Senate vs.
Ermita , GR 169777, April 20, 2006 expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that
the President has abused power by issuing E.O. 464
“Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of
Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege
and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing
in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the
Constitution, and for Other Purposes”. Petitioners pray
for its declaration as null and void for being
unconstitutional.
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the
Philippines, through its various Senate Committees,
conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation
which call for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and
employees of the executive department, bureaus, and
offices including those employed in Government Owned
and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police
(PNP).
The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to
various officials of the Executive Department for them to
appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the
railway project, others on the issues of massive election
fraud in the Philippine elections, wire tapping, and the
role of military in the so-called “Gloriagate Scandal”.
Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of
consent from the President as provided by E.O. 464,
Section 3 which requires all the public officials
enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the
President prior to appearing before either house of
Congress.
ISSUE:
Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public
officials, enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the
consent of the President prior to appearing before either
house of Congress, valid and constitutional?
RULING:
No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is
broad and is covered by the executive privilege. The
doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact
that certain information must, as a matter of necessity,
be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The
privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the
obligation to disclose information, in this case to
Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as
to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation
in a particular case.
Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the
executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of
legislation. If the executive branch withholds such
information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so
assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be
respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the
executive branch to evade congressional requests for
information without need of clearly asserting a right to do
so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere
Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is
frustrated.
BENGZON VS SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE
EN BANC
Posted by kaye lee on 5:46 PM
G.R. No. 89914 November 20, 1991 [Section 21, Article
6: Aids in Legislation: On Legislative Investigation]
FACTS:
PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan against Benjamin
Romualdez, et al for engaging in devices, schemes and
stratagems to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense
of plaintiff and the Filipino people.
The Senate Minority Floor Leader Enrile delivered a
speech before the Senate on the alleged take-over
personal privilege before the Senate on the alleged
"takeover of SOLOIL Inc," the FlagShip of the First
Manila Management of Companies or FMMC by Ricardo
Lopa and called upon the Senate to look into the possible
violation of the law in the case with regard to RA 3019
(Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).
The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee (Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers [SBRC]) started its
investigation on the matter. Petitioners and Ricardo Lopa
were subpoenaed by the SBRC to appear before it and
testify on what they know regarding the sale of 36
corporations belonging to Benjamin Romualdez. Lopa
and Bengzon refused to testify, invoking their rights to
due process, and that their testimony may unduly
prejudice the defendants and petitioners in case before
the Sandiganbayan.
SBRC rejected the petitioner's plea to be excused from
testifying and the SBRC continued its investigation of the
matter.
The petitioners filed for prohibition with a prayer for TRO
and/or injunctive relief, claiming that the SBRC in
requiring their attendance and testimony, acted in
excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose.
The Supreme Court intervened upon a motion for
reconsideration filed by one of the defendants of the civil
case.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over the case.
2. Whether or not the SBRC's inquiry has valid legislative
purpose.
3. whether or not the civil case of Sandiganbayan is
beyond the power of the SBRC to inquire into.
4. Whether or not the inquiry violates the petitioners' right
to due process.

RULING:
1. Yes. In Angara vs Electoral Commission, the
Constitution provided for an elaborate system of checks
and balances to secure coordination in the workings of
the various departments of the government. The Court
has provided that the allocation of constitutional
boundaries is a task which the judiciary must perform
under the Constitution. Moreover, as held in a recent
case, "(t)he political question doctrine neither interposes
an obstacle to judicial determination of the rival claims.
The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has
been given to this Court. It cannot abdicate that
obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution, although
said provision by no means does away with the
applicability of the principle in appropriate cases."
The Court is thus of the considered view that it has
jurisdiction over the present controversy for the purpose
of determining the scope and extent of the power of the
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to conduct inquiries into
private affairs in purported aid of legislation.
2. No.
The power to conduct formal inquiries or investigations
is specifically provided for in Sec. 1 of the Senate Rules
of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation.
Such inquiries may refer to the implementation or re-
examination of any law or in connection with any
proposed legislation or the formulation of future
legislation. They may also extend to any and all matters
vested by the Constitution in Congress and/or in the
Senate alone.
It appears, therefore, that the contemplated inquiry by
respondent Committee is not really "in aid of legislation"
because it is not related to a purpose within the
jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the
investigation is to find out whether or not the relatives of
the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section
5 RA No. 3019, the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act", a matter that appears more within the province of
the courts rather than of the legislature.
3. No. It cannot be said that the contemplated inquiry on
the subject of the privilege speech of Senator Juan
Ponce Enrile, i.e., the alleged sale of the 36 (or 39)
corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez
to the Lopa Group is to be conducted pursuant to Senate
Resolution No. 212 because, firstly, Senator Enrile did
not indict the PCGG, and, secondly, neither Mr. Ricardo
Lopa nor the herein petitioners are connected with the
government but are private citizens.
4. Yes. The Constitution expressly provides that "the
rights of persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries shall be respected.
It should be emphasized that the constitutional restriction
does not call for the banning or prohibition of
investigations where a violation of a basis rights is
claimed. It only requires that in the course of the
proceedings, the right of persons should be respected.
What the majority opinion mandates is a blanket
prohibition against a witness testifying at all, simply
because he is already facing charges before the
Sandiganbayan. To my mind, the Constitution allows him
to interpose objections whenever an incriminating
question is posed or when he is compelled to reveal his
court defenses, but not to refuse to take the witness
stand completely.
NERI VS SENATE COMMITTEE ON
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
Posted by kaye lee on 8:54 PM
G.R.No. 180643, March 25 2008 [Executive Privilege]
FACTS:
The Senate issued various Senate Resolutions directing
SBRC, among others, to conduct an investigation
regarding the NBN-ZTE deal. Neri, the head of NEDA,
was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue
Ribbon. He disclosed that the COMELEC Chairman
Abalos offered him P200M in exchange for his approval
of the NBN Project, that he informed PGMA about the
bribery and that she instructed him not to accept the
bribe. However, when probed further on what they
discussed about the NBN Project, he refused to answer,
invoking “executive privilege”. In particular, he refused to
answer the questions on (a) whether or not President
Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not
she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not
she directed him to approve. As a result, the Senate cited
him for contempt.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the communications elicited by the 3
questions covered by executive privilege.
RULING:
The SC recognized the executive privilege which is the
Presidential communications privilege. It pertains
to “communications, documents or other materials that
reflect presidential decision-making and deliberations
and that the President believes should remain
confidential.” Presidential communications
privilege applies to decision-making of the President. It
is rooted in the constitutional principle of separation of
power and the President’s unique constitutional role.
The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in
cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a power
textually committed by the Constitution to the President,
such as the area of military and foreign relations. The
information relating to these powers may enjoy greater
confidentiality than others.
Elements of presidential communications privilege:
1) The protected communication must relate to a
“quintessential and non-delegable presidential power.”
- i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with
other countries. This authority of the President to enter
into executive agreements without the concurrence of
the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in
Philippine jurisprudence.
2) The communication must be authored or
“solicited and received” by a close advisor of the
President or the President himself. The judicial test is
that an advisor must be in “operational proximity” with the
President.
3) The presidential communications
privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be
overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the
information sought “likely contains important evidence”
and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by
an appropriate investigating authority. - there is no
adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify
the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of
the information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority.
SABIO VS GORDON
Posted by kaye lee on 9:17 PM
In the Matter of the Petition for Issuance of Writ of
Habeas Corpus of CAMILO L. SABIO v.
HON. SENATOR RICHARD J. GORDON, et al.
G.R. No. 174340 17 October 2006,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J. (En Banc)
[Congress Power of Inquiry]
FACTS:
Pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 455, Senator Gordon
requested PCGG Chairman Sabio and his
Commissioners to appear as resource persons in the
public meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on
Government Corporations and Public
Enterprises and Committee on Public Services.
Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior
commitment, and at the same time invoked Section 4(b)
of EO No. 1: “No member or staff of the Commission
shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any
judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding
concerning matters within its official cognizance.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 4(b) of E.O. No.1 limits power of
legislative inquiry by exempting all PCGG members or
staff from testifying in any judicial, legislative or
administrative proceeding.
RULING:
No. Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution grants
the power of inquiry not only to the Senate and the
House of Representatives, but also to any of their
respective committees. Clearly, there is a direct
conferral of investigatory power to the committees and it
means that the mechanism which the Houses can take
in order to effectively perform its investigative functions
are also available to the committees.
It can be said that the Congress’ power of inquiry has
gained more solid existence and expansive
construal. The Court’s high regard to such power is
rendered more evident in Senate v. Ermita, where it
categorically ruled that “the power of inquiry is broad
enough to cover officials of the executive
branch.” Verily, the Court reinforced the doctrine
in Arnault that “the operation of government, being a
legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for
investigation” and that “the power of inquiry is co-
extensive with the power to legislate.”
Considering these jurisprudential instructions, Section
4(b) is directly repugnant with Article VI, Section 21.
Section 4(b) exempts the PCGG members and staff from
the Congress’ power of inquiry. This cannot be
countenanced. Nowhere in the Constitution is any
provision granting such exemption. The Congress’
power of inquiry, being broad, encompasses everything
that concerns the administration of existing laws as well
as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It even
extends “to government agencies created by Congress
and officers whose positions are within the power of
Congress to regulate or even abolish.” PCGG belongs to
this class.
A statute may be declared unconstitutional because it is
not within the legislative power to enact; or it creates or
establishes methods or forms that infringe constitutional
principles; or its purpose or effect violates the
Constitution or its basic principles.
Moreover, Sec. 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 has been repealed by
the Constitution because it is inconsistent with the
constitutional provisions on the Congress’ power of
inquiry (Art. VI, Sec. 21), the principle of public
accountability (Art. XI, Sec. 1), the policy of full
disclosure (Art. II, Sec. 28), and the right of access to
public information (Art. III, Sec. 7).
Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a
limitation to the broad power of Congress, in the absence
of any constitutional basis.
NEGROS ORIENTAL II ELEC. COOP., INC. vs.
SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD OF DUMAGUETE
FACTS:
A subpoena was sent by the Ad Hoc Committee of
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete (respondent) to
the petitioners Paterio Torres and Arturo Umbac,
Chairman of the Board of Directors and the General
Manager, respectively, of petitioner Negros Oriental II
Electric Cooperative NORECO II), requiring their
attendance and testimony at the Committee's
investigation. However, they failed to appear at said
investigation and were sent were ordered to show cause
why they should not be punished for legislative contempt
due to their failure to appear at said investigation. The
investigation to be conducted by respondent Committee
was "in connection with pending legislation related to the
operations of public utilities" in the City of Dumaguete
and the inquiry was to focus on the alleged installation
and use by the petitioner NORECO II of inefficient power
lines in that city. Petitioners moved to quash the
subpoena but the motion to quash was denied.
Petitioners contend that the respondent Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Dumaguete is bereft of the power to
compel the attendance and testimony of witnesses, nor
the power to order the arrest of witnesses who fail to
obey its subpoena. It is further argued that assuming the
power to compel the attendance and testimony of
witnesses to be lodged in said body, it cannot be
exercised in the investigation of matters affecting the
terms and conditions of the franchise granted to
NORECO II which are beyond the jurisdiction of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod.
ISSUE:
Does a Sangguniang Panglungsod have a power to
punish for a legislative contempt for a party’s
disobedience of subpoena?
HELD: No. There is no express provision either in the
1973 Constitution or in the Local Government granting
local legislative bodies, the power to subpoena
witnesses and the power to punish non-members for
contempt. There being no provision in the Local
Government Code explicitly granting local legislative
bodies, the power to issue compulsory process and the
power to punish for contempt, the Sanggunian
Panlungsod of Dumaguete is devoid of power to punish
the petitioners Torres and Umbac for contempt. The Ad-
Hoc Committee of said legislative body has even less
basis to claim that it can exercise these powers. Even
assuming that the respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod
and the respondent Ad-Hoc Committee had the power to
issue the subpoena and the order complained of, such
issuances would still be void for being ultra vires. The
contempt power (and the subpoena power) if actually
possessed, may only be exercised where the subject
matter of the investigation is within the jurisdiction of the
legislative body. As admitted by the respondents in their
Comment, the investigation to be conducted by the Ad-
Hoc Committee was to look into the use by NORECO II
of inefficient power lines "of pre-war vintage" which the
latter had acquired from the Visayan Electric Com.
company, and "to hear the side of the petitioners". It
comes evident that the inquiry would touch upon the
efficiency of the electric service of NORECO II and,
necessarily, its compliance with the franchise. Such
inquiry is beyond the jurisdiction of the respondent
Sangguniang Panlungsod and the respondent
committee.
155 SCRA 421 – Political Law – Inquiry in Aid of
Legislation – LGUs
In 1985, the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) of
Dumaguete sought to conduct an investigation in
connection with pending legislation related to the
operations of public utilities. Invited in the hearing were
the heads of NORECO II (Negros Oriental II Electric
Cooperative, Inc.) – Paterio Torres and Arturo Umbac.
NORECO II is alleged to have installed inefficient power
lines in the said city. Torres and Umbac refused to
appear before the SP and they alleged that the power to
investigate, and to order the improvement of, alleged
inefficient power lines to conform to standards is lodged
exclusively with the National Electrification
Administration (NEA); and neither the Charter of the City
of Dumaguete nor the [old] Local Government Code
(Batas Pambansa Blg. 337) grants the SP such power.
The SP averred that inherent in the legislative functions
performed by the respondent SP is the power to conduct
investigations in aid of legislation and with it, the power
to punish for contempt in inquiries on matters within its
jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether or not LGUs can issue contempt.
HELD: No. There is no express provision either in the
1973 Constitution or in the LGC (BP 337) granting local
legislative bodies, the power to subpoena witnesses and
the power to punish non-members for contempt. Absent
a constitutional or legal provision for the exercise of
these powers, the only possible justification for the
issuance of a subpoena and for the punishment of non-
members for contumacious behavior would be for said
power to be deemed implied in the statutory grant of
delegated legislative power. But, the contempt power
and the subpoena power partake of a judicial nature.
They cannot be implied in the grant of legislative power.
Neither can they exist as mere incidents of the
performance of legislative functions. To allow local
legislative bodies or administrative agencies to exercise
these powers without express statutory basis would run
afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers. There being
no provision in the LGC explicitly granting local
legislative bodies, the power to issue compulsory
process and the power to punish for contempt, the SP of
Dumaguete is devoid of power to punish the petitioners
Torres and Umbac for contempt. The Ad Hoc Committee
of said legislative body has even less basis to claim that
it can exercise these powers. Even assuming that the SP
and the Ad-Hoc Committee had the power to issue the
subpoena and the order complained of, such issuances
would still be void for being ultra vires. The contempt
power (and the subpoena power) if actually possessed,
may only be exercised where the subject matter of the
investigation is within the jurisdiction of the legislative
body.
ARANETA v. DINGLASAN
84 PHIL 368
84 Phil. 368 – Political Law – First Emergency Powers
Cases
Antonio Araneta is being charged for allegedly violating
of Executive Order 62 which regulates rentals for houses
and lots for residential buildings. Judge Rafael Dinglasan
was the judge hearing the case. Araneta appealed
seeking to prohibit Dinglasan and the Fiscal from
proceeding with the case. He averred that EO 62 was
issued by virtue of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 671
which he claimed ceased to exist, hence, the EO has no
legal basis.
Three other cases were consolidated with this one. L-
3055 which is an appeal by Leon Ma. Guerrero, a shoe
exporter, against EO 192 which controls exports in the
Philippines; he is seeking to have permit issued to him.
L-3054 is filed by Eulogio Rodriguez to prohibit the
treasury from disbursing funds [from ’49-‘50] pursuant to
EO 225.
L-3056 filed by Antonio Barredo is attacking EO 226
which was appropriating funds to hold the national
elections.
They all aver that CA 671, otherwise known as AN ACT
DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL EMERGENCY AS A
RESULT OF WAR INVOLVING THE PHILIPPINES AND
AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE
RULES AND REGULATIONS TO MEET SUCH
EMERGENCY or simply the Emergency Powers Act, is
already inoperative and that all EOs issued pursuant to
said CA had likewise ceased.
ISSUE: Whether or not CA 671 has ceased.
HELD: Yes. CA 671, which granted emergency powers
to the president, became inoperative ex proprio
vigore when Congress met in regular session on May 25,
1946, and that Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and
226 were issued without authority of law. In setting the
first regular session of Congress instead of the first
special session which preceded it as the point of
expiration of the Act, the SC is giving effect to the
purpose and intention of the National Assembly. In a
special session, the Congress may “consider general
legislation or only such subjects as he (President) may
designate.” Such acts were to be good only up to the
corresponding dates of adjournment of the following
sessions of the Legislature, “unless sooner amended or
repealed by the National Assembly.” Even if war
continues to rage on, new legislation must be made and
approved in order to continue the EPAs, otherwise it is
lifted upon reconvening or upon early repeal.
Rodriguez v. Gella Digest
92 Phil. 603 – Political Law – Second Emergency
Powers Cases
Eulogio Rodriguez et al seek to invalidate Executive
Orders 545 and 546 issued in 1952, the first
appropriating the sum of P37,850,500 for urgent and
essential public works, and the second setting aside the
sum of P11,367,600 for relief in the provinces and cities
visited by typhoons, floods, droughts, earthquakes,
volcanic action and other calamities. They sought to
have Vicente Gella, then National Treasurer, be enjoined
from releasing funds pursuant to said EOs. These EO’s
were pursuant to Commonwealth Act 671. Note that prior
to Araneta vs Dinglasan, Congress passed House Bill
727 intending to revoke CA 671 but the same was vetoed
by the President due to the Korean War and his
perception that war is still subsisting as a fact. Note also
that CA 671 was already declared inoperative by the
Supreme Court in the same case of Araneta vs
Dinglasan.
ISSUE: Whether or not the EO’s are valid.
HELD: No. As similarly decided in the Araneta case,
the EO’s issued in pursuant to CA 671 shall be rendered
ineffective. The president did not invoke any actual
emergencies or calamities emanating from the last world
war for which CA 671 has been intended. Without such
invocation, the veto of the president cannot be of merit
for the emergency he feared cannot be attributed to the
war contemplated in CA 671. Even if the president
vetoed the repealing bill the intent of Congress must be
given due weight. For it would be absurd to contend
otherwise. For “while Congress might delegate its power
by a simple majority, it might not be able to recall them
except by two-third vote. In other words, it would be
easier for Congress to delegate its powers than to take
them back. This is not right and is not, and ought not to
be the law.” Act No. 671 may be likened to an ordinary
contract of agency, whereby the consent of the agent is
necessary only in the sense that he cannot be compelled
to accept the trust, in the same way that the principal
cannot be forced to keep the relation in eternity or at the
will of the agent. Neither can it be suggested that the
agency created under the Act is coupled with interest.
Tolentino Vs secretary of Finance
235 SCRA 630 (1994) – 249 SCRA 635 (1995) –
Political Law – Origination of Revenue Bills –
EVAT – Amendment by Substitution
Arturo Tolentino et al are questioning the constitutionality
of RA 7716 otherwise known as the Expanded Value
Added Tax (EVAT) Law. Tolentino averred that this
revenue bill did not exclusively originate from the House
of Representatives as required by Section 24, Article 6
of the Constitution. Even though RA 7716 originated as
HB 11197 and that it passed the 3 readings in the HoR,
the same did not complete the 3 readings in Senate for
after the 1st reading it was referred to the Senate Ways
& Means Committee thereafter Senate passed its own
version known as Senate Bill 1630. Tolentino averred
that what Senate could have done is amend HB 11197
by striking out its text and substituting it with the text of
SB 1630 in that way “the bill remains a House Bill and
the Senate version just becomes the text (only the text)
of the HB”. (It’s ironic however to note that Tolentino and
co-petitioner Raul Roco even signed the said Senate
Bill.)
ISSUE: Whether or not the EVAT law is procedurally
infirm.
HELD: No. By a 9-6 vote, the Supreme Court rejected
the challenge, holding that such consolidation was
consistent with the power of the Senate to propose or
concur with amendments to the version originated in the
HoR. What the Constitution simply means, according to
the 9 justices, is that the initiative must come from the
HoR. Note also that there were several instances before
where Senate passed its own version rather than having
the HoR version as far as revenue and other such bills
are concerned. This practice of amendment by
substitution has always been accepted. The proposition
of Tolentino concerns a mere matter of form. There is no
showing that it would make a significant difference if
Senate were to adopt his over what has been done.
Demetrio Demetria vs Manuel Alba
148 SCRA 208 – Political Law – Transfer of Funds
– Power of the President to Realign Funds
Demetrio Demetria et al as taxpayers and members of
the Batasan Pambansa sought to prohibit Manuel Alba,
then Minister of the Budget, from disbursing funds
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1177 or the Budget
Reform Decree of 1977. Demetria assailed the
constitutionality of paragraph 1, Section 44 of the said
PD. This Section provides that:
“The President shall have the authority to transfer any
fund, appropriated for the different departments,
bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive
Department, which are included in the General
Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of
any department, bureau, or office included in the General
Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment.”
Demetria averred that this is unconstitutional for it
violates the 1973 Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not Paragraph 1, Section 44, of PD
1177 is constitutional.
HELD: No. The Constitution provides that no law shall
be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations,
however, the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker,
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads
of constitutional commissions may by law be authorized
to augment any item in the general appropriations law for
their respective offices from savings in other items of
their respective appropriations.
However, paragraph 1 of Section 44 of PD 1177 unduly
overextends the privilege granted under the Constitution.
It empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer
funds from one department, bureau, office or agency of
the Executive Department to any program, project or
activity of any department, bureau or office included in
the General Appropriations Act or approved after its
enactment, without regard as to whether or not
the funds to be transferred are actually savings
in the item from which the same are to be taken,
or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of
augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made.
It does not only completely disregard the standards set
in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue
delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes
beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed, such constitutional
infirmities render the provision in question null and void.
But it should be noted, transfers of savings within one
department from one item to another in the GAA may be
allowed by law in the interest of expediency and
efficiency. There is no transfer from one department to
another here.
Subject Shall Be Expressed in the Title – Police
Power Not Validly Exercise
Vicente De La Cruz et al were club & cabaret operators.
They assail the constitutionality of Ord. No. 84, Ser. of
1975 or the Prohibition and Closure Ordinance of
Bocaue, Bulacan. De la Cruz averred that the said
Ordinance violates their right to engage in a lawful
business for the said ordinance would close out their
business. That the hospitality girls they employed are
healthy and are not allowed to go out with customers.
Judge Paras however lifted the TRO he earlier issued
against Ord. 84 after due hearing declaring that Ord 84.
is constitutional for it is pursuant to RA 938 which reads
“AN ACT GRANTING MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS
AND COUNCILS THE POWER TO REGULATE THE
ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION
OF CERTAIN PLACES OF AMUSEMENT WITHIN
THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIAL
JURISDICTIONS”. Paras ruled that the prohibition is a
valid exercise of police power to promote general
welfare. De la Cruz then appealed citing that they were
deprived of due process.
ISSUE: Whether or not a municipal corporation,
Bocaue, Bulacan can, prohibit the exercise of a lawful
trade, the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a
lawful occupation, such clubs employing hostesses
pursuant to Ord 84 which is further in pursuant to RA
938.
HELD: The SC ruled against Paras. If night clubs were
merely then regulated and not prohibited, certainly the
assailed ordinance would pass the test of validity. SC
had stressed reasonableness, consonant with the
general powers and purposes of municipal corporations,
as well as consistency with the laws or policy of the
State. It cannot be said that such a sweeping exercise of
a lawmaking power by Bocaue could qualify under the
term reasonable. The objective of fostering public
morals, a worthy and desirable end can be attained by a
measure that does not encompass too wide a field.
Certainly the ordinance on its face is characterized by
overbreadth. The purpose sought to be achieved could
have been attained by reasonable restrictions rather
than by an absolute prohibition. Pursuant to the title of
the Ordinance, Bocaue should and can only regulate not
prohibit the business of cabarets.
104 SCRA 710 – Political Law – One Subject
Embraced in the Title of a Bill
Insular Lumber Company (ILC) is an American company
engaged as a licensed forest concessionaire. The ILC
purchased manufactured oil and motor fuel which it used
in the operation of its forest concession. In 1956,
Republic Act No. 1435 was passed. Section 5 thereof
provides that there should be a partial tax refund to those
using oil in the operation of forest and mining
concessions.
In 1964, ILC filed with the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue (CIR) to have a tax refund of P19,921.37
pursuant to the said RA. The Court of Industrial Relations
(CIR) ruled that ILC is not covered by such provision
because Sec. 5, RA 1435 is only effective 5 years from
its enactment. Hence, in 1961 the provision ceased to be
effective. ILC appealed the issue to the CTA and the
CTA ruled the operation of a sawmill is distinct from the
operation of a forest concession, hence, the refund
provision of Sec 5, RA 1435 allowing partial refund to
forest and mining concessionaires cannot be extended
to the operators of a sawmill. And out of the P19,921.37
claimed, only the amount of P14,598.08 was paid on oil
utilized in logging operations. The CTA did not allow the
refund of the full amount of P14,598.08 because the
ILC’s right to claim the refund of a portion thereof,
particularly those paid during the period from January 1,
1963 to April 29, 1963 had already prescribed. Hence,
ICL was credited the refund of P10,560.20 only. Both
parties appealed from the decision of the CTA.
The CIR averred that CTA should not have ruled this
way: The title of RA 1435 is “An Act to Provide Means
for Increasing The Highway Special Fund.” The CIR
contends that the subject of RA 1435 was to increase
Highway Special Fund. However, Section 5 of the Act
deals with another subject which is the partial exemption
of miners and loggers. And this partial exemption on
which the Company based its claim for refund is clearly
not expressed in the title of the aforesaid Act. More
importantly, Section 5 provides for a decrease rather
than an increase of the Highway Special Fund.
ISSUE: Whether or not to grant the partial tax refund to
ILC.
HELD: Yes, but only in the amount as found by the
CTA. The Supreme Court ruled that there is no merit in
the contention of the CIR. RA 1435 deals with only one
subject and proclaims just one policy, namely, the
necessity for increasing the Highway Special Fund
through the imposition of an increased specific tax on
manufactured oils. The proviso in Sec 5 of the law is in
effect a partial exemption from the imposed increased
tax. Said proviso, which has reference to specific tax on
oil and fuel, is not a deviation from the general subject of
the law. The primary purpose of the aforequoted
constitutional provision is to prohibit duplicity in
legislation the title of which might completely fail to
apprise the legislators or the public of the nature, scope
and consequences of the law or its operation. But that is
not so for in the passage of RA 1435 since, as the
records of its proceedings bear out, a full debate on
precisely the issue of whether its title reflects its
complete subject was held by Congress which passed it.
24 SCRA 172 – Political Law – Title Must Express
One Subject
In 1961, Republic Act No. 3043 (An
Act to Further
Amend Commonwealth Act Numbered One
Hundred Twenty, as Amended by Republic Act
Numbered Twenty Six Hundred and Forty One) was
passed. This law amended the charter of NAPOCOR
(National Power Corporation). Section 3 of RA 3043
provides that:
a. contractors being supplied by NAPOCOR shall not
exceed an annual profit of 12%;
b. if they do, they shall refund such excess to their
customers;
c. that NAPOCOR has the power to renew all existing
contracts with franchise holders for the supply of energy.
Santiago Alalayan and the Philippine Power and
Development Company (PPDC) assailed the said
provision.They averred that Section 3 is a rider because
first, it was not included in the title of the amending law
nor was it included in the amended law. Second, the
main purpose of RA 3043 was to increase the capital
stock of NAPOCOR hence Alalayan et al believed that
Section 3 was not germane to RA 3043.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 3 of RA 3043 is
constitutional.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court simply ruled that the
Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the
title of an enactment, language of such precision as to
mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the
minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve
the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform
the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of
the bill, and the public, of the nature, scope and
consequences of the proposed law and its operation.
And this, to lead them to inquire into the body of the bill,
study and discuss the same, take appropriate action
thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon the
legislators.
6 SCRA 418 – Political Law – One Title, One
Subject Rule – Tenancy Act
Manuel Cordero was the trial lawyer of the Tenancy
Counsel Unit (TCU) of the Agricultural Tenancy
Commission of the Department of Justice. He later
appeared as the counsel of indigent tenant Vicente
Salazar who filed a case against landlord Leonardo Sta.
Romana in order to reinstate and reliquidate past
harvests. Sta. Romana filed a motion to disqualify
Cordero as counsel for Salazar and he invoked Sec. 54
of Republic Act No. 1199 or The Agricultural Tenancy Act
of the Philippines. The said section indicates that
representation by counsel of tenants who cannot afford
to pay should be done by the public defenders of the
Department of Labor.
Judge Jose Cabatuando ruled in favor of Sta. Romana.
Cordero appealed. During pendency of the appeal
Republic Act No. 2263, AN ACT AMENDING CERTAIN
SECTIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED ONE
THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED NINETY-NINE,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE AGRICULTURAL
TENANCY ACT OF THE PHILIPPINES, was passed.
This law, particularly Sections 19 and 20 thereof,
amended the previous law and now allows trial lawyers
from the TCU to represent indigent tenants and it is also
the basis of the creation of the Tenancy Mediation
Division. Cordero filed a Manifestation averring that by
virtue of the amendment the issue has now become
moot and academic. Cabatuando countered that the
provisions were not embraced in the title of the amending
law nor in the amended law hence void.
ISSUE: Whether or not the creation of the TMD is
embraced in the title of the bill and whether or not to allow
trial lawyers from TCU to appear as counsel for indigent
tenants should be allowed.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that that the
constitutional requirement in question is satisfied if all
parts of the law are related, and are germane to the
subject matter expressed in the title of the bill.The
constitutional requirement is complied with as long as the
law, as in the instant case, has a single general subject
which is the Agricultural Tenancy Act and the
amendatory provisions no matter how diverse they may
be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to
the general subject, will be regarded as valid. To declare
sections 19 and 20 of RA 2263 null and void would in
effect upset the transfer of the duty of representing
indigent tenants from the public defenders of the
Department of Labor to the trial attorneys in the
Mediation Division of the Agricultural Tenancy
Commission of the Department of Justice. In other
words, a declaration of nullity of these provisions of RA
2263 would do harm to, and would be nugatory of, the
intention of Congress to consolidate the function of
enforcing our tenancy laws in the Department of Justice.
Equal Protection” – Oil Deregulation Law
Considering that oil is not endemic to this country, history
shows that the government has always been finding
ways to alleviate the oil industry. The government
created laws accommodate these innovations in the oil
industry. One such law is the Downstream Oil
Deregulation Act of 1996 or RA 8180. This law allows
that “any person or entity may import or purchase any
quantity of crude oil and petroleum products from a
foreign or domestic source, lease or own and operate
refineries and other downstream oil facilities and market
such crude oil or use the same for his own requirement,”
subject only to monitoring by the Department of Energy.
Tatad assails the constitutionality of the law. He claims,
among others, that the imposition of different tariff rates
on imported crude oil and imported refined petroleum
products violates the equal protection clause. Tatad
contends that the 3%-7% tariff differential unduly favors
the three existing oil refineries and discriminates against
prospective investors in the downstream oil industry who
do not have their own refineries and will have to source
refined petroleum products from abroad.3% is to be
taxed on unrefined crude products and 7% on refined
crude products.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 8180 is constitutional.
HELD: The SC declared the unconstitutionality of RA
8180 because it violated Sec 19 of Art 12 of the
Constitution. It violated that provision because it only
strengthens oligopoly which is contrary to free
competition. It cannot be denied that our downstream oil
industry is operated and controlled by an oligopoly, a
foreign oligopoly at that. Petron, Shell and Caltex stand
as the only major league players in the oil market. All
other players belong to the lilliputian league. As the
dominant players, Petron, Shell and Caltex boast of
existing refineries of various capacities. The tariff
differential of 4% therefore works to their immense
benefit. Yet, this is only one edge of the tariff differential.
The other edge cuts and cuts deep in the heart of their
competitors. It erects a high barrier to the entry of new
players. New players that intend to equalize the market
power of Petron, Shell and Caltex by building refineries
of their own will have to spend billions of pesos. Those
who will not build refineries but compete with them will
suffer the huge disadvantage of increasing their product
cost by 4%. They will be competing on an uneven field.
The argument that the 4% tariff differential is desirable
because it will induce prospective players to invest in
refineries puts the cart before the horse. The first need
is to attract new players and they cannot be attracted by
burdening them with heavy disincentives. Without new
players belonging to the league of Petron, Shell and
Caltex, competition in our downstream oil industry is an
idle dream.
RA 8180 is unconstitutional on the ground inter alia that
it discriminated against the “new players” insofar as it
placed them at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis the
established oil companies by requiring them to meet
certain conditions already being observed by the latter.
68 Phil. 912 (299 U.S. 410) – Political law – Bill –
Veto – Veto a Bill
Juan Bengzon was appointed as Justice of the Peace in
1912 in Lingayen, Pangasinan. Upon reaching 65 years
of age in 1933 he would have to retire in accordance with
the law. He later sought to claim gratuity pursuant to Act
4051 “An Act to provide for the payment of
retirement gratuities to officers and employees of
the Insular Government retired from the service as
a result of the reorganization or reduction of
personnel thereof, including the justices of the
peace who must relinquish office in accordance
with the provisions of Act Numbered Thirty-eight
hundred and ninety-nine, and for other purposes.”
Section 7 thereof specifically provides that gratuity may
be availed of by justices like Bengzon but that provision
has been vetoed by the governor-general. Bengzon said
the veto is beyond the power of the governor-general
hence he filed a petition for mandamus to compel the
Secretary of Justice to implement the gratuity provision
of the said law.
ISSUE: Whether or not Bengzon is entitled to the
gratuity provision of the Retirement Gratuity Law.
HELD: No. The governor-general in vetoing the said
item of the law has acted within his power; for this is also
in compliance with the Organic Act. Section 19 of the
former Organic Act, the Act of Congress of August 29,
1916, established the practice for the enactment of a law,
including the sanctioning of the veto power by the
Governor-General. Specifically it provided:
The Governor-General shall have the power to veto any
particular item or items of an appropriation bill, but the
veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does
not object.
The SC then is constrained to rule against Bengzon and
to hold that the veto by the Governor-General of section
7 of Act No. 4051 was in conformity with the legislative
purpose and the provisions of the Organic Act.
Read full text
NOTE: Quite interestingly, while I was doing some
research on this, it appears that this case was further
appealed (via certiorari) to the U.S. Supreme Court (299
U.S. 410). That was allowed then because the
Philippines was under the Commonwealth regime. The
U.S. Supreme Court reversed the decision. You can read
it here. It was ruled that the Governor-General did not
have the power to veto such item in the said law because
in truth and in fact, the said law was not an
appropriations law. hence, no line item veto can be
had.
11 SCRA 486 – Political Law – Veto Power –
Condition Attached to an Item
Bolinao Electronics Corporation was the co-owner and a
co-petitioner of Chronicle Broadcasting Network, Inc.
(CBN) and Montserrat Broadcasting System Inc. They
operate and own television (channel 9) and radio
stations in the Philippines. They were summoned by
Brigido Valencia, then Secretary of Communications, for
operating even after their permit has expired. Valencia
claimed that because of CBN’s continued operation sans
license and their continuing operation had caused
damages to his department.
ISSUE: Whether or not Valencia is entitled to claim for
damages.
HELD: The SC ruled in the negative. Valencia failed to
show that any right of his has been violated by the refusal
of CBN to cease operation. Further, the SC noted that as
the records show, the appropriation to operate the
Philippine Broadcasting Service as approved by
Congress and incorporated in the 1962-1963 Budget of
the Republic of the Philippines does not allow
appropriations for TV stations particularly in Luzon.
Hence, since there was no appropriation allotted then
there can be no damage; and if there are expenditures
made by Valencia’s department they are in fact in
violation of the law and they cannot claim damages
therefrom. And even if it is shown that the then president
vetoed this provision of the Budget Act, such veto is
illegal because he may not legally veto a condition
attached to an appropriation or item in the appropriation
bill.
Note: This ruling, that the executive’s veto power does
not carry with it the power to strike out conditions or
restrictions, has been adhered to in subsequent cases.
If the veto is unconstitutional, it follows that the same
produced no effect whatsoever; and the restriction
imposed by the appropriation bill, therefore, remains.
Political Law – Veto Power – Inappropriate
Provision in an Appropriation Bill
Gonzales, together w/ 22 other senators, assailed the
constitutionality of Cory’s veto of Section 55 of the 1989
Appropriations Bill (Sec 55 FY ’89, and subsequently of
its counterpart Section 16 of the 1990 Appropriations Bill
(Sec 16 FY ’90). Gonzalez averred the following: (1) the
President’s line-veto power as regards appropriation bills
is limited to item/s and does not cover provision/s;
therefore, she exceeded her authority when she vetoed
Section 55 (FY ’89) and Section 16 (FY ’90) which are
provision; (2) when the President objects to a provision
of an appropriation bill, she cannot exercise the item-
veto power but should veto the entire bill; (3) the item-
veto power does not carry with it the power to strike out
conditions or restrictions for that would be legislation, in
violation of the doctrine of separation of powers; and (4)
the power of augmentation in Article VI, Section 25 [5] of
the 1987 Constitution, has to be provided for by law and,
therefore, Congress is also vested with the prerogative
to impose restrictions on the exercise of that power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the President exceeded the
item-veto power accorded by the Constitution. Or
differently put, has the President the power to veto
`provisions’ of an Appropriations Bill.
HELD: SC ruled that Congress cannot include in a
general appropriations bill matters that should be more
properly enacted in separate legislation, and if it does
that, the inappropriate provisions inserted by it must be
treated as “item,” which can be vetoed by the President
in the exercise of his item-veto power. The SC went one
step further and rules that even assuming arguendo that
“provisions” are beyond the executive power to veto, and
Section 55 (FY ’89) and Section 16 (FY ’90) were not
“provisions” in the budgetary sense of the term, they are
“inappropriate provisions” that should be treated as
“items” for the purpose of the President’s veto power.
208 SCRA 133 – Political Law – Veto Power of the
President
In 1990, Congress sought to reenact some old laws (i.e.
Republic Act No. 1797) that were “repealed” during the
time of former President Ferdinand Marcos. These old
laws provided certain retirement benefits to retired
judges, justices, and members of the constitutional
commissions. Congress felt a need to restore these laws
in order to standardize retirement benefits among
government officials. However, President Corazon
Aquino vetoed the bill (House Bill No. 16297) on the
ground that the law should not give preferential treatment
to certain or select government officials.
Meanwhile, a group of retired judges and justices filed a
petition with the Supreme Court asking the court to
readjust their pensions. They pointed out that RA 1797
was never repealed (by P.D. No. 644) because the said
PD was one of those unpublished PDs which were
subject of the case of Tañada v. Tuvera. Hence, the
repealing law never existed due to non publication and
in effect, RA 1797 was never repealed. The Supreme
Court then readjusted their pensions.
Congress took notice of the readjustment and son in the
General Appropriations Bill (GAB) for 1992, Congress
allotted additional budget for pensions of retired justices.
Congress however did the allotment in the following
manner: Congress made an item entitled: “General Fund
Adjustment”; included therein are allotments to
unavoidable obligations in different brances of the
government; among such obligations is the allotment for
the pensions of retired justices of the judiciary.
However, President Aquino again vetoed the said lines
which provided for the pensions of the retired justices in
the judiciary in the GAB. She explained that that portion
of the GAB is already deemed vetoed when she vetoed
H.B. 16297.
This prompted Cesar Bengzon and several other retired
judges and justices to question the constitutionality of
the veto made by the President. The President was
represented by then Executive Secretary Franklin Drilon.
ISSUE: Whether or not the veto of the President on that
portion of the General Appropriations bill is
constitutional.
HELD: No. The Justices of the Court have vested
rights to the accrued pension that is due to them in
accordance to Republic Act 1797 which was never
repealed. The president has no power to set aside and
override the decision of the Supreme Court neither does
the president have the power to enact or amend statutes
promulgated by her predecessors much less to the
repeal of existing laws.
The Supreme Court also explained that the veto is
unconstitutional since the power of the president to
disapprove any item or items in the appropriations bill
does not grant the authority to veto part of an item and
to approve the remaining portion of said item. It appears
that in the same item, the Presidents vetoed some
portion of it and retained the others. This cannot be done.
The rule is: the Executive must veto a bill in its entirety
or not at all; the Executive must veto an entire line item
in its entirety or not at all. In this case, the president did
not veto the entire line item of the general adjustment
fund. She merely vetoed the portion which pertained to
the pensions of the justices but did not veto the other
items covering obligations to the other departments of limitations and restrictions as [Congress] may impose” to
the government. fix “within specific limits” “tariff rates . . . and other duties
or imposts . . . .” In this case, it is the Tariff and Customs
Code which authorized the President ot issue the said
Read full text EOs.

211 SCRA 219 – Political Law – Congress

Authorizing the President to Tax
In November 1990, President Corazon Aquino issued
Executive Order No. 438 which imposed, in addition to
any other duties, taxes and charges imposed by law on
all articles imported into the Philippines, an additional
duty of 5% ad valorem tax. This additional duty was
imposed across the board on all imported articles,
including crude oil and other oil products imported into
the Philippines. In 1991, EO 443 increased the additional
duty to 9%. In the same year, EO 475 was passed
reinstating the previous 5% duty except that crude oil
and other oil products continued to be taxed at
9%. Enrique Garcia, a representative from Bataan,
avers that EO 475 and 478 are unconstitutional for they
violate Section 24 of Article VI of the Constitution which
provides:
All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing
increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and
private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur
with amendments.
He contends that since the Constitution vests the
authority to enact revenue bills in Congress, the
President may not assume such power by issuing
Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which are in the
nature of revenue-generating measures.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 475 and 478 are
constitutional.
HELD: Under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution,
the enactment of appropriation, revenue and tariff bills,
like all other bills is, of course, within the province of the
Legislative rather than the Executive Department. It does
not follow, however, that therefore Executive Orders
Nos. 475 and 478, assuming they may be characterized
as revenue measures, are prohibited to be exercised by
the President, that they must be enacted instead by the
Congress of the Philippines.
Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides as
follows:
(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President
to fix within specified limits, and subject to such
limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates,
import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues,
and other duties or imposts within the framework of the
national development program of the Government.
There is thus explicit constitutional permission to
Congress to authorize the President “subject to such