CASE DIGEST 5 – APARRI VS CA

Petitioner: BRUNO O. APARRI

Respondent: THE COURT OF APPEALS and LAND AUTHORITY, the latter in substitution for REMEDIOS O.
FORTICH, as Chairman, ANGELINO M. BANZON, RAFAEL B. HILAO, VALERIANO PLANTILLA and SEVERO
YAP, as members of the Board of Directors of the defunct National Resettlement and Rehabilitation
Administration (NARRA)

FACTS:

1. On January 15, 1960, through Resolution 13, Buro Aparri was appointed as the General Manager
of NARRA by Chairman Fortich.

2. On March 15, 1962, BOD approved Resolution 24 which fixes the term of office of incumbent
general manager up to March 31, 1962 in accordance with Sec 8(2) RA 1160, which states that
“the BOD has the power to appoint and fix the term of office of the general manager …subject to
the recommendation of Economic Coordination and approval of the President of the Philippines”.

3. Through a petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction, petitioner prayed for annulment
of Resolution 24, to command BOD to allow him to continue office as general manager until he
vacates in accordance with law.

4. CFI dismissed the petition, which was subsequently affirmed by the CA stating that Aparri
accepted the position of general manager without fixed term and his appointment, in essence, is
terminable at the pleasure of the appointing power which, in this case, is the BOD. Hence, the
present petition with the Supreme Court assailing the decision of the lower courts.

ISSUE: Whether or not the BOD has the jurisdiction to fix the term of office of General Manager Aparri.

HELD: Yes. The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.

1. In the case at bar, the term of office is not fixed by law. However, the power to fix the term is
vested in the BOD as provided for in RA 1160 Sec 8(2). Resolution 24 speaks of no removal but an
expiration of the term of office of the petitioner.

2. It is the rule in statutory construction that if the words and phrase of a statute are not obscure or
ambiguous, its meaning and the intention of the legislature must be determined from the
language employed, and, where there is not ambiguity in the words, there is no room for
construction. The courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from
the words. The reason for the rule is that the legislature must be presumed to know the meaning
of words, to have used words advisedly and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words
as are found in the statute.