11. G.R. No. 175581 March 28, 2008 him on account of their age difference.
him on account of their age difference.5 In her pre-trial brief, Felisa expounded that while her
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.
G.R. No. 179474
FELISA TECSON-DAYOT, Petitioner, vs. JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before us are two consolidated petitions. G.R. No. 175581 and G.R. No. 179474 are Petitions for
Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by the Republic of the Philippines and Felisa
Tecson-Dayot (Felisa), respectively, both challenging the Amended Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals, dated 7 November 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, which declared the marriage between
Jose Dayot (Jose) and Felisa void ab initio.
The records disclose that on 24 November 1986, Jose and Felisa were married at the Pasay City
Hall. The marriage was solemnized by Rev. Tomas V. Atienza.2 In lieu of a marriage license, Jose
and Felisa executed a sworn affidavit,3 also dated 24 November 1986, attesting that both of them
had attained the age of maturity, and that being unmarried, they had lived together as husband
and wife for at least five years.
On 7 July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint4 for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Biñan, Laguna, Branch 25. He contended that his marriage with
Felisa was a sham, as no marriage ceremony was celebrated between the parties; that he did not
execute the sworn affidavit stating that he and Felisa had lived as husband and wife for at least five
years; and that his consent to the marriage was secured through fraud.
In his Complaint, Jose gave his version of the events which led to his filing of the same. According
to Jose, he was introduced to Felisa in 1986. Immediately thereafter, he came to live as a boarder
in Felisa’s house, the latter being his landlady. Some three weeks later, Felisa requested him to
accompany her to the Pasay City Hall, ostensibly so she could claim a package sent to her by her
brother from Saudi Arabia. At the Pasay City Hall, upon a pre-arranged signal from Felisa, a man
bearing three folded pieces of paper approached them. They were told that Jose needed to sign
the papers so that the package could be released to Felisa. He initially refused to do so. However,
Felisa cajoled him, and told him that his refusal could get both of them killed by her brother who
had learned about their relationship. Reluctantly, he signed the pieces of paper, and gave them to
the man who immediately left. It was in February 1987 when he discovered that he had contracted
marriage with Felisa. He alleged that he saw a piece of paper lying on top of the table at the sala of
Felisa’s house. When he perused the same, he discovered that it was a copy of his marriage
contract with Felisa. When he confronted Felisa, the latter feigned ignorance.
In opposing the Complaint, Felisa denied Jose’s allegations and defended the validity of their
marriage. She declared that they had maintained their relationship as man and wife absent the
legality of marriage in the early part of 1980, but that she had deferred contracting marriage with
marriage to Jose was subsisting, the latter contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual
(Rufina) on 31 August 1990. On 3 June 1993, Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose.
Subsequently, she filed an administrative complaint against Jose with the Office of the
Ombudsman, since Jose and Rufina were both employees of the National Statistics and
Coordinating Board.6 The Ombudsman found Jose administratively liable for disgraceful and
immoral conduct, and meted out to him the penalty of suspension from service for one year
without emolument.7
On 26 July 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision8 dismissing the Complaint. It disposed:
WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation and analysis of the evidence presented by both parties, this
Court finds and so holds that the [C]omplaint does not deserve a favorable consideration.
Accordingly, the above-entitled case is hereby ordered DISMISSED with costs against [Jose].9
The RTC ruled that from the testimonies and evidence presented, the marriage celebrated
between Jose and Felisa on 24 November 1986 was valid. It dismissed Jose’s version of the story as
implausible, and rationalized that:
Any person in his right frame of mind would easily suspect any attempt to make him or her sign a
blank sheet of paper. [Jose] could have already detected that something was amiss, unusual, as
they were at Pasay City Hall to get a package for [Felisa] but it [was] he who was made to sign the
pieces of paper for the release of the said package. Another indirect suggestion that could have
put him on guard was the fact that, by his own admission, [Felisa] told him that her brother would
kill them if he will not sign the papers. And yet it took him, more or less, three months to
"discover" that the pieces of paper that he signed was [sic] purportedly the marriage contract.
[Jose] does not seem to be that ignorant, as perceived by this Court, to be "taken in for a ride" by
[Felisa.]
[Jose’s] claim that he did not consent to the marriage was belied by the fact that he acknowledged
Felisa Tecson as his wife when he wrote [Felisa’s] name in the duly notarized statement of assets
and liabilities he filled up on May 12, 1988, one year after he discovered the marriage contract he
is now claiming to be sham and false. [Jose], again, in his company I.D., wrote the name of [Felisa]
as the person to be contacted in case of emergency. This Court does not believe that the only
reason why her name was written in his company I.D. was because he was residing there then. This
is just but a lame excuse because if he really considers her not his lawfully wedded wife, he would
have written instead the name of his sister.
When [Jose’s] sister was put into the witness stand, under oath, she testified that she signed her
name voluntarily as a witness to the marriage in the marriage certificate (T.S.N., page 25,
November 29, 1996) and she further testified that the signature appearing over the name of Jose
Dayot was the signature of his [sic] brother that he voluntarily affixed in the marriage contract
(page 26 of T.S.N. taken on November 29, 1996), and when she was asked by the Honorable Court
if indeed she believed that Felisa Tecson was really chosen by her brother she answered yes. The
testimony of his sister all the more belied his claim that his consent was procured through fraud.10
Moreover, on the matter of fraud, the RTC ruled that Jose’s action had prescribed. It cited Article
8711 of the New Civil Code which requires that the action for annulment of marriage must be
commenced by the injured party within four years after the discovery of the fraud. Thus:
That granting even for the sake of argument that his consent was obtained by [Felisa] through
fraud, trickery and machinations, he could have filed an annulment or declaration of nullity of
marriage at the earliest possible opportunity, the time when he discovered the alleged sham and
false marriage contract. [Jose] did not take any action to void the marriage at the earliest instance.
x x x.12
Undeterred, Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals. In a
Decision dated 11 August 2005, the Court of Appeals found the appeal to be without merit. The
dispositive portion of the appellate court’s Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.13
The Court of Appeals applied the Civil Code to the marriage between Jose and Felisa as it was
solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. The appellate court observed that the
circumstances constituting fraud as a ground for annulment of marriage under Article 8614 of the
Civil Code did not exist in the marriage between the parties. Further, it ruled that the action for
annulment of marriage on the ground of fraud was filed beyond the prescriptive period provided
by law. The Court of Appeals struck down Jose’s appeal in the following manner:
Nonetheless, even if we consider that fraud or intimidation was employed on Jose in giving his
consent to the marriage, the action for the annulment thereof had already prescribed. Article 87
(4) and (5) of the Civil Code provides that the action for annulment of marriage on the ground that
the consent of a party was obtained by fraud, force or intimidation must be commenced by said
party within four (4) years after the discovery of the fraud and within four (4) years from the time
the force or intimidation ceased. Inasmuch as the fraud was allegedly discovered by Jose in
February, 1987 then he had only until February, 1991 within which to file an action for annulment
of marriage. However, it was only on July 7, 1993 that Jose filed the complaint for annulment of his
marriage to Felisa.15
Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not accept Jose’s assertion that his marriage to Felisa was void
ab initio for lack of a marriage license. It ruled that the marriage was solemnized under Article
7616 of the Civil Code as one of exceptional character, with the parties executing an affidavit of
marriage between man and woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years. The Court of Appeals concluded that the falsity in the affidavit to the effect that Jose and
Felisa had lived together as husband and wife for the period required by Article 76 did not affect
the validity of the marriage, seeing that the solemnizing officer was misled by the statements
contained therein. In this manner, the Court of Appeals gave credence to the good-faith reliance of
the solemnizing officer over the falsity of the affidavit. The appellate court further noted that on
the dorsal side of said affidavit of marriage, Rev. Tomas V. Atienza, the solemnizing officer, stated
that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and
found no legal impediment to their marriage. Finally, the Court of Appeals dismissed Jose’s
argument that neither he nor Felisa was a member of the sect to which Rev. Tomas V. Atienza
belonged. According to the Court of Appeals, Article 5617 of the Civil Code did not require that
either one of the contracting parties to the marriage must belong to the solemnizing officer’s
church or religious sect. The prescription was established only in Article 718 of the Family Code
which does not govern the parties’ marriage.
Differing with the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration
thereof.1avvphi1 His central opposition was that the requisites for the proper application of the
exemption from a marriage license under Article 76 of the Civil Code were not fully attendant in
the case at bar. In particular, Jose cited the legal condition that the man and the woman must have
been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage. Essentially, he
maintained that the affidavit of marital cohabitation executed by him and Felisa was false.
The Court of Appeals granted Jose’s Motion for Reconsideration and reversed itself. Accordingly, it
rendered an Amended Decision, dated 7 November 2006, the fallo of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 11, 2005 is RECALLED and SET ASIDE and another one
entered declaring the marriage between Jose A. Dayot and Felisa C. Tecson void ab initio.
Furnish a copy of this Amended Decision to the Local Civil Registrar of Pasay City.19
In its Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals relied on the ruling of this Court in Niñal v.
Bayadog,20 and reasoned that:
In Niñal v. Bayadog, where the contracting parties to a marriage solemnized without a marriage
license on the basis of their affidavit that they had attained the age of majority, that being
unmarried, they had lived together for at least five (5) years and that they desired to marry each
other, the Supreme Court ruled as follows:
"x x x In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from
the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the
absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the
marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity – meaning no third
party was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity – that is unbroken. Otherwise, if
that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties
were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then the law would be
sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing
them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a
special relationship must be respected as such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The
presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the
approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse to
not comply with every single requirement and later use the same missing element as a pre-
conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from securing a
marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It should
be noted that a license is required in order to notify the public that two persons are about to be
united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the
union of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar.
Article 80(3) of the Civil Code provides that a marriage solemnized without a marriage license, save
marriages of exceptional character, shall be void from the beginning. Inasmuch as the marriage
between Jose and Felisa is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license,
it is, therefore, void ab initio because of the absence of a marriage license.21
Felisa sought reconsideration of the Amended Decision, but to no avail. The appellate court
rendered a Resolution22 dated 10 May 2007, denying Felisa’s motion.
Meanwhile, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed
a Petition for Review before this Court in G.R. No. 175581, praying that the Court of Appeals’
Amended Decision dated 7 November 2006 be reversed and set aside for lack of merit, and that
the marriage between Jose and Felisa be declared valid and subsisting. Felisa filed a separate
Petition for Review, docketed as G.R. No. 179474, similarly assailing the appellate court’s Amended
Decision. On 1 August 2007, this Court resolved to consolidate the two Petitions in the interest of
uniformity of the Court rulings in similar cases brought before it for resolution.23
The Republic of the Philippines propounds the following arguments for the allowance of its
Petition, to wit:
I parties and their witnesses, and must be considered a primary evidence of marriage. To further
RESPONDENT FAILED TO OVERTHROW THE PRESUMPTION OF THE VALIDITY OF HIS MARRIAGE TO
FELISA.
II
RESPONDENT DID NOT COME TO THE COURT WITH CLEAN HANDS AND SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED
TO PROFIT FROM HIS OWN FRAUDULENT CONDUCT.
III
RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE LEGALITY OF HIS MARRIAGE FOR LACK OF
MARRIAGE LICEN[S]E.24
Correlative to the above, Felisa submits that the Court of Appeals misapplied Niñal.25 She
differentiates the case at bar from Niñal by reasoning that one of the parties therein had an
existing prior marriage, a circumstance which does not obtain in her cohabitation with Jose.
Finally, Felisa adduces that Jose only sought the annulment of their marriage after a criminal case
for bigamy and an administrative case had been filed against him in order to avoid liability. Felisa
surmises that the declaration of nullity of their marriage would exonerate Jose from any liability.
For our resolution is the validity of the marriage between Jose and Felisa. To reach a considered
ruling on the issue, we shall jointly tackle the related arguments vented by petitioners Republic of
the Philippines and Felisa.
The Republic of the Philippines asserts that several circumstances give rise to the presumption that
a valid marriage exists between Jose and Felisa. For her part, Felisa echoes the claim that any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage by citing this Court’s ruling in
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals.26 To buttress its assertion, the Republic points to the affidavit
executed by Jose and Felisa, dated 24 November 1986, attesting that they have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years, which they used in lieu of a marriage license. It is the
Republic’s position that the falsity of the statements in the affidavit does not affect the validity of
the marriage, as the essential and formal requisites were complied with; and the solemnizing
officer was not required to investigate as to whether the said affidavit was legally obtained. The
Republic opines that as a marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license
was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by the fact that the parties
incorporated a fabricated statement in their affidavit that they cohabited as husband and wife for
at least five years. In addition, the Republic posits that the parties’ marriage contract states that
their marriage was solemnized under Article 76 of the Civil Code. It also bears the signature of the
fortify its Petition, the Republic adduces the following documents: (1) Jose’s notarized Statement
of Assets and Liabilities, dated 12 May 1988 wherein he wrote Felisa’s name as his wife; (2)
Certification dated 25 July 1993 issued by the Barangay Chairman 192, Zone ZZ, District 24 of Pasay
City, attesting that Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband and wife in said barangay; and (3)
Jose’s company ID card, dated 2 May 1988, indicating Felisa’s name as his wife.
The first assignment of error compels this Court to rule on the issue of the effect of a false affidavit
under Article 76 of the Civil Code. A survey of the prevailing rules is in order.
It is beyond dispute that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was celebrated on 24 November 1986,
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. Accordingly, the Civil Code governs their union. Article
53 of the Civil Code spells out the essential requisites of marriage as a contract:
ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character. (Emphasis ours.)
Article 5827 makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being
issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting party habitually
resides, save marriages of an exceptional character authorized by the Civil Code, but not those
under Article 75.28 Article 80(3)29 of the Civil Code makes it clear that a marriage performed
without the corresponding marriage license is void, this being nothing more than the legitimate
consequence flowing from the fact that the license is the essence of the marriage contract.30 This
is in stark contrast to the old Marriage Law,31 whereby the absence of a marriage license did not
make the marriage void. The rationale for the compulsory character of a marriage license under
the Civil Code is that it is the authority granted by the State to the contracting parties, after the
proper government official has inquired into their capacity to contract marriage.32
Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by Chapter 2, Title III,
comprising Articles 72 to 79. To wit, these marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo mortis or at the
point of death during peace or war, (2) marriages in remote places, (2) consular marriages,33 (3)
ratification of marital cohabitation, (4) religious ratification of a civil marriage, (5) Mohammedan or
pagan marriages, and (6) mixed marriages.34
The instant case pertains to a ratification of marital cohabitation under Article 76 of the Civil Code,
which provides:
ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have attained the
age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least
five years, desire to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an
affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The official, priest or minister
who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the
ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to
the marriage.
The reason for the law,35 as espoused by the Code Commission, is that the publicity attending a
marriage license may discourage such persons who have lived in a state of cohabitation from
legalizing their status.36
It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was performed without a marriage
license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit declaring that "they have attained the age of
maturity; that being unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years; and that because of this union, they desire to marry each other."37 One of the central issues
in the Petition at bar is thus: whether the falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the
parties have in truth fallen short of the minimum five-year requirement, effectively renders the
marriage void ab initio for lack of a marriage license.
We answer in the affirmative.
Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the
indispensability of the formal requisite of a marriage license. Under the rules of statutory
construction, exceptions, as a general rule, should be strictly38 but reasonably construed.39 They
extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of
the general provisions rather than the exception.40 Where a general rule is established by statute
with exceptions, the court will not curtail the former or add to the latter by implication.41 For the
exception in Article 76 to apply, it is a sine qua non thereto that the man and the woman must
have attained the age of majority, and that, being unmarried, they have lived together as husband
and wife for at least five years.
A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us with no other expediency but to read
the law as it is plainly written. The exception of a marriage license under Article 76 applies only to
those who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and desire to marry each
other. The Civil Code, in no ambiguous terms, places a minimum period requirement of five years
of cohabitation. No other reading of the law can be had, since the language of Article 76 is precise.
The minimum requisite of five years of cohabitation is an indispensability carved in the language of
the law. For a marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid, this material fact cannot be
dispensed with. It is embodied in the law not as a directory requirement, but as one that partakes
of a mandatory character. It is worthy to mention that Article 76 also prescribes that the
contracting parties shall state the requisite facts42 in an affidavit before any person authorized by
law to administer oaths; and that the official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall
also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the
contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.
It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time
they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. The Republic admitted that Jose and
Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of
their marriage.43 The Court of Appeals also noted Felisa’s testimony that Jose was introduced to
her by her neighbor, Teresita Perwel, sometime in February or March 1986 after the EDSA
Revolution.44 The appellate court also cited Felisa’s own testimony that it was only in June 1986
when Jose commenced to live in her house.45
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the question as to whether they satisfied the minimum five-year
requisite is factual in nature. A question of fact arises when there is a need to decide on the truth
or falsehood of the alleged facts.46 Under Rule 45, factual findings are ordinarily not subject to this
Court’s review.47 It is already well-settled that:
The general rule is that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding on this Court. A
recognized exception to this rule is when the Court of Appeals and the trial court, or in this case
the administrative body, make contradictory findings. However, the exception does not apply in
every instance that the Court of Appeals and the trial court or administrative body disagree. The
factual findings of the Court of Appeals remain conclusive on this Court if such findings are
supported by the record or based on substantial evidence.48
Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24 November 1986, executed by Jose and Felisa to
exempt them from the requirement of a marriage license, is beyond question.
We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the statements in the parties’
affidavit will not affect the validity of marriage, since all the essential and formal requisites were
complied with. The argument deserves scant merit. Patently, it cannot be denied that the marriage
between Jose and Felisa was celebrated without the formal requisite of a marriage license. Neither
did Jose and Felisa meet the explicit legal requirement in Article 76, that they should have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years, so as to be excepted from the requirement of
a marriage license.
Anent petitioners’ reliance on the presumption of marriage, this Court holds that the same finds
no applicability to the case at bar. Essentially, when we speak of a presumption of marriage, it is
with reference to the prima facie presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.49 Restated more explicitly,
persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-
presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married.50 The present case does not
involve an apparent marriage to which the presumption still needs to be applied. There is no
question that Jose and Felisa actually entered into a contract of marriage on 24 November 1986,
hence, compelling Jose to institute a Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage, which spawned the instant consolidated Petitions.
In the same vein, the declaration of the Civil Code51 that every intendment of law or fact leans
towards the validity of marriage will not salvage the parties’ marriage, and extricate them from the
effect of a violation of the law. The marriage of Jose and Felisa was entered into without the
requisite marriage license or compliance with the stringent requirements of a marriage under
exceptional circumstance. The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation
of the law and would lead or could be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud against innocent
and unwary parties, which was one of the evils that the law sought to prevent by making a prior
license a prerequisite for a valid marriage.52 The protection of marriage as a sacred institution
requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as
well.53 To permit a false affidavit to take the place of a marriage license is to allow an abject
circumvention of the law. If this Court is to protect the fabric of the institution of marriage, we
must be wary of deceptive schemes that violate the legal measures set forth in our laws.
Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic that as a marriage under a
license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage
not be invalidated by a fabricated statement that the parties have cohabited for at least five years
as required by law. The contrast is flagrant. The former is with reference to an irregularity of the
marriage license, and not to the absence of one. Here, there is no marriage license at all.
Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and
Felisa’s cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the
requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential
fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath. If the
essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of paper, without force
and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at all.
In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts forth the argument that based on equity, Jose
should be denied relief because he perpetrated the fabrication, and cannot thereby profit from his
wrongdoing. This is a misplaced invocation. It must be stated that equity finds no room for
application where there is a law.54 There is a law on the ratification of marital cohabitation, which
is set in precise terms under Article 76 of the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the authorities are
consistent that the declaration of nullity of the parties’ marriage is without prejudice to their
criminal liability.55
The Republic further avers in its third assignment of error that Jose is deemed estopped from
assailing the legality of his marriage for lack of a marriage license. It is claimed that Jose and Felisa
had lived together from 1986 to 1990, notwithstanding Jose’s subsequent marriage to Rufina
Pascual on 31 August 1990, and that it took Jose seven years before he sought the declaration of
nullity; hence, estoppel had set in.
This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible.56 Jose and Felisa’s marriage
was celebrated sans a marriage license. No other conclusion can be reached except that it is void
ab initio. In this case, the right to impugn a void marriage does not prescribe, and may be raised
any time.
Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the rule that the five-year common-law
cohabitation period under Article 76 means a five-year period computed back from the date of
celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of a
marriage.57 It covers the years immediately preceding the day of the marriage, characterized by
exclusivity - meaning no third party was involved at any time within the five years - and continuity
that is unbroken.58
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 7
November 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, declaring the marriage of Jose Dayot to Felisa Tecson-
Dayot void ab initio, is AFFIRMED, without prejudice to their criminal liability, if any. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
12. G.R. No. 160172 February 13, 2008
REINEL ANTHONY B. DE CASTRO, petitioner,
vs.
ANNABELLE ASSIDAO-DE CASTRO, respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV. No. 69166,2
declaring that (1) Reianna Tricia A. De Castro is the legitimate child of the petitioner; and (2) that
the marriage between petitioner and respondent is valid until properly nullified by a competent
court in a proceeding instituted for that purpose.
The facts of the case, as culled from the records, follow.
Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991. They planned to get married,
thus they applied for a marriage license with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City in
September 1994. They had their first sexual relation sometime in October 1994, and had regularly
engaged in sex thereafter. When the couple went back to the Office of the Civil Registrar, the
marriage license had already expired. Thus, in order to push through with the plan, in lieu of a
marriage license, they executed an affidavit dated 13 March 1995 stating that they had been living
together as husband and wife for at least five years. The couple got married on the same date,
with Judge Jose C. Bernabe, presiding judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City,
administering the civil rites. Nevertheless, after the ceremony, petitioner and respondent went
back to their respective homes and did not live together as husband and wife.
On 13 November 1995, respondent gave birth to a child named Reinna Tricia A. De Castro. Since
the child’s birth, respondent has been the one supporting her out of her income as a government
dentist and from her private practice.
On 4 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for support against petitioner before the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City (trial court.3 In her complaint, respondent alleged that she is married to
petitioner and that the latter has "reneged on his responsibility/obligation to financially support
her "as his wife and Reinna Tricia as his child."4
Petitioner denied that he is married to respondent, claiming that their marriage is void ab initio
since the marriage was facilitated by a fake affidavit; and that he was merely prevailed upon by
respondent to sign the marriage contract to save her from embarrassment and possible
administrative prosecution due to her pregnant state; and that he was not able to get parental
advice from his parents before he got married. He also averred that they never lived together as
husband and wife and that he has never seen nor acknowledged the child.
In its Decision dated 16 October 2000,5 the trial court ruled that the marriage between petitioner
and respondent is not valid because it was solemnized without a marriage license. However, it
declared petitioner as the natural father of the child, and thus obliged to give her support.
Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the lower court committed grave
abuse of discretion when, on the basis of mere belief and conjecture, it ordered him to provide
support to the child when the latter is not, and could not have been, his own child.
The Court of Appeals denied the appeal. Prompted by the rule that a marriage is presumed to be
subsisting until a judicial declaration of nullity has been made, the appellate court declared that
the child was born during the subsistence and validity of the parties’ marriage. In addition, the
Court of Appeals frowned upon petitioner’s refusal to undergo DNA testing to prove the paternity
and filiation, as well as his refusal to state with certainty the last time he had carnal knowledge
with respondent, saying that petitioner’s "forgetfulness should not be used as a vehicle to relieve
him of his obligation and reward him of his being irresponsible."6 Moreover, the Court of Appeals
noted the affidavit dated 7 April 1998 executed by petitioner, wherein he voluntarily admitted that
he is the legitimate father of the child.
The appellate court also ruled that since this case is an action for support, it was improper for the
trial court to declare the marriage of petitioner and respondent as null and void in the very same
case. There was no participation of the State, through the prosecuting attorney or fiscal, to see to
it that there is no collusion between the parties, as required by the Family Code in actions for
declaration of nullity of a marriage. The burden of proof to show that the marriage is void rests
upon petitioner, but it is a matter that can be raised in an action for declaration of nullity, and not
in the instant proceedings. The proceedings before the trial court should have been limited to the
obligation of petitioner to support the child and his wife on the basis of the marriage apparently
and voluntarily entered into by petitioner and respondent.7 The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 16 October 2000, of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City, National Capital Judicial Region, Brach 70, in JDRC No. 4626, is AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATIONS (1) declaring Reianna Tricia A. De Castro, as the legitimate child of the
appellant and the appellee and (2) declaring the marriage on 13 March 1995 between the
appellant and the appellee valid until properly annulled by a competent court in a proceeding
instituted for that purpose. Costs against the appellant.8
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the motion was denied by the Court of Appeals.9
Hence this petition.
Before us, petitioner contends that the trial court properly annulled his marriage with respondent
because as shown by the evidence and admissions of the parties, the marriage was celebrated
without a marriage license. He stresses that the affidavit they executed, in lieu of a marriage
license, contained a false narration of facts, the truth being that he and respondent never lived
together as husband and wife. The false affidavit should never be allowed or admitted as a
substitute to fill the absence of a marriage license.10 Petitioner additionally argues that there was
no need for the appearance of a prosecuting attorney in this case because it is only an ordinary
action for support and not an action for annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage.
In any case, petitioner argues that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the invalidity of
their marriage since it was validly invoked as an affirmative defense in the instant action for
support. Citing several authorities,11 petitioner claims that a void marriage can be the subject of a
collateral attack. Thus, there is no necessity to institute another independent proceeding for the
declaration of nullity of the marriage between the parties. The refiling of another case for
declaration of nullity where the same evidence and parties would be presented would entail
enormous expenses and anxieties, would be time-consuming for the parties, and would increase
the burden of the courts.12 Finally, petitioner claims that in view of the nullity of his marriage with
respondent and his vigorous denial of the child’s paternity and filiation, the Court of Appeals
gravely erred in declaring the child as his legitimate child.
In a resolution dated 16 February 2004, the Court required respondent and the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) to file their respective comments on the petition.13
In her Comment,14 respondent claims that the instant petition is a mere dilatory tactic to thwart
the finality of the decision of the Court of Appeals. Echoing the findings and rulings of the appellate
court, she argues that the legitimacy of their marriage cannot be attacked collaterally, but can only
be repudiated or contested in a direct suit specifically brought for that purpose. With regard to the
filiation of her child, she pointed out that compared to her candid and straightforward testimony,
petitioner was uncertain, if not evasive in answering questions about their sexual encounters.
Moreover, she adds that despite the challenge from her and from the trial court, petitioner
strongly objected to being subjected to DNA testing to prove paternity and filiation.15
For its part, the OSG avers that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that it was improper for the
trial court to declare null and void the marriage of petitioner and respondent in the action for
support. Citing the case of Niñal v. Bayadog,16 it states that courts may pass upon the validity of a
marriage in an action for support, since the right to support from petitioner hinges on the
existence of a valid marriage. Moreover, the evidence presented during the proceedings in the trial
court showed that the marriage between petitioner and respondent was solemnized without a
marriage license, and that their affidavit (of a man and woman who have lived together and
exclusively with each other as husband and wife for at least five years) was false. Thus, it concludes
the trial court correctly held that the marriage between petitioner and respondent is not valid.17
In addition, the OSG agrees with the findings of the trial court that the child is an illegitimate child
of petitioner and thus entitled to support.18
Two key issues are presented before us. First, whether the trial court had the jurisdiction to
determine the validity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent in an action for support
and second, whether the child is the daughter of petitioner.
Anent the first issue, the Court holds that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the validity
of the marriage between petitioner and respondent. The validity of a void marriage may be
collaterally attacked.19 Thus, in Niñal v. Bayadog, we held:
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a
marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of
heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime,
or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit
not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the
case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a
final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry.
The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of
the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of
remarriage.20
Likewise, in Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño,21 the Court ruled that it is clothed with sufficient
authority to pass upon the validity of two marriages despite the main case being a claim for death
benefits. Reiterating Niñal, we held that the Court may pass upon the validity of a marriage even in
a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. However, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to
prove the existence of grounds rendering such a marriage an absolute nullity.22
Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the
marriage void ab initio, whereas a defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the
marriage voidable.23 In the instant case, it is clear from the evidence presented that petitioner
and respondent did not have a marriage license when they contracted their marriage. Instead,
they presented an affidavit stating that they had been living together for more than five years.24
However, respondent herself in effect admitted the falsity of the affidavit when she was asked
during cross-examination, thus—
ATTY. CARPIO:
Q But despite of (sic) the fact that you have not been living together as husband and wife for the
last five years on or before March 13, 1995, you signed the Affidavit, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.25
The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal requisites of
marriage. The law dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a man and a woman who
have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and
unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The aim of this provision is to avoid
exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous
cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicant’s name
for a marriage license.26 In the instant case, there was no "scandalous cohabitation" to protect; in
fact, there was no cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed
so they could push through with the marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper.
They were not exempt from the marriage license requirement. Their failure to obtain and present
a marriage license renders their marriage void ab initio.
Anent the second issue, we find that the child is petitioner’s illegitimate daughter, and therefore
entitled to support.
Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children.27 Thus, one can prove illegitimate filiation through the record of
birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, an admission of legitimate filiation in a
public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, or the
open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child, or any other means allowed by
the Rules of Court and special laws.28
The Certificate of Live Birth29 of the child lists petitioner as the father. In addition, petitioner, in an
affidavit waiving additional tax exemption in favor of respondent, admitted that he is the father of
the child, thus stating:
1. I am the legitimate father of REIANNA TRICIA A. DE CASTRO who was born on November 3, 1995
at Better Living, Parañaque, Metro Manila;30
We are likewise inclined to agree with the following findings of the trial court:
That Reinna Tricia is the child of the respondent with the petitioner is supported not only by the
testimony of the latter, but also by respondent’s own admission in the course of his testimony
wherein he conceded that petitioner was his former girlfriend. While they were sweethearts, he
used to visit petitioner at the latter’s house or clinic. At times, they would go to a motel to have
sex. As a result of their sexual dalliances, petitioner became pregnant which ultimately led to their
marriage, though invalid, as earlier ruled. While respondent claims that he was merely forced to
undergo the marriage ceremony, the pictures taken of the occasion reveal otherwise (Exhs. "B,"
"B-1," to "B-3," "C," "C-1" and "C-2," "D," "D-1" and "D-2," "E," "E-1" and "E-2," "F," "F-1" and "F-2,"
"G," "G-1" and "G-2" and "H," "H-1" to "H-3"). In one of the pictures (Exhs. "D," "D-1" and "D-2"),
defendant is seen putting the wedding ring on petitioner’s finger and in another picture (Exhs. "E,"
"E-1" and "E-2") respondent is seen in the act of kissing the petitioner.31
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted in part. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 69166 are SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial Court Branch
70 of Pasig City in JDRC No. 4626 dated 16 October 2000 is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
13. G.R. No. 200233 JULY 15, 2015
LEONILA G. SANTIAGO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLEOF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ:
We resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Leonila G. Santiago from the
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 33566.1 The CA affirmed
the Decision and Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 7232 2 convicting her
of bigamy.
THE FACTS
Four months after the solemnization of their marriage on 29 July 1997, 3 Leonila G. Santiago and
Nicanor F. Santos faced an Information 4 for bigamy. Petitioner pleaded "not guilty," while her
putative husband escaped the criminal suit. 5
The prosecution adduced evidence that Santos, who had been married to Estela Galang since 2
June 1974, 6 asked petitioner to marry him. Petitioner, who 'was a 43-year-old widow then,
married Santos on 29 July 1997 despite the advice of her brother-in-law and parents-in-law that if
she wanted to remarry, she should choose someone who was "without responsibility." 7
Petitioner asserted her affirmative defense that she could not be included as an accused in the
crime of bigamy, because she had been under the belief that Santos was still single when they got
married. She also averred that for there to be a conviction for bigamy, his second marriage to her
should be proven valid by the prosecution; but in this case, she argued that their marriage was
void due to the lack of a marriage license.
Eleven years after the inception of this criminal case, the first wife, Estela Galang, testified for the
prosecution.1âwphi1 She alleged that she had met petitioner as early as March and April 1997, on
which occasions the former introduced herself as the legal wife of Santos. Petitioner denied this
allegation and averred that she met Galang only in August and September 1997, or after she had
already married Santos.
THE RTC RULING
The RTC appreciated the undisputed fact that petitioner married Santos during the subsistence of
his marriage to Galang. Based on the more credible account of Galang that she had already
introduced herself as the legal wife of Santos in March and April 1997, the trial court rejected the
affirmative defense of petitioner that she had not known of the first marriage. It also held that it
was incredible for a learned person like petitioner to be easily duped by a person like Santos. 8
The RTC declared that as indicated in the Certificate of Marriage, "her marriage was celebrated
without a need for a marriage license in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code, which is an
admission that she cohabited with Santos long before the celebration of their marriage." 9Thus,
the trial court convicted petitioner as follows: 10
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds the accused Leonila G. Santiago GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy, defined and penalized under Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code and imposes against her the indeterminate penalty of six ( 6) months and one (1) day
of Prision Correctional as minimum to six ( 6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as maximum.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. She contended that her marriage to Santos was void ab
initio for having been celebrated without complying with Article 34 of the Family Code, which
provides an exemption from the requirement of a marriage license if the parties have actually lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years prior to the celebration of their marriage. In
her case, petitioner asserted that she and Santos had not lived together as husband and wife for
five years prior to their marriage. Hence, she argued that the absence of a marriage license
effectively rendered their marriage null and void, justifying her acquittal from bigamy.
The RTC refused to reverse her conviction and held thus: 11
Accused Santiago submits that it is her marriage to her co-accused that is null and void as it was
celebrated without a valid marriage license x x x. In advancing that theory, accused wants this
court to pass judgment on the validity of her marriage to accused Santos, something this court
cannot do. The best support to her argument would have been the submission of a judicial decree
of annulment of their marriage. Absent such proof, this court cannot declare their marriage null
and void in these proceedings.
THE CA RULING
On appeal before the CA, petitioner claimed that her conviction was not based on proof beyond
reasonable doubt. She attacked the credibility of Galang and insisted that the former had not
known of the previous marriage of Santos.
Similar to the RTC, the CA gave more weight to the prosecution witnesses' narration. It likewise
disbelieved the testimony of Santos. Anent the lack of a marriage license, the appellate court
simply stated that the claim was a vain attempt to put the validity of her marriage to Santos in
question. Consequently, the CA affirmed her conviction for bigamy. 12
THE ISSUES
Before this Court, petitioner reiterates that she cannot be a co-accused in the instant case,
because she was not aware of Santos's previous marriage. But in the main, she argues that for
there to be a conviction for bigamy, a valid second marriage must be proven by the prosecution
beyond reasonable doubt.
Citing People v. De Lara, 13 she contends that her marriage to Santos is void because of the
absence of a marriage license. She elaborates that their marriage does not fall under any of those
marriages exempt from a marriage license, because they have not previously lived together
exclusively as husband and wife for at least five years. She alleges that it is extant in the records
that she married Santos in 1997, or only four years since she met him in 1993. Without completing
the five-year requirement, she posits that their marriage without a license is void.
In the Comment 14 filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), respondent advances the
argument that the instant Rule 45 petition should be denied for raising factual issues as regards
her husband's subsequent marriage. As regards petitioner's denial of any knowledge of Santos' s
first marriage, respondent reiterates that credible testimonial evidence supports the conclusion of
the courts a quo that petitioner knew about the subsisting marriage.
The crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent
spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings.
In Montanez v. Cipriano, 15 this Court enumerated the elements of bigamy as follows:
The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been legally married; (b) the
marriage has not been legally dissolved x x x; (c) that he contracts a second or subsequent
marriage; and (d) the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent marriage. It
is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential
requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage. (Emphasis
supplied)
For the second spouse to be indicted as a co-accused in the crime, People v. Nepomuceno, Jr. 16
instructs that she should have had knowledge of the previous subsisting marriage. People v.
Archilla 17 likewise states that the knowledge of the second wife of the fact of her spouse's
existing prior marriage constitutes an indispensable cooperation in the commission of bigamy,
which makes her responsible as an accomplice.
THE RULING OF THE COURT
The penalty for bigamy and petitioner's knowledge of Santos's first marriage
The crime of bigamy does not necessary entail the joint liability of two persons who marry each
other while the previous marriage of one of them is valid and subsisting. As explained in
Nepomuceno: 18
In the crime of bigamy, both the first and second spouses may be the offended parties depending
on the circumstances, as when the second spouse married the accused without being aware of his
previous marriage. Only if the second spouse had knowledge of the previous undissolved marriage
of the accused could she be included in the information as a co-accused. (Emphasis supplied)
Therefore, the lower courts correctly ascertained petitioner's knowledge of Santos's marriage to
Galang. Both courts consistently found that she knew of the first marriage as shown by the totality
of the following circumstances: 19 (1) when Santos was courting and visiting petitioner in the
house of her in-laws, they openly showed their disapproval of him; (2) it was incredible for a
learned person like petitioner to not know of his true civil status; and (3) Galang, who was the
more credible witness compared with petitioner who had various inconsistent testimonies,
straightforwardly testified that she had already told petitioner on two occasions that the former
was the legal wife of Santos.
After a careful review of the records, we see no reason to reverse or modify the factual findings of
the R TC, less so in the present case in which its findings were affirmed by the CA. Indeed, the trial
court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses deserves great respect, since it had the important
opportunity to observe firsthand the expression and demeanor of the witnesses during the trial. 20
Given that petitioner knew of the first marriage, this Court concurs with the ruling that she was
validly charged with bigamy. However, we disagree with the lower courts' imposition of the
principal penalty on her. To recall, the RTC, which the CA affirmed, meted out to her the penalty
within the range of prision correctional as minimum to prision mayor as maximum.
Her punishment as a principal to the crime is wrong. Archilla 21 holds that the second spouse, if
indicted in the crime of bigamy, is liable only as an accomplice. In referring to Viada, Justice Luis B.
Reyes, an eminent authority in criminal law, writes that "a person, whether man or woman, who
knowingly consents or agrees to be married to another already bound in lawful wedlock is guilty as
an accomplice in the crime of bigamy." 22 Therefore, her conviction should only be that for an
accomplice to the crime.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for a principal in the crime
of bigamy is prision mayor, which has a duration of six years and one day to twelve years. Since the
criminal participation of petitioner is that of an accomplice, the sentence imposable on her is the
penalty next lower in degree, 23 prision correctional, which has a duration of six months and one
day to six years. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, this penalty shall be
imposed in its medium period consisting of two years, four months and one day to four years and
two months of imprisonment. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, 24 petitioner shall be
entitled to a minimum term, to be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, arresto mayor,
which has a duration of one month and one day to six months imprisonment.
The criminal liability of petitioner resulting from her marriage to Santos
Jurisprudence clearly requires that for the accused to be convicted of bigamy, the second or
subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites for validity. 25 If the accused wants to
raise the nullity of the marriage, he or she can do it as a matter of defense during the presentation
of evidence in the trial proper of the criminal case. 26 In this case, petitioner has consistently27
questioned below the validity of her marriage to Santos on the ground that marriages celebrated
without the essential requisite of a marriage license are void ab initio. 28
Unfortunately, the lower courts merely brushed aside the issue. The RTC stated that it could not
pass judgment on the validity of the marriage.1âwphi1 The CA held that the attempt of petitioner
to attack her union with Santos was in vain.
On the basis that the lower courts have manifestly overlooked certain issues and facts, 29 and
given that an appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case open for review, 30 this Court now
resolves to correct the error of the courts a quo.
After a perusal of the records, it is clear that the marriage between petitioner and Santos took
place without a marriage license. The absence of this requirement is purportedly explained in their
Certificate of Marriage, which reveals that their union was celebrated under Article 34 of the
Family Code. The provision reads as follows:
No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other.
The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized
by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained
the qualifications of the contracting parties are found no legal impediment to the marriage.31
Here, respondent did not dispute that petitioner knew Santos in more or less in February 1996 32
and that after six months of courtship,33 she married him on 29 July 1997. Without any objection
from the prosecution, petitioner testified that Santos had frequently visited her in Castellano,
Nueva Ecija, prior to their marriage. However, he never cohabited with her, as she was residing in
the house of her in-laws,34 and her children from her previous marriage disliked him.35 On cross
examination, respondent did not question the claim of petitioner that sometime in 1993, she first
met Santos as an agent who sold her piglets.36
All told, the evidence on record shows that petitioner and Santos had only known each other for
only less than four years. Thus, it follows that the two of them could not have cohabited for at
least five years prior to their marriage.
Santiago and Santos, however, reflected the exact opposite of this demonstrable fact. Although
the records do not show that they submitted an affidavit of cohabitation as required by Article 34
of the Family Code, it appears that the two of them lied before the solemnizing officer and
misrepresented that they had actually cohabited for at least five years before they married each
other. Unfortunately, subsequent to this lie was the issuance of the Certificate of Marriage, 37 in
which the solemnizing officer stated under oath that no marriage license was necessary, because
the marriage was solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code.
The legal effects in a criminal case of a deliberate act to put a flaw in the marriage
The Certificate of Marriage, signed by Santos and Santiago, contained the misrepresentation
perpetrated by them that they were eligible to contract marriage without a license. We thus face
an anomalous situation wherein petitioner seeks to be acquitted of bigamy based on her illegal
actions of (1) marrying Santos without a marriage license despite knowing that they had not
satisfied the cohabitation requirement under the law; and (2) falsely making claims in no less than
her marriage contract.
We chastise this deceptive scheme that hides what is basically a bigamous and illicit marriage in an
effort to escape criminal prosecution. Our penal laws on marriage, such as bigamy, punish an
individual's deliberate disregard of the permanent and sacrosanct character of this special bond
between spouses.38 In Tenebro v. Court of Appeals,39 we had the occasion to emphasize that the
State's penal laws on bigamy should not be rendered nugatory by allowing individuals "to
deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the
consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with
the promise of futurity and commitment."
Thus, in the case at bar, we cannot countenance petitioner's illegal acts of feigning a marriage and,
in the same breath, adjudge her innocent of the crime. For us, to do so would only make a
mockery of the sanctity of marriage. 40
Furthermore, it is a basic concept of justice that no court will "lend its aid to x x x one who has
consciously and voluntarily become a party to an illegal act upon which the cause of action is
founded." 41 If the cause of action appears to arise ex turpi causa or that which involves a
transgression of positive law, parties shall be left unassisted by the courts. 42 As a result, litigants
shall be denied relief on the ground that their conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest
or fraudulent, or deceitful as to the controversy in issue. 43
Here, the cause of action of petitioner, meaning her affirmative defense in this criminal case of
bigamy, is that her marriage with Santos was void for having been secured without a marriage
license. But as elucidated earlier, they themselves perpetrated a false Certificate of Marriage by
misrepresenting that they were exempted from the license requirement based on their fabricated
claim that they had already cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years prior their
marriage. In violation of our law against illegal marriages,44 petitioner married Santos while
knowing full well that they had not yet complied with the five-year cohabitation requirement
under Article 34 of the Family Code. Consequently, it will be the height of absurdity for this Court
to allow petitioner to use her illegal act to escape criminal conviction.
The applicability of People v. De Lara
Petitioner cites De Lara as the relevant jurisprudence involving an acquittal for bigamy on the
ground that the second marriage lacked the requisite marriage license. In that case, the Court
found that when Domingo de Lara married his second wife, Josefa Rosales, on 18 August 1951, the
local Civil Registrar had yet to issue their marriage license on 19 August 1951. Thus, since the
marriage was celebrated one day before the issuance of the marriage license, the Court acquitted
him of bigamy.
Noticeably, Domingo de Lara did not cause the falsification of public documents in order to
contract a second marriage. In contrast, petitioner and Santos fraudulently secured a Certificate of
Marriage, and petitioner later used this blatantly illicit act as basis for seeking her exculpation.
Therefore, unlike our treatment of the accused in De Lara, this Court cannot regard petitioner
herein as innocent of the crime.
No less than the present Constitution provides that "marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is
the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State." 45 It must be safeguarded from
the whims and caprices of the contracting parties. 46 in keeping therefore with this fundamental
policy, this Court affirms the conviction of petitioner for bigamy
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Leonila G. Santiago is DENIED.
The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 33566 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. As modified, petitioner Leonila G. Santiago is hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy as an accomplice. She is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of six months of arresto mayor as minimum to four years of prision
correctional as maximum plus accessory penalties provided by law.
SO ORDERED.
14. G.R. No. 173614 September 28, 2007
LOLITA D. ENRICO, Petitioner,
vs.
HEIRS OF SPS. EULOGIO B. MEDINACELI AND TRINIDAD CATLI-MEDINACELI, REPRESENTED BY
VILMA M. ARTICULO, Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
The instant Petition for Certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure assails
the Order,1 dated 3 May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 6, in
Civil Case No. II-4057, granting reconsideration of its Order,2 dated 11 October 2005, and
reinstating respondents’ Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.
On 17 March 2005, respondents, heirs of Spouses Eulogio B. Medinaceli (Eulogio) and Trinidad
Catli-Medinaceli (Trinidad) filed with the RTC, an action for declaration of nullity of marriage of
Eulogio and petitioner Lolita D. Enrico. Substantially, the complaint alleged, inter alia, that Eulogio
and Trinidad were married on 14 June 1962, in Lal-lo, Cagayan.3 They begot seven children, herein
respondents, namely: Eduardo, Evelyn, Vilma, Mary Jane, Haizel, Michelle and Joseph Lloyd.4 On 1
May 2004, Trinidad died.5 On 26 August 2004, Eulogio married petitioner before the Municipal
Mayor of Lal-lo, Cagayan.6 Six months later, or on 10 February 2005, Eulogio passed away.7
In impugning petitioner’s marriage to Eulogio, respondents averred that the same was entered
into without the requisite marriage license. They argued that Article 348 of the Family Code, which
exempts a man and a woman who have been living together for at least five years without any
legal impediment from securing a marriage license, was not applicable to petitioner and Eulogio
because they could not have lived together under the circumstances required by said provision.
Respondents posited that the marriage of Eulogio to Trinidad was dissolved only upon the latter’s
death, or on 1 May 2004, which was barely three months from the date of marriage of Eulogio to
petitioner. Therefore, petitioner and Eulogio could not have lived together as husband and wife for
at least five years. To further their cause, respondents raised the additional ground of lack of
marriage ceremony due to Eulogio’s serious illness which made its performance impossible.
In her Answer, petitioner maintained that she and Eulogio lived together as husband and wife
under one roof for 21 years openly and publicly; hence, they were exempted from the
requirement of a marriage license. From their union were born Elvin Enrico and Marco Enrico, all
surnamed Medinaceli, on 28 October 1988 and 30 October 1991, respectively. She further
contended that the marriage ceremony was performed in the Municipal Hall of Lal-lo, Cagayan,
and solemnized by the Municipal Mayor. As an affirmative defense, she sought the dismissal of the
action on the ground that it is only the contracting parties while living who can file an action for
declaration of nullity of marriage.
On 11 October 2005, the RTC issued an Order,9 granting the dismissal of the Complaint for lack of
cause of action. It cited A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC,10 dated 7 March 2003, promulgated by the
Supreme Court En Banc as basis. The RTC elucidated on its position in the following manner:
The Complaint should be dismissed.
1) Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10-SC promulgated by the Supreme Court which took effect on
March 15, 2003 provides in Section 2, par. (a)11 that a petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity
of a Void Marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. The language of this rule is plain
and simple which states that such a petition may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. The
rule is clear and unequivocal that only the husband or the wife may file the petition for Declaration
of Absolute Nullity of a Void Marriage. The reading of this Court is that the right to bring such
petition is exclusive and this right solely belongs to them. Consequently, the heirs of the deceased
spouse cannot substitute their late father in bringing the action to declare the marriage null and
void.12 (Emphasis supplied.)
The dispositive portion of the Order, thus, reads:
WHEREFORE, [the] Motion to Dismiss raised as an affirmative defense in the answer is hereby
GRANTED. Accordingly, the Complaint filed by the [respondents] is hereby DISMISSED with costs
de officio. 13
Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof. Following the filing by petitioner of her
Comment to the said motion, the RTC rendered an Order14 dated 3 May 2006, reversing its Order
of 11 October 2005. Hence, the RTC reinstated the complaint on the ratiocination that the assailed
Order ignored the ruling in Niñal v. Bayadog,15 which was on the authority for holding that the
heirs of a deceased spouse have the standing to assail a void marriage even after the death of the
latter. It held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-20-SC, which provides that a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife,
applies only where both parties to a void marriage are still living.16 Where one or both parties are
deceased, the RTC held that the heirs may file a petition to declare the marriage void. The RTC
expounded on its stance, thus:
The questioned Order disregarded the case of Niñal vs. Bayadog, 328 SCRA 122 (March 14, 2000) in
which the Supreme Court, First Division, held that the heirs of a deceased person may file a
petition for the declaration of his marriage after his death. The Order subject of this motion for
reconsideration held that the case of Niñal vs. Bayadog is now superseded by the new Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriages (hereinafter referred to as the Rule) because the
Supreme Court has rejected the case of Niñal vs. Bayadog by approving the Rule on Nullity of Void
Marriages. The Order further held that it is only the husband or the wife who is (sic) the only
parties allowed to file an action for declaration of nullity of their marriage and such right is purely
personal and is not transmissible upon the death of the parties.
It is admitted that there seems to be a conflict between the case of Niñal vs. Bayadog and Section
2(a) of the Rule. In view of this, the Court shall try to reconcile the case of Niñal vs. Bayadog and
the Rule. To reconcile, the Court will have to determine [the] basic rights of the parties. The rights
of the legitimate heirs of a person who entered into a void marriage will be prejudiced particularly
with respect to their successional rights. During the lifetime of the parent[,] the heirs have only an
inchoate right over the property of the said parents. Hence, during the lifetime of the parent, it
would be proper that it should solely be the parent who should be allowed to file a petition to
declare his marriage void. However, upon the death of the parent his heirs have already a vested
right over whatever property left by the parent. Such vested right should not be frustrated by any
rules of procedure such as the Rule. Rules of Procedure cannot repeal rights granted by
substantive law. The heirs, then, have a legal standing in Court.
If the heirs are prohibited from questioning the void marriage entered by their parent, especially
when the marriage is illegal and feloniously entered into, it will give premium to such union
because the guilty parties will seldom, if ever at all, ask for the annulment of the marriage. Such
void marriage will be given a semblance of validity if the heirs will not be allowed to file the
petition after the death of the parent.
For these reasons, this Court believes that Sec. 2(a) of the Rules on Declaration of Absolute Nullity
of Marriage is applicable only when both parties to a (sic) void marriage are still living. Upon the
death of anyone of the guilty party to the void marriage, his heirs may file a petition to declare the
the (sic) marriage void, but the Rule is not applicable as it was not filed b the husband or the wife.
It shall be the ordinary rule of civil procedure which shall be applicable.17
Perforce, the decretal portion of the RTC Order of 3 May 2006 states:
In view of the foregoing, the Court grants the motion for reconsideration dated October 31, 2005
and reinstate this case.18
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing Order; however, on 1
June 2006, the RTC denied the said motion on the ground that no new matter was raised
therein.19
Hence, the instant Petition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on the sole question
of whether the case law as embodied in Niñal, or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, as specified in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC of the
Supreme Court applies to the case at bar.
At the outset, we note that petitioner took an abbreviated route to this Court, countenancing the
hierarchy of courts.
We have earlier emphasized that while the Supreme Court has the concurrent jurisdiction with the
Court of Appeals and the RTCs (for writs enforceable within their respective regions), to issue writs
of mandamus, prohibition or certiorari, the litigants are well advised against taking a direct
recourse to this Court.20 Instead, they should initially seek the proper relief from the lower courts.
As a court of last resort, this Court should not be burdened with the task of dealing with causes in
the first instance. Where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is concurrently within the
competence of the Court of Appeals or the RTC, litigants must observe the principle of hierarchy of
courts.21 However, it cannot be gainsaid that this Court has the discretionary power to brush aside
procedural lapses if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised, warrant
the immediate exercise of its jurisdiction.22 Moreover, notwithstanding the dismissibility of the
instant Petition for its failure to observe the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts, this Court will
proceed to entertain the case grounded as it is on a pure question of law.
Petitioner maintains that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs the instant case. A contrario, respondents
posit that it is Niñal which is applicable, whereby the heirs of the deceased person were granted
the right to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage after his death.
We grant the Petition.
In reinstating respondents’ Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, the RTC acted with
grave abuse of discretion.
While it is true that Niñal in no uncertain terms allowed therein petitioners to file a petition for the
declaration of nullity of their father’s marriage to therein respondent after the death of their
father, we cannot, however, apply its ruling for the reason that the impugned marriage therein
was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. The Court in Niñal recognized that the
applicable law to determine the validity of the two marriages involved therein is the Civil Code,
which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration.23 What we have before us belongs to
a different milieu, i.e., the marriage sought to be declared void was entered into during the
effectivity of the Family Code. As can be gleaned from the facts, petitioner’s marriage to Eulogio
was celebrated in 2004.1âwphi1
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is explicit in its scope, to wit:
Section 1. Scope. – This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines.
The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily. (Emphasis supplied.)
The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The coverage extends
only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on
3 August 1988.24
Moreover, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC took effect on 15 March 2003, following its publication in a
newspaper of general circulation. Thus, contrary to the opinion of the RTC, there is no need to
reconcile the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC with the ruling in Niñal, because they vary in
scope and application. As has been emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers marriages under the
Family Code of the Philippines, and is prospective in its application. The marriage of petitioner to
Eulogio was celebrated on 26 August 2004, and it squarely falls within the ambit of A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC.
Hence, in resolving the issue before us, we resort to Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which
provides:
Section 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. –
(a) Who may file. – A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed
solely by the husband or the wife. (n) (Emphasis supplied.)
There is no ambiguity in the Rule. Absolute sententil expositore non indiget. When the language of
the law is clear, no explanation of it is required. Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, makes it the
sole right of the husband or the wife to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage.
The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders explicates on Section 2(a) in the
following manner, viz:
1. Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions for annulment of voidable marriages and
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petitions cannot be filed by the compulsory
or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. [Section 2; Section 3, paragraph a]
Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriages or
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or
intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not have
a legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the
death of their predecessor, and hence can only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses
upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased
spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to preserve
marriage and not to seek its dissolution.25 (Emphasis supplied.)
Respondents clearly have no cause of action before the court a quo. Nonetheless, all is not lost for
respondents. While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the
compulsory or intestate heirs are already without any recourse under the law. They can still
protect their successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of
Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and
Provisional Orders, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of
the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity, but upon the death of a spouse in a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. Civil Case No. II-4057 filed before the Regional Trial Court
of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 6, is ORDERED DISMISSED without prejudice to challenging the validity
of the marriage of Lolita D. Enrico to Eulogio B. Medinaceli in a proceeding for the settlement of
the estate of the latter. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
15. G.R. No. 179922 December 16, 2008
JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS, petitioner,
vs.
FELICIDAD SANDOVAL, also known as FELICIDAD S. VDA. DE CARLOS or FELICIDAD SANDOVAL
CARLOS or FELICIDAD SANDOVAL VDA. DE CARLOS, and TEOFILO CARLOS II, respondents.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
ONLY a spouse can initiate an action to sever the marital bond for marriages solemnized during the
effectivity of the Family Code, except cases commenced prior to March 15, 2003. The nullity and
annulment of a marriage cannot be declared in a judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment,
or confession of judgment.
We pronounce these principles as We review on certiorari the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) which reversed and set aside the summary judgment2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in an
action for declaration of nullity of marriage, status of a child, recovery of property, reconveyance,
sum of money, and damages.
The Facts
The events that led to the institution of the instant suitare unveiled as follows:
Spouses Felix B. Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate. They left six parcels of land to their
compulsory heirs, Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos. The lots are particularly
described as follows:
Parcel No. 1
Lot No. 162 of the MUNTINLUPA ESTATE SUBDIVISION, Case No. 6137 of the Court of Land
Registration.
Exemption from the provisions of Article 567 of the Civil Code is specifically reserved.
Area: 1 hectare, 06 ares, 07 centares.
Parcel No. 2
A parcel of land (Lot No. 159-B), being a portion of Lot 159, situated in the Bo. of Alabang,
Municipality of Muntinlupa, Province of Rizal, x x x containing an area of Thirteen Thousand Four
Hundred Forty One (13,441) square meters.
Parcel No. 3
A parcel of land (Lot 159-B-2 of the subd. plan [LRC] Psd-325903, approved as a non-subd. project),
being a portion of Lot 159-B [LRC] Psd- Alabang, Mun. of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, Island of
Luzon. Bounded on the NE, points 2 to 4 by Lot 155, Muntinlupa Estate; on the SE, point 4 to 5 by
Lot 159-B-5; on the S, points 5 to 1 by Lot 159-B-3; on the W, points 1 to 2 by Lot 159-B-1 (Road
widening) all of the subd. plan, containing an area of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY (130) SQ. METERS,
more or less.
PARCEL No. 4
A parcel of land (Lot 28-C of the subd. plan Psd-13-007090, being a portion of Lot 28, Muntinlupa
Estate, L.R.C. Rec. No. 6137), situated in the Bo. of Alabang, Mun. of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila.
Bounded on the NE, along lines 1-2 by Lot 27, Muntinlupa Estate; on the East & SE, along lines 2 to
6 by Mangangata River; and on the West., along line 6-1, by Lot 28-B of the subd. plan x x x
containing an area of ONE THUSAND AND SEVENTY-SIX (1,076) SQUARE METERS.
PARCEL No. 5
PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 50, Manzana No. 18, de la subd. de Solocan. Linda por el NW, con la
parcela 49; por el NE, con la parcela 36; por el SE, con la parcela 51; y por el SW, con la calle Dos
Castillas. Partiendo de un punto marcado 1 en el plano, el cual se halla a S. gds. 01'W, 72.50 mts.
Desde el punto 1 de esta manzana, que es un mojon de concreto de la Ciudad de Manila, situado
on el esquina E. que forman las Calles Laong Laan y Dos. Castillas, continiendo un extension
superficial de CIENTO CINCUENTA (150) METROS CUADRADOS.
PARCEL No. 6
PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 51, Manzana No. 18, de la subd. De Solocon. Linda por el NW, con la
parcela 50; por el NE, con la parcela 37; por el SE, con la parcela 52; por el SW, con la Calle Dos
Castillas. Partiendo de un punto Marcado 1 en el plano, el cual se halla at S. 43 gds. 01'E, 82.50
mts. Desde el punto 1 de esta manzana, que es un mojon de concreto de la Ciudad de Manila,
situado on el esquina E. que forman las Calles Laong Laan y Dos. Castillas, continiendo una
extension superficial de CIENTO CINCUENTA (150) METROS CUADRADOS.3
During the lifetime of Felix Carlos, he agreed to transfer his estate to Teofilo. The agreement was
made in order to avoid the payment of inheritance taxes. Teofilo, in turn, undertook to deliver and
turn over the share of the other legal heir, petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos.
Eventually, the first three (3) parcels of land were transferred and registered in the name of
Teofilo. These three (3) lots are now covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 234824
issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City; TCT No. 139061 issued by the Registry of Deeds of
Makati City; and TCT No. 139058 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City.
Parcel No. 4 was registered in the name of petitioner. The lot is now covered by TCT No. 160401
issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City.
On May 13, 1992, Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by respondents Felicidad and their son,
Teofilo Carlos II (Teofilo II). Upon Teofilo's death, Parcel Nos. 5 & 6 were registered in the name of
respondent Felicidad and co-respondent, Teofilo II. The said two (2) parcels of land are covered by
TCT Nos. 219877 and 210878, respectively, issued by the Registry of Deeds of Manila.
In 1994, petitioner instituted a suit against respondents before the RTC in Muntinlupa City,
docketed as Civil Case No. 94-1964. In the said case, the parties submitted and caused the approval
of a partial compromise agreement. Under the compromise, the parties acknowledged their
respective shares in the proceeds from the sale of a portion of the first parcel of land. This includes
the remaining 6,691-square-meter portion of said land.
On September 17, 1994, the parties executed a deed of extrajudicial partition, dividing the
remaining land of the first parcel between them.
Meanwhile, in a separate case entitled Rillo v. Carlos,4 2,331 square meters of the second parcel of
land were adjudicated in favor of plaintiffs Rillo. The remaining 10,000-square meter portion was
later divided between petitioner and respondents.
The division was incorporated in a supplemental compromise agreement executed on August 17,
1994, with respect to Civil Case No. 94-1964. The parties submitted the supplemental compromise
agreement, which was approved accordingly.
Petitioner and respondents entered into two more contracts in August 1994. Under the contracts,
the parties equally divided between them the third and fourth parcels of land.
In August 1995, petitioner commenced an action, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-135, against
respondents before the court a quo with the following causes of action: (a) declaration of nullity of
marriage; (b) status of a child; (c) recovery of property; (d) reconveyance; and (e) sum of money
and damages. The complaint was raffled to Branch 256 of the RTC in Muntinlupa.
In his complaint, petitioner asserted that the marriage between his late brother Teofilo and
respondent Felicidad was a nullity in view of the absence of the required marriage license. He
likewise maintained that his deceased brother was neither the natural nor the adoptive father of
respondent Teofilo Carlos II.
Petitioner likewise sought the avoidance of the contracts he entered into with respondent
Felicidad with respect to the subject real properties. He also prayed for the cancellation of the
certificates of title issued in the name of respondents. He argued that the properties covered by
such certificates of title, including the sums received by respondents as proceeds, should be
reconveyed to him.
Finally, petitioner claimed indemnification as and by way of moral and exemplary damages,
attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs of suit.
On October 16, 1995, respondents submitted their answer. They denied the material averments of
petitioner's complaint. Respondents contended that the dearth of details regarding the requisite
marriage license did not invalidate Felicidad's marriage to Teofilo. Respondents declared that
Teofilo II was the illegitimate child of the deceased Teofilo Carlos with another woman.
On the grounds of lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter,
respondents prayed for the dismissal of the case before the trial court. They also asked that their
counterclaims for moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees, be granted.
But before the parties could even proceed to pre-trial, respondents moved for summary judgment.
Attached to the motion was the affidavit of the justice of the peace who solemnized the marriage.
Respondents also submitted the Certificate of Live Birth of respondent Teofilo II. In the certificate,
the late Teofilo Carlos and respondent Felicidad were designated as parents.
On January 5, 1996, petitioner opposed the motion for summary judgment on the ground of
irregularity of the contract evidencing the marriage. In the same breath, petitioner lodged his own
motion for summary judgment. Petitioner presented a certification from the Local Civil Registrar of
Calumpit, Bulacan, certifying that there is no record of birth of respondent Teofilo II.
Petitioner also incorporated in the counter-motion for summary judgment the testimony of
respondent Felicidad in another case. Said testimony was made in Civil Case No. 89-2384, entitled
Carlos v. Gorospe, before the RTC Branch 255, Las Piñas. In her testimony, respondent Felicidad
narrated that co-respondent Teofilo II is her child with Teofilo.5
Subsequently, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa submitted to the trial court its
report and manifestation, discounting the possibility of collusion between the parties.
RTC and CA Dispositions
On April 8, 1996, the RTC rendered judgment, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendant's (respondent's) Motion for Summary Judgment is
hereby denied. Plaintiff's (petitioner's) Counter-Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted
and summary judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff as follows:
1. Declaring the marriage between defendant Felicidad Sandoval and Teofilo Carlos solemnized at
Silang, Cavite on May 14, 1962, evidenced by the Marriage Certificate submitted in this case, null
and void ab initio for lack of the requisite marriage license;
2. Declaring that the defendant minor, Teofilo S. Carlos II, is not the natural, illegitimate, or legally
adopted child of the late Teofilo E. Carlos;
3. Ordering defendant Sandoval to pay and restitute to plaintiff the sum of P18,924,800.00
together with the interest thereon at the legal rate from date of filing of the instant complaint until
fully paid;
4. Declaring plaintiff as the sole and exclusive owner of the parcel of land, less the portion
adjudicated to plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 11975, covered by TCT No. 139061 of the Register of
Deeds of Makati City, and ordering said Register of Deeds to cancel said title and to issue another
title in the sole name of plaintiff herein;
5. Declaring the Contract, Annex "K" of complaint, between plaintiff and defendant Sandoval null
and void, and ordering the Register of Deeds of Makati City to cancel TCT No. 139058 in the name
of Teofilo Carlos, and to issue another title in the sole name of plaintiff herein;

6. Declaring the Contract, Annex M of the complaint, between plaintiff and defendant Sandoval
null and void;
7. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210877 in the names of defendant Sandoval and defendant
minor Teofilo S. Carlos II and ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to issue another title in the
exclusive name of plaintiff herein;
8. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210878 in the name of defendant Sandoval and defendant
Minor Teofilo S. Carlos II and ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to issue another title in the
sole name of plaintiff herein.
Let this case be set for hearing for the reception of plaintiff's evidence on his claim for moral
damages, exemplary damages, attorney's fees, appearance fees, and litigation expenses on June 7,
1996 at 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon.
SO ORDERED.6
Dissatisfied, respondents appealed to the CA. In the appeal, respondents argued, inter alia, that
the trial court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in rendering summary judgment annulling
the marriage of Teofilo, Sr. and Felicidad and in declaring Teofilo II as not an illegitimate child of
Teofilo, Sr.
On October 15, 2002, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC ruling, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the summary judgment appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and in lieu
thereof, a new one is entered REMANDING the case to the court of origin for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.7
The CA opined:
We find the rendition of the herein appealed summary judgment by the court a quo contrary to
law and public policy as ensconced in the aforesaid safeguards. The fact that it was appellants who
first sought summary judgment from the trial court, did not justify the grant thereof in favor of
appellee. Not being an action "to recover upon a claim" or "to obtain a declaratory relief," the rule
on summary judgment apply (sic) to an action to annul a marriage. The mere fact that no genuine
issue was presented and the desire to expedite the disposition of the case cannot justify a
misinterpretation of the rule. The first paragraph of Article 88 and 101 of the Civil Code expressly
prohibit the rendition of decree of annulment of a marriage upon a stipulation of facts or a
confession of judgment. Yet, the affidavits annexed to the petition for summary judgment
practically amount to these methods explicitly proscribed by the law.
We are not unmindful of appellee's argument that the foregoing safeguards have traditionally
been applied to prevent collusion of spouses in the matter of dissolution of marriages and that the
death of Teofilo Carlos on May 13, 1992 had effectively dissolved the marriage herein impugned.
The fact, however, that appellee's own brother and appellant Felicidad Sandoval lived together as
husband and wife for thirty years and that the annulment of their marriage is the very means by
which the latter is sought to be deprived of her participation in the estate left by the former call for
a closer and more thorough inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the case. Rather that the
summary nature by which the court a quo resolved the issues in the case, the rule is to the effect
that the material facts alleged in the complaint for annulment of marriage should always be
proved. Section 1, Rule 19 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
"Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. - Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise
admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that
party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal
separation, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved." (Underscoring
supplied)
Moreover, even if We were to sustain the applicability of the rules on summary judgment to the
case at bench, Our perusal of the record shows that the finding of the court a quo for appellee
would still not be warranted. While it may be readily conceded that a valid marriage license is
among the formal requisites of marriage, the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio
pursuant to Article 80(3) in relation to Article 58 of the Civil Code the failure to reflect the serial
number of the marriage license on the marriage contract evidencing the marriage between Teofilo
Carlos and appellant Felicidad Sandoval, although irregular, is not as fatal as appellee represents it
to be. Aside from the dearth of evidence to the contrary, appellant Felicidad Sandoval's affirmation
of the existence of said marriage license is corroborated by the following statement in the affidavit
executed by Godofredo Fojas, then Justice of the Peace who officiated the impugned marriage, to
wit:
"That as far as I could remember, there was a marriage license issued at Silang, Cavite on May 14,
1962 as basis of the said marriage contract executed by Teofilo Carlos and Felicidad Sandoval, but
the number of said marriage license was inadvertently not placed in the marriage contract for the
reason that it was the Office Clerk who filled up the blanks in the Marriage Contract who in turn,
may have overlooked the same."
Rather than the inferences merely drawn by the trial court, We are of the considered view that the
veracity and credibility of the foregoing statement as well as the motivations underlying the same
should be properly threshed out in a trial of the case on the merits.
If the non-presentation of the marriage contract - the primary evidence of marriage - is not proof
that a marriage did not take place, neither should appellants' non-presentation of the subject
marriage license be taken as proof that the same was not procured. The burden of proof to show
the nullity of the marriage, it must be emphasized, rests upon the plaintiff and any doubt should
be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.
Considering that the burden of proof also rests on the party who disputes the legitimacy of a
particular party, the same may be said of the trial court's rejection of the relationship between
appellant Teofilo Carlos II and his putative father on the basis of the inconsistencies in appellant
Felicidad Sandoval's statements. Although it had effectively disavowed appellant's prior claims
regarding the legitimacy of appellant Teofilo Carlos II, the averment in the answer that he is the
illegitimate son of appellee's brother, to Our mind, did not altogether foreclose the possibility of
the said appellant's illegitimate filiation, his right to prove the same or, for that matter, his
entitlement to inheritance rights as such.
Without trial on the merits having been conducted in the case, We find appellee's bare allegation
that appellant Teofilo Carlos II was merely purchased from an indigent couple by appellant
Felicidad Sandoval, on the whole, insufficient to support what could well be a minor's total
forfeiture of the rights arising from his putative filiation. Inconsistent though it may be to her
previous statements, appellant Felicidad Sandoval's declaration regarding the illegitimate filiation
of Teofilo Carlos II is more credible when considered in the light of the fact that, during the last
eight years of his life, Teofilo Carlos allowed said appellant the use of his name and the shelter of
his household. The least that the trial court could have done in the premises was to conduct a trial
on the merits in order to be able to thoroughly resolve the issues pertaining to the filiation of
appellant Teofilo Carlos II.8
On November 22, 2006, petitioner moved for reconsideration and for the inhibition of the
ponente, Justice Rebecca De Guia-Salvador. The CA denied the twin motions.
Issues
In this petition under Rule 45, petitioner hoists the following issues:
1. That, in reversing and setting aside the Summary Judgment under the Decision, Annex A hereof,
and in denying petitioner's Motion for reconsideration under the Resolution, Annex F hereof, with
respect to the nullity of the impugned marriage, petitioner respectfully submits that the Court of
Appeals committed a grave reversible error in applying Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code,
despite the fact that the circumstances of this case are different from that contemplated and
intended by law, or has otherwise decided a question of substance not theretofore decided by the
Supreme Court, or has decided it in a manner probably not in accord with law or with the
applicable decisions of this Honorable Court;
2. That in setting aside and reversing the Summary Judgment and, in lieu thereof, entering another
remanding the case to the court of origin for further proceedings, petitioner most respectfully
submits that the Court of Appeals committed a serious reversible error in applying Section 1, Rule
19 (now Section 1, Rule 34) of the Rules of Court providing for judgment on the pleadings, instead
of Rule 35 governing Summary Judgments;
3. That in reversing and setting aside the Summary Judgment and, in lieu thereof, entering another
remanding the case to the court of origin for further proceedings, petitioner most respectfully
submits that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion, disregarded judicial
admissions, made findings on ground of speculations, surmises, and conjectures, or otherwise
committed misapplications of the laws and misapprehension of the facts.9 (Underscoring supplied)
Essentially, the Court is tasked to resolve whether a marriage may be declared void ab initio
through a judgment on the pleadings or a summary judgment and without the benefit of a trial.
But there are other procedural issues, including the capacity of one who is not a spouse in bringing
the action for nullity of marriage.
Our Ruling
I. The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage must be proved. Neither judgment on
the pleadings nor summary judgment is allowed. So is confession of judgment disallowed.
Petitioner faults the CA in applying Section 1, Rule 1910 of the Revised Rules of Court, which
provides:
SECTION 1. Judgment on the pleadings. - Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise
admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that
party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal
separation, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.
He argues that the CA should have applied Rule 35 of the Rules of Court governing summary
judgment, instead of the rule on judgment on the pleadings.
Petitioner is misguided. The CA did not limit its finding solely within the provisions of the Rule on
judgment on the pleadings. In disagreeing with the trial court, the CA likewise considered the
provisions on summary judgments, to wit:
Moreover, even if We are to sustain the applicability of the rules on summary judgment to the
case at bench, Our perusal of the record shows that the finding of the court a quo for appellee
would still not be warranted. x x x11
But whether it is based on judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment, the CA was correct in
reversing the summary judgment rendered by the trial court. Both the rules on judgment on the
pleadings and summary judgments have no place in cases of declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage and even in annulment of marriage.
With the advent of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, known as "Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages," the question on the application of
summary judgments or even judgment on the pleadings in cases of nullity or annulment of
marriage has been stamped with clarity. The significant principle laid down by the said Rule, which
took effect on March 15, 200312 is found in Section 17, viz.:
SEC. 17. Trial. - (1) The presiding judge shall personally conduct the trial of the case. No delegation
of evidence to a commissioner shall be allowed except as to matters involving property relations of
the spouses.
(2) The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of marriage must be proved. No
judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, or confession of judgment shall be allowed.
(Underscoring supplied)
Likewise instructive is the Court's pronouncement in Republic v. Sandiganbayan.13 In that case,
We excluded actions for nullity or annulment of marriage from the application of summary
judgments.
Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, save for annulment of marriage or declaration of its
nullity or for legal separation, summary judgment is applicable to all kinds of actions.14
(Underscoring supplied)
By issuing said summary judgment, the trial court has divested the State of its lawful right and duty
to intervene in the case. The participation of the State is not terminated by the declaration of the
public prosecutor that no collusion exists between the parties. The State should have been given
the opportunity to present controverting evidence before the judgment was rendered.15
Both the Civil Code and the Family Code ordain that the court should order the prosecuting
attorney to appear and intervene for the State. It is at this stage when the public prosecutor sees
to it that there is no suppression of evidence. Concomitantly, even if there is no suppression of
evidence, the public prosecutor has to make sure that the evidence to be presented or laid down
before the court is not fabricated.
To further bolster its role towards the preservation of marriage, the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages reiterates the duty of the public prosecutor, viz.:
SEC. 13. Effect of failure to appear at the pre-trial. - (a) x x x
(b) x x x If there is no collusion, the court shall require the public prosecutor to intervene for the
State during the trial on the merits to prevent suppression or fabrication of evidence.
(Underscoring supplied)
Truly, only the active participation of the public prosecutor or the Solicitor General will ensure that
the interest of the State is represented and protected in proceedings for declaration of nullity of
marriages by preventing the fabrication or suppression of evidence.16
II. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband
or wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases commenced before the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC; and (2) Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code.
Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may not be filed by any party
outside of the marriage. The Rule made it exclusively a right of the spouses by stating:
SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. -
(a) Who may file. - A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely
by the husband or the wife. (Underscoring supplied)
Section 2(a) of the Rule makes it the sole right of the husband or the wife to file a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage. The rationale of the Rule is enlightening, viz.:
Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriages or
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or
intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not have
a legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the
death of their predecessor, and, hence, can only question the validity of the marriage of the
spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to
preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution.17 (Underscoring supplied)
The new Rule recognizes that the husband and the wife are the sole architects of a healthy, loving,
peaceful marriage. They are the only ones who can decide when and how to build the foundations
of marriage. The spouses alone are the engineers of their marital life. They are simultaneously the
directors and actors of their matrimonial true-to-life play. Hence, they alone can and should decide
when to take a cut, but only in accordance with the grounds allowed by law.
The innovation incorporated in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC sets forth a demarcation line between
marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code. The Rule
extends only to marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect
on August 3, 1988.18
The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages marks the beginning of
the end of the right of the heirs of the deceased spouse to bring a nullity of marriage case against
the surviving spouse. But the Rule never intended to deprive the compulsory or intestate heirs of
their successional rights.
While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the compulsory or intestate
heirs are without any recourse under the law. They can still protect their successional right, for, as
stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the validity of
the marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon the death of a
spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular
courts.19
It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to cases already commenced before
March 15, 2003 although the marriage involved is within the coverage of the Family Code. This is
so, as the new Rule which became effective on March 15, 200320 is prospective in its application.
Thus, the Court held in Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli,21 viz.:
As has been emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers marriages under the Family Code of the
Philippines, and is prospective in its application.22 (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case against respondent Felicidad in 1995. The
marriage in controversy was celebrated on May 14, 1962. Which law would govern depends upon
when the marriage took place.23
The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law
is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its celebration.24 But the Civil Code is
silent as to who may bring an action to declare the marriage void. Does this mean that any person
can bring an action for the declaration of nullity of marriage?
We respond in the negative. The absence of a provision in the Civil Code cannot be construed as a
license for any person to institute a nullity of marriage case. Such person must appear to be the
party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to
the avails of the suit.25 Elsewise stated, plaintiff must be the real party-in-interest. For it is basic in
procedural law that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-
in-interest.26
Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest or an interest in issue to be
affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the
question involved or a mere incidental interest. One having no material interest to protect cannot
invoke the jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an action. When plaintiff is not the real party-in-
interest, the case is dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action.27
Illuminating on this point is Amor-Catalan v. Court of Appeals,28 where the Court held:
True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the respondents were married,
or even in the Family Code, there is no specific provision as to who can file a petition to declare the
nullity of marriage; however, only a party who can demonstrate "proper interest" can file the
same. A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party-in-interest and must be based on a cause of action. Thus, in
Niñal v. Badayog, the Court held that the children have the personality to file the petition to
declare the nullity of marriage of their deceased father to their stepmother as it affects their
successional rights.
xxxx
In fine, petitioner's personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage cannot be
ascertained because of the absence of the divorce decree and the foreign law allowing it. Hence, a
remand of the case to the trial court for reception of additional evidence is necessary to determine
whether respondent Orlando was granted a divorce decree and whether the foreign law which
granted the same allows or restricts remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce decree was
obtained and the same did not allow respondent Orlando's remarriage, then the trial court should
declare respondent's marriage as bigamous and void ab initio but reduced the amount of moral
damages from P300,000.00 to P50,000.00 and exemplary damages from P200,000.00 to
P25,000.00. On the contrary, if it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained which allowed
Orlando to remarry, then the trial court must dismiss the instant petition to declare nullity of
marriage on the ground that petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan lacks legal personality to file the
same.29 (Underscoring supplied)
III. The case must be remanded to determine whether or not petitioner is a real-party-in-interest
to seek the declaration of nullity of the marriage in controversy.
In the case at bench, the records reveal that when Teofilo died intestate in 1992, his only surviving
compulsory heirs are respondent Felicidad and their son, Teofilo II. Under the law on succession,
successional rights are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent and the compulsory
heirs are called to succeed by operation of law.30
Upon Teofilo's death in 1992, all his property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of
the inheritance are transmitted to his compulsory heirs. These heirs were respondents Felicidad
and Teofilo II, as the surviving spouse and child, respectively.
Article 887 of the Civil Code outlined who are compulsory heirs, to wit:
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their legitimate
children and descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of the Civil Code.31
Clearly, a brother is not among those considered as compulsory heirs. But although a collateral
relative, such as a brother, does not fall within the ambit of a compulsory heir, he still has a right to
succeed to the estate. Articles 1001 and 1003 of the New Civil Code provide:
ART. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the
latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children
to the other half.
ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the
collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the
following articles. (Underscoring supplied)
Indeed, only the presence of descendants, ascendants or illegitimate children excludes collateral
relatives from succeeding to the estate of the decedent. The presence of legitimate, illegitimate, or
adopted child or children of the deceased precludes succession by collateral relatives.32
Conversely, if there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse,
the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the decedent.33
If respondent Teofilo II is declared and finally proven not to be the legitimate, illegitimate, or
adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner would then have a personality to seek the nullity of marriage of
his deceased brother with respondent Felicidad. This is so, considering that collateral relatives, like
a brother and sister, acquire successional right over the estate if the decedent dies without issue
and without ascendants in the direct line.
The records reveal that Teofilo was predeceased by his parents. He had no other siblings but
petitioner. Thus, if Teofilo II is finally found and proven to be not a legitimate, illegitimate, or
adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner succeeds to the other half of the estate of his brother, the first
half being allotted to the widow pursuant to Article 1001 of the New Civil Code. This makes
petitioner a real-party-interest to seek the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage of his
deceased brother with respondent Felicidad. If the subject marriage is found to be void ab initio,
petitioner succeeds to the entire estate.
It bears stressing, however, that the legal personality of petitioner to bring the nullity of marriage
case is contingent upon the final declaration that Teofilo II is not a legitimate, adopted, or
illegitimate son of Teofilo.
If Teofilo II is proven to be a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally adopted son of Teofilo, then
petitioner has no legal personality to ask for the nullity of marriage of his deceased brother and
respondent Felicidad. This is based on the ground that he has no successional right to be
protected, hence, does not have proper interest. For although the marriage in controversy may be
found to be void from the beginning, still, petitioner would not inherit. This is because the
presence of descendant, illegitimate,34 or even an adopted child35 excludes the collateral
relatives from inheriting from the decedent.
Thus, the Court finds that a remand of the case for trial on the merits to determine the validity or
nullity of the subject marriage is called for. But the RTC is strictly instructed to dismiss the nullity of
marriage case for lack of cause of action if it is proven by evidence that Teofilo II is a legitimate,
illegitimate, or legally adopted son of Teofilo Carlos, the deceased brother of petitioner.

IV. Remand of the case regarding the question of filiation of respondent Teofilo II is proper and in
order. There is a need to vacate the disposition of the trial court as to the other causes of action
before it.
Petitioner did not assign as error or interpose as issue the ruling of the CA on the remand of the
case concerning the filiation of respondent Teofilo II. This notwithstanding, We should not leave
the matter hanging in limbo.
This Court has the authority to review matters not specifically raised or assigned as error by the
parties, if their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just resolution of the case.36
We agree with the CA that without trial on the merits having been conducted in the case,
petitioner's bare allegation that respondent Teofilo II was adopted from an indigent couple is
insufficient to support a total forfeiture of rights arising from his putative filiation. However, We
are not inclined to support its pronouncement that the declaration of respondent Felicidad as to
the illegitimate filiation of respondent Teofilo II is more credible. For the guidance of the appellate
court, such declaration of respondent Felicidad should not be afforded credence. We remind the
CA of the guaranty provided by Article 167 of the Family Code to protect the status of legitimacy of
a child, to wit:
ARTICLE 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared
against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. (Underscoring supplied)
It is stressed that Felicidad's declaration against the legitimate status of Teofilo II is the very act
that is proscribed by Article 167 of the Family Code. The language of the law is unmistakable. An
assertion by the mother against the legitimacy of her child cannot affect the legitimacy of a child
born or conceived within a valid marriage.37
Finally, the disposition of the trial court in favor of petitioner for causes of action concerning
reconveyance, recovery of property, and sum of money must be vacated. This has to be so, as said
disposition was made on the basis of its finding that the marriage in controversy was null and void
ab initio.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is MODIFIED as follows:
1. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court in regard to the action on the status and
filiation of respondent Teofilo Carlos II and the validity or nullity of marriage between respondent
Felicidad Sandoval and the late Teofilo Carlos;
2. If Teofilo Carlos II is proven to be the legitimate, or illegitimate, or legally adopted son of the late
Teofilo Carlos, the RTC is strictly INSTRUCTED to DISMISS the action for nullity of marriage for lack
of cause of action;
3. The disposition of the RTC in Nos. 1 to 8 of the fallo of its decision is VACATED AND SET ASIDE.
The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to conduct trial on the merits with dispatch and to give this
case priority in its calendar.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
16. G.R. No. 158298 August 11, 2010
ISIDRO ABLAZA, Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Whether a person may bring an action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage of
his deceased brother solemnized under the regime of the old Civil Code is the legal issue to be
determined in this appeal brought by the petitioner whose action for that purpose has been
dismissed by the lower courts on the ground that he, not being a party in the assailed marriage,
had no right to bring the action.
Antecedents
On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cataingan, Masbate a
petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on December 26,
1949 between his late brother Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato.1 The case was docketed as
Special Case No. 117 entitled In Re: Petition for Nullification of Marriage Contract between
Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato; Isidro Ablaza, petitioner.
The petitioner alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had been celebrated
without a marriage license, due to such license being issued only on January 9, 1950, thereby
rendering the marriage void ab initio for having been solemnized without a marriage license. He
insisted that his being the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had died without any issue
entitled him to one-half of the real properties acquired by Cresenciano before his death, thereby
making him a real party in interest; and that any person, himself included, could impugn the
validity of the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila at any time, even after the death of
Cresenciano, due to the marriage being void ab initio.2
Ruling of the RTC
On October 18, 2000, 3 the RTC dismissed the petition, stating:
Considering the petition for annulment of marriage filed, the Court hereby resolved to DISMISS the
petition for the following reasons: 1) petition is filed out of time (action had long prescribed) and
2) petitioner is not a party to the marriage (contracted between Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila
Nonato on December 26, 1949 and solemnized by Rev. Fr. Eusebio B. Calolot).
SO ORDERED.
The petitioner seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration, but the RTC denied the motion for
reconsideration on November 14, 2000.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), assigning the lone error that:
The trial court erred in dismissing the petition for being filed out of time and that the petitioner is
not a party to the marriage.
In its decision dated January 30, 2003,4 however, the CA affirmed the dismissal order of the RTC,
thus:
While an action to declare the nullity of a marriage considered void from the beginning does not
prescribe, the law nonetheless requires that the same action must be filed by the proper party,
which in this case should be filed by any of the parties to the marriage. In the instant case, the
petition was filed by Isidro Ablaza, a brother of the deceased-spouse, who is not a party to the
marriage contracted by Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato. The contention of petitioner-
appellant that he is considered a real party in interest under Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as he stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, is simply
misplaced. Actions for annulment of marriage will not prosper if persons other than those
specified in the law file the case.
Certainly, a surviving brother of the deceased spouse is not the proper party to file the subject
petition. More so that the surviving wife, who stands to be prejudiced, was not even impleaded as
a party to said case.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error therefrom, the Orders now on appeal are hereby
AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner-appellant.
SO ORDERED.5
Hence, this appeal.
Issues
The petitioner raises the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THIS HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN CA-G.R. CV. NO.
69684 AFFIRMING THE ORDER OF DISMISSAL OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 49 AT
CATAINGAN, MASBATE IN SPECIAL PROCEEDING NO. 117 IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPLICABLE
LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE;
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN CA-G.R. CV NO.
69684 (SHOULD) BE REVERSED BASED ON EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 209 AND EXISTING
JURISPRUDENCE.
The issues, rephrased, boil down to whether the petitioner is a real party in interest in the action
to seek the declaration of nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother.
Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
A valid marriage is essential in order to create the relation of husband and wife and to give rise to
the mutual rights, duties, and liabilities arising out of such relation. The law prescribes the
requisites of a valid marriage. Hence, the validity of a marriage is tested according to the law in
force at the time the marriage is contracted.6 As a general rule, the nature of the marriage already
celebrated cannot be changed by a subsequent amendment of the governing law.7 To illustrate, a
marriage between a stepbrother and a stepsister was void under the Civil Code, but is not anymore
prohibited under the Family Code; yet, the intervening effectivity of the Family Code does not
affect the void nature of a marriage between a stepbrother and a stepsister solemnized under the
regime of the Civil Code. The Civil Code marriage remains void, considering that the validity of a
marriage is governed by the law in force at the time of the marriage ceremony.8
Before anything more, the Court has to clarify the impact to the issue posed herein of
Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 02-11-10-SC (Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages), which took effect on March 15, 2003.
Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitly provides the limitation that a petition
for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife. Such
limitation demarcates a line to distinguish between marriages covered by the Family Code and
those solemnized under the regime of the Civil Code.9 Specifically, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC extends
only to marriages covered by the Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988, but, being a
procedural rule that is prospective in application, is confined only to proceedings commenced after
March 15, 2003.10
Based on Carlos v. Sandoval,11 the following actions for declaration of absolute nullity of a
marriage are excepted from the limitation, to wit:
1. Those commenced before March 15, 2003, the effectivity date of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and
2. Those filed vis-à-vis marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code and, those
celebrated under the regime of the Family Code prior to March 15, 2003.
Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila was contracted on December 26,
1949, the applicable law was the old Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of the celebration of
the marriage. Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of the parties to the marriage as having the right to
initiate the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC had
absolutely no application to the petitioner.
The old and new Civil Codes contain no provision on who can file a petition to declare the nullity of
a marriage, and when. Accordingly, in Niñal v. Bayadog,12 the children were allowed to file after
the death of their father a petition for the declaration of the nullity of their father’s marriage to
their stepmother contracted on December 11, 1986 due to lack of a marriage license. There, the
Court distinguished between a void marriage and a voidable one, and explained how and when
each might be impugned, thuswise:
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish
the nullity of a marriage. "A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties
to their original rights or to make the marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be
absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of society as for the peace of mind of
all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and declared by
the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction." "Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a
void marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no
marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be
maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or
collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time, whether before or after the death of
either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such
marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts." It is not like a
voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding instituted
during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either, the marriage cannot be
impeached, and is made good ab initio. But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that
there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a
party can enter into a second marriage and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final
judgment to that effect. For the same reason, the law makes either the action or defense for the
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible. Corollarily, if the death of either party
would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for defense, then the same cannot be
considered imprescriptible.
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a
marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of
heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime,
or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit
not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the
case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a
final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry.
The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of
the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of
remarriage.13
It is clarified, however, that the absence of a provision in the old and new Civil Codes cannot be
construed as giving a license to just any person to bring an action to declare the absolute nullity of
a marriage. According to Carlos v. Sandoval,14 the plaintiff must still be the party who stands to be
benefited by the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit, for it is basic in procedural law
that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party in interest.15
Thus, only the party who can demonstrate a "proper interest" can file the action.16 Interest within
the meaning of the rule means material interest, or an interest in issue to be affected by the
decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved
or a mere incidental interest. One having no material interest to protect cannot invoke the
jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an action. When the plaintiff is not the real party in interest,
the case is dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action.17
Here, the petitioner alleged himself to be the late Cresenciano’s brother and surviving heir.
Assuming that the petitioner was as he claimed himself to be, then he has a material interest in the
estate of Cresenciano that will be adversely affected by any judgment in the suit. Indeed, a brother
like the petitioner, albeit not a compulsory heir under the laws of succession, has the right to
succeed to the estate of a deceased brother under the conditions stated in Article 1001 and Article
1003 of the Civil Code, as follows:
Article 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the
latter shall be entitled to one half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children
to the other half.
Article 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse,
the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the
following articles.
Pursuant to these provisions, the presence of descendants, ascendants, or illegitimate children of
the deceased excludes collateral relatives like the petitioner from succeeding to the deceased’s
estate.18 Necessarily, therefore, the right of the petitioner to bring the action hinges upon a prior
determination of whether Cresenciano had any descendants, ascendants, or children (legitimate or
illegitimate), and of whether the petitioner was the late Cresenciano’s surviving heir. Such prior
determination must be made by the trial court, for the inquiry thereon involves questions of fact.
As can be seen, both the RTC and the CA erroneously resolved the issue presented in this case. We
reverse their error, in order that the substantial right of the petitioner, if any, may not be
prejudiced.
Nevertheless, we note that the petitioner did not implead Leonila, who, as the late Cresenciano’s
surviving wife,19 stood to be benefited or prejudiced by the nullification of her own marriage. It is
relevant to observe, moreover, that not all marriages celebrated under the old Civil Code required
a marriage license for their validity;20 hence, her participation in this action is made all the more
necessary in order to shed light on whether the marriage had been celebrated without a marriage
license and whether the marriage might have been a marriage excepted from the requirement of a
marriage license. She was truly an indispensable party who must be joined herein:
xxx under any and all conditions, [her] presence being a sine qua non for the exercise of judicial
power.1avvphi1 It is precisely "when an indispensable party is not before the court [that] the
action should be dismissed." The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions
of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as
to those present.21
We take note, too, that the petitioner and Leonila were parties in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 91025 entitled
Heirs of Cresenciano Ablaza, namely: Leonila G. Ablaza and Leila Ablaza Jasul v. Spouses Isidro and
Casilda Ablaza, an action to determine who between the parties were the legal owners of the
property involved therein. Apparently, C.A.-G.R. CV No. 91025 was decided on November 26, 2009,
and the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied on June 23, 2010. As a defendant in
that action, the petitioner is reasonably presumed to have knowledge that the therein plaintiffs,
Leonila and Leila, were the wife and daughter, respectively, of the late Cresenciano. As such, Leila
was another indispensable party whose substantial right any judgment in this action will definitely
affect. The petitioner should likewise implead Leila.
The omission to implead Leonila and Leila was not immediately fatal to the present action,
however, considering that Section 11,22 Rule 3, Rules of Court, states that neither misjoinder nor
non-joinder of parties is a ground for the dismissal of an action. The petitioner can still amend his
initiatory pleading in order to implead her, for under the same rule, such amendment to implead
an indispensable party may be made "on motion of any party or on (the trial court’s) own initiative
at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just."
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is granted.
We reverse and set aside the decision dated January 30, 2003 rendered by the Court of Appeals.
Special Case No. 117 entitled In Re: Petition for Nullification of Marriage Contract between
Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato; Isidro Ablaza, petitioner, is reinstated, and its records are
returned to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 49, in Cataingan, Masbate, for further proceedings,
with instructions to first require the petitioner to amend his initiatory pleading in order to implead
Leonila Honato and her daughter Leila Ablaza Jasul as parties-defendants; then to determine
whether the late Cresenciano Ablaza had any ascendants, descendants, or children (legitimate or
illegitimate) at the time of his death as well as whether the petitioner was the brother and
surviving heir of the late Cresenciano Ablaza entitled to succeed to the estate of said deceased;
and thereafter to proceed accordingly.
No costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
17. G.R. No. 186400 October 20, 2010
CYNTHIA S. BOLOS, Petitioner,
vs.
DANILO T. BOLOS, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking a review of
the December 10, 2008 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in an original action for certiorari
under Rule 65 entitled "Danilo T. Bolos v. Hon. Lorifel Lacap Pahimna and Cynthia S. Bolos,"
docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 97872, reversing the January 16, 2007 Order of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City, Branch 69 (RTC), declaring its decision pronouncing the nullity of marriage
between petitioner and respondent final and executory.
On July 10, 2003, petitioner Cynthia Bolos (Cynthia) filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of
her marriage to respondent Danilo Bolos (Danilo) under Article 36 of the Family Code, docketed as
JDRC No. 6211.
After trial on the merits, the RTC granted the petition for annulment in a Decision, dated August 2,
2006, with the following disposition:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage between petitioner CYNTHIA S.
BOLOS and respondent DANILO T. BOLOS celebrated on February 14, 1980 as null and void ab
initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of both petitioner and respondent
under Article 36 of the Family Code with all the legal consequences provided by law.
Furnish the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan as well as the National Statistics Office (NSO) copy of
this decision.
SO ORDERED.2
A copy of said decision was received by Danilo on August 25, 2006. He timely filed the Notice of
Appeal on September 11, 2006.
In an order dated September 19, 2006, the RTC denied due course to the appeal for Danilo’s failure
to file the required motion for reconsideration or new trial, in violation of Section 20 of the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages.
On November 23, 2006, a motion to reconsider the denial of Danilo’s appeal was likewise denied.
On January 16, 2007, the RTC issued the order declaring its August 2, 2006 decision final and
executory and granting the Motion for Entry of Judgment filed by Cynthia.
Not in conformity, Danilo filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 seeking to annul
the orders of the RTC as they were rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in
excess of jurisdiction, to wit: 1) the September 19, 2006 Order which denied due course to Danilo’s
appeal; 2) the November 23, 2006 Order which denied the motion to reconsider the September
19, 2006 Order; and 3) the January 16, 2007 Order which declared the August 2, 2006 decision as
final and executory. Danilo also prayed that he be declared psychologically capacitated to render
the essential marital obligations to Cynthia, who should be declared guilty of abandoning him, the
family home and their children.
As earlier stated, the CA granted the petition and reversed and set aside the assailed orders of the
RTC. The appellate court stated that the requirement of a motion for reconsideration as a
prerequisite to appeal under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC did not apply in this case as the marriage
between Cynthia and Danilo was solemnized on February 14, 1980 before the Family Code took
effect. It relied on the ruling of this Court in Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli3 to the effect that
the "coverage [of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC] extends only to those marriages entered into during the
effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988."
Cynthia sought reconsideration of the ruling by filing her Manifestation with Motion for Extension
of Time to File Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Partial Reconsideration [of the
Honorable Court’s Decision dated December 10, 2008]. The CA, however, in its February 11, 2009
Resolution,4 denied the motion for extension of time considering that the 15-day reglementary
period to file a motion for reconsideration is non-extendible, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 40, 1997
Rules on Civil Procedure citing Habaluyas v. Japson, 142 SCRA 208. The motion for partial
reconsideration was likewise denied.
Hence, Cynthia interposes the present petition via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising the
following
ISSUES
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONED DECISION DATED
DECEMBER 10, 2008 CONSIDERING THAT:

A. THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE HONORABLE COURT IN ENRICO V. SPS. MEDINACELI IS NOT
APPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE CONSIDERING THAT THE FACTS AND THE ISSUE THEREIN ARE
NOT SIMILAR TO THE INSTANT CASE.
B. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE HONORABLE COURT IS
APLLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE, ITS RULING IN ENRICO V. SPS. MEDINACELI IS PATENTLY
ERRONEOUS BECAUSE THE PHRASE "UNDER THE FAMILY CODE" IN A.M. NO. 02-11-10-SC
PERTAINS TO THE WORD "PETITIONS" RATHER THAN TO THE WORD "MARRIAGES."
C. FROM THE FOREGOING, A.M. NO. 02-11-10-SC ENTITLED "RULE ON DECLARATION OF ABSOLUTE
NULLITY OF VOID MARRIAGES AND ANNULMENT OF VOIDABLE MARRIAGES" IS APPLICABLE TO
MARRIAGES SOLEMNIZED BEFORE THE EFFECTIVITY OF THE FAMILY CODE. HENCE, A MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION IS A PRECONDITION FOR AN APPEAL BY HEREIN RESPONDENT.
D. CONSIDERING THAT HEREIN RESPONDENT REFUSED TO COMPLY WITH A PRECONDITION FOR
APPEAL, A RELAXATION OF THE RULES ON APPEAL IS NOT PROPER IN HIS CASE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONED RESOLUTION DATED
FEBRUARY 11, 2009 CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING AND THE FACTUAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS
CASE.
III
THE TENETS OF JUSTICE AND FAIR PLAY, THE NOVELTY AND IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUE AND THE
SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES IN THIS CASE JUSTIFY AND WARRANT A LIBERAL VIEW OF THE RULES IN
FAVOR OF THE PETITIONER. MOREOVER, THE INSTANT PETITION IS MERITORIOUS AND NOT
INTENDED FOR DELAY.5
From the arguments advanced by Cynthia, the principal question to be resolved is whether or not
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC entitled "Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages," is applicable to the case at bench.
Petitioner argues that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is also applicable to marriages solemnized before the
effectivity of the Family Code. According to Cynthia, the CA erroneously anchored its decision to an
obiter dictum in the aforecited Enrico case, which did not even involve a marriage solemnized
before the effectivity of the Family Code.
She added that, even assuming arguendo that the pronouncement in the said case constituted a
decision on its merits, still the same cannot be applied because of the substantial disparity in the
factual milieu of the Enrico case from this case. In the said case, both the marriages sought to be
declared null were solemnized, and the action for declaration of nullity was filed, after the
effectivity of both the Family Code in 1988 and of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC in 2003. In this case, the
marriage was solemnized before the effectivity of the Family Code and A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC while
the action was filed and decided after the effectivity of both.
Danilo, in his Comment,6 counters that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is not applicable because his
marriage with Cynthia was solemnized on February 14, 1980, years before its effectivity. He further
stresses the meritorious nature of his appeal from the decision of the RTC declaring their marriage
as null and void due to his purported psychological incapacity and citing the mere "failure" of the
parties who were supposedly "remiss," but not "incapacitated," to render marital obligations as
required under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The Court finds the petition devoid of merit.
Petitioner insists that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs this case. Her stance is unavailing. The Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages as
contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which the Court promulgated on March 15, 2003, is explicit in
its scope. Section 1 of the Rule, in fact, reads:
Section 1. Scope – This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines.
The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.
The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The coverage extends
only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on
August 3, 1988.7 The rule sets a demarcation line between marriages covered by the Family Code
and those solemnized under the Civil Code.8
The Court finds Itself unable to subscribe to petitioner’s interpretation that the phrase "under the
Family Code" in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the word "petitions" rather than to the word
"marriages."
A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free from any doubt or
ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation. There is only room for application.9
As the statute is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and
applied without attempted interpretation. This is what is known as the plain-meaning rule or verba
legis. It is expressed in the maxim, index animi sermo, or "speech is the index of intention."
Furthermore, there is the maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or "from the words of a statute
there should be no departure."10
There is no basis for petitioner’s assertion either that the tenets of substantial justice, the novelty
and importance of the issue and the meritorious nature of this case warrant a relaxation of the
Rules in her favor. Time and again the Court has stressed that the rules of procedure must be
faithfully complied with and should not be discarded with the mere expediency of claiming
substantial merit.11 As a corollary, rules prescribing the time for doing specific acts or for taking
certain proceedings are considered absolutely indispensable to prevent needless delays and to
orderly and promptly discharge judicial business. By their very nature, these rules are regarded as
mandatory.12
The appellate court was correct in denying petitioner’s motion for extension of time to file a
motion for reconsideration considering that the reglementary period for filing the said motion for
reconsideration is non-extendible. As pronounced in Apex Mining Co., Inc. v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, 13
The rule is and has been that the period for filing a motion for reconsideration is non-extendible.
The Court has made this clear as early as 1986 in Habaluyas Enterprises vs. Japzon. Since then, the
Court has consistently and strictly adhered thereto.1avvphil
Given the above, we rule without hesitation that the appellate court’s denial of petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration is justified, precisely because petitioner’s earlier motion for extension of time
did not suspend/toll the running of the 15-day reglementary period for filing a motion for
reconsideration. Under the circumstances, the CA decision has already attained finality when
petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration. It follows that the same decision was already
beyond the review jurisdiction of this Court.
In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the RTC decision which denied due
course to respondent’s appeal and denying petitioner’s motion for extension of time to file a
motion for reconsideration.
Appeal is an essential part of our judicial system. Its purpose is to bring up for review a final
judgment of the lower court. The courts should, thus, proceed with caution so as not to deprive a
party of his right to appeal.14 In the recent case of Almelor v. RTC of Las Pinas City, Br. 254,15 the
Court reiterated: While the right to appeal is a statutory, not a natural right, nonetheless it is an
essential part of our judicial system and courts should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a
party of the right to appeal, but rather, ensure that every party-litigant has the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, free from the constraints of
technicalities.
In the case at bench, the respondent should be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits
of his appeal considering that what is at stake is the sacrosanct institution of marriage.
No less than the 1987 Constitution recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution. This
constitutional policy is echoed in our Family Code. Article 1 thereof emphasizes its permanence
and inviolability, thus:
Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered
into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of
the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are
governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the
property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.
This Court is not unmindful of the constitutional policy to protect and strengthen the family as the
basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.16
Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in
which the State is vitally interested. The State finds no stronger anchor than on good, solid and
happy families. The break up of families weakens our social and moral fabric and, hence, their
preservation is not the concern alone of the family members.17
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
18. G.R. No. 169766 March 30, 2011
ESTRELLITA JULIANO-LLAVE, Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HAJA PUTRI ZORAYDA A. TAMANO and ADIB AHMAD A. TAMANO,
Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
A new law ought to affect the future, not what is past. Hence, in the case of subsequent marriage
laws, no vested rights shall be impaired that pertain to the protection of the legitimate union of a
married couple.
This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision1 dated August 17, 2004 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 61762 and its subsequent Resolution2 dated September 13, 2005,
which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 89 declaring
petitioner Estrellita Juliano-Llave’s (Estrellita) marriage to Sen. Mamintal A.J. Tamano (Sen.
Tamano) as void ab initio.
Factual Antecedents
Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamano married Estrellita twice – initially under the
Islamic laws and tradition on May 27, 1993 in Cotabato City3 and, subsequently, under a civil
ceremony officiated by an RTC Judge at Malabang, Lanao del Sur on June 2, 1993.4 In their
marriage contracts, Sen. Tamano’s civil status was indicated as ‘divorced.’
Since then, Estrellita has been representing herself to the whole world as Sen. Tamano’s wife, and
upon his death, his widow.
On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) and her son
Adib Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf and in behalf of the rest of Sen. Tamano’s
legitimate children with Zorayda,5 filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City for the
declaration of nullity of marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for being bigamous. The
complaint6 alleged, inter alia, that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda on May 31, 1958 under civil rites,
and that this marriage remained subsisting when he married Estrellita in 1993. The complaint
likewise averred that:
11. The marriage of the deceased and Complainant Zorayda, having been celebrated under the
New Civil Code, is therefore governed by this law. Based on Article 35 (4) of the Family Code, the
subsequent marriage entered into by deceased Mamintal with Defendant Llave is void ab initio
because he contracted the same while his prior marriage to Complainant Zorayda was still
subsisting, and his status being declared as "divorced" has no factual or legal basis, because the
deceased never divorced Complainant Zorayda in his lifetime, and he could not have validly done
so because divorce is not allowed under the New Civil Code;
11.1 Moreover, the deceased did not and could not have divorced Complainant Zorayda by
invoking the provision of P.D. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, for the
simple reason that the marriage of the deceased with Complainant Zorayda was never deemed,
legally and factually, to have been one contracted under Muslim law as provided under Art. 186 (2)
of P.D. 1083, since they (deceased and Complainant Zorayda) did not register their mutual desire
to be thus covered by this law;7
Summons was then served on Estrellita on December 19, 1994. She then asked from the court for
an extension of 30 days to file her answer to be counted from January 4, 1995,8 and again, another
15 days9 or until February 18, 1995, both of which the court granted.10
Instead of submitting her answer, however, Estrellita filed a Motion to Dismiss11 on February 20,
1995 where she declared that Sen. Tamano and Zorayda are both Muslims who were married
under the Muslim rites, as had been averred in the latter’s disbarment complaint against Sen.
Tamano.12 Estrellita argued that the RTC has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case
because under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1083, or the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines (Muslim Code), questions and issues involving Muslim marriages and divorce fall under
the exclusive jurisdiction of shari’a courts.
The trial court denied Estrellita’s motion and asserted its jurisdiction over the case for declaration
of nullity.13 Thus, Estrellita filed in November 1995 a certiorari petition with this Court questioning
the denial of her Motion to Dismiss. On December 15, 1995, we referred the petition to the CA14
which was docketed thereat as CA-G.R. SP No. 39656.
During the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 39656, the RTC continued to try the case since there can be
no default in cases of declaration of nullity of marriage even if the respondent failed to file an
answer. Estrellita was allowed to participate in the trial while her opposing parties presented their
evidence. When it was Estrellita’s turn to adduce evidence, the hearings set for such purpose15
were postponed mostly at her instance until the trial court, on March 22, 1996, suspended the
proceedings16 in view of the CA’s temporary restraining order issued on February 29, 1996,
enjoining it from hearing the case.17
Eventually, however, the CA resolved the petition adverse to Estrellita in its Decision dated
September 30, 1996.18 Estrellita then elevated the appellate court’s judgment to this Court by way
of a petition for review on certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 126603.19
Subsequent to the promulgation of the CA Decision, the RTC ordered Estrellita to present her
evidence on June 26, 1997.20 As Estrellita was indisposed on that day, the hearing was reset to
July 9, 1997.21 The day before this scheduled hearing, Estrellita again asked for a
postponement.22
Unhappy with the delays in the resolution of their case, Zorayda and Adib moved to submit the
case for decision,23 reasoning that Estrellita had long been delaying the case. Estrellita opposed,
on the ground that she has not yet filed her answer as she still awaits the outcome of G.R. No.
126603.24
On June 29, 1998, we upheld the jurisdiction of the RTC of Quezon City,25 stating as one of the
reasons that as shari’a courts are not vested with original and exclusive jurisdiction in cases of
marriages celebrated under both the Civil Code and PD 1083, the RTC, as a court of general
jurisdiction, is not precluded from assuming jurisdiction over such cases. In our Resolution dated
August 24, 1998,26 we denied Estrellita’s motion for reconsideration27 with finality.
A few days before this resolution, or on August 18, 1998, the RTC rendered the aforementioned
judgment declaring Estrellita’s marriage with Sen. Tamano as void ab initio.28
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The RTC, finding that the marital ties of Sen. Tamano and Zorayda were never severed, declared
Sen. Tamano’s subsequent marriage to Estrellita as void ab initio for being bigamous under Article
35 of the Family Code of the Philippines and under Article 83 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.29
The court said:
A comparison between Exhibits A and B (supra) immediately shows that the second marriage of
the late Senator with [Estrellita] was entered into during the subsistence of his first marriage with
[Zorayda]. This renders the subsequent marriage void from the very beginning. The fact that the
late Senator declared his civil status as "divorced" will not in any way affect the void character of
the second marriage because, in this jurisdiction, divorce obtained by the Filipino spouse is not an
acceptable method of terminating the effects of a previous marriage, especially, where the
subsequent marriage was solemnized under the Civil Code or Family Code.30
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In her appeal,31 Estrellita argued that she was denied her right to be heard as
the RTC rendered its judgment even without waiting for the finality of the Decision of the Supreme
Court in G.R. No. 126603. She claimed that the RTC should have required her to file her answer
after the denial of her motion to dismiss. She maintained that Sen. Tamano is capacitated to marry
her as his marriage and subsequent divorce with Zorayda is governed by the Muslim Code. Lastly,
she highlighted Zorayda’s lack of legal standing to question the validity of her marriage to the
deceased.
In dismissing the appeal in its Decision dated August 17, 2004,32 the CA held that Estrellita can no
longer be allowed to file her answer as she was given ample opportunity to be heard but simply
ignored it by asking for numerous postponements. She never filed her answer despite the lapse of
around 60 days, a period longer than what was prescribed by the rules. It also ruled that Estrellita
cannot rely on her pending petition for certiorari with the higher courts since, as an independent
and original action, it does not interrupt the proceedings in the trial court.
As to the substantive merit of the case, the CA adjudged that Estrellita’s marriage to Sen. Tamano
is void ab initio for being bigamous, reasoning that the marriage of Zorayda and Sen. Tamano is
governed by the Civil Code, which does not provide for an absolute divorce. It noted that their first
nuptial celebration was under civil rites, while the subsequent Muslim celebration was only
ceremonial. Zorayda then, according to the CA, had the legal standing to file the action as she is
Sen. Tamano’s wife and, hence, the injured party in the senator’s subsequent bigamous marriage
with Estrellita.
In its September 13, 2005 Resolution,33 the CA denied Estrellita’s Motion for
Reconsideration/Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration where it debunked the additional
errors she raised. The CA noted that the allegation of lack of the public prosecutor’s report on the
existence of collusion in violation of both Rule 9, Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court34 and Article 48
of the Family Code35 will not invalidate the trial court’s judgment as the proceedings between the
parties had been adversarial, negating the existence of collusion. Assuming that the issues have
not been joined before the RTC, the same is attributable to Estrellita’s refusal to file an answer.
Lastly, the CA disregarded Estrellita’s allegation that the trial court erroneously rendered its
judgment way prior to our remand to the RTC of the records of the case ratiocinating that G.R. No.
126603 pertains to the issue on the denial of the Motion to Dismiss, and not to the issue of the
validity of Estrellita’s marriage to Sen. Tamano.
The Parties’ Respective Arguments
Reiterating her arguments before the court a quo, Estrellita now argues that the CA erred in
upholding the RTC judgment as the latter was prematurely issued, depriving her of the opportunity
to file an answer and to present her evidence to dispute the allegations against the validity of her
marriage. She claims that Judge Macias v. Macias36 laid down the rule that the filing of a motion
to dismiss instead of an answer suspends the period to file an answer and, consequently, the trial
court is obliged to suspend proceedings while her motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction has not yet been resolved with finality. She maintains that she merely participated in
the RTC hearings because of the trial court’s assurance that the proceedings will be without
prejudice to whatever action the High Court will take on her petition questioning the RTC’s
jurisdiction and yet, the RTC violated this commitment as it rendered an adverse judgment on
August 18, 1998, months before the records of G.R. No. 126603 were remanded to the CA on
November 11, 1998.37 She also questions the lack of a report of the public prosecutor anent a
finding of whether there was collusion, this being a prerequisite before further proceeding could
be held when a party has failed to file an answer in a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage.
Estrellita is also steadfast in her belief that her marriage with the late senator is valid as the latter
was already divorced under the Muslim Code at the time he married her. She asserts that such law
automatically applies to the marriage of Zorayda and the deceased without need of registering
their consent to be covered by it, as both parties are Muslims whose marriage was solemnized
under Muslim law. She pointed out that Sen. Tamano married all his wives under Muslim rites, as
attested to by the affidavits of the siblings of the deceased.38
Lastly, Estrellita argues that Zorayda and Adib have no legal standing to file suit because only the
husband or the wife can file a complaint for the declaration of nullity of marriage under Supreme
Court Resolution A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.39
Refuting the arguments, the Solicitor General (Sol Gen) defends the CA’s reasoning and stresses
that Estrellita was never deprived of her right to be heard; and, that filing an original action for
certiorari does not stay the proceedings of the main action before the RTC.
As regards the alleged lack of report of the public prosecutor if there is collusion, the Sol Gen says
that this is no longer essential considering the vigorous opposition of Estrellita in the suit that
obviously shows the lack of collusion. The Sol Gen also supports private respondents’ legal
standing to challenge the validity of Estrellita’s purported marriage with Sen. Tamano, reasoning
that any proper interested party may attack directly or collaterally a void marriage, and Zorayda
and Adib have such right to file the action as they are the ones prejudiced by the marital union.
Zorayda and Adib, on the other hand, did not file any comment.
Issues
The issues that must be resolved are the following:
1. Whether the CA erred in affirming the trial court’s judgment, even though the latter was
rendered prematurely because: a) the judgment was rendered without waiting for the Supreme
Court’s final resolution of her certiorari petition, i.e., G.R. No. 126603; b) she has not yet filed her
answer and thus was denied due process; and c) the public prosecutor did not even conduct an
investigation whether there was collusion;
2. Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen. Tamano was bigamous; and
3. Whether Zorayda and Adib have the legal standing to have Estrellita’s marriage declared void ab
initio.
Our Ruling
Estrellita’s refusal to file an answer eventually led to the loss of her right to answer; and her
pending petition for certiorari/review on certiorari questioning the denial of the motion to dismiss
before the higher courts does not at all suspend the trial proceedings of the principal suit before
the RTC of Quezon City.
Firstly, it can never be argued that Estrellita was deprived of her right to due process. She was
never declared in default, and she even actively participated in the trial to defend her interest.
Estrellita invokes Judge Macias v. Macias40 to justify the suspension of the period to file an answer
and of the proceedings in the trial court until her petition for certiorari questioning the validity of
the denial of her Motion to Dismiss has been decided by this Court. In said case, we affirmed the
following reasoning of the CA which, apparently, is Estrellita’s basis for her argument, to wit:
However, she opted to file, on April 10, 2001, a ‘Motion to Dismiss,’ instead of filing an Answer to
the complaint. The filing of said motion suspended the period for her to file her Answer to the
complaint. Until said motion is resolved by the Respondent Court with finality, it behooved the
Respondent Court to suspend the hearings of the case on the merits. The Respondent Court, on
April 19, 2001, issued its Order denying the ‘Motion to Dismiss’ of the Petitioner. Under Section 6,
Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure [now Section 4], the Petitioner had the balance of the
period provided for in Rule 11 of the said Rules but in no case less than five (5) days computed
from service on her of the aforesaid Order of the Respondent Court within which to file her
Answer to the complaint: x x x41 (Emphasis supplied.)
Estrellita obviously misappreciated Macias. All we pronounced therein is that the trial court is
mandated to suspend trial until it finally resolves the motion to dismiss that is filed before it.
Nothing in the above excerpt states that the trial court should suspend its proceedings should the
issue of the propriety or impropriety of the motion to dismiss be raised before the appellate
courts. In Macias, the trial court failed to observe due process in the course of the proceeding of
the case because after it denied the wife’s motion to dismiss, it immediately proceeded to allow
the husband to present evidence ex parte and resolved the case with undue haste even when,
under the rules of procedure, the wife still had time to file an answer. In the instant case, Estrellita
had no time left for filing an answer, as she filed the motion to dismiss beyond the extended
period earlier granted by the trial court after she filed motions for extension of time to file an
answer.
Estrellita argues that the trial court prematurely issued its judgment, as it should have waited first
for the resolution of her Motion to Dismiss before the CA and, subsequently, before this Court.
However, in upholding the RTC, the CA correctly ruled that the pendency of a petition for certiorari
does not suspend the proceedings before the trial court. "An application for certiorari is an
independent action which is not part or a continuation of the trial which resulted in the rendition
of the judgment complained of."42 Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is explicit in stating that "[t]he
petition shall not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or
a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the public respondent from further
proceeding in the case."43 In fact, the trial court respected the CA’s temporary restraining order
and only after the CA rendered judgment did the RTC again require Estrellita to present her
evidence.
Notably, when the CA judgment was elevated to us by way of Rule 45, we never issued any order
precluding the trial court from proceeding with the principal action. With her numerous requests
for postponements, Estrellita remained obstinate in refusing to file an answer or to present her
evidence when it was her turn to do so, insisting that the trial court should wait first for our
decision in G.R. No. 126603. Her failure to file an answer and her refusal to present her evidence
were attributable only to herself and she should not be allowed to benefit from her own dilatory
tactics to the prejudice of the other party. Sans her answer, the trial court correctly proceeded
with the trial and rendered its Decision after it deemed Estrellita to have waived her right to
present her side of the story. Neither should the lower court wait for the decision in G.R. No.
126603 to become final and executory, nor should it wait for its records to be remanded back to it
because G.R. No. 126603 involves strictly the propriety of the Motion to Dismiss and not the issue
of validity of marriage.
The Public Prosecutor issued a report as
to the non-existence of collusion.
Aside from Article 48 of the Family Code and Rule 9, Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court, the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC)44 also requries the participation of the public prosecutor in cases involving void
marriages. It specifically mandates the prosecutor to submit his investigation report to determine
whether there is collusion between the parties:
Sec. 9. Investigation report of public prosecutor.–(1) Within one month after receipt of the court
order mentioned in paragraph (3) of Section 8 above, the public prosecutor shall submit a report to
the court stating whether the parties are in collusion and serve copies thereof on the parties and
their respective counsels, if any.
(2) If the public prosecutor finds that collusion exists, he shall state the basis thereof in his report.
The parties shall file their respective comments on the finding of collusion within ten days from
receipt of a copy of the report. The court shall set the report for hearing and if convinced that the
parties are in collusion, it shall dismiss the petition.
(3) If the public prosecutor reports that no collusion exists, the court shall set the case for pre-trial.
It shall be the duty of the public prosecutor to appear for the State at the pre-trial.
Records show that the trial court immediately directed the public prosecutor to submit the
required report,45 which we find to have been sufficiently complied with by Assistant City
Prosecutor Edgardo T. Paragua in his Manifestation dated March 30, 1995,46 wherein he attested
that there could be no collusion between the parties and no fabrication of evidence because
Estrellita is not the spouse of any of the private respondents.
Furthermore, the lack of collusion is evident in the case at bar. Even assuming that there is a lack
of report of collusion or a lack of participation by the public prosecutor, just as we held in Tuason
v. Court of Appeals,47 the lack of participation of a fiscal does not invalidate the proceedings in the
trial court:
The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of marriage and legal separation
proceedings is to determine whether collusion exists between the parties and to take care that the
evidence is not suppressed or fabricated. Petitioner's vehement opposition to the annulment
proceedings negates the conclusion that collusion existed between the parties. There is no
allegation by the petitioner that evidence was suppressed or fabricated by any of the parties.
Under these circumstances, we are convinced that the non-intervention of a prosecuting attorney
to assure lack of collusion between the contending parties is not fatal to the validity of the
proceedings in the trial court.48
The Civil Code governs the marriage of Zorayda and the late Sen. Tamano; their marriage was
never invalidated by PD 1083. Sen. Tamano’s subsequent marriage to Estrellita is void ab initio.
The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in 1958, solemnized
under civil and Muslim rites.49 The only law in force governing marriage relationships between
Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950, under the provisions of which only one
marriage can exist at any given time.50 Under the marriage provisions of the Civil Code, divorce is
not recognized except during the effectivity of Republic Act No. 39451 which was not availed of
during its effectivity.
As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamano’s prior marriage to Zorayda has been severed by way
of divorce under PD 1083,52 the law that codified Muslim personal laws. However, PD 1083 cannot
benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof provides that the law applies to "marriage and
divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the
marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines."
But we already ruled in G.R. No. 126603 that "Article 13 of PD 1083 does not provide for a
situation where the parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites."53
Moreover, the Muslim Code took effect only on February 4, 1977, and this law cannot retroactively
override the Civil Code which already bestowed certain rights on the marriage of Sen. Tamano and
Zorayda. The former explicitly provided for the prospective application of its provisions unless
otherwise provided:
Art. 186 (1). Effect of code on past acts. —Acts executed prior to the effectivity of this Code shall
be governed by the laws in force at the time of their execution, and nothing herein except as
otherwise specifically provided, shall affect their validity or legality or operate to extinguish any
right acquired or liability incurred thereby.
It has been held that:
The foregoing provisions are consistent with the principle that all laws operate prospectively,
unless the contrary appears or is clearly, plainly and unequivocably expressed or necessarily
implied; accordingly, every case of doubt will be resolved against the retroactive operation of laws.
Article 186 aforecited enunciates the general rule of the Muslim Code to have its provisions
applied prospectively, and implicitly upholds the force and effect of a pre-existing body of law,
specifically, the Civil Code – in respect of civil acts that took place before the Muslim Code’s
enactment.54
An instance of retroactive application of the Muslim Code is Article 186(2) which states:
A marriage contracted by a Muslim male prior to the effectivity of this Code in accordance with
non-Muslim law shall be considered as one contracted under Muslim law provided the spouses
register their mutual desire to this effect.
Even granting that there was registration of mutual consent for the marriage to be considered as
one contracted under the Muslim law, the registration of mutual consent between Zorayda and
Sen. Tamano will still be ineffective, as both are Muslims whose marriage was celebrated under
both civil and Muslim laws. Besides, as we have already settled, the Civil Code governs their
personal status since this was in effect at the time of the celebration of their marriage. In view of
Sen. Tamano’s prior marriage which subsisted at the time Estrellita married him, their subsequent
marriage is correctly adjudged by the CA as void ab initio.
Zorayda and Adib, as the injured parties, have the legal personalities to file the declaration of
nullity of marriage. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which limits to only the husband or the wife the filing of
a petition for nullity is prospective in application and does not shut out the prior spouse from filing
suit if the ground is a bigamous subsequent marriage.
Her marriage covered by the Family Code of the Philippines,55 Estrellita relies on A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC which took effect on March 15, 2003 claiming that under Section 2(a)56 thereof, only the
husband or the wife, to the exclusion of others, may file a petition for declaration of absolute
nullity, therefore only she and Sen. Tamano may directly attack the validity of their own marriage.
Estrellita claims that only the husband or the wife in a void marriage can file a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage. However, this interpretation does not apply if the reason behind
the petition is bigamy.
In explaining why under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC only the spouses may file the petition to the
exclusion of compulsory or intestate heirs, we said:
The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders explicates on Section 2(a) in the
following manner, viz:
(1) Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions for annulment of voidable marriages and
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petitions cannot be filed by the compulsory
or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. [Section 2; Section 3, paragraph a]
Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriages or
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or
intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not have
a legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the
death of their predecessor, and hence can only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses
upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased
spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to preserve
marriage and not to seek its dissolution.57
Note that the Rationale makes it clear that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the
"aggrieved or injured spouse." If Estrellita’s interpretation is employed, the prior spouse is unjustly
precluded from filing an action. Surely, this is not what the Rule contemplated.
The subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only discovered
during the connubial period that the marriage was bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss
had already vanished. Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit from the bigamous
marriage, it would not be expected that they would file an action to declare the marriage void and
thus, in such circumstance, the "injured spouse" who should be given a legal remedy is the one in a
subsisting previous marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not
only threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of
all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will always be a
reminder of the infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage which sanctity is
protected by the Constitution.
Indeed, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC precludes the son from impugning the subsequent
marriage.1âwphi1 But in the case at bar, both Zorayda and Adib have legal personalities to file an
action for nullity. Albeit the Supreme Court Resolution governs marriages celebrated under the
Family Code, such is prospective in application and does not apply to cases already commenced
before March 15, 2003.58
Zorayda and Adib filed the case for declaration of nullity of Estrellita’s marriage in November 1994.
While the Family Code is silent with respect to the proper party who can file a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage prior to A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, it has been held that in a void
marriage, in which no marriage has taken place and cannot be the source of rights, any interested
party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even
beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage.59 Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply,
Adib, as one of the children of the deceased who has property rights as an heir, is likewise
considered to be the real party in interest in the suit he and his mother had filed since both of
them stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit.60
Since our Philippine laws protect the marital union of a couple, they should be interpreted in a way
that would preserve their respective rights which include striking down bigamous marriages. We
thus find the CA Decision correctly rendered.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed August 17, 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 61762, as well as its subsequent Resolution issued on September 13, 2005, are
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
19. G.R. No. 183896 January 30, 2013
SYED AZHAR ABBAS, Petitioner,
vs.
GLORIA GOO ABBAS, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
questioning the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated March 11, 2008 in CA-G.R. CV No.
86760, which reversed the Decision2 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM dated October 5, 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 109, Pasay City, and the CA Resolution dated July 24, 2008,
denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the CA Decision.
The present case stems from a petition filed by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas (Syed) for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gloria Goo-Abbas (Gloria) with the RTC of Pasay City,
docketed as Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM, and raffled to RTC Branch 109. Syed alleged the absence
of a marriage license, as provided for in Article 4, Chapter I, Title 1 of Executive Order No. 269,
otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines, as a ground for the annulment of his
marriage to Gloria.
In the Marriage Contract3 of Gloria and Syed, it is stated that Marriage License No. 9969967,
issued at Carmona, Cavite on January 8, 1993, was presented to the solemnizing officer. It is this
information that is crucial to the resolution of this case.
At the trial court, Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met Gloria, a Filipino citizen, in Taiwan
in 1991, and they were married on August 9, 1992 at the Taipei Mosque in Taiwan.4 He arrived in
the Philippines in December of 1992. On January 9, 1993, at around 5 o’clock in the afternoon, he
was at his mother-in-law’s residence, located at 2676 F. Muñoz St., Malate, Manila, when his
mother-in-law arrived with two men. He testified that he was told that he was going to undergo
some ceremony, one of the requirements for his stay in the Philippines, but was not told of the
nature of said ceremony. During the ceremony he and Gloria signed a document. He claimed that
he did not know that the ceremony was a marriage until Gloria told him later. He further testified
that he did not go to Carmona, Cavite to apply for a marriage license, and that he had never
resided in that area. In July of 2003, he went to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite,
to check on their marriage license, and was asked to show a copy of their marriage contract
wherein the marriage license number could be found.5 The Municipal Civil Registrar, Leodivinia C.
Encarnacion, issued a certification on July 11, 2003 to the effect that the marriage license number
appearing in the marriage contract he submitted, Marriage License No. 9969967, was the number
of another marriage license issued to a certain Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan.6 Said
certification reads as follows:
11 July 2003

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify as per Registry Records of Marriage License filed in this office, Marriage License
No. 9969967 was issued in favor of MR. ARLINDO GETALADO and MISS MYRA MABILANGAN on
January 19, 1993.
No Marriage License appear [sic] to have been issued to MR. SYED AZHAR ABBAS and MISS GLORIA
F. GOO on January 8, 1993.
This certification is being issued to Mr. Syed Azhar Abbas for whatever legal purpose or intents it
may serve.7
On cross-examination, Syed testified that Gloria had filed bigamy cases against him in 2001 and
2002, and that he had gone to the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite to get certification
on whether or not there was a marriage license on advice of his counsel.8
Petitioner also presented Norberto Bagsic (Bagsic), an employee of the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite. Bagsic appeared under a letter of authority from the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite, and brought documents pertaining to Marriage License No. 9969967, which was
issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January 20, 1993.9
Bagsic testified that their office issues serial numbers for marriage licenses and that the numbers
are issued chronologically.10 He testified that the certification dated July 11, 2003, was issued and
signed by Leodivina Encarnacion, Registrar of the Municipality of Carmona, Cavite, certifying that
Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued for Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January
19, 1993, and that their office had not issued any other license of the same serial number, namely
9969967, to any other person.11
For her part, Gloria testified on her own behalf, and presented Reverend Mario Dauz, Atty. Lorenzo
Sanchez, Felicitas Goo and May Ann Ceriola.
Reverend Mario Dauz (Rev. Dauz) testified that he was a minister of the Gospel and a barangay
captain, and that he is authorized to solemnize marriages within the Philippines.12 He testified
that he solemnized the marriage of Syed Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo at the residence of the bride
on January 9, 1993.13 He stated that the witnesses were Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez (Atty. Sanchez) and
Mary Ann Ceriola.14 He testified that he had been solemnizing marriages since 1982, and that he is
familiar with the requirements.15 Rev. Dauz further testified that Atty. Sanchez gave him the
marriage license the day before the actual wedding, and that the marriage contract was prepared
by his secretary.16 After the solemnization of the marriage, it was registered with the Local Civil
Registrar of Manila, and Rev. Dauz submitted the marriage contract and copy of the marriage
license with that office.17
Atty. Sanchez testified that he was asked to be the sponsor of the wedding of Syed Abbas and
Gloria Goo by the mother of the bride, Felicitas Goo.18 He testified that he requested a certain
Qualin to secure the marriage license for the couple, and that this Qualin secured the license and
gave the same to him on January 8, 1993.19 He further testified that he did not know where the
marriage license was obtained.20 He attended the wedding ceremony on January 9, 1993, signed
the marriage contract as sponsor, and witnessed the signing of the marriage contract by the
couple, the solemnizing officer and the other witness, Mary Ann Ceriola.21
Felicitas Goo testified that Gloria Goo is her daughter and Syed Azhar Abbas is her son-in-law, and
that she was present at the wedding ceremony held on January 9, 1993 at her house.22 She
testified that she sought the help of Atty. Sanchez at the Manila City Hall in securing the marriage
license, and that a week before the marriage was to take place, a male person went to their house
with the application for marriage license.23 Three days later, the same person went back to their
house, showed her the marriage license before returning it to Atty. Sanchez who then gave it to
Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing officer.24 She further testified that she did not read all of the contents
of the marriage license, and that she was told that the marriage license was obtained from
Carmona.25 She also testified that a bigamy case had been filed by Gloria against Syed at the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, evidenced by an information for Bigamy dated January 10, 2003,
pending before Branch 47 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila.26
As to Mary Ann Ceriola’s testimony, the counsels for both parties stipulated that: (a) she is one of
the sponsors at the wedding of Gloria Goo and Syed Abbas on January 9, 1993; (b) she was seen in
the wedding photos and she could identify all the persons depicted in said photos; and (c) her
testimony corroborates that of Felicitas Goo and Atty. Sanchez.
The respondent, Gloria, testified that Syed is her husband, and presented the marriage contract
bearing their signatures as proof.27 She and her mother sought the help of Atty. Sanchez in
securing a marriage license, and asked him to be one of the sponsors. A certain Qualin went to
their house and said that he will get the marriage license for them, and after several days returned
with an application for marriage license for them to sign, which she and Syed did. After Qualin
returned with the marriage license, they gave the license to Atty. Sanchez who gave it to Rev.
Dauz, the solemnizing officer. Gloria testified that she and Syed were married on January 9, 1993
at their residence.28
Gloria further testified that she has a daughter with Syed, born on June 15, 1993.29
Gloria also testified that she filed a bigamy case against Syed, who had married a certain Maria
Corazon Buenaventura during the existence of the previous marriage, and that the case was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 02A-03408, with the RTC of Manila.30
Gloria stated that she and Syed had already been married on August 9, 1992 in Taiwan, but that
she did not know if said marriage had been celebrated under Muslim rites, because the one who
celebrated their marriage was Chinese, and those around them at the time were Chinese.31
The Ruling of the RTC
In its October 5, 2005 Decision, the Pasay City RTC held that no valid marriage license was issued
by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite in favor of Gloria and Syed, as Marriage License
No. 9969967 had been issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan, and the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Carmona, Cavite had certified that no marriage license had been issued for Gloria and
Syed.32 It also took into account the fact that neither party was a resident of Carmona, Cavite, the
place where Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued, in violation of Article 9 of the Family
Code.33 As the marriage was not one of those exempt from the license requirement, and that the
lack of a valid marriage license is an absence of a formal requisite, the marriage of Gloria and Syed
on January 9, 1993 was void ab initio.
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner, and against the respondent
declaring as follows:
1. The marriage on January 9, 1993 between petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and respondent Gloria
Goo-Abbas is hereby annulled;
2. Terminating the community of property relations between the petitioner and the respondent
even if no property was acquired during their cohabitation by reason of the nullity of the marriage
of the parties.
3. The Local Civil Registrar of Manila and the Civil Registrar General, National Statistics Office, are
hereby ordered to cancel from their respective civil registries the marriage contracted by
petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas on January 9, 1993 in Manila.
SO ORDERED.34
Gloria filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated November 7, 2005, but the RTC denied the same,
prompting her to appeal the questioned decision to the Court of Appeals.
The Ruling of the CA
In her appeal to the CA, Gloria submitted the following assignment of errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE PETITIONER AND
RESPONDENT AS NULL AND VOID DUE TO THE ABSENCE OF A MARRIAGE LICENSE DESPITE
EVIDENCE CLEARLY SHOWING THAT THERE WAS ONE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING, AS A REQUISITE OF A VALID MARRIAGE, THE
OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT A MARRIAGE CEREMONY TOOK PLACE WITH THE
APPEARANCE OF THE CONTRACTING PARTIES BEFORE THE SOLEMNIZING OFFICER AND THEIR
PERSONAL DECLARATION THAT THEY TOOK EACH OTHER AS HUSBAND AND WIFE IN THE
PRESENCE OF NOT LESS THAN TWO WITNESSES OF LEGAL AGE.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING ON THE ISSUE OF ESTOPPEL BY LACHES ON THE PART
OF THE PETITIONER, AN ISSUE TIMELY RAISED IN THE COURT BELOW.35
The CA gave credence to Gloria’s arguments, and granted her appeal. It held that the certification
of the Municipal Civil Registrar failed to categorically state that a diligent search for the marriage
license of Gloria and Syed was conducted, and thus held that said certification could not be
accorded probative value.36 The CA ruled that there was sufficient testimonial and documentary
evidence that Gloria and Syed had been validly married and that there was compliance with all the
requisites laid down by law.37
It gave weight to the fact that Syed had admitted to having signed the marriage contract. The CA
also considered that the parties had comported themselves as husband and wife, and that Syed
only instituted his petition after Gloria had filed a case against him for bigamy.38
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 05 October 2005
and Order dated 27 January 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 109, in Civil Case
No. 03-0382-CFM are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage is DISMISSED. The marriage between Shed [sic] Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo Abbas
contracted on 09 January 1993 remains valid and subsisting. No costs.
SO ORDERED.39
Syed then filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated April 1, 200840 but the same was denied by
the CA in a Resolution dated July 24, 2008.41
Hence, this petition.
Grounds in Support of Petition
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW IN CITING REPUBLIC
VS. COURT OF APPEALS AS THE SAME IS DIAMETRICALLY INCONSISTENT AND CONTRARY TO THE
COURT’S OWN FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS IN THIS CASE.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN REVERSING AND SETTING ASIDE,
WITHOUT ANY FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS, THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
GRANTING THE PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.42
The Ruling of this Court
The petition is meritorious.
As the marriage of Gloria and Syed was solemnized on January 9, 1993, Executive Order No. 209,
or the Family Code of the Philippines, is the applicable law. The pertinent provisions that would
apply to this particular case are Articles 3, 4 and 35(3), which read as follows:
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before
the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and
wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab
initio, except as stated in Article 35(2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in Article
45.
An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or
parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxxx
(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by the preceding Chapter.
There is no issue with the essential requisites under Art. 2 of the Family Code, nor with the formal
requisites of the authority of the solemnizing officer and the conduct of the marriage ceremony.
Nor is the marriage one that is exempt from the requirement of a valid marriage license under
Chapter 2, Title I of the Family Code. The resolution of this case, thus, hinges on whether or not a
valid marriage license had been issued for the couple. The RTC held that no valid marriage license
had been issued. The CA held that there was a valid marriage license.
We find the RTC to be correct in this instance.
Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a copy thereof, and relied on
the marriage contract as well as the testimonies of her witnesses to prove the existence of said
license. To prove that no such license was issued, Syed turned to the office of the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Carmona, Cavite which had allegedly issued said license. It was there that he
requested certification that no such license was issued. In the case of Republic v. Court of
Appeals43 such certification was allowed, as permitted by Sec. 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court,
which reads:
SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. – A written statement signed by an officer having the custody of an
official record or by his deputy that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is
found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is
admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such record or entry.

In the case of Republic, in allowing the certification of the Civil Registrar of Pasig to prove the non-
issuance of a marriage license, the Court held:
The above Rule authorized the custodian of the documents to certify that despite diligent search, a
particular document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was
not to be found in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public officers
charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they are required to enter
all applications for marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage
license was issued and such other relevant data.44
The Court held in that case that the certification issued by the civil registrar enjoyed probative
value, as his duty was to maintain records of data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the marriage license of Gloria and Syed
was allegedly issued, issued a certification to the effect that no such marriage license for Gloria
and Syed was issued, and that the serial number of the marriage license pertained to another
couple, Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. A certified machine copy of Marriage License No.
9969967 was presented, which was issued in Carmona, Cavite, and indeed, the names of Gloria
and Syed do not appear in the document.
In reversing the RTC, the CA focused on the wording of the certification, stating that it did not
comply with Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
The CA deduced that from the absence of the words "despite diligent search" in the certification,
and since the certification used stated that no marriage license appears to have been issued, no
diligent search had been conducted and thus the certification could not be given probative value.
To justify that deduction, the CA cited the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals.45 It is worth noting
that in that particular case, the Court, in sustaining the finding of the lower court that a marriage
license was lacking, relied on the Certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig, which merely
stated that the alleged marriage license could not be located as the same did not appear in their
records. Nowhere in the Certification was it categorically stated that the officer involved
conducted a diligent search, nor is a categorical declaration absolutely necessary for Sec. 28, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court to apply.
Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable presumption that an official duty
has been regularly performed, absent contradiction or other evidence to the contrary. We held,
"The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of
irregularity or failure to perform a duty."46 No such affirmative evidence was shown that the
Municipal Civil Registrar was lax in performing her duty of checking the records of their office, thus
the presumption must stand. In fact, proof does exist of a diligent search having been conducted,
as Marriage License No. 996967 was indeed located and submitted to the court. The fact that the
names in said license do not correspond to those of Gloria and Syed does not overturn the
presumption that the registrar conducted a diligent search of the records of her office.
It is telling that Gloria failed to present their marriage license or a copy thereof to the court. She
failed to explain why the marriage license was secured in Carmona, Cavite, a location where,
admittedly, neither party resided. She took no pains to apply for the license, so she is not the best
witness to testify to the validity and existence of said license. Neither could the other witnesses
she presented prove the existence of the marriage license, as none of them applied for the license
in Carmona, Cavite. Her mother, Felicitas Goo, could not even testify as to the contents of the
license, having admitted to not reading all of its contents. Atty. Sanchez, one of the sponsors,
whom Gloria and Felicitas Goo approached for assistance in securing the license, admitted not
knowing where the license came from. The task of applying for the license was delegated to a
certain Qualin, who could have testified as to how the license was secured and thus impeached the
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar as well as the testimony of her representative. As
Gloria failed to present this Qualin, the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar still enjoys
probative value.
It is also noted that the solemnizing officer testified that the marriage contract and a copy of the
marriage license were submitted to the Local Civil Registrar of Manila. Thus, a copy of the marriage
license could have simply been secured from that office and submitted to the court. However,
Gloria inexplicably failed to do so, further weakening her claim that there was a valid marriage
license issued for her and Syed.
In the case of Cariño v. Cariño,47 following the case of Republic,48 it was held that the certification
of the Local Civil Registrar that their office had no record of a marriage license was adequate to
prove the non-issuance of said license. The case of Cariño further held that the presumed validity
of the marriage of the parties had been overcome, and that it became the burden of the party
alleging a valid marriage to prove that the marriage was valid, and that the required marriage
license had been secured.49 Gloria has failed to discharge that burden, and the only conclusion
that can be reached is that no valid marriage license was issued. It cannot be said that there was a
simple irregularity in the marriage license that would not affect the validity of the marriage, as no
license was presented by the respondent. No marriage license was proven to have been issued to
Gloria and Syed, based on the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite and
Gloria’s failure to produce a copy of the alleged marriage license.
To bolster its ruling, the CA cited other evidence to support its conclusion that Gloria and Syed
were validly married. To quote the CA:

Moreover, the record is replete with evidence, testimonial and documentary, that appellant and
appellee have been validly married and there was compliance with all the requisites laid down by
law. Both parties are legally capacitated to marry. A certificate of legal capacity was even issued by
the Embassy of Pakistan in favor of appellee. The parties herein gave their consent freely. Appellee
admitted that the signature above his name in the marriage contract was his. Several pictures
were presented showing appellant and appellee, before the solemnizing officer, the witnesses and
other members of appellant’s family, taken during the marriage ceremony, as well as in the
restaurant where the lunch was held after the marriage ceremony. Most telling of all is Exhibit "5-
C" which shows appellee signing the Marriage Contract.
xxxx
The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and has [sic] one offspring, Aliea
Fatima Goo Abbas, who was born on 15 June 1993. It took appellee more than ten (10) years
before he filed on 01 August 2003 his Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Article 4
of the Family Code. We take serious note that said Petition appears to have been instituted by him
only after an Information for Bigamy (Exhibit "1") dated 10 January 2003 was filed against him for
contracting a second or subsequent marriage with one Ma. Corazon (Maryam) T. Buenaventura.
We are not ready to reward (appellee) by declaring the nullity of his marriage and give him his
freedom and in the process allow him to profit from his own deceit and perfidy.50
All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was conducted and a marriage
contract was signed does not operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage license. Article 4 of
the Family Code is clear when it says, "The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall
render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2)." Article 35(3) of the Family
Code also provides that a marriage solemnized without a license is void from the beginning, except
those exempt from the license requirement under Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2, Title I of the same
Code.51 Again, this marriage cannot be characterized as among the exemptions, and thus, having
been solemnized without a marriage license, is void ab initio.1âwphi1
As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage to Gloria, it may well be that his motives
are less than pure, that he seeks to evade a bigamy suit. Be that as it may, the same does not make
up for the failure of the respondent to prove that they had a valid marriage license, given the
weight of evidence presented by petitioner. The lack of a valid marriage license cannot be
attributed to him, as it was Gloria who took steps to procure the same. The law must be applied.
As the marriage license, a formal requisite, is clearly absent, the marriage of Gloria and Syed is void
ab initio.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated
March 11, 2008 and Resolution dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
86760 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 109,
Pasay City dated October 5, 2005 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM annulling the marriage of
petitioner with respondent on January 9, 1993 is hereby REINSTATED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
20. G.R. No. 164493 March 10, 2010
JOCELYN M. SUAZO, Petitioner,
vs.
ANGELITO SUAZO and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the appeal filed by petitioner Jocelyn Suazo (Jocelyn) from the July 14, 2004 Decision of
the Court of Appeals (CA)1 in CA-G.R. CV No. 62443, which reversed the January 29, 1999
judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 119, Pasay City in Civil Case No. 97-1282.2 The
reversed RTC decision nullified Jocelyn’s marriage with respondent Angelito Suazo (Angelito) on
the ground of psychological incapacity.
THE FACTS
Jocelyn and Angelito were 16 years old when they first met in June 1985; they were residents of
Laguna at that time. After months of courtship, Jocelyn went to Manila with Angelito and some
friends. Having been gone for three days, their parents sought Jocelyn and Angelito and after
finding them, brought them back to Biñan, Laguna. Soon thereafter, Jocelyn and Angelito’s
marriage was arranged and they were married on March 3, 1986 in a ceremony officiated by the
Mayor of Biñan.
Without any means to support themselves, Jocelyn and Angelito lived with Angelito’s parents after
their marriage. They had by this time stopped schooling. Jocelyn took odd jobs and worked for
Angelito’s relatives as household help. Angelito, on the other hand, refused to work and was most
of the time drunk. Jocelyn urged Angelito to find work and violent quarrels often resulted because
of Jocelyn’s efforts.

Jocelyn left Angelito sometime in July 1987. Angelito thereafter found another woman with whom
he has since lived. They now have children.
Ten years after their separation, or on October 8, 1997, Jocelyn filed with the RTC a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended. She claimed
that Angelito was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage. In addition to the above historical narrative of their relationship, she alleged in her
complaint:
xxxx
8. That from the time of their marriage up to their separation in July 1987, their relationship had
been marred with bitter quarrels which caused unbearable physical and emotional pains on the
part of the plaintiff because defendant inflicted physical injuries upon her every time they had a
troublesome encounter;
9. That the main reason for their quarrel was always the refusal of the defendant to work or his
indolence and his excessive drinking which makes him psychologically incapacitated to perform his
marital obligations making life unbearably bitter and intolerable to the plaintiff causing their
separation in fact in July 1987;
10. That such psychological incapacity of the defendant started from the time of their marriage
and became very apparent as time went and proves to be continuous, permanent and incurable;
xxxx
Angelito did not answer the petition/complaint. Neither did he submit himself to a psychological
examination with psychologist Nedy Tayag (who was presumably hired by Jocelyn).
The case proceeded to trial on the merits after the trial court found that no collusion existed
between the parties. Jocelyn, her aunt Maryjane Serrano, and the psychologist testified at the trial.
In her testimony, Jocelyn essentially repeated the allegations in her petition, including the alleged
incidents of physical beating she received from Angelito. On cross-examination, she remained firm
on these declarations but significantly declared that Angelito had not treated her violently before
they were married.
Asst. Sol. Gen. Kim Briguera:
Q. Can you describe your relationship with the respondent before you got married?
A. He always go (sic) to our house to court me.
Q. Since you cited violence, after celebration of marriage, will you describe his behavioural (sic)
pattern before you got married?
A. He show (sic) kindness, he always come (sic) to the house.
Q. So you cannot say his behavioral pattern composing of violent nature before you got married
(sic), is there any signs (sic) of violence?
A. None maam (sic), because we were not sweethearts.
Q. Even to other people?
A. He also quarrel (sic).3
Maryjane Serrano corroborated parts of Jocelyn’s testimony.
When the psychologist took the witness stand, she declared:
Q. What about the respondent, did you also make clinical interpretation of his behavior?
A. Apparently, the behavior and actuation of the respondent during the time of the marriage the
respondent is suffering from anti-social personality Disorder this is a serious and severe apparently
incurable (sic). This disorder is chronic and long-standing before the marriage.
Q. And you based your interpretation on the report given by the petitioner?
A. Based on the psychological examination wherein there is no pattern of lying when I examined
her, the petitioner was found to be very responsive, coherent, relevant to marital relationship with
respondent.
Q. And the last page of Exhibit "E" which is your report there is a statement rather on the last
page, last paragraph which state: It is the clinical opinion of the undersigned that marriage
between the two, had already hit bottom rock (sic) even before the actual celebration of marriage.
Respondent(’s) immature, irresponsible and callous emotionality practically harbors (sic) the
possibility of having blissful relationship. His general behavior fulfill(s) the diagnostic criteria for a
person suffering from Anti Social Personality Disorder. Such disorder is serious and severe and it
interferred (sic) in his capacity to provide love, caring, concern and responsibility to his family. The
disorder is chronic and long-standing in proportion and appear(s) incurable. The disorder was
present at the time of the wedding and became manifest thereafter due to stresses and pressure
of married life. He apparently grew up in a dysfunctional family. Could you explain what does
chronic mean?
A. Chronic is a clinical language which means incurable it has been there long before he entered
marriage apparently, it came during early developmental (sic) Basic trust was not develop (sic).
Q. And this long standing proportion (sic).
A. That no amount of psychological behavioral help to cure such because psychological disorder
are not detrimental to men but to others particularly and this (sic) because the person who have
this kind of disorder do not know that they have this kind of disorder.
Q. So in other words, permanent?
A. Permanent and incurable.
Q. You also said that this psychological disorder is present during the wedding or at the time of the Court:
wedding or became manifest thereafter? Q. This Anti-Social behavior is naturally affected the petitioner (sic)?
A. They do not have children because more often than not the respondent is under the influence
A. Yes, ma’am." of alcohol, they do not have peaceful harmonious relationship during the less than one year and
one thing what is significant, respondent allowed wife to work as housemaid instead of he who
xxxx should provide and the petitioner never receive and enjoy her earning for the five months that she
work and it is also the petitioner who took sustainance of the vices. (sic)
Court: Q. And because of that Anti-Social disorder he had not shown love to the petitioner?
Q. Is there a clinical findings (sic)? A. From the very start the respondent has no emotion to sustain the marital relationship but what
A. That is the clinical findings. Personality Disorder labeled on Anti-Social Personality Disorder (sic). he need is to sustain his vices thru the petitioner (sic).
Q. How was shown during the marriage (sic)? Court:
A. The physical abuses on the petitioner also correlated without any employment exploitative and Q. What are the vices?
silent (sic) on the part of the respondent is clearly Anti-Social Disorder. A. Alcohol and gambling.
Q. Do the respondent know that he has that kind of psychological disorder (sic)? Court:
A. Usually a person suffering that psychological disorder will not admit that they are suffering that Q. And this affected psychological incapacity to perform marital obligation?
kind of disorder (sic). A. Not only that up to this time from my clinical analysis of Anti-Social Personality Disorder, he is
Court: good for nothing person.4
Q. So because of this Anti-Social Disorder the petitioner suffers a lot (sic)?
A. Yes, because the petitioner is a victim of hardships of marital relation to the respondent (sic). The psychologist also identified the Psychological Report she prepared. The Report pertinently
Court: states:5
Q. Was the Anti-Social Personality Disorder also shown to the parents (sic)? Report on the psychological condition of JOCELYN M. SUAZO, a petitioner for "Nullity of Marriage"
A. Yes, according to the petitioner, respondent never give due respect more often than not he versus ANGELITO D. SUAZO
even shouted at them for no apparent reason (sic). GENERAL DATA
Court: [This pertains to Jocelyn’s]
Q. Did you say Anti-Social Disorder incurable (sic)? BRIEF MARITAL HISTORY
A. Yes, sir. xxxx
Court: Husband is Angelito D. Suazo, 28 years old reached 3rd year high school, a part time tricycle driver,
Q. Is there a physical violence (sic)? eldest among 4 siblings. Father is a machine operator, described to be an alcoholic, womanizer and
A. Actually, I could see the petitioner is tortured mentally of the respondent (sic). a heavy gambler. While mother is a sales agent. It was a common knowledge within their vicinity
Court: that she was also involved in an illicit relationship. Familial relationship was described to be
Q. How was the petitioner tortured? stormy, chaotic whose bickering and squabbles were part and parcel of their day to day living.
A. She was able to counter-act by the time she was separated by the respondent (sic).
Court: TEST RESULTS AND EVALUATION
Q. Do you mean to tell us that Anti-Social disorder is incurable?
A. Yes, sir. Projective data reveal an introvert person whose impulse life is adequately suppressed so much so
Court: that it does not create inner tension and anxiety. She is fully equipped in terms of drives and
Q. Why did you know? motivation particularly in uplifting not, only her socio-emotional image but was as her morale. She
A. Anti-Social disorder is incurable again because the person itself, the respondent is not aware may be sensitive yet capable of containing the effect of such sensitiveness; in order to remain in
that this kind of personality affect the other party (sic). goodstead (sic) with her immediate environment.
She is pictured as a hard-working man (sic) who looks forward for a better future in spite of
difficulties she had gone through in the past. She is fully aware of external realities of life that she
set simple life goals which is (sic) commensurate with her capabilities and limitations. However,
she needs to prioritize her interest in order to direct her energy toward specific goals. Her
tolerance for frustration appears to be at par with her coping mechanism that she is able to
discharge negative trends appropriately.
REMARKS :
[Already cited in full in the psychologist’s testimony quoted above]6
The Office of the Solicitor General – representing the Republic of the Philippines – strongly
opposed the petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage. Through a Certification filed with
the RTC, it argued that the psychologist failed to examine and test Angelito; thus, what she said
about him was purely hearsay.
THE RTC RULING
The RTC annulled the marriage under the following reasoning:
While there is no particular instance setforth (sic) in the law that a person may be considered as
psychologically incapacitated, there as (sic) some admitted grounds that would render a person to
be unfit to comply with his marital obligation, such as "immaturity, i.e., lack of an effective sense of
rational judgment and responsibility, otherwise peculiar to infants (like refusal of the husband to
support the family or excessive dependence on parents or peer group approval) and habitual
alcoholism, or the condition by which a person lives for the next drink and the next drinks" (The
Family Code of the Phils, Alicia Sempio-Diy, p.39, 1988 ed.)
The evidence presented by the petitioner and the testimony of the petitioner and Dr. Tayag, points
(sic) to one thing – that the petitioner failed to establish a harmonious family life with the
respondent. On the contrary, the respondent has not shown love and respect to the petitioner
manifested by the former’s being irresponsible, immature, jobless, gambler, drunkard and worst of
all – a wife beater. The petitioner, unable to bear any longer the misbehavior and attitude of the
respondent, decided, after one year and four months of messy days, to leave the respondent.
In this regard, the petitioner was able to prove that right from the start of her married life with the
respondent, she already suffered from maltreatment, due to physical injuries inflicted upon her
and that she was the one who worked as a housemaid of a relative of her husband to sustain the
latter’s niece (sic) and because they were living with her husband’s family, she was obliged to do
the household chores – an indication that she is a battered wife coupled with the fact that she
served as a servant in his (sic) husband’s family.
This situation that the petitioner had underwent may be attributed to the fact that at the time of
their marriage, she and her husband are still young and was forced only to said marriage by her
relatives. The petitioner and the respondent had never developed the feeling of love and respect,
instead, the respondent blamed the petitioner’s family for said early marriage and not to his own
liking.
Applying the principles and the requisites of psychological incapacity enunciated by this Court in
Santos v. Court of Appeals,7 the RTC concluded:
The above findings of the psychologist [referring to the psychologist’ testimony quoted above]
would only tend to show that the respondent was, indeed, suffering from psychological incapacity
which is not only grave but also incurable.
Likewise, applying the principles set forth in the case of Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina,
268 SCRA 198, wherein the Supreme Court held that:
x x x x [At this point, the RTC cited the pertinent Molina ruling]
The Court is satisfied that the evidence presented and the testimony of the petitioner and Dr.
Familiar (sic) [the psychologist who testified in this case was Nedy Tayag, not a Dr. Familiar]
attesting that there is psychological incapacity on the part of the respondent to comply with the
essential marital obligations has been sufficiently and clearly proven and, therefore, petitioner is
entitled to the relief prayed for.
A claim that the marriage is valid as there is no psychological incapacity of the respondent is a
speculation and conjecture and without moral certainty. This will enhanced (sic) a greater tragedy
as the battered wife/petitioner will still be using the surname of the respondent, although they are
now separated, and a grim and sad reminder of her husband who made here a slave and a
punching bag during the short span of her marriage with him. The law on annulment should be
liberally construed in favor of an innocent suffering petitioner otherwise said law will be an
instrument to protect persons with mental illness like the serious anti-social behavior of herein
respondent.8
THE CA RULING
The Republic appealed the RTC decision to the CA. The CA reversed the RTC decision, ruling that:
True, as stated in Marcos vs Marcos 343 SCRA 755, the guidelines set in Santos vs Court of Appeals
and Republic vs Court of Appeals do not require that a physician personally examine the person to
be declared psychologically incapacitated. The Supreme Court adopted the totality of evidence
approach which allows the fact of psychological incapacity to be drawn from evidence that
medically or clinically identify the root causes of the illness. If the totality of the evidence is enough
to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person
concerned need not be resorted to. Applied in Marcos, however, the aggregate testimony of the
aggrieved spouse, children, relatives and the social worker were not found to be sufficient to prove
psychological incapacity, in the absence of any evaluation of the respondent himself, the person
whose mental and psychological capacity was in question.
In the case at bench, there is much scarcer evidence to hold that the respondent was
psychologically incapable of entering into the marriage state, that is, to assume the essential
duties of marriage due to an underlying psychological illness. Only the wife gave first-hand
testimony on the behavior of the husband, and it is inconclusive. As observed by the Court in
Marcos, the respondent may have failed to provide material support to the family and has
resorted to physical abuse, but it is still necessary to show that they were manifestations of a
deeper psychological malaise that was clinically or medically identified. The theory of the
psychologist that the respondent was suffering from an anti-social personality syndrome at the
time of the marriage was not the product of any adequate medical or clinical investigation. The
evidence that she got from the petitioner, anecdotal at best, could equally show that the behavior
of the respondent was due simply to causes like immaturity or irresponsibility which are not
equivalent to psychological incapacity, Pesca vs Pesca 356 SCRA 588, or the failure or refusal to
work could have been the result of rebelliousness on the part of one who felt that he had been
forced into a loveless marriage. In any event, the respondent was not under a permanent
compulsion because he had later on shown his ability to engage in productive work and more
stable relationships with another. The element of permanence or incurability that is one of the
defining characteristic of psychological incapacity is not present.
There is no doubt that for the short period that they were under the same roof, the married life of
the petitioner with the respondent was an unhappy one. But the marriage cannot for this reason
be extinguished. As the Supreme Court intimates in Pesca, our strict handling of Article 36 will be a
reminder of the inviolability of the marriage institution in our country and the foundation of the
family that the law seeks to protect. The concept of psychological incapacity is not to be a mantra
to legalize what in reality are convenient excuses of parties to separate and divorce.
THE PETITION
Jocelyn now comes to us via the present petition to challenge and seek the reversal of the CA
ruling based on the following arguments:
1. The Court of Appeals went beyond what the law says, as it totally disregarded the legal basis of
the RTC in declaring the marriage null and void – Tuason v. Tuason (256 SCRA 158; to be accurate,
should be Tuason v. Court of Appeals) holds that "the finding of the Trial Court as to the existence
or non-existence of petitioner’s psychological incapacity at the time of the marriage is final and
binding on us (the Supreme Court); petitioner has not sufficiently shown that the trial court’s
factual findings and evaluation of the testimonies of private respondent’s witnesses vis-à-vis
petitioner’s defenses are clearly and manifestly erroneous";
2. Article 36 of the Family Code did not define psychological incapacity; this omission was
intentional to give the courts a wider discretion to interpret the term without being shackled by
statutory parameters. Article 36 though was taken from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon
Law, which gives three conditions that would make a person unable to contract marriage from
mental incapacity as follows:
"1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:
(1) who lack the sufficient use of reason;
(2) who suffer from grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning essential matrimonial rights
and duties which are to be mutually given and accepted;
(3) who are not capable of assuming the essential obligations of matrimony due to causes of a
psychic nature."
The decision of the RTC, Jocelyn claims, intelligently conforms to these criteria. The RTC, being
clothed with discretionary functions, applied its finding of psychological incapacity based on
existing jurisprudence and the law itself which gave lower court magistrates enough latitude to
define what constitutes psychological incapacity. On the contrary, she further claims, the OSG
relied on generalities without being specific on why it is opposed to the dissolution of a marriage
that actually exists only in name.
Simply stated, we face the issue of whether there is basis to nullify Jocelyn’s marriage with
Angelito under Article 36 of the Family Code.
THE COURT’S RULING
We find the petition devoid of merit. The CA committed no reversible error of law in setting aside
the RTC decision, as no basis exists to declare Jocelyn’s marriage with Angelito a nullity under
Article 36 of the Family Code and its related jurisprudence.
The Law, Molina and Te
Article 36 of the Family Code provides that a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of
the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations
of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
A unique feature of this law is its intended open-ended application, as it merely introduced an
abstract concept – psychological incapacity that disables compliance with the contractual
obligations of marriage – without any concrete definition or, at the very least, an illustrative
example. We must therefore apply the law based on how the concept of psychological incapacity
was shaped and developed in jurisprudence.
Santos v. Court of Appeals9 declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. It should refer to "no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage." It must be
confined to "the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage."10
The Court laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of the law in
Republic v. Court of Appeals11 (Molina) as follows:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish
the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on
the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally
"inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and
marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the
court that the parties or one of them was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the
person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as
not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless
such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage.
The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's."
The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must
have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the
exercise of a profession or employment in a job. x x x
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other
words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in
the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family
Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated
in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in
the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear
as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the
date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge
the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.12
Molina, subsequent jurisprudence holds, merely expounded on the basic requirements of
Santos.13
A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,14 further clarified that there is no requirement that the
defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a
condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity.
Accordingly, it is no longer necessary to introduce expert opinion in a petition under Article 36 of
the Family Code if the totality of evidence shows that psychological incapacity exists and its
gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability can be duly established.15
Pesca v. Pesca16 clarifies that the Molina guidelines apply even to cases then already pending,
under the reasoning that the court’s interpretation or construction establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent of the law; the latter as so interpreted and construed would
thus constitute a part of that law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling
of this Court finds itself later overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may
have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have
acted in good faith in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of "lex prospicit, non respicit."
On March 15, 2003, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment
of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 08-11-10 SC, Rules) promulgated by the Court took effect. Section
2(d) of the Rules pertinently provides:
(d) What to allege. – A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege the
complete facts showing that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from
complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of
marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.
The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of
psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not
be alleged.
Section 12(d) of the Rules requires a pre-trial brief containing all the evidence presented, including
expert opinion, if any, briefly stating or describing the nature and purpose of these pieces of
evidence. Section 14(b) requires the court to consider during the pre-trial conference the
advisability of receiving expert testimony and such other matters as may aid in the prompt
disposition of the petition. Under Section 17 of the Rules, the grounds for the declaration of the
absolute nullity or annulment of marriage must be proved.
All cases – involving the application of Article 36 of the Family Code – that came to us were
invariably decided based on the principles in the cited cases. This was the state of law and
jurisprudence on Article 36 when the Court decided Te v. Yu-Te17 (Te) which revisited the Molina
guidelines.
Te begins with the observation that the Committee that drafted the Family Code did not give any
examples of psychological incapacity for fear that by so doing, it would limit the applicability of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis; that the Committee desired that the courts
should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, by the findings of
experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals that,
although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision itself
was taken from the Canon Law.18 Te thus assumes it a basic premise that the law is so designed to
allow some resiliency in its application.19
Te then sustained Santos’ doctrinal value, saying that its interpretation is consistent with that of
the Canon Law.
Going back to its basic premise, Te said:
Conscious of the law’s intention that it is the courts, on a case-to-case basis, that should determine
whether a party to a marriage is psychologically incapacitated, the Court, in sustaining the lower
court’s judgment of annulment in Tuason v. Court of Appeals, ruled that the findings of the trial
court are final and binding on the appellate courts.
Again, upholding the trial court’s findings and declaring that its decision was not a judgment on the
pleadings, the Court, in Tsoi v. Court of Appeals, explained that when private respondent testified
under oath before the lower court and was cross-examined by the adverse party, she thereby
presented evidence in the form of testimony. Importantly, the Court, aware of parallel decisions of
Catholic marriage tribunals, ruled that the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to
fulfill the marital obligation of procreating children is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
With this as backdrop, Te launched an attack on Molina. It said that the resiliency with which the
concept should be applied and the case-to-case basis by which the provision should be
interpreted, as so intended by its framers, had, somehow, been rendered ineffectual by the
imposition of a set of strict standards in Molina. Molina, to Te, has become a strait-jacket, forcing
all sizes to fit into and be bound by it; wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying
Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the
like, to continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage.
Te then enunciated the principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori
assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but according to its own facts. Courts should
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
As a final note though, Te expressly stated that it is not suggesting the abandonment of Molina,
but that, following Antonio v. Reyes, it merely looked at other perspectives that should also govern
the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. The subsequent Ting v. Velez-
Ting20 follows Te’s lead when it reiterated that Te did not abandon Molina; far from abandoning
Molina, it simply suggested the relaxation of its stringent requirements, cognizant of the
explanation given by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules on the rationale of the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages:21
To require the petitioner to allege in the petition the particular root cause of the psychological
incapacity and to attach thereto the verified written report of an accredited psychologist or
psychiatrist have proved to be too expensive for the parties. They adversely affect access to justice
of poor litigants. It is also a fact that there are provinces where these experts are not available.
Thus, the Committee deemed it necessary to relax this stringent requirement enunciated in the
Molina Case. The need for the examination of a party or parties by a psychiatrist or clinical
psychologist and the presentation of psychiatric experts shall now be determined by the court
during the pre-trial conference.
Te, therefore, instead of substantially departing from Molina,22 merely stands for a more flexible
approach in considering petitions for declaration of nullity of marriages based on psychological
incapacity. It is also noteworthy for its evidentiary approach in these cases, which it expounded on
as follows:
By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decision-
making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on
the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.
xxxx
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals emphasizes the importance of presenting expert testimony to
establish the precise cause of a party’s psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at the
inception of the marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcos asserts, there is no requirement that the
person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if the
totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. Verily, the
evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological
incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.
This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that the presentation of expert
proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or
expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological
incapacity.23 [Underscoring supplied]
This evidentiary approach is repeated in Ting v. Velez-Ting.24
Under this evolutionary development, as shown by the current string of cases on Article 36 of the
Family Code, what should not be lost on us is the intention of the law to confine the application of
Article 36 to the most serious cases of personality disorders, clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage; that the psychological
illness that must have afflicted a party at the inception of the marriage should be a malady so
grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond he or she is about to assume.25 It is not enough that the respondent, alleged to
be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in complying with his marital obligations, or was
unwilling to perform these obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor – an
adverse integral element in the respondent’s personality structure that effectively incapacitated
him from complying with his essential marital obligations – must be shown.26 Mere difficulty,
refusal or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will on the part of the spouse is
different from incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological condition or illness;
irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility
and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as
the same may only be due to a person’s refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential
obligations of marriage.27
If all these sound familiar, they do, for they are but iterations of Santos’ juridical antecedence,
gravity and incurability requisites. This is proof of Santos’ continuing doctrinal validity.
The Present Case
As the CA did, we find Jocelyn’s evidence insufficient to establish Angelito’s psychological
incapacity to perform essential marital obligations. We so conclude based on our own examination
of the evidence on record, which we were compelled to undertake because of the differences in
the trial court and the appellate court’s appreciation and evaluation of Jocelyn’s presented
evidence.
a. The Expert Opinion Evidence
Both the psychologist’s testimony and the psychological report did not conclusively show the root
cause, gravity and incurability of Angelito’s alleged psychological condition.

We first note a critical factor in appreciating or evaluating the expert opinion evidence – the
psychologist’s testimony and the psychological evaluation report – that Jocelyn presented. Based
on her declarations in open court, the psychologist evaluated Angelito’s psychological condition
only in an indirect manner – she derived all her conclusions from information coming from Jocelyn
whose bias for her cause cannot of course be doubted. Given the source of the information upon
which the psychologist heavily relied upon, the court must evaluate the evidentiary worth of the
opinion with due care and with the application of the more rigid and stringent set of standards
outlined above, i.e., that there must be a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the
psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a psychological incapacity that is grave, severe
and incurable.
In saying this, we do not suggest that a personal examination of the party alleged to be
psychologically incapacitated is mandatory; jurisprudence holds that this type of examination is
not a mandatory requirement. While such examination is desirable, we recognize that it may not
be practical in all instances given the oftentimes estranged relations between the parties. For a
determination though of a party’s complete personality profile, information coming from persons
intimately related to him (such as the party’s close relatives and friends) may be helpful. This is an
approach in the application of Article 36 that allows flexibility, at the same time that it avoids, if
not totally obliterate, the credibility gaps spawned by supposedly expert opinion based entirely on
doubtful sources of information.
From these perspectives, we conclude that the psych`ologist, using meager information coming
from a directly interested party, could not have secured a complete personality profile and could
not have conclusively formed an objective opinion or diagnosis of Angelito’s psychological
condition. While the report or evaluation may be conclusive with respect to Jocelyn’s psychological
condition, this is not true for Angelito’s. The methodology employed simply cannot satisfy the
required depth and comprehensiveness of examination required to evaluate a party alleged to be
suffering from a psychological disorder. In short, this is not the psychological report that the Court
can rely on as basis for the conclusion that psychological incapacity exists.1avvphi1
Other than this credibility or reliability gap, both the psychologist’s report and testimony simply
provided a general description of Angelito’s purported anti-social personality disorder, supported
by the characterization of this disorder as chronic, grave and incurable. The psychologist was
conspicuously silent, however, on the bases for her conclusion or the particulars that gave rise to
the characterization she gave. These particulars are simply not in the Report, and neither can they
be found in her testimony.
For instance, the psychologist testified that Angelito’s personality disorder is chronic or incurable;
Angelito has long been afflicted with the disorder prior to his marriage with Jocelyn or even during
his early developmental stage, as basic trust was not developed. However, she did not support this
declaration with any factual basis. In her Report, she based her conclusion on the presumption
that Angelito apparently grew up in a dysfunctional family. Quite noticeable, though, is the
psychologist’s own equivocation on this point – she was not firm in her conclusion for she herself
may have realized that it was simply conjectural. The veracity, too, of this finding is highly suspect,
for it was based entirely on Jocelyn’s assumed knowledge of Angelito’s family background and
upbringing.
Additionally, the psychologist merely generalized on the questions of why and to what extent was
Angelito’s personality disorder grave and incurable, and on the effects of the disorder on
Angelito’s awareness of and his capability to undertake the duties and responsibilities of marriage.
The psychologist therefore failed to provide the answers to the more important concerns or
requisites of psychological incapacity, all of which are critical to the success of Jocelyn’s cause.
b. Jocelyn’s Testimony
The inadequacy and/or lack of probative value of the psychological report and the psychologist’s
testimony impel us to proceed to the evaluation of Jocelyn’s testimony, to find out whether she
provided the court with sufficient facts to support a finding of Angelito’s psychological incapacity.
Unfortunately, we find Jocelyn’s testimony to be insufficient. Jocelyn merely testified on Angelito’s
habitual drunkenness, gambling, refusal to seek employment and the physical beatings she
received from him – all of which occurred after the marriage. Significantly, she declared in her
testimony that Angelito showed no signs of violent behavior, assuming this to be indicative of a
personality disorder, during the courtship stage or at the earliest stages of her relationship with
him. She testified on the alleged physical beatings after the marriage, not before or at the time of
the celebration of the marriage. She did not clarify when these beatings exactly took place –
whether it was near or at the time of celebration of the marriage or months or years after. This is a
clear evidentiary gap that materially affects her cause, as the law and its related jurisprudence
require that the psychological incapacity must exist at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
Habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a job, while indicative of psychological
incapacity, do not, by themselves, show psychological incapacity. All these simply indicate
difficulty, neglect or mere refusal to perform marital obligations that, as the cited jurisprudence
holds, cannot be considered to be constitutive of psychological incapacity in the absence of proof
that these are manifestations of an incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological condition
or illness.
The physical violence allegedly inflicted on Jocelyn deserves a different treatment. While we may
concede that physical violence on women indicates abnormal behavioral or personality patterns,
such violence, standing alone, does not constitute psychological incapacity. Jurisprudence holds
that there must be evidence showing a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest
psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. The evidence of this nexus is
irretrievably lost in the present case under our finding that the opinion of the psychologist cannot
be relied upon. Even assuming, therefore, that Jocelyn’s account of the physical beatings she
received from Angelito were true, this evidence does not satisfy the requirement of Article 36 and
its related jurisprudence, specifically the Santos requisites.

On the whole, the CA correctly reversed the RTC judgment, whose factual bases we now find to be
clearly and manifestly erroneous. Our ruling in Tuason recognizing the finality of the factual
findings of the trial court in Article 36 cases (which is Jocelyn’s main anchor in her present appeal
with us) does not therefore apply in this case. We find that, on the contrary, the CA correctly
applied Article 36 and its related jurisprudence to the facts and the evidence of the present case.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of merit. We AFFIRM the
appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62443. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.