videns. as though to say that God sees other
things from His own height.
Caput 50 Chapter 50
Quod Deus habet propriam THAT GOD HAS A PROPER
cognitionem de omnibus rebus KNOWLEDGE OF ALL THINGS
Quia vero quidam dixerunt quod [1] Some have said that God has only a

Deus de aliis rebus non habet universal knowledge of other things. He
cognitionem nisi universalem, knows them, that is, in so far as they are
utpote cognoscens ea inquantum beings because He knows the nature of
sunt entia, ex hoc quod naturam being through a knowledge of Himself.
essendi cognoscit per cognitionem For this reason, it remains for us to
sui ipsius; restat ostendendum show that God knows all other things as
quod Deus cognoscit omnes alias they are distinct from one another and
res prout ab invicem sunt distinctae from Himself. This is to know things
et a Deo. Quod est cognoscere res according to their proper natures.
secundum proprias rationes earum.
Ad huius autem ostensionem, [2] In order to show this point, let us
Deum esse causam omnis entis suppose that God is the cause of every
supponatur: quod et ex supra dictis being, as is somewhat evident from
aliquatenus patet, et infra plenius what we said above and will be more
ostendetur. Sic igitur nihil in aliqua fully shown later on. Thus, there is
re esse potest quod non sit ab eo consequently nothing in any thing that is
causatum vel mediate vel not caused by God, mediately or
immediate. Cognita autem causa, immediately. Now, when the cause is
cognoscitur eius effectus. Quicquid known, the effect is known. Whatever is
igitur est in quacumque re potest in each and every thing can be known if
cognosci cognito Deo et omnibus we know God and all the causes that
causis mediis quae sunt inter Deum are between God and things. But God
et res. Sed Deus seipsum cognoscit knows Himself and all the intervening
et omnes causas medias quae sunt causes between Himself and any given
inter ipsum et rem quamlibet. Quod thing. Now, we have already shown that
enim seipsum perfecte cognoscat, God knows Himself perfectly. By
iam ostensum est. Seipso autem knowing Himself, God knows whatever
cognito, cognoscit quod ab ipso proceeds from Him immediately. When
immediate est. Quo cognito, this is known, God once more knows
cognoscit iterum quod ab illo what proceeds from it immediately; and
immediate est: et sic de omnibus so on for all intermediate causes down
causis mediis usque ad ultimum to the last effect. Therefore, God knows
effectum. Ergo Deus cognoscit whatever is found in reality. But this is to
quicquid est in re. Hoc autem est have a proper and complete knowledge
habere propriam et completam of a thing, namely, to know all that there

cognitionem de re, cognoscere is in that thing, both what is common
scilicet omnia quae in re sunt, and what is proper. Therefore, God has
communia et propria. Deus ergo a proper knowledge of things, in so far
propriam de rebus cognitionem as they are distinct from one another.
habet, secundum quod sunt ab
invicem distinctae.
Adhuc. Omne quod agit per [3] Furthermore, whatever acts through
intellectum, habet cognitionem de an intellect knows what it does
re quam agit secundum propriam according to the proper nature of its
facti rationem: quia cognitio work; for the knowledge of the maker
facientis determinat formam facto. determines the form for the thing made.
Deus autem causa est rerum per Now, God causes things through His
intellectum: cum suum esse sit intellect, since His being is His
suum intelligere, unumquodque understanding and each thing acts in so
autem agit inquantum est actu. far as it is in act. God, therefore, has a
Cognoscit igitur causatum suum proper knowledge of what He causes,
proprie, secundum quod est so far as it is distinct from the others.
distinctum ab aliis.
Amplius. Rerum distinctio non [4] Moreover, the distinction of things
potest esse a casu: habet enim cannot be from chance, because it has
ordinem certum. Oportet ergo ex a fixed order. The distinction in things
alicuius causae intentione must therefore be from the intention of
distinctionem in rebus esse. Non some cause. It cannot be from the
autem ex intentione alicuius causae intention of a cause acting through a
per necessitatem naturae agentis: necessity of nature, for nature is
quia natura determinatur ad unum, determined to one course of action, and
et sic nullius rei per naturae thus the intention of no thing acting
necessitatem agentis intentio potest through the necessity of nature can
esse ad multa inquantum distincta terminate in many effects in so far as
sunt. Restat ergo quod distinctio in these are distinct. It remains, then, that
rebus provenit ex intentione alicuius distinction in things comes from the
causae cognoscentis. Videtur intention of a knowing cause. But it
autem intellectus proprium esse seems to be proper to the intellect to
rerum distinctionem considerare: consider the distinction of things; and so
unde et Anaxagoras distinctionis Anaxagoras called the intellect the
principium intellectum dixit. source of distinction. Now, the universal
Universalis autem rerum distinctio distinction of things cannot be from the
non potest esse ex intentione intention of some secondary cause,
alicuius causarum secundarum: because all such causes belong to the
quia omnes huiusmodi causae sunt world of distinct effects. It belongs to the
de universitate causatorum first cause, that is through itself
distinctorum. Est igitur hoc primae distinguished from all other things, to
causae, quae per seipsam ab aim at the distinction of all things. God,
omnibus aliis distinguitur, intendere therefore, knows things as distinct.
distinctionem omnium rerum. Deus
igitur cognoscit res ut distinctas.
Item. Quicquid Deus cognoscit, [5] Again, whatever God knows He

perfectissime cognoscit: est enim in knows most perfectly. For, as was
eo omnis perfectio sicut in shown above, there is all perfection in
simpliciter perfecto, ut supra God as in the absolutely perfect being.
ostensum est. Quod autem Now, what is known only in a general
cognoscitur in communi tantum, way is not perfectly known, since one
non perfecte cognoscitur: does not yet know what is most
ignorantur enim ea quae sunt important in that thing, namely, the
praecipua illius rei, scilicet ultimae ultimate perfections, by which its proper
perfectiones, quibus perficitur being is completed; so that by such a
proprium esse eius; unde tali knowledge a thing is known potentially
cognitione magis cognoscitur res in rather than actually. Since, then, by
potentia quam in actu. Si igitur knowing His own essence God knows
Deus cognoscendo essentiam things in a universal way, He must also
suam cognoscit omnia in universali, have a proper knowledge of things.
oportet quod etiam propriam habeat
cognitionem de rebus.
Adhuc. Quicumque cognoscit [6] Then, too, whoever knows a certain

naturam aliquam, cognoscit per se nature knows the essential accidents of
accidentia illius naturae. Per se that nature. The essential accidents of
autem accidentia entis, inquantum being as being are one and many, as is
est ens, sunt unum et multa, ut proved in Metaphysics IV [3]. If, then, by
probatur in IV Metaph. Deus igitur, knowing His essence, God knows the
si cognoscendo essentiam suam nature of being in a universal way, it
cognoscit in universali naturam follows that He knows multitude. But
entis, sequitur quod cognoscat multitude cannot be understood without
multitudinem. Multitudo autem sine distinction. Therefore, God knows things
distinctione intelligi non potest. as they are distinct from one another.
Intelligit igitur res prout sunt ab
invicem distinctae.
Amplius. Quicumque cognoscit [7] Whoever, furthermore, perfectly

perfecte aliquam naturam knows a universal nature knows the
universalem, cognoscit modum quo mode in which that nature can be
natura illa haberi potest: sicut qui possessed. In the same way, he who
cognoscit albedinem, scit quod knows whiteness knows that which
recipit magis et minus. Sed ex receives it more and less. But the
diverso modo essendi constituuntur grades of beings are established from
diversi gradus entium. Si igitur the diverse mode of being. If, then, by
Deus cognoscendo se cognoscit knowing Himself, God knows the
naturam universalem entis; non universal nature of being, and this not
autem imperfecte, quia ab eo omnis imperfectly, since, as we have shown,
imperfectio longe est, ut supra every imperfection is remote from Him,
probatum est: oportet quod God must know all grades of beings.
cognoscat omnes gradus entium. Et Thus, God will have a proper knowledge
sic de rebus aliis a se habebit of things other than Himself.
propriam cognitionem.
Praeterea. Quicumque cognoscit [8] Furthermore, he who knows

perfecte aliquid, cognoscit omnia something perfectly knows all that is in
quae sunt in illo. Sed Deus it. But God knows Himself perfectly.
cognoscit seipsum perfecte. Ergo Therefore, He knows all that is in Him
cognoscit omnia quae sunt in ipso according to His active power. But all
secundum potentiam activam. Sed things, in their proper forms, are in Him
omnia secundum proprias formas according to His active power, since
sunt in ipso secundum potentiam God is the principle of every being.
activam: cum ipse sit omnis entis Therefore, God has a proper knowledge
principium. Ipse igitur habet of all things.
cognitionem propriam de omnibus
rebus.
Adhuc. Quicumque scit naturam [9] Again, he who knows a certain
aliquam, scit an illa natura sit nature knows whether that nature is
communicabilis: non enim animalis communicable. He who did not know
naturam sciret perfecte qui nesciret that the nature of animal is
eam pluribus communicabilem communicable to many would not know
esse. Divina autem natura it perfectly. Now, the divine nature is
communicabilis est per communicable by likeness. God,
similitudinem. Scit ergo Deus quot therefore, knows in how many modes
modis eius essentiae aliquid simile there can be something like His
esse potest. Sed ex hoc sunt essence. But the diversities of forms
diversitates formarum quod divinam arise from the fact that things imitate the
essentiam res diversimode divine essence diversely; and so the
imitantur: unde philosophus formam Philosopher has called a natural form
naturalem divinum quoddam “something divine.” Therefore, God has
nominat. Deus igitur de rebus habet a knowledge of things in terms of their
cognitionem secundum proprias proper forms.
formas.
Praeterea. Apud homines et alios [10] Moreover, men and other knowing
cognoscentes habetur cognitio de beings know things as distinct from one
rebus prout in sua multitudine sunt another in their multitude. If, then, God
ab invicem distinctae. Si igitur Deus does not know things in their distinction,
res in sua distinctione non it follows that He is the most foolish
cognoscit, sequitur eum being of all, as He must have been for
insipientissimum esse: sicut et illis those who held that God did not know
qui ponebant Deum non strife, a thing known to allan opinion
cognoscere litem, quam omnes that the Philosopher considers to be
cognoscunt; quod pro inconvenienti untenable in De anima I [5]and
habet philosophus, in I de anima et Metaphysics III [4].
in III metaphysicae.
Hoc etiam auctoritate Scripturae [11] We likewise receive this teaching
canonicae edocemur. Dicitur from the canonic Scriptures. For it is
namque Gen. 131: vidit Deus said in Genesis (1:31): “And God saw all
cuncta quae fecerat, et erant valde things that He had made, and they were
bona. Et Heb. 413: non est ulla very good.” And in Hebrews (4:13):
creatura invisibilis in conspectu “Neither is there any creature invisible in
eius: omnia nuda et aperta sunt His sight: but all things are naked and
oculis eius. open to His eyes.”
Caput 51 Chapters 5152
Rationes ad inquirendum ARGUMENTS INQUIRING HOW A
qualiter multitudo MULTITUDE OF INTELLECTUAL
intellectorum sit in intellectu OBJECTS IS IN THE DIVINE INTELLECT
divino
Sed ne multitudo intellectorum in [1] Lest the multitude of intellectual objects,
intellectum divinum however, introduce a composition into the
compositionem inducat, divine intellect, we must investigate the
investigandus est modus quo ista mode in which these intellectual objects
intellecta sint multa. are many.
Non autem haec multitudo sic [2.] Now, this multitude cannot be taken to

intelligi potest quasi multa mean that many intellectual objects have a
intellecta habeant esse distinct being in God. For either these
distinctum in Deo. Ista enim objects would be the same as the divine
intellecta aut essent idem quod essence, and thus a certain multitude
essentia divina: et sic in essentia would be posited in the essence of God,
Dei poneretur aliqua multitudo, which we set aside above in many ways;
quod supra multipliciter est or they would be added to the divine
remotum. Aut essent superaddita essence, and thus there would be some
essentiae divinae: et sic esset in accident in God, which we have shown
Deo aliquod accidens, quod above to be impossible.
supra impossibile esse
ostendimus.
Nec iterum potest poni [3] Nor, again, can such intelligible forms
huiusmodi formas intelligibilia per be posited as existing in themselves. This
se existere: quod Plato, is what Plato, avoiding the above
praedicta inconvenientia vitans, difficulties, seems to have posited by
videtur posuisse, introducendo introducing the Ideas. For the forms of
ideas. Nam formae rerum natural things cannot exist without matter,
naturalium sine materia existere since neither are they understood without
non possunt: cum nec sine matter.
materia intelligantur.
Quod etiam si poneretur, nec hoc [4] And, even if this position were held, it

sufficeret ad ponendum Deum would not enable us to posit that God has
intelligere multitudinem. Nam understanding of a multitude. For, since
cum formae praedictae sint extra the aforementioned forms are outside
Dei essentiam, si sine his Deus God’s essence, if God could not
multitudinem rerum intelligere understand the multitude of things without
non posset, quod ad them, as the perfection of His intellect
perfectionem sui intellectus requires, it would follow that His perfection
requiritur, sequeretur quod sua in understanding depended on something
perfectio in intelligendo ab alio else, and consequently so would His
dependeret: et per consequens perfection in being, since His being is His
in essendo, cum suum esse sit understanding. The contrary of this was
suum intelligere. Cuius shown above.
contrarium supra ostensum est.
Item. Cum omne quod est [5] Furthermore, since whatever is outside

praeter essentiam suam sit His essence must be caused by Him, as
causatum ab eo, ut infra will be shown later on it is necessary that,
ostendetur, necesse est, si if the aforementioned forms are to be
formae praedictae extra Deum found outside God, they must be caused
sunt, ab eo causatas esse. Ipse by Him. But God is the cause of things
autem est causa rerum per through His intellect, as will be shown later
intellectum, ut infra ostendetur. on. Therefore, so that these intelligibles
Ergo Deum intelligere huiusmodi may have existence, it is required
intelligibilia praeexigitur ordine according to the order of nature that God
naturae ad hoc quod huiusmodi first understand them. Hence, God does
intelligibilia sint. Non igitur per not have knowledge of multitude by the
hoc Deus intelligit multitudinem fact that many intelligibles are found
quod intelligibilia multa per se outside Him.
existunt extra eum.
Adhuc. Intelligibile in actu est [6] Furthermore, the intelligible in act is the

intellectus in actu: sicut et intellect in act, just as the sensible in act is
sensibile in actu est sensus in the sense in act. According as the
actu. Secundum vero quod intelligible is distinguished from the
intelligibile ab intellectu intellect, both are in potency, as likewise
distinguitur, est utrumque in appears in the case of the sense. For
potentia, sicut et in sensu patet: neither the sight is seeing in act, nor is the
nam neque visus est videns actu, visible object seen in act, except when the
neque visibile videtur actu, nisi sight is informed by the species of the
cum visus informatur visibilis visible object, so that thereby from the
specie, ut sic ex visu et visibili sight and the object something one results.
unum fiat. Si igitur intelligibilia If, then, the intelligible objects of God are
Dei sunt extra intellectum ipsius, outside His intellect, it will follow that His
sequetur quod intellectus suus sit intellect is in potency, as are also its
in potentia, et similiter intelligibilia intelligible objects. Thus, some cause
ipsius. Et sic indigebit aliquo reducing them to act would be needed,
reducente in actu. Quod est which is impossible, since there is nothing
impossibile: nam hoc esset eo prior to God.
prius.
Praeterea. Intellectum oportet [7] Then, too, the understood must be in
esse in intelligente. Non igitur him who understands. Therefore, to posit
sufficit ponere formas rerum per the forms of things as existing in
se existentes extra intellectum themselves outside the divine intellect
divinum ad hoc quod Deus does not suffice for God to understand a
multitudinem rerum intelligat, sed multitude of things; these intelligibles must
oportet quod sint in ipso be in the divine intellect itself.
intellectu divino.
Ex eisdem etiam rationibus [8] [Chapter 52] From the same arguments

apparet quod non potest poni it likewise appears that the multitude of the
quod multitudo intelligibilium aforementioned intelligibles cannot reside
praedictorum sit in aliquo alio in any intellect other than the divine
intellectu praeter divinum, vel intellect—for example, that of a soul or an
animae vel Angeli sive angel or intelligence.
intelligentiae. If this were true, the divine intellect would
Nam sic intellectus divinus, depend on a lower intellect for some
quantum ad aliquam suam operation. But this is impossible.
operationem, dependeret ab
aliquo posteriori intellectu. Quod
etiam est impossibile.
Sicut etiam res in se [9] Then, too, just as selfsubsisting things

subsistentes a Deo sunt, ita et are from God, so is whatever inheres in
quae rebus insunt. Unde et ad them. Hence, the divine understanding, by
esse praedictorum intelligibilium which God is a cause, is a prerequisite for
in aliquo posteriorum the being of the aforementioned
intellectuum praeexigitur intelligibles in some lower intellect.
intelligere divinum, per quod
Deus est causa.
Sequetur etiam intellectum [10] It likewise follows that the divine
divinum esse in potentia: cum intellect is in potency, since its intelligible
sua intelligibilia non sint ei objects are not joined to it.
coniuncta.
Sicut etiam unicuique est [11] Furthermore, just as each thing has its

proprium esse, ita et propria own being, so it has its own operation. It
operatio. Non igitur esse potest cannot happen, then, that because some
ut per hoc quod aliquis intellectus intellect is disposed for operation another
ad operandum disponitur, alius intellect will perform an intellectual
operationem intellectualem operation; rather, the very same intellect in
exequatur, sed ipsemet which the disposition is present will do this,
intellectus apud quem dispositio just as each thing is through its own
invenitur: sicut unumquodque est essence, not through the essence of
per essentiam suam, non per another. Therefore, by the fact that there
essentiam alterius. Per hoc igitur are many intelligible objects in some
quod intelligibilia multa sunt apud secondary intellect it could not come about
aliquem secundorum that the first intellect knows a multitude.
intellectuum, non poterit esse
quod intellectus primus

multitudinem cognoscat.
Caput 53 Chapter 53
Solutio praemissae THE SOLUTION OF THE ABOVE
dubitationis DIFFICULTY
Praemissa autem dubitatio [1] We can solve the above difficulty with
faciliter solvi potest, si diligenter ease if we examine diligently how the
inspiciatur qualiter res intellectae things that are understood by the intellect
in intellectu existant. exist within the intellect.
Et ut ab intellectu nostro ad divini [2] So far as it is possible, let us proceed
intellectus cognitionem, prout est from our intellect to the knowledge that the
possibile, procedamus, divine intellect has. Let us consider the
considerandum est quod res fact that an external thing understood by
exterior intellecta a nobis in us does not exist in our intellect according
intellectu nostro non existit to its own nature; rather, it is necessary
secundum propriam naturam, sed that its species be in our intellect, and
oportet quod species eius sit in through this species the intellect comes to
intellectu nostro, per quam fit be in act. Once in act through this species
intellectus in actu. Existens autem as through its own form, the intellect
in actu per huiusmodi speciem knows the thing itself. This is not to be
sicut per propriam formam, understood in the sense that the act itself
intelligit rem ipsam. Non autem ita of understanding is an action proceeding
quod ipsum intelligere sit actio to the thing understood, as heating
transiens in intellectum, sicut proceeds to the heated thing.
calefactio transit in calefactum, Understanding remains in the one
sed manet in intelligente: sed understanding, but it is related to the thing
habet relationem ad rem quae understood because the abovementioned
intelligitur, ex eo quod species species, which is a principle of intellectual
praedicta, quae est principium operation as a form, is the likeness of the
intellectualis operationis ut forma, thing understood.
est similitudo illius.
Ulterius autem considerandum [3] We must further consider that the
est quod intellectus, per speciem intellect, having been informed by the
rei formatus, intelligendo format in species of the thing, by an act of
seipso quandam intentionem rei understanding forms within itself a certain
intellectae, quae est ratio ipsius, intention of the thing understood, that is to
quam significat definitio. Et hoc say, its notion, which the definition
quidem necessarium est: eo quod signifies. This is a necessary point,
intellectus intelligit indifferenter because the intellect understands a
rem absentem et praesentem, in present and an absent thing indifferently.
quo cum intellectu imaginatio In this the imagination agrees with the
convenit; sed intellectus hoc intellect. But the intellect has this
amplius habet, quod etiam characteristic in addition, namely, that it

intelligit rem ut separatam a understands a thing as separated from
conditionibus materialibus, sine material conditions, without which a thing
quibus in rerum natura non existit; does not exist in reality. But this could not
et hoc non posset esse nisi take place unless the intellect formed the
intellectus sibi intentionem abovementioned intention for itself.
praedictam formaret.
Haec autem intentio intellecta, [4] Now, since this understood intention is,

cum sit quasi terminus intelligibilis as it were, a terminus of intelligible
operationis, est aliud a specie operation, it is distinct from the intelligible
intelligibili quae facit intellectum in species that actualizes the intellect, and
actu, quam oportet considerari ut that we must consider the principle of
intelligibilis operationis principium: intellectual operation, though both are a
licet utrumque sit rei intellectae likeness of the thing understood. For, by
similitudo. Per hoc enim quod the fact that the intelligible species, which
species intelligibilis quae est is the form of the intellect and the principle
forma intellectus et intelligendi of understanding, is the likeness of the
principium, est similitudo rei external thing, it follows that the intellect
exterioris, sequitur quod forms an intention like that thing, since
intellectus intentionem formet illi such as a thing is, such are its works. And
rei similem: quia quale est because the understood intention is like
unumquodque, talia operatur. Et some thing, it follows that the intellect, by
ex hoc quod intentio intellecta est forming such an intention) knows that
similis alicui rei, sequitur quod thing.
intellectus, formando huiusmodi
intentionem, rem illam intelligat.
Intellectus autem divinus nulla [5] Now, the divine intellect understands
alia specie intelligit quam by no species other than the divine
essentia sua, ut supra ostensum essence, as was shown above.
est. Sed tamen essentia sua est Nevertheless, the divine essence is the
similitudo omnium rerum. Per hoc likeness of all things. Thereby it follows
ergo sequitur quod conceptio that the conception of the divine intellect
intellectus divini, prout seipsum as understanding itself, which is its Word,
intelligit, quae est verbum ipsius, is the likeness not only of God Himself
non solum sit similitudo ipsius Dei understood, but also of all those things of
intellecti, sed etiam omnium which the divine essence is the likeness.
quorum est divina essentia In this way, therefore, through one
similitudo. Sic ergo per unam intelligible species, which is the divine
speciem intelligibilem, quae est essence, and through one understood
divina essentia, et per unam intention, which is the divine Word, God
intentionem intellectam, quae est can understand many things.
verbum divinum, multa possunt a
Deo intelligi.
Caput 54 Chapter 54
Qualiter divina essentia una et HOW THE DIVINE ESSENCE, BEING
simplex sit propria similitudo ONE AND SIMPLE, IS THE PROPER
omnium intelligibilium LIKENESS OF ALL INTELLIGIBLE
OBJECTS
Sed rursus difficile vel impossibile [1] But, again, it can seem to someone
alicui videri potest quod unum et difficult or impossible that one and the
idem simplex, ut divina essentia, sit same simple being, the divine essence
propria ratio sive similitudo for example, is the proper model or
diversorum. likeness of diverse things.
Nam, cum diversarum rerum sit For, since among diverse things there is
distinctio ratione propriarum a distinction by reason of their proper
formarum, quod alicui secundum forms, whatever is like something
propriam formam simile fuerit, alteri according to its proper form must turn
necesse est ut dissimile inveniatur. out to be unlike something else. To be
Secundum vero quod diversa sure, according as diverse things have
aliquid commune habent, nihil something in common, nothing prevents
prohibet ea similitudinem unam them from having one likeness, as do
habere, sicut homo et asinus man and a donkey so far as they are
inquantum sunt animalia. Ex quo animals. But from this it will follow that
sequetur quod Deus de rebus God does not have a proper knowledge
propriam cognitionem non habeat, of things, but a common one; for the
sed communem: nam secundum operation that knowledge is follows the
modum quo similitudo cogniti est in mode in which the likeness of the known
cognoscente, sequitur cognitionis is in the knower. So, too, heating is
operatio, sicut et calefactio according to the mode of the heat. For
secundum modum caloris; the likeness of the known in the knower
similitudo enim cogniti in is as the form by which the operation
cognoscente est sicut forma qua takes place. Therefore, if God has a
agitur. Oportet igitur, si Deus de proper knowledge of many things, He
pluribus propriam cognitionem must be the proper model of singulars.
habet, quod ipse sit propria ratio How this may be we must investigate.
singulorum. Quod qualiter sit
investigandum est.
Ut enim philosophus dicit, in VIII [2] As the Philosopher says in
Metaph., formae et definitiones Metaphysics VIII [3], the forms of things
rerum, quae eas significant, sunt and the definitions that signify them are
similes numeris. Nam in numeris, like numbers. Among numbers, the
una unitate addita vel subtracta, addition or subtraction of unity changes
species numeri variatur: ut patet in the species of a number, as appears in
binario et ternario. Similiter autem the numbers two and three. It is the
est et in definitionibus: nam una same among definitions: the addition or
differentia addita vel subtracta subtraction of one difference changes
variat speciem; substantia enim the species. For sensible substance,
sensibilis absque rationali, et with the difference rational taken away
rationali addito, specie differt. and added, differs in species.
In his autem quae in se multa [3] Now, with reference to things that
continent, non sic se habet contain a multitude, the intellect and
intellectus ut natura. Nam ea quae nature are differently disposed. For what
ad esse alicuius rei requiruntur illius is required for the being of something
rei natura divisa esse non patitur: the nature of that thing does not permit
non enim remanebit animalis natura to be removed. For the nature of an
si a corpore anima subtrahatur. animal will not survive if the soul is
Intellectus vero ea quae sunt in taken away from the body. But what is
esse coniuncta, interdum disiunctim joined in reality the intellect can at times
accipere potest, quando unum receive separately, when one of the
eorum in alterius rationem non elements is not included in the notion of
cadit. Et per hoc in ternario potest the other. Thus, in the number three the
considerare binarium tantum; et in intellect can consider the number two
animali rationali id quod est only, and in the rational animal it can
sensibile tantum. Unde intellectus id consider that which is sensible only.
quod plura complectitur potest Hence, that which contains several
accipere ut propriam rationem elements the intellect can take as the
plurimorum, apprehendendo aliqua proper notion of the several elements by
illorum absque aliis. Potest enim apprehending one of them without the
accipere denarium ut propriam others. It can, for example, take the
rationem novenarii, una unitate number ten as the proper notion of nine
subtracta; et similiter ut propriam by subtracting unity, and similarly as the
rationem singulorum numerorum proper notion of each of the numbers
infra inclusorum. Similiter etiam in included under it. So, too, it can take in
homine accipere potest proprium man the proper exemplar of irrational
exemplar animalis irrationalis animal as such, and of each of its
inquantum huiusmodi, et species, except that they would add
singularum specierum eius, nisi some positive differences.
aliquas differentias adderent On this account a certain philosopher,
positivas. Clement by name, said that the nobler
Propter hoc quidam philosophus, beings in reality are the exemplars of
Clemens nomine, dixit quod the less noble [cf. PseudoDionysius,
nobiliora in entibus, sunt minus De div. nom. V, 9].
nobilium exemplaria.
Divina autem essentia in se [4] But the divine essence comprehends

nobilitates omnium entium within itself the nobilities of all beings,
comprehendit, non quidem per not indeed compositely, but, as we have
modum compositionis, sed per shown above, according to the mode of
modum perfectionis, ut supra perfection. Now, every form, both proper
ostensum est. Forma autem omnis, and common, considered as positing
tam propria quam communis, something, is a certain perfection; it
secundum id quod aliquid ponit, est includes imperfection only to the extent
perfectio quaedam: non autem that it falls short of true being. The
imperfectionem includit nisi intellect of God, therefore, can
secundum quod deficit a vero esse. comprehend in His essence that which
Intellectus igitur divinus id quod est is proper to each thing by understanding
proprium unicuique in essentia sua wherein the divine essence is being
comprehendere potest, intelligendo imitated and wherein each thing falls
in quo eius essentiam imitetur, et in short of its perfection. Thus, by
quo ab eius perfectione deficit understanding His essence as imitable
unumquodque: utpote, intelligendo in the mode of life and not of
essentiam suam ut imitabilem per knowledge, God has the proper form of
modum vitae et non cognitionis, a plant; and if He knows His essence as
accipit propriam formam plantae; si imitable in the mode of knowledge and
vero ut imitabilem per modum not of intellect, God has the proper form
cognitionis et non intellectus, of animal, and so forth. Thus, it is clear
propriam formam animalis; et sic de that, being absolutely perfect, the divine
aliis. Sic igitur patet quod essentia essence can be taken as the proper
divina, inquantum est absolute exemplar of singulars. Through it,
perfecta, potest accipi ut propria therefore, God can have a proper
ratio singulorum. Unde per eam knowledge of all things.
Deus propriam cognitionem de
omnibus habere potest.
Quia vero propria ratio unius [5] Since, however, the proper exemplar

distinguitur a propria ratione of one thing is distinguished from the
alterius; distinctio autem est proper exemplar of another thing, and
pluralitatis principium: oportet in distinction is the source of plurality, we
intellectu divino distinctionem must observe in the divine intellect a
quandam et pluralitatem rationum certain distinction and plurality of
intellectarum considerare, understood exemplars, according as
secundum quod id quod est in that which is in the divine intellect is the
intellectu divino est propria ratio proper exemplar of diverse things.
diversorum. Unde, cum hoc sit Hence, since this obtains according as
secundum quod Deus intelligit God understands the proper relation of
proprium respectum assimilationis resemblance that each creature has to
quam habet unaquaeque creatura Him, it remains that the exemplars of
ad ipsum, relinquitur quod rationes things in the divine intellect are many or
rerum in intellectu divino non sint distinct only according as God knows
plures vel distinctae nisi secundum that things can be made to resemble
quod Deus cognoscit res pluribus et Him by many and diverse modes.
diversis modis esse assimilabiles In accord with this, Augustine says that
sibi. God made man and a horse by distinct
Et secundum hoc Augustinus dicit exemplars. He also says that the
quod Deus alia ratione facit exemplars of things are a plurality in the
hominem et alia equum; et rationes divine mind.
rerum pluraliter in mente divina This conclusion likewise saves to some
esse dicit. extent the opinion of Plato and his
In quo etiam aliqualiter salvatur doctrine of Ideas, according to which
Platonis opinio ponentis ideas, would be formed everything that is
secundum quas formarentur omnia found among material things.
quae in rebus materialibus existunt.
Caput 55 Chapter 55
Quod Deus omnia simul THAT GOD UNDERSTANDS ALL
intelligit THINGS TOGETHER
Ex his autem ulterius apparet [1] From this it is further apparent that
quod Deus omnia simul intelligit. God understands all things together.
Intellectus enim noster simul multa [2] Our intellect cannot understand in act
actu intelligere non potest, quia, many things together. The reason is that,
cum intellectus in actu sit since “the intellect in act is its object in
intellectum in actu, si plura simul act,” if the intellect did understand many
actu intelligeret, sequeretur quod things together, it would follow that the
intellectus simul esset plura intellect would be at one and the same
secundum unum genus, quod est time many things according to one genus
impossibile. Dico autem —which is impossible. I say “according to
secundum unum genus: quia nihil one genus” because nothing prevents the
prohibet idem subiectum informari same subject from being informed by
diversis formis diversorum diverse forms of diverse genera, just as
generum, sicut idem corpus est the same body is figured and colored.
figuratum et coloratum. Species Now, the intelligible species, by which the
autem intelligibiles, quibus intellect is formed so as to be the objects
intellectus formatur ad hoc quod that are understood in act, all belong to
sit ipsa intellecta in actu, omnes one genus; for they have one manner of
sunt unius generis: habent enim being in the order of intelligible being,
unam rationem essendi secundum even though the things whose species
esse intelligibile, licet res quarum they are do not have one manner of
sunt species in una essendi non being. Hence, the species are not
conveniant ratione; unde nec contrary through the contrariety of the
contrariae sunt per contrarietatem things that are outside the soul. It is in
rerum quae sunt extra animam. Et this way that, when certain things that are
inde est quod, quando aliqua many are considered as in any way
multa accipiuntur quocumque united, they are understood together. For
modo unita, simul intelliguntur: the intellect understands a continuous
simul enim intelligit totum whole all at once, not part after part. So,
continuum, non partem post too, it understands a proposition all at
partem; et similiter simul intelligit once, not first the subject and then the
propositionem, non prius predicate, since it knows all the parts
subiectum et postea praedicatum; according to one species of the whole.
quia secundum unam totius
speciem omnes partes cognoscit.
Ex his igitur accipere possumus [3] From these remarks we can infer that,

quod quaecumque plura una whenever several things are known
specie cognoscuntur, simul through one species, they can be known
possunt intelligi. Omnia autem together. But all that God knows He
quae Deus cognoscit, una specie knows through one species, which is His
cognoscit, quae est sua essentia. essence. Therefore, God can understand
Omnia igitur simul intelligere all things together.
potest.
Item. Vis cognoscitiva non [4] Again, a knowing power does not
cognoscit aliquid actu nisi adsit know anything in act unless the intention
intentio: unde et phantasmata in be present. Thus, the phantasms
organo conservata interdum non preserved in the organ are not always
actu imaginamur, quia intentio non actually imagined because the intention is
fertur ad ea; appetitus enim alias not directed to them. For among
potentias in actum movet in voluntary agents the appetite moves the
agentibus per voluntatem. Multa other powers to act. We do not
igitur ad quae simul intentio non understand together, therefore, many
fertur, non simul intuemur. Quae things to which the intention is not
autem oportet sub una intentione directed at the same time. But things that
cadere, oportet simul esse must fall under one intention must be
intellecta: qui enim understood together; for he who is
comparationem duorum considering a comparison between two
considerat, intentionem ad things directs his intention to both and
utrumque dirigit et simul intuetur sees both together.
utrumque.
Omnia autem quae sunt in divina [5] Now, all the things that are in the
scientia sub una intentione divine knowledge must fall under one
necesse est cadere. Intendit enim intention. For God intends to see His
Deus suam essentiam perfecte essence perfectly, which is to see it
videre. Quod est videre ipsam according to its whole power, under which
secundum totam virtutem suam, are contained all things. Therefore God,
sub qua omnia concluduntur. by seeing His essence, sees all things
Deus igitur, videndo essentiam together.
suam, simul omnia intuetur.
Amplius. Intellectus successive [6] Furthermore, the intellect of one

multa considerantis impossibile considering successively many things
est esse unam tantum cannot have only one operation. For
operationem: cum enim since operations differ according to their
operationes secundum obiecta objects, the operation by which the first is
differant, oportebit diversam esse considered must be different from the
operationem intellectus qua operation by which the second is
considerabitur primum, et qua considered. But the divine intellect has
considerabitur secundum. only one operation, namely, the divine
Intellectus autem divini est una essence, as we have proved. Therefore,
operatio, quae est sua essentia, ut God considers all that He knows, not
probatum est supra. Non igitur successively, but together.
successive, sed simul omnia sua
cognita considerat.
Adhuc. Successio sine tempore [7] Moreover, succession cannot be

intelligi non potest, nec tempus understood without time nor time without
sine motu: cum tempus sit motion, since time is “the number of
numerus motus secundum prius et motion according to before and after.” But
posterius. In Deo autem there can be no motion in God, as may
impossibile est esse motum be inferred from what we have said.
aliquem, ut ex supra dictis haberi There is, therefore, no succession in the
potest. Nulla igitur est in divine consideration. Thus, all that He
consideratione divina successio. knows God considers together.
Et sic omnia quae cognoscit simul
considerat.
Item. Intelligere Dei est ipsum [8] Then, too, God’s understanding is His

suum esse, ut ex supra dictis being, as is clear from what we have
patet. In esse autem divino non said. But there is no before and after in
est prius et posterius, sed est the divine being; everything is together,
totum simul, ut supra ostensum as was shown above. Neither, therefore,
est. Igitur nec consideratio Dei does the consideration of God contain a
habet prius et posterius, sed before and after, but, rather, understands
omnia simul intelligit. all things together.
Praeterea. Omnis intellectus [9] Every intellect, furthermore, that

intelligens unum post aliud est understands one thing after the other is at
quandoque potentia intelligens et one time potentially understanding and at
quandoque actu: dum enim another time actually understanding. For
intelligit primum in actu, intelligit while it understands the first thing actually
secundum in potentia. Intellectus it understands the second thing
autem divinus nunquam est in potentially. But the divine intellect is never
potentia sed semper actu potentially, but always actually,
intelligens. Non igitur intelligit res understanding. Therefore, it does not
successive, sed omnia simul understand things successively but rather
intelligit. understands them together.
Huic autem veritati testimonium [10] Sacred Scripture bears witness to

sacra Scriptura affert: dicitur enim this truth. For it is written: “With God there
Iac. 117, quod apud Deum non is no change nor shadow of alteration”
est transmutatio nec vicissitudinis (James 1:17).
obumbratio.
Caput 56 Chapter 56
Quod cognitio Dei non est THAT GOD’S KNOWLEDGE IS NOT
habitualis HABITUAL
Ex hoc autem apparet quod in Deo [1] From this it appears that there is no

non est habitualis cognitio. habitual knowledge in God.
In quibuscumque enim est [2] Where there is habitual knowledge,
habitualis cognitio, non omnia simul not all things are known together; some
cognoscuntur, sed dum quaedam are known actually, and some
cognoscuntur actu, alia habitually. But, as we have proved, God
cognoscuntur habitu. Deus autem has actual understanding of all things
omnia simul actu intelligit, ut together. There is, therefore, no habitual
probatum est. Non est igitur in eo knowledge in Him.
habitualis cognitio.
Praeterea. Habens habitum et non [3] Furthermore, he who has a habit and

considerans est quodammodo in is not using it is in a manner in potency,
potentia, aliter tamen quam ante though otherwise than prior to
intelligere. Ostensum est autem understanding. But we have shown that
quod intellectus divinus nullo modo the divine intellect is in no way in
est in potentia. Nullo igitur modo est potency. In no way, therefore, is there
in ipso habitualis cognitio. habitual knowledge in it.
Adhuc. Omnis intellectus [4] Moreover, if an intellect knows

habitualiter aliquid cognoscentis est something habitually, its essence is
aliud eius essentia quam sua other than its intellectual operation,
operatio intellectualis, quae est ipsa which is the consideration itself. For an
consideratio: intellectui enim intellect that knows habitually is lacking
habitualiter cognoscenti deest sua its operation, but its essence cannot be
operatio; non autem eius essentia lacking to it. In God, however, as we
deesse ei potest. In Deo autem sua have proved, His essence is His
essentia est sua operatio, ut supra operation. There is, therefore, no
ostensum est. Non est igitur in eius habitual knowledge in His intellect.
intellectu habitualis cognitio.
Item. Intellectus habitualiter tantum [5] Again, an intellect that knows only
cognoscens non est in sua ultima habitually is not at its highest perfection.
perfectione: unde nec felicitas, quae That is why happiness, which is
est optimum, ponitur secundum something best, is posited in terms of
habitum, sed secundum actum. Si act, not in terms of habit. If, therefore,
igitur Deus est habitualiter God is habitually knowing through His
cognoscens per suam substantiam, substance, considered in His substance
secundum suam substantiam He will not be universally perfect. We
consideratus non erit universaliter have shown the contrary of this
perfectus. Cuius contrarium conclusion.
ostensum est supra.
Amplius. Ostensum est quod ipse [6] It has also been shown that God
est intelligens per essentiam suam, understands through His essence, but
non autem per aliquas species not through any intelligible species
intelligibiles essentiae superadditas. added to His essence. Now, every
Omnis autem intellectus in habitu habitual intellect understands through
per aliquas species intelligit: nam some species. For either a habit confers
habitus vel est habilitatio quaedam on the intellect a certain ability to
intellectus ad recipiendum species receive the intelligible species by which
intelligibiles quibus actu fiat it becomes understanding in act, or else
intelligens; vel est ordinata it is the ordered aggregate of the
aggregatio ipsarum specierum species themselves existing in the
existentium in intellectu non intellect, not according to a complete
secundum completum actum, sed act, but in a way intermediate between
medio modo inter potentiam et potency and act. There is therefore no
actum. Non est igitur in ipso habitual knowledge in God.
habitualis scientia.
Praeterea. Habitus quaedam [7] Then, again, a habit is a certain

qualitas est. Deo autem non potest quality. But no quality or accident can
nec qualitas nec aliquod accidens be added to God, as we have proved.
accidere, ut supra probatum est. Habitual knowledge, therefore, does not
Non igitur Deo competit habitualis befit God.
cognitio.
Quia vero dispositio qua quis est [8] But because the disposition by which

habitu tantum considerans aut one is only habitually considering or
volens vel agens assimilatur willing or doing is likened to the
dispositioni dormientis, hinc est disposition of one sleeping, hence it is
quod David, ut habitualem that, in order to remove any habitual
dispositionem a Deo removeret, disposition from God, David says:
dicit: ecce, non dormitavit neque “Behold He neither slumbers nor
dormiet qui custodit Israel. Hinc sleeps, who keeps Israel” (Ps. 120:4).
etiam est quod Eccli. 2328 dicitur: Hence, also, what is said in Sirach
oculi domini multo sunt lucidiores (23:28): “The eyes of the Lord are far
super solem: nam sol semper est in brighter than the sun”; for the sun is
actu lucendi. always shining.
Caput 57 Chapter 57
Quod cognitio Dei non est THAT GOD’S KNOWLEDGE IS NOT
discursiva DISCURSIVE
Ex hoc autem ulterius habetur quod [1] We thereby further know that the

divina consideratio non est divine consideration is not ratiocinative
ratiocinativa vel discursiva. or discursive.
Tunc enim ratiocinativa est nostra [2] Our consideration is ratiocinative
consideratio quando ab uno when we proceed from the consideration
considerato in aliud transimus, sicut of one thing to another, as when in
syllogizando a principiis in syllogistic reasoning we proceed from
conclusiones. Non enim ex hoc principles to conclusions. For, when
aliquis ratiocinatur vel discurrit someone examines how a conclusion
quod inspicit qualiter conclusio ex follows from premises and considers
praemissis sequatur, simul both together, he is not on this account
utrumque considerans: hoc enim reasoning or discoursing, since this
contingit non argumentando, sed takes place, not by arguing, but by
argumenta iudicando; sicut nec judging the arguments. So, too,
cognitio materialis est ex hoc quod knowledge is not material because it
materialia diiudicat. Ostensum est judges material things. Now, it has been
autem quod Deus non considerat shown that God does not consider one
unum post aliud quasi successive, thing after the other as it were in
sed simul omnia. Non ergo eius succession, but all together. His
cognitio est ratiocinativa vel knowledge, therefore, is not ratiocinative

discursiva: quamvis omnem or discursive, although He knows all
discursum et ratiocinationem discourse and ratiocination.
cognoscat.
Item. Omnis ratiocinans alia [3] Everyone reasoning sees the

consideratione intuetur principia et principle by one consideration and the
conclusionem: non enim oporteret, conclusions by another. There would be
consideratis principiis, ad no need to proceed to conclusions after
conclusionem procedere, si ex hoc the consideration of the principles if by
ipso quod principia considerantur considering the principles we also
conclusiones etiam considered the conclusions. But God
considerarentur. Deus autem knows all things by one operation, His
cognoscit omnia operatione una, essence, as we proved above. His
quae est sua essentia, ut supra knowledge is, therefore, not
probatum est. Non est igitur sua ratiocinative.
cognitio ratiocinativa.
Praeterea. Omnis ratiocinativa [4] Again, all ratiocinative knowledge

cognitio habet aliquid de potentia et contains some potency and some act,
aliquid de actu: nam conclusiones for conclusions are in principles
in principiis sunt in potentia. In potentially. But in the divine intellect
divino autem intellectu potentia potency has no place, as was proved
locum non habet, ut supra above. God’s intellect, therefore, is not
ostensum est. Non est igitur eius discursive.
intellectus discursivus.
Amplius. In omni scientia discursiva [5] Moreover, in all discursive knowledge
oportet aliquid esse causatum: nam there must be something caused, since
principia sunt quodammodo causa principles are in a manner the efficient
efficiens conclusionis; unde et cause of the conclusion. Hence,
demonstratio dicitur syllogismus demonstration is said to be “a syllogism
faciens scire. In divina autem making one to know.” But in the divine
scientia nihil potest esse causatum: knowledge there can be nothing caused,
cum sit ipse Deus, ut ex since it is God Himself, as is clear from
superioribus patet. Dei igitur what has preceded. God’s knowledge,
scientia non potest esse discursiva. therefore, cannot be discursive.
Adhuc. Ea quae naturaliter [6] What is naturally known, furthermore,

cognoscuntur, absque is known to us without ratiocination. But
ratiocinatione nobis sunt nota: sicut in God there can be only natural
patet de primis principiis. Sed in knowledge, indeed, only essential
Deo non potest esse cognitio nisi knowledge; for, as was proved above,
naturalis, immo nisi essentialis: sua His knowledge is His essence. God’s
enim scientia est sua essentia, ut knowledge, therefore, is not
supra probatum est. Dei igitur ratiocinative.
cognitio non est ratiocinativa.
Praeterea. Omnem motum necesse [7] Again, every motion must be reduced
est reduci in primum movens quod to a first mover that is only mover and
est movens tantum et non motum. not moved. That from which the first
Illud igitur a quo est prima origo motion originates, therefore, must be an
motus, oportet omnino esse absolutely unmoved mover. This, as was
movens non motum. Hoc autem est proved above, is the divine intellect. The
intellectus divinus, ut supra divine intellect must, therefore, be an
ostensum est. Oportet igitur absolutely unmoved mover. But
intellectum divinum omnino esse ratiocination is a certain motion of the
moventem non motum. Ratiocinatio intellect proceeding from one thing to
autem est quidam motus intellectus another. Hence, the divine intellect is not
transeuntis ab uno in aliud. Non est ratiocinative.
igitur divinus intellectus
ratiocinativus.
Item. Quod est supremum in nobis [8] Then, too, what is highest in us is
est inferius eo quod in Deo est: lower than what is in God, for the lower
nam inferius non attingit superius reaches the higher only in its own
nisi in sui summo. Supremum highest part. But what is highest in our
autem in nostra cognitione est, non knowledge is, not reason, but intellect,
ratio, sed intellectus, qui est rationis which is the origin of reason. God’s
origo. Dei igitur cognitio non est knowledge, then, is not ratiocinative but
ratiocinativa, sed intellectualis solely intellectual.
tantum.
Amplius. A Deo omnis defectus [9] Moreover, since God is absolutely
removendus est: eo quod ipse est perfect, as we proved above, every
simpliciter perfectus, ut supra defect must be removed from Him. But
ostensum est. Sed ex ratiocinative knowledge arises from an
imperfectione intellectualis naturae imperfection in intellectual nature. For
provenit ratiocinativa cognitio. Nam that which is known through another is
quod per aliud cognoscitur minus less known than what is known through
est notum eo quod per se itself; nor is the nature of the knower
cognoscitur; nec ad id quod per sufficient for knowing that which is
aliud est notum natura known through another without that
cognoscentis sufficit sine eo per through which it is made known. But in
quod fit notum. In cognitione autem ratiocinative knowledge something is
ratiocinativa fit aliquid notum per made known through another, whereas
aliud: quod autem intellectualiter that which is known intellectually is
cognoscitur per se est notum, et ad known through itself, and the nature of
ipsum cognoscendum natura the knower is able to know it without an
cognoscentis sufficit absque external means. Hence, it is manifest
exteriori medio. Unde manifestum that reason is a certain defective
est quod defectivus quidam intellect. Therefore, the divine
intellectus est ratio. Divina igitur knowledge is not ratiocinative.
scientia non est ratiocinativa.
Adhuc. Absque rationis discursu [10] Furthermore, those things whose

comprehenduntur ea quorum species are in the knower are
species sunt in cognoscente: non comprehended without discursive

enim visus discurrit ad lapidem reasoning. For the sight does not
cognoscendum cuius similitudo in proceed discursively to know the stone
visu est. Divina autem essentia est whose likeness it possesses. But the
omnium similitudo, ut supra divine essence, as was shown above, is
probatum est. Non igitur procedit the likeness of all things. Hence, it does
ad aliquid cognoscendum per not proceed to know something through
rationis discursum. discursive reasoning.
Patet etiam solutio eorum quae [11] The solution of those difficulties that

discursum in divinam scientiam seem to introduce discursiveness into
inducere videntur. Tum ex hoc quod the divine knowledge is likewise at hand.
per essentiam suam alia novit. First, because God knows other things
Quod quidem ostensum est non through His essence. For it was shown
fieri discursive: cum eius essentia that this does not take place
se habeat ad alia non sicut discursively, since God’s essence is
principium ad conclusiones, sed related to other things, not as a principle
sicut species ad res cognitas. Tum to conclusions, but as a species to
ex hoc quod inconveniens forte things known. Secondly, because some
aliquibus videretur si Deus might think it unbefitting if God were not
syllogizare non posset. Habet enim able to syllogize. For God possesses the
syllogizandi scientiam tanquam knowledge of syllogizing as one judging,
iudicans, et non sicut syllogizando and not as one proceeding by
discurrens. syllogizing.
Huic autem veritati, rationibus [12] To this truth, which has been
probatae, etiam sacra Scriptura rationally proved, Sacred Scripture
testimonium perhibet. Dicitur enim likewise gives witness. For it is written:
Hebr. 413: omnia nuda et aperta “And things are naked and open to His
sunt oculis eius. Quae enim sight” (Heb. 4:13). For what we know by
ratiocinando scimus non sunt reasoning is not through itself naked and
secundum se nobis nuda et aperta, revealed to us, but is opened and laid
sed ratione aperiuntur et nudantur. bare by reason.
Caput 58 Chapter 58
Quod Deus non intelligit THAT GOD DOES NOT UNDERSTAND
componendo et dividendo BY COMPOSING AND DIVIDING
Per eadem etiam ostendi potest [1] Through the same means we can
quod intellectus divinus non intelligit also show that the divine intellect does
per modum intellectus componentis not understand in the manner of a
et dividentis. composing and dividing intellect.
Cognoscit enim omnia [2] For the divine intellect knows all
cognoscendo essentiam suam. things by knowing its own essence. Now
Essentiam autem suam non it does not know its own essence by
cognoscit componendo et composing and dividing, since it knows
dividendo: cognoscit enim seipsum itself as it is and there is no composition
sicut est: in ipso autem nulla est in it. It does not, therefore, know in the
compositio. Non igitur intelligit per manner of a composing and dividing
modum intellectus componentis et intellect.
dividentis.
Adhuc. Ea quae intellectu [3] Moreover, what is composed and
componuntur et dividuntur nata divided by the intellect is of a nature to
sunt seorsum ab eo considerari: be considered separately by it. For there
compositione enim et divisione would be no need of composition and
opus non esset si in hoc ipso quod division if by apprehending the essence
de aliquo apprehenderetur quid est, of a thing we grasped what belonged in
haberetur quid ei inesset vel non it and what did not. If, then, God
inesset. Si igitur Deus intelligeret understood in the manner of a
per modum intellectus componentis composing and dividing intellect, it
et dividentis, sequeretur quod non would follow that He did not consider all
uno intuitu omnia consideraret, sed things by one intuition but each thing
seorsum unumquodque. Cuius separately. We have shown the contrary
contrarium supra est ostensum. of this above.
Amplius. In Deo non potest esse [4] Furthermore, there can be no before

prius et posterius. Compositio and after in God. But composition and
autem et divisio posterior est division come after the consideration of
consideratione eius quod quid est, the essence, which is their principle.
quae est eius principium. In Hence, composition and division cannot
operatione igitur divini intellectus be found in the operation of the divine
compositio et divisio esse non intellect.
potest.
Item. Proprium obiectum intellectus [5] Again, the proper object of the
est quod quid est: unde circa hoc intellect is what a thing is. Hence, in
non decipitur intellectus nisi per relation to what a thing is the intellect
accidens, circa compositionem suffers no deception except by accident,
autem et divisionem decipitur; sicut whereas as concerns composition and
et sensus qui est propriorum division it is deceived. So, too, a sense
semper est verus, in aliis autem dealing with its proper sensibles is
fallitur. In intellectu autem divino always true, but in other cases it is
non est aliquid per accidens, sed deceived. But in the divine intellect there
solum quod per se est. In divino is nothing accidental, but only that which
igitur intellectu non est compositio is substantial. In the divine intellect,
et divisio sed solum simplex rei therefore, there is no composition and
acceptio. division, but only the simple
apprehension of a thing.
Amplius. Propositionis per [6] Furthermore, in the case of a

intellectum componentem et proposition formed by a composing and
dividentem formatae compositio in dividing intellect, the composition itself

ipso intellectu existit, non in re quae exists in the intellect, not in the thing
est extra animam. Si igitur that is outside the soul. If the divine
intellectus divinus de rebus iudicet intellect should judge of things in the
per modum intellectus componentis manner of a composing and dividing
et dividentis, erit intellectus ipse intellect, the intellect itself will be
compositus. Quod est impossibile, composite. This is impossible, as is
ut ex supra dictis patet. clear from what has been said.
Item. Intellectus componens et [7] Again, the composing and dividing

dividens diversis compositionibus intellect judges diverse things by diverse
diversa diiudicat: compositio enim compositions, for the composition of the
intellectus compositionis terminos intellect does not exceed the terms of
non excedit; unde compositione the composition. Hence, the intellect
qua intellectus diiudicat hominem does not judge the triangle to be a figure
esse animal, non diiudicat by the same composition by which it
triangulum esse figuram. judges man to be an animal. Now,
Compositio autem vel divisio composition or division is a certain
operatio quaedam intellectus est. Si operation of the intellect. If, then, God
igitur Deus res considerat considers things by means of
componendo et dividendo, sequetur composing and dividing, it will follow that
quod suum intelligere non sit unum His understanding is not solely one but
tantum sed multiplex. Et sic etiam many. And thus His essence, as well,
sua essentia non erit una tantum: will not be solely one, since His
cum sua operatio intellectualis sit intellectual operation is His essence, as
sua essentia, ut supra ostensum was proved above.
est.
Non autem propter hoc oportet nos [8] But it is not on this account

dicere quod enuntiabilia ignorat. necessary for us to say that God does
Nam essentia sua, cum sit una et not know enunciables. For His essence,
simplex, exemplar est omnium being one and simple, is the exemplar of
multiplicium et compositorum. Et sic all manifold and composite things. And
per ipsam Deus omnem thus God knows through His essence all
multitudinem et compositionem tam multitude and composition both of
naturae quam rationis cognoscit. nature and of reason.
His autem sacrae Scripturae [9] With these conclusions the authority
auctoritas consonat. Dicitur enim of Sacred Scripture is in harmony. For it
Isaiae 558 non enim cogitationes is said in Isaiah (55:8): “For My thoughts
meae cogitationes vestrae. Et are not your thoughts.” Yet it is said in a
tamen in Psalmo dicitur: dominus Psalm (93:11): “The Lord knows the
scit cogitationes hominum, quas thoughts of men,” which thoughts
constat per compositionem et evidently proceed through composition
divisionem intellectus procedere. and division in the intellect.
Dionysius etiam dicit, VII cap. de [10] Dionysius likewise says: “Therefore,

Div. Nom.: igitur divina sapientia, in knowing itself, the divine wisdom
seipsam cognoscens, cognoscit knows all thingsthe material

omnia, et materialia immaterialiter immaterially, the divisible indivisibly, and
et indivisibiliter divisibilia et multa the many unitedly” [De div. nom. VII, 2].
unitive.
Caput 59 Chapter 59
Quod a Deo non excluditur veritas THAT THE TRUTH OF
enuntiabilium ENUNCIABLES IS NOT EXCLUDED
FROM GOD
Ex hoc autem apparet quod, licet [1] From this it may be seen that,
divini intellectus cognitio non se although the knowledge of the divine
habeat ad modum intellectus intellect is not of the sort belonging to
componentis et dividentis, non an intellect that composes and divides,
tamen excluditur ab eo veritas, quae, truth, which according to the
secundum philosophum, solum circa Philosopher is found only in the
compositionem et divisionem composition and division of the intellect
intellectus est. [Metaph. V, 4; De anima III, 6], is yet
not excluded from it.
Cum enim veritas intellectus sit [2] For, since the truth of the intellect is

adaequatio intellectus et rei, “the adequation of intellect and thing,”
secundum quod intellectus dicit esse inasmuch as the intellect says that
quod est vel non esse quod non est, what is is and what is not is not, truth
ad illud in intellectu veritas pertinet belongs to that in the intellect which
quod intellectus dicit, non ad the intellect says, not to the operation
operationem qua illud dicit. Non enim by which it says it. For the intellect to
ad veritatem intellectus exigitur ut be true it is not required that its act of
ipsum intelligere rei aequetur, cum understanding be adequated to the
res interdum sit materialis, intelligere thing known, since the thing is
vero immateriale: sed illud quod sometimes material whereas the act of
intellectus intelligendo dicit et understanding is immaterial. Rather,
cognoscit, oportet esse rei what the intellect in understanding
aequatum, ut scilicet ita sit in re sicut says and knows must be adequated to
intellectus dicit. Deus autem sua the thing, so that, namely, the thing be
simplici intelligentia, in qua non est such as the intellect says it to be. Now,
compositio et divisio, cognoscit non by His simple understanding, in which
solum rerum quidditates, sed etiam there is no composition and division,
enuntiationes, ut ostensum est. Et God knows not only the quiddities of
sic illud quod intellectus divinus things but also enunciations, as has
intelligendo dicit est compositio et been shown. Hence, that which the
divisio. Non ergo excluditur veritas divine intellect says in understanding is
ab intellectu divino ratione suae composition and division. Therefore,
simplicitatis. truth is not excluded from the divine
intellect by reason of its simplicity.
Amplius. Cum aliquod incomplexum [1] When the incomplex is said or
vel dicitur vel intelligitur, ipsum understood, the incomplex, of itself, is
quidem incomplexum, quantum est neither equated to a thing nor unequal
de se, non est rei aequatum nec rei to it. For equality and inequality are by
inaequale: cum aequalitas et relation, whereas the incomplex, of
inaequalitas secundum itself, does not imply any relation or
comparationem dicantur; application to a thing. Hence, of itself, it
incomplexum autem, quantum est de can be said to be neither true nor false;
se, non continet aliquam but the complex can, in which the
comparationem vel applicationem ad relation of the incomplex to a thing is
rem. Unde de se nec verum nec designated by a sign of composition or
falsum dici potest: sed tantum division. Nevertheless, the incomplex
complexum, in quo designatur intellect in understanding what a thing
comparatio incomplexi ad rem per is apprehends the quiddity of a thing in
notam compositionis aut divisionis. a certain relation to the thing, because
Intellectus tamen incomplexus, it apprehends it as the quiddity of that
intelligendo quod quid est, thing. Hence although the incomplex
apprehendit quidditatem rei in itself, or even a definition, is not in itself
quadam comparatione ad rem: quia true or false, nevertheless the intellect
apprehendit eam ut huius rei that apprehends what a thing is is
quidditatem. Unde, licet ipsum always said to be through itself true, as
incomplexum, vel etiam definitio, non appears in De anima III [6], although it
sit secundum se verum vel falsum, can be by accident false, in so far as a
tamen intellectus apprehendens definition includes some composition
quod quid est dicitur quidem per se either of the parts of a definition with
semper esse verus, ut patet in III de one another or of the whole definition
anima; etsi per accidens possit esse with the thing defined. Hence,
falsus, inquantum vel definitio according as the definition is
includit aliquam complexionem, vel understood to be the definition of this
partium definitionis ad invicem, vel or that thing, as it is received by the
totius definitionis ad definitum. Unde intellect, it will be called absolutely
definitio dicetur, secundum quod false if the parts of the definition do not
intelligitur ut huius vel illius rei belong together, as if we should say
definitio, secundum quod ab insensible animal; or it will be called
intellectu accipitur, vel simpliciter false with reference to a given thing, as
falsa, si partes definitionis non when the definition of a circle is taken
cohaereant invicem, ut si dicatur as that of a triangle. Given, therefore,
animal insensibile; vel falsa by an impossible supposition, that the
secundum hanc rem, prout definitio divine intellect knew only incomplexes,
circuli accipitur ut trianguli. Dato it would still be true in knowing its own
igitur, per impossibile, quod quiddity as its own.
intellectus divinus solum incomplexa
cognosceret, adhuc esset verus,
cognoscendo suam quidditatem ut
suam.
Adhuc. Divina simplicitas [4] Again, the divine simplicity does not

perfectionem non excludit: quia in exclude perfection, because it
suo esse simplici habet quicquid possesses in its simple being whatever
perfectionis in aliis rebus per of perfection is found in other things
quandam aggregationem through a certain aggregation of

perfectionum seu formarum perfections or forms, as was shown
invenitur, ut supra ostensum est. above. But in apprehending
Intellectus autem noster, incomplexes, our intellect does not yet
apprehendendo incomplexa, reach its ultimate perfection, because it
nondum pertingit ad ultimam suam is still in potency to composition or
perfectionem, quia adhuc est in division. So, too, among natural things,
potentia respectu compositionis vel the simple are in potency with
divisionis: sicut et in naturalibus reference to the mixed, and the parts
simplicia sunt in potentia respectu with reference to the whole. According
commixtorum, et partes respectu to His simple understanding, therefore,
totius. Deus igitur secundum suam God has that perfection of knowledge
simplicem intelligentiam illam that our intellect has through both
perfectionem cognitionis habet quam knowledges, that of complexes and
intellectus noster habet per that of incomplexes. But our intellect
utramque cognitionem, et reaches truth in its perfect knowledge,
complexorum et incomplexorum. that is to say, when it already has
Sed veritas consequitur intellectum arrived at composition. Therefore, in
nostrum in sui perfecta cognitione, the simple understanding of God as
quando iam usque ad well there is truth.
compositionem pervenit. Ergo et in
ipsa simplici Dei intelligentia est
veritas.
Item. Cum Deus omnis boni bonum [5] Again, since God is the good of
sit, utpote omnes bonitates in se every good, as having every goodness
habens, ut supra ostensum est, in Himself, as has been shown above,
bonitas intellectus ei deesse non the goodness of the intellect cannot be
potest. Sed verum est bonum lacking to Him. But the true is the good
intellectus: ut patet per philosophum, of the intellect, as appears from the
in VI Ethicorum. Ergo veritas in Deo Philosopher [Ethics VI, 2]. Therefore,
est. truth is in God.
Et hoc est quod dicitur in Psalmo: est [6] And this is what is said in a Psalm:
autem Deus verax. “But God is true” (Rom. 3:4).
Caput 60 Chapter 60
Quod Deus est veritas THAT GOD IS TRUTH
Ex praemissis autem apparet quod [1] From the foregoing it is evident that

ipse Deus est veritas. God Himself is truth.
Veritas enim quaedam perfectio est [2] Truth is a certain perfection of
intelligentiae, sive intellectualis understanding or of intellectual
operationis, ut dictum est. Intelligere operation, as has been said. But the
autem Dei est sua substantia. understanding of God is His substance.
Ipsum etiam intelligere, cum sit Furthermore, since this understanding

divinum esse, ut ostensum est, non is, as we have shown, the divine being,
supervenienti aliqua perfectione it is not perfected through any
perfectum est, sed est per seipsum superadded perfection; it is perfect
perfectum: sicut et de divino esse through itself, in the same manner as
supra ostensum est. Relinquitur we have shown of the divine being. It
igitur quod divina substantia sit ipsa remains, therefore, that the divine
veritas. substance is truth itself.
Item. Veritas est quaedam bonitas [3] Again, according to the Philosopher,

intellectus, secundum philosophum. truth is a certain goodness of the
Deus autem est sua bonitas, ut intellect. But God is His own goodness,
supra ostensum est. Ergo est etiam as we have shown above. Therefore,
sua veritas. He is likewise His own truth.
Praeterea. De Deo nihil participative [4] Furthermore, nothing can be said of
dici potest: cum sit suum esse, quod God by participation, since He is His
nihil participat. Sed veritas est in own being, which participates in
Deo, ut supra ostensum est. Si igitur nothing. But, as was shown above,
non dicatur participative, oportet there is truth in God. If, then, it is not
quod dicatur essentialiter. Deus said by participation, it must be said
ergo est sua veritas. essentially. Therefore, God is His truth.
Amplius. Licet verum proprie non sit [5] Moreover, although, according to the
in rebus sed in mente, secundum Philosopher, the true is properly not in
philosophum, res tamen interdum things but in the mind, a thing is at
vera dicitur, secundum quod proprie times said to be true when it reaches in
actum propriae naturae consequitur. a proper way the act of its own nature.
Unde Avicenna dicit, in sua Hence, Avicenna says in his
metaphysica, quod veritas rei est Metaphysics that “the truth of a thing is
proprietas esse uniuscuiusque rei the property of the being established in
quod stabilitum est ei, inquantum each thing” [VIII, 6]. This is so in so far
talis res nata est de se facere veram as each thing is of a nature to give a
aestimationem, et inquantum true account of itself and in so far as it
propriam sui rationem quae est in imitates the model of itself which is in
mente divina, imitatur. Sed Deus est the divine mind. But God is His
sua essentia. Ergo, sive de veritate essence. Therefore, whether we speak
intellectus loquamur sive de veritate of the truth of the intellect or of the truth
rei, Deus est sua veritas. of a thing, God is His truth.
Hoc autem confirmatur auctoritate [6] This is confirmed by the authority of

domini de se dicentis, Ioan. 146: our Lord, Who says of Himself: “I am
ego sum via, veritas et vita. the way, and the truth, and the life”
(John 14:6).
Caput 61 Chapter 61
Quod Deus est purissima veritas THAT GOD IS THE PUREST TRUTH
[1] It is clear from this demonstration that
in God there is pure truth, with which no
falsity or deception can be mingled.
Hoc autem ostenso, manifestum [2] For truth is not compatible with falsity,

est quod in Deo est pura veritas, as neither is whiteness with blackness.
cui nulla falsitas vel deceptio But God is not only true, He is truth itself.
admisceri potest. Therefore, there can be no falsity in Him.
Veritas enim falsitatem non [not in translation] For truth excludes
compatitur: sicut nec albedo falsity, just as whitness excludes
nigredinem. Deus autem non blackness. But God is not only true, but
solum est verus, sed est ipsa truth itself. Therefore there can be no
veritas. Ergo in eo falsitas esse falsity in him.
non potest.
Amplius. Intellectus non decipitur in [3] Moreover, the intellect is not deceived
cognoscendo quod quid est: sicut in knowing what a thing is, just as the
nec sensus in proprio sensibili. sense is not deceived in its proper
Omnis autem cognitio divini sensible. But, as we have shown, all the
intellectus se habet ad modum knowledge of the divine intellect is in the
intellectus cognoscentis quod quid manner of an intellect knowing what a
est, ut ostensum est. Impossibile thing is. It is impossible, therefore, that
est igitur in divina cognitione there be error or deception or falsity in
errorem sive deceptionem aut the divine knowledge.
falsitatem esse.
Praeterea. Intellectus in primis [4] Furthermore, the intellect does not err

principiis non errat, sed in in the case of first principles; it errs at
conclusionibus interdum, ad quas times in the case of conclusions at which
ex principiis primis ratiocinando it arrives by reasoning from first
procedit. Intellectus autem divinus principles. But the divine intellect, as we
non est ratiocinativus aut have shown above, is not ratiocinative or
discursivus, ut supra ostensum est. discursive. Therefore, there cannot be
Non igitur potest esse in ipso falsity or deception in it.
falsitas aut deceptio.
Item. Quanto aliqua vis [5] Again, the higher a knowing power,
cognoscitiva est altior, tanto eius so much the more universal is its proper
proprium obiectum est object, containing several objects under
universalius, plura sub se it. Thus, that which sight knows by
continens: unde illud quod visus accident the common sense or the
cognoscit per accidens, sensus imagination apprehends as contained
communis aut imaginatio under its proper object. But the power of
apprehendit ut sub proprio obiecto the divine intellect is at the very peak of
contentum. Sed vis divini elevation in knowing. Hence, all
intellectus est in fine sublimitatis in knowable objects are related to it as
cognoscendo. Ergo omnia knowable properly ,and essentially and

cognoscibilia comparantur ad not by accident. In such cases, however,
ipsum sicut cognoscibilia proprie et the knowing power does not err.
per se et non secundum accidens. Therefore, the divine intellect cannot err
In talibus autem virtus cognoscitiva in the case of any knowable object.
non errat. In nullo igitur cognoscibili
possibile est divinum intellectum
errare.
Amplius. Virtus intellectualis est [6] Moreover, intellectual virtue is a

quaedam perfectio intellectus in certain perfection of the intellect in
cognoscendo. Secundum autem knowing. But according to intellectual
virtutem intellectualem non virtue no intellect expresses what is
contingit intellectum falsum dicere, false, but always what is true; for to
sed semper verum: verum enim speak the true is the good of the act of
dicere est bonus actus intellectus, the intellect, and it belongs to virtue “to
virtutis autem est actum bonum make an act good.” But the divine
reddere. Sed divinus intellectus intellect, being at the peak of perfection,
perfectior est per suam naturam is more perfect through its nature than
quam intellectus humanus per the human intellect is through the habit
habitum virtutis: est enim in fine of virtue. It remains, therefore, that there
perfectionis. Relinquitur igitur quod cannot be falsity in the divine intellect.
in intellectu divino non potest esse
falsitas.
Adhuc. Scientia intellectus humani [7] Furthermore, the knowledge of the
a rebus quodammodo causatur: human intellect is in a manner caused by
unde provenit quod scibilia sunt things. Hence it is that knowable things
mensura scientiae humanae; ex are the measure of human knowledge;
hoc enim verum est quod intellectu for something that is judged to be so by
diiudicatur, quia res ita se habet, et the intellect is true because it is so in
non e converso. Intellectus autem reality, and not conversely. But the divine
divinus per suam scientiam est intellect through its knowledge is the
causa rerum. Unde oportet quod cause of things. Hence, its knowledge is
scientia eius sit mensura rerum: the measure of things, in the same way
sicut ars est mensura as an art is the measure of artifacts,
artificiatorum, quorum each one of which is perfect in so far as
unumquodque in tantum perfectum it agrees with the art. The divine intellect,
est inquantum arti concordat. Talis therefore, is related to things as things
igitur est comparatio intellectus are related to the human intellect. But
divini ad res qualis rerum ad the falsity that is caused by the lack of
intellectum humanum. Falsitas equality between the human intellect and
autem causata ex inaequalitate a thing is not in reality but in the intellect.
intellectus humani et rei non est in If, therefore, there were no adequation
rebus, sed in intellectu. Si igitur whatever of the divine intellect to things,
non esset omnimoda adaequatio the falsity would be found in things and
intellectus divini ad res, falsitas not in the divine intellect. Nevertheless,
esset in rebus, non in intellectu there is no falsity in things, because, so
divino. Nec tamen in rebus est far as each thing has being, to that
falsitas: quia quantum extent does it have truth. There is,
unumquodque habet de esse, therefore, no inequality between the

tantum habet de veritate. Nulla divine intellect and things, nor can there
igitur inaequalitas est inter be any falsity in the divine intellect.
intellectum divinum et res; nec
aliqua falsitas in intellectu divino
esse potest.
Item. Sicut verum est bonum [8] Again, as the true is the good of the
intellectus, ita falsum est malum intellect, so the false is its evil. For we
ipsius: naturaliter enim appetimus naturally seek to know the truth and flee
verum cognoscere et refugimus from being deceived by the false. But, as
falso decipi. Malum autem in Deo we have proved, there can be no evil in
esse non potest, ut probatum est. God. Hence, there can be no falsity in
Non potest igitur in eo esse Him.
falsitas.
Hinc est quod dicitur Rom. 34: est [9] Hence it is written: “But God is true”
autem Deus verax; et Num. 2319: (Rom. 3:4); and in Numbers (23:19):
non est Deus ut homo, ut “God is not a man, that He should lie”;
mentiatur; et I Ioan. 15: Deus lux and in John (I, 1:5): “God is light, and in
est et tenebrae in eo non sunt Him there is no darkness.”
ullae.
Caput 62 Chapter 62
Quod divina veritas est prima et THAT THE DIVINE TRUTH IS THE
summa veritas FIRST AND HIGHEST TRUTH
Ex his autem quae ostensa sunt [1] From what we have shown it clearly
manifeste habetur quod divina results that the divine truth is the first and
veritas sit prima et summa veritas. highest truth.
Sicut enim est dispositio rerum in [2] As is clear from the Philosopher,
esse, ita et in veritate, ut patet per things are disposed in truth as they are
philosophum, in II Metaph.: et hoc disposed in being. The reason for this is
ideo quia verum et ens se invicem that the true and being follow one
consequuntur; est enim verum cum another; for the true then exists when
dicitur esse quod est vel non esse that which is is said to be and that which
quod non est. Sed divinum esse is not is said not to be. But the divine
est primum et perfectissimum. being is first and most perfect. Therefore,
Ergo et sua veritas est prima et its truth is the first and highest truth.
summa.
Item. Quod per essentiam alicui [3] Again, what belongs to a thing
convenit, perfectissime ei convenit. essentially belongs to it most perfectly.
Sed veritas Deo attribuitur But, as we have shown, truth is said of
essentialiter, ut ostensum est. Sua God essentially. Therefore, His truth is
igitur veritas est summa et prima the highest and first truth.
veritas.
Praeterea. Veritas in nostro [4] Furthermore, there is truth in our
intellectu ex hoc est quod intellect because it is adequated to the
adaequatur rei intellectae. thing that the intellect understands. But,
Aequalitatis autem causa est as can be seen in Metaphysics V [15],
unitas, ut patet in V metaphysicae. unity is the cause of equality. Since,
Cum igitur in intellectu divino sit then, in the divine intellect the intellect
omnino idem intellectus et quod and that which it understands are
intelligitur, sua veritas erit prima et absolutely one, its truth is the first and
summa veritas. highest truth.
Amplius. Illud quod est mensura in [5] Moreover, that which is the measure

unoquoque genere, est in any given genus is most perfect in that
perfectissimum illius generis: unde genus. That is why all colors are
omnes colores mensurantur albo. measured by white. But the divine truth
Sed divina veritas est mensura is the measure of all truth. For the truth
omnis veritatis. Veritas enim nostri of our intellect is measured by the thing
intellectus mensuratur a re quae outside the soul, since our intellect is
est extra animam, ex hoc enim said to be true because it is in
intellectus noster verus dicitur quod agreement with the thing that it knows.
consonat rei: veritas autem rei On the other hand, the truth of a thing is
mensuratur ad intellectum divinum, measured by the divine intellect, which is
qui est causa rerum, ut infra the cause of things, as will later on be
probabitur; sicut veritas proved. In the same way, the truth of
artificiatorum ab arte artificis; tunc artifacts comes from the art of the
enim vera est arca quando artisan, for a chest is then true when it
consonat arti. Cum etiam Deus sit agrees with its art. And since God is the
primus intellectus et primum first intellect and the first intelligible, the
intelligibile, oportet quod veritas truth of any given intellect must be
intellectus cuiuslibet eius veritate measured by the truth of His intellect—if,
mensuretur: si unumquodque as the Philosopher teaches, each thing is
mensuratur primo sui generis, ut measured by that which is first in its
philosophus tradit, in X genus. The divine truth, therefore, is the
metaphysicae. Divina igitur veritas first, highest, and most perfect truth.
est prima, summa et perfectissima
veritas.
Caput 63 Chapter 63
Rationes volentium subtrahere THE ARGUMENTS OF THOSE WHO
Deo cognitionem singularium WISH TO TAKE AWAY THE
KNOWLEDGE OF SINGULARS
FROM GOD
Sunt autem quidam qui perfectioni [1] Now, there are certain persons who

divinae cognitionis singularium are trying to take away the knowledge
notitiam subtrahere nituntur. Ad quod of singulars from the perfection of the
quidem confirmandum septem viis divine knowledge. They use seven
procedunt. ways to confirm their position.
Prima est ex ipsa singularitatis [2] The first way is based on the very
conditione. Cum enim singularitatis condition of singularity. For the
principium sit materia signata, non principle of singularity is designated
videtur per aliquam virtutem matter, and hence it seems that
immaterialem singularia posse singulars cannot be known by any
cognosci, si omnis cognitio per immaterial power, given that all
quandam assimilationem fiat. Unde knowledge takes place through a
et in nobis illae solae potentiae certain assimilation. So, too, in our own
singularia apprehendunt quae case only those powers apprehend
materialibus organis utuntur, ut singulars that make use of material
imaginatio et sensus et huiusmodi; organs, for example, the imagination,
intellectus autem noster, quia the senses, and the like. But because it
immaterialis est, singularia non is immaterial, our intellect does not
cognoscit. Multo igitur minus know singulars. Much less, therefore,
intellectus divinus singularium est does the divine intellect know
cognoscitivus, qui maxime a materia singulars, being the most removed
recedit. Et sic nullo modo videtur from matter. Thus, in no way does it
quod Deus singularia cognoscere seem that God can know singulars.
possit.
Secunda est quod singularia non [3] The second way is based on the
semper sunt. Aut igitur semper fact that singulars do not always exist.
scientur a Deo: aut quandoque Therefore, either they will be known by
scientur et quandoque non scientur. God always, or they will be known at
Primum esse non potest: quia de eo some time and not at another. The first
quod non est non potest esse alternative is impossible, since of that
scientia, quae solum verorum est; ea which does not exist there can be no
autem quae non sunt, vera esse non knowledge; knowledge deals only with
possunt. Secundum etiam esse non what is true, and what does not exist
potest: quia divini intellectus cognitio cannot be true. Nor is the second
est omnino invariabilis, ut ostensum alternative possible, since, as we have
est. shown, the knowledge of the divine
intellect is absolutely unchangeable.
Tertia, ex eo quod non omnia [4] The third way is based on the fact
singularia de necessitate proveniunt, that not all singulars come to be of
sed quaedam contingenter. Unde de necessity but some happen
eis certa cognitio esse non potest contingently. Hence, there can be a
nisi quando sunt. Certa enim cognitio certain knowledge of them only when
est quae falli non potest: cognitio they exist. Now, that knowledge is
autem omnis quae est de certain which cannot be deceived. But
contingenti, cum futurum est, falli all knowledge of the contingent can be
potest; potest enim evenire deceived when the contingent is future,
oppositum eius quod cognitione since the opposite of what is held by
tenetur; si enim non posset knowledge can happen; for, if it could
oppositum evenire, iam necessarium not happen, it would then be
esset. Unde et de contingentibus necessary. Hence it is that we cannot
futuris non potest esse in nobis have any knowledge of future
scientia, sed coniecturalis aestimatio contingents, but only a certain
quaedam. Supponere autem oportet conjectural estimation. Now, we must
omnem Dei cognitionem esse suppose that all God’s knowledge is,
certissimam et infallibilem, ut supra as we have shown, most certain and
ostensum est. Impassibile est etiam infallible. And because of His
quod Deus aliquid de novo immutability, as we have said, it is
cognoscere incipiat, propter eius impossible for God to begin to know
immutabilitatem, ut dictum est. Ex something anew. From all this it seems
his igitur videtur sequi quod to follow that God does not know
singularia contingentia non contingent singulars.
cognoscat.
Quarta est ex hoc quod quorundam [5] The fourth way is based on the fact

singularium causa est voluntas. that the will is the cause of some
Effectus autem, antequam sit, non singulars. Before it exists, an effect can
potest nisi in sua causa cognosci: sic be known only in its cause, since,
enim solum esse potest antequam in before it begins to be, this is the only
se esse incipiat. Motus autem way for an effect to exist. But the
voluntatis a nullo possunt per motions of the will can be known with
certitudinem cognosci nisi a volente, certitude only by the one willing, in
in cuius potestate sunt. Impossibile whose power they lie. It seems
igitur videtur quod Deus de impossible, therefore, that God should
huiusmodi singularibus quae causam have an eternal knowledge of such
ex voluntate sumunt, notitiam singulars as are caused by the will.
aeternam habeat.
Quinta est ex singularium infinitate. [6] The fifth way is based on the infinity

Infinitum enim, inquantum of singulars. The infinite as such is
huiusmodi, est ignotum: nam omne unknown. Everything that is known is
quod cognoscitur sub cognoscentis in a manner measured by the
comprehensione quodammodo comprehension of the knower, since
mensuratur; cum mensuratio nihil this “measure” is nothing other than a
aliud sit quam quaedam certificatio certain certification of the measured
rei mensuratae. Unde omnis ars thing. That is why every art repudiates
infinita repudiat. Singularia autem the infinite. But singulars are infinite, at
sunt infinita, ad minus in potentia. least potentially. It seems impossible,
Impossibile igitur videtur quod Deus then, that God knows singulars.
singularia cognoscat.
Sexta est ex ipsa vilitate singularium. [7] The sixth way is based on the very
Cum enim nobilitas scientiae ex lowliness of singulars. Since the dignity
nobilitate scibilis quodammodo of a science is in a way determined
pensetur, vilitas etiam scibilis in from the dignity of its object, the
vilitatem scientiae redundare videtur. lowliness of the knowable object
Divinus autem intellectus likewise seems to redound to the

nobilissimus est. Non igitur eius lowliness of the science. But the divine
nobilitas patitur quod Deus quaedam intellect is most noble. Its nobility,
vilissima inter singularia cognoscat. therefore, forbids that it should know
certain of the lowliest among singulars.
Septima est ex malitia quae in [8] The seventh way is based on the
quibusdam singularibus invenitur. evil found in some singulars. For, since
Cum enim cognitum sit aliquo modo that which is known is found in the
in cognoscente; malum autem in knower in a certain way, and there can
Deo esse non possit, ut supra be no evil in God, as was shown
ostensum est: videtur sequi quod above, it seems to follow that God has
Deus malum et privationem omnino absolutely no knowledge of evil and
non cognoscat, sed solum intellectus privation. This is known only by an
qui est in potentia; privatio enim non intellect that is in potency, for privation
nisi in potentia esse potest. Et ex can exist only in potency. From this it
hoc sequitur quod non habeat Deus follows that God has no knowledge of
de singularium notitiam, in quibus the singulars in which there is evil and
malum et privatio invenitur. privation.
Caput 64 Chapter 64
Ordo dicendorum circa divinam THE ORDER OF WHAT IS TO BE
cognitionem SAID ON THE DIVINE KNOWLEDGE
Ad huius autem erroris exclusionem; [1] To remove this error, and likewise
ut etiam divinae scientiae perfectio to show the perfection of the divine
ostendatur; oportet diligenter knowledge, we must diligently look into
veritatem inquirere circa singula the truth of each of the above ways, so
praedictorum, ut ea quae sunt veritati that what is opposed to the truth may
contraria repellantur. Primo, ergo, be refuted. We shall first show, then,
ostendemus quod divinus intellectus that the divine intellect knows
singularia cognoscit. Secundo, quod singulars. Second, we shall show that
cognoscit ea quae non sunt in actu. it knows what does not exist in act.
Tertio, quod cognoscit contingentia Third, that it knows future contingents
futura infallibili cognitione. Quarto, with an infallible knowledge. Fourth,
quod cognoscit motus voluntatis. that it knows the motions of the will.
Quinto, quod cognoscit infinita. Fifth, that it knows infinite things. Sixth,
Sexto, quod cognoscit quaelibet vilia that it knows every lowly and least
et minima in entibus. Septimo, quod thing among beings. Seventh, that it
cognoscit mala et privationes knows evils and all privations and
quaslibet vel defectus. defects.
Caput 65 Chapter 65
Quod Deus singularia cognoscat THAT GOD KNOWS SINGULARS
Primo igitur ostendemus quod [1] We shall therefore first show that the

singularium cognitio Deo non potest knowledge of singulars cannot be
deesse. lacking to God.
Ostensum enim est supra quod [2] It was shown above that God knows

Deus cognoscit alia inquantum est other things in so far as He is their
causa eis. Effectus autem Dei sunt cause. Now, singular things are God's
res singulares. Hoc enim modo effects. God causes things in so far as
Deus causat res, inquantum facit He makes them to be in act. Universals,
eas esse in actu: universalia autem on the other hand, are not subsisting
non sunt res subsistentes, sed things, but rather have being only in
habent esse solum in singularibus, singulars, as is proved in Metaphysics
ut probatur in VII metaphysicae. VII [13]. God, therefore, knows things
Deus igitur cognoscit res alias a se other than Himself, not only universally,
non solum in universali, sed etiam in but also in the singular.
singulari.
Item. Cognitis principiis ex quibus [3] Again, by knowing the principles of
constituitur essentia rei, necesse est which the essence of a thing is
rem illam cognosci: sicut, cognita composed, we necessarily know that
anima rationali et corpore tali, thing itself. Thus, by knowing a rational
cognoscitur homo. Singularis autem soul and a certain sort of body, we know
essentia constituitur ex materia man. Now, the singular essence is
designata et forma individuata: sicut composed of designated matter and
Socratis essentia ex hoc corpore et individuated form. Thus, the essence of
hac anima, ut essentia hominis Socrates is composed of this body and
universalis ex anima et corpore, ut this soul, just as the universal essence
patet in VII metaphysicae. Unde, of man is composed of soul and body,
sicut haec cadunt in definitione as may be seen in Metaphysics VII [10].
hominis universalis, ita illa caderent Hence, just as the latter principles fall
in definitione Socratis si posset within the definition of universal man, so
definiri. Cuicumque igitur adest the former principles would fall in the
cognitio materiae, et eorum per definition of Socrates if he could be
quae materia designatur, et formae defined. Hence, whoever has a
in materia individuatae, ei non knowledge of matter and of what
potest deesse cognitio singularis. designates matter, and also of form
Sed Dei cognitio usque ad materiam individuated in matter, must have a
et accidentia individuantia et formas knowledge of the singular. But the
pertingit. Cum enim suum intelligere knowledge of Cod extends to matter
sit sua essentia, oportet quod and to individuating accidents and
intelligat omnia quae sunt forms. For, since His understanding is
quocumque modo in eius essentia; His essence, He must understand all
in qua quidem virtute sunt, sicut in things that in any way are in His
prima origine, omnia quae esse essence. Now, within His essence, as
quocumque modo habent, cum sit within the first source, there are virtually
primum et universale essendi present all things that in any way have
principium; a quibus materia et being, since He is the first and universal
accidens non sunt aliena, cum principle of being. Matter and accidents

materia sit ens in potentia et are not absent from among these
accidens sit ens in alio. Deo igitur things, since matter is a being in
cognitio singularium non deest. potency and an accident is a being in
another. Therefore, the knowledge of
singulars is not lacking to God.
Amplius. Natura generis perfecte [4] Moreover, the nature of a genus
non potest cognosci nisi eius cannot be known perfectly unless its
differentiae primae et passiones first differences and proper attributes
propriae cognoscantur: non enim are known. The nature of number would
perfecte sciretur natura numeri si not be known perfectly if the even and
par et impar ignorarentur. Sed the odd were not known. But universal
universale et singulare sunt and singular are differences or essential
differentiae, vel per se passiones attributes of being. If, then, in knowing
entis. Si igitur Deus, cognoscendo His essence God knows perfectly the
essentiam suam, perfecte cognoscit common nature of being, He must know
naturam communem entis, oportet the universal and the singular perfectly.
quod perfecte cognoscat universale But, just as He would not know the
et singulare. Sicut autem non universal perfectly if He knew the
perfecte cognosceret universale si intention of universality and did not
cognosceret intentionem know the universal reality, for example,
universalitatis et non cognosceret man or animal, so He would not know
rem universalem, ut hominem aut the singular perfectly if He knew the
animal; ita non perfecte cognosceret nature of singularity and did not know
singulare si cognosceret rationem this or that singular. Therefore, God
singularitatis et non cognosceret must know singular things.
hoc vel illud singulare. Oportet igitur
quod Deus res singulares
cognoscat.
Adhuc. Sicut Deus est ipsum suum [5] Furthermore, just as God is His
esse, ita est suum cognoscere, ut being, so, as we have shown, He is His
ostensum est. Sed ex hoc quod est knowing. Now, since He is His being, all
suum esse oportet quod in ipso the perfections of being must be found
inveniantur omnes perfectiones in Him as in the first origin of being, as
essendi sicut in prima essendi was shown above. Therefore, there
origine, ut supra habitum est. Ergo must be found in His knowledge, as in
oportet quod in eius cognitione the first source of knowledge, the
inveniatur omnis cognitionis perfection of all knowledge. But this
perfectio sicut in primo cognitionis would not be so if the knowledge of
fonte. Hoc autem non esset si ei singulars were lacking to Him; for the
singularium notitia deesset: cum in perfection of some knowers consists in
hoc aliquorum cognoscentium this knowledge. Therefore, it is
perfectio consistat. Impossibile est impossible for God not to have a
igitur eum singularium notitiam non knowledge of singulars.
habere.
Praeterea. In omnibus virtutibus [6] Furthermore, among all ordered

ordinatis hoc communiter invenitur powers it is commonly found that the
quod virtus superior ad plura se higher power, though one, extends to
extendit et tamen est unica, virtus several things, whereas a lower power
vero inferior se extendit ad extends to fewer things and is
pauciora, et multiplicatur tamen nevertheless multiplied by its relation to
respectu illorum: sicut patet in them. This happens in the case of the
imaginatione et sensu; nam una vis imagination and the sense. The one
imaginationis se extendit ad omnia power of the imagination extends to all
quae quinque vires sensuum the things that the five powers of the
cognoscunt et ad plura. Sed vis senses know, and to more besides. But
cognoscitiva in Deo est superior the knowing power in God is higher
quam in homine. Quicquid ergo than it is in man. Therefore, whatever
homo diversis viribus cognoscit, man knows by means of diverse
intellectu scilicet, imaginatione et powers, namely, the intellect, the
sensu, hoc Deus uno suo simplici imagination, and the sense, this God
intellectu considerat. Est igitur considers by His one simple intellect.
singularium cognoscitivus, quae nos God, therefore, knows the singulars that
sensu et imaginatione we apprehend by the sense and the
apprehendimus. imagination.
Amplius. Divinus intellectus ex [7] Moreover, the divine intellect does

rebus cognitionem non sumit, sicut not gather its knowledge from things, as
noster, sed magis per suam ours does; rather, as will be shown later
cognitionem est causa rerum, ut on, it is through its knowledge the cause
infra ostendetur: et sic eius cognitio of things. The knowledge that the divine
quam de rebus aliis habet, est ad intellect has of other things is after the
modum practicae cognitionis. manner of practical knowledge. Now,
Practica autem cognitio non est practical knowledge is not perfect
perfecta nisi ad singularia unless it reaches to singulars. For the
perveniatur: nam practicae end of practical knowledge is operation,
cognitionis finis est operatio, quae in which belongs to the domain of
singularibus est. Divina igitur singulars. Therefore, the knowledge
cognitio quam de aliis rebus habet, that God has of other things extends to
se usque ad singularia extendit. singulars.
Adhuc. Primum mobile movetur a [8] Furthermore, as was shown above,
motore movente per intellectum et the first movable is moved by a mover
appetitum, ut supra ostensum est. moving through intellect and appetite.
Non autem posset motor aliquis per Now, a mover could not cause motion
intellectum causare motum nisi through his intellect unless he moved
cognosceret mobile inquantum the movable in so far as it is of a nature
natum est moveri secundum locum. to be moved in place. But this is true of
Hoc autem est inquantum est hic et the movable in so far as it is here and
nunc: et per consequens inquantum now, and consequently in so far as it is
est singulare. Intellectus igitur qui singular. Therefore, the intellect that is
est motor primi mobilis, cognoscit the mover of the first movable knows
primum mobile inquantum est the first movable in so far as it is
singulare. Qui quidem motor vel singular. Now, this mover is either held
ponitur Deus, et sic habetur to be God, in which case we have made
propositum: vel aliquid quod est our point, or it is held to be some being

infra Deum. Cuius intellectus si below God. But, if the intellect of such a
potest cognoscere singulare sua being can by its power know the
virtute, quod noster intellectus non singular, which our intellect cannot, all
potest, multo magis hoc poterit the more will the intellect of God be able
intellectus Dei. to do this.
Item. Agens honorabilius est [9] Again, the agent is more noble than

patiente et acto, sicut actus the patient or thing acted upon, as act is
potentia. Forma igitur quae est more noble than potency. Hence, a form
inferioris gradus non potest agendo of a lower grade cannot by acting
perducere suam similitudinem in extend its likeness to a higher grade;
gradum altiorem; sed forma superior rather, the higher form by acting can
poterit perducere agendo suam extend its likeness to a lower grade.
similitudinem in gradum inferiorem; Thus, from the incorruptible powers of
sicut ex virtutibus incorruptibilibus the stars there are produced corruptible
stellarum producuntur formae forms among sublunary things; but a
corruptibiles in istis inferioribus, corruptible power cannot produce an
virtus autem corruptibilis non potest incorruptible form. Now, all knowledge
producere formam incorruptibilem. takes place through the assimilation of
Cognitio autem omnis fit per the knower and the known. There is this
assimilationem cognoscentis et difference, however, that the
cogniti: in hoc tamen differt, quod assimilation in human knowledge takes
assimilatio in cognitione humana fit place through the action of sensible
per actionem rerum sensibilium in things on man’s knowing powers,
vires cognoscitivas humanas, in whereas in the case of God’s
cognitione autem Dei est e knowledge the assimilation takes place
converso per actionem formae contrariwise through the action of the
intellectus divini in res cognitas. forms of the divine intellect on the
Forma igitur rei sensibilis, cum sit things known. Hence, since the form of
per suam materialitatem individuata, the sensible thing is individuated
suae singularitatis similitudinem through its materiality, it cannot extend
perducere non potest in hoc quod the likeness of its singularity so that it
sit omnino immaterialis, sed solum be absolutely immaterial. It can extend
usque ad vires quae organis its likeness to the level of the powers
materialibus utuntur; ad intellectum that use material organs; it reaches the
autem perducitur per virtutem intellect only through the power of the
intellectus agentis, inquantum agent intellect in so far as it is
omnino a conditionibus materiae completely divested of the conditions of
exuitur; et sic similitudo matter. Thus, the likeness of the
singularitatis formae sensibilis non singularity of a sensible form cannot
potest pervenire usque ad reach up to the human intellect. But the
intellectum humanum. Similitudo likeness of a form in the divine intellect,
autem formae intellectus divini, cum by reaching to the least of things to
pertingat usque ad rerum minima, which its causality reaches, extends to
ad quae pertingit sua causalitas, the singularity of the sensible and
pervenit usque ad singularitatem material form. The divine intellect,
formae sensibilis et materialis. therefore, can know singulars, but not
Intellectus igitur divinus potest the human intellect.
cognoscere singularia, non autem
humanus.
Praeterea. Sequeretur inconveniens [10] Then, too, if God does not know

quod philosophus contra singulars which even men know, there
Empedoclem inducit, scilicet Deum would follow the difficulty that the
esse insipientissimum, si singularia Philosopher raises against Empedocles,
non cognoscit, quae etiam homines namely, that God is the most foolish of
cognoscunt. beings [De anima I, 5; Metaph. III, 4].
Haec autem probata veritas etiam [11] This truth that we have proved is
Scripturae sacrae auctoritate likewise strengthened by the authority
firmatur. Dicitur enim Hebr. 413: of Sacred Scripture. For it is said in
non est ulla creatura invisibilis in Hebrews (4:13): “Neither is there any
conspectu eius. Error etiam creature invisible in His sight.” The
contrarius excluditur Eccli. 1616: contrary error likewise is removed by
non dicas: a Deo abscondar, et ex Sirach (16:16): “Do not say: I shall be
summo quis mei memorabitur? hidden from God, and who shall
remember me from on high?”
Patet etiam ex dictis qualiter [12] It is also clear from what has been

obiectio in contrarium facta non said how the objection to the contrary
recte concludit. Nam id quo does not conclude properly. For,
intellectus divinus intelligit, etsi although that by which the divine
immateriale sit, est tamen et intellect understands is immaterial, it is
materiae et formae similitudo, sicut nevertheless the likeness of both form
primum principium productivum and matter, being the first productive
utriusque. principle of both.
Caput 66 Chapter 66
Quod Deus cognoscit ea quae THAT GOD KNOWS THE THINGS THAT
non sunt ARE NOT
Deinde ostendendum est quod [1] We must next show that the
Deo non deest notitia eorum knowledge even of the things that are not
etiam quae non sunt. is not lacking to God.
Ut enim ex supra dictis patet, [2] As is clear from what we have said
eadem est comparatio scientiae above, the relation of the divine
divinae ad res scitas quae knowledge to the things known is the
scibilium ad scientiam nostram. same as the relation of the things that we
Est autem haec comparatio know to our knowledge. Now, the relation
scibilis ad nostram scientiam, of a thing known to our knowledge is this,
quod scibile potest esse absque namely, that the known thing can exist
eo quod eius scientia a nobis without our having a knowledge of it, as
habeatur, ut ponit exemplum Aristotle illustrates of the squaring of a
philosophus, in praedicamentis, circle; but the converse is not true. The
de circuli quadratura; non autem e relation of the divine knowledge to other
converso. Talis ergo erit things, therefore, win be such that it can
comparatio divinae scientiae ad be even of nonexisting things.
res alias quod etiam non
existentium esse potest.
Item. Cognitio divini intellectus [3] Again, the knowledge of the divine
comparatur ad res alias sicut intellect is to other things as the
cognitio artificis ad artificiata: cum knowledge of an artisan to artifacts, since
per suam scientiam sit causa through His knowledge God is the cause
rerum. Artifex autem suae artis of things. Now, the artisan knows through
cognitione etiam ea quae nondum his art even those things that have not yet
sunt artificiata cognoscit: formae been fashioned, since the forms of his art
enim artis ex eius scientia effluunt flow from his knowledge to external
in exteriorem materiam ad matter for the constitution of the artifacts.
artificiatorum constitutionem; unde Hence, nothing forbids that there be in the
nihil prohibet in scientia artificis knowledge of an artisan forms that have
esse formas quae nondum not yet come out of it. Thus, nothing
exterius prodierunt. Sic igitur nihil forbids God to have knowledge of the
prohibet Deum eorum quae non things that are not.
sunt notitiam habere.
Praeterea. Deus cognoscit alia a [4] Furthermore, through His essence

se per suam essentiam God knows things other than Himself in
inquantum est similitudo eorum so far as His essence is the likeness of
quae ab eo procedunt, ut ex dictis the things that proceed from Him. This is
patet. Sed, cum essentia Dei sit clear from what we have said. But since,
infinitae perfectionis, ut supra as was shown above, the essence of God
ostensum est; quaelibet autem is of an infinite perfection, whereas every
alia res habeat esse et other thing has a limited being and
perfectionem terminatam: perfection, it is impossible that the
impossibile est quod universitas universe of things other than God equal
rerum aliarum adaequet essentiae the perfection of the divine essence.
divinae perfectionem. Extendit Hence, its power of representation
igitur se vis suae extends to many more things than to
repraesentationis ad multo plura those that are. Therefore, if God knows
quam ad ea qua sunt. Si igitur completely the power and perfection of
Deus totaliter virtutem et His essence, His knowledge extends not
perfectionem essentiae suae only to the things that are but also to the
cognoscit, extendit se eius things that are not.
cognitio non solum ad ea quae
sunt, sed etiam ad ea qua non
sunt.
Amplius. Intellectus noster, [5] Moreover, by that operation through

secundum illam operationem qua which it knows what a thing is our intellect
cognoscit quod quid est, notitiam can know even those things that do not
habere potest etiam eorum quae actually exist. It can comprehend the
non sunt actu: potest enim leonis essence of a lion or a horse even though
vel equi essentiam all such animals were to be destroyed.
comprehendere omnibus But the divine intellect knows, in the
huiusmodi animalibus interemptis. manner of one knowing what a thing is,
Intellectus autem divinus not only definitions but also enunciables,
cognoscit ad modum as is clear from what we have said.
cognoscentis quod quid est non Therefore, it can know even the things
solum definitiones, sed etiam that are not.
enuntiabilia, ut ex supra dictis
patet. Potest igitur etiam eorum
quae non sunt notitiam habere.
Adhuc. Effectus aliquis in sua [6] Furthermore, an effect can be pre
causa praenosci potest etiam known in its cause even before it exists.
antequam sit: sicut praenoscit Thus, an astronomer preknows a future
astrologus eclipsim futuram ex eclipse from a consideration of the order
consideratione ordinis caelestium of the heavenly motions. But God knows
motuum. Sed cognitio Dei est de all things through a cause; for, by knowing
rebus omnibus per causam: se Himself, Who is the cause of other things,
enim cognoscendo, qui est He knows other things as His effects, as
omnium causa, alia quasi suos was shown above. Nothing, therefore,
effectus cognoscit, ut supra prevents God from knowing even the
ostensum est. Nihil igitur prohibet things that are not.
quin etiam quae nondum sunt
cognoscat.
Amplius. Intelligere Dei [7] Moreover, God’s understanding has no

successionem non habet, sicut succession, as neither does His being. He
nec eius esse. Est igitur totum is therefore an everabiding simultaneous
simul semper manens: quod de wholewhich belongs to the nature of
ratione aeternitatis est. Temporis eternity. On the other hand, the duration
autem duratio successione prioris of time is stretched out through the
et posterioris extenditur. Proportio succession of the before and after.
igitur aeternitatis ad totam Hence, the proportion of eternity to the
temporis durationem est sicut total duration of time is as the proportion
proportio indivisibilis ad of the indivisible to something continuous;
continuum: non quidem eius not, indeed, of that indivisible that is the
indivisibilis quod terminus continui terminus of a continuum, which is not
est, quod non adest cuilibet parti present to every part of a continuum (the
continui, huius enim similitudinem instant of time bears a likeness to such an
habet instans temporis sed eius indivisible), but of that indivisible which is
indivisibilis quod extra continuum outside a continuum and which
est, cuilibet tamen parti continui, nevertheless coexists with any given part
sive puncto in continuo signato, of a continuum or with a determinate point
coexistit: nam, cum tempus in the continuum. For, since time lies
motum non excedat, aeternitas, within motion, eternity, which is
quae omnino extra motum est, completely outside motion, in no way
nihil temporis est. belongs to time.
Rursum, cum aeterni esse Furthermore, since the being of what is
nunquam deficiat, cuilibet tempori eternal does not pass away, eternity is
vel instanti temporis present in its presentiality to any time or
praesentialiter adest aeternitas. instant of time. We may see an example
Cuius exemplum utcumque in of sorts in the case of a circle. Let us
circulo est videre: punctum enim consider a determined point on the
in circumferentia signatum, etsi circumference of a circle. Although it is
indivisibile sit, non tamen cuilibet indivisible, it does not coexist
puncto alii secundum situm simultaneously with any other point as to
coexistit simul, ordo enim situs position, since it is the order of position
continuitatem circumferentiae that produces the continuity of the
facit; centrum vero, quod est extra circumference. On the other hand, the
circumferentiam, ad quodlibet center of the circle, which is no part of the
punctum in circumferentia circumference, is directly opposed to any
signatum directe oppositionem given determinate point on the
habet. Quicquid igitur in circumference. Hence, whatever is found
quacumque parte temporis est, in any part of time coexists with what is
coexistit aeterno quasi praesens eternal as being present to it, although
eidem: etsi respectu alterius partis with respect to some other time it be past
temporis sit praeteritum vel or future. Something can be present to
futurum. Aeterno autem non what is eternal only by being present to
potest aliquid praesentialiter the whole of it, since the eternal does not
coexistere nisi toti: quia have the duration of succession. The
successionis durationem non divine intellect, therefore, sees in the
habet. Quicquid igitur per totum whole of its eternity, as being present to it,
decursum temporis agitur, divinus whatever takes place through the whole
intellectus in tota sua aeternitate course of time. And yet what takes place
intuetur quasi praesens. Nec in a certain part of time was not always
tamen quod quadam parte existent. It remains, therefore, that God
temporis agitur, semper fuit has a knowledge of those things that
existens. Relinquitur igitur quod according to the march of time do not yet
eorum quae secundum decursum exist.
temporis nondum sunt, Deus
notitiam habet.
Per has igitur rationes apparet [8] Through these arguments it appears
quod Deus non entium notitiam that God has a knowledge of nonbeing.
habet. Non tamen omnia non But not all nonbeings have the same
entia eandem habent habitudinem relation to His knowledge.
ad eius scientiam. For those things that are not, nor will be,
Ea enim quae non sunt nec erunt nor ever were, are known by God as
nec fuerunt, a Deo sciuntur quasi possible to His power. Hence, God does
eius virtuti possibilia. Unde non not know them as in some way existing in
cognoscit ea ut existentia themselves, but as existing only in the
aliqualiter in seipsis, sed ut divine power. These are said by some to
existentia solum in potentia divina. be known by God according to a
Quae quidem a quibusdam knowledge of simple understanding.
dicuntur a Deo cognosci The things that are present, past, or future
secundum notitiam simplicis to us God knows in His power, in their
intelligentiae. proper causes, and in themselves. The
Ea vero quae sunt praesentia, knowledge of such things is said to be a
praeterita vel futura nobis, knowledge of vision. For of the things that
cognoscit Deus secundum quod for us are not yet God sees not only the
sunt in sua potentia, et in propriis being that they have in their causes but
causis, et in seipsis. Et horum also the being that they have in
cognitio dicitur notitia visionis: non themselves, in so far as His eternity is
enim Deus rerum quae apud nos present in its indivisibility to all time.
nondum sunt, videt solum esse
quod habent in suis causis, sed
etiam illud quod habent in seipsis,
inquantum eius aeternitas est
praesens sua indivisibilitate omni
tempori.
Et tamen esse quodcumque rei [9] Nevertheless, whatever being a thing
Deus cognoscit per essentiam has God knows through His essence. For
suam. Nam sua essentia est His essence can be represented by many
repraesentabilis per multa quae things that are not, nor will be, nor ever
non sunt nec erunt nec fuerunt. were. His essence is likewise the likeness
Ipsa etiam est similitudo virtutis of the power of every cause, through
cuiuslibet causae, secundum which effects preexist in their causes.
quam praeexistunt effectus in And the being that each thing has in itself
causis. Esse etiam cuiuslibet rei comes from the divine essence as from its
quod habet in seipsa, est ab ea exemplary source.
exemplariter deductum.
Sic igitur non entia cognoscit [10] Thus, therefore, God knows non
Deus inquantum aliquo modo beings in so far as in some way they have
habent esse: vel in potentia Dei, being, namely, in His power, or in their
vel in causis suis, vel in seipsis. causes, or in themselves. This is not
Quod rationi scientiae non incompatible with the nature of
obsistit. knowledge.
His autem quae praemissa sunt [11] The authority of Sacred Scripture
etiam Scripturae sacrae auctoritas likewise offers witness to what has
testimonium perhibet. Dicitur enim preceded. For it is said in Sirach (23:29):
Eccli. 2329: domino Deo nostro, “For all things were known to the Lord
antequam crearentur, nota sunt God before they were created: so also
omnia: sic et post perfectum after they were perfected He beholds all
cognoscit omnia. Et Ier. 15: things.” And in Jeremias (1:5): “Before I
priusquam te formarem in utero formed you in the bowels of your mother I
novi te. knew you.”
Patet autem ex praemissis quod [12] It is also clear from what has
non cogimur dicere, sicut quidam preceded that we are not forced to say, as
dixerunt, Deum universaliter some said, that God knows singulars
singularia cognoscere, quia universally because He knows them only
cognoscit ea in causis in universal causes, just as one would
universalibus tantum, sicut qui know a particular eclipse not in itself but
cognosceret eclipsim hanc, non as it arises from the position of the stars.
prout haec, sed prout provenit ex For we have shown that the divine
oppositione: cum ostensum sit knowledge extends to singulars in so far
quod divina cognitio se extendit as they are in themselves.
ad singularia prout sunt in seipsis.
Caput 67 Chapter 67
Quod Deus cognoscit THAT GOD KNOWS FUTURE
singularia contingentia futura CONTINGENT SINGULARS
Ex his autem iam aliqualiter [1] From this we can begin to understand
patere potest quod contingentium somewhat that God had from eternity an
singularium ab aeterno Deus infallible knowledge of contingent
infallibilem scientiam habuit, nec singulars, and yet they do not cease to be
tamen contingentia esse contingent.
desistunt.
Contingens enim certitudini [2] The contingent is opposed to the
cognitionis non repugnat nisi certitude of knowledge only so far as it is
secundum quod futurum est, non future, not so far as it is present. For when
autem secundum quod praesens the contingent is future, it can notbe.
est. Contingens enim, cum Thus, the knowledge of one conjecturing
futurum est, potest non esse: et that it will be can be mistaken: it will be
sic cognitio aestimantis ipsum mistaken if what he conjectures as future
futurum esse falli potest; falletur will not take place. But in so far as the
enim si non erit quod futurum contingent is present, in that time it cannot
esse aestimavit. Ex quo autem notbe. It can notbe in the future, but this
praesens est, pro illo tempore affects the contingent not so far as it is
non potest non esse: potest present but so far as it is future. Thus,
autem in futurum non esse, sed nothing is lost to the certitude of sense
hoc non iam pertinet ad when someone sees a man running, even
contingens prout praesens est, though this judgment is contingent. All
sed prout futurum est. Unde nihil knowledge, therefore, that bears on
certitudini sensus deperit cum something contingent as present can be
quis videt currere hominem, certain. But the vision of the divine
quamvis hoc dictum sit intellect from all eternity is directed to
contingens. Omnis igitur cognitio each of the things that take place in the
quae supra contingens fertur course of time, in so far as it is present, as
prout praesens est, certa esse shown above. It remains, therefore, that
potest. Divini autem intellectus nothing prevents God from having from all
intuitus ab aeterno fertur in eternity an infallible knowledge of
unumquodque eorum quae contingents.
temporis cursu peraguntur prout
praesens est, ut supra ostensum
est. Relinquitur igitur quod de
contingentibus nihil prohibet
Deum ab aeterno scientiam

infallibilem habere.
Item. Contingens a necessario [3] Again, the contingent differs from the
differt secundum quod necessary according to the way each of
unumquodque in sua causa est: them is found in its cause. The contingent
contingens enim sic in sua causa is in its cause in such a way that it can
est ut non esse ex ea possit et both notbe and be from it; but the
esse; necessarium vero non necessary can only be from its cause. But
potest ex sua causa nisi esse. according to the way both of them are in
Secundum id vero quod themselves, they do not differ as to being,
utrumque eorum in se est, non upon which the true is founded. For,
differt quantum ad esse, supra according as it is in itself, the contingent
quod fundatur verum: quia in cannot be and notbe, it can only be, even
contingenti, secundum id quod in though in the future it can notbe. Now, the
se est, non est esse et non esse, divine intellect from all eternity knows
sed solum esse, licet in futurum things not only according to the being that
contingens possit non esse. they have in their causes, but also
Divinus autem intellectus ab according to the being that they have in
aeterno cognoscit res non solum themselves. Therefore, nothing prevents
secundum esse quod habent in the divine intellect from having an eternal
causis suis, sed etiam secundum and infallible knowledge of contingents.
esse quod habent in seipsis. Nihil
igitur prohibet ipsum habere
aeternam cognitionem de
contingentibus et infallibilem.
Amplius. Sicut ex causa [4] Moreover, just as from a necessary
necessaria certitudinaliter cause an effect follows with certitude, so it
sequitur effectus, ita ex causa follows from a complete contingent cause
contingenti completa si non if it be not impeded. But since, as appears
impediatur. Sed, cum Deus from what was said above, God knows all
cognoscat omnia, ut ex supra things, He knows not only the causes of
dictis patet, scit non solum contingent things but also those things by
causas contingentium, sed etiam which these causes may be impeded.
ea quibus possunt impediri. Scit Therefore, He knows with certitude
igitur per certitudinem an whether contingent things are or are not.
contingentia sint vel non sint.
Adhuc. Effectum excedere suae [5] Furthermore, an effect cannot exceed
causae perfectionem non the perfection of its cause, though
contingit, interdum tamen ab ea sometime it falls short of it. Hence, since
deficit. Unde, cum in nobis ex our knowledge comes to us from things, it
rebus cognitio causetur, contingit happens at times that we know what is
interdum quod necessaria non necessary not according to the mode of
per modum necessitatis necessity but according to that of
cognoscimus, sed probabilitatis. probability. Now, just as in us things are
Sicut autem apud nos res sunt the cause of knowledge, so the divine
causa cognitionis, ita divina knowledge is the cause of the things
cognitio est causa rerum known. Therefore, nothing prevents those

cognitarum. Nihil igitur prohibet things from being contingent in
ea in se contingentia esse de themselves of which God has a necessary
quibus Deus necessariam knowledge.
scientiam habet.
Praeterea. Effectus non potest [6] Again, an effect whose cause is
esse necessarius cuius causa est contingent cannot be a necessary one;
contingens: contingeret enim otherwise, the effect could be even though
effectum esse remota causa. the cause were removed. Now, of the
Effectus autem ultimi causa est et most remote effect there is both a
proxima et remota. Si igitur proximate and a remote cause. If, then,
proxima fuerit contingens, eius the proximate cause were contingent, its
effectum contingentem oportet effect would have to be contingent even
esse, etiam si causa remota though the remote cause is necessary.
necessaria sit: sicut plantae non Thus, plants do not bear fruit of necessity,
necessario fructificant, quamvis even though the motion of the sun is
motus solis sit necessarius, necessary, because the intermediate
propter causas intermedias causes are contingent. But the knowledge
contingentes. Scientia autem Dei, of God, though it is the cause of the things
etsi sit causa rerum scitarum per known through it, is yet a remote cause.
ipsam, est tamen causa remota. Therefore, the contingency of the things
Eius igitur necessitati scitorum known is not in conflict with this necessity,
contingentia non repugnat: cum since it may be that the intermediate
contingat causas intermedias causes are contingent.
contingentes esse.
Item. Scientia Dei vera non esset [7] The knowledge of God, furthermore,

et perfecta si non hoc modo res would not be true and perfect if things did
evenirent sicut Deus eas evenire not happen in the way in which God
cognoscit. Deus autem, cum sit knows them to happen. Now, since God
cognitor totius esse, cuius est knows all being, and is its source, He
principium, cognoscit knows every effect not only in itself but
unumquemque effectum non also in its order to each of its causes. But
solum in se, sed etiam in ordine the order of contingent things to their
ad quaslibet suas causas. Ordo proximate causes is that they come forth
autem contingentium ad suas from these causes in a contingent way.
causas proximas est ut Hence, God knows that some things are
contingenter ex eis proveniant. taking place, and this contingently. Thus,
Cognoscit igitur Deus aliqua therefore, the certitude and truth of the
evenire et contingenter evenire. divine knowledge does not remove the
Sic igitur divinae scientiae contingency of things.
certitudo et veritas rerum
contingentiam non tollit.
Patet igitur ex dictis quomodo [8] From what has been said, it is
obiectio cognitionem therefore clear bow the objection
contingentium in Deo impugnans impugning a knowledge of contingents in
sit repellenda. Non enim God is to be repulsed. For change in that
posteriorum variatio prioribus which comes later does not induce

variabilitatem inducit: cum change in that which has preceded; for it
contingat ex causis necessariis is possible that from prime necessary
primis effectus ultimos causes there proceed ultimate contingent
contingentes procedere. Res effects. Now, the things that are known by
autem a Deo scitae non sunt God are not prior to His knowledge, as is
priores eius scientia, sicut apud the case with us, but, rather, subsequent
nos est, sed sunt ea posteriores. to it. It does not therefore follow that, if
Non igitur sequitur, si id quod est something known by God can change, His
a Deo scitum variari potest, quod knowledge of it can be deceived or in any
eius scientia possit falli vel way changed. We shall be deceived in the
qualitercumque variari. consequent therefore, if, because our
Secundum consequens igitur knowledge of changeable things is itself
decipiemur si, quia nostra changeable, we suppose on this account
cognitio rerum variabilium that such is necessarily the case in all
variabilis est, propter hoc in omni knowledge.
cognitione hoc necessario
accidere putetur.
Rursus, cum dicitur, Deus scit, vel [9] Again, when it is said that God knows

scivit, hoc futurum, medium or knew this future thing, a certain
quoddam accipitur inter divinam intermediate point between the divine
scientiam et rem scitam, scilicet knowledge and the thing known is
tempus in quo est locutio, assumed. This is the time when the above
respectu cuius illud quod a Deo words are spoken, in relation to which
scitum dicitur est futurum. Non time that which is known by God is said to
autem est futurum respectu be future. But this is not future with
divinae scientiae, quae, in reference to the divine knowledge, which,
momento aeternitatis existens, ad abiding in the moment of eternity, is
omnia praesentialiter se habet. related to all things as present to them. If
Respectu cuius, si tempus with respect to the divine knowledge we
locutionis de medio subtrahatur, remove from its intermediate position the
non est dicere hoc esse cognitum time when the words are spoken, we
quasi non existens, ut locum cannot say that this is known by God as
habeat quaestio qua quaeritur an nonexistent, so as to leave room for the
possit non esse: sed sic cognitum question whether it can notbe; rather, it
dicetur a Deo ut iam in sua will be said to be known by God in such a
existentia visum. Quo posito, non way that it is seen by Him already in its
remanet praedictae quaestioni own existence. On this basis there is no
locus: quia quod iam est, non room for the preceding question. For that
potest, quantum ad illud instans, which already is cannot, with respect to
non esse. Deceptio igitur accidit that moment of time, not be. We are
ex hoc quod tempus in quo therefore deceived by the fact that the
loquimur, coexistit aeternitati, vel time in which we are speaking is present
etiam tempus praeteritum quod to eternity, as is likewise past time
designatur cum dicimus, Deus (designated by the words God knew).
scivit : unde habitudo temporis Hence, the relation of past or present time
praeteriti vel praesentis ad to the future is attributed to eternity, to
futurum aeternitati attribuitur, which such a relation does not belong. It is
quae omnino ei non competit. Et thus that we commit the fallacy of
ex hoc accidit secundum accident.

accidens falli.
Praeterea, si unumquodque a There is more. If each thing is known by
Deo cognoscitur sicut God as seen by Him in the present, what
praesentialiter visum, sic is known by God will then have to be.
necessarium erit esse quod Deus Thus, it is necessary that Socrates be
cognoscit, sicut necessarium est seated from the fact that he is seen
Socratem sedere ex hoc quod seated. But this is not absolutely
sedere videtur. Hoc autem non necessary or, as some say, with the
necessarium est absolute, vel, ut necessity of the consequent; it is
a quibusdam dicitur, necessitate necessary conditionally, or with the
consequentis: sed sub necessity of the consequence. For this is
conditione, vel necessitate a necessary conditional proposition: if he
consequentiae. Haec enim is seen sitting, he is sitting. Hence,
conditionalis est necessaria: si although the conditional proposition may
videtur sedere, sedet. Unde et, si be changed to a categorical one, to read
conditionalis in categoricam what is seen sitting must necessarily be
transferatur, ut dicatur, quod sitting, it is clear that the proposition is
videtur sedere, necesse est true if understood of what is said, and
sedere, patet eam de dicto compositely; but it is false if understood of
intellectam, et compositam, esse what is meant, and dividedly. Thus, in
veram; de re vero intellectam, et these and all similar arguments used by
divisam, esse falsam. Et sic in those who oppose God’s knowledge of
his, et in omnibus similibus quae contingents, the fallacy of composition and
Dei scientiam circa contingentia division takes place.
oppugnantes argumentantur,
secundum compositionem et
divisionem falluntur.
Quod autem Deus futura [11] That God knows future contingents is

contingentia sciat, etiam also shown by the authority of Sacred
auctoritate Scripturae sacrae Scripture. For it is said of the divine
ostenditur. Dicitur enim Sap. 88, wisdom: “She knows signs and wonders
de divina sapientia: signa et before they be done, and the events of
monstra scit antequam fiant, et times and ages” (Wis. 8:8). And in Sirach
eventus temporum et (39:2425) it is said: “There is nothing
saeculorum. Et Eccli. 3924 non hidden from His eyes. He sees from
est quicquam absconditum ab eternity to eternity.” And in Isaiah (48:5): “I
oculis eius: a saeculo usque in foretold you of old, before they came to
saeculum respicit. Et Isaiae 485: pass I told you.”
praedixi tibi ex tunc: antequam
venirent, indicavi tibi.
Caput 68 Chapter 68
Quod Deus cognoscit motus THAT GOD KNOWS THE MOTIONS OF
voluntatis THE WILL
Deinde oportet ostendere quod [1] We must now show that God knows
Deus cogitationes mentium et the thoughts of the mind and the motions
voluntates cordium cognoscat. of the will.
Omne enim quod quocumque [2] As was shown above, whatever in
modo est cognoscitur a Deo, any way exists is known by God in so far
inquantum suam essentiam as He knows His own essence. There is
cognoscit, ut supra ostensum est. a certain being in the soul and a certain
Ens autem quoddam est in anima, being in things outside the soul. God,
quoddam in rebus extra animam. therefore, knows all these differences of
Cognoscit igitur Deus omnes being and what is contained under them.
huiusmodi entis differentias, et But the being that is in the soul is that
quae sub eis continentur. Ens which is in the will or in thought. It
autem in anima est quod est in remains, therefore, that God knows that
voluntate vel cogitatione. which is in thought and in the will.
Relinquitur igitur quod Deus ea
quae sunt in cogitatione et
voluntate cognoscat.
Amplius. Sic Deus cognoscendo [3] Moreover, in knowing His essence,
suam essentiam alia cognoscit, God knows other things in the same way
sicut per cognitionem causae as an effect is known through a
cognoscuntur effectus. Omnia knowledge of the cause. By knowing His
igitur Deus cognoscit, suam essence, therefore, God knows all things
essentiam cognoscendo, ad quae to which His causality extends. But it
sua causalitas extenditur. extends to the operations of the intellect
Extenditur autem ad operationes and the will. For, since each thing acts
intellectus et voluntatis: nam, cum through its form, from which the thing
res quaelibet operetur per suam has a certain being, so the fount and
formam, a qua est aliquod esse rei, source of all being, from which is also
oportet fontale principium totius every form, must be the source of all
esse, a quo est etiam omnis forma, operation; for the effects of second
omnis operationis principium esse; causes are grounded more principally in
cum effectus causarum first causes. Therefore, God knows the
secundarum in causas primas thoughts and affections of the mind.
principalius reducantur. Cognoscit
igitur Deus et cogitationes et
affectiones mentis.
Item. Sicut esse suum est primum [4] Again, just as God’s being is prime
et per hoc omnis esse causa, ita and for this reason the cause of all
suum intelligere est primum, et per being, so His understanding is prime and
hoc omnis intellectualis operationis on this account the cause of all
intellectualis causa. Sicut igitur intellectual operation. Hence, just as
Deus cognoscendo suum esse God, by knowing His being knows the
cognoscit esse cuiuslibet rei, ita being of each thing, so by knowing His
cognoscendo suum intelligere et understanding and willing He knows
velle cognoscit omnem every thought and will.

cogitationem et voluntatem.
Adhuc. Deus non solum cognoscit [5] Moreover, as is clear from what was
res secundum quod in seipsis sunt, said above, God knows things not only
sed etiam secundum quod sunt in so far as they are in themselves, but also
causis suis, ut ex supra dictis so far as they are in their causes; for He
patet: cognoscit enim ordinem knows the order of a cause to its effect.
causae ad suum effectum. Sed But artifacts are in artisans through their
artificialia sunt in artificibus per intellect and will, just as natural things
intellectum et voluntatem artificum, are in their causes through the powers of
sicut res naturales sunt in suis these causes. For just as natural things
causis per virtutes causarum: sicut through their active powers assimilate
enim res naturales assimilant sibi their effects to themselves, so an artisan
suos effectus per suas virtutes through his intellect induces into the
activas, ita artifex per intellectum artifact the form through which it is
inducit formam artificiati, per quam assimilated to his art. The situation is the
assimilatur suae arti. Et similis ratio same for all things that proceed
est de omnibus quae a proposito intentionally from an agent. Therefore,
aguntur. Scit igitur Deus et God knows the thoughts and affections
cogitationes et voluntates. of the mind.
Item. Deus non minus cognoscit [6] Again, God knows intelligible
substantias intelligibiles quam ipse, substances no less than He knows or we
vel nos, substantias sensibiles: know sensible substances; for
cum substantiae intellectuales sint intellectual substances are more
magis cognoscibiles, puta magis in knowable, since they are in act. Now,
actu existentes. Informationes both God and we know how sensible
autem et inclinationes substances are informed and inclined.
substantiarum sensibilium Since, then, the soul’s thinking is a
cognoscuntur et a Deo et a nobis. certain information of the soul itself and
Cum igitur cogitatio animae sit per its affection is a certain inclination of the
informationem quandam ipsius; soul towards something (so, too, we
affectio autem sit quaedam likewise call the inclination of a natural
inclinatio ipsius ad aliquid, nam et thing a natural appetite), it remains that
ipsam inclinationem rei naturalis God knows the thoughts and affections
appetitum naturalem dicimus; of the mind.
relinquitur quod Deus cogitationes
et affectiones cordium cognoscat.
Hoc autem testimonio Scripturae [7] This is confirmed by the testimony of

sacrae confirmatur. Dicitur enim in Sacred Scripture. For it is said in a
Psalmo: scrutans corda et renes Psalm (7:10): “The searcher of hearts
Deus; Prov. 1511: Infernus et and reins is God.” And in the Proverbs
perditio coram domino: quanto (15:11): “Hell and destruction are before
magis corda filiorum hominum. the Lord: how much more the hearts of
Ioan. 225: ipse sciebat quid esset the children of men?” And John (2:25):
in homine. “He knew what was in man.”
Dominium autem quod habet [8] As for the dominion that the will has
voluntas supra suos actus, per over its acts, through which it lies in the
quod in eius est potestate velle vel power of the will to will or not to will, this
non velle, excludit determinationem excludes the determination of the power
virtutis ad unum, et violentiam to one effect and any violence from a
causae exterius agentis: non cause acting from the outside; but it does
autem excludit influentiam not exclude the influence of a higher
superioris causae, a qua est ei cause from which come its being and
esse et operari. Et sic remanet operation. Thus, the causality in the first
causalitas in causa prima, quae cause, which is God, is not removed with
Deus est, respectu motuum respect to the motions of the will. Hence,
voluntatis: ut sic Deus, seipsum God, by knowing Himself, can know such
cognoscendo, huiusmodi motions.
cognoscere possit.
Caput 69 Chapter 69
Quod Deus cognoscit infinita THAT GOD KNOWS INFINITE THINGS
Post haec ostendendum est quod [1] After this we must show that God
Deus infinita cognoscit. knows infinite things.
Cognoscendo enim se esse [2] By knowing Himself to be the cause of

causam rerum alia a se cognoscit, things God knows things other than
ut ex superioribus patet. Ipse Himself, as is clear from the above. But
autem est causa infinitorum, si God is the cause of infinite things, if there
infinita sunt entia: est enim are infinite things, since He is the cause
omnium eorum quae sunt causa. of all things that are. Therefore, God
Est igitur infinitorum cognoscitivus. knows infinite things.
Item. Deus suam virtutem perfecte [3] Again, as is clear from what we have
cognoscit, ut ex supra dictis patet. said, God knows His own power
Virtus autem non potest cognosci perfectly. But a power cannot be known
perfecte nisi cognoscantur omnia perfectly unless all that it can do is
in quae potest: cum secundum ea known, since this is how the magnitude
quantitas virtutis quodammodo of a power is in a manner gauged. But
attendatur. Sua autem virtus, cum since, as was shown above, His power is
sit infinita, ut ostensum est supra, infinite, it extends to infinite things.
ad infinita se extendit. Est igitur Therefore, God knows infinite things.
Deus infinitorum cognitor.
Amplius. Si Dei cognitio ad omnia [4] Moreover, if the knowledge of God
se extendit quae quocumque extends to all things that in any way are,
modo sunt, ut ostensum est, as was shown, He must know not only
oportet quod non solum cognoscat that which is actual but also that which is
ens actu, sed etiam ens potentia. potential. But among natural things there
Sed in rebus naturalibus est is the infinite in potency, though not in
infinitum in potentia, etsi non actu, act, as the Philosopher proves in Physics
ut philosophus probat in III III [6]. God, therefore, knows infinite
physicorum. Cognoscit igitur Deus things. So, too, unity, which is the source
infinita: sicut unitas, quae est of number, would know the infinite
principium numeri, infinitas species of number if it knew whatever
species numerorum cognosceret was in it potentially; for unity is potentially
si cognosceret quicquid est in se every number.
in potentia; est enim unitas
potentia omnis numerus.
Adhuc. Deus essentia sua sicut [5] Furthermore, God knows other things

quodam medio exemplari alia by His essence as through a certain
cognoscit. Sed cum sit perfectionis exemplary means. But, since His
infinitae, ut supra ostensum est, essence is of an infinite perfection, as
ab ipso exemplari possunt infinita was shown above, an infinite number of
habentia perfectiones finitas: quia things having finite perfections can be
nec aliquod unum eorum, nec derived from it. For no one thing or any
quotlibet plura exemplata number of things copied from the divine
perfectionem exemplaris essence can equal the perfection of their
adaequare possunt; et sic semper cause. There thus always remains a new
remanet novus modus quo aliquod way in which some copy is able, to
exemplatum ipsam imitari possit. imitate the divine essence. Hence,
Nihil igitur prohibet ipsum per nothing prevents God from knowing
essentiam suam infinita infinite things through His essence.
cognoscere.
Praeterea. Esse Dei est suum [6] Besides, God’s being is His
intelligere. Sicut igitur suum esse understanding. Hence, just as His being
est infinitum, ut ostensum est, ita is infinite, as we have shown, so His
suum intelligere est infinitum. Sicut understanding is infinite. But as the finite
autem se habet finitum ad finitum, is to the finite, so the infinite is to the
ita infinitum ad infinitum. Si igitur infinite. If, then, we are able to grasp
secundum intelligere nostrum, finite things according to our
quod finitum est, finita capere understanding, which is finite, so God
possumus, et Deus secundum according to His understanding can
suum intelligere infinita capere grasp infinite things.
potest.
Amplius. Intellectus cognoscens [7] Moreover, the intellect that knows the

maximum intelligibile non minus greatest intelligible, all the more, rather
cognoscit minora, sed magis, ut than less, knows lesser intelligibles, as is
patet per philosophum, in III de clear from the Philosopher in De anima III
anima: quod ex hoc provenit quia [4]. This arises because the intellect is
intellectus non corrumpitur ex not corrupted by an excelling intelligible,
excellenti intelligibili, sicut sensus, as is the sense, but is rather perfected by
sed magis perficitur. Sed si it. Now, let us take infinite things, whether
accipiantur infinita entia; sive sint of the same species (for example, an
eiusdem speciei, ut infiniti infinite number of men) or of infinite
homines, sive infinitarum species, and let us even assume that
specierum; etiam si aliqua vel some or all of them were infinite in
omnia essent infinita secundum quantity, were this possible the universe
quantitatem, si hoc esset of these things would be of a lesser
possibile; universum eorum esset infinity than is God. For each of them,
minoris infinitatis quam Deus: nam and all of them together, would have a
quodlibet eorum et omnia simul being that is received and limited to a
haberent esse receptum et given species or genus and would thus
limitatum ad aliquam speciem vel be finite in some respect. Hence, it would
genus, et sic secundum aliquid fall short of the infinity of God, Who is
esset finitum; unde deficeret ab absolutely infinite, as was shown above.
infinitate Dei, qui est infinitus Therefore, since God knows Himself
simpliciter, ut supra ostensum est. perfectly, nothing prevents Him from also
Cum igitur Deus perfecte seipsum knowing that sum of infinite things.
cognoscat, nihil prohibet eum
etiam illam summam infinitorum
cognoscere.
Adhuc. Quanto aliquis intellectus [8] Again, the more an intellect is more
est efficacior et limpidior in efficacious and penetrating in knowing,
cognoscendo, tanto ex uno potest the more it can know many things
plura cognoscere: sicut et omnis through one means. So, too, every power
virtus, quanto est fortior, tanto est is more united the more strong it is. But
magis unita. Intellectus autem the divine intellect, as is clear from the
divinus secundum efficaciam sive above, is infinite in power or in perfection.
perfectionem est infinitus, ut ex Therefore, it can know infinite things
superioribus patet. Potest ergo per through one means, namely, the divine
unum, quod est sua essentia, essence.
infinita cognoscere.
Praeterea. Intellectus divinus est [9] Moreover, the divine intellect, like the
perfectus simpliciter: sicut et eius divine essence, is absolutely perfect.
essentia. Nulla igitur perfectio Hence, no intelligible perfection is lacking
intelligibilis ei deest. Sed id ad to it. But that to which our own intellect is
quod est in potentia intellectus in potency is its intelligible perfection.
noster est eius perfectio Now, our intellect is in potency to all
intelligibilis. Est autem in potentia intelligible species. But such species are
ad omnes species intelligibiles. infinite, since the species of both
Species autem huiusmodi sunt numbers and figures are infinite. It
infinitae: nam et numerorum remains, then, that God knows all such
species infinitae sunt et figurarum. infinites.
Relinquitur igitur quod Deus omnia
huiusmodi infinita cognoscat.
Item. Cum intellectus noster sit [10] Again, since our intellect can know
cognoscitivus infinitorum in infinite things in potency, being able to
potentia, potest enim in infinitum multiply the species of numbers infinitely,
species numerorum multiplicare; si if the divine intellect did not know infinite
intellectus divinus non things also in act, it would follow either
cognosceret infinita etiam actu, that the human intellect knew more than
sequeretur quod vel plurium esset did the divine intellect, or that the divine
cognoscitivus intellectus humanus intellect did not know in act all the things
quam divinus; vel quod intellectus that it knew in potency. Both alternatives
divinus non cognosceret omnia are impossible, as appears from what
actu quorum est cognoscitivus in was said above.
potentia. Quorum utrumque est
impossibile, ut ex supra dictis
patet.
Adhuc. Infinitum cognitioni [11] Again, the infinite cannot be known in

repugnat inquantum repugnat so far as it cannot be numbered, for it is
numerationi: nam partes infiniti in itself impossible to number the parts of
numerari secundum se impossibile the infinite, as implying a contradiction.
est, quasi contradictionem But to know something by the numbering
implicans. Cognoscere autem of its parts belongs to an intellect that
aliquid per numerationem suarum knows one part after the other; it does
partium est intellectus successive not belong to an intellect that
cognoscentis partem post partem, comprehends the diverse parts together.
non autem intellectus simul Therefore, since the divine intellect
diversas partes comprehendentis. knows all things together without
Cum igitur intellectus absque succession, it is no more prevented from
successione cognoscat omnia knowing infinite things than from knowing
simul, non magis impeditur finite things.
cognoscere infinita quam finita.
Amplius. Omnis quantitas in [12] Moreover, all quantity consists in a

quadam multiplicatione partium certain multiplication of parts, and this is
consistit: et propter hoc numerus why number is the first of quantities.
est prima quantitatum. Ubi ergo Where, therefore, plurality does not bring
pluralitas nullam differentiam about any difference, there neither does
operatur, ibi nec aliquid quod anything that follows quantity bring about
quantitatem consequitur aliquam any difference. Now, in the case of God’s
differentiam facit. In cognitione knowledge, many things are known as
autem Dei plura hoc modo one, since they are known not through
cognoscuntur ut unum: cum non diverse species but through one species,
per diversas species, sed per namely, the divine essence. Hence, many
unam speciem, quae est Dei things are also known together by God,
essentia, cognoscantur. Unde et so that in this way plurality introduces no
simul multa cognoscuntur a Deo. difference in the divine knowledge.
Et ita in Dei cognitione nullam Neither, therefore, does the infinite that
differentiam pluralitas facit. Ergo accompanies quantity. Hence, to know
nec infinitum, quod quantitatem infinite and finite objects makes no
consequitur. Nihil ergo differt ad difference to the divine intellect. Thus,
intellectum divinum infinitorum et since God knows finite things, nothing
finitorum cognitio. Et sic, cum prevents Him from also knowing infinite
cognoscat finita, nihil prohibet eum things.
cognoscere etiam infinita.
Huic autem consonat quod in [13] What is said in a Psalm (146:5)
Psalmo dicitur: et sapientiae eius agrees with this: “And of His wisdom
non est numerus. there is no number.”
Patet autem ex praedictis quare [14] Now, from what has been said it is
intellectus noster infinitum non evident why our intellect does not know
cognoscit, sicut intellectus divinus. the infinite, as does the divine intellect.
Differt enim intellectus noster ab For our intellect is distinguished from the
intellectu divino quantum ad divine intellect on four points which bring
quatuor, quae hanc differentiam about this difference. The first point is
faciunt. Primum est, quod that our intellect is absolutely finite
intellectus noster simpliciter finitus whereas the divine intellect is infinite.
est: divinus autem infinitus. The second point is that our intellect
Secundum est, quia intellectus knows diverse things through diverse
noster diversa per diversas species. This means that it does not
species cognoscit. Unde non extend to infinite things through one act
potest in infinita secundum unam of knowledge as does the divine intellect.
cognitionem, sicut intellectus The third point follows from the second.
divinus. Tertium est ex hoc Since our intellect knows diverse things
proveniens, quod intellectus through diverse species it cannot know
noster, quia per diversas species many things at one and the same time.
diversa cognoscit, non potest Hence, it can know infinite things only
simul multa cognoscere; et ita successively by numbering them. This is
infinita cognoscere non posset nisi not the case with the divine intellect
successive ea numerando. Quod which sees many things together as
non est in intellectu divino, qui grasped through one species. The fourth
simul multa intuetur, quasi per point is that the divine intellect knows
unam speciem visa. Quartum est, both the things that are and the things
quia intellectus divinus est eorum that are not, as has been shown.
quae sunt et quae non sunt, ut
ostensum est.
Patet etiam quomodo verbum [15] It is likewise evident how the
philosophi, qui dicit quod infinitum, statement of Aristotle, who says that the
secundum quod infinitum, est infinite as infinite is unknown, is not
ignotum, praesenti sententiae non opposed to the present conclusion. For,
obviat. Quia, cum infiniti ratio since the nature of the infinite belongs to
quantitati competat, ut ipse dicit, quantity, as he himself says, the infinite
infinitum ut infinitum cognosceretur as infinite would be known if it were
si per mensurationem suarum known through the measurement of its
partium notum esset: haec est parts, for this is the proper knowledge of
enim propria cognitio quantitatis. quantity. But God does not know in this
Sic autem Deus non cognoscit. way. God, therefore, so to speak, does
Unde, ut ita dicatur, non cognoscit not know the infinite in so far as it is
infinitum secundum quod est infinite, but, as we have shown, in so far
infinitum, sed secundum quod ad as it is related to His knowledge as
suam scientiam se habet ac si though it were something finite.
esset finitum, ut ostensum est.
Sciendum tamen quod Deus [16] It must be observed, however, that
infinita non cognoscit scientia God does not know infinite things with
visionis, ut verbis aliorum utamur, the knowledge of vision, to make use of
quia infinita nec sunt actu, nec an expression employed by others. For
fuerunt nec erunt; cum generatio there neither are nor have been nor will
ex neutra parte sit infinita, be infinite things in act, since, according
secundum fidem Catholicam. Scit to the Catholic faith, generation is not
tamen infinita scientia simplicis infinite at either end. But God knows the
intelligentiae. Scit enim Deus infinite with the knowledge of simple
infinita quae nec sunt nec erunt understanding. For He knows the infinite
nec fuerunt, quae tamen sunt in things which neither are nor will be nor
potentia creaturae. Et scit etiam have been, which yet lie in the potency of
infinita quae sunt in sua potentia the creation. God likewise knows the
quae nec sunt nec erunt nec infinite things that are in His power, which
fuerunt. neither are nor will be nor have been.
Unde, quantum ad quaestionem [17] Hence, as concerns the question of
de cognitione singularium pertinet, the knowledge of singulars, we may reply
responderi posset per by denying the major. There are not
interemptionem maioris: non enim infinite singulars. However, if there were,
singularia sunt infinita. Si tamen God would still know them.
essent, nihil minus Deus ea
cognosceret.
Caput 70 Chapter 70
Quod Deus vilia cognoscit THAT GOD KNOWS LOWLY THINGS
Hoc autem habito, ostendendum [1] Having achieved this conclusion, we

est quod Deus cognoscit vilia; et must show that God knows lowly things,
quod hoc nobilitati eius scientiae and that this is not opposed to the nobility
non repugnat. of His knowledge.
Quando enim aliqua virtus activa [2] The stronger a given active power is,
est fortior, tanto in remotiora suam the more does its action extend to more
actionem extendit: ut etiam in remote effects. This is also evident in the
sensibilium actionibus apparet. Vis actions of sensible things. Now, the
autem divini intellectus in power of the divine intellect in knowing
cognoscendo res similatur virtuti things is like an active power. For God
activae: intellectus enim divinus knows things not by receiving anything
non recipiendo a rebus cognoscit, from them, but, rather, by exercising His
sed magis per hoc quod eis influit. causality on them. Hence, since God is of
Cum igitur sit infinitae virtutis in an infinite power in understanding, as is
intelligendo, ut ex praedictis patet, clear from what has preceded, His
oportet quod eius cognitio usque knowledge must extend even to the most
ad remotissima extendatur. Sed remote things. But the gradation of
gradus nobilitatis et vilitatis in nobility and lowliness among all things is

omnibus entibus attenditur measured according to their nearness to
secundum propinquitatem et and distance from God, Who is at the
distantiam a Deo, qui est in fine peak of nobility. Therefore, because of
nobilitatis. Ergo quantumcumque the perfect power of His intellect, God
vilissima in entibus Deus, propter knows the lowliest possible among
maximam virtutem sui intellectus, beings.
cognoscit.
Praeterea. Omne quod est, in eo [3] Furthermore, everything that is, in that

quod est vel quale quid est, actu it is or in what it is, is in act and the
est, et similitudo primi actus est, et likeness of the first act, and on this
ex hoc nobilitatem habet. Quod account has nobility. Whatever is in
etiam potentia est, ex ordine ad potency likewise participates in nobility
actum, nobilitatis est particeps: sic from its order to act; for it is thus that it is
enim esse dicitur. Relinquitur igitur said to be. It remains, then, that,
quod unumquodque, in se considered in itself, each thing is noble,
consideratum, nobile est: sed vile but is called lowly with respect to
dicitur respectu nobilioris. A Deo something more noble. Now, the most
autem distant nobilissimae aliarum noble of creatures are no less distant
rerum non minus quam ultimae from God than the lowest of creatures are
rerum creatarum distent a distant from the highest. Hence, if this
supremis. Si igitur haec distantia distance prevented God from knowing
impediret divinam cognitionem, them, all the more would the previous
multo magis impediret illa. Et sic distance. It would thus follow that God did
sequeretur quod nihil Deus not know anything other than Himself.
cognosceret aliud a se. Quod This was disproved above. If, then, God
supra improbatum est. Si igitur knows something other than Himself,
aliquid aliud a se cognoscit, however supreme in nobility it may be, by
quantumcumque nobilissimum, the same reason He knows anything
pari ratione cognoscit quodlibet, whatever, however exceedingly lowly it
quantumcumque dicatur may be called.
vilissimum.
Amplius. Bonum ordinis universi [4] Moreover, the good of the order of the

nobilius est qualibet parte universi: universe is more noble than any part of
cum partes singulae ordinentur ad the universe, since the individual parts
bonum ordinis qui est in toto sicut are ordered, as to an end, to the good of
ad finem, ut per philosophum the order that is in the whole. Ibis is
patet, in XI metaphysicae. Si igitur evident from the Philosopher in
Deus cognoscit aliquam aliam Metaphysics XI [10]. Hence, if God knows
naturam nobilem, maxime some other noble nature, He especially
cognoscet ordinem universi. Hic knows the order of the universe. But this
autem cognosci non potest nisi order cannot be known without a
cognoscantur et nobiliora et knowledge both of the things that are
viliora, in quorum distantiis et more noble and of the things that are
habitudinibus ordo universi more lowly, in whose distances and
consistit. Relinquitur igitur quod relations the order of the universe
Deus cognoscit non solum nobilia, consists. It remains, therefore, that God
sed etiam ea quae vilia reputantur. knows not only noble things but also the
things that are deemed lowly.
Adhuc. Vilitas cognitorum in [5] Again, the lowliness of the things
cognoscentem non redundat per known does not of itself redound to the
se: hoc est enim de ratione knower. For it belongs to the nature of
cognitionis, ut cognoscens knowledge that the knower should
contineat species cogniti contain the species of the thing known
secundum modum suum. Per according to his own manner.
accidens autem potest redundare Accidentally, however, the lowliness of
in cognoscentem vilitas the things known can redound to the
cognitorum: vel eo quod, dum vilia knower. This may be either because,
considerat, a nobilioribus while he is considering lowly things, his
abstrahitur cogitandis: vel eo quod mind is turned away from thinking of more
ex consideratione vilium in aliquas noble things; or it may be because, as a
indebitas affectiones inclinatur. result of considering lowly things, he is
Quod quidem in Deo esse non inclined towards certain unbefitting
potest, ut ex dictis patet. Non igitur affections. This, however, is not possible
derogat divinae nobilitati vilium in God, as is clear from what has been
rerum cognitio, sed magis pertinet said. The knowledge of lowly things,
ad divinam perfectionem, therefore, does not detract from the
secundum quod omnia in seipso divine nobility, but rather belongs to the
praehabet, ut supra ostensum est. divine perfection according as it pre
contains all things in itself, as was shown
above.
Adhuc. Virtus aliqua non iudicatur [6] Furthermore, a power is not judged to

parva quae in parva potest, sed be small because it can do small things
quae ad parva determinatur: nam but because it is limited to small things;
virtus quae in magna potest, etiam for a power that can do great things can
potest in parva. Cognitio ergo likewise do small ones. Hence, a
quae simul potest in nobilia et knowledge that extends at the same time
vilia, non est iudicanda vilis, sed to both noble and lowly things is not to be
illa quae in vilia tantum potest, judged as being lowly; rather, that
sicut in nobis accidit: nam alia knowledge is to be judged lowly which
consideratione consideramus extends only to lowly things, as happens
divina et humana, et alia scientia in our own case. For we examine divine
est utriusque; unde, comparatione and human things by different
nobilioris, inferior vilior reputatur. considerations, and the knowledge of the
In Deo autem non est sic: nam one is not the knowledge of the other, so
eadem scientia et consideratione that by comparison with the more noble
seipsum et omnia alia considerat. knowledge the lower knowledge is
Non igitur eius scientiae aliqua deemed to be lowlier. But it is not thus in
vilitas ascribitur ex hoc quod God. By one and the same knowledge
quaecumque vilia cognoscit. and consideration He considers both
Himself and all other things. No lowliness,
therefore, is ascribed to His knowledge
from the fact that He knows any lowly
things whatever.
Huic autem consonat quod dicitur [7] What is said of the divine wisdom is in

Sap. 7 de divina sapientia, quod harmony with this conclusion. Wisdom
attingit ubique propter suam “reaches everywhere by reason of her
munditiam, et nihil inquinatum purity... and therefore no defiled thing
incurrit in illam. cometh into her” (Wis. 7:2425).
Patet autem ex praedictis quod [8] Now, from what has been said it is
ratio quae in oppositum evident that the argument advanced on
obiiciebatur, ostensae veritati non the opposite side is not opposed to the
repugnat. Nobilitas enim scientiae truth we have shown. For the nobility of
attenditur secundum ea ad quae knowledge is measured in terms of those
principaliter scientia ordinatur, et things to which knowledge is principally
non ad omnia quaecumque in directed, and not in terms of all the things
scientia cadunt: sub nobilissima that fall within knowledge. For in the most
enim scientiarum, apud nos, noble among the knowledges that we
cadunt non solum suprema in have there are included not only the
entibus, sed etiam infima; nam highest beings but also the lowest. For
philosophia prima first philosophy extends its consideration
considerationem suam extendit a from the first being to being in potency,
primo ente usque ad ens in which is the lowest being. Thus, under
potentia, quod est ultimum in divine science are included the lowest of
entibus. Sic autem sub divina beings as being known along with its
scientia comprehenduntur infima principal object. For the divine essence is
entium quasi cum principali the principal object known by God and in
cognitio simul nota: divina enim this object, as was shown above, all
essentia est principale a Deo others are known.
cognitum, in quo omnia
cognoscuntur, ut supra ostensum
est.
Patet etiam quod haec veritas non [9] It is also evident that this truth is not
repugnat dictis philosophi in XI opposed to what the Philosopher says in
metaphysicae. Nam ibi intendit Metaphysics XI [9]. Aristotle there intends
ostendere quod divinus intellectus to show that the divine intellect does not
non cognoscit aliud a se quod sit know anything other than itself that is its
sui intellectus perfectio quasi perfection in the sense of being its
principale cognitum. Et secundum principal known object. In this sense he
hunc modum dicit quod vilia says that it is better not to know lowly
melius ignorantur quam things than to know them. This is the
cognoscuntur: quando scilicet est case, namely, when the knowledge of the
alia cognitio vilium et nobilium, et lowly is different from the knowledge of
vilium consideratio the noble and the consideration of lowly
considerationem nobilium impedit. things impedes the consideration of noble
things.
Caput 71 Chapter 71
Quod Deus cognoscit mala THAT GOD KNOWS EVILS
Nunc restat ostendere quod Deus [1] It now remains to show that God
cognoscat etiam mala. likewise knows evils.
Bono enim cognito, malum [2] When a good is known, the opposite

oppositum cognoscitur. Sed Deus evil is known. But God knows all
cognoscit omnia particularia bona, particular goods, to which evils are
quibus mala opponuntur. Cognoscit opposed. Therefore, God knows evils.
igitur Deus mala.
Praeterea. Contrariorum rationes in [3] Furthermore, the notions of

anima non sunt contrariae: alias non contraries are themselves not
simul essent in anima, nec simul contraries in the soul; otherwise, they
cognoscerentur. Ratio ergo qua would not be in the soul together nor
cognoscitur malum, non repugnat would they be known together. The
bono, sed magis ad rationem boni notion, therefore, by which evil is known
pertinet. Si igitur in Deo, propter is not opposed to the good but belongs,
suam absolutam perfectionem, rather, to the notion of the good. Hence,
inveniuntur omnes rationes if all the notions of goodness are found
bonitatis, ut supra probatum est, in God because of His absolute
relinquitur quod in ipso sit ratio qua perfection, as was proved above, it
malum cognoscitur. Et sic est etiam follows that there is in Him the notion by
malorum cognoscitivus. which evil is known. And thus God also
knows evils.
Item. Verum est bonum intellectus: [4] Again, the true is the good of the
ex hoc enim aliquis intellectus dicitur intellect. For an intellect is said to be
bonus quod verum cognoscit. Verum good because it knows the true. But it is
autem non solum est bonum esse true not only that the good is good but
bonum, sed etiam malum esse also that evil is evil; for just as it is true
malum: sicut enim verum est esse that that which is is, so it is true that
quod est, ita verum est non esse that which is not is not. The good of the
quod non est. Bonum igitur intellect, therefore, also consists in the
intellectus etiam in cognitione mali knowledge of evil. But, since the divine
consistit. Sed, cum divinus intellect is perfect in goodness, no
intellectus sit perfectus in bonitate, intellectual perfection can be lacking to
non potest sibi deesse aliqua it. Therefore, it has a knowledge of
intellectualium perfectionum. Adest evils.
igitur sibi malorum cognitio.
Amplius. Deus cognoscit rerum [5] Moreover, as was shown above,
distinctionem, ut supra ostensum God knows the distinction of things. But
est. Sed in ratione distinctionis est negation is found within the notion of
negatio: distincta enim sunt quorum distinction; for those things are distinct
unum non est aliud. Unde et prima, of which one is not the other. Hence,
quae seipsis distinguuntur, mutuo the first notions, which are
sui negationem includunt: ratione distinguished by themselves, mutually

cuius negativae propositiones in eis include a negation of one another. That
sunt immediatae, ut, nulla quantitas is why the negative propositions among
est substantia. Cognoscit igitur Deus them are immediate: for example, no
negationem. Privatio autem negatio quantity is a substance. God, therefore,
quaedam est in subiecto knows negation. But privation is a
determinato, ut in IV Metaphys. certain negation in a determinate
ostenditur. Cognoscit igitur subject, as is shown in Metaphysics IV
privationem. Et per consequens [2]. God, therefore, knows privation.
malum, quod nihil est aliud quam Consequently, He knows evil, which is
privatio debitae perfectionis. nothing other than the privation of a due
perfection.
Praeterea. Si Deus cognoscit omnes [6] Furthermore, if God knows all the

species rerum, ut supra probatum species of things, as was proved
est, et etiam a quibusdam above, and is likewise conceded and
philosophis conceditur et probatur, proved by certain philosophers, He
oportet quod cognoscat contraria: must know contraries. This is so
tum quia quorundam generum because the species of certain genera
species sunt contrariae; tum quia are contraries and also because the
differentiae generum sunt differences of genera are contraries, as
contrariae, ut patet in X is proved in Metaphysics X [8]. But
metaphysicae. Sed in contrariis between contraries there is included the
includitur oppositio formae et opposition of form and privation, as is
privationis, ut ibidem habetur. Ergo said in the same reference. Therefore,
oportet quod Deus cognoscat God must know privation and
privationem. Et per consequens consequently evil.
malum.
Adhuc. Deus cognoscit non solum [7] Again, as was shown above, God
formam, sed etiam materiam, ut knows not only form but also matter.
supra ostensum est. Materia autem, But, since matter is a being in potency,
cum sit ens in potentia, cognosci it cannot be known perfectly unless
perfecte non potest nisi cognoscatur those things to which its potency
ad quae eius potentia se extendat: extends are known. This is the case
sicut et in omnibus aliis potentiis with all other potencies. Now, the
accidit. Extendit autem se potentia potency of matter extends both to form
materiae et ad formam et and to privation, since that which can
privationem: quod enim potest esse, be can also notbe. Therefore, God
potest etiam non esse. Ergo Deus knows privation, and consequently He
cognoscit privationem. Et sic knows evil.
cognoscit per consequens malum.
Item. Si Deus cognoscit aliquid aliud [8] Again, if God knows something

a se, maxime cognoscet quod est other than Himself, He especially
optimum. Hoc autem est ordo knows that which is the best. Ibis is the
universi, ad quem sicut ad finem order of the universe to which, as to the
omnia particularia bona ordinantur. end, all particular goods are ordered.
In ordine autem universi sunt But in the order of the universe certain

quaedam quae sunt ad things exist to ward off dangers that
removendum nocumenta quae may come about from certain other
possent ex quibusdam aliis things. This is clear from what is given
provenire: ut patet in his quae to animals for their own protection.
dantur animalibus ad defensionem. Therefore, God knows such dangers.
Ergo huiusmodi nocumenta Deus Hence, He knows evils.
cognoscit. Cognoscit igitur mala.
Praeterea. In nobis malorum [9] Furthermore, in our own case the
cognitio nunquam vituperatur knowledge of evil is not considered
secundum id quod per se scientiae blameworthy according to that which
est, idest secundum iudicium quod essentially belongs to knowledge,
habetur de malis: sed per accidens, namely, the judgment that we have of
secundum quod per malorum evil things. But it is considered
considerationem interdum aliquis ad blameworthy by accident, in so far as
mala inclinatur. Hoc autem non est through the consideration of evil one is
in Deo: quia immutabilis est, ut sometimes inclined to evil things. This
supra ostensum est. Nihil igitur is not the case in God, because, as was
prohibet quin Deus mala cognoscat. shown above, He is immutable.
Nothing, therefore, prevents God from
knowing evils.
Huic autem consonat quod dicitur [10] What is said in Wisdom (7:30)
Sap. 8, quod Dei sapientiam non harmonizes with this conclusion: “No
vincit malitia. Prov. 1511 dicitur: evil can overcome” the “wisdom” of
Infernus et perditio coram domino. God. And in Proverbs (15:11) it is said:
Et in Psalmo: delicta mea a te non “Hell and destruction are before the
sunt abscondita. Et Iob 1111 dicitur: Lord.” And in the Psalm (68:6): “My
ipse novit hominum vanitatem: et offenses are not hidden from you.” And
videns iniquitatem, nonne in Job (11:11) it is said: “For He knows
considerat? the vanity of men, and when He sees
iniquity, does He not consider it?”
Sciendum autem quod circa [11] We must observe, however, that on

cognitionem mali et privationis aliter the knowledge of evil and privation the
se habet intellectus divinus, atque divine intellect and our own are
aliter intellectus noster. Nam cum differently disposed. For, since our
intellectus noster singulas res per intellect knows singular things through
singulas species proprias cognoscat singular species that are proper and
et diversas, id quod est in actu diverse, that which it is in act it knows
cognoscit per speciem intelligibilem, through an intelligible species through
per quam fit intellectus in actu. Unde which it is made an intellect in act.
et potentiam cognoscere potest, Hence, it can also know potency in so
inquantum in potentia ad talem far as it is sometimes in potency to
speciem quandoque se habet: ut such a species; so that just as it knows
sicut actum cognoscit per actum, ita act through act, so likewise it knows
etiam potentiam per potentiam potency through potency. And because
cognoscat. Et quia potentia est de potency belongs to the nature of
ratione privationis, nam privatio est privation, since privation is a negation
negatio, cuius subiectum est ens in whose subject is a being in potency, it
potentia; sequitur quod intellectui follows that it is suitable to our intellect
nostro competat aliquo modo in a certain manner to know privation in
cognoscere privationem, inquantum so far as it is of a nature to be in
est natus esse in potentia. Licet potency. Nevertheless, it can also be
etiam dici possit quod ex ipsa said that the knowledge of potency and
cognitione actus sequitur cognitio privation follows from the knowledge of
potentiae et privationis. act.
Intellectus autem divinus, qui nullo [12] The divine intellect, on the other
modo est in potentia, non cognoscit hand, which is in no way in potency,
modo praedicto privationem nec does not know privation or anything
aliquid aliud. Nam si cognosceret else in the above given way. For, if it
aliquid per speciem quae non est knew something through a species that
ipse, sequeretur de necessitate is not itself, it would necessarily follow
quod proportio eius ad illam that its proportion to that species would
speciem esset sicut proportio be as the proportion of potency to act.
potentiae ad actum. Unde oportet God must therefore understand solely
quod ipse intelligat solum per through the species that is His own
speciem quae est sua essentia. Et essence. It follows, consequently, that
per consequens quod intelligat se He understands only Himself as the first
tantum sicut primum intellectum. object of His intellect. But in
Intelligendo tamen se, cognoscit understanding Himself He understands
alia, sicut supra ostensum est. Non other things, as was proved above. And
solum autem actus, sed potentias et He knows not only acts, but also
privationes. potencies and, privations.
Et hic est sensus verborum quae [13] This is the meaning of the words
philosophus ponit in III de anima, that the Philosopher sets down in De
dicens: aut quomodo malum anima III [6], when he says: “How does
cognoscit, aut nigrum? Contraria it apprehend evil or something black?
enim quodammodo cognoscit. For in a manner it knows contraries. But
Oportet autem potentia esse the knower must be potentially what it
cognoscens, et esse in ipso. Si vero knows and this must be in it. But, if no
alicui non inest contrarium scilicet contrary is present to a certain
in potentia , seipsum cognoscit, et knower”—that is, in potency—“this
actu est, et separabile. Nec oportet knower knows itself and is in act and
sequi expositionem Averrois, qui vult separable.”“ Nor must we adopt the
quod ex hoc sequatur quod interpretation of Averroes, who takes
intellectus qui est tantum in actu, the position that it follows from this text
nullo modo cognoscat privationem. that the intellect that is solely in act in
Sed sensus est quod non cognoscat no way knows privation. Rather, the
privationem per hoc quod est in sense is that it does not know privation
potentia ad aliquid aliud, sed per by the fact of being in potency to
hoc quod cognoscit seipsum et est something else; it knows privation
semper in actu. because it knows itself and is always in
act.
Rursus sciendum quod, si Deus hoc [14] Moreover, we must observe that, if
modo seipsum cognosceret quod, God knew Himself in such a way that,
cognoscendo se, non cognosceret by knowing Himself, He did not know
alia entia, quae sunt particularia other beings, which are particular
bona, nullo modo cognosceret goods, then in no way would He know
privationem aut malum. Quia bono privation and evil. For to the good that
quod est ipse non est aliqua privatio He is there is no contrary privation,
opposita: cum privatio et suum since privation and its opposite bear on
oppositum sint nata esse circa idem, the same thing, and thus to that which
et sic ei quod est actus purus nulla is pure act no privation is opposed.
privatio opponitur. Et per And, consequently, neither is evil.
consequens nec malum. Unde, Hence, granted that God knows only
posito quod Deus se solum Himself, by knowing the good that He is
cognoscat, cognoscendo bono quod He will not know evil. But because, in
est ipse non cognoscet malum. Sed knowing Himself, He knows the beings
quia, cognoscendo se, cognoscit that are by nature subject to privations,
entia in quibus natae sunt esse He must know the privations and the
privationes, necesse est ut evils that are opposed to particular
cognoscat privationes oppositas, et goods.
mala opposita particularibus bonis.
Sciendum etiam quod, sicut Deus [15] We must likewise observe, as was

absque discursu intellectus shown above, that just as God in
cognoscendo se cognoscit alia, ut knowing Himself knows other things
supra ostensum est; ita etiam non without any discursiveness of the
oportet quod eius cognitio sit intellect, so likewise it is not necessary
discursiva si per bona cognoscit that His knowledge be discursive if He
mala. Nam bonum est quasi ratio knows the evil through the good. For
cognitionis mali. Unde cognoscuntur the good is as the principle of the
mala per bona sicut res per suas knowledge of what is evil. Hence, evils
definitiones: non sicut conclusiones are known through goods as things are
per principia. known through their definitions, not as
conclusions are known through their
principles.
Nec etiam ad imperfectionem [16] Nor, again, does it mean that there

cognitionis divinae cedit si mala per is imperfection in the divine knowledge
privationem bonorum cognoscat. if God knows evils through the privation
Quia malum non dicit esse nisi of goods. For the position says that evil
inquantum est privatio boni. Unde exists only in so far as it is the privation
secundum hunc solum modum est of good. Hence, in this way alone is it
cognoscibile: nam unumquodque, knowable, for each thing is knowable to
quantum habet de esse, tantum the extent that it has being.
habet de cognoscibilitate.
Caput 72 Chapter 72
Quod Deus est volens THAT GOD HAS WILL
Expeditis his quae ad divini [1] Having dealt with what concerns the

intellectus cognitionem pertinent, knowledge of the divine intellect, it
nunc restat considerare de Dei remains for us to deal with God’s will.
voluntate.
Ex hoc enim quod Deus est [2] From the fact that God is endowed
intelligens, sequitur quod sit volens. with intellect it follows that He is
Cum enim bonum intellectum sit endowed with will. For, since the
obiectum proprium voluntatis, understood good is the proper object of
oportet quod bonum intellectum, the will, the understood good is, as
inquantum huiusmodi, sit volitum. such, willed. Now that which is
Intellectum autem dicitur ad understood is by reference to one who
intelligentem. Necesse est igitur understands. Hence, he who grasps the
quod intelligens bonum, inquantum good by his intellect is, as such,
huiusmodi, sit volens. Deus autem endowed with will. But God grasps the
intelligit bonum: cum enim sit good by His intellect, For, since the
perfecte intelligens, ut ex supra activity of His intellect is perfect, as
dictis patet, intelligit ens simul cum appears from what has been said, He
ratione boni. Est igitur volens. understands being together with the
qualification of the good. He is,
therefore, endowed with will.
Adhuc. Cuicumque inest aliqua [3] Again, whoever possesses some

forma, habet per illam formam form is related through that form to
habitudinem ad ea quae sunt in things in reality. For example, white
rerum natura: sicut lignum album wood is through its whiteness like some
per suam albedinem est aliquibus things and unlike other things. But in
simile et quibusdam dissimile. In one understanding and sensing there is
intelligente autem et sentiente est the form of the understood and sensed
forma rei intellectae et sensatae: thing, since all knowledge is through
cum omnis cognitio sit per aliquam some likeness. There must, therefore,
similitudinem. Oportet igitur esse be a relation of the one understanding
habitudinem intelligentis et and sensing to understood and sensed
sentientis ad ea quae sunt intellecta things according as these are in reality.
et sensata secundum quod sunt in But this is not because of the fact that
rerum natura. Non autem hoc est these beings understand and sense,
per hoc quod intelligunt et sentiunt: since thereby we rather find a relation of
nam per hoc magis attenditur things to the one understanding and
habitudo rerum ad intelligentem et sensing; for to understand and to sense
sentientem; quia intelligere et exist according as things are in the
sentire est secundum quod res sunt intellect and the sense, following the
in intellectu et sensu, secundum mode of each. He who senses and
modum utriusque. Habet autem understands has a relation to the thing
habitudinem sentiens et intelligens outside the soul through his will and
ad rem quae est extra animam per appetite. Hence, all sensing and
voluntatem et appetitum. Unde understanding beings have appetite and
omnia sentientia et intelligentia will. Properly speaking, however, the
appetunt et volunt: voluntas tamen will is in the intellect. Since, then, God is

proprie in intellectu est. Cum igitur intelligent, He must be endowed with
Deus sit intelligens, oportet quod sit will.
volens.
Amplius. Illud quod consequitur [4] Moreover, that which accompanies

omne ens, convenit enti inquantum every being belongs to being inasmuch
est ens. Quod autem est huiusmodi, as it is in being. This accompaniment
oportet quod in eo maxime must be found in a supreme way in that
inveniatur quod est primum ens. which is the first being. Now, it belongs
Cuilibet autem enti competit to every being to seek its perfection and
appetere suam perfectionem et the conservation of its being, and this in
conservationem sui esse: unicuique the case of each being according to its
tamen secundum suum modum, mode: for intellectual beings through
intellectualibus quidem per will, for animals through sensible
voluntatem, animalibus per appetite, and to those lacking sense
sensibilem appetitum, carentibus through natural appetite. To seek
vero sensu per appetitum perfection belongs differently to those
naturalem. Aliter tamen quae that have it and those that have it not.
habent, et quae non habent: nam ea For those that have it not tend by
quae non habent, appetitiva virtute desire, through the appetitive power
sui generis desiderio tendunt ad proper to them, to acquire what is
acquirendum quod ei deest; quae lacking to their desire, whereas those
autem habent, quietantur in ipso. that have it rest in it. Hence, this cannot
Hoc igitur primo enti, quod Deus be lacking to the first being, which is
est, deesse non potest. Cum igitur God. Since, then, God is intelligent,
ipse sit intelligens, inest sibi there is in Him a will by which His being
voluntas, qua placet sibi suum esse and His goodness are pleasing to Him.
et sua bonitas.
Item. Intelligere, quanto perfectius [5] Again, the more perfect

est, tanto delectabilius est understanding is, the more delightful it
intelligenti. Sed Deus intelligit, et is to the one understanding, But God
suum intelligere est perfectissimum, understands and His understanding is
ut supra ostensum est. Ergo most perfect, as was shown above.
intelligere est ei delectabilissimum. Therefore, His understanding is most
Delectatio autem intelligibilis est per full of delight. But intelligible delight is
voluntatem: sicut delectatio through the will, as sensible delight is
sensibilis est per concupiscentiae through the appetite of concupiscence.
appetitum. Est igitur in Deo There is, therefore, will in God.
voluntas.
Praeterea. Forma per intellectum [6] Furthermore, a form considered by

considerata non movet nec aliquid the intellect does not move or cause
causat nisi mediante voluntate, anything except through the will, whose
cuius obiectum est finis et bonum, a object is the end and the good, by
quo movetur aliquis ad agendum. which someone is moved to act. Hence,
Unde intellectus speculativus non the speculative intellect does not move,
movet; neque imaginatio pura nor does the imagination alone without
absque aestimatione. Sed forma an act of the estimative power. But the
intellectus divini est causa motus et form of the divine intellect is the cause
esse in aliis: agit enim res per of motion and being in other things,
intellectum, ut infra ostendetur. since God produces things by His
Oportet igitur quod ipse sit volens. intellect, as will be shown later on.
Therefore, God must be endowed with
will.
Item. In virtutibus motivis, in [7] Again, among moving powers in

habentibus intellectum, prima beings possessing an intellect, the first
invenitur voluntas: nam voluntas is found to be the will. For the will sets
omnem potentiam applicat ad suum every power to its act: we understand
actum; intelligimus enim quia because we will, we imagine because
volumus, et imaginamur quia we will, and so with the rest. The will
volumus, et sic de aliis. Et hoc has this role because its object is the
habet quia obiectum eius est finis: end; although it is also a fact that the
quamvis intellectus, non secundum intellect, though not in the manner of an
modum causae efficientis et efficient and moving cause, but in that
moventis, sed secundum modum of a final cause, moves the will by
causae finalis, moveat voluntatem, proposing to it its object, namely, the
proponendo sibi suum obiectum, end. It therefore belongs supremely to
quod est finis. Primo igitur moventi the first mover to have a will.
convenit maxime habere
voluntatem.
Praeterea. Liberum est quod sui [8] Furthermore, “that is free which is for

causa est: et sic liberum habet its own sake,” and thus the free has the
rationem eius quod est per se. nature of that which is through itself.
Voluntas autem primo habet Now, first and primarily, will has liberty
libertatem in agendo: inquantum in acting, for according as someone
enim voluntarie agit quis, dicitur acts voluntarily he is said to perform
libere agere quamcumque any given action freely. To act through
actionem. Primo igitur agenti will, therefore, supremely befits the first
maxime competit per voluntatem agent, whom it supremely befits to act
agere, cui maxime convenit per se through himself.
agere.
Amplius. Finis et agens ad finem [9] Moreover, the end and the agent to
semper unius ordinis inveniuntur in the end are always found to be of one
rebus: unde et finis proximus, qui order in reality; and hence the
est proportionatus agenti, incidit in proximate end that is proportioned to an
idem specie cum agente, tam in agent falls into the same species as the
naturalibus quam in artificialibus; agent both among natural things and
nam forma artis per quam artifex artificial things. For the form of the art
agit, est species formae quae est in through which the artisan works is the
materia, quae est finis artificis; et species of the form that is in matter,
forma ignis generantis qua agit, est which is the end of the artisan; and the
eiusdem speciei cum forma ignis form by which the generating fire acts is
geniti, quae est finis generationis. of the same species as the form of the
Deo autem nihil coordinatur quasi generated fire, which is the end of
eiusdem ordinis nisi ipse: alias generation. But nothing is coordered
essent plura prima, cuius contrarium with God, as within the same order,
supra ostensum est. Ipse est igitur except Himself; otherwise, there would
primum agens propter finem qui est be several first beings—whose contrary
ipsemet. Ipse igitur non solum est was proved above. He is therefore the
finis appetibilis, sed appetens, ut ita first agent because of the end that He is
dicam, se finem, et appetitu Himself. He is therefore not only the
intellectuali, cum sit intelligens: qui appetible end, but also the seeker of
est voluntas. Est igitur in Deo Himself as the end, so to speak. And
voluntas. this He is with an intellectual appetite,
since He is intelligent. This is will. There
is, therefore, will in God.
Hanc autem Dei voluntatem [10] The testimony of Sacred Scripture
Scripturae sacrae testimonia is witness to the divine will. For it is said
confitentur. Dicitur enim in Psalmo: in a Psalm (134:6): “Whatever the Lord
omnia quaecumque voluit, dominus pleased He has done.” And Romans
fecit. Et Rom. 919: voluntati eius (9:19): “Who resists His will?”
quis resistit?
Caput 73 Chapter 73
Quod voluntas Dei est eius THAT THE WILL OF GOD IS HIS
essentia ESSENCE
Ex hoc autem apparet quod sua [1] From this it appears that God’s will is

voluntas non est aliud quam sua not other than His essence.
essentia.
Deo enim convenit esse volentem [2] It belongs to God to be endowed with

inquantum est intelligens, ut will in so far as He is intelligent, as has
ostensum est. Est autem intelligens been shown. But God has
per essentiam suam, ut supra understanding by His essence, as was
probatum est. Ergo et volens. Est proved above. So, therefore, does He
igitur voluntas Dei ipsa eius have will. God’s will, therefore, is His
essentia. very essence.
Adhuc. Sicut intelligere est perfectio [3] Again, as to understand is the

intelligentis, ita et velle volentis: perfection of the one understanding, so
utrumque enim est actio in agente to will is the perfection of the one willing;
manens, non autem transiens in for both are actions remaining in the
aliquid passum, sicut calefactio. agent and not going out (as does heat)
Sed intelligere Dei est eius esse, ut to some receiving subject. But the
supra probatum est: eo quod, cum understanding of God is His being, as
esse divinum secundum se sit was proved above. For, since the divine
perfectissimum, nullam being is in itself most perfect, it admits
supervenientem perfectionem of no superadded perfection, as was

admittit, ut supra ostensum est. Est proved above. The divine willing also is,
igitur et divinum velle esse ipsius. therefore, His being; and hence the will
Ergo et voluntas Dei est eius of God is His essence.
essentia.
Amplius. Cum omne agens agat [4] Moreover, since every agent acts in
inquantum actu est, oportet quod so far as it is in act, God, Who is pure
Deus, qui est actus purus, per act, must act through His essence.
suam essentiam agat. Velle autem Willing, however, is a certain operation
est quaedam Dei operatio. Oportet of God. Therefore, God must be
igitur quod Deus per essentiam endowed with will through His essence.
suam sit volens. Sua igitur voluntas Therefore, His will is His essence.
est sua essentia.
Item. Si voluntas esset aliquid [5] Furthermore, if will were something
additum divinae substantiae, cum added to the divine substance, since the
divina substantia sit quid divine substance is something complete
completum in esse, sequeretur in being it would follow that will would be
quod voluntas adveniret ei quasi added to it as an accident to a subject,
accidens subiecto; sequeretur quod that the divine substance would be
divina substantia compararetur ad related to it as potency to act, and that
ipsam quasi potentia ad actum; et there would be composition in God. All
quod esset compositio in Deo. this was refuted above. Hence, it is not
Quae omnia supra improbata sunt. possible that the divine will be
Non est igitur possibile quod divina something added to the divine
voluntas sit aliquid additum divinae substance.
essentiae.
Caput 74 Chapter 74
Quod principale volitum Dei THAT THE PRINCIPAL OBJECT OF THE
est divina essentia DIVINE WILL IS THE DIVINE ESSENCE
Ex hoc autem ulterius apparet [1] From this it further appears that the
quod principale divinae voluntatis principal object of the divine will is the
volitum est eius essentia. divine essence.
Bonum enim intellectum est [2] The understood good is the object of
obiectum voluntatis, ut dictum the will, as has been said. But that which is
est. Id autem quod a Deo principally understood by God is the divine
principaliter intelligitur est divina essence, as was proved above. The divine
essentia, ut supra probatum est. essence, therefore, is principally the object
Divina igitur essentia est id de of the divine will.
quo principaliter est divina
voluntas.
Item. Appetibile comparatur ad [3] Again, the appetible is to appetite as
appetitum sicut movens ad the mover to the moved, as was said
motum, ut supra dictum est. Et above. Similar, too, is the relation of the
similiter se habet volitum ad object of the will to the will, since the will
voluntatem: cum voluntas sit de belongs to the class of appetitive powers.
genere appetitivarum If, then, the principal object of the divine
potentiarum. Si igitur voluntatis will be other than the divine essence, it will
divinae sit aliud principale follow that there is something higher than
volitum quam ipsa Dei essentia, the divine will moving it. The contrary of
sequetur quod aliquid aliud sit this is apparent from what has been said.
superius divina voluntate, quod
ipsam movet. Cuius contrarium
ex praedictis patet.
Praeterea. Principale volitum est [4] Moreover, the principal object willed is
unicuique volenti causa volendi: for each one willing the cause of his willing.
cum enim dicimus, volo For when we say, I will to walk in order to
ambulare ut saner, causam nos become healed, we are of the impression
reddere arbitramur; et si that we are assigning a cause. If, then, it
quaeratur, quare vis sanari, be asked, why do you want to become
procedetur in assignatione healed? causes will be assigned one after
causarum quousque perveniatur the other until we arrive at the ultimate
ad finem ultimum, qui est end. This is the principal object of the will,
principale volitum, quod est which is through itself the cause of willing.
causa volendi per seipsum. Si If, then, God should principally will
igitur Deus aliquid aliud something other than Himself, it will follow
principaliter velit quam seipsum, that something other is the cause of His
sequetur quod aliquid aliud sit ei willing. But His willing is His being, as has
causa volendi. Sed suum velle been shown.” Hence, something other will
est suum esse, ut ostensum est. be the cause of His being—which is
Ergo aliquid aliud erit ei causa contrary to the nature of the first being.
essendi. Quod est contra
rationem primi entis.
Adhuc. Unicuique volenti [5] Furthermore, for each being endowed

principale volitum est suus with a will the principal object willed is the
ultimus finis: nam finis est per se ultimate end. For the end is willed through
volitus, et per quem alia fiunt itself, and through it other things become
volita. Ultimus autem finis est objects of will. But the ultimate end is God
ipse Deus: quia ipse est Himself, since He is the highest good, as
summum bonum, ut ostensum has been shown. Therefore, God is the
est. Ipse igitur est principale principal object of His will.
volitum suae voluntatis.
Amplius. Unaquaeque virtus ad [6] Moreover, every power is proportioned

suum obiectum principale with equality to its principal object, for the
secundum aequalitatem power of a thing is measured according to
proportionatur: nam virtus rei its objects, as may be seen through the
secundum obiecta mensuratur, ut Philosopher in De caelo et mundo [11], But
patet per philosophum, in I caeli the will is proportioned with equality to its
et mundi. Voluntas igitur ex principal object, and similarly the intellect
aequo proportionatur suo and likewise the sense. Now, nothing is
principali obiecto: et similiter proportioned with equality to the divine will
intellectus, et etiam sensus. save only God’s essence. Therefore, the
Divinae autem voluntati nihil ex principal object of the divine will is the
aequo proportionatur nisi eius divine essence.
essentia. Ergo principale
obiectum divinae voluntatis est
essentia divina.
Cum autem essentia divina sit [7] But since the divine essence is God’s
Dei intelligere et omnia alia quae understanding and all else that is said to
in ipso esse dicuntur, manifestum be in Him, it is further manifest that in the
est ulterius quod eodem modo same way He principally wills Himself to
principaliter vult se intelligere, se understand, to will, to be one, and other
velle, se esse unum, et quicquid such attributes.
aliud est huiusmodi.
Caput 75 Chapter 75
Quod Deus, volendo se, vult THAT IN WILLING HIMSELF GOD
etiam alia ALSO WILLS OTHER THINGS
Hinc autem ostendi potest quod, [1] Thereby it can be shown, however,
volendo se, vult etiam alia. that in willing Himself God also wills
other things.
Cuius enim est velle finem [2] For to whom it belongs to win the end

principaliter, eius est velle ea quae principally, to him it belongs to will the
sunt ad finem ratione finis. Est things that are ordered to the end for the
autem ipse Deus ultimus rerum sake of the end. Now, God Himself is the
finis, ut ex praedictis aliquatenus ultimate end of things, as appears
patet. Ex hoc igitur quod vult se somewhat from what has been said.
esse, etiam alia vult, quae in ipsum Hence, because He wills Himself to be,
sicut in finem ordinantur. He likewise wills other things, which are
ordered to Him as to the end.
Item. Unusquisque eius quod est [3] Again, everyone desires the
propter ipsum ab ipso volitum et perfection of that which is willed and
amatum, perfectionem desiderat: loved by him for its own sake. For the
quae enim propter se amamus, things that we love for their own sake we
volumus esse optima, et semper want to be most perfect, and always to
meliorari et multiplicari, quantum become better and be multiplied as much
possibile est. Ipse autem Deus as possible. But God wills and loves His
essentiam suam propter seipsam essence for its own sake. Now, the divine
vult et amat. Non autem secundum essence cannot be increased or

se augmentabilis et multiplicabilis multiplied in itself, as is manifest from
est, ut ex supra dictis est what has been said; it can be multiplied
manifestum: sed solum solely according to its likeness, which is
multiplicabilis est secundum suam participated by many. God, therefore,
similitudinem, quae a multis wills the multitude of things in willing and
participatur. Vult igitur Deus rerum loving His own essence and perfection.
multitudinem ex hoc quod suam
essentiam et perfectionem vult et
amat.
Amplius. Quicumque amat aliquid [4] Moreover, whoever loves something

secundum se et propter ipsum, in itself and for its own sake
amat per consequens omnia in consequently loves all the things in which
quibus illud invenitur: ut qui amat it is found: for example, he who loves
dulcedinem propter ipsam, oportet sweetness for itself must love all sweet
quod omnia dulcia amet. Sed Deus things. But God wills and loves His own
suum esse secundum se et propter being in itself and for its own sake, as
ipsum vult et amat, ut supra shown above. Every other being,
ostensum est. Omne autem aliud however, is by way of likeness a certain
esse est quaedam sui esse participation of His being, as appears
secundum similitudinem somewhat from what has been said. It
participatio, ut ex praedictis remains, then, that God, in that He wills
aliquatenus patet. Relinquitur igitur and loves Himself, wills and loves other
quod Deus, ex hoc ipso quod vult things.
et amat se, vult et amat alia.
Adhuc. Deus, volendo se, vult [5] Furthermore, in willing Himself God
omnia quae in ipso sunt. Omnia wills all that is in Him. But all things in a
autem quodammodo praeexistunt certain manner preexist in Him through
in ipso per proprias rationes, ut their proper models, as was shown
supra ostensum est. Deus igitur, above. God, therefore, in willing Himself
volendo se, etiam alia vult. likewise wills other things.
Item. Quanto aliquid est [6] Then, again, the more perfect the
perfectioris virtutis, tanto sua power of a being, by so much does its
causalitas ad plura se extendit et in causality extend to more, and more
magis remotum, ut supra dictum remote, things, as was said above. But
est. Causalitas autem finis in hoc the causality of the end consists in this,
consistit quod propter ipsum alia that other things are desired for its sake.
desiderantur. Quanto igitur finis est The more perfect an end, therefore, and
perfectior et magis volitus, tanto the more willed, by so much does the will
voluntas volentis finem ad plura of one willing the end extend to more
extenditur ratione finis illius. Divina things for the sake of that end. But the
autem essentia est perfectissima in divine essence is most perfect as
ratione bonitatis et finis. Igitur goodness and as end. It will, therefore,
diffundet suam causalitatem supremely diffuse its causality to many,
maxime ad multa, ut propter ipsam so that many things may be willed for its
multa sint volita; et praecipue a sake; and especially so by God, Who
Deo, qui eam secundum totam wills the divine essence perfectly
suam virtutem perfecte vult. according to its power.
Praeterea. Voluntas consequitur [7] Moreover, will accompanies intellect.

intellectum. Sed Deus intellectu But by His intellect God principally
suo intelligit se principaliter et in se understands Himself, and He
intelligit alia. Igitur similiter understands other things in Himself. In
principaliter vult se, et, volendo se, the same way, therefore, He principally
vult omnia alia. wills Himself, and wills all other things in
willing Himself.
Hoc autem auctoritate sacrae [8] This is confirmed by the authority of
Scripturae confirmatur. Dicitur enim Sacred Scripture. For it is said in
Sap. 1125: diligis enim omnia Wisdom (11:25): “For You love all things
quae sunt, et nihil eorum odisti that are, and hate none of the things
quae fecisti. which You have made.”
Caput 76 Chapter 76
Quod Deus uno actu voluntatis THAT GOD WILLS HIMSELF AND
se et alia velit OTHER THINGS BY ONE ACT OF
WILL
Hoc autem habito, sequitur quod [1] From this result it follows that God
Deus uno actu voluntatis se et alia wills Himself and other things by one act
velit. of will.
Omnis enim virtus una operatione, [2.] Every power is directed to its object
vel uno actu, fertur in obiectum et and to the formal notion of the object by
in rationem formalem obiecti: sicut one operation or one act. For example,
eadem visione videmus lumen et by the same sight we see light and color,
colorem, qui fit visibilis actu per which becomes visible in act through
lumen. Cum autem aliquid volumus light. Now, when we will something solely
propter finem tantum, illud quod for the sake of the end, that which is
propter finem desideratur accipit desired for the sake of the end derives
rationem voliti ex fine: et sic finis the nature of something willed from the
comparatur ad ipsum sicut ratio end; and thus the end is to it as the
formalis ad obiectum, ut lumen ad formal notion of the object is to the
colorem. Cum igitur Deus omnia object, for example, as light is to color.
alia velit propter se sicut propter Since, then, God wills other things for
finem, ut ostensum est, uno actu His own sake as for the sake of the end,
voluntatis vult se et alia. as has been shown, He wills Himself and
other things by one act of will.
Amplius. Quod perfecte [3] Moreover, what is perfectly known

cognoscitur et desideratur, and desired is known and desired
secundum totam suam virtutem according to its whole power. But the
cognoscitur et desideratur. Finis power of the end is measured not only
autem virtus est non solum according as it is desired in itself, but
secundum quod in se desideratur, also according as other things become
sed etiam secundum quod alia desirable for its sake. Hence, whoever
fiunt appetibilia propter ipsum. Qui desires an end perfectly desires it in both
igitur perfecte desiderat finem, ways. But there is no act of will in God by
utroque modo ipsum desiderat. which He wills Himself and does not do
Sed non est ponere aliquem actum so perfectly, since there is nothing
Dei volentis quo velit se et non velit imperfect in Him. Therefore, by whatever
se perfecte: cum in eo nihil sit act God wills Himself, He wills Himself
imperfectum. Quolibet igitur actu absolutely and other things for His sake.
quo Deus vult se, vult se absolute But He does not will things other than
et alia propter se. Alia vero a se Himself except in so far as He wills
non vult nisi inquantum vult se, ut Himself, as has been proved. It remains,
probatum est. Relinquitur igitur then, that God does not will Himself and
quod se et alia non alio et alio actu other things by different acts of will, but
voluntatis vult, sed uno et eodem. by one and the same act.
Adhuc. Sicut ex supra dictis patet, [4] Furthermore, as appears from what
in actu cognitivae virtutis discursus has been said, discursiveness is found in
attenditur secundum quod semotim the act of a cognitive power according as
cognoscimus principia, et ex eis in we know principles by themselves and
conclusiones venimus: si enim in from them we arrive at conclusions. For,
ipsis principiis intueremur if we saw conclusions in principles by
conclusiones ipsa principia knowing the principles themselves, there
cognoscendo, non esset discursus, would be no discursiveness, as likewise
sicut nec quando aliquid videmus there is not when we see something in a
in speculo. Sicut autem principia se mirror. But as principles are to
habent ad conclusiones in conclusions in speculative matters, so
speculativis, ita fines ad ea quae ends are to the things ordered to them in
sunt ad finem in operativis et operative and appetitive matters; for, just
appetitivis: nam sicut conclusiones as conclusions are known through
cognoscimus per principia, ita ex principles, so the appetite and doing of
fine procedit appetitus et operatio the things ordered to the end proceed
eorum quae sunt ad finem. Si igitur from the end. If, then, someone wills
aliquis semotim velit finem et ea separately the end and the things
quae sunt ad finem, erit quidam ordered to the end, there will be a certain
discursus in eius voluntate. Hunc discursiveness in His will. But this cannot
autem in Deo esse est impossibile: be in God, since He is outside all motion.
cum sit extra omnem motum. It remains, then, that God wills Himself
Relinquitur igitur quod simul, et and other things together and in the
eodem actu voluntatis, Deus vult same act of will.
se et alia.
Item. Cum Deus semper velit se, si [5] Again, since God wills Himself

alio actu vult se et alio alia, always, if He wills Himself and other
sequetur quod est impossibile: things by different acts it will follow that
nam unius simplicis potentiae non there are at once two acts of will in Him.
sunt simul duae operationes. This is impossible, since one simple

power does not have at once two
operations.
Praeterea. In omni actu voluntatis [6] Furthermore, in every act of the will
volitum comparatur ad volentem ut the object willed is to the one willing as a
movens ad motum. Si igitur sit mover to the moved. If, then, there be
aliqua actio voluntatis divinae qua some action of the divine will, by which
vult alia a se, diversa a voluntate God wills things other than Himself,
qua vult se, in illo erit aliquid aliud which is diverse from the action by which
movens divinam voluntatem. Quod He wills Himself, there will be in Him
est impossibile. some other mover of the divine will. This
is impossible.
Amplius. Velle Dei est suum esse, [7] Moreover, God’s willing is His being,
ut probatum est. Sed in Deo non as has been proved. But in God there is
est nisi unum esse. Ergo non est only one being. Therefore, there is in
ibi nisi unum velle. Him only one willing.
Item. Velle competit Deo [8] Again, willing belongs to God
secundum quod est intelligens. according as He is intelligent. Therefore,
Sicut igitur uno actu intelligit se et just as by one act He understands
alia, inquantum essentia sua est Himself and other things, in so far as His
exemplar omnium; ita uno actu vult essence is the exemplar of all things, so
se et alia, inquantum sua bonitas by one act He wills Himself and other
est ratio omnis bonitatis. things, in so far as His goodness is the
likeness of all goodness.
Caput 77 Chapter 77
Quod volitorum multitudo THAT THE MULTITUDE OF THE
divinae simplicitati non OBJECTS OF THE WILL IS NOT
repugnat OPPOSED TO THE DIVINE SIMPLICITY
Ex hoc autem sequitur quod [1] From this it follows that the multitude
volitorum multitudo non repugnat of the objects of the will is not opposed to
unitati et simplicitati divinae the unity and simplicity of the divine
substantiae. substance.
Nam actus secundum obiecta [2] For acts are distinguished according to

distinguuntur. Si igitur volita plura their objects. If, then, the many objects
quae Deus vult inducerent in ipso that God wills caused a multitude in Him,
aliquam multitudinem, sequeretur it would follow that there was not in Him
quod non esset in eo una tantum solely one operation of the will. This is
operatio voluntatis. Quod est against what has been proved above.
contra praeostensa.
Item. Ostensum est quod Deus [3] Again, it has been shown that God
alia vult inquantum vult bonitatem wills other things in so far as He wills His
suam. Hoc igitur modo own goodness. Hence, other things are to
comparantur aliqua ad voluntatem His will in the manner in which they are
quo comprehenduntur a bonitate comprehended by His goodness. But all
eius. Sed omnia in bonitate eius things in His goodness are one, since
unum sunt: sunt enim alia in ipso other things are in Him according to His
secundum modum eius, scilicet way, namely, “the material immaterially
materialia immaterialiter et multa and the many unitedly,” as appears from
unite, ut ex supra dictis patet. what has been said. It remains, then, that
Relinquitur igitur quod multitudo the multitude of the objects of the will
volitorum non multiplicat divinam does not multiply the divine substance.
substantiam.
Praeterea. Divinus intellectus et [4] Moreover, the divine intellect and will
voluntas sunt aequalis are of an equal simplicity, for both are the
simplicitatis: quia utrumque est divine substance, as has been proved.
divina substantia, ut probatum est. But the multitude of intellectual objects
Multitudo autem intellectorum non does not cause a multitude in the divine
inducit multitudinem in essentia essence, nor a composition in the divine
divina, neque compositionem in intellect. Neither, therefore, does a
intellectu eius. Ergo neque multitude of the objects of the will cause
multitudo volitorum inducit aut either a diversity in the divine essence or
diversitatem in essentia divina, a composition in the divine will.
aut compositionem in eius
voluntate.
Amplius. Hoc inter cognitionem et [5] Furthermore, there is this difference

appetitum interest, quod cognitio between knowledge and appetite, that
fit secundum quod cognitum est knowledge takes place according as the
aliquo modo in cognoscente; known is in some way in the knower,
appetitus autem non, sed e whereas appetite does not take place in
converso secundum quod this way, but rather conversely, according
appetitus refertur ad rem as the appetite is related to the appetible
appetibilem, quam appetens thing, which the one pursuing seeks or in
quaerit vel in qua quiescit. Et which be rests. And on this account good
propter hoc bonum et malum, and evil, which have reference to
quae respiciunt appetitum, sunt in appetite, are in things, whereas the true
rebus; verum autem et falsum, and the false, which have reference to
quae respiciunt cognitionem, sunt knowledge, are in the mind, as the
in mente; ut philosophus dicit, in Philosopher says in Metaphysics VI [4].
VI metaphysicae. Quod autem Now, that something be related to many is
aliquid ad multa se habeat, non not opposed to its simplicity, since unity
repugnat simplicitati eius: cum et itself is the principle of numerical
unitas sit multorum numerorum multitude. Hence, the multitude of the
principium. Multitudo ergo objects willed by God is not opposed to
volitorum a Deo non repugnat His simplicity.
eius simplicitati.
Caput 78 Chapter 78
Quod divina voluntas ad THAT THE DIVINE WILL EXTENDS TO
singula bonorum se extendit SINGULAR GOODS
Ex quo etiam apparet quod non [1] From this it is likewise apparent that,
oportet nos dicere, ad for the purpose of conserving the divine
conservandam simplicitatem simplicity, we should not say that God
divinam, quod velit alia bona in wills other goods in a certain general way,
quadam universalitate, inquantum in so far as He wills Himself to be the
vult se esse principium bonorum principle of the goods that can come forth
quae possunt ab ipso fluere, non from Him, but that He does not will them
autem velit ea in particulari. in the particular.
Nam velle est secundum [2] For to will implies a relationship of the

comparationem volentis ad rem one willing to the thing willed. But the
volitam. Non autem prohibet divine simplicity does not forbid its being
divina simplicitas quin possit related even to many particulars; for God
comparari ad multa etiam is said to be something best and first in
particularia: dicitur enim Deus relation to singulars. Therefore, His
optimum vel primum etiam simplicity does not forbid Him from willing
respectu singularium. Ergo sua things other than Himself in the concrete
simplicitas non prohibet quin or the particular.
etiam in speciali vel particulari alia
a se velit.
Item. Voluntas Dei ad alia [3] Again, the will of God is related to
comparatur inquantum bonitatem other things in so far as they participate in
participant ex ordine ad bonitatem goodness in virtue of their order to the
divinam, quae est ratio volendi divine goodness, which is for God the
Deo. Sed non solum universitas reason of His willing. But not only the
bonorum, sed et singulum eorum totality of goods, but even each one of
a bonitate divina bonitatem them derives its goodness from the divine
sortitur, sicut et esse. Voluntas goodness, as well as its being. Therefore,
igitur Dei ad singula bonorum se the will of God extends to singular goods.
extendit.
Amplius. Secundum philosophum, [4] Moreover, according to the

in XI Metaph., duplex bonum Philosopher, in Metaphysics XI [10], a
ordinis invenitur in universo: unum twofold good of order is found in the
quidem secundum quod totum universe: one according to which the
universum ordinatur ad id quod whole universe is ordered to what is
est extra universum, sicut outside the universe, as the army is
exercitus ordinatur ad ducem; ordered to its general; the other according
aliud secundum quod partes as the parts of the universe are ordered to

universi ordinantur ad invicem, one another, as are the parts of the army.
sicut et partes exercitus. Now, the second order is for the sake of
Secundus autem ordo est propter the first. But God, from the fact of willing
primum. Deus autem, ex hoc Himself as the end, wills other things that
quod vult se ut finis est, vult alia are ordered to Him as to the end, as has
quae ordinantur in ipsum ut in been proved. He therefore wills the good
finem, sicut probatum est. Vult of the order that the whole universe has to
igitur bonum ordinis totius universi Him, as well as the good of the order that
in ipsum, et bonum ordinis the universe has in the mutual relations of
universi secundum partes suas ad its parts. But the good of an order arises
invicem. Bonum autem ordinis from singular goods. Therefore, God also
consurgit ex singulis bonis. Vult wills singular goods.
igitur etiam singula bona.
Praeterea. Si Deus non vult [5] Furthermore, if God does not will the
singula bona ex quibus constat singular goods of which the universe is
universum, sequitur quod in composed, it follows that in the universe
universo sit casu ordinis bonum: the good that order is is by chance. For it
non est enim possibile quod is not possible that some part of the
aliqua pars universi omnia universe should bring together all the
particularia bona componat in particular goods into the order of the
ordinem universi, sed sola universe; only the universal cause of the
universalis causa totius universi, whole universe, God, Who acts through
quae Deus est, qui per suam His will, as will later be shown, can do
voluntatem agit, ut infra this. Now, that the order of the universe
ostendetur. Quod autem ordo be by chance is impossible, since it would
universi sit casualis, est follow that the consequences of the order
impossibile: quia sequeretur quod would all the more be by chance. It
multo magis alia posteriora essent remains, then, that God wills even
casu. Relinquitur igitur quod Deus singulars among goods.
etiam singula bonorum vult.
Adhuc. Bonum intellectum, [6] Again, the understood good, as such,

inquantum huiusmodi, est volitum. is what is willed. But God understands
Sed Deus intelligit etiam even particular goods, as was proved
particularia bona, ut supra above. He therefore wills even particular
probatum est. Vult igitur etiam goods.
particularia bona.
Hoc autem auctoritate Scripturae [7] This is confirmed by the authority of
confirmatur, quae, Genesis 1, ad Scripture, which, in the first chapter of
singula opera complacentiam Genesis (1:4, 31), shows the pleasure of
divinae voluntatis ostendit, dicens: the divine will with each single work, in
vidit Deus lucem quod esset the words: “God saw the light that it was
bona, et similiter de aliis operibus, good,” and similarly of His other works,
et postea de omnibus simul: vidit and then of all the works together: “And
Deus cuncta quae fecerat, et God saw all the things that He had made,
erant valde bona. and they were very good.”
Caput 79 Chapter 79
Quod Deus vult etiam ea quae THAT GOD WILLS EVEN THE
nondum sunt THINGS THAT ARE NOT YET
Si autem velle est per comparatione [1] If willing implies a relationship of the
volentis ad volitum, forte alicui one willing to the thing willed, it can
potest videri quod Deus non velit possibly seem to someone that God
nisi ea quae sunt: nam relativa cannot will save only the things that
oportet simul esse, et, uno are. For relatives ought to be together,
interempto, interimitur alterum, ut and when one is destroyed so is the
philosophus docet. Si igitur velle est other, as the Philosopher teaches. If,
per comparationem volentis ad then, willing implies the relationship of
volitum, nullus potest velle nisi ea the one willing to the thing willed, no
quae sunt. one can will save the things that are.
Praeterea. Voluntas dicitur ad volita, [2] Furthermore, will is said in relation to
sicut et causa et creator. Non autem the things that are willed, and similarly
potest dici etiam Deus creator, vel with cause and creator. But not even
dominus, vel pater, nisi eorum quae God can be called Creator, or Lord, or
sunt. Ergo nec potest dici velle nisi Father, save of the things that are.
ea quae sunt. Therefore, neither can He be said to will
save the things that are.
Ex hoc autem posset ulterius [3] From this it could be further
concludi, si divinum velle est concluded that, if the divine willing is
invariabile, sicut et suum esse, et unchangeable as is the divine being,
non vult nisi ea quae actu sunt, and God does not will save the things
quod nihil velit quod non semper sit. that are in act, He wills nothing that
does not always exist.
Dicunt autem ad haec quidam quod [4] To these difficulties some answer

ea quae non sunt in seipsis, sunt in that the things that are not in
Deo et in eius intellectu. Unde nihil themselves are in God and in His
prohibet etiam ea quae non sunt in intellect. Hence, nothing prevents God
seipsis, Deum velle secundum quod from willing the things that do not exist
in eo sunt. in themselves in so far as they are in
Him.
Hoc autem non videtur sufficienter [5] But this does not seem to be a
dictum. Nam secundum hoc dicitur sufficient reply. For someone with a will
quilibet volens aliquid velle, quod is said to will something in so far as his
voluntas sua refertur ad volitum. Si will is related to the thing willed. If, then,
igitur divina voluntas non refertur ad the divine will is not related to the thing
volitum quod non est nisi secundum willed save only in so far as it exists in
quod est in ipso vel in eius intellectu, Him or in His intellect, it will follow that
sequetur quod Deus non velit illud God does not will that thing except
aliter nisi quia vult illud esse in se because He wills it to be in His being or
vel in eius intellectu. Hoc autem non in His intellect. But this is not the
intendunt loquentes sed quod Deus intention of those who bold the position;
huiusmodi quae nondum sunt velit they intend that God wills such notyet
esse etiam in seipsis. existents to be even in themselves.
Rursum, si voluntas comparatur ad [6] Again, if the will is related to the
rem volitam per suum obiectum, thing willed through its object, the
quod est bonum intellectum; understood good, and the intellect
intellectus autem non solum intelligit understands not only that the good
bonum esse in se, sed etiam in exists in it but that it exists in its own
propria natura: et voluntas nature, the will likewise is related to the
comparabitur ad volitum non solum thing willed not only as it is in the
secundum quod est in cognoscente, knower, but likewise as it is in itself.
sed etiam secundum quod est in
seipso.
Dicamus igitur quod, cum bonum [7] Let us therefore reply that, since the

apprehensum moveat voluntatem, apprehended good moves the will, the
oportet quod ipsum velle sequatur act of will itself must follow the condition
conditionem apprehensionis: sicut et of apprehension; just as the motions of
motus aliorum mobilium sequuntur the other movers follow the conditions
conditiones moventis quod est of the mover that is the cause of
causa motus. Relatio autem motion. But the relation of the
apprehendentis ad apprehensum apprehension to the thing apprehended
est consequens ad apprehensionem follows upon the apprehension itself,
ipsam: per hoc enim refertur because one who apprehends is
apprehendens ad apprehensum related to the apprehended thing in that
quod apprehendit ipsum. Non autem he apprehends it. Now, he who
solum apprehendens apprehendit apprehends does not apprehend a
rem secundum quod est in ipso, sed thing solely as it is in him, but as it is in
secundum quod est in propria its own nature; for not only do we know
natura: quia non solum that a thing is understood by us
cognoscimus rem intelligi a nobis, because it is in the intellect, but we
quod est eam esse in intellectu, sed know also that it exists or has existed or
eam esse vel fuisse vel futuram will exist in its own nature. Therefore,
esse in propria natura. Licet igitur although at that moment the thing does
tunc res illa non sit nisi in not exist save only in the intellect, the
cognoscente, relatio tamen relation following upon the
consequens apprehensionem est ad apprehension is to the thing, not as it
eam non prout est in cognoscente, exists in the knower, but as it is in its
sed prout est secundum propriam own nature, which the one
naturam, quam apprehendit apprehending apprehends.
apprehendens.
Voluntatis igitur divinae relatio est ad [8] The relation of the divine will,

rem non existentem secundum quod therefore, is to the nonexisting thing
est in propria natura secundum according as it exists in its proper
aliquod tempus, et non solum nature at a certain time, and not only
secundum quod est in Deo according as it is in God knowing it. The
cognoscente. Vult igitur Deus rem thing that does not now exist God wills
quae non est nunc, esse secundum to be at a certain time; He does not will
aliquod tempus: et non solum vult solely the fact that He understands it.
secundum quod ipse eam intelligit.
Nec est simile de relatione volentis [9] The relations of the one willing to the

ad volitum, et creantis ad creatum, thing willed, of creator to created, and
et facientis ad factum, aut domini ad of maker to thing made, or of Lord to
subiectam creaturam. Nam velle est His subject creature, are not similar. For
actio in volente manens: unde non willing is an action remaining in the one
cogit intelligi aliquid extra existens. willing, and hence does not require that
Sed facere et creare et gubernare something existing outside the will be
significant actionem terminatam ad understood. But to make, to create, and
exteriorem effectum, sine cuius to govern signify an action terminating
existentia huiusmodi actio non in an exterior effect, without whose
potest intelligi. existence such an action cannot be
understood.
Caput 80 Chapter 80
Quod Deus de necessitate vult THAT HIS OWN BEING AND HIS OWN
suum esse et suam bonitatem GOODNESS GOD WILLS
NECESSARILY
Ex his autem quae supra ostensa [1] From what was shown above it
sunt, sequitur quod Deus de follows that God wills His own being and
necessitate velit suum esse et His own goodness in a necessary way,
suam bonitatem, nec possit and cannot will the contrary.
contrarium velle.
Ostensum est enim supra quod [2] For it was shown above that God wills

Deus vult suum esse et suam His own being and His own goodness as
bonitatem ut principale obiectum, His principal object, which is for Him the
quod est sibi ratio volendi alia. In reason for willing other things. In
omni igitur volito vult suum esse et everything willed, therefore, God wills
suam bonitatem: sicut visus in His own being and His own goodness,
omni colore videt lumen. just as the sight in every color sees light.
Impossibile est autem Deum non But it is impossible for God not to will
velle aliquid actu: esset enim something in act, for He would be willing
volens in potentia tantum; quod est only in potency, which is impossible,
impossibile, cum suum velle sit since His willing is His being. It is
suum esse. Necesse est igitur therefore necessary that God will His
quod velit suum esse et suam own being and His own goodness.
bonitatem.
Item. Quilibet volens de [3] Again, every being endowed with will

necessitate vult suum ultimum necessarily wills his own ultimate end:
finem: sicut homo de necessitate for example, man necessarily wills his
vult suam beatitudinem, nec potest own beatitude and cannot will misery.
velle miseriam. Sed Deus vult se But God wills Himself to be as the
esse sicut ultimum finem, ut ex ultimate end, as appears from what has
praedictis patet. Necessario igitur been said. Therefore, He necessarily
vult se esse, nec potest velle se wills Himself to be, nor can He will
non esse. Himself not to be.
Amplius. In appetitivis et in [4] Moreover, in appetitive and operative

operativis finis hoc modo se habet matters the end functions as an
sicut principium indemonstrabile in indemonstrable principle does in
speculativis: sicut enim ex speculative matters. For just as in
principiis concluduntur in speculative matters the conclusions are
speculativis conclusiones, ita in reached from principles, so in active and
activis et appetitivis ratio omnium appetitive matters the principle of all the
agendorum et appetendorum ex things to be done and sought is taken
fine sumitur. Sed in speculativis from the end. But in speculative matters
intellectus de necessitate assentit the intellect necessarily assents to the
primis principiis first and indemonstrable principles, and
indemonstrabilibus, quorum can in no way assent to their contraries.
contrariis nullo modo potest Therefore, the will necessarily inheres to
assentire. Ergo voluntas the ultimate end, so as to be unable to
necessario inhaeret fini ultimo, ut will the contrary. Thus, if the divine will
non possit contrarium velle. Et sic, has no end other than itself, it
si divinae voluntati non est alius necessarily wills itself to be.
finis quam ipse, de necessitate vult
se esse.
Adhuc. Omnia, inquantum sunt, [5] Again, all things in so far as they are,

assimilantur Deo, qui est primo et are likened to God Who is primarily and
maxime ens. Omnia autem, supremely being. But all things, in so far
inquantum sunt, suo modo as they are, in their own way naturally
naturaliter diligunt suum esse. love their own being. All the more, then,
Multo igitur magis Deus suum esse does God naturally love His own being.
diligit naturaliter. Natura autem eius But His nature is a being necessary
est per se necesseesse, ut supra through itself, as was shown above.
probatum est. Deus igitur ex Therefore, God of necessity wills Himself
necessitate vult se esse. to be.
Praeterea. Omnis perfectio et [6] Furthermore, every perfection and

bonitas quae in creaturis est, Deo goodness found in creatures is proper to
convenit essentialiter, ut supra God in an essential way, as was proved
probatum est. Diligere autem above. But to love God is the highest
Deum est summa perfectio perfection of the rational creature, since
rationalis creaturae: cum per hoc thereby it is somehow united to God.
quodammodo Deo uniatur. Ergo in Therefore, this love is found in God in an
Deo essentialiter est. Ergo ex essential way. Therefore, of necessity
necessitate diligit se. Et sic vult se God loves Himself. And thus He wills
esse. Himself to be.
Caput 81 Chapter 81
Quod Deus non de necessitate THAT GOD DOES NOT WILL OTHER
vult alia a se THINGS IN A NECESSARY WAY
Si autem divina voluntas est [1] But, if the divine will of necessity wills
divinae bonitatis et divini esse ex the divine goodness and the divine being, it
necessitate, posset alicui videri might seem to someone that it wills of
quod etiam aliorum ex necessity other things as well, since God
necessitate esset: cum omnia wills all other things in willing His own
alia velit volendo suam goodness, as was proved above.
bonitatem, ut supra probatum Nevertheless, if we consider the matter
est. Sed tamen recte correctly, it appears that He does not will
considerantibus apparet quod other things necessarily.
non est aliorum ex necessitate.
Est enim aliorum ut ordinatorum [2] For God wills other things as ordered to

ad finem suae bonitatis. Voluntas the end of His goodness. But the will is not
autem non ex necessitate fertur directed to what is for the sake of the end if
in ea quae sunt ad finem, si finis the end can be without it. For, on the basis
sine his esse possit: non enim of his intention to heal, a doctor does not
habet necesse medicus, ex necessarily have to give to a sick person
suppositione voluntatis quam the medicine without which the sick person
habet de sanando, illa can nevertheless be healed. Since, then,
medicamenta adhibere infirmo the divine goodness can be without other
sine quibus nihilominus potest things, and, indeed, is in no way increased
infirmum sanare. Cum igitur by other things, it is under no necessity to
divina bonitas sine aliis esse will other things from the fact of willing its
possit, quinimmo nec per alia ei own goodness.
aliquid accrescat; nulla inest ei
necessitas ut alia velit ex hoc
quod vult suam bonitatem.
Adhuc. Cum bonum intellectum [3] Furthermore, since the understood good

sit proprium obiectum voluntatis, is the object of the will, the will can will
cuiuslibet per intellectum anything conceived by the intellect in which
concepti potest esse voluntas the nature of the good is present. Hence,
ubi salvatur ratio boni. Unde, although the being of any given thing is as
quamvis esse cuiuslibet, such a good and its nonbeing an evil, the
inquantum huiusmodi, bonum sit, nonbeing of something can fall under the
non esse autem malum; ipsum will (though not by necessity) because of
tamen non esse alicuius potest some adjoined good that is preserved;
cadere sub voluntate ratione since it is a good that something be, even
alicuius boni adiuncti quod though something else does not exist.
salvatur, licet non ex necessitate: Therefore, according to its own nature, the
est enim bonum aliquid esse, will cannot not will that good whose non
etiam alio non existente. Solum existence causes the nature of the good
igitur illud bonum voluntas, entirely to be lost. But there is no such
secundum sui rationem, non good apart from God. According to its
potest velle non esse, quo non nature, therefore, the will can will the non
existente tollitur totaliter ratio existence of anything whatever apart from
boni. Tale autem nullum est God. But in God will is present according to
praeter Deum. Potest igitur its whole range, since all things in Him are
voluntas, secundum sui universally perfect. God, therefore, can will
rationem, velle non esse the nonexistence of anything whatever
quamcumque rem praeter apart from Himself. Hence, it is not of
Deum. Sed in Deo est voluntas necessity that things other than Himself
secundum totam suam exist.
facultatem: omnia enim in ipso
sunt universaliter perfecta.
Potest igitur Deus velle non esse
quamcumque rem aliam praeter
se. Non igitur de necessitate vult
esse alia a se.
Amplius. Deus, volendo [4] Moreover, God, in willing His own
bonitatem suam, vult esse alia a goodness, wills things other than Himself to
se prout bonitatem eius be in so far as they participate in His
participant. Cum autem divina goodness. But, since the divine goodness
bonitas sit infinita, est infinitis is infinite, it can be participated in infinite
modis participabilis, et aliis ways, and in ways other than it is
modis quam ab his creaturis participated in by the creatures that now
quae nunc sunt participetur. Si exist. if, then, as a result of willing His own
igitur, ex hoc quod vult bonitatem goodness, God necessarily willed the
suam, vellet de necessitate ea things that participate in it, it would follow
quae ipsam participant, that He would will the existence of an
sequeretur quod vellet esse infinity of creatures participating in His
infinitas creaturas, infinitis modis goodness in an infinity of ways. This is
participantes suam bonitatem. patently false, because, if He willed them,
Quod patet esse falsum: quia, si they would be, since His will is the principle
vellet, essent; cum sua voluntas of being for things, as will be shown later
sit principium essendi rebus, ut on. Therefore, God does not necessarily
infra ostendetur. Non igitur ex will even the things that now exist.
necessitate vult etiam ea quae
nunc sunt.
Item. Sapientis voluntas, ex hoc [5] Again, the will of a wise man, by the fact

quod est de causa, est de of dealing with a cause, deals also with the
effectu qui ex causa de effect that necessarily follows from the
necessitate sequitur: stultum cause. For it would be foolish to wish the
enim esset velle solem existere sun to be overhead and yet that it should
super terram, et non esse diei not be daylight. But, as to an effect that
claritatem. Sed effectum qui non does not follow of necessity from a cause,
ex necessitate sequitur ex it is not necessary that someone will it
causa, non est necesse aliquem because he wills the cause. Now, other
velle ex hoc quod vult causam. A things proceed from God Without
Deo autem procedunt alia non necessity, as will be shown later on. It is
ex necessitate, ut infra not necessary, therefore, that God will
ostendetur. Non igitur necesse other things from the fact of willing Himself.
est quod Deus alia velit ex hoc
quod vult se.
Amplius. Res procedunt a Deo [6] Moreover, things proceed from God as
sicut artificiata ab artifice, ut infra artifacts from an artisan, as will be shown
ostendetur. Sed artifex, quamvis later on. But, although the artisan wishes to
velit se habere artem, non tamen have the art, he does not necessarily wish
ex necessitate vult artificiata to produce the artifacts. Neither, therefore,
producere. Ergo nec Deus ex does God necessarily will that there be
necessitate vult alia a se esse. things other than Himself.
Est ergo considerandum quare [7] We must therefore consider why it is
Deus alia a se ex necessitate that God necessarily knows things other
sciat, non autem ex necessitate than Himself, but does not necessarily will
velit: cum tamen, ex hoc quod them, even though from the fact that He
intelligit et vult se, intelligat et understands and wills Himself He
velit alia. Huius autem ratio est: understands and wills other things. The
quod enim intelligens intelligat reason is as follows. That he who
aliquid, est ex hoc quod understands should understand something
intelligens se habet quodam arises from the fact that he is disposed in a
modo; prout ex hoc aliquid actu certain way, since something is understood
intelligitur quod est eius in act in so far as its likeness is in the one
similitudo in intelligente. Sed understanding. But that he who wills should
quod volens aliquid velit, ex hoc will something arises from the fact that
est quod volitum aliquo modo se what is willed is disposed in a certain way.
habet: volumus enim aliquid vel For we will something either because it is
quia finis est, vel quia ad finem the end or because it is ordered to the end.
ordinatur. Esse autem omnia in Now, that all things be in God, so that they
Deo, ut in eo intelligi possent, ex can be understood in Him, is necessarily
necessitate requirit divina required by the divine perfection; but the
perfectio: non autem divina divine goodness does not necessarily
bonitas ex necessitate requirit require that other things exist, which are
alia esse, quae in ipsam ordered to it as to the end. That is why it is
ordinantur ut in finem. Et ob hoc necessary that God know other things, but
necesse est Deum alia scire, not necessary that He will them. Hence,
non autem velle. Unde nec neither does God will all the things that can
omnia vult quae ad bonitatem have an order to His goodness; but He
ipsius ordinem habere possent: knows all things that have any order
omnia autem scit quae ad whatever to His essence, by which He
essentiam eius, per quam understands.
intelligit, qualemcumque ordinem
habent.
Caput 82 Chapter 82.
Rationes ducentes ad ARGUMENTS LEADING TO
inconveniens si Deus alia a se AWKWARD CONSEQUENCES IF GOD
non necessario velit DOES NOT NECESSARILY WILL
THINGS OTHER THAN HIMSELF
Videntur tamen sequi [1] Awkward consequences seem to

inconvenientia si Deus ea quae vult follow if God does not will necessarily
non ex necessitate velit. the things that He wills.
Si enim Dei voluntas respectu [2] For, if with respect to certain objects

aliquorum volitorum non the will of God is not determined to
determinetur quantum ad illa, them, it would seem to be disposed to
videtur se ad utrumlibet habere. opposites. But every power that is
Omnis autem virtus quae est ad disposed to opposites is in a manner in
utrumlibet est quodammodo in potency, since “to opposites” is a
potentia: nam ad utrumlibet species species of the contingent possible.
est possibilis contingentis. Erit igitur Therefore, there is potency in the will of
Dei voluntas in potentia. Non igitur God, which will consequently not be the
erit Dei substantia, in qua nulla est substance of God, in which there is no
potentia, ut supra ostensum est. potency, as was shown above.
Adhuc. Si ens in potentia, [3] If being in potency, as such, is of a
inquantum huiusmodi, natum est nature to be moved , because what can
moveri, quia quod potest esse be can notbe, it follows that the divine
potest non esse; sequitur ulterius will is changeable.
divinam voluntatem esse
variabilem.
Praeterea. Si naturale est Deo [4] Furthermore, if it is natural to God to

aliquid circa causata sua velle, will something about His effects, it is
necessarium est. Innaturale autem necessary. Now there can be nothing
nihil in ipso esse potest: non enim unnatural in God, since there cannot be
in ipso potest esse aliquid per anything accidental or violent in Him, as
accidens neque violentum, ut supra was proved above.
ostensum est.
Item. Si quod est ad utrumlibet [5] Again, if what is open to opposites,
indifferenter se habens non magis being indifferently disposed, tends no
in unum quam in aliud tendit nisi ab more to one thing than to another unless
alio determinetur, oportet quod it be determined by another, it is
Deus vel nihil eorum velit ad quae necessary either that God will none of
ad utrumlibet se habet, cuius the things towards which He is disposed
contrarium supra ostensum est; vel to opposites, of which the contrary was

quod ab alio determinetur ad unum. proved above, or that God be
Et sic erit aliquid eo prius, quod determined to one effect by another.
ipsum determinet ad unum. Thus, there will be something prior to
Him, determining Him to one effect.
Horum autem nullum necesse est [6] But of these conclusions none
sequi. Ad utrumlibet enim esse necessarily follows. For to be open to
alicui virtuti potest convenire opposites belongs to a certain power in
dupliciter: uno modo, ex parte sui; a twofold way: in one way, from the side
alio modo, ex parte eius ad quod of itself; in another way, from the side of
dicitur. its object.
Ex parte quidem sui, quando From the side of itself, when it has not
nondum consecuta est suam yet achieved its perfection, through
perfectionem, per quam ad unum which it is determined to one effect. This
determinetur. Unde hoc in openness redounds to the imperfection
imperfectionem virtutis redundat, et of a power, and potentiality is shown to
ostenditur esse potentialitas in ipsa: be in it; as appears in the case of an
sicut patet in intellectu dubitantis, intellect in doubt, which has yet not
qui nondum assecutus est principia acquired the principles from which to be
ex quibus ad alterum determinetur. determined to one alternative.
Ex parte autem eius ad quod From the side of its object, a certain
dicitur, invenitur aliqua virtus ad power is found open to opposites when
utrumlibet esse quando perfecta the perfect operation of the power
operatio virtutis a neutro dependet, depends on neither alternative, though
sed tamen utrumque esse potest: both can be. An example is an art which
sicut ars, quae diversis instrumentis can use diverse instruments to perform
uti potest ad idem opus aequaliter the same work equally well. This
perficiendum. Hoc autem ad openness does not pertain to the
imperfectionem virtutis non pertinet, imperfection of a power, but rather to its
sed magis ad eius eminentiam: eminence, in so far as it dominates both
inquantum utrumlibet oppositorum alternatives, and thereby is determined
excedit, et ob hoc determinatur ad to neither, being open to both. This is
neutrum, se ad utrumlibet habens. bow the divine will is disposed in relation
Sic autem est in divina voluntate to things other than itself. For its end
respectu aliorum a se: nam finis depends on none of the other things,
eius a nullo aliorum dependet, cum though it itself is most perfectly united to
tamen ipsa fini suo perfectissime sit its end. Hence, it is not required that any
unita. Non igitur oportet potentiality be posited in the divine will.
potentialitatem aliquam in divina
voluntate poni.
Similiter autem nec mutabilitatem. [7] Mutability, similarly, is not required
Si enim in divina voluntate nulla est For, if there is no potentiality in the
potentialitas, non sic absque divine will, God does not thus prefer one
necessitate alterum oppositorum of the opposites among His effects as if
praeaccipit circa sua causata quasi He should be thought as being in
consideretur in potentia ad potency to both, so that He first wills
utrumque, ut primo sit volens both in potency and afterward He wills in
potentia utrumque et postmodum act; rather, He wills in act whatever He
volens actu, sed semper est volens wills, not only in relation to Himself but
actu quicquid vult, non solum circa also in relation to His effects. The
se sed etiam circa causata: sed reason rather is because the object
quia volitum non habet willed does not have a necessary order
necessarium ordinem ad divinam to the divine goodness, which is the
bonitatem, quae est proprium proper object of the divine will; just as
obiectum divinae voluntatis; per we call enunciables, not necessary, but
modum quo non necessaria, sed possible when there is not a necessary
possibilia enuntiabilia dicimus order of the predicate to the subject.
quando non est necessarius ordo Hence, when it is said, God wills this
praedicati ad subiectum. Unde cum effect, it is manifest that it is not a
dicitur, Deus vult hoc causatum, necessary enunciable but a possible
manifestum est esse enuntiabile one, not in the sense in which
non necessarium, sed possibile, illo something is said to be possible
modo quo non dicitur aliquid according to some power, but in the
possibile secundum aliquam sense in which the possible is that
potentiam, sed quod non necesse whose existence is neither necessary
est esse nec impossibile est esse, nor impossible, as the Philosopher
ut philosophus tradit in V Metaph.: teaches in Metaphysics V [12]. For
sicut triangulum habere duo latera example, for a triangle to have two
aequalia est enuntiabile possibile, equal sides is a possible enunciable, but
non tamen secundum aliquam not according to some power, since in
potentiam, cum in mathematicis mathematics there is neither power nor
non sit potentia neque motus. motion. The exclusion of the aforesaid
Exclusio igitur necessitatis necessity, therefore, does not take away
praedictae immutabilitatem divinae the immutability of the divine will.
voluntatis non tollit. This Sacred Scripture professes: “But
Quam Scriptura sacra profitetur, I the triumpher in Israel will not spare,
Reg. 1529: triumphator in Israel and will not be moved to repentance” (1
poenitudine non flectetur. Samuel 15:29).
Quamvis autem divina voluntas ad [8] However, although the divine will is
sua causata non determinetur, non not determined to its effects, we yet
tamen oportet dicere quod nihil cannot say that it wills none of them, or
eorum velit, aut quod ad volendum that in order to will one of them it is
ab aliquo exteriori determinetur. determined by an exterior agent. For,
Cum enim bonum apprehensum since the apprehended good determines
voluntatem sicut proprium obiectum the will as its proper object, and the
determinet; intellectus autem divine intellect is not outside God’s will,
divinus non sit extraneus ab eius because both are His essence, if God’s
voluntate, cum utrumque sit sua will is determined to will something
essentia; si voluntas Dei ad aliquid through the knowledge of His intellect,
volendum per sui intellectus this determination of the divine will will
cognitionem determinetur, non erit not be due to something extraneous.
determinatio voluntatis divinae per For the divine intellect apprehends not
aliquid extraneum facta. Intellectus only the divine being, which is God’s
enim divinus apprehendit non goodness, but also other goods, as was
solum divinum esse, quod est shown above. These goods it
bonitas eius, sed etiam alia bona, apprehends as certain likenesses of the
ut supra ostensum est. Quae divine goodness and essence, not as its

quidem apprehendit ut similitudines principles. And thus, the divine will tends
quasdam divinae bonitatis et to them as befitting its goodness, not as
essentiae, non ut eius principia. Et necessary to it. The same thing
sic voluntas divina in illa tendit ut happens in the case of our own will.
suae bonitati convenientia, non ut When it is inclined to something as
ad suam bonitatem necessaria. Sic absolutely necessary to the end, it is
autem et in nostra voluntate accidit: moved to it with a certain necessity; but
quod, cum ad aliquid inclinatur when it tends to something only
quasi necessarium simpliciter ad because of a certain befittingness, it
finem, quadam necessitate movetur tends to it without necessity. Hence,
in illud; cum autem tendit in aliquid neither does the divine will tend to its
solum propter convenientiam effects in a necessary way.
quandam, non necessario in illud
tendit. Unde nec divina voluntas
tendit in sua causata necessario.
Non etiam oportet propter [9] Nor, furthermore, is it necessary
praemissa innaturale aliquid in Deo because of the foregoing to posit
ponere. Voluntas namque sua uno something unnatural in God. For His will
et eodem actu vult se et alia: sed wills itself and other things by one and
habitudo eius ad se est necessaria the same act. But its relation to itself is
et naturalis; habitudo autem eius ad necessary and natural, whereas its
alia est secundum convenientiam relation to other things is according to a
quandam, non quidem necessaria certain befittingness, not indeed
et naturalis, neque violenta aut necessary and natural, nor violent and
innaturalis, sed voluntaria; quod unnatural, but voluntary; for the
enim voluntarium est, neque voluntary need be neither natural nor
naturale neque violentum necesse violent.
est esse.
Caput 83 Chapter 83
Quod Deus vult aliquid aliud a se THAT GOD WILLS SOMETHING
necessitate suppositionis OTHER THAN HIMSELF WITH THE
NECESSITY OF SUPPOSITION
Ex his autem haberi potest quod, [1] From this we may infer that,
licet Deus circa causata nihil although among His effects God wills
necessario velit absolute, vult tamen nothing with absolute necessity, yet He
aliquid necessario ex suppositione. does will something with the necessity
of supposition.
Ostensum enim est divinam [2] For it has been shown that the
voluntatem immutabilem esse. In divine will is immutable. Now, if
quolibet autem immutabili, si semel something is found in any immutable
est aliquid, non potest postmodum being, it cannot afterwards not be; for
non esse: hoc enim moveri dicimus we say that a thing has moved if it is
quod aliter se habet nunc et prius. Si otherwise disposed now than it was
igitur divina voluntas est immutabilis, previously. If, then, the divine will is
posito quod aliquid velit, necesse est immutable, assuming that it wills
ex suppositione eum hoc velle. something, God must by supposition
will this thing.
Item. Omne aeternum est [3] Again, everything eternal is

necessarium. Deum autem velle necessary. Now, that God should will
aliquid causatum esse est aeternum: some effect to be is eternal, for, like His
sicut enim esse suum, ita et velle being, so, too, His willing is measured
aeternitate mensuratur. Est ergo by eternity, and is therefore necessary.
necessarium. Sed non absolute But it is not necessary considered
consideratum: quia voluntas Dei non absolutely, because the will of God
habet necessariam habitudinem ad does not have a necessary relation to
hoc volitum. Ergo est necessarium this willed object. Therefore, it is
ex suppositione. necessary by supposition.
Praeterea. Quicquid Deus potuit, [4] Furthermore, whatever God could

potest: virtus enim eius non minuitur, He can, for His power is not
sicut nec eius essentia. Sed non decreased, as neither is His essence.
potest nunc non velle quod ponitur But He cannot now not will what He is
voluisse: quia non potest mutari sua posited as having willed, because His
voluntas. Ergo nunquam potuit non will cannot be changed. Therefore, at
velle quicquid voluit. Est ergo no time could He not will what He has
necessarium ex suppositione eum willed. It is therefore necessary by
voluisse quicquid voluit, sicut et supposition that He willed whatever He
velle: neutrum autem necessarium willed, and also that He wills it; neither,
absolute, sed possibile modo however, is absolutely necessary, but,
praedicto. rather, possible in the aforementioned
way.
Amplius. Quicumque vult aliquid, [5] Moreover, whoever wills something,

necessario vult ea quae necessario necessarily wills whatever it
requiruntur ad illud, nisi sit ex parte necessarily required for it, unless there
eius defectus, vel propter be a defect in him either because of
ignorantiam, vel quia a recta ignorance or because he is led astray
electione eius quod est ad finem through passion from the right choice
intentum abducatur per aliquam of that which leads to the intended end.
passionem. Quae de Deo dici non This cannot be said of God. If God,
possunt. Si igitur Deus, volendo se, then, in willing Himself wills something
vult aliquid aliud a se, necessarium other than Himself, it is necessary that
est eum velle omne illud quod ad He will for this object whatever is
volitum ab eo ex necessitate necessarily required by it. Thus, it is
requiritur: sicut necessarium est necessary that God will the rational
Deum velle animam rationalem soul to exist supposing that He wills
esse, supposito quod velit hominem man to exist.
esse.
Caput 84 Chapter 84
THAT THE WILL OF GQuod voluntas
Dei non est impossibilium
secundum seOD IS NOT OF WHAT
IS IN ITSELF IMPOSSIBLE
Ex hoc apparet quod voluntas Dei [1] From this it appears that the will of
non potest esse eorum quae sunt God cannot be of the things that are
secundum se impossibilia. impossible in themselves.
Huiusmodi enim sunt quae in seipsis For these have a contradiction in

repugnantiam habent: ut hominem themselves, for example, that man is
esse asinum, in quo includitur an ass, in which the rational and the
rationale esse irrationale. Quod irrational are included. For what is
autem repugnat alicui, excludit incompatible with something excludes
aliquid eorum quae ad ipsum some of the things that are necessary
requiruntur: sicut esse asinum to it, as to be an ass excludes man’s
excludit hominis rationem. Si igitur reason. If, then, God necessarily wills
necessario vult ea quae requiruntur the things that are required for what He
ad hoc quod supponitur velle, wills by supposition, it is impossible for
impossibile est eum velle ea quae Him to will what is incompatible with
eis repugnant. Et sic impossibile est these things. Thus, it is impossible for
eum velle ea quae sunt impossibilia God to will the absolutely impossible.
simpliciter.
Item. Sicut supra ostensum est, [3] Again, as was shown above, in
Deus, volendo suum esse, quod est willing His own being, which is His own
sua bonitas, vult omnia alia goodness, God wills all other things in
inquantum habent eius so far as they bear His likeness. But in
similitudinem. Secundum hoc autem so far as a thing is opposed to the
quod aliquid repugnat rationi entis nature of being as such, there cannot
inquantum huiusmodi, non potest in be preserved in it the likeness of the
eo salvari similitudo primi esse, first being, namely, the divine being,
scilicet divini, quod est fons essendi. which is the source of being. Hence,
Non potest igitur Deus velle aliquid God cannot will something that is
quod repugnat rationi entis opposed to the nature of being as
inquantum huiusmodi. Sicut autem such. But just as it is opposed to the
rationi hominis inquantum est homo nature of man as man to be irrational,
repugnat esse irrationale, ita rationi so it is opposed to the nature of being
entis inquantum huiusmodi repugnat as such that something be at once
quod aliquid sit simul ens et non ens. being and nonbeing. God, therefore,
Non potest igitur Deus velle quod cannot will that affirmation and
affirmatio et negatio sint simul verae. negation be true together. But this is
Hoc autem includitur in omni per se included in everything that is of itself
impossibili, quod ad seipsum impossible, which has an opposition
repugnantiam habet inquantum with itself as implying a contradiction.
contradictionem implicat. Voluntas The will of God, therefore, cannot be of
igitur Dei non potest esse per se that which is of itself impossible.

impossibilium.
Amplius. Voluntas non est nisi [4] Moreover, the will is only of the
alicuius boni intellecti. Illud igitur understood good. Hence, whatever
quod non cadit in intellectum, non cannot be the object of the intellect is
potest cadere in voluntatem. Sed ea not an object of the will. But that which
quae sunt secundum se impossibilia is of itself impossible is not an object of
non cadunt in intellectum, cum sibi the intellect, since it is self
ipsis repugnent: nisi forte per contradictory, except, of course,
errorem non intelligentis rerum through the fault of one who does not
proprietatem, quod de Deo dici non understand what belongs to things—
potest. In divinam igitur voluntatem which cannot be said of God.
non possunt cadere quae secundum Therefore, that which is of itself
se sunt impossibilia. impossible cannot be the object of the
will.
Adhuc. Secundum quod [5] Furthermore, as a thing is disposed

unumquodque se habet ad esse, ita toward being, so it is disposed toward
se habet ad bonitatem. Sed goodness. But the impossible is that
impossibilia sunt quae non possunt which cannot be. Therefore, it cannot
esse. Ergo non possunt esse bona. be good, and hence cannot be willed
Ergo nec volita a Deo, qui non vult by God, Who does not will save only
nisi ea quae sunt vel possunt esse the things that are or can be good.
bona.
Caput 85 Chapter 85
Quod divina voluntas non tollit THAT THE DIVINE WILL DOES NOT
contingentiam a rebus, neque REMOVE CONTINGENCY FROM
eis necessitatem absolutam THINGS, NOR DOES IT IMPOSE
imponit ABSOLUTE NECESSITY ON THEM
Ex praedictis autem haberi potest [1] From what has been said it results
quod divina voluntas contingentiam that the divine will does not remove
non tollit, nec necessitatem contingency from things, nor does it
absolutam rebus imponit. impose absolute necessity on things.
Vult enim Deus omnia quae [2] God wills whatever is required for a
requiruntur ad rem quam vult, ut thing that He wills, as has been said. But
dictum est. Sed aliquibus rebus it befits certain things, according to the
secundum modum suae naturae mode of their nature, that they be
competit quod sint contingentes, contingent and not necessary. Therefore,
non necessariae. Igitur vult aliquas God wills that some things be contingent.
res esse contingentes. Efficacia Now, the efficacy of the divine will
autem divinae voluntatis exigit ut requires not only that something be that
non solum sit quod Deus vult esse, God wills to be, but also that it be as He
sed etiam ut hoc modo sit sicut wills it to be. For, among natural agents
Deus vult illud esse: nam et in as well, when the acting power is strong
agentibus naturalibus, cum virtus it assimilates its effect to itself not only as
agens est fortis, assimilat sibi to species but also as to the accidents,
suum effectum non solum quantum which are certain modes of that thing.
ad speciem, sed etiam quantum ad Therefore, the efficacy of the divine will
accidentia, quae sunt quidam modi does not remove contingency.
ipsius rei. Igitur efficacia divinae
voluntatis contingentiam non tollit.
Amplius. Deus principalius vult [3] Moreover, God wills the good of the
bonum universitatis suorum universe of His effects more principally
effectuum quam aliquod bonum than He does any particular good,
particulare: quanto in illo according as a fuller likeness of His
completior invenitur suae bonitatis goodness is found in it. But the
similitudo. Completio autem completeness of the universe requires
universi exigit ut sint aliqua that there be some contingent things;
contingentia: alias non omnes otherwise, not all grades of beings would
gradus entium in universo be contained in the universe. Therefore,
continerentur. Vult igitur Deus God wills that there be some contingent
aliqua esse contingentia. things.
Adhuc. Bonum universi in quodam [4] Furthermore, the good of the universe
ordine consideratur, ut patet in XI is seen in a certain order, as appears in
metaphysicae. Requirit autem ordo Metaphysics XI [10]. But the order of the
universi aliquas causas esse universe requires that there be some
variabiles: cum corpora sint de changeable causes, since bodies are
perfectione universi, quae non part of the perfection of the universe, and
movent nisi mota. A causa autem they do not move unless they be moved.
variabili effectus contingentes Now, contingent effects follow from a
sequuntur: non enim potest esse changeable cause, for an effect cannot
effectus firmioris esse quam sua have a more stable being than its cause.
causa. Unde videmus, quamvis Hence we see that, even though the
causa remota sit necessaria, si remote cause is necessary, provided the
tamen causa proxima sit proximate cause is contingent, the effect
contingens, effectum contingentem is contingent, as may be seen in the
esse: sicut patet in his quae circa things that happen among sublunary
inferiora corpora accidunt; quae bodies, which are contingent because of
quidem contingentia sunt propter the contingency of the proximate causes
proximarum causarum even though the remote causes, which
contingentiam, quamvis causae are the heavenly motions, are necessary.
remotae, quae sunt motus God, therefore, wills something to come
caelestes, sint ex necessitate. Vult to pass contingently.
igitur Deus aliqua contingenter
evenire.
Praeterea. Necessitas ex [5] The necessity of supposition in the

suppositione in causa non potest cause, moreover, does not require an
concludere necessitatem absolute necessity in the effect. But God
absolutam in effectu. Deus autem wills something in the creature, not by
vult aliquid in creatura non absolute necessity, but only by a
necessitate absoluta, sed solum necessity of supposition, as was shown
necessitate quae est ex above. From the divine will, therefore, an
suppositione, ut supra ostensum absolute necessity in created things
est. Ex voluntate igitur divina non cannot be inferred. But only this excludes
potest concludi in rebus creatis contingency, for even the contingents
necessitas absoluta. Haec autem open to opposites are made necessary
sola excludit contingentiam: nam by supposition: for example, that
etiam contingentia ad utrumlibet Socrates be moved, if he runs, is
redduntur ex suppositione necessary. Therefore, the divine will
necessaria; sicut Socratem moveri, does not exclude contingency from the
si currit, est necessarium. Divina things it wills.
igitur voluntas non excludit a rebus
volitis contingentiam.
Non igitur sequitur, si Deus vult [6] Hence, it does not follow, if God wills

aliquid, quod illud de necessitate something, that it will of necessity take
eveniat: sed quod haec place. But this conditional is true and
conditionalis sit vera et necessaria, necessary: If God wills something, it will
si Deus aliquid vult, illud erit. be. But the consequent does not have to
Consequens tamen non oportet be necessary.
esse necessarium.
Caput 86 Chapter 86
Quod divinae voluntatis potest THAT A REASON CAN BE
ratio assignari ASSIGNED TO THE DIVINE WILL
Colligere autem ex praedictis [1] From what has been said we can
possumus quod divinae voluntatis infer that a reason can be assigned to
ratio assignari potest. the divine will.
Finis enim est ratio volendi ea quae [2] The end is the reason for willing the
sunt ad finem. Deus autem vult things that are for the sake of the end.
bonitatem suam tanquam finem, But God wills His own goodness as the
omnia autem alia vult tanquam ea end, and other things He wills as things
quae sunt ad finem. Sua igitur that are for the sake of the end. His
bonitas est ratio quare vult alia quae goodness, therefore, is the reason why
sunt diversa ab ipso. He wills the other things which are
different from Himself.
Rursus. Bonum particulare ordinatur [3] Again, a particular good is ordered

ad bonum totius sicut ad finem, ut to the good of the whole as to its end,
imperfectum ad perfectum. Sic as the imperfect to the perfect. Now,
autem cadunt aliqua sub divina some things fall under the divine will
voluntate secundum quod se habent according to their disposition in the

in ordine boni. Relinquitur igitur order of the good. It remains, then, that
quod bonum universi sit ratio quare the good of the universe is the reason
Deus vult unumquodque particulare why God wills each particular good in
bonum in universo. the universe.
Item. Sicut supra ostensum est, [4] Again, as was shown above, on the

supposito quod Deus aliquid velit, supposition that God wills something, it
sequitur ex necessitate quod velit ea follows necessarily that He wills the
quae ad illud requiruntur. Quod things required for it. But that which
autem alii necessitatem imponit, est imposes necessity on another is the
ratio quare illud sit. Ratio igitur reason why that other exists. Therefore,
quare Deus vult ea quae requiruntur the reason why God wills the things that
ad unumquodque, est ut sit illud ad are required for each thing is that that
quod requiritur. thing be for which they are required.
Sic igitur procedere possumus in [5] Thus, therefore, can we proceed in
assignando divinae voluntatis assigning the reason of the divine will.
rationem: Deus vult hominem God wills man to have a reason in order
habere rationem ad hoc quod homo that man be; He wills man to be so that
sit; vult autem hominem esse ad hoc the universe may be complete; and He
quod completio universi sit; vult wills that the good of the universe be
autem bonum universi esse quia because it befits His goodness.
decet bonitatem ipsius.
Non tamen praedicta triplex ratio [6] However, this threefold reason does

secundum eandem habitudinem not proceed according to the same
procedit. Nam bonitas divina neque relationship. For the divine goodness
dependet a perfectione universi, neither depends on the perfection of the
neque ex ea aliquid sibi accrescit. universe nor is anything added to it
Perfectio autem universi, licet ex from this perfection. For, although the
aliquibus particularibus bonis ex perfection of the universe necessarily
necessitate dependeat, quae sunt depends on certain particular goods
essentiales partes universi, ex that are its essential parts, yet on some
quibusdam tamen non dependet ex of them it does not depend of necessity,
necessitate, sed tamen ex eis aliqua but nevertheless a certain goodness or
bonitas vel decor accrescit universo: adornment accrues to the universe from
sicut ex his quae sunt solum ad them, as from those things that exist
munimentum vel decorem aliarum only for the support or adornment of the
partium universi. Particulare autem other parts of the universe. A particular
bonum dependet ex necessitate ex good depends necessarily on the things
his quae ad ipsum absolute that are absolutely required for it, even
requiruntur: licet et hoc etiam habeat though this too has certain things that
quaedam quae sunt propter melius are for its embellishment. Hence, at
ipsius. Aliquando igitur ratio divinae times the reason of the divine will
voluntatis continet solum decentiam; contains only a befittingness; at other
aliquando utilitatem; aliquando times, usefulness; at still other times, a
autem necessitatem quae est ex necessity of supposition; but a
suppositione; necessitatem vero necessity that is absolute only when it
absolutam, solum cum vult seipsum. wills itself.
Caput 87 Chapter 87
Quod divinae voluntatis nihil THAT NOTHING CAN BE THE CAUSE
potest esse causa OF THE DIVINE WILL
Quamvis autem aliqua ratio divinae [1] Now, although a certain reason of the
voluntatis assignari possit, non divine will can be assigned, it does not
tamen sequitur quod voluntatis eius follow that anything is the cause of the
sit aliquid causa. divine will.
Voluntati enim causa volendi est [2] For to the will the cause of its willing

finis. Finis autem divinae voluntatis is the end. But the end of the divine will
est sua bonitas. Ipsa igitur est Deo is its goodness. Hence, it is the cause of
causa volendi, quae est etiam God’s willing, just as it is also His act of
ipsum suum velle. will.
Aliorum autem a Deo volitorum [3] As to the other objects willed by God,

nullum est Deo causa volendi. Sed none is the cause of willing for God. But
unum eorum est alteri causa ut one of them is the cause for the other to
ordinem habeat ad divinam have an order to the divine goodness.
bonitatem. Et sic intelligitur Deus And thus God is understood to will one
propter unum eorum aliud velle. of them for the sake of another.
Patet tamen quod non oportet [4] It is nevertheless manifest that no
discursum aliquem ponere in Dei discursiveness is to be posited in the
voluntate. Nam ubi est unus actus, divine will. For where there is one act
non consideratur discursus: ut that is no discursiveness, as was shown
supra circa intellectum ostensum above in connection with the intellect.
est. Deus autem uno actu vult et But by means of one act God wills His
suam bonitatem et omnia alia: cum goodness and all other things, since His
sua actio sit sua essentia. action is His essence.
Per praedicta autem excluditur [5] Through the foregoing is set aside
error quorundam dicentium omnia the error of certain persons who said
procedere a Deo secundum that all things proceed from God
simplicem voluntatem: ut de nullo according to His simple will, which
oporteat rationem reddere nisi quia means that we are not to give an
Deus vult. explanation of anything except that God
wills it.
Quod etiam Scripturae divinae [6] This view is likewise opposed to
contrariatur, quae Deum perhibet Sacred Scripture, which proclaims that
secundum ordinem sapientiae suae God made all things according to the
omnia fecisse: secundum illud order of His wisdom, as is said in the
Psalmi: omnia in sapientia fecisti. Psalm (103:24): “You made all things in
Et Eccli. 110 dicitur quod Deus wisdom.” And in Sirach (1:10) it is said
effudit sapientiam suam super that God “poured” His wisdom “out upon
omnia opera sua. all His works.”
Caput 88 Chapter 88
Quod in Deo est liberum THAT IN GOD THERE IS FREE
arbitrium CHOICE
Ex praedictis autem ostendi potest [1] From what has been said it can be
quod in Deo liberum arbitrium shown that free choice is found in God.
invenitur.
Nam liberum arbitrium dicitur [2] Free choice is said in relation to the
respectu eorum quae non things that one wills, not of necessity,
necessitate quis vult, sed propria but of his own accord. Thus, there is in
sponte: unde in nobis est liberum us free choice in relation to our willing to
arbitrium respectu eius quod run or to walk. But God wills things other
volumus currere vel ambulare. than Himself without necessity, as was
Deus autem alia a se non ex shown above. Therefore, to have free
necessitate vult, ut supra ostensum choice befits God.
est. Deo igitur liberum arbitrium
habere competit.
Adhuc. Voluntas divina in his ad [3] Again, towards the things to which it

quae secundum suam naturam non is not determined by nature the divine
determinatur, inclinatur will is in a manner inclined through its
quodammodo per suum intellectum, intellect, as was shown above. But on
ut supra ostensum est. Sed ex hoc this account is man said to have free
homo dicitur prae ceteris choice as opposed to the other animals
animalibus liberum arbitrium habere because he is inclined to willing by the
quod ad volendum iudicio rationis judgment of the reason and not by the
inclinatur, non impetu naturae sicut impulse of nature, as are the brutes.
bruta. Ergo in Deo est liberum Therefore, in God there is free choice.
arbitrium.
Item. Secundum philosophum, in III [4] Furthermore, according to the

Ethic., voluntas est finis, electio Philosopher in Ethics III [5], “will is of the
autem eorum quae ad finem sunt. end, but election is of that which is for
Cum igitur Deus seipsum tanquam the sake of the end.” Since, then, God
finem velit, alia vero sicut quae ad wills Himself as the end, and other
finem sunt, sequitur quod respectu things as what is for the sake of the end,
sui habeat voluntatem tantum, it follows that with reference to Himself
respectu autem aliorum electionem. God has only will, but with reference to
Electio autem semper per liberum other things He has election. But
arbitrium fit. Deo igitur liberum election is made by choice. Therefore,
arbitrium competit. free choice befits God.
Praeterea. Homo per hoc quod [5] Moreover, because he has free
habet liberum arbitrium, dicitur choice, man is said to be master of his
suorum actuum dominus. Hoc acts. But this supremely befits the first
autem maxime competit primo agent, whose act does not depend on
agenti, cuius actus ab alio non another. Therefore, God has free
dependet. Ipse igitur Deus liberum choice.
arbitrium habet.
Hoc etiam ex ipsa nominis ratione [6] This can likewise be gathered from
haberi potest. Nam liberum est the very meaning of the name. For “that
quod sui causa est, secundum is free which is for its own sake,”
philosophum, in principio according to the Philosopher in the
metaphysicae. Hoc autem nulli beginning of the Metaphysics [I, 2]. But
magis competit quam primae this befits no being more than the first
causae, quae Deus est. cause, God.
Caput 89 Chapter 89
Quod in Deo non sunt passiones THAT IN GOD THERE ARE NOT THE
affectuum PASSIONS OF THE APPETITES
Ex praemissis autem sciri potest [1] From what has preceded we can
quod passiones affectuum in Deo know that the passions of the appetites
non sunt. are not in God.
Secundum enim intellectivam [2] Now, according to intellective

affectionem non est aliqua passio, appetite there is no passion, but only
sed solum secundum sensitivam, ut according to sensitive appetite, as is
probatur in VII physicorum. Nulla proved in Physics VII [3]. But no such
autem talis affectio in Deo esse appetite can be in God, since He does
potest: cum desit sibi sensitiva not have sensitive knowledge, as is
cognitio, ut per supra dicta est manifest from what has been said
manifestum. Relinquitur igitur quod above. Therefore, there is no passion of
in Deo non sit affectiva passio. the appetite in God.
Praeterea. Omnis affectiva passio [3] Moreover, every passion of the
secundum aliquam appetite takes place through some
transmutationem corporalem fit: bodily change, for example, the
puta secundum constrictionem vel contraction or distension of the heart, or
dilatationem cordis, aut secundum something of the sort. Now, none of this
aliquid huiusmodi. Quorum nullum can take place in God, since He is not a
in Deo possibile est accidere: eo body or a power in a body, as was
quod non sit corpus nec virtus in shown above. There is, therefore, no
corpore, ut supra ostensum est. passion of the appetite in Him.

Non est igitur in ipso affectiva
passio.
Item. In omni affectiva passione [4] Again, in every passion of the
patiens aliqualiter trahitur extra appetite the patient is somehow drawn
suam communem, aequalem vel out of his usual, calm, or connatural
connaturalem dispositionem: cuius disposition. A sign of this is that such
signum est quod huiusmodi passions, if intensified, bring death to
passiones, si intendantur, animals. But it is not possible for God to
animalibus inferunt mortem. Sed be somehow drawn outside His natural
non est possibile Deum extra suam condition, since He is absolutely
naturalem conditionem aliqualiter immutable, as has been shown. It
trahi: cum sit omnino immutabilis, ut appears, then, that such passions
supra ostensum est. Patet igitur cannot be found in God.
quod in Deo huiusmodi passiones
esse non possunt.
Amplius. Omnis affectio quae est [5] Moreover, every affection arising
secundum passionem, determinate from a passion is directed determinately
in unum fertur, secundum modum et to one thing according to the manner
mensuram passionis: passio enim and measure of the passion. For
impetum habet ad aliquid unum, passion has an impulse to something
sicut et natura; et propter hoc one, as does nature, and on this
ratione oportet eam reprimi et account it must be curbed and regulated
regulari. Divina autem voluntas non by reason. But the divine will is not
determinatur secundum se ad unum determined in itself to something one
in his quae creata sunt, nisi ex among creatures, except out of the
ordine suae sapientiae, ut supra order of its wisdom, as was shown
ostensum est. Non est igitur in ipso above. Therefore, there is no passion of
passio secundum affectionem the appetite in God.
aliquam.
Adhuc. Omnis passio est alicuius [6] Furthermore, every passion belongs
potentia existentis. Deus autem est to something existing in potency. But
omnino liber a potentia: cum sit God is completely free from potency,
purus actus. Est igitur agens since He is pure act. God, therefore, is
tantum, et nullo modo aliqua passio solely agent, and in no way does any
in ipso locum habet. passion have a place in Him.
Sic igitur omnis passio ratione [7] Thus, therefore, by reason of its
generis a Deo removetur. genus, passion is excluded in God.
Quaedam autem passiones [8] Some passions, however, are

removentur a Deo non solum excluded from God not only by reason
ratione sui generis, sed etiam of their genus, but also by reason of
ratione speciei. Omnis enim passio their species. For every passion is
ex obiecto speciem recipit. Cuius specified by its object. That passion,
igitur obiectum omnino est Deo therefore, whose subject is absolutely
incompetens, talis passio a Deo unbefitting to God is removed from God
removetur etiam secundum even according to the nature of its
rationem propriae speciei. proper species.
Talis autem est tristitia vel dolor: [9] Such a passion, however, is sorrow
nam eius obiectum est malum iam or pain, for its subject is the already
inhaerens, sicut gaudii obiectum est present evil, just as the object of joy is
bonum praesens et habitum. the good present and possessed.
Tristitia igitur et dolor ex ipsa sui Sorrow and pain, therefore, of their very
ratione in Deo esse non possunt. nature cannot be found in God.
Adhuc. Ratio obiecti alicuius [10] Furthermore, the notion of the
passionis non solum sumitur ex object of a given passion is derived not
bono et malo, sed etiam ex hoc only from good and evil, but also from
quod aliqualiter quis se habet ad the fact that one is disposed in a certain
alterum horum: sic enim spes et way towards one of them. For it is thus
gaudium differunt. Si igitur modus that hope and joy differ. If, then, the
ipse se habendi ad obiectum qui in mode itself in which one is disposed
ratione passionis includitur, Deo toward the object that is included in the
non competit, nec ipsa passio Deo notion of passion is not befitting to God,
convenire potest, etiam ex ratione neither can the passion itself befit Him,
propriae speciei. Spes autem, even through the nature of its proper
quamvis habeat obiectum bonum, species. Now, although hope has as its
non tamen bonum iam obtentum, object something good, yet it is not a
sed obtinendum. Quod quidem Deo good already possessed, but one to be
non potest competere, ratione suae possessed. This cannot befit God,
perfectionis, quae tanta est quod ei because of His perfection, which is so
additio fieri non potest. Spes igitur great that nothing can be added to it.
in Deo esse non potest, etiam Hope, therefore, cannot be found in
ratione suae speciei. Et similiter nec God, even by reason of its species. And
desiderium alicuius non habiti. likewise, neither can the. desire of
something not possessed.
Amplius. Sicut divina perfectio [11] Moreover, just as the divine
impedit potentiam additionis alicuius perfection excludes from God the
boni obtinendi a Deo, ita etiam, et potency of the addition of some good to
multo amplius, excludit potentiam be obtained, so likewise, and all the
ad malum. Timor autem respicit more, does it exclude the potency to
malum quod potest imminere, sicut evil. Fear has reference to the evil that
spes bonum obtinendum. Duplici can threaten, as hope has reference to
igitur ratione suae speciei timor a a good to be obtained. By a twofold
Deo excluditur: et quia non est nisi reason of its species, therefore, is fear
existentis in potentia; et quia habet excluded from God: both because it
obiectum malum quod potest belongs only to one existing in potency
inesse. and because it has for its object a
threatening evil.
Item. Poenitentia mutationem [12] Again, repentance implies a change

affectus importat. Igitur et ratio of affection. Therefore, the nature of
poenitentiae Deo repugnat, non repentance likewise is repugnant to
solum quia species tristitiae est, sed God, not only because it is a species of
etiam quia mutationem voluntatis sadness, but also because it implies a
importat. change of will.
Praeterea. Absque errore [13] Furthermore, without an error of the

cognitivae virtutis esse non potest cognitive power it is impossible that
ut illud quod est bonum what is good be apprehended as evil.
apprehendatur ut malum. Nec est Nor is it possible that the evil of one be
nisi in particularibus bonis ut alterius the good of another, except among
malum possit bonum existere alteri, particular goods in which “the corruption
in quibus corruptio unius est of one is the generation of another.” But
generatio alterius: universali autem the universal good does not lose
bono ex nullo particulari bono anything because of the existence of
aliquid deperit, sed per some particular good, but is rather
unumquodque repraesentatur. Deus mirrored by each one. God, however, is
autem est universale bonum, cuius the universal good, and by participating
similitudinem participando omnia in His likeness all things are called
dicuntur bona. Nullius igitur malum good. The evil of no thing, therefore,
sibi potest esse bonum. Nec potest can be His good. Nor is it possible that
esse ut id quod est simpliciter what is absolutely good, and is not evil
bonum et non est sibi malum, to itself, He should apprehend as
apprehendat ut malum: quia sua something evil; for His knowledge is
scientia est absque errore, ut supra without error, as has been shown. Envy,
ostensum est. Invidiam igitur in Deo therefore, cannot be found in God, even
impossibile est esse, etiam according to the nature of its species,
secundum suae speciei rationem: not only because it is a species of
non solum quia invidia species sadness, but also because it is
tristitiae est, sed etiam quia tristatur saddened by the good of another and
de bono alterius, et sic accipit thus takes his good as its own evil.
bonum alterius tanquam malum sibi.
Adhuc. Eiusdem rationis est tristari [14] Moreover, to be saddened over a
de bono et appetere malum: nam good and to seek evil are of the same
primum est ex hoc quod bonum nature, for the first arises because the
aestimatur malum; secundum vero good is judged to be evil, while the
est ex hoc quod malum aestimatur second arises because evil is judged to
bonum. Ira autem est appetitus mali be good. Anger is the appetite of
alterius ad vindictam. Ira igitur a another’s evil for the sake of revenge.
Deo longe est secundum rationem Anger, therefore, is far from God
suae speciei: non solum quia according to the nature of its species,
effectus tristitiae est; sed etiam quia not only because it is an effect of
est appetitus vindictae propter sadness, but likewise because it is an
tristitiam ex iniuria illata conceptam. appetite for revenge arising from
sadness due to an injury received.
Rursus, quaecumque aliae [15] Again, whatever other passions are

passiones harum species sunt vel species of these or are caused by them,
ab eis causantur, pari ratione a Deo are for the same reason removed from
excluduntur. God.
Caput 90 Chapter 90
Quod in Deo sit delectatio et THAT IN GOD THERE ARE DELIGHT
gaudium non tamen repugnat AND JOY, BUT THEY ARE NOT
divinae perfectioni OPPOSED TO THE DIVINE
PERFECTION
Sunt autem quaedam passiones [1] There are certain passions which,
quae, licet Deo non conveniant though they do not befit God as
secundum quod passiones, nihil passions, do not signify anything by the
tamen ex ratione suae speciei nature of their species that is repugnant
important repugnans divinae to the divine perfection.
perfectioni.
Harum autem est gaudium et [2] Among these passions are joy and
delectatio. Est enim gaudium delight. Delight is of a present good.
praesentis boni. Neque igitur ratione Neither, therefore, by reason of its
obiecti, quod est bonum, neque object, which is a good, nor by reason
ratione modi se habendi ad of its disposition towards its object,
obiectum, quod est actu habitum, which is possessed in act, is joy,
gaudium secundum suae speciei according to the nature of its species,
rationem divinae perfectioni repugnant to the divine perfection.
repugnat.
Ex hoc autem manifestum est quod [3] From this it is manifest that joy or
gaudium vel delectatio proprie in delight is properly in God. For just as
Deo sit. Sicut enim bonum et malum the apprehended good and evil are the
apprehensum sunt obiectum object of sensible appetite, so, too, are
appetitus sensibilis, ita et appetitus they of intellective appetite. It belongs
intellectivi. Utriusque enim est to both to seek good and avoid evil,
prosequi bonum et fugere malum, whether truly or by estimation. There is
vel secundum veritatem vel the difference that the object of
secundum aestimationem: nisi quod intellective appetite is more common
obiectum intellectivi appetitus est than that of the sensitive appetite,
communius quam sensitivi, quia because intellective appetite has
intellectivus appetitus respicit reference to good and evil absolutely,
bonum vel malum simpliciter, whereas sensitive appetite has
appetitus autem sensitivus bonum reference to good or evil according to
vel malum secundum sensum; sicut the sense. So, too, the object of the
etiam et intellectus obiectum est intellect is more common than that of
communius quam sensus. Sed the sense. But the operations of
operationes appetitus speciem ex appetite derive their species from their
obiectis sortiuntur. Inveniuntur igitur objects. Hence, there are found in

in appetitu intellectivo, qui est intellective appetite, which is the will,
voluntas, similes operationes operations that in the nature of their
secundum rationem speciei species are similar to the operations of
operationibus appetitus sensitivi, in the sensitive appetite, differing in that in
hoc differentes quod in appetitu the sensitive appetite there are
sensitivo sunt passiones, propter passions because of its union to a
coniunctionem eius ad organum bodily organ, whereas in the intellective
corporale, in intellectivo autem sunt appetite there are simple operations; for
operationes simplices: sicut enim just as through the passion of fear,
per passionem timoris, quae est in which resides in the sensitive appetite,
appetitu sensitivo, refugit quis someone flees a future evil, so without
malum futurum, ita sine passione passion the intellective appetite does
intellectivus appetitus idem operatur. the same thing. Since, then, joy and
Cum igitur gaudium et delectatio delight are not repugnant to God
Deo non repugnent secundum suam according to their species, but only in
speciem, sed solum inquantum so far as they are passions, and since
passiones sunt; in voluntate autem they are found in the will according to
sunt secundum suam speciem, non their species but not as passions, it
autem ut passiones: relinquitur quod remains that they are not lacking even
etiam divinae voluntati non desint. to the divine will.
Item. Gaudium et delectatio est [4] Again, joy and delight are a certain
quaedam quietatio voluntatis in suo resting of the will in its object. But God,
volito. Deus autem in seipso, qui est Who is His own principal object willed,
suum principale volitum, maxime is supremely at rest in Himself, as
quietatur, utpote in se omnem containing all abundance in Himself.
sufficientiam habens. Ipse igitur per God, therefore, through His will
suam voluntatem in se maxime supremely rejoices in Himself.
gaudet et delectatur.
Praeterea. Delectatio est quaedam [5] Furthermore, delight is a certain

operationis perfectio, ut patet per perfection of operation, as appears from
philosophum, X Ethic.: perficit enim the Philosopher in Ethics X [4]; “for it
operationem sicut pulchritudo perfects operation, as does beauty
iuventutem. Sed Deus youth.” But God has the most perfect
perfectissimam operationem habet operation in understanding, as appears
in intelligendo, ut ex praedictis patet. from what has been said. If, then, our
Si igitur nostrum intelligere, propter understanding is delightful because of
suam perfectionem, est delectabile, its perfection, the divine understanding
divinum intelligere erit sibi will be most full of delight.
delectabilissimum.
Amplius. Unumquodque naturaliter [6] Moreover, each thing takes joy in its

in suo simili gaudet, quasi in like as in something agreeable, except
convenienti: nisi per accidens, by accident in so far as it may interfere
inquantum est impeditivum propriae with one’s own advantage: for example,
utilitatis, sicut figuli ad invicem “potters quarrel among themselves”
corrixantur, pro eo quod unus because one interferes with the profit of
impedit lucrum alterius. Omne the other. Now, every good is a likeness

autem bonum est divinae bonitatis of the divine good, as was said above,
similitudo, ut ex supra dictis patet: nor does God lose any good because of
nec ex aliquo bono sibi aliquid some good. It remains, then, that God
deperit. Relinquitur igitur quod Deus takes joy in every good.
de omni bono gaudet.
Est igitur in eo proprie gaudium et [7] joy and delight, then, are properly in

delectatio. Differunt autem gaudium God. Now, joy and delight differ in
et delectatio ratione. Nam delectatio notion. For delight arises from a really
provenit ex bono realiter coniuncto: conjoined good, whereas joy does not
gaudium autem hoc non requirit, require this, but the resting of the will in
sed sola quietatio voluntatis in volito the object willed suffices for the nature
sufficit ad gaudii rationem. Unde of joy. Hence, delight is only of the
delectatio est solum de coniuncto conjoined good if it be taken properly,
bono, si proprie sumatur: gaudium whereas joy is of a nonconjoined good.
autem de exteriori. Ex quo patet From this it is apparent that God
quod Deus proprie in seipso properly delights in Himself, but He
delectatur, gaudet autem et in se et takes joy both in Himself and in other
in aliis. things.
Caput 91 Chapter 91
Quod in Deo sit amor THAT IN GOD THERE IS LOVE
Similiter autem oportet et amorem [1] In the same way, there must be love
in Deo esse secundum actum in God according to the act of His will.
voluntatis eius.
Hoc enim est proprie de ratione [2] For this belongs properly to the nature

amoris, quod amans bonum amati of love, that the lover will the good of the
velit. Deus autem vult bonum suum one he loves. Now, God wills His own
et aliorum, ut ex dictis patet. good and that of others, as appears from
Secundum hoc igitur Deus et se et what has been said. This means,
alia amat. therefore, that God loves Himself and
other things.
Adhuc. Ad veritatem amoris [3] Again, for true love it is required that
requiritur quod bonum alicuius vult we will someone’s good as his good. For
prout est eius: cuius enim bonum if we will someone’s good only in so far
aliquis vult solum prout in alterius as it leads to the good of another, we
bonum cedit, per accidens amatur; love this someone by accident, just as he
sicut qui vult vinum conservari ut who wishes to store wine in order to
illud bibat, aut hominem ut sibi sit drink it or loves a man so that this man
utilis aut delectabilis, per accidens may be useful or enjoyable to him, loves
amat vinum aut hominem, per se the wine or the man by accident, but
autem seipsum. Sed Deus vult essentially he loves himself. But God
bonum uniuscuiusque secundum wills the good of each thing according as
quod est eius: vult enim it is the good of each thing; for He wills
unumquodque esse secundum each thing to be according as it is in itself
quod in se bonum est; licet etiam good (although He likewise orders one
unum ordinet in utilitatem alterius. thing to another’s use). God, then, truly
Deus igitur vere amat et se et alia. loves Himself and other things.
Amplius. Cum unumquodque [4] Moreover, since each thing in its own

naturaliter velit aut appetat suo way wills and seeks its proper good, if it
modo proprium bonum, si hoc is the nature of love that the lover will
habet amoris ratio quod amans and seek the good of the one he loves, it
velit aut appetat bonum amati, follows that the lover is to the loved as to
consequens est quod amans ad that which in some way is one with him.
amatum se habeat sicut ad id quod From this the proper nature of love is
est cum eo aliquo modo unum. Ex seen to consist in this, that the affection
quo videtur propria ratio amoris of the one tends to the other as to
consistere in hoc quod affectus someone who is somehow one with him.
unius tendat in alterum sicut in On this account it is said by Dionysius
unum cum ipso aliquo modo: that love is a “unitive power” [De div.
propter quod dicitur a Dionysio nom. IV, 13]. Therefore, the more that
quod amor est unitiva virtus. through which the lover is one with the
Quanto ergo id unde amans est one he loves is greater, the more is the
unum cum amato est maius, tanto love intense. For we love those whom
est amor intensior: magis enim the origin of birth joins to us, or the way
amamus quos nobis unit of life, or something of the sort, more
generationis origo, aut than those whom the community of
conversationis usus, aut aliquid human nature alone joins to us. Again,
huiusmodi, quam eos quos solum the more the source of the union is
nobis unit humanae naturae intimate to the lover, by so much the
societas. Et rursus, quanto id ex stronger becomes the love. Hence, at
quo est unio est magis intimum times, the love arising from some
amanti, tanto amor fit firmior: unde passion becomes more intense than the
interdum amor qui est ex aliqua love that is of natural origin or from some
passione, fit intensior amore qui habit; but it passes more easily. But the
est ex naturali origine vel ex aliquo source whence all things are joined to
habitu, sed facilius transit. Id God, namely, His goodness, which all
autem unde omnia Deo uniuntur, things imitate, is what is supreme and
scilicet eius bonitas, quam omnia most intimate in God, since it is His
imitantur, est maximum et intimum goodness. There is, therefore, in God not
Deo: cum ipse sit sua bonitas. Est only a true love, but also a most perfect
igitur in Deo amor non solum and a most enduring love.
verus, sed etiam perfectissimus et
firmissimus.
Item. Amor ex parte obiecti non [5] Again, from the side of its object love

importat aliquid repugnans Deo: does not signify anything repugnant to
cum sit boni. Nec ex modo se God, since its object is the good; neither
habendi ad obiectum: nam amor does it from the mode of its disposition
est alicuius rei non minus cum towards its object. For we love some
habetur, sed magis, quia bonum thing, not less, but more when we have
aliquod fit nobis affinius cum it, because a good is closer to us when
habetur; unde et motus ad finem in we have it. So, too, a motion to an end
rebus naturalibus ex propinquitate among natural things becomes
finis intenditur (quandoque autem intensified from the nearness of the end.
contrarium per accidens accidit, (The contrary sometimes happens by
utpote quando in amato experimur accident, namely, when in the one we
aliquid quod repugnat amori: tunc love we experience something repugnant
enim minus amatur quando to love; then the object loved is loved
habetur). Non igitur amor repugnat less when it is gained.) Hence, love is
divinae perfectioni secundum not repugnant to the divine perfection
rationem suae speciei. Est igitur in according to the nature of its species.
Deo. Therefore, it is found in God.
Praeterea. Amoris est ad unionem [6] Moreover, it belongs to love to move
movere, ut Dionysius dicit. Cum towards union, as Dionysius says. For
enim, propter similitudinem vel since, because of a likeness or
convenientiam amantis et amati, congeniality between the lover and the
affectus amantis sit quodammodo one he loves, the affection of the lover is
unitus amato, tendit appetitus in in a manner united to the one loved, his
perfectionem unionis, ut scilicet appetite tends to the perfection of the
unio quae iam inchoata est in union, so that, namely, the union that has
affectu, compleatur in actu: unde et already begun in affection may be
amicorum proprium est mutua completed in act. Hence, it is also the
praesentia et convictu et privilege of friends to take joy in one
collocutionibus gaudere. Deus another’s presence, in living together,
autem movet omnia alia ad and in conversation. But God moves all
unionem: inquantum enim dat eis things to union, for in so far as He gives
esse et alias perfectiones, unit ea them being and other perfections, He
sibi per modum quo possibile est. joins them to Himself in the manner in
Deus igitur et se et alia amat. which this is possible. God, therefore,
loves Himself and other things.
Adhuc. Omnis affectionis [7] Again, the principle of every affection

principium est amor. Gaudium is love. For joy and desire are only of a
enim et desiderium non est nisi good that is loved, and fear and sadness
amati boni; timor et tristitia non est are only of an evil that is opposed to the
nisi de malo quod contrariatur good that is loved; and from these all the
bono amato; ex his autem omnes other affections take their origin. But in
aliae affectiones oriuntur. Sed in God there is joy and delight, as was
Deo est gaudium et delectatio, ut shown above. Therefore, in God there is
supra ostensum est. Ergo in Deo love.
est amor.
Posset autem alicui videri quod [8] Now, it might seem to someone that
Deus non magis hoc quam illud God does not love this thing more than
amet. Si enim intensio et remissio that. For, if increase or decrease in
naturae mutabilis proprie est, Deo intensity properly belongs to a
competere non potest, a quo changeable nature, it cannot befit God,
omnis mutabilitas procul est. from whom all mutability is absent.
Rursus. Nullum aliorum quae de [9] Again, none of the other things that
Deo per modum operationis are said of God in terms of operation are
dicuntur, secundum magis et said of Him according to more and less;
minus de ipso dicitur: neque enim for neither does He know one thing more
magis aliquid alio cognoscit, neque than another, nor does He take more joy
magis de hoc quam de illo gaudet. over this thing than over that.
Sciendum itaque quod, cum aliae [10] We must therefore observe that,
operationes animae sint circa although the other operations of the soul
unum solum obiectum, solus amor deal with only one object, love alone
ad duo obiecta ferri videtur. Per seems to be directed to two objects. For
hoc enim quod intelligimus vel by the fact that we understand and
gaudemus, ad aliquod obiectum rejoice, we must be somehow related to
aliqualiter nos habere oportet: some object. Love, however, wills
amor vero aliquid alicui vult, hoc something for someone, for we are said
enim amare dicimur cui aliquod to love the thing to which we wish some
bonum volumus, secundum good, as explained above. Hence, the
modum praedictum. Unde et ea things that we want, absolutely and
quae concupiscimus, simpliciter properly we are said to desire, but not to
quidem et proprie desiderare love; rather, we love ourselves for whom
dicimur, non autem amare, sed we want those things: whence it is by
potius nos ipsos, quibus ea accident and improperly that such things
concupiscimus: et ex hoc ipsa per are said to be loved. Now, then, the other
accidens et improprie dicuntur operations are susceptible of more and
amari. Aliae igitur operationes less only according to the vigor of the
secundum solum actionis vigorem action. This cannot take place in God.
secundum magis et minus For the vigor of an action is measured
dicuntur. Quod in Deo accidere according to the power by which it is
non potest. Nam vigor actionis done, and every divine action belongs to
secundum virtutem qua agitur one and the same power. On the other
mensuratur: omnis autem divina hand, love is said according to more and
actio unius et eiusdem virtutis est. less in a twofold way. In one way, from
Amor autem secundum magis et the good that we will to someone, and
minus dupliciter dici potest. Uno according to this we are said to love him
quidem modo, ex bono quod alicui more to whom we will the greater good.
volumus: secundum quod illum In a second way, from the vigor of the
magis diligere dicimur cui volumus action, and in this way we are said to
maius bonum. Alio modo ex vigore love him more to whom we will with
actionis: secundum quod dicimur greater fervor and efficacity, though not a
illum magis diligere cui, etsi non greater good, yet an equal good.
maius bonum, aequale tamen
bonum ferventius et efficacius
volumus.
Primo quidem igitur modo, nihil [11] In the first way, nothing prevents us
prohibet dici quod Deus aliquid alio from saying that God loves one thing
magis diligat, secundum quod ei more than another, according as He wills

maius vult bonum. Secundo autem it a greater good. In the second way, this
modo dici non potest: eadem cannot be said, for the same reason that
ratione quae de aliis dicta est. was given in the case of the other
operations.
Patet igitur ex praedictis quod de [12] It is therefore apparent from what
nostris affectionibus nulla est quae has been said that, from among our
in Deo proprie possit esse nisi affections, there is none that can
gaudium et amor: quamvis haec properly exist in God save only joy and
etiam in eo non secundum love; although even these are not in God
passionem, sicut in nobis, sint. as passions, as they are in us.
Quod autem in Deo sit gaudium vel [13] That there are joy and delight in God
delectatio, auctoritate Scripturae is confirmed by the authority of Sacred
confirmatur. Dicitur enim in Scripture. For it is said in a Psalm
Psalmo: delectationes in dextera (15:11): “At Your right hand there are
tua usque in finem. Prov. 9: delights even to the ends.” In the
delectabar per singulos dies Proverbs (8:30), divine Wisdom, which is
ludens coram eo, dicit divina God, as we have shown, says: “I... was
sapientia, quae Deus est, ut delighted every day playing before Him
ostensum est. Luc. 1510: gaudium at all times.” And Luke (15:10): “There is
est in caelo super uno peccatore joy in heaven before the angels of God
poenitentiam agente. Philosophus upon one sinner doing penance.” The
etiam dicit, in VII Ethic., quod Deus Philosopher likewise says in Ethics VII
semper gaudet una et simplici [14] that “God ever rejoices with one
delectatione. simple delight.”
Amorem etiam Dei Scriptura [14] Sacred Scripture likewise records

commemorat, Deut. 333: dilexit the love of God: “He hath loved the
populos; Ierem. 313: in caritate people” (Deut. 33:3); “I have loved you
perpetua dilexi te; Ioan. 1627: ipse with an everlasting love” (Jer. 31:3); “For
enim pater amat vos. Philosophi the Father Himself loves you” (John
etiam quidam posuerunt rerum 16:27). Certain philosophers likewise
principium Dei amorem. Cui made God’s love to be the principle of
consonat Dionysii verbum, IV cap. things. With this view the words of
de Div. Nom.; dicentis quod divinus Dionysius agree when he says that “the
amor non permisit ipsum sine divine love did not allow Him to be
germine esse. without offspring” [De div. nom. IV, 11].
Sciendum tamen etiam alias [15] It must be noted, however, that the
affectiones, quae secundum other affections, which in their species
speciem suam divinae perfectioni are repugnant to the divine perfection,
repugnant, in sacra Scriptura de are also said of God in Sacred Scripture,
Deo dici, non quidem proprie, ut not indeed properly, as has been proved,
probatum est, sed metaphorice, but metaphorically, because of a likeness
propter similitudinem vel either in effects or in some preceding
effectuum, vel alicuius affectionis affection.
praecedentis.
Dico autem effectuum, quia [16] I say of effects because the will at
interdum voluntas ex sapientiae times, following the order of wisdom,
ordine in illum effectum tendit in tends to that effect to which someone is
quem aliquis ex passione defectiva inclined because of a defective passion;
inclinatur: iudex enim ex iustitia for a judge punishes from justice, as the
punit, sicut et iratus ex ira. Dicitur angry man punishes from anger. Hence,
igitur aliquando Deus iratus, God is at times called angry in so far as,
inquantum ex ordine suae following the order of His wisdom, He
sapientiae aliquem vult punire: wills to punish someone, according to a
secundum illud Psalmi: cum Psalm (2:13): “When His wrath shall be
exarserit in brevi ira eius. kindled in a short time.” On the other
Misericors vero dicitur inquantum hand, God is called merciful in so far as
ex sua benevolentia miserias out of His lovingkindness He takes away
hominum tollit: sicut et nos propter the miseries of men, just as we do the
misericordiae passionem facimus same thing through the passion of mercy.
idem. Unde in Psalmo: miserator et Hence the Psalm (102:8): “The Lord is
misericors dominus, patiens et compassionate and merciful:
multum misericors. Poenitens longsuffering and plenteous in mercy.”
etiam interdum dicitur, inquantum Sometimes, too, God is said to repent in
secundum aeternum et so far as according to the eternal and
immutabilem providentiae suae immutable order of His providence He
ordinem facit quae prius makes what He previously had
destruxerat, vel destruit quae prius destroyed, or destroys what He had
fecit: sicut et poenitentia moti previously had made—as those who are
facere inveniuntur. Unde Gen. 67: moved by repentance are found doing.
poenitet me fecisse hominem. Hence Genesis (6:7): “I repent that I
Quod autem hoc proprie intelligi have made man.” That this cannot be
non possit, patet per hoc quod taken at the letter appears from what is
habetur I Reg. 1529: triumphator said in 1 Samuel (15:29): “But the
in Israel non parcet, nec triumpher in Israel will not spare, and will
poenitudine flectetur. not be moved to repentance.”
Dico autem propter similitudinem [17] And I say in [the likeness of] some
affectionis praecedentis. Nam preceding affection since love and joy,
amor et gaudium, quae in Deo which are properly in God, are the
proprie sunt, principia sunt omnium principles of the other affections, love in
affectionum: amor quidem per the manner of a moving principle and joy
modum principii moventis: in the manner of an end. Hence, those
gaudium vero per modum finis; likewise who punish in anger rejoice as
unde etiam irati punientes gaudent, having gained their end. God, then, is
quasi finem assecuti. Dicitur igitur said to be saddened in so far as certain
Deus tristari, inquantum accidunt things take place that are contrary to
aliqua contraria his quae ipse amat what He loves and approves; just as we
et approbat: sicut et in nobis est experience sadness over things that
tristitia de his quae nobis have taken place against our will. This is
nolentibus acciderunt. Et hoc patet apparent in Isaiah ( 59:1516): God “saw,
Isaiae 5915 vidit Deus, et malum and it appeared evil in His eyes, because
apparuit in oculis eius, quia non est there is no judgment. And He saw that
iudicium. Et vidit quia non est vir, et there is not a man, and He stood

aporiatus est, quia non est qui astonished, because there is none to
occurrat. oppose Himself.”
Ex praedictis autem excluditur [18] Now, what we have said sets aside
error quorundam Iudaeorum the error of certain Jews who attributed
attribuentium Deo iram, tristitiam, anger, sadness, repentance, and all such
poenitentiam, et omnes huiusmodi passions in their proper sense to God,
passiones, secundum failing to distinguish what in Sacred
proprietatem, non distinguentes Scripture is said properly and what
quid in Scripturis sacris proprie et metaphorically.
metaphorice dicatur.
Caput 92 Chapter 92
Quomodo in Deo ponantur esse HOW VIRTUES MAY BE HELD TO
virtutes BE IN GOD
Consequens est autem dictis [1] Following what has been said, it
ostendere quomodo virtutes in Deo remains to show how virtues may be
ponere oportet. Oportet enim, sicut posited in God. For just as God’s being
esse eius est universaliter perfectum, is universally perfect, containing in
omnium entium perfectiones in se itself the perfections of all beings, so
quodammodo comprehendens, ita et His goodness must in a manner
bonitatem eius omnium bonitates in contain the goodness in each and
se quodammodo comprehendere. every thing. Now, virtue is a certain
Virtus autem est bonitas quaedam goodness in the virtuous, for
virtuosi: nam secundum eam dicitur “according to it is one called good, and
bonus, et opus eius bonum. Oportet his work good.” Therefore, the divine
ergo bonitatem divinam omnes goodness must contain in its way all
virtutes suo modo continere. the virtues.
Unde nulla earum secundum [2] As a consequence, none of them is

habitum in Deo dicitur, sicut in nobis. posited as a habit in God, as happens
Deo enim non convenit bonum esse in our case. For it does not befit God to
per aliquid aliud ei superadditum, be good through something else
sed per essentiam suam: cum sit superadded to Him, but through His
omnino simplex. Nec etiam per essence, since He is absolutely
aliquid suae essentiae additum agit: simple. Nor, likewise, does He act
cum sua actio sit suum esse, ut through something added to His
ostensum est. Non est igitur virtus essence, since His action is His being,
eius aliquis habitus, sed sua as has been shown. Hence, His virtue
essentia. is not some habit, but His essence.
Item. Habitus imperfectus actus est, [3] Again, a habit is an imperfect act,
quasi medius inter potentiam et as being intermediate between
actum: unde et habentes habitum potency and act; hence, those
dormientibus comparantur. In Deo possessing a habit are compared to
autem est actus perfectissimus. those who are asleep. But in God there
Actus igitur in eo non est sicut is most perfect act. Act, therefore, is
habitus, ut scientia: sed sicut not in Him as a habit, for example,
considerare, quod est actus ultimus science, but as the act of considering,
et perfectus. which is an ultimate and perfect act.
Adhuc. Habitus potentiae alicuius [4] Further, habit is perfective of a
perfectivus est. In Deo autem nihil power. But in God there is nothing in
est secundum potentiam, sed solum potency, but only in act. A habit,
secundum actum. In eo igitur habitus therefore, cannot be found in Him.
esse non potest.
Praeterea. Habitus de genere [5] Moreover, a habit is in the genus of

accidentis est. Quod in Deo omnino accident, which in no way is found in
non est, ut supra ostensum est. Igitur God, as was shown above. Neither,
nec virtus aliqua in Deo secundum therefore, is any virtue said of God as
habitum dicitur, sed solum secundum a habit, but only according to His
essentiam. essence.
Cum autem virtutes humanae sint [6] Now, since human virtues are those

quibus humana vita dirigitur; humana by which human life is directed, and
autem vita est duplex, contemplativa human life is twofold, contemplative
et activa: quae quidem ad activam and active, the virtues belonging to the
vitam virtutes pertinent, prout hanc active life, so far as they perfect this
vitam perficiunt, Deo competere non life, cannot befit God.
possunt.
Vita enim activa hominis in usu [7] For man’s active life consists in the

corporalium bonorum consistit: unde use of bodily goods, and hence the
et virtutes vitam activam dirigunt active life is directed by the virtues by
quibus his bonis recte utimur. which we make a right use of these
Huiusmodi autem Deo convenire non goods. Such goods, however, cannot
possunt. Igitur nec huiusmodi virtutes befit God, nor, therefore, can such
prout hanc vitam dirigunt. virtues so far as they direct this life.
Adhuc. Huiusmodi virtutes mores [8] Furthermore, such virtues perfect

hominum secundum politicam the ways of men in the domain of
conversationem perficiunt: unde illis political life. Hence, for those who do
qui politica conversatione non not take part in such a life the active
utuntur, convenire non multum virtues do not seem very suitable.
videntur. Multo igitur minus Deo Much less, therefore, can they suit
convenire possunt, cuius conversatio God, whose conduct and life is far
et vita longe est a modo humanae removed from the manner of human
vitae. life.
Harum etiam virtutum quae circa [9] Of the virtues that deal with the
activam vitam sunt, quaedam circa active life some, likewise, direct the
passiones nos dirigunt. Quas in Deo passions. These we cannot posit in
ponere non possumus. Virtutes enim God. For the virtues that deal with the
quae circa passiones sunt, ex ipsis passions take their species from the
passionibus speciem sortiuntur sicut passions as from their proper objects;
ex propriis obiectis: unde et and so temperance differs from
temperantia a fortitudine differt fortitude so far as it deals with desires,
inquantum haec circa whereas the latter with fear and daring.
concupiscentias est, illa vero circa But in God there are no passions, as
timores et audacias. In Deo autem has been shown, and therefore neither
passiones non sunt, ut ostensum est. can such virtues be found in Him.
Igitur nec huiusmodi virtutes in Deo
esse possunt.
Item. Huiusmodi virtutes non in parte [10] Again, such virtues are not found

intellectiva animae sunt, sed in parte in the intellective part of the soul but in
sensitiva, in qua sola passiones esse the sensitive part, in which alone
possunt, ut probatur in VII passions can be found, as is proved in
physicorum. In Deo autem non est Physics VII [3]. In God, however, there
sensitiva pars, sed solus intellectus. is no sensitive part, but only intellect. It
Relinquitur igitur quod in Deo remains, then, that such virtues cannot
huiusmodi virtutes esse non possint, be in God even according to their
etiam secundum proprias rationes. proper natures.
Passionum autem circa quas virtutes [11] Of the passions, with which the

sunt, quaedam sunt secundum virtues deal, some exist according to
inclinationem appetitus in aliquod the inclination of the appetite to some
corporale bonum quod est corporeal good that is delightful to the
delectabile secundum sensum, sicut sense, for example, food, drink, and
sunt cibi et potus et venerea; circa sex. For the desires of these passions
quorum concupiscentias est there are sobriety and chastity, and, in
sobrietas, castitas, et universaliter general, temperance and continence.
temperantia et continentia. Unde, Hence, because bodily delights are
quia corporales delectationes absolutely foreign to God, the
omnino a Deo remotae sunt, virtutes aforesaid virtues neither befit God
praedictae nec proprie Deo properly, since they deal with passions,
conveniunt, cum circa passiones sint; nor are they said of God even
nec etiam metaphorice de Deo metaphorically in Scripture, because
dicuntur in Scripturis, quia nec est there is no available likeness of them
accipere similitudinem ipsarum in in God in terms of a likeness of some
Deo secundum similitudinem alicuius effect.
effectus.
Quaedam vero passiones sunt [12] Some passions, however, follow

secundum inclinationem appetitus in the inclination of the appetite to some
aliquod spirituale bonum, sicut est spiritual good, such as honor, power,
honor, dominium, victoria, vindicta, et victory, revenge, and the like; and
alia huiusmodi: circa quorum spes, concerned with their hopes, their
audacias et omnino appetitus sunt darings, and in general their desires
fortitudo, magnanimitas, there are fortitude, magnanimity,
mansuetudo, et aliae huiusmodi gentleness, and other like virtues.
virtutes. Quae quidem in Deo proprie These, properly speaking, cannot be
esse non possunt, eo quod circa found in God, since they deal with
passiones sunt: dicuntur tamen in passions, but in Scripture they are said
Scriptura metaphorice de Deo, metaphorically of God, because of a
propter similitudinem effectus; ut est likeness in effects. For example, what
illud I Reg. 22: non est fortis sicut is said in 1 Samuel (2:2): “There is no
Deus noster; et Mich. 6: quaerite one as strong as our God”; and Micah
mansuetum, quaerite bonum. [rather, Zephaniah 2:31: “Seek the just,
seek the meek.”
Caput 93 Chapter 93
Quod in Deo sunt virtutes THAT IN GOD THERE ARE THE
morales quae sunt circa actiones MORAL VIRTUES THAT DEAL WITH
ACTIONS
Sunt autem virtutes aliquae vitam [1] Now, there are some virtues directing

activam hominis dirigentes quae the active life of man that do not deal
non circa passiones, sed circa with passions, but with actions: for
actiones sunt: ut veritas, iustitia, example, truth, justice, liberality,
liberalitas, magnificentia, prudentia magnificence, prudence, and art.
et ars.
Cum autem virtus ex obiecto vel [2] Since, however, virtue derives its
materia speciem sortiatur; actiones species from its object or its matter, and
autem quae sunt harum virtutum since the actions that are the matter or
materiae vel obiecta, divinae the objects of such virtues are not
perfectioni non repugnant: nec repugnant to the divine perfection,
huiusmodi virtutes, secundum neither do these virtues, according to
propriam speciem, habent aliquid their proper species, have anything on
propter quod a divina perfectione whose account they are excluded from
excludantur. the divine perfection.
Item. Huiusmodi virtutes [3] Again, these virtues are certain

perfectiones quaedam voluntatis et perfections of the intellect and the will,
intellectus sunt, quae sunt principia which are principles of operation without
operationum absque passione. In passion. But in God there are intellect
Deo autem est voluntas et and will, lacking no perfection.
intellectus nulla carens perfectione. Therefore, these virtues cannot be
Igitur haec Deo deesse non absent from God.
possunt.
Amplius. Eorum omnium quae a [4] Moreover, of the things that come
Deo in esse procedunt, ratio into being from God the proper model is

propria in divino intellectu est, ut in the divine intellect, as was shown
supra ostensum est. Ratio autem above. Now, the model in the mind of
rei fiendae in mente facientis ars the maker of the thing to be made is art.
est: unde philosophus dicit, in VI Hence, the Philosopher says in Ethics VI
Ethic., quod ars est recta ratio [4] that “art is the true model of things to
factibilium. Est igitur proprie ars in be made.” Art, then, is properly in God.
Deo. Et ideo dicitur Sap. 721: And therefore it is said in Wisdom (7:21):
omnium artifex docuit me “the artisan of all things has taught me
sapientiam. wisdom.”
Item. Divina voluntas, in his quae [5] Again, the divine will, with reference
sunt alia ab ipso, determinatur ad to things other than God, is determined
unum per cognitionem suam, ut to one effect by His knowledge, as was
supra ostensum est. Cognitio shown above. But the knowledge
autem ordinans voluntatem ad directing the will to act is prudence; for,
agendum prudentia est: quia according to the Philosopher in Ethics VI
secundum philosophum, in VI [5], “prudence is the true notion of the
Ethic., prudentia est recta ratio things to be done.” There is, therefore,
agibilium. Est igitur in Deo prudence in God. And this is what is
prudentia. Et hoc est quod dicitur said in Job (12:13): “With Him is
Iob 26: apud ipsum est prudentia et prudence and strength.”
fortitudo.
Adhuc. Ostensum est supra quod [6] Furthermore, it was shown above
ex hoc quod Deus vult aliquid, vult that because God wills something He
illa quae requiruntur ad ipsum. also wills those things that are
Quod autem ad perfectionem necessary to it. But that which is
alicuius requiritur, est debitum necessary to the perfection of each thing
unicuique. Est igitur in Deo iustitia, is due to it. Therefore, there is justice in
cuius est unicuique quod suum est God, to which it belongs to give to each
distribuere. Unde in Psalmo dicitur: one what belongs to him. Hence it is
iustus dominus et iustitias dilexit. said in a Psalm (30:8): “The Lord is just
and loves justice.”
Amplius. Sicut supra ostensum est, [7] Moreover, as was shown above, the

finis ultimus propter quem Deus ultimate end for which God wills all
vult omnia, nullo modo dependet ab things in no way depends on the things
his quae sunt ad finem, nec that exist for the sake of the end, and
quantum ad esse nec quantum ad this either as to being or as to some
perfectionem aliquam. Unde non perfection. Hence, He does not will to
vult alicui suam bonitatem give to someone His goodness so that
communicare ad hoc ut sibi exinde thereby something may accrue to
aliquid accrescat, sed quia ipsum Himself, but because for Him to make
communicare est sibi conveniens such a gift befits Him as the fount of
sicut fonti bonitatis. Dare autem goodness. But to give something not for
non propter aliquod commodum ex the sake of some benefit expected from
datione expectatum, sed propter the giving, but because of the goodness
ipsam bonitatem et convenientiam and befittingness of the giving, is an act
dationis, est actus liberalitatis, ut of liberality, as appears from the
patet per philosophum, in IV Philosopher in Ethics IV [1]. God,
Ethicorum. Deus igitur est maxime therefore, is supremely liberal; and, as
liberalis: et, ut Avicenna dicit, ipse Avicenna says, He alone can truly be
solus liberalis proprie dici potest; called liberal, for every agent other than
nam omne aliud agens praeter God acquires some good from his
ipsum ex sua actione aliquod action, which is the intended end.”
bonum acquirit, quod est finis Scripture sets forth this liberality of God,
intentus. Hanc autem eius saying in a Psalm (103:28): “When You
liberalitatem Scriptura ostendit, open Your hand, they shall all be filled
dicens in Psalmo: aperiente te with good”; and in James (1:5): “Who
manum tuam, omnia implebuntur gives to all men abundantly without
bonitate; et Iac. 15: qui dat reproaching.”
omnibus affluenter et non
improperat.
Item. Omnia quae a Deo esse [8] Again, all things that receive being
accipiunt, necesse est ut ipsius from God must bear His likeness in so
similitudinem gerant inquantum far as they are, are good, and have their
sunt, et bona sunt, et proprias proper models in the divine intellect, as
rationes in divino intellectu habent, was shown above. But it belongs to the
ut supra ostensum est. Hoc autem virtue of truth, as appears from the
ad virtutem veritatis pertinet, ut per Philosopher in Ethics IV [7], for
philosophum in IV Ethic. patet, ut in someone in his deeds and words to
suis factis et dictis aliquis talem se show himself such as he is. Therefore,
exhibeat qualis est. Est igitur in there is in God the virtue of truth. Hence,
Deo veritatis virtus. Unde Rom. 34: Romans (3:4): “But God is true”; and the
est autem Deus verax; et in Psalm (118:151): “All Your ways are
Psalmo: omnes viae tuae veritas. truth.”
Si quae autem virtutes sunt quae [9] But, if there are any virtues that deal

ad aliquas actiones ordinentur quae with notions belonging to subordinates
sunt subiectorum ad superiora, talia in relation to their superiors, such cannot
Deo convenire non possunt: sicut befit God: for example, obedience,
obedientia, latria, vel aliquid worship, or something of the sort that is
huiusmodi quod superiori debetur. due a superior.
Si etiam aliquarum ex praedictis [10] If, furthermore, some of the
virtutibus sint aliqui actus aforementioned virtues have certain
imperfecti, secundum illos Deo imperfect acts, the virtues in question
attribui dictae virtutes non possunt. cannot be attributed to God according to
Sicut prudentia quantum ad actum those acts. Thus, prudence, according
bene consiliandi Deo non competit. to the act of taking good counsel, does
Cum enim consilium sit quaedam not befit God. For, since counsel is “a
quaestio, ut dicitur in VI Ethic.; certain inquiry,” as is said in Ethics VI
divina autem cognitio non sit [9], and the divine knowledge is not
inquisitiva, ut supra ostensum est: inquiring, as was shown above, to take
non potest sibi consiliari esse counsel cannot befit God. Hence Job
conveniens. Unde Iob 263: cui (26:3): “How you have counseled him
dedisti consilium? Forsitan ei qui who has no wisdom!”; and Isaiah
non habet intelligentiam? Et Isaiae (40:14): “Whom has He consulted: and
4014: cum quo iniit consilium, et who has instructed Him?” But as to the
instruxit eum? Secundum autem act that consists in judging the matter of
actum illum qui est de consiliatis counsel and choosing what has been
iudicare et approbata eligere, nihil approved, nothing prevents prudence
prohibet prudentiam de Deo dici. from being said of God. Nevertheless,
Dicitur tamen interdum consilium counsel is at times said of God. This is
de Deo. Vel propter similitudinem either because of the likeness in privacy,
occultationis: nam consilia occulte since counsels take place in private, so
aguntur; unde quod est in divina that what is hidden in the divine wisdom
sapientia occultum, per is called by likeness counsel, as
similitudinem consilium dicitur, ut appears in Isaiah in the other version:
patet Isaiae 251, secundum aliam “May Your ancient counsel be verified”
litteram: consilium tuum antiquum (25:1 Septuagint); or in so far as He
verum fiat. Vel inquantum gives satisfaction to those who seek His
consulentibus satisfacit: est enim counsel, since one who has
etiam sine discursu intelligentis understanding can, even without any
instruere inquirentes. discursiveness, instruct the inquiring.
Similiter etiam iustitia quantum ad [11] In the same way, justice, as
commutationis actum Deo concerns the act of commutative justice,
competere non potest: cum ipse a cannot befit God, since He does not
nullo aliquid accipiat. Unde Rom. receive anything from anyone. Hence
1135: quis prior dedit illi, et Romans (11:35): “Who hath first given to
retribuetur ei? Et Iob 411: quis Him and recompense shall be made
ante mihi dedit, ut reddam ei? Per him?” And Job (41:2): “Who hath given
similitudinem tamen aliqua Deo me before that I should repay him?”
dare dicimur, inquantum nostra Through a likeness, however, we are
data Deus acceptat. Non igitur sibi said to give some things to God in so far
competit commutativa iustitia, sed as God looks with favor upon our gifts.
solum distributiva. Unde Dionysius Commutative justice, therefore, does not
dicit, VIII cap. de Div. Nom. quod befit God, but only distributive. Hence,
iustitia laudatur Deus sicut omnibus Dionysius says that “God is praised for
secundum dignitatem distribuens: His justice as giving to all according to
secundum illud Matth. 2515: dedit their worth” [De div. nom. VIII, 3]. And in
unicuique secundum propriam the words of Matthew (25:15): “He
virtutem. gave... to every one according to his
proper ability.”
Scire autem oportet quod actiones [12] We must observe, however, that the

circa quas sunt praedictae virtutes, actions with which the above virtues
secundum suas rationes ex rebus deal, do not according to their natures
humanis non dependent: non enim depend on man; for to judge of the
de agendis iudicare, aliquid dare things that are to be done, or to give or
vel distribuere, solius hominis est, distribute something, does not belong to
sed cuiuslibet intellectum habentis. man alone but to any being possessing
Secundum tamen quod ad res an intellect. Yet, in so far as these are
humanas contrahuntur, ex his narrowed to the human sphere, in a
quodammodo speciem sumunt: manner they receive their species from
sicut curvum in naso facit speciem them, as the curvature in a nose
simi. Virtutes igitur praedictae, produces the species of the snub. The
secundum quod ordinant humanam aforementioned virtues, therefore,
vitam activam, ad has actiones according as they order man’s active
ordinantur prout ad res humanas life, are ordered to these actions in so
contrahuntur, ab eis speciem far as they are narrowed to human
sumentes. Secundum quem affairs and take their species from them.
modum Deo convenire non In this manner they cannot befit God.
possunt. Secundum vero quod But in so far as the aforementioned
actiones praedictae in sua actions are taken in their generality, they
communitate accipiuntur, possunt can be attributed even to divine things.
etiam rebus divinis aptari. Sicut For just as man is a distributor of human
enim homo rerum humanarum, ut goods, such as money and honor, so too
pecuniae vel honoris, distributor God is the distributor of all the goods of
est, ita et Deus omnium bonitatum the universe. The aforementioned
universi. Sunt igitur praedictae virtues, therefore, are of a more
virtutes in Deo universalioris universal extension in God than in man;
extensionis quam in homine; nam for as the justice of man is to the
sicut iustitia hominis se habet ad community or the household, so the
civitatem vel domum, ita iustitia Dei justice of God is to the whole universe.
se habet ad totum universum. Unde Hence, the divine virtues are said to be
et divinae virtutes nostrarum the exemplar virtues of ours; for the
exemplares dicuntur: nam quae things that are contracted and
sunt contracta et particulata, particularized are the likenesses of
similitudines quaedam absolutorum certain absolute beings, just as the light
entium sunt, sicut lumen candelae of a candle is to the light of the sun. As
se habet ad lumen solis. Aliae vero for the other virtues, which do not
virtutes, quae Deo proprie non properly befit God, they do not have an
conveniunt, non habent exemplar in exemplar in the divine nature, but only in
divina natura; sed solum in divina the divine wisdom, which contains the
sapientia, quae omnium entium proper likenesses of all beings: this is
proprias rationes complectitur; sicut the case with other corporeal beings.
est de aliis corporalibus rebus.
Caput 94 Chapter 94
Quod in Deo sunt virtutes THAT IN GOD THERE ARE
contemplativae CONTEMPLATIVE VIRTUES
De contemplativis autem virtutibus [1] Concerning the contemplative virtues

dubium esse non potest quin Deo there can be no doubt that they
maxime conveniant. supremely befit God.
Si enim sapientia in cognitione [2] For if wisdom consists in the
altissimarum causarum consistit, knowledge of the highest causes,
secundum philosophum, in according to the Philosopher in the
principio metaphysicae; ipse beginning of the Metaphysics [I, 2], and if
autem Deus praecipue seipsum God especially knows Himself, and does
cognoscit, nec aliquid cognoscit not know anything, as has been proved,
nisi cognoscendo seipsum, ut except by knowing Himself Who is the
probatum est, qui est omnium first cause of all things, it is manifest that
prima causa: manifestum est quod wisdom must most especially be
sibi potissime sapientia debet attributed to Him. Hence Job (9:4): “He is
adscribi. Unde Iob 94: sapiens wise in heart”; and Sirach (1:1): “All
corde est: et Eccli. 11: omnis wisdom is from the Lord God, and hath
sapientia a domino Deo est, et been always with Him.” The Philosopher
cum illo fuit semper. Philosophus also says in the beginning of the
etiam dicit, in principio Metaphysics [I, 2] that wisdom is a divine
metaphysicae, quod est divina possession, not a human one.
possessio, non humana.
Item. Si scientia est rei cognitio per [3] Again, if science is the knowledge of a
propriam causam; ipse autem thing through its cause, and if God knows
omnium causarum et effectuum the order of all causes and effects, and
ordinem cognoscit, et per hoc thereby knows the proper causes of
singulorum proprias causas novit, singulars, as was shown above, it is
ut supra ostensum est: manifestum manifest that in a proper sense there is
est quod in ipso proprie scientia science in Him. Nevertheless, this is not
est: non tamen quae sit per the science caused by ratiocination, as
ratiocinationem causata, sicut our science is caused by demonstration.
scientia nostra ex demonstratione Hence 1 Samuel (2:3): “For the Lord is
causatur. Unde I Reg. 23: Deus the God of all knowledge.”
scientiarum dominus est.
Adhuc. Si immaterialis cognitio [4] Furthermore, if the immaterial

aliquarum rerum absque discursu knowledge of some things without
intellectus est; Deus autem discursiveness is intellect, and God has
huiusmodi cognitionem de such knowledge of all things, as was
omnibus habet, ut supra ostensum shown above, there is therefore intellect
est: est igitur in ipso intellectus. in God. Hence Job (12:13): “He hath
Unde Iob 1213: ipse habet counsel and understanding.”
consilium et intelligentiam.
Hae etiam virtutes in Deo sunt [5] These virtues, likewise, are in God the

exemplares nostrarum, sicut exemplars of ours, as the perfect of the
perfectum imperfecti. imperfect.
Caput 95 Chapter 95
Quod Deus non potest velle THAT GOD CANNOT WILL EVIL
malum
Ex his autem quae dicta sunt, [1] From what has been said it can be

ostendi potest quod Deus non potest shown that God cannot will evil.
velle malum.
Virtus enim rei est secundum quam [2] For the virtue of a being is that by
aliquis bene operatur. Omnis autem which he operates well. Now every
operatio Dei est operatio virtutis: operation of God is an operation of
cum sua virtus sit sua essentia, ut virtue, since His virtue is His essence,
supra ostensum est. Non potest as was shown above. Therefore, God
igitur malum velle. cannot will evil.
Item. Voluntas nunquam ad malum [3] Again, the will never aims at evil
fertur nisi aliquo errore in ratione without some error existing in the
existente, ad minus in particulari reason, at least with respect to a
eligibili. Cum enim voluntatis particular object of choice. For, since
obiectum sit bonum apprehensum, the object of the will is the
non potest voluntas ferri in malum apprehended good, the will cannot aim
nisi aliquo modo proponatur sibi ut at evil unless in some way it is
bonum: et hoc sine errore esse non proposed to it as a good; and this
potest. In divina autem cognitione cannot take place without error. But in
non potest esse error, ut supra the divine knowledge there cannot be
ostensum est. Non igitur voluntas error, as was shown above. God’s will
eius potest ad malum tendere. cannot, therefore, tend towards evil.
Amplius. Deus est summum bonum, [4] Moreover, God is the highest good,

ut supra probatum est. Summum as has been shown. But the highest
autem bonum non patitur aliquod good cannot bear any mingling with
consortium mali: sicut nec summe evil, as neither can the highest hot
calidum permixtionem frigidi. Divina thing bear any mingling with the cold.
igitur voluntas non potest flecti ad The divine will, therefore, cannot be
malum. turned to evil.
Praeterea. Cum bonum habeat [5] Furthermore, since the good has
rationem finis, malum non potest the nature of an end, evil cannot enter
incidere in voluntate nisi per the will except by turning away from
aversionem a fine. Voluntas autem the end. But the divine will cannot be
divina a fine averti non potest: cum turned from the end, since it can will
nihil possit velle nisi volendo nothing except by willing itself.
seipsum, ut ostensum est. Non Therefore, it cannot will evil.
potest igitur velle malum.
Et sic patet quod liberum arbitrium in [6] And thus it appears that free choice
ipso naturaliter stabilitum est in in God naturally stands abiding in the
bono. good.
Hoc autem est quod dicitur Deut. 32 [7] This is what is said in Deuteronomy
4: Deus fidelis et absque iniquitate; (32:4): “God is faithful and without any
et Hab. 113: mundi sunt oculi tui, iniquity”; and Habakkuk (1:13): “Your
domine, et respicere ad iniquitatem eyes are too pure to behold evil, and
non potes. You cannot look on iniquity.”
Per hoc autem confutatur error [8] By this is refuted the error of the
Iudaeorum, qui in Talmut dicunt Jews, who say in the Talmud that at
Deum quandoque peccare et a times God sins and is cleansed from
peccato purgari; et Luciferianorum, sin; and of the Luciferians, who say
qui dicunt Deum in Luciferi that God sinned in ejecting Lucifer.
deiectione peccasse.
Caput 96 Chapter 96
Quod Deus nihil odit, nec odium THAT GOD HATES NOTHING, AND
alicuius rei ei convenire potest THE HATRED OF NO THING BEFITS
HIM
Ex hoc autem apparet quod odium [1] From this it appears that the hatred of
alicuius rei Deo convenire non something does not befit God.
potest.
Sicut enim amor se habet ad [2] For as love is to the good, so hatred is

bonum, ita odium se habet ad to evil; for to those we love we will good,
malum: nam his quos amamus, and to those we hate, evil. If, then, the
bonum volumus; his vero quos will of God cannot be inclined to evil, as
odimus, malum. Si igitur voluntas has been shown, it is impossible that He
Dei ad malum inclinari non potest, should hate anything.
ut ostensum est, impossibile est
quod ipse rem aliquam odio
habeat.
Item. Voluntas Dei in alia a se [3] Again, the will of God is directed to
fertur, ut supra ostensum est, things other than Himself, as has been
inquantum, volendo et amando shown, in so far as, by willing and loving
suum esse et suam bonitatem vult His own being and His own goodness,
eam diffundi, secundum quod God wills it to be diffused as much as
possibile est, per similitudinis possible through the communication of
communicationem. Hoc igitur est likeness. This, then, is what God wills in
quod Deus in rebus aliis a se vult, other things, that there be in them the
ut in eis sit suae bonitatis likeness of His goodness. But this is the
similitudo. Hoc autem est bonum good of each thing, namely, to participate
uniuscuiusque rei, ut similitudinem in the likeness of God; for every other
divinam participet: nam quaelibet goodness is nothing other than a certain
bonitas alia non est nisi quaedam likeness of the first goodness. Therefore,
similitudo primae bonitatis. Igitur God wills good to each thing. Hence, He
Deus unicuique rei vult bonum. hates nothing.
Nihil igitur odit.
Adhuc. A primo ente omnia alia [4] Furthermore, from the first being all
originem essendi sumunt. Si igitur the others take the origin of their being.
aliquid eorum quae sunt odio If, then, God hates anything among the
habet, vult illud non esse: quia hoc things that are, He wills it not to be, since
est unicuique bonum. Vult igitur to be is each thing’s good. He wills,
actionem suam non esse qua illud therefore, the nonexistence of His own
in esse producitur vel mediate vel action by which that thing is brought into
immediate: ostensum est enim being either mediately or immediately.
supra quod, si Deus aliquid vult, For it was shown above that, if God wills
oportet quod illa velit quae ad illud something, He must will the things that
requiruntur. Hoc autem est are necessary for it. Now, this is
impossibile. Quod quidem patet, si impossible. This is apparent if things
res per voluntatem ipsius in esse come into being through His will, for then
procedant: quia tunc oportet the action by which things are produced
actionem qua res producuntur must be voluntary. The same is the case
esse voluntariam. Similiter si if God is by nature the cause of things,
naturaliter sit rerum causa: quia, for, just as His nature is pleasing to Him,
sicut placet sibi sua natura, sic so whatever His nature requires is
placet sibi omne illud quod sua pleasing to Him. God, therefore, does not
natura requirit. Nullam igitur rem hate anything.
Deus odit.
Praeterea. Illud quod invenitur in [5] Moreover, that which is found in all
omnibus causis activis naturaliter, naturally active causes must be
praecipue in primo agente especially found in the first cause. But all
necesse est inveniri. Omnia autem agents in their own way love their effects
agentia suo modo suos effectus as such: thus, parents love their children,
amant, secundum quod poets their poetry, and artists their works.
huiusmodi: sicut parentes filios, All the more, then, does God not hate
poetae poemata, artifices sua anything, since He is the cause of all
opera. Multo igitur magis Deus things.
nullam rem odit: cum ipse sit
omnium causa.
Hoc autem est quod dicitur Sap. [6] This is what is said in Wisdom
1125: diligis omnia quae sunt, et (11:25): “For You love all the things that
nihil odisti eorum quae fecisti. are, and hate none of the things which
You hast made.”
Dicitur autem similitudinarie Deus [7] However, God is said by similitude to

aliqua odire. Et hoc dupliciter. hate some things, and this in a twofold
Primo modo, ex hoc quod Deus, way. In the first way, because God, in
amando res, volens eorum bonum loving things and by willing the existence
esse, vult contrarium malum non of their good, wills the nonexistence of
esse. Unde malorum odium the contrary evil. Hence, He is said to
habere dicitur, nam quae non esse have a hatred of evils, for we are said to
volumus, dicimur odio habere: hate what we will not to exist. In the
secundum illud Zach. 817: words of Zechariah (8:17): “And let none
unusquisque malum contra of you imagine evil in your hearts against
amicum suum ne cogitetis in his friend and love not a false oath. For
cordibus vestris, et iuramentum all these are the things that I hate, says
mendax non diligatis: omnia enim the Lord.” These, however, are not
haec sunt quae odi, dicit dominus. effects in the manner of subsisting
Haec autem non sunt effectus ut things, to which properly love and hate
res subsistentes, quarum proprie refer.
est odium vel amor.
Alius autem modus est ex hoc [8] The second way arises from the fact
quod Deus vult aliquod maius that God wills some greater good that
bonum quod esse non potest sine cannot be without the loss of some lesser
privatione minoris boni. Et sic good. And thus He is said to hate,
dicitur odire: cum magis hoc sit although this is rather to love. For thus,
amare. Sic enim, inquantum vult inasmuch as He wills the good of justice
bonum iustitiae vel ordinis universi, or of the order of the universe, which
quod esse non potest sine cannot exist without the punishment or
punitione vel corruptione corruption of some things, God is said to
aliquorum, dicitur illa odire quorum hate the things whose punishment or
punitionem vult vel corruptionem: corruption He wills. In the words of
secundum illud Mal. 13: Esau Malachi (1:3): “I have hated Esau”; and
odio habui; et illud Psalmi: odisti the Psalms (5:7): “You hate all workers of
omnes qui operantur iniquitatem; iniquity: You destroy all who speak a lie.
perdes omnes qui loquuntur The bloody and the deceitful man the
mendacium: virum sanguinum et Lord will abhor.”
dolosum abominatur dominus.
Caput 97 Chapter 97
Quod Deus est vivens THAT GOD IS LIVING
Ex his autem quae iam ostensa [1] From what has already been proved it
sunt, de necessitate habetur necessarily follows that God is living.
quod Deus est vivens.
Ostensum est enim Deum esse [2] For it has been shown that God is
intelligentem et volentem. understanding and willing, and the acts of
Intelligere autem et velle non nisi understanding and willing belong only to a
viventis est. Est igitur Deus living being. Therefore, God is living.
vivens.
Adhuc. Vivere secundum hoc [3] Again, to live is attributed to some
aliquibus attributum est quod beings because they are seen to move
visa sunt per se, non ab alio themselves, but not to be moved by
moveri. Et propter hoc illa quae another. And on this account the things
videntur per se moveri, quorum that seem to be moved by themselves,
motores vulgus non percipit, per whose movers people in general do not
similitudinem dicimus vivere: perceive, we call by similitude living: for
sicut aquam vivam fontis fluentis, example, the living water of a flowing

non autem cisternae vel stagni spring, but not the water of a cistern or a
stantis; et argentum vivum, quod stagnant pool; or quicksilver, which
motum quendam habere videtur. appears to have a certain movement. For,
Proprie enim illa sola per se in a proper sense, those things move
moventur quae movent seipsa, through themselves that move themselves,
composita ex motore et moto, being composed of a mover and something
sicut animata. Unde haec sola moved, for example, animate things. These
proprie vivere dicimus: alia vero alone we properly say are living, while all
omnia ab aliquo exteriori other things are moved by some exterior
moventur, vel generante, vel agent, be it a generating cause, or one
removente prohibens, vel removing an obstacle, or an impelling
impellente. Et quia operationes cause. And because all sensible
sensibiles cum motu sunt, operations involve motion, everything that
ulterius omne illud quod agit se moves itself to its own operations is further
ad proprias operationes, said to live, though this be not with motion;
quamvis non sint cum motu, and so understanding, appetition, and
dicitur vivere: unde intelligere, sensing are actions of life. But it is
appetere et sentire actiones vitae supremely true of God that He does not act
sunt. Sed Deus maxime non ab from another, but through Himself, since
alio, sed a seipso operatur: cum He is the first agent. Therefore, to live
sit prima causa agens. Maxime belongs to Him in a supreme way.
igitur ei competit vivere.
Item. Divinum esse omnem [4] Again, the divine being comprehends
perfectionem essendi every perfection of being, as has been
comprehendit, ut supra shown. But to live is a certain perfection,
ostensum est. Vivere autem est which is why living things in the order of
quoddam esse perfectum: unde being are higher than nonliving things.
viventia in ordine entium non Hence, the divine being is living. Therefore,
viventibus praeferuntur. Divinum God is living.
igitur esse est vivere. Ipse igitur
est vivens.
Hoc etiam auctoritate divinae [5] This is likewise confirmed by the
Scripturae confirmatur. Dicitur authority of the divine Scripture. For it is
enim Deut. 3240, ex ore domini: said in Deuteronomy (32:40) in the person
dicam, vivo ego in aeternum; et of the Lord: “I will say: I live forever”; and in
in Psalmo: cor meum et caro a Psalm (83:3): “My heart and my flesh
mea exultaverunt in Deum have rejoiced in the living God.”
vivum.
Caput 98 Chapter 98
Quod Deus est sua vita THAT GOD IS HIS LIFE
Ex hoc autem ulterius patet quod [1] From this it further appears that
Deus sit sua vita. God is His life.
Vita enim viventis est ipsum vivere in [2] For the life of the living being is the
quadam abstractione significatum: very act of living signified in an abstract
sicut cursus non est secundum rem manner, as running is in reality nothing
aliud quam currere. Vivere autem other than to run. Now, “to live is for the
viventium est ipsum esse eorum, ut living their very being,” as appears
patet per philosophum, in II de from the Philosopher in De anima II [4].
anima: cum enim ex hoc animal For, since an animal is said to be living
dicatur vivens quod animam habet, because it has a soul, through which it
secundum quam habet esse, utpote has being as through its proper form, it
secundum propriam formam, oportet follows that to live is nothing other than
quod vivere nihil sit aliud quam tale such a being arising from such a form.
esse ex tali forma proveniens. Deus But God is His own being, as was
autem est suum esse, ut supra proved above. Therefore, He is His
probatum est. Est igitur suum vivere own act of living and His own life.
et sua vita.
Item. Ipsum intelligere est quoddam [3] Again, understanding is a certain
vivere, ut patet per philosophum, in II way of living, as appears from the
de anima: nam vivere est actus Philosopher in De anima II [2]; for to
viventis. Deus autem est suum live is the act of a living being. But God
intelligere, sicut supra ostensum est. is His own understanding, as was
Est igitur suum vivere et sua vita. shown above, and therefore He is His
own act of living and His own life.
Amplius. Si Deus non esset sua vita, [4] Moreover, if God were not His life,

cum sit vivens, ut ostensum est, since He is living, as has been shown,
sequeretur quod esset vivens per it would follow that He would be living
participationem vitae. Omne autem through the participation of life. But
quod est per participationem, everything that is through participation
reducitur ad id quod est per is reduced to that which is through
seipsum. Deus igitur reduceretur in itself. Therefore, God would be
aliquod prius, per quod viveret. Quod reduced to something prior, through
est impossibile, ut ex dictis patet. which He would be living. This is
impossible, as is apparent from what
has been said.
Adhuc. Si sit vivens Deus, ut [5] Furthermore, if God is living, as has

ostensum est, oportet in ipso esse been shown, there must be life in Him.
vitam. Si igitur non sit ipse sua vita, If, then, He is not His own life, there will
erit aliquid in ipso quod non est ipse. be something in Him that is not He..
Et sic erit compositus. Quod supra Thus, He will be composite, which has
improbatum est. Est igitur Deus sua been disproved.” Therefore, God is His
vita. life.
Et hoc est quod dicitur Ioan. 146: [6] This is what is said in John (14:6): “I

ego sum vita. am... the life.”
Caput 99 Chapter 99
Quod vita Dei est sempiterna THAT THE LIFE OF GOD IS
EVERLASTING
Ex hoc autem apparet quod vita [1] From this it appears that God’s life is
eius sit sempiterna. everlasting.
Nihil enim desinit vivere nisi per [2] Nothing ceases to live except through
separationem vitae. Nihil autem a separation from life. But nothing can be
seipso separari potest: omnis separated from God, since every
enim separatio fit per divisionem separation takes place through the
alicuius ab alio. Impossibile est division of something from something. It is
igitur quod Deus deficiat vivere: therefore impossible that God cease to
cum ipse sit sua vita, ut ostensum live, since He is His life, as has been
est. shown.
Item. Omne illud quod quandoque [3] Again, everything that at times is and

est et quandoque non est, est per at times is not is through some cause, for
aliquam causam: nihil enim nothing leads itself from nonbeing to
seipsum de non esse in esse being, since that which does not yet exist
adducit, quia quod nondum est, does not act. But the divine life has no
non agit. Divina autem vita non cause, as neither does the divine being.
habet aliquam causam: sicut nec Hence, God is not at times living and at
divinum esse. Non igitur times notliving, but He always lives.
quandoque est vivens et Therefore, His life is everlasting.
quandoque non vivens, sed
semper vivit. Est igitur vita eius
sempiterna.
Adhuc. In qualibet operatione [4] Furthermore, in every operation the
operans manet, licet interdum agent abides, even though at times the
operatio transeat secundum operation passes through succession.
successionem: unde et in motu Hence, in motion likewise, the movable
mobile manet idem subiecto in remains the same in subject during the
toto motu, licet non secundum whole motion, although not in situation.
rationem. Ubi igitur actio est Where, therefore, the action is the agent
ipsum agens, oportet quod nihil ibi itself, of necessity nothing there passes
per successionem transeat, sed through succession, but the whole
totum simul maneat. Intelligere remains all together. But the
autem et vivere Dei ipse est understanding and living of God are God
Deus, ut ostensum est. Igitur eius Himself, as has been shown. Therefore,
vita non habet successionem, sed His life has no succession, but is life all
est tota simul. Est igitur together. Therefore, it is everlasting.
sempiterna.
Amplius. Deus omnino immobilis [5] Moreover, God is absolutely immobile,

est, ut supra ostensum est. Quod as was shown above. But what begins to
autem incipit aut desinit vivere, live and ceases to live, or in living suffers
vel in vivendo successionem succession, is mutable. For one’s life
patitur, mutabile est: nam vita begins through generation, it ceases
alicuius incipit per generationem, through corruption, and as to succession,
desinit autem per corruptionem, it exists because of some motion. But God
successio autem propter motum neither began to live, nor will He cease to
aliquem est. Deus igitur neque live, not in living does He suffer any
incoepit vivere, neque desinet succession. Therefore, His life is
vivere, neque in vivendo everlasting.
successionem patitur. Est igitur
eius vita sempiterna.
Hinc est quod dicitur Deut. 3240, [6] Hence what is said in Deuteronomy

ex ore domini: vivo ego in (32:40) in the person of the Lord: “I live
aeternum; I Ioan. ult.: hic est forever”; and in 1 John (5:20): “This is true
verus Deus et vita aeterna. God and life eternal.”
Caput 100 Chapter 101
Quod Deus est beatus THAT GOD IS BLESSED
Restat autem ex praemissis [1] It remains from the foregoing to show

ostendere Deum esse beatum. that God is blessed.
Cuiuslibet enim intellectualis [2] The proper good of every intellectual
naturae proprium bonum est nature is blessedness. Since, then, God
beatitudo. Cum igitur Deus sit is intelligent, His proper good will be
intelligens, suum proprium bonum blessedness. But He is not related to His
erit beatitudo. Non autem proper good as is something that tends to
comparatur ad proprium bonum a good not yet possessed, since this
sicut quod in bonum nondum belongs to a nature that is movable and
habitum tendit, hoc enim est existing in potency; He is related rather as
naturae mobilis et in potentia that which already possesses its proper
existentis: sed sicut quod iam good. Therefore, He not only desires
obtinet proprium bonum. Igitur blessedness, as we do, but enjoys it.
beatitudinem non solum desiderat, Therefore, He is blessed.
sicut nos, sed ea fruitur. Est igitur
beatus.
Amplius. Illud est maxime [3] Moreover, that is supremely desired or

desideratum vel volitum ab willed by an intellectual nature which is
intellectuali natura quod est most perfect in it; and this is its
perfectissimum in ipsa: et hoc est blessedness. But the most perfect thing in
eius beatitudo. Perfectissimum each being is its most perfect operation.
autem in unoquoque est operatio For potency and habit are perfected by
perfectissima eius: nam potentia operation, and so the Philosopher says
et habitus per operationem that "felicity is perfect operation" [Ethics
perficiuntur; unde et philosophus X, 7].
dicit felicitatem esse operationem But the perfection of operation depends
perfectam. on four things. First, on its genus, namely,
Perfectio autem operationis that it be abiding in its operating cause.
dependet ex quatuor. Primo, ex By an operation that abides in its cause I
suo genere: ut scilicet sit manens mean one through which nothing takes
in ipso operante. Dico autem place but the operation itself: for example,
operationem in ipso manentem to see and to hear. For these are the
per quam non fit aliud praeter perfections of the beings whose
ipsam operationem: sicut videre et operations they are, and can be ultimate
audire. Huiusmodi enim sunt because they are not ordered to
perfectiones eorum quorum sunt something made as to their end. On the
operationes, et possunt esse other hand, the operation or the action
ultimum: quia non ordinantur ad from which there follows some result
aliquod factum quod sit finis. beyond the action itself is the perfection
Operatio vero vel actio ex qua of the thing produced, and not of the
sequitur aliquid actum praeter operating cause, and is related to it as to
ipsam, est perfectio operati, non an end. Hence, such an operation of an
operantis, et comparatur ad ipsum intellectual nature is not blessedness or
sicut ad finem. Et ideo talis felicity. Second, it depends on the
operatio intellectualis naturae non principle of operation, namely, that it be
est beatitudo sive felicitas. the operation of the highest power.
Secundo, ex principio operationis: Hence, there is not felicity in us according
ut sit altissimae potentiae. Unde to the operation of sense, butt according
secundum operationem sensus to the operation of the intellect, and one
non est in nobis felicitas, sed perfected by a habit. Third, it depends on
secundum operationem intellectus the object of operation. On this account,
et per habitum perfecti. Tertio, ex the highest felicity in us consists in
operationis obiecto. Et propter hoc understanding the highest intelligible.
in nobis ultima felicitas est in Fourth, it depends on the form of the
intelligendo altissimum intelligibile. operation, namely, that it be easily, firmly,
Quarto, ex forma operationis: ut and with delight. Such, however, is the
scilicet perfecte, faciliter, firmiter et operation of God, since He is intelligent,
delectabiliter operetur. Talis autem and His the highest power, nor does He
est Dei operatio: cum sit need any perfecting habit, because He is
intelligens; et suus intellectus perfect in Himself, as was shown above.
altissima virtutum sit, nec indiget Furthermore, He understands Himself,
habitu perficiente, quia in seipso being the highest intelligible, and this
perfectus est, ut supra ostensum perfectly, without any difficulty, and with
est; ipse autem seipsum intelligit, delight. God is, therefore, blessed.
qui est summum intelligibilium;
perfecte, absque omni difficultate,
et delectabiliter. Est igitur beatus.
Adhuc. Per beatitudinem [4] Furthermore, through blessedness

desiderium omne quietatur: quia, every desire is given rest, because, when
ea habita, non restat aliud blessedness is possessed, nothing else
desiderandum; cum sit ultimus remains to be desired, since it is the
finis. Oportet igitur eum esse ultimate end. He must, therefore, be
beatum qui perfectus est quantum blessed who is perfect in relation to all the
ad omnia quae desiderare potest: things that He can desire. Hence,
unde Boetius dicit quod beatitudo Boethius says that blessedness is "a
est status omnium bonorum state made perfect by the accumulation of
congregatione perfectus. Sed talis all goods" [De consolatione philosophiae
est divina perfectio quod omnem III, 2]. But such is the divine perfection,
perfectionem in quadam because it comprehends all perfection in
simplicitate comprehendit, ut a certain simplicity, as was shown above.
supra ostensum est. Ipse igitur est Therefore, God is truly blessed.
vere beatus.
Item. Quandiu alicui deest aliquid [5] Again, as long as someone is missing

quo indigeat, nondum beatus est: something that he needs, he is not yet
quia eius desiderium nondum est blessed, for his desire is not yet at rest.
quietatum. Quicumque igitur sibi Whoever, therefore, is selfsufficient,
sufficiens est, nullo indigens, ille needing nothing, he is blessed. But it has
beatus est. Ostensum est autem been shown above that God does not
supra quod Deus non indiget aliis: need other things, since His perfection
cum a nullo exteriori sua perfectio depends on nothing outside Himself, nor
dependeat; nec alia vult propter does God will other things for His own
se sicut propter finem quasi eis sake as though He needed them, but
indigeat, sed solum quia hoc est solely because this befits His goodness.
conveniens suae bonitati. Est Therefore, He is blessed.
igitur ipse beatus.
Praeterea. Ostensum est supra [6] Furthermore, it was shown above that

quod Deus non potest velle God cannot will something impossible.
aliquod impossibile. Impossibile But it is impossible that God should
est autem ei aliquid advenire quod receive what He does not already have,
nondum habeat: cum ipse nullo since He is in no way in potency, as has
modo sit in potentia, ut ostensum been shown. Therefore, He cannot will to
est. Igitur nihil potest velle se have anything that He does not have.
habere quod non habeat. Hence, whatever He wills, He has. Nor
Quicquid igitur vult, habet. Nec does He will anything evil, as was shown
aliquid male vult, ut supra above. He is therefore blessed, in the
ostensum est. Est igitur beatus: manner in which some proclaim the
secundum quod a quibusdam blessed man to be “be who has whatever
beatus esse perhibetur qui habet He wills and who wills nothing evil.”
quicquid vult et nihil male vult.
Eius etiam beatitudinem sacra [7] Sacred Scripture, furthermore,

Scriptura protestatur, I Tim. ult.: proclaims the blessedness of God:
quem ostendet suis temporibus “Which in His times He shall show Who is
beatus et potens. the Blessed and only Mighty” (1 Tim.
6:15).
Quod Deus sit sua beatitudo THAT GOD IS HIS BLESSEDNESS
Ex his autem apparet quod Deus [1] From this it is apparent that God is His
sit sua beatitudo. blessedness.
Beatitudo enim eius est [2] For His blessedness is a certain
intellectualis operatio ipsius, ut intellectual operation, as has been shown.
ostensum est. Supra autem But it was shown above that His
ostendimus quod ipsum Dei understanding is His substance. Therefore,
intelligere sit sua substantia. Ipse He is His blessedness.
igitur est sua beatitudo.
Item. Beatitudo, cum sit ultimus [3] Again, blessedness, since it is the
finis, est id quod quilibet natus ultimate end, is that which he who can
habere, vel habens, principaliter have it, or has it, principally wills. But it was
vult. Ostensum est autem supra shown above that God principally wills His
quod Deus principaliter vult essence. Therefore, His essence is His
suam essentiam. Sua igitur blessedness.
essentia est eius beatitudo.
Adhuc. Unusquisque in [4] Furthermore, everyone relates to his

beatitudinem suam ordinat blessedness whatever he wills. For it is
quicquid vult: ipsa enim est quae what is not desired for the sake of
propter aliud non desideratur, et something else, and that in which
ad quam terminatur motus terminates the motion of the desire of
desiderii unum propter aliud someone desiring one thing for the sake of
desiderantis, ne sit infinitus. Cum another—so that the motion may not be
igitur Deus omnia alia velit infinite. Since, then, God wills all other
propter suam bonitatem, quae things for the sake of His goodness, which
est sua essentia, oportet quod is His essence, it is necessary that, just as
ipse, sicut est sua essentia et He is His essence and His goodness, He
sua bonitas, ita sit sua beatitudo. be His blessedness.
Praeterea. Duo summa bona [5] Moreover, that there be two highest
esse est impossibile: si enim goods is impossible. For, if one lacked
aliquid uni deesset quod alterum something that the other had, neither
haberet, neutrum summum et would be highest and perfect. But God was
perfectum esset. Deus autem shown above to be the highest good.
ostensus est supra summum Blessedness will also be shown to be the
bonum esse. Beatitudo etiam highest good because it is the ultimate
summum bonum ostendetur end. Therefore, blessedness and God are
esse ex hoc quod est ultimus identical. Therefore, God is His
finis. Ergo beatitudo et Deus sunt blessedness.
idem. Est igitur Deus sua
beatitudo.
Quod beatitudo divina perfecta THAT THE PERFECT AND UNIQUE
et singularis est excedens BLESSEDNESS OF GOD EXCELS
omnem aliam beatitudinem EVERY OTHER BLESSEDNESS
Ulterius autem ex praemissis [1] From what has preceded we may
considerari potest beatitudinis further examine the excellence of the
divinae excellentia. divine blessedness.
Quanto enim aliquid propinquius [2] The nearer something is to

est beatitudini, tanto perfectius blessedness, the more blessed it is.
beatum est. Unde, etsi aliquis Hence, although a man may be called
propter spem beatitudinis blessed because he hopes to obtain
obtinendae beatus dicatur, nullo blessedness, in no way does his
modo sua beatitudo comparatur blessedness compare with the
eius beatitudini qui eam iam actu blessedness of the one who already
consecutus est. Propinquissimum possesses it in act. But the thing nearest
autem est beatitudini quod est ipsa to blessedness is blessedness itself. This
beatitudo. Quod de Deo ostensum has been shown of God. Therefore, God
est. Ipse igitur est singulariter is in a unique way perfectly blessed.
perfecte beatus.
Item. Cum delectatio ex amore [3] Again, since delight is caused by love,

causetur, ut ostensum est, ubi est as has been shown, the possession of
maior amor, et maior delectatio in what is Joved. But, other things being
consecutione amati. Sed equal, each thing loves itself more than
unumquodque, ceteris paribus, another, and a sign of this is that the
plus se amat quam aliud: cuius nearer a thing is to something else the
signum est quod, quanto aliquid more it is naturally loved. God, therefore,
est alicui propinquius, magis delights more in His blessedness, which
naturaliter amatur. Plus igitur He Himself is, than do other blessed
delectatur Deus in sua beatitudine, ones in the blessedness which is not
quae est ipsemet, quam alii beati they themselves. The desire has
in beatitudine quae non est quod therefore all the more repose, and the
ipsi sunt. Magis igitur desiderium blessedness is all the more perfect.
quiescit, et perfectior est beatitudo.
Praeterea. Quod per essentiam [4] Furthermore, that which is through its

est, potius est eo quod per essence is more excellent than what is
participationem dicitur sicut natura said by participation: for example, the
ignis perfectius invenitur in ipso nature of fire is found more perfectly in
igne quam in rebus ignitis. Deus fire itself than in things that are on fire.
autem per essentiam suam beatus But God is blessed through His essence,
est. Quod nulli alii competere and this befits no other being, since no
potest: nihil enim aliud praeter being other than He can be the highest
ipsum potest esse summum good, as can be seen from what has
bonum, ut ex praedictis patere been said. And thus, whoever other than
potest; et sic oportet ut quicumque God is blessed, must be called blessed
alius ab ipso beatus est, by participation. The divine blessedness,
participatione beatus dicatur. therefore, excels every other
Divina igitur beatitudo omnem blessedness.
aliam beatitudinem excedit.
Amplius. Beatitudo in perfecta [5] Moreover, blessedness consists in the

operatione intellectus consistit, ut perfect operation of the intellect, as has
ostensum est. Nulla autem alia been shown. But no other intellectual
intellectualis operatio eius operation can compare with God’s
operationi comparari potest. Quod operation. This is evident not only
patet non solum ex hoc quod est because it is a subsistent operation but
operatio subsistens: sed quia una also because by one operation God
operatione Deus seipsum ita knows Himself as perfectly as He is
perfecte intelligit sicut est, et omnia perfect, as well as all other things, those
alia, quae sunt et quae non sunt, that are and those that are not, the good
bona et mala. In aliis autem and the evil. But in all other beings with
intelligentibus intelligere ipsum non an intellect, the operation of the intellect
est subsistens, sed actus is not itself subsistent, but the act of
subsistentis. Nec ipsum Deum, qui something subsistent. Nor, again, is God
est summum intelligibile, aliquis ita Himself, Who is the highest intelligible,
perfecte potest intelligere sicut understood by anyone as perfectly as He
perfecte est: cum nullius esse is perfect, since the being of no thing is
perfectum sit sicut esse divinum, as perfect as the divine being, nor can
nec alicuius operatio possit esse the operation of any being be more
perfectior quam sua substantia. perfect than its substance. Nor, still, is
Nec est aliquis alius intellectus qui there another intellect that knows also all
omnia etiam quae Deus facere the things that God can make, for then it
potest, cognoscat: quia sic divinam would comprehend the divine power. And
potentiam comprehenderet. Illa even as to the things that another
etiam quae intellectus alius intellect knows, it does not know them all
cognoscit, non omnia una et by one and the same operation. God,
eadem operatione cognoscit. therefore, is blessed above all things
Incomparabiliter igitur Deus supra beyond compare.
omnia beatus est.
Item. Quanto aliquid magis est [6] Again, the more something is united,
unitum, tanto eius virtus et bonitas by so much the more are its power and
perfectior est. Operatio autem goodness more perfect. But a successive
successiva secundum diversas operation is divided according to the
partes temporis dividitur. Nullo diverse parts of time. Its perfection,
igitur modo eius perfectio potest therefore, can in no way be compared to
comparari perfectioni operationis the perfection of an operation that is all at
quae est absque successione tota once without succession, and this
simul: et praecipue si non in especially if it does not pass away in a
momento transeat, sed in moment but abides for eternity. Now, in
aeternum maneat. Divinum autem God, to understand exists eternally all at
intelligere est absque successione once and without succession, whereas in

totum simul aeternaliter existens: us to understand implies succession
nostrum autem intelligere because continuity and time are by
successionem habet, inquantum accident joined to it. Hence, the divine
adiungitur ei per accidens blessedness infinitely excels human
continuum et tempus. Divina igitur blessedness, as the duration of eternity
beatitudo in infinitum excedit excels the flowing now of time.
humanam: sicut duratio aeternitatis
excedit nunc temporis fluens.
Adhuc. Fatigatio, et occupationes [7] Furthermore, weariness and the

variae quibus necesse est various cares with which perforce our
contemplationem nostram in hac contemplation in this life is mingled (in
vita interpolari, in qua consistit this contemplation human felicity
praecipue humana felicitas, si qua especially consists, if by chance there is
est praesentis vitae; errores, such in the present life), and the errors,
dubitationes, et casus varii quibus doubts and hazards to which the present
subiacet praesens vita; ostendunt life is exposed show that human felicity,
omnino incomparabilem esse especially that of the present life, cannot
humanam felicitatem, praecipue at all compare with the divine
huius vitae, divinae beatitudini. blessedness.
Amplius. Perfectio divinae [8] Moreover, the perfection of the divine

beatitudinis considerari potest ex blessedness can be observed from the
hoc quod omnes beatitudines fact that it includes within itself every
complectitur secundum blessedness in a most perfect way. For
perfectissimum modum. De contemplative felicity God has the most
contemplativa quidem felicitate, perfect and everlasting consideration of
habet perfectissimam sui et Himself and other things. For active
aliorum perpetuam felicity He has the government, not of the
considerationem. De activa vero, life of one man, or of a household, a city,
non vitae unius hominis, aut or a kingdom, but of the whole universe.
domus aut civitatis aut regni, sed
totius universi gubernationem.
Falsa etiam felicitas et terrena non [9] As for false and earthly felicity, it

habet nisi quandam umbram illius contains no more than a shadow of that
perfectissimae felicitatis. Consistit most perfect felicity. For it consists in five
enim in quinque, secundum things, according to Boethius [De
Boetium: scilicet in voluptate, consolatione philosophiae III, 2]; namely,
divitiis, potestate, dignitate et in pleasure, riches, power, honor, and
fama. Habet autem Deus fame. But God enjoys a most excelling
excellentissimam delectationem de delight in Himself, as well as a universal
se, et universale gaudium de joy in all things, without the admixture of
omnibus bonis, absque contrarii any contrary. For wealth, He has the all
admixtione. Pro divitiis vero habet abundant sufficiency of all good things
omnimodam sufficientiam in seipso within Himself, as was shown above. For
omnium bonorum, ut supra power, He has His infinite strength. For
ostensum est. Pro potestate habet honor, He has the primacy and rule over
infinitam virtutem. Pro dignitate all beings. For fame, He has the
habet omnium entium primatum et admiration of every intellect that knows
regimen. Pro fama habet Him however little.
admirationem omnis intellectus
ipsum utcumque cognoscentis.
Ipsi igitur qui singulariter beatus To Him, then, Who is singularly blessed,
est, honor sit et gloria in saecula be, honor and glory unto the ages of
saeculorum. Amen. ages. Amen.

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5/4/2016 Thomas Aquinas: Contra Gentiles: English

Veritatem meditabitur guttur meum, “My mouth shall meditate truth, and my

apparatus. Quae quidem artes aliis being the ruling arts. That is why the

Convenienter ergo ex ore [4] Appropriately, therefore, is the twofold

Perfectius quidem, quia It is more perfect because, in so far as a man

Sublimius autem est quia per It is more noble because through this pursuit

Utilius autem est quia per It is more useful because through wisdom we

Assumpta igitur ex divina [2] And so, in the name of the divine Mercy, I

Contra singulorum autem [3] To proceed against individual errors,

necesse est prius ostendere quis the case, we must first show what way is

Est autem in his quae de Deo [2] There is a twofold mode of truth in what

Quod autem sint aliqua [3] That there are certain truths about God

Adhuc ex intellectuum gradibus [4] We may easily see the same point from

Adhuc idem manifeste apparet ex [5] The same thing, moreover, appears

Huic etiam consonat dictum [6] The remark of Aristotle likewise agrees

Scriptura testimonium perhibet. to this truth. We read in Job: “Do you think

Duplici igitur veritate divinorum [1] Since, therefore, there exists a twofold

Unum est quod paucis hominibus [3] The first is that few men would

Secundum inconveniens est quod [4] The second awkward effect is that

invenitur. Tum etiam propter multa have said. There is also the fact that, in

inquisitionem veritatis perveniat, that some things should be proposed to

Et ideo dicitur Eccli. 3­25: [6] Therefore it is written: “For many things

Huiusmodi autem veritati, cui [1] Those who place their faith in this truth,

praedicantur, voluptates carnis is invisible.

Huius quidem confirmationis [2] The manner of this confirmation is

Haec autem tam mirabilis mundi [3] This wonderful conversion of the world

Hi vero qui sectas errorum [4] On the other hand, those who founded

a veritatis cognitione noster would be hindered from knowing truth by

Et ideo apostolus dicit, Rom. 10­8: [5] Therefore, the Apostle says: “The

Considerandum etiam videtur quod [1] There is also a further consideration.

Intendentibus igitur nobis per [4] We are aiming, then, to set out following

non habito, omnis consideratio things is necessarily suppressed.

cogitari non esse. Quod maius cannot be thought. Clearly, such a being is

Adhuc. Propositiones illas [4] Furthermore, those propositions ought

Item. Illud per se notum oportet [6] There is also the consideration that that

igitur quod Deum esse per se

Partim vero contingit ex eo quod [2] In part, however, the above opinion

Nec oportet ut statim, cognita [3] And, contrary to the Point made by the

intellectus, qui eum intueri non cannot behold God Himself except through

Ad quintam etiam de facili patet [7] So, too, with the fifth argument, an easy

Ad hoc autem dicendum moti [2] What led some persons to hold this view

Item. Si principium ad [4] Furthermore, according to the logic of

posterioribus ostenditur, ea from sense, whatever transcends all sense

Huius autem sententiae falsitas [6] The falsity of this opinion is shown to us,

Nec hoc debet movere, quod in [7] Nor, contrary to the first argument, is

In rationibus autem quibus [8] Now, in arguments proving the existence

Primo autem ponemus rationes [2] We shall first set forth the arguments by

non movetur a seipso. Ergo hoc posited as being moved by itself is not

Tertio, probat sic. Nihil idem est [9] In the third way, Aristotle proves the

nihil enim differt devenire ad understood by Aristotle.

Aliam autem propositionem, [11] The second proposition, namely, that

Quarum prima talis est. Si in [12] The first is as follows [VII, 1]. If among

Quod autem sit impossibile [13] Furthermore, that it is impossible for the

Secunda ratio ad idem [14] The second argument proving the same

Tertia probatio in idem redit, nisi [15] The third proof comes to the same

Secunda via talis est. Si omne [17] The second way is this. If every mover

Si autem praedicta propositio [19] But, if the proposition that every mover

Ergo relinquitur quod oportet [20] It remains, therefore, that we must posit

Sed, hoc dato, iterum idem [22] But, on this basis, the same conclusion

Non autem potest dici quod [23] Nor can it be held that both parts of the

Sed quia in moventibus se quae [24] But there is another point to consider.

Item, in moventibus se videmus [26] Again, we see that among beings that

Sed quia Deus non est pars [28] Now, God is not part of any self­moving

Et ideo dicitur Eccli. 325: [6] Therefore it is written: “For many things

Et ideo apostolus dicit, Rom. 108: [5] Therefore, the Apostle says: “The

Sed quia Deus non est pars [28] Now, God is not part of any selfmoving

corruptibilia. Omne autem quod est which can be and notbe. But what can