Villareal vs.

People ( Next case is also villareal, Pili ka nalang)

GR No. 151258
February 1, 2012
664 scra

FACTS: Seven Freshmen Law students of Ateneo de Manila University School of Law have
been initiated by the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity on February 1991. The initiation rites started
when the neophytes were met by some members of the mentioned fraternity at the lobby of the
Ateneo Law School. They were consequently brought to a house and briefed on what will be
happening during the days when they will be initiated. They were informed that there will be
physical beatings and that the neophytes can quit anytime they want. They were brought to
another house to commence their initiation.The neophytes were insulted and threatened even
before they got off the van. Members of the fraternity delivered blows to the neophytes as they
alighted from the van. Several initiation rites were experienced by the neophytes like the Indian
run, Bicol express and rounds. They were asked to recite provisions and principles of the
fraternity and were hit everytime they made a mistake. Accused fraternity members, Dizon and
Villareal, asked the head of the initiation rites (Victorino) to reopen the initiation. Fraternity
members subjected neophytes to paddling and additional hours of physical pain. After the last
session of beatings, Lenny Villa could not walk. Later that night, he was feeling cold and his
condition worsened. He was brought to the hospital but was declared dead on arrival. Criminal
case was filed against 26 fraternity members and was subsequently found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide and penalized with reclusion perpetua. On January 10
2002, CA modified the criminal liability of each of the accused according to individual
participation. 19 of the the accused were acquitted, 4 of the appellants were found guilty of slight
physical injuries, and 2 of the accused-appellants (Dizon and Villareal) were found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide. Accused Villareal petitioned for review on Certriori
under Rue 45 on the grounds that the CA made 2 reversible errors: first, denial of due process
and second, conviction absent proof beyond reasonable doubt. Consequently, petitioner Villareal
died on 13 March 2011 and filed a Notice of Death of Party on 10 August 2011.

ISSUE: Whether or not criminal liability for personal penalties of the accused is extinguished by
death
Doctrine: Yes, criminal liability of the accused is extinguished by death. The Court took note of
counsel for petitioner’s Notice of Death when it has been received while the petition was
pending resolution. Personal penalties refer to the service of personal or imprisonment penalties,
while pecuniary penalties refer to fines, costs, civil liability. Article 89 of the Revised Penal
Code states that the criminal liability of a convict for personal penalties is totally extinguished by
death of the convict. His pecuniary penalty has been extinguished since the death of the accused
happened before his final judgment. Therefore, the death of the petitioner for both personal and
pecuniary penalties including his civil liability has ended. His petition has also been dismissed
and the criminal case against him has been closed and terminated

Villareal vs. People

People (Lenny Villa Case)

Facts:

February 1991- 7 freshmen law students of ADMU signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis fraternity. They
were met by members of AL at the lobby of Ateneo Law. They were informed that there will be physical beatings
and that they can quit anytime. The rites were scheduled to last 3 days. They were subjected to traditional Aquilan
initiation rites such as the “Indian Run”, “Bicol Express”, “Rounds”, “Auxies Privilege Round”, rough basketball,
comic plays, and other forms of paddling. Lenny received several blows, one of which was so strong that it sent him
sprawling to the ground. When they were already sleeping, the neophytes were roused by Lenny’s shivering and
mumblings. He was brought to the hospital but was pronounced dead on arrival.

Held:

 No crime without a law punishing it

 Thus, having in mind the potential conflict between the proposed law and the core principle of mala in
seadhered to under the Revised Penal Code, Congress did not simply enact an amendment thereto. Instead,
it created a special law on hazing, founded upon the principle of mala prohibita. This dilemma faced by
Congress is further proof of how the nature of hazing — unique as against typical crimes — cast a cloud of
doubt on whether society considered the act as an inherently wrong conduct or mala in seat the time.
 Consequently, the collective acts of the fraternity members were tantamount to recklessness, which made
the resulting death of Lenny a culpable felony. It must be remembered that organizations owe to their
initiates a duty of care not to cause them injury in the process. With the foregoing facts, we rule that the
accused are guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. Since the NBI medico-legal officer found
that the victim’s death was the cumulative effect of the injuries suffered, criminal responsibility redounds
to all those who directly participated in and contributed to the infliction of physical injuries
 Our finding of criminal liability for the felony of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide shall cover
only accused Tecson, Ama, Almeda, Bantug, and Dizon. Had the Anti-Hazing Law been in effect then,
these five accused fraternity members would have all been convicted of the crime of hazing punishable
by reclusion perpetua(life imprisonment). Since there was no law prohibiting the act of hazing when
Lenny died, we are constrained to rule according to existing laws at the time of his death.
CASE:
People v Toling
DATE:
January 17, 1975
PONENTE:
Aquino, J.
Topic in Syllabus: Art. 48
–
Complex Crimes
FACTS:

Antonio Toling
and
Jose Toling
(
both the accused
), twins, both married, are natives of BarrioNenita Samar. They are illiterate farmers tilling their
own lands.

Antonio's daughter, Leonora, was working in Manila. Jose's three children had stayed in Manilaalso
since 1964. Antonio decided to go to Manila after receiving a letter from Leonora tellinghim that
she would give him money.

To have money for his expenses, Antonio killed a pig and sold the meat to Jose's wife for
sixtypesos. Jose decided to go with Antonio in order to see his children. He was able to raise
eighty-five pesos for his expenses.

Leonora gave her father P50. Antonio's grandson, gave him P30. Antonio placed the eightypesos in
the right pocket of his pants.

After buying their tickets home, they boarded the night Bicol express train at about five o'clockin
the afternoon. The train left at six o'clock that evening. The twins were in coach No. 9.

Each seat in the coach faced an opposite seat. An aisle separated the two rows. The brotherswere
seated side by side on the
fourth
three-passenger seat from the rear, facing the back door.Jose was seated between Antonio, who
was near the window, and a three-year old boy. Besidethe boy was a woman breast-feeding her baby
who was near the aisle. That woman wasCorazon Bernal. There were more than one hundred twenty
passengers in the coach. Somepassengers were standing on the aisle.

Sitting on the
third
seat and facing the brothers were two men and an old woman who wassleeping with her head resting
on the back of the seat. on the two-passenger seat across theaisle in line with the seat where the
brothers were sitting, there were seated a fat woman, whowas near the window, and one Cipriano
Reganet who was on her left. On the opposite seat wereseated a woman, her daughter and Amanda
Mapa with an eight-month old baby. They were infront of Reganet.

The train stopped at Cabuyao, Laguna, and not long after it resumed regular speed, Antoniostood up
and stabbed the man sitting directly in front of him with scissors. Jose stabbed thesleeping old
woman sitting in front of him with a knife.

The twins ran amuck and started stabbing the people in the coach. They were finally stoppedwhen
Constabulary soldiers aboard the train heard about the incident. At that time,Constabulary
Sergeant Vicente Rayel was not on duty and was simply taking his wife child toQuezon. He was at
the dining car when the incident happened. Constabulary Sargeant VicenteAldea was in the dining
car as well.

The dead amounted to twelve. Eight suffered from stab wounds while others died after
they jumped off the train, apparently trying to escape the violence. Seven were injured,
though oneof them was reported to have died as well.

Velasco V. People 2006

G.R. No. 166479 February 28, 2006

Lessons Applicable: Attempted

Laws Applicable: Art. 6

FACTS:
• April 19, 1998 7:30 am: Frederick Maramba was cleaning and washing his owner type jeep in front of
his house when a motorized tricycle stopped near him. Rodolfo C. Velasco dashed out of the tricycle,
approached the complainant and fired at him several times with a .45 caliber pistol. Velasco missed his
first shot but the second one hit the complainant at the upper arm, causing him to stumble on the
ground. But, Frederick stood up and ran, while Velasco fired 6 more but missed.
• After being reported as wearing a vest or a “chaleco”, the police, composed of SPO4 Romulo Villamil,
PO3 Rolando Alvendo, and SPO1 Soliven pursued and caught Velasco who was on board a motorized
tricycle to the highway going to Barangay Banaoang in Calasiao town with a firearm protruding from the
waistline
• Velasco’s Alibi: April 18, 1998, he spent the night at a friend’s house in Lingayen, Pangasinan and
between 6:00-7:00am, he left Lingayen riding in the Volkswagen car of Berting Soriano then alighted at
the corner of Banaoang diversion road to ride a tricycle where he heard a jeep behind him blowing its
horn and when he looked back he saw three men on board pointing their guns at him.
• RTC: guilty of attempted murder appreciating treachery in the commission of the crime sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of Four (4) years of prision correccional, as minimum to Eight (8) years
and One (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum and to pay P2,696 as actual damages
• CA: Affirmed RTC
• Velasco filed a petition for certiorari
o he had no motive to harm, much less kill, the victim for he was total stranger and since the identity of
the assailant is in doubt, motive becomes important and his alibi gains weight and value and that the
testimony of Armando Maramba is not credible, he being a relative of the victim

ISSUE: W/N Velasco is guilty of attempted murder

HELD: YES. petition is DENIED

• it was not physically impossible for Velasco to be at the crime scene when the crime was committed
since it only takes a 10-minute ride from the place where he allegedly alighted from the car of one Berting
Soriano to the crime scene
• Even without a ballistic report, the positive identification by prosecution witnesses is more than
sufficient to prove accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
• It must be stressed that motive is a state of (one’s) mind which others cannot discern. It is not an
element of the crime, and as such does not have to be proved. In fact, lack of motive for committing a
crime does not preclude conviction. It is judicial knowledge that persons have been killed or assaulted for
no reason at all. Even in the absence of a known motive, the time-honored rule is that motive is not
essential to convict when there is no doubt as to the identity of the culprit. Motive assumes significance
only where there is no showing of who the perpetrator of the crime was.
o since petitioner has been positively identified the lack of motive is no longer of consequence
• relationship could strengthen the witnesses’ credibility, for it is unnatural for an aggrieved relative to
falsely accuse someone other than the actual culprit
• The fact that the shooting occurred in broad daylight does not render its commission impossible. The
fact that petitioner was a navy man, a protector of the people, does not mean that he is innocent of the
crime charged or that he is incapable of doing it.
• The suddenness of the shooting and the fact that he was unarmed left private complainant with no
option but to run for his life. – treachery
• Having commenced the criminal act by overt acts but failing to perform all acts of execution as to
produce the felony by reason of some cause other than his own desistance, petitioner committed an
attempted felony. Petitioner already commenced his attack with a manifest intent to kill by shooting
private complainant seven times, but failed to perform all the acts of execution by reason of causes
independent of his will, that is, poor aim and the swiftness of the latter. Private complainant sustained a
wound on the left arm that is not sufficient to cause his death. The settled rule is that where the wound
inflicted on the victim is not sufficient to cause his death, the crime is only attempted murder, since the
accused did not perform all the acts of execution that would have brought about death
• Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and there being no aggravating or mitigating
circumstances, the minimum of the penalty to be imposed should be within the range of prision
correccional, and the maximum of the penalty to be imposed should be within the range of prision mayor
in its medium period.

QUINTOS VS PEOPLE

CARPIO, ACTING C.J.:

The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review[1] assailing the Decision[2] dated 31 July 2012 and
Resolution[3] dated 11 January 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 33776, affirming the Joint
Decision[4] dated 20 October 2010 of the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan (trial court) in
Criminal Case Nos. L-8340, L-8341 and L-8342.

The Facts

Petitioner Leopoldo Quintos y Del Amor (petitioner) was charged, in conspiracy with his brothers Pedro,
Rolly and Lando, all surnamed Quintos, and Narciso Buni for frustrated homicide and homicide.

The Information[5] in Criminal Case No. L-8341 reads, in part:

That on or about January 15, 2008 in the afternoon at Brgy. Laois, Labrador, Pangasinan and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused in conspiracy with each other, with intent
to kill, did then and there, wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously accost, maul and hack with bolo and
samurai Robert M. dela Cruz who suffered hacking wounds, several lacerations and contusions on the
different parts of his body, thus, the accused performed all the acts of execution which would produce
homicide as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of the timely medical
intervention applied on him that prevented his death, to the prejudice and damage of the said Robert dela
Cruz.

CONTRARY to Article 249 in relation to Art. 6 of the Revised Penal Code.

The Information[6] in Criminal Case No. L-8342 reads, in part:

That on or about January 15, 2008 in the afternoon at Brgy. Laois, Labrador, Pangasinan and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused in conspiracy with each other, with intent
to kill, did then and there, wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously accost, maul and hack with bolo and
samurai Felomina dela Cruz who suffered hacking wounds and several lacerations on the different parts of
her body, thus, the accused performed all the acts of execution which would produce homicide as a
consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of the timely medical intervention
applied on him that prevented his (sic) death, to the prejudice and damage of the said Felomina dela Cruz.

CONTRARY to Article 249 in relation to Art. 6 of the Revised Penal Code.

In Criminal Case No. L-8340, an Amended Information[7] was filed when the victim Freddie dela Cruz
died:

That on or about January 15, 2008 in the afternoon at Brgy. Laois, Labrador, Pangasinan and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused in conspiracy with each other, with intent
to kill, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously accost, maul and hack with bolo and
samurai Freddie dela Cruz who suffered hacking wounds on the different parts of his body, which caused
his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of Freddie dela Cruz.

CONTRARY to Article 249 in relation to Art. 6 of the Revised Penal Code.

Of the five accused, Pedro Quintos, Narciso Buni and petitioner were arrested. Rolly and Lando evaded
arrest and remain at large. Petitioner, Pedro and Narciso all pled not guilty to the charges brought against
them.
The prosecution presented five witnesses, namely: Eduardo Oyando, Felomina dela Cruz, Robert dela
Cruz, Police Officer Bernardo Cerezo, and Dr. Saniata V. Fernandez.

The defense presented two witnesses, namely, petitioner and Pedro Quintos. Narciso Buni jumped bail
before he could testify. Petitioner's sister was also scheduled to testify, but since her testimony would only
be corroborative, the prosecution admitted her testimony.[8]

Version of the Prosecution

The prosecution established that at about 3:30 p.m. of 15 January 2008, Freddie dela Cruz, Robert dela
Cruz, Felomina dela Cruz, and Eduardo Oyando were walking along the barangay road of Laois, Labrador,
Pangasinan. They were on their way to the town proper when they were accosted by Pedro Quintos, Rolly
Quintos, Lando Quintos, Narciso Buni and petitioner. Pedro was wielding a samurai, Lando, Narciso and
petitioner were carrying bolos, and Rolly was holding a big stone. Robert, Freddie, Felomina, all
surnamed dela Cruz, and Eduardo Oyando ran back towards their house, but the five attackers caught up
with them.

Pedro struck Robert dela Cruz with the samurai, but the latter parried the attack with his left hand. Robert
dela Cruz attempted to gain control of the samurai, but Rolly hit him in the face, near the jaw, with the
stone Rolly was carrying. Robert dela Cruz lost his hold of the samurai and fell to the ground.

Lando struck Freddie dela Cruz at the back of his head, which caused the latter to fall face up. Petitioner
joined Lando in hacking Freddie dela Cruz, who, while defending himself with his hands, sustained
injuries on his right hand and lost a few fingers on his left. Rolly then crushed Freddie dela Cruz's chest
with the same stone he used to hit Robert dela Cruz in the face.

Pedro advanced towards Felomina dela Cruz as the latter moved towards Robert dela Cruz. Pedro pulled
Felomina dela Cruz's hair, slashed her nape with the samurai, and then kicked her to the ground.

Eduardo Oyando was forced to stand aside and was prevented from helping the dela Cruzes because
Narciso Buni was aiming a bolo at him. The attackers left when they were done, and only then was
Eduardo Oyando able to approach the victims and call for help.

Robert, Freddie and Felomina, all surnamed dela Cruz, were brought to the hospital. They were treated
for the injuries sustained from the attack. After a few days, Freddie dela Cruz died from his injuries.
Before he died, Freddie dela Cruz identified Pedro and Lando Quintos as his attackers.

Version of the Defense

The defense presented a different version of the events. In the afternoon of 15 January 2008, Robert,
Freddie, Felomina, all surnamed dela Cruz, and Eduardo Oyando came to the Quintos' house looking for
trouble. Pedro, who was in the front portion of the house, went out to try and pacify them. Robert dela
Cruz punched Pedro first, hitting him in the face. Robert dela Cruz then went to Felomina dela Cruz and
took a bolo wrapped in a towel that the latter was holding. Pedro and Robert dela Cruz grappled for the
bolo. Felomina dela Cruz approached the two and tried to help Robert dela Cruz, and in the process got
slashed with the bolo. The scuffle resulted in Robert dela Cruz falling to the ground and Pedro gaining
control of the bolo.

Pedro then noticed that Freddie dela Cruz, who was holding a bolo, was fighting with Lando. Pedro
hurried over and hacked Freddie dela Cruz to defend his brother Lando. According to Pedro, his senses
dimmed and he did not remember how many times he hacked Freddie dela Cruz. His brothers pacified
him, and Pedro went with them back to the house; while Robert, Freddie and Felomina, all surnamed dela
Cruz, were brought to the hospital.
 The Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial court gave full faith and credit to the version of the prosecution. Petitioner was found guilty for
the crime of homicide for the death of Freddie dela Cruz. However, the trial court held that the
uncertainty on the nature of the wounds of Robert dela Cruz and Felomina dela Cruz warrants the
appreciation of a lesser gravity of the crime from frustrated homicide to attempted homicide. [9]

The dispositive portion of the Joint Decision dated 20 October 2010 reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing, the Court finds:

IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. L-8340

Accused PEDRO QUINTOS, POLDO QUINTOS and NARCISO BUNI GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of HOMICIDE as defined in Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. The prescribed penalty for
Homicide is reclusion temporal which is from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty years. Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum penalty should be taken from the penalty one (1) degree
lower than the imposable penalty which is Prision Mayor in its full extent, the range of which is from six
(6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. Appreciating no mitigating circumstances in favor of the
accused, the accused is accordingly sentenced from EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of PRISION
MAYOR, as minimum, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY
of RECLUSION TEMPORAL, as maximum.

Accused are further ORDERED to pay the heirs of Freddie Dela Cruz, the amounts of (a) Php 75,000.00
as civil indemnity; (b) Php 75,000.00 as moral damages; (c) Php 57,286.00 as actual damages; (d) and
Php 15,000.00 as attorney's fees.

IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. L-8341

Accused PEDRO QUINTOS, POLDO QUINTOS and NARCISO BUNI GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE and are meted with an indeterminate sentence of Two (2) months
and One (1) day of arresto mayor as minimum to Two (2) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day
of prision correccional as maximum.

Accused are furthered (sic) ordered to pay Robert dela Cruz actual damages in the amount of Php
1,650.00 and moral damages in the amount of Php 15,000.00.

IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. L-8342

Accused PEDRO QUINTOS, POLDO QUINTOS and NARCISO BUNI GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE and are meted with an indeterminate sentence of Two (2) months
and One (1) day or arresto mayor as minimum to Two (2) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day
of prision correccional as maximum.

Accused are furthered (sic) ordered to pay Felomina dela Cruz actual damages in the amount of Php
3,750.00 and moral damages in the amount of Php 15,000.00.

In all cases, considering that Pedro Quintos and Poldo Quintos have undergone preventive imprisonment,
they shall be credited in the service of their sentences with the time they have undergone preventive
imprisonment subject to the conditions provided for in Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.

xxxx

SO ORDERED.[10]
Petitioner and Pedro Quintos appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, alleging that the trial court
gravely erred in convicting them despite the prosecution's failure to prove their guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals found the appeal bereft of merit, thus:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED and the assailed Joint Decision dated October 20, 2010
of the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 39, in Criminal Case Nos. L-8340, L-8341
and L-8342 is AFFIRMED IN TOTO.

SO ORDERED.[11]

Hence, this petition.

The Issues

Petitioner faults the Court of Appeals for: (1) affirming the conviction, despite the prosecution's failure to
prove petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and (2) finding that conspiracy exists, in particular, that
a finding of conspiracy should not be left to conjecture, in light of the alleged failure of the prosecution to
present evidence that petitioner took part in inflicting injuries on the victims in furtherance of a common
design to kill.[12]

The Court's Ruling

The petition is unmeritorious.

Review of Questions of Fact Improper

The review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited to questions of law. This Court
does not weigh all over again the evidence already considered in the proceedings below.[13] The narrow
ambit of review prescribed under this rule allows us to swiftly dispose of such appeals. This rule, of
course, admits of exceptions applicable to those rare petitions whose peculiar factual milieu justifies
relaxation of the Rules such as based on speculation or conjectures, or overlooked undisputed facts which,
if duly considered, lead to a different conclusion.[14]

In the present case, petitioner finds fault in the decisions of the trial and appellate courts, alleging that
had the said courts given weight to the defense evidence, conviction would not have been justified. This is
clearly an invitation for the Court to review the probative value of the evidence presented in the
proceedings below.

A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is
a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. [15] For a question to
be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented
by the litigants.[16] Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question
posed is one of fact.[17]

Petitioner attempts to justify the review of facts by alleging that the courts a quo indulged in conjectures
and surmises. However, a careful reading of the decisions of the trial and appellate courts shows that such
is not the case here. The discussion of the trial court deals extensively with evidence from both sides,
weighing each accordingly. Similarly, the appellate court evaluated the evidence of the prosecution and
the defense alike.

Uniform findings of fact of the trial and appellate courts deserve grave respect, and in the absence of any
compelling reason to deviate therefrom, are final and conclusive upon this Court. We thus proceed with
our review without disturbing the factual findings of the Court of Appeals.

Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence

Petitioner avers that his conviction was not supported by proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. His
argument revolves mainly on self-defense, defense of relatives and absence of conspiracy.

We are not persuaded. The records of this case show that the prosecution witnesses Eduardo Oyando,
Robert dela Cruz and Felomina dela Cruz positively and consistently identified the accused and relayed
the sequence of events. Their testimonies are corroborated by the evidence presented by the doctors who
attended the hacking victims, as well as by the police officer who took the statement of Freddie dela Cruz
before the latter died.

We must emphasize that the trial court found the prosecution witnesses credible. The assessment of the
trial court on this point is generally binding on this Court, and none of the exceptions to this rule are
obtaining here. Further, the trial court found that the prosecution witnesses did not have any motive to
testify falsely against the accused.

Pedro Quintos admitted to hacking Robert dela Cruz and Freddie dela Cruz, and hitting Felomina dela
Cruz, invoking self-defense. Because of Pedro's admissions, he and his co-conspirators assumed the
burden to establish such defense by credible, clear and convincing evidence; otherwise, the same
admissions would lead to their conviction.[18]

We held in People v. Nugas:

x x x Self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated when it is uncorroborated by independent and

competent evidence or when it is extremely doubtful by itself. Indeed, the accused must discharge the
burden of proof by relying on the strength of his own evidence, not on the weakness of the State's
evidence, because the existence of self-defense is a separate issue from the existence of the crime, and
establishing self-defense does not require or involve the negation of any of the elements of the offense
itself.

To escape liability, the accused must show by sufficient, satisfactory and convincing evidence that: (a) the
victim committed unlawful aggression amounting to an actual or imminent threat to the life and limb of
the accused claiming self-defense; (b) there was reasonable necessity in the means employed to prevent or
repel the unlawful aggression; and (c) there was lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused
claiming self-defense or at least any provocation executed by the accused claiming self-defense was not
the proximate and immediate cause of the victim's aggression. [19]

Both petitioner and Pedro also testified that Pedro hacked Freddie in defense of their brother
Lando.[20] The defense of relatives argument likewise fails in light of the lack of unlawful aggression on the
part of the victims. For the accused to be entitled to exoneration based on defense of relatives, complete or
incomplete, it is essential that there be unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, for if there is no
unlawful aggression, there would be nothing to prevent or repel.[21]

The discussion of the Court of Appeals on this point is well-taken:

We are hardly persuaded by accused-appellants' allegations that they were acting in self-defense because
the victims were committing unlawful aggression. We found the following loopholes:

First, as Pedro claims in his testimony, the dela Cruzes were shouting for the brothers of Pedro to come
out of the house. No actual sudden or imminent attack, however, was performed. It has been ruled that
mere intimidating or threatening words, even if said aloud, do not constitute unlawful aggression. Thus,
in People vs. Cajurao, the Supreme Court held that:

There can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete unless there is clear and convincing proof of
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. The unlawful aggression, a constitutive element of self-
defense, must be real or at least imminent and not merely imaginary. A belief that a person is about to be
attacked is not sufficient. Even an intimidating or threatening attitude is by no means enough. Unlawful
aggression presupposes an actual or imminent danger on the life or limb of a person. Mere shouting,
an[d] intimidating or threatening attitude of the victim does not constitute unlawful aggression. Unlawful
aggression refers to an attack that has actually broken out or materialized or at the very least is clearly
imminent; it cannot consist in oral threats or merely a threatening stance or posture.

Furthermore, as Pedro testified, the dela Cruzes were shouting for his brothers to go out, but then, Pedro
was the one who went out. If, indeed, the dela Cruzes had some anger or aggression at that time, it was
definitely not directed at Pedro.

Then, as Pedro went down to pacify the dela Cruzes, Pedro and Robert dela Cruz engaged in a fist fight.
Robert turned and ran towards his mother, Felomina to allegedly get a bolo which was in Felomina's
possession and concealed under a towel. If this is true, Robert had already retreated and was trying to arm
himself to level the supposed fight with Pedro. Thus, from Pedro's narration, it cannot be definitely said
that the dela Cruzes went to the house of the accused-appellants with the determined intention to inflict
serious harm on Pedro.

Second, Pedro claims that he was trying to defend his brother Lando Quintos who was lying on the ground
and being attacked by the deceased Freddie dela Cruz. According to him, he hacked Freddie before the
latter could stab Lando. Pedro would like to impress upon the court that Lando was also involved in the
fight against the dela Cruzes. However, in the same testimony, Pedro said that it was he alone who was
fighting Robert, Freddie and Felomina, and that his brothers, including Lando, were "just there, sir,
pacifying."

Third, despite the alleged savagery that transpired, surprisingly, accused-appellants did not report the
incident to the police. During cross-examination, Pedro admitted that:

After you were threatened and you did not report of the alleged incident that happened on
Q:
January 15 as what you are telling now?
A: No sir.
In fact even after you were allegedly brought to the hospital and you were treated you did not
Q: even rel[a]y to the police or even to your barangay the alleged incident which you are now
narrating, am I correct?
I was not able to report anymore because after I was treated to the hospital I was brought
A:
directly to the jail, sir.
It is doctrinal that, for evidence to be believed, it must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible
witness, but it must be credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can
approve as probable under the circumstances. We find it difficult to believe that accused-appellants, who
vehemently claim to be the aggrieved parties, did not report the incident to the police. Pedro's alleged
treatment or confinement in the hospital did not prevent them from doing so. Pedro had at least three
brothers: Poldo, Rolly and Lando; not to mention his mother and sister, who could have easily gone to the
police to report the alleged attack upon them by the dela Cruzes. This omission, therefore, casts doubt on
the veracity of the account of the accused-appellants.
Lastly, the nature of the wounds inflicted on the deceased and the other victims negate[s] the accused-
appellants' claim of self-defense. According to the medical certificate of Freddie dela Cruz, he suffered
cardio-respiratory arrest, septicemia and multiple hacking wounds. Then, in the death certificate, it was
further stated that Freddie dela Cruz suffered "amputation of left and right hand." Meanwhile, with
respect to Robert dela Cruz, the attending physician, Dr. Saniata V. Fernandez, testified that the victim
suffered lacerated wounds on the forehead, lower lip and left hand. As for Felomina dela Cruz, she also
suffered almost similar lacerated wounds.

It has been ruled that the presence of a large number of wounds on the part of the victim, their nature and
location disprove self-defense and instead indicate a determined effort to kill the victim[s]. In the case at
bar, as already explained, the wounds on Freddie, Robert and Felomina, all surnamed dela Cruz, negate
accused-appellant's claim of self-defense.

We have contrasted the claim of self-defense to the evidence presented by the prosecution and this Court
believes that the version of the latter is more credible and consistent with the truth. As a matter of fact, by
simply admitting that they attacked Freddie dela Cruz and the two other victims, the case against the
accused-appellants had become irrefutable. x x x.[22]

Existence of Conspiracy

Petitioner alleges that the prosecution did not present evidence of his participation in the attacks on
Robert dela Cruz and Felomina dela Cruz. He also argues that his mere presence during the said attacks
does not by itself show concurrence of wills and unity of purpose.

Petitioner's presence during the commission of the crime was well-established as he himself testified to
that fact. Assuming that he was merely present during the attack, inaction does not exculpate him. To
exempt himself from criminal liability, a conspirator must have performed an overt act to dissociate or
detach himself from the conspiracy to commit the felony and prevent the commission thereof.[23]

Indeed, mere presence does not signify conspiracy. However, neither does it indicate the lack thereof.
Conspiracy can be inferred from and established by the acts of the accused themselves when said acts
point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest. [24] In fact, the
prosecution established that petitioner was actively involved in the attack on Freddie dela Cruz.

In People v. De Leon,[25] we held:

x x x To be a conspirator, one need not participate in every detail of the execution; he need not even take
part in every act or need not even know the exact part to be performed by the others in the execution of
the conspiracy. Each conspirator may be assigned separate and different tasks which may appear
unrelated to one another but, in fact, constitute a whole collective effort to achieve their common criminal
objective. Once conspiracy is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators. The precise extent or
mo[r]ality of participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are principals.

The acts of petitioner before, during and after the attacks on Robert dela Cruz and Felomina dela Cruz
disclose his agreement with the joint purpose and design in the commission of the felony. The facts, found
by the trial and appellate courts, establish that petitioner, together with his brothers and Narciso Buni, all
of them armed, accosted the dela Cruzes, and gave chase even as the latter were retreating towards their
house. During the attacks, each conspirator had a different task. After the attacks, all the accused left the
felled dela Cruzes for dead, clearly showing their united purpose in the felonies committed. The act of one
is the act of all. With the conspiracy proved, the conviction of petitioner was in order.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition, and AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 31 July
2012 and the Resolution dated 11 January 2013 in CA-G.R. CR No. 33776.

SO ORDERED.

CABANLIG vs SANDIGANBAYAN

CASE DIGEST: FULFILLMENT OF DUTY

SPO2 Ruperto Cabanlig vs. Sandiganbayan and Office of the Special Prosecutor (G.R. No/ 148431, July
28, 2005)
Facts:
Police officers CABANLIG, PADILLA, ABESAMIS, MERCADO and ESTEBAN were all charged for the
MURDER of Jimmy Valino before the Sandiganbayan. Jimmy Valino was a detained prisoner who was
escorted to retrieve the effects of the crime to the place where he hid the same. Aboard the police vehicle,
Jimmy Valino suddenly grabbed the M16 rifle and about to jump out of the jeep. CABANLIG shouted
“hoy!”and without issuing any warning of any sort, CABANLIG fired at Valino, hitting his head, left side of
the chest and left lower back.
CABANLIG admitted shooting Valino during the trial. However, Cabanlig justified the shooting as an act of
self-defense and performance of duty. Nevertheless, Sandiganbayan CONVICTED CABANLIG but
acquitted his 4 companions.
Upon appeal, the SUPREME COURT eventually ACQUITTED CABANLIG
RULING 1: Because the killing was justified and that the same was done in the fulfillment of duty
A policeman in the performance of duty is JUSTIFIED in using such force as is reasonably (and
absolutely)necessary to (1) secure and detain the offender, (2) overcome his resistance, (3) prevent his
escape, (4) recapture him if he escapes, and (4) protect himself from bodily harm. (People v. Oanis, 74
Phil 257 [1943]; People v. Lagata (83 Phil 150 [1949]).
Unlike in self-defense where unlawful aggression is an element, in performance of duty, unlawful
aggression from the victim is NOT a requisite.
In People v. Delima,(46 Phil 738 [1992]) where the killing of a fugitive who lunged at a policeman with a
bamboo-makeshift lance, the SC ruled that the same was done in the fulfillment of duty. The fugitive’s
unlawful aggression, in that case, had already ceased when the policeman killed him, however, the
policeman's act of shooting at him is justified because he was running away from him when he was shot.
Ordinarily, it may appear that the policeman, acting in the fulfillment of duty, is the aggressor, but his
aggression is NOT UNLAWFUL, it being necessary to fulfill his duty. But IF the policeman was a
PRIVATE PERSON, not in the performance of duty, and the same situation was given, there would be
NO self-defense because there would be NO unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased.
RULING 2: Because Cabanlig did not exceed the fulfillment of duty when he IMMEDIATELY SHOT Valino
without issuing a warning.
The duty to issue a warning is not absolutely mandated at all times and at all cost to the detriment of the
life of law enforcers. The directive to issue a warning contemplates a situation where several options are
still available to the law enforcers. In exceptional circumstances where the threat to the life of a law
enforcer is already imminent AND there is NO OTHER option but to use force to subdue the offender, the
law enforcer’s failure to issue a warning is EXCUSABLE.
RULING 3: Was there an OVERKILL?
There was none.
FROM SHOZ: This is one of my favorite SC cases and most of the time, I’m always using this to justify
my actions. I’ve been through with lots of CHR cases and I am always asking them -- do you ever witness
a shootout? Do you ever experience how your brain runs when guns were being fired at you and you’re
scared that you'll die and you can no longer see your family? Most of them deny to respond but just a
piece of advice, those CHR people, they are not our enemies.. like us, they are just doing their job.. all
they need is to know our side of the story- with evidentiary proof of course.

People vs Baharan GR No 188314 10 January 2011

Facts: Trinidad and Baharan were trained by Abu Sayyaf group and bombed a bus on 2005
Valentines. After the bombing, Trinidad gave ABS-CBN News Network an exclusive interview
some time after the incident, confessing his participation in the Valentines Day bombing
incident. In another exclusive interview on the network, accused Baharan likewise admitted
his role in the bombing incident.
Only Baharan, Trinidad, Asali, and Rohmat were arrested, while the other accused remain
at-large. They were then charged with multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder. On
arraignment they pleaded guilty on the charge of multiple murder. On multiple frustrated
murder, Trinidad and Baharan pleaded not guilty.

In the light of the pretrial stipulations, the trial court asked whether accused Baharan and
Trinidad were amenable to changing their not guilty pleas to the charge of multiple
frustrated murder, considering that they pled guilty to the heavier charge of multiple
murder, creating an apparent inconsistency in their pleas. Defense counsel conferred with
accused Baharan and Trinidad and explained to them the consequences of the pleas. The
two accused acknowledged the inconsistencies and manifested their readiness for re-
arraignment. After the Information was read to them, Baharan and Trinidad pled guilty to
the charge of multiple frustrated murder.

Issue: WON the trial court gravely erred in accepting Trinidad and Baharan plea of guilt
despite insufficiency of searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of
the consequences of the said plea.
Decision: The Court observed that accused Baharan and Trinidad previously pled guilty to
another charge multiple murder based on the same act relied upon in the multiple frustrated
murder charge.
The Court further noted that prior to the change of plea to one of guilt, accused Baharan
and Trinidad made two other confessions of guilt one through an extrajudicial confession
(exclusive television interviews, as stipulated by both accused during pretrial), and the
other via judicial admission (pretrial stipulation).
Considering the foregoing circumstances, the Court deem it unnecessary to rule on the
sufficiency of the searching inquiry in this instance. Remanding the case for re-arraignment
is not warranted, as the accused plea of guilt was not the sole basis of the condemnatory
judgment under consideration.