G.R. No.

L-63915 April 24, 1985

LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD,

INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his
capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as
Director, Malacañang Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of
Printing, respondents.

ESCOLIN, J.:

Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the
1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the
Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public
officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of
instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.

Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:

a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200, 234, 265, 286, 298,
303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404, 406, 415, 427, 429, 445, 447, 473, 486,
491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718, 731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835,
836, 923, 935, 961, 1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 1242, 1246, 1250, 1278,
1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-1840, 1842-1847.

b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153, 155, 161, 173, 180,
187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213, 215-224, 226-228, 231-239, 241-245, 248, 251,
253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-289, 291, 293, 297-299, 301-303, 309, 312-315, 325, 327,
343, 346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438-440, 444- 445, 473, 486, 488,
498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611, 612, 615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712-
713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881, 882, 939-940, 964,997,1149-1178,1180-1278.

c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.

d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529, 1532, 1535, 1538,
1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600, 1606-1609, 1612-1628, 1630-1649, 1694-
1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737-1742, 1744, 1746-1751, 1752, 1754, 1762, 1764-1787,
1789-1795, 1797, 1800, 1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816, 1825-1826, 1829, 1831-1832, 1835-
1836, 1839-1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866, 1868, 1870, 1876-1889, 1892,
1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952, 1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-2028, 2030-2044, 2046-2145, 2147-
2161, 2163-2244.

e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494-507, 509-510, 522, 524-
528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-568, 570, 574, 593, 594, 598-604, 609,
611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-786, 788-852, 854-857.

f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92, 94, 95, 107,
120, 122, 123.

g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439.

The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners
have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is submitted that in the absence of any
showing that petitioners are personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the
presidential issuances in question 2 said petitioners are without the requisite legal personality to institute this mandamus
proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties" within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which
we quote:

SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station,
or unlawfully excludes another from the use a rd enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is
entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty
and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant, immediately or at some other
 specified time, to do the act required to be done to Protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the
damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant.

Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object is to
compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific interest for their petition to be given due course.

The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs. Governor General, 3 this Court
held that while the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to a private individual only in those cases
where he has some private or particular interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be protected, independent of
that which he holds with the public at large," and "it is for the public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public
rights are to be subserved [Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless, "when the question is one of public right
and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party
in interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or
special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the
laws [High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].

Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as a proper party to the
mandamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor General to call a special election for the position of municipal
president in the town of Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said:

We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the proposition that the relator is a
proper party to proceedings of this character when a public right is sought to be enforced. If the general
rule in America were otherwise, we think that it would not be applicable to the case at bar for the reason
'that it is always dangerous to apply a general rule to a particular case without keeping in mind the reason
for the rule, because, if under the particular circumstances the reason for the rule does not exist, the rule
itself is not applicable and reliance upon the rule may well lead to error'

No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by counsel for the
respondent. The circumstances which surround this case are different from those in the United States,
inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to these proceedings no other person could be, as we
have seen that it is not the duty of the law officer of the Government to appear and represent the people
in cases of this character.

The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the aforementioned case apply
squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized
by no less than the fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute this proceeding, it would indeed
be difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate the same, considering that the Solicitor General, the government
officer generally empowered to represent the people, has entered his appearance for respondents in this case.

Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of
laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential
issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is
not indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code:

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...

The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said article. In a long line of
decisions,4 this Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation
itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of
effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes
into effect.

Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of
publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached that
said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the
date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:

Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legisiative acts and resolutions
of a public nature of the, Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive and administrative orders and
proclamations, except such as have no general applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of decisions of the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be
so published; [4] such documents or classes of documents as may be required so to be published by law;
and [5] such documents or classes of documents as the President of the Philippines shall determine from
time to time to have general applicability and legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be published.
...

The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are
to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the
application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a
citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws taken so vital
significance that at this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed solely by the
legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and deliberations in the Batasan
Pambansa—and for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative records—no such publicity accompanies the law-
making process of the President. Thus, without publication, the people have no means of knowing what presidential
decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing themselves of the specific contents and
texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden
tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordines dictadas de conformidad con las
mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad.5

The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in the Official Gazette ... ."
The word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the
Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law
itself makes a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with
no discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from such publication.

The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law.
Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a
burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which
apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on
the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned. 6

It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a
requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and
specifically informed of its contents. As Justice Claudio Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7:

In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form part of the law of the
land, the requirement of due process and the Rule of Law demand that the Official Gazette as the official
government repository promulgate and publish the texts of all such decrees, orders and instructions so
that the people may know where to obtain their official and specific contents.

The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published, shall have
no force and effect. Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect this decision
might have on acts done in reliance of the validity of those presidential decrees which were published only during the
pendency of this petition, have put the question as to whether the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s which had
been enforced or implemented prior to their publication. The answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the past this
Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank 8 to wit:

The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found to be
unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and
hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442;
Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad
statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The
actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial
declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various
aspects-with respect to particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have
become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of
public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand
examination. These questions are among the most difficult of those which have engaged the attention of
courts, state and federal and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a
principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.

Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban 9 sustained the right of a party under the Moratorium
Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said law was declared unconstitutional by this Court.

Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is "an
operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new
judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."

From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the presidential decrees sought by
petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937
to 1939, inclusive, have not been so published. 10 Neither the subject matters nor the texts of these PDs can be
ascertained since no copies thereof are available. But whatever their subject matter may be, it is undisputed that none of
these unpublished PDs has ever been implemented or enforced by the government. In Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the Court,
through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of [penal]
regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. " The cogency of this holding is
apparently recognized by respondent officials considering the manifestation in their comment that "the government, as a
matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the same shall have been published in the
Official Gazette or in some other publication, even though some criminal laws provide that they shall take effect
immediately.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential
issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-28040 August 18, 1972

TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSEFA TANGCO, JOSE DE BORJA, administrator-appellee; JOSE DE BORJA, as

administrator, CAYETANO DE BORJA, MATILDE DE BORJA and CRISANTO DE BORJA (deceased) as Children of
Josefa Tangco, appellees,
vs.
TASIANA VDA. DE DE BORJA, Special Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Francisco de Borja, appellant. .

G.R. No L-28568 August 18, 1972

TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE FRANCISCO DE BORJA, TASIANA O. VDA. DE DE BORJA, special Administratrix
appellee,
vs.
JOSE DE BORJA, oppositor-appellant.

G.R. No. L-28611 August 18, 1972

TASIANA 0. VDA. DE BORJA, as Administratrix of the Testate Estate of the late Francisco de Borja, plaintiff-
appellee,
vs.
JOSE DE BORJA, as Administrator of the Testate Estate of the late Josefa Tangco, defendant-appellant.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:p

Of these cases, the first, numbered L-28040 is an appeal by Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, special administratrix
of the testate estate of Francisco de Borja,1 from the approval of a compromise agreement by the Court of First Instance
of Rizal, Branch I, in its Special Proceeding No. R-7866, entitled, "Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco, Jose de Borja,
Administrator".

Case No. L-28568 is an appeal by administrator Jose Borja from the disapproval of the same compromise agreement by
the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch II, in its Special Proceeding No. 832, entitled, "Testate Estate of
Francisco de Borja, Tasiana O. Vda. de de Borja, Special Administratrix".

And Case No. L-28611 is an appeal by administrator Jose de Borja from the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Branch X, in its Civil Case No. 7452, declaring the Hacienda Jalajala Poblacion, which is the main object of the
aforesaid compromise agreement, as the separate and exclusive property of the late Francisco de Borja and not a
conjugal asset of the community with his first wife, Josefa Tangco, and that said hacienda pertains exclusively to his
testate estate, which is under administrator in Special Proceeding No. 832 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija,
Branch II.

It is uncontested that Francisco de Borja, upon the death of his wife Josefa Tangco on 6 October 1940, filed a petition for
the probate of her will which was docketed as Special Proceeding No. R-7866 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch I. The will was probated on 2 April 1941. In 1946, Francisco de Borja was appointed executor and administrator: in
1952, their son, Jose de Borja, was appointed co-administrator. When Francisco died, on 14 April 1954, Jose became the
sole administrator of the testate estate of his mother, Josefa Tangco. While a widower Francisco de Borja allegedly took
unto himself a second wife, Tasiana Ongsingco. Upon Francisco's death, Tasiana instituted testate proceedings in the
Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, where, in 1955, she was appointed special administratrix. The validity of Tasiana's
marriage to Francisco was questioned in said proceeding.

The relationship between the children of the first marriage and Tasiana Ongsingco has been plagued with several court
suits and counter-suits; including the three cases at bar, some eighteen (18) cases remain pending determination in the
courts. The testate estate of Josefa Tangco alone has been unsettled for more than a quarter of a century. In order to put
an end to all these litigations, a compromise agreement was entered into on 12 October 1963,2 by and between "[T]he
heir and son of Francisco de Borja by his first marriage, namely, Jose de Borja personally and as administrator of the
Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco," and "[T]he heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second marriage,
Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja, assisted by her lawyer, Atty. Luis Panaguiton Jr." The terms and conditions of the
compromise agreement are as follows:

AGREEMENT

THIS AGREEMENT made and entered into by and between

The heir and son of Francisco de Borja by his first marriage, namely, Jose de Borja personally and as
administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco,

AND
 The heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de
Borja, assisted by her lawyer, Atty. Luis Panaguiton Jr.

WITNESSETH

THAT it is the mutual desire of all the parties herein terminate and settle, with finality, the various court
litigations, controversies, claims, counterclaims, etc., between them in connection with the administration,
settlement, partition, adjudication and distribution of the assets as well as liabilities of the estates of
Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco, first spouse of Francisco de Borja.

THAT with this end in view, the parties herein have agreed voluntarily and without any reservations to
enter into and execute this agreement under the following terms and conditions:

1. That the parties agree to sell the Poblacion portion of the Jalajala properties situated in Jalajala, Rizal,
presently under administration in the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco (Sp. Proc. No. 7866, Rizal), more
specifically described as follows:

Linda al Norte con el Rio Puwang que la separa de la jurisdiccion del Municipio de Pililla
de la Provincia de Rizal, y con el pico del Monte Zambrano; al Oeste con Laguna de Bay;
por el Sur con los herederos de Marcelo de Borja; y por el Este con los terrenos de la
Familia Maronilla

with a segregated area of approximately 1,313 hectares at the amount of P0.30 per square meter.

2. That Jose de Borja agrees and obligates himself to pay Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja the total
amount of Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos (P800,000) Philippine Currency, in cash, which represent
P200,000 as his share in the payment and P600,000 as pro-rata shares of the heirs Crisanto, Cayetano
and Matilde, all surnamed de Borja and this shall be considered as full and complete payment and
settlement of her hereditary share in the estate of the late Francisco de Borja as well as the estate of
Josefa Tangco, Sp. Proc. No. 832-Nueva Ecija and Sp. Proc. No. 7866-Rizal, respectively, and to any
properties bequeathed or devised in her favor by the late Francisco de Borja by Last Will and Testament
or by Donation Inter Vivos or Mortis Causa or purportedly conveyed to her for consideration or otherwise.
The funds for this payment shall be taken from and shall depend upon the receipt of full payment of the
proceeds of the sale of Jalajala, "Poblacion."

3. That Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja hereby assumes payment of that particular obligation
incurred by the late Francisco de Borja in favor of the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, now
Development Bank of the Philippines, amounting to approximately P30,000.00 and also assumes
payment of her 1/5 share of the Estate and Inheritance taxes on the Estate of the late Francisco de Borja
or the sum of P3,500.00, more or less, which shall be deducted by the buyer of Jalajala, "Poblacion" from
the payment to be made to Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja under paragraph 2 of this Agreement and
paid directly to the Development Bank of the Philippines and the heirs-children of Francisco de Borja.

4. Thereafter, the buyer of Jalajala "Poblacion" is hereby authorized to pay directly to Tasiana Ongsingco
Vda. de de Borja the balance of the payment due her under paragraph 2 of this Agreement
(approximately P766,500.00) and issue in the name of Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja,
corresponding certified checks/treasury warrants, who, in turn, will issue the corresponding receipt to
Jose de Borja.

5. In consideration of above payment to Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, Jose de Borja personally
and as administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco, and Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja,
for themselves and for their heirs, successors, executors, administrators, and assigns, hereby forever
mutually renounce, withdraw, waive, remise, release and discharge any and all manner of action or
actions, cause or causes of action, suits, debts, sum or sums of money, accounts, damages, claims and
demands whatsoever, in law or in equity, which they ever had, or now have or may have against each
other, more specifically Sp. Proceedings Nos. 7866 and 1955, CFI-Rizal, and Sp. Proc. No. 832-Nueva
Ecija, Civil Case No. 3033, CFI Nueva Ecija and Civil Case No. 7452-CFI, Rizal, as well as the case filed
against Manuel Quijal for perjury with the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, the intention being to completely,
absolutely and finally release each other, their heirs, successors, and assigns, from any and all liability,
arising wholly or partially, directly or indirectly, from the administration, settlement, and distribution of the
assets as well as liabilities of the estates of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco, first spouse of
Francisco de Borja, and lastly, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja expressly and specifically renounce
absolutely her rights as heir over any hereditary share in the estate of Francisco de Borja.

6. That Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, upon receipt of the payment under paragraph 4 hereof,
shall deliver to the heir Jose de Borja all the papers, titles and documents belonging to Francisco de Borja
which are in her possession and said heir Jose de Borja shall issue in turn the corresponding receive
thereof.
 7. That this agreement shall take effect only upon the fulfillment of the sale of the properties mentioned
under paragraph 1 of this agreement and upon receipt of the total and full payment of the proceeds of the
sale of the Jalajala property "Poblacion", otherwise, the non-fulfillment of the said sale will render this
instrument NULL AND VOID AND WITHOUT EFFECT THEREAFTER.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have her unto set their hands in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the 12th of October, 1963.

On 16 May 1966, Jose de Borja submitted for Court approval the agreement of 12 October 1963 to the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, in Special Proceeding No. R-7866; and again, on 8 August 1966, to the Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ecija, in Special Proceeding No. 832. Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja opposed in both instances. The Rizal court
approved the compromise agreement, but the Nueva Ecija court declared it void and unenforceable. Special administratrix
Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja appealed the Rizal Court's order of approval (now Supreme Court G.R. case No. L-
28040), while administrator Jose de Borja appealed the order of disapproval (G.R. case No. L-28568) by the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija.

The genuineness and due execution of the compromised agreement of 12 October 1963 is not disputed, but its validity is,
nevertheless, attacked by Tasiana Ongsingco on the ground that: (1) the heirs cannot enter into such kind of agreement
without first probating the will of Francisco de Borja; (2) that the same involves a compromise on the validity of the
marriage between Francisco de Borja and Tasiana Ongsingco; and (3) that even if it were valid, it has ceased to have
force and effect.

In assailing the validity of the agreement of 12 October 1963, Tasiana Ongsingco and the Probate Court of Nueva Ecija
rely on this Court's decision in Guevara vs. Guevara. 74 Phil. 479, wherein the Court's majority held the view that the
presentation of a will for probate is mandatory and that the settlement and distribution of an estate on the basis of
intestacy when the decedent left a will, is against the law and public policy. It is likewise pointed out by appellant Tasiana
Ongsingco that Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Revised Rules explicitly conditions the validity of an extrajudicial settlement of
a decedent's estate by agreement between heirs, upon the facts that "(if) the decedent left no will and no debts, and the
heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial and legal representatives ..." The will of Francisco de
Borja having been submitted to the Nueva Ecija Court and still pending probate when the 1963 agreement was made,
those circumstances, it is argued, bar the validity of the agreement.

Upon the other hand, in claiming the validity of the compromise agreement, Jose de Borja stresses that at the time it was
entered into, on 12 October 1963, the governing provision was Section 1, Rule 74 of the original Rules of Court of 1940,
which allowed the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of a deceased person regardless of whether he left a will or not.
He also relies on the dissenting opinion of Justice Moran, in Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479, wherein was expressed
the view that if the parties have already divided the estate in accordance with a decedent's will, the probate of the will is a
useless ceremony; and if they have divided the estate in a different manner, the probate of the will is worse than useless.

The doctrine of Guevara vs. Guevara, ante, is not applicable to the case at bar. This is apparent from an examination of
the terms of the agreement between Jose de Borja and Tasiana Ongsingco. Paragraph 2 of said agreement specifically
stipulates that the sum of P800,000 payable to Tasiana Ongsingco —

shall be considered as full — complete payment — settlement of her hereditary share in the estate of the
late Francisco de Borja as well as the estate of Josefa Tangco, ... and to any properties bequeathed or
devised in her favor by the late Francisco de Borja by Last Will and Testament or by Donation Inter Vivos
or Mortis Causa or purportedly conveyed to her for consideration or otherwise.

This provision evidences beyond doubt that the ruling in the Guevara case is not applicable to the cases at bar. There
was here no attempt to settle or distribute the estate of Francisco de Borja among the heirs thereto before the probate of
his will. The clear object of the contract was merely the conveyance by Tasiana Ongsingco of any and all her individual
share and interest, actual or eventual in the estate of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco. There is no stipulation as to
any other claimant, creditor or legatee. And as a hereditary share in a decedent's estate is transmitted or vested
immediately from the moment of the death of such causante or predecessor in interest (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art.
777)3 there is no legal bar to a successor (with requisite contracting capacity) disposing of her or his hereditary share
immediately after such death, even if the actual extent of such share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of
the estate.4 Of course, the effect of such alienation is to be deemed limited to what is ultimately adjudicated to the vendor
heir. However, the aleatory character of the contract does not affect the validity of the transaction; neither does the
coetaneous agreement that the numerous litigations between the parties (the approving order of the Rizal Court
enumerates fourteen of them, Rec. App. pp. 79-82) are to be considered settled and should be dismissed, although such
stipulation, as noted by the Rizal Court, gives the contract the character of a compromise that the law favors, for obvious
reasons, if only because it serves to avoid a multiplicity of suits.

It is likewise worthy of note in this connection that as the surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja, Tasiana Ongsingco was
his compulsory heir under article 995 et seq. of the present Civil Code. Wherefore, barring unworthiness or valid
disinheritance, her successional interest existed independent of Francisco de Borja's last will and testament and would
exist even if such will were not probated at all. Thus, the prerequisite of a previous probate of the will, as established in
the Guevara and analogous cases, can not apply to the case of Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja.
Since the compromise contract Annex A was entered into by and between "Jose de Borja personally and as administrator
of the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco" on the one hand, and on the other, "the heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de
Borja by his second marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja", it is clear that the transaction was binding on both in
their individual capacities, upon the perfection of the contract, even without previous authority of the Court to enter into the
same. The only difference between an extrajudicial compromise and one that is submitted and approved by the Court, is
that the latter can be enforced by execution proceedings. Art. 2037 of the Civil Code is explicit on the point:

8. Art. 2037. A compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res judicata; but there shall be
no execution except in compliance with a judicial compromise.

It is argued by Tasiana Ongsingco that while the agreement Annex A expressed no definite period for its
performance, the same was intended to have a resolutory period of 60 days for its effectiveness. In
support of such contention, it is averred that such a limit was expressly stipulated in an agreement in
similar terms entered into by said Ongsingco with the brothers and sister of Jose de Borja, to wit,
Crisanto, Matilde and Cayetano, all surnamed de Borja, except that the consideration was fixed at
P600,000 (Opposition, Annex/Rec. of Appeal, L-28040, pp. 39- 46) and which contained the following
clause:

III. That this agreement shall take effect only upon the consummation of the sale of the property
mentioned herein and upon receipt of the total and full payment of the proceeds of the sale by the herein
owner heirs-children of Francisco de Borja, namely, Crisanto, Cayetano and Matilde, all surnamed de
Borja; Provided that if no sale of the said property mentioned herein is consummated, or the non-receipt
of the purchase price thereof by the said owners within the period of sixty (60) days from the date hereof,
this agreement will become null and void and of no further effect.

Ongsingco's argument loses validity when it is considered that Jose de Borja was not a party to this particular contract
(Annex 1), and that the same appears not to have been finalized, since it bears no date, the day being left blank "this —
day of October 1963"; and while signed by the parties, it was not notarized, although plainly intended to be so done, since
it carries a proposed notarial ratification clause. Furthermore, the compromise contract with Jose de Borja (Annex A),
provides in its par. 2 heretofore transcribed that of the total consideration of P800, 000 to be paid to Ongsingco, P600,000
represent the "prorata share of the heirs Crisanto, Cayetano and Matilde all surnamed de Borja" which corresponds to the
consideration of P600,000 recited in Annex 1, and that circumstance is proof that the duly notarized contract entered into
wit Jose de Borja under date 12 October 1963 (Annex A), was designed to absorb and supersede the separate
unformalize agreement with the other three Borja heirs. Hence, the 60 days resolutory term in the contract with the latter
(Annex 1) not being repeated in Annex A, can not apply to the formal compromise with Jose de Borja. It is moreover
manifest that the stipulation that the sale of the Hacienda de Jalajala was to be made within sixty days from the date of
the agreement with Jose de Borja's co-heirs (Annex 1) was plainly omitted in Annex A as improper and ineffective, since
the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion) that was to be sold to raise the P800,000 to be paid to Ongsingco for her share
formed part of the estate of Francisco de Borja and could not be sold until authorized by the Probate Court. The Court of
First Instance of Rizal so understood it, and in approving the compromise it fixed a term of 120 days counted from the
finality of the order now under appeal, for the carrying out by the parties for the terms of the contract.

This brings us to the plea that the Court of First Instance of Rizal had no jurisdiction to approve the compromise with Jose
de Borja (Annex A) because Tasiana Ongsingco was not an heir in the estate of Josefa Tangco pending settlement in the
Rizal Court, but she was an heir of Francisco de Borja, whose estate was the object of Special Proceeding No. 832 of the
Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija. This circumstance is irrelevant, since what was sold by Tasiana Ongsingco was
only her eventual share in the estate of her late husband, not the estate itself; and as already shown, that eventual share
she owned from the time of Francisco's death and the Court of Nueva Ecija could not bar her selling it. As owner of her
undivided hereditary share, Tasiana could dispose of it in favor of whomsoever she chose. Such alienation is expressly
recognized and provided for by article 1088 of the present Civil Code:

Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any or all of
the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale,
provided they do so within the period of one month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale
of the vendor.

If a sale of a hereditary right can be made to a stranger, then a fortiori sale thereof to a coheir could not be forbidden.

Tasiana Ongsingco further argues that her contract with Jose de Borja (Annex "A") is void because it amounts to a
compromise as to her status and marriage with the late Francisco de Borja. The point is without merit, for the very
opening paragraph of the agreement with Jose de Borja (Annex "A") describes her as "the heir and surviving spouse of
Francisco de Borja by his second marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja", which is in itself definite admission of
her civil status. There is nothing in the text of the agreement that would show that this recognition of Ongsingco's status
as the surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja was only made in consideration of the cession of her hereditary rights.

It is finally charged by appellant Ongsingco, as well as by the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija in its order of 21
September 1964, in Special Proceedings No. 832 (Amended Record on Appeal in L-28568, page 157), that the
compromise agreement of 13 October 1963 (Annex "A") had been abandoned, as shown by the fact that, after its
execution, the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, in its order of 21 September 1964, had declared that "no amicable
settlement had been arrived at by the parties", and that Jose de Borja himself, in a motion of 17 June 1964, had stated
that the proposed amicable settlement "had failed to materialize".

It is difficult to believe, however, that the amicable settlement referred to in the order and motion above-mentioned was
the compromise agreement of 13 October 1963, which already had been formally signed and executed by the parties and
duly notarized. What the record discloses is that some time after its formalization, Ongsingco had unilaterally attempted to
back out from the compromise agreement, pleading various reasons restated in the opposition to the Court's approval of
Annex "A" (Record on Appeal, L-20840, page 23): that the same was invalid because of the lapse of the allegedly
intended resolutory period of 60 days and because the contract was not preceded by the probate of Francisco de Borja's
will, as required by this Court's Guevarra vs. Guevara ruling; that Annex "A" involved a compromise affecting Ongsingco's
status as wife and widow of Francisco de Borja, etc., all of which objections have been already discussed. It was natural
that in view of the widow's attitude, Jose de Borja should attempt to reach a new settlement or novatory agreement before
seeking judicial sanction and enforcement of Annex "A", since the latter step might ultimately entail a longer delay in
attaining final remedy. That the attempt to reach another settlement failed is apparent from the letter of Ongsingco's
counsel to Jose de Borja quoted in pages 35-36 of the brief for appellant Ongsingco in G.R. No. 28040; and it is more
than probable that the order of 21 September 1964 and the motion of 17 June 1964 referred to the failure of the parties'
quest for a more satisfactory compromise. But the inability to reach a novatory accord can not invalidate the original
compromise (Annex "A") and justifies the act of Jose de Borja in finally seeking a court order for its approval and
enforcement from the Court of First Instance of Rizal, which, as heretofore described, decreed that the agreement be
ultimately performed within 120 days from the finality of the order, now under appeal.

We conclude that in so doing, the Rizal court acted in accordance with law, and, therefore, its order should be upheld,
while the contrary resolution of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija should be, and is, reversed.

In her brief, Tasiana Ongsingco also pleads that the time elapsed in the appeal has affected her unfavorably, in that while
the purchasing power of the agreed price of P800,000 has diminished, the value of the Jalajala property has increased.
But the fact is that her delay in receiving the payment of the agreed price for her hereditary interest was primarily due to
her attempts to nullify the agreement (Annex "A") she had formally entered into with the advice of her counsel, Attorney
Panaguiton. And as to the devaluation de facto of our currency, what We said in Dizon Rivera vs. Dizon, L-24561, 30
June 1970, 33 SCRA 554, that "estates would never be settled if there were to be a revaluation with every subsequent
fluctuation in the values of currency and properties of the estate", is particularly opposite in the present case.

Coming now to Case G.R. No. L-28611, the issue is whether the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion), concededly acquired
by Francisco de Borja during his marriage to his first wife, Josefa Tangco, is the husband's private property (as contended
by his second spouse, Tasiana Ongsingco), or whether it forms part of the conjugal (ganancial) partnership with Josefa
Tangco. The Court of First Instance of Rizal (Judge Herminio Mariano, presiding) declared that there was adequate
evidence to overcome the presumption in favor of its conjugal character established by Article 160 of the Civil Code.

We are of the opinion that this question as between Tasiana Ongsingco and Jose de Borja has become moot and
academic, in view of the conclusion reached by this Court in the two preceding cases (G.R. No. L-28568), upholding as
valid the cession of Tasiana Ongsingco's eventual share in the estate of her late husband, Francisco de Borja, for the sum
of P800,000 with the accompanying reciprocal quit-claims between the parties. But as the question may affect the rights
of possible creditors and legatees, its resolution is still imperative.

It is undisputed that the Hacienda Jalajala, of around 4,363 hectares, had been originally acquired jointly by Francisco de
Borja, Bernardo de Borja and Marcelo de Borja and their title thereto was duly registered in their names as co-owners in
Land Registration Case No. 528 of the province of Rizal, G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 26403 (De Barjo vs. Jugo, 54 Phil. 465).
Subsequently, in 1931, the Hacienda was partitioned among the co-owners: the Punta section went to Marcelo de Borja;
the Bagombong section to Bernardo de Borja, and the part in Jalajala proper (Poblacion) corresponded to Francisco de
Borja (V. De Borja vs. De Borja 101 Phil. 911, 932).

The lot allotted to Francisco was described as —

Una Parcela de terreno en Poblacion, Jalajala: N. Puang River; E. Hermogena Romero; S. Heirs of
Marcelo de Borja O. Laguna de Bay; containing an area of 13,488,870 sq. m. more or less, assessed at
P297,410. (Record on Appeal, pages 7 and 105)

On 20 November 1962, Tasiana O. Vda. de Borja, as Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Francisco de Borja, instituted
a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Civil Case No. 7452) against Jose de Borja, in his capacity as
Administrator of Josefa Tangco (Francisco de Borja's first wife), seeking to have the Hacienda above described declared
exclusive private property of Francisco, while in his answer defendant (now appellant) Jose de Borja claimed that it was
conjugal property of his parents (Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco), conformably to the presumption established by
Article 160 of the Philippine Civil Code (reproducing Article 1407 of the Civil Code of 1889), to the effect that:

Art. 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be
proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.

Defendant Jose de Borja further counterclaimed for damages, compensatory, moral and exemplary, as well as for
attorney's fees.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Rizal, per Judge Herminio Mariano, held that the plaintiff had adduced sufficient
evidence to rebut the presumption, and declared the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion) to be the exclusive private property
of the late Francisco de Borja, and his Administratrix, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja, to be entitled to its possession.
Defendant Jose de Borja then appealed to this Court.

The evidence reveals, and the appealed order admits, that the character of the Hacienda in question as owned by the
conjugal partnership De Borja-Tangco was solemnly admitted by the late Francisco de Borja no less than two times: first,
in the Reamended Inventory that, as executor of the estate of his deceased wife Josefa Tangco, he filed in the Special
Proceedings No. 7866 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal on 23 July 1953 (Exhibit "2"); and again, in the Reamended
Accounting of the same date, also filed in the proceedings aforesaid (Exhibit "7"). Similarly, the plaintiff Tasiana O. Vda.
de Borja, herself, as oppositor in the Estate of Josefa Tangco, submitted therein an inventory dated 7 September 1954
(Exhibit "3") listing the Jalajala property among the "Conjugal Properties of the Spouses Francisco de Borja and Josefa
Tangco". And once more, Tasiana Ongsingco, as administratrix of the Estate of Francisco de Borja, in Special
Proceedings No. 832 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, submitted therein in December, 1955, an inventory
wherein she listed the Jalajala Hacienda under the heading "Conjugal Property of the Deceased Spouses Francisco de
Borja and Josefa Tangco, which are in the possession of the Administrator of the Testate Estate of the Deceased Josefa
Tangco in Special Proceedings No. 7866 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal" (Exhibit "4").

Notwithstanding the four statements aforesaid, and the fact that they are plain admissions against interest made by both
Francisco de Borja and the Administratrix of his estate, in the course of judicial proceedings in the Rizal and Nueva Ecija
Courts, supporting the legal presumption in favor of the conjugal community, the Court below declared that the Hacienda
de Jalajala (Poblacion) was not conjugal property, but the private exclusive property of the late Francisco de Borja. It did
so on the strength of the following evidences: (a) the sworn statement by Francis de Borja on 6 August 1951 (Exhibit "F")
that —

He tomado possession del pedazo de terreno ya delimitado (equivalente a 1/4 parte, 337 hectareas)
adjunto a mi terreno personal y exclusivo (Poblacion de Jalajala, Rizal).

and (b) the testimony of Gregorio de Borja, son of Bernardo de Borja, that the entire Hacienda had been bought at a
foreclosure sale for P40,100.00, of which amount P25,100 was contributed by Bernardo de Borja and P15,000. by
Marcelo de Borja; that upon receipt of a subsequent demand from the provincial treasurer for realty taxes the sum of
P17,000, Marcelo told his brother Bernardo that Francisco (son of Marcelo) wanted also to be a co-owner, and upon
Bernardo's assent to the proposal, Marcelo issue a check for P17,000.00 to pay the back taxes and said that the amount
would represent Francisco's contribution in the purchase of the Hacienda. The witness further testified that —

Marcelo de Borja said that that money was entrusted to him by Francisco de Borja when he was still a
bachelor and which he derived from his business transactions. (Hearing, 2 February 1965, t.s.n., pages
13-15) (Emphasis supplied)

The Court below, reasoning that not only Francisco's sworn statement overweighed the admissions in the inventories
relied upon by defendant-appellant Jose de Borja since probate courts can not finally determine questions of ownership of
inventoried property, but that the testimony of Gregorio de Borja showed that Francisco de Borja acquired his share of the
original Hacienda with his private funds, for which reason that share can not be regarded as conjugal partnership
property, but as exclusive property of the buyer, pursuant to Article 1396(4) of Civil Code of 1889 and Article 148(4) of the
Civil Code of the Philippines.

The following shall be the exclusive property of each spouse:

xxx xxx xxx

(4) That which is purchased with exclusive money of the wife or of the husband.

We find the conclusions of the lower court to be untenable. In the first place, witness Gregorio de Borja's testimony as to
the source of the money paid by Francisco for his share was plain hearsay, hence inadmissible and of no probative value,
since he was merely repeating what Marcelo de Borja had told him (Gregorio). There is no way of ascertaining the truth of
the statement, since both Marcelo and Francisco de Borja were already dead when Gregorio testified. In addition, the
statement itself is improbable, since there was no need or occasion for Marcelo de Borja to explain to Gregorio how and
when Francisco de Borja had earned the P17,000.00 entrusted to Marcelo. A ring of artificiality is clearly discernible in this
portion of Gregorio's testimony.

As to Francisco de Borja's affidavit, Exhibit "F", the quoted portion thereof (ante, page 14) does not clearly demonstrate
that the "mi terreno personal y exclusivo (Poblacion de Jalajala, Rizal) " refers precisely to the Hacienda in question. The
inventories (Exhibits 3 and 4) disclose that there were two real properties in Jalajala owned by Francisco de Borja, one of
72.038 sq. m., assessed at P44,600, and a much bigger one of 1,357.260.70 sq. m., which is evidently the Hacienda de
Jalajala (Poblacion). To which of these lands did the affidavit of Francisco de Borja (Exhibit "F") refer to? In addition,
Francisco's characterization of the land as "mi terreno personal y exclusivo" is plainly self-serving, and not admissible in
the absence of cross examination.
It may be true that the inventories relied upon by defendant-appellant (Exhibits "2", "3", "4" and "7") are not conclusive on
the conjugal character of the property in question; but as already noted, they are clear admissions against the pecuniary
interest of the declarants, Francisco de Borja and his executor-widow, Tasiana Ongsingco, and as such of much greater
probative weight than the self-serving statement of Francisco (Exhibit "F"). Plainly, the legal presumption in favor of the
conjugal character of the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion) now in dispute has not been rebutted but actually confirmed by
proof. Hence, the appealed order should be reversed and the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion) declared property of the
conjugal partnership of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco.

No error having been assigned against the ruling of the lower court that claims for damages should be ventilated in the
corresponding special proceedings for the settlement of the estates of the deceased, the same requires no pro
announcement from this Court.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appealed order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Case No. L-28040 is hereby
affirmed; while those involved in Cases Nos. L-28568 and L-28611 are reversed and set aside. Costs against the
appellant Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja in all three (3) cases.

Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, JJ., concur.

Fernando, J., took no part.

G.R. No. 193707 December 10, 2014

NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her minor child RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM, Petitioner,
vs.
ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside
the Orders1 dated February 19, 2010 and September 1, 2010, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (RTC-
Cebu), which dismissed the criminal case entitled People of the Philippines v. Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem,
docketed as Criminal Case No. CBU-85503, for violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-
Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004.

The following facts are culled from the records:

Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland on
September 25, 1990.2 On January 19, 1994, they were blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem, who at the
time of the filing of the instant petition was sixteen (16) years of age. 3

Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court
of Holland.4 At that time, their son was only eighteen (18) months old. 5 Thereafter, petitioner and her son came home to
the Philippines.6

According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide monthly support to their son in the amount of Two Hundred
Fifty (250) Guildene (which is equivalent to Php17,500.00 more or less). 7 However, since the arrival of petitioner and her
son in the Philippines, respondent never gave support to the son, Roderigo. 8

Not long thereafter, respondent cameto the Philippines and remarried in Pinamungahan, Cebu, and since then, have been
residing thereat.9 Respondent and his new wife established a business known as Paree Catering, located at Barangay
Tajao, Municipality of Pinamungahan, Cebu City.10 To date, all the parties, including their son, Roderigo, are presently
living in Cebu City.11

On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter demanding for support from respondent. However,
respondent refused to receive the letter.12

Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a complaint affidavit with the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City
against respondent for violation of Section 5, paragraph E(2) of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to support his
minor child with petitioner.13 Respondent submitted his counter-affidavit thereto, to which petitioner also submitted her
reply-affidavit.14 Thereafter, the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an
information for the crime charged against herein respondent.

The information, which was filed with the RTC-Cebu and raffled to Branch 20 thereof, states that:

That sometime in the year 1995 and up to the present, more or less, in the Municipality of Minglanilla, Province of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and deliberately deprive, refuse and still continue to deprive his son RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM, a
fourteen (14) year old minor, of financial support legally due him, resulting in economic abuse to the victim. CONTRARY
TO LAW.15

Upon motion and after notice and hearing, the RTC-Cebu issued a Hold Departure Order against
respondent.16Consequently, respondent was arrested and, subsequently, posted bail. 17 Petitioner also filed a
Motion/Application of Permanent Protection Order to which respondent filed his Opposition.18 Pending the resolution
thereof, respondent was arraigned.19 Subsequently, without the RTC-Cebu having resolved the application of the
protection order, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged;
and (2) prescription of the crime charged.20

On February 19, 2010, the RTC-Cebu issued the herein assailed Order,21 dismissing the instant criminal case against
respondent on the ground that the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense with respect to the
respondent who is an alien, the dispositive part of which states:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense with respect to the
accused, he being an alien, and accordingly, orders this case DISMISSED.

The bail bond posted by accused Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem for his provisional liberty is hereby cancelled (sic)
and ordered released.
SO ORDERED.

Cebu City, Philippines, February 19, 2010.22

Thereafter, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration thereto reiterating respondent’s obligation to support their child
under Article 19523 of the Family Code, thus, failure to do so makes him liable under R.A. No. 9262 which "equally applies
to all persons in the Philippines who are obliged to support their minor children regardless of the obligor’s nationality." 24

On September 1, 2010, the lower court issued an Order25 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration and reiterating
its previous ruling. Thus:

x x x The arguments therein presented are basically a rehash of those advanced earlier in the memorandum of the
prosecution. Thus, the court hereby reiterates its ruling that since the accused is a foreign national he is not subject to our
national law (The Family Code) in regard to a parent’s duty and obligation to givesupport to his child. Consequently, he
cannot be charged of violating R.A. 9262 for his alleged failure to support his child. Unless it is conclusively established
that R.A. 9262 applies to a foreigner who fails to give support tohis child, notwithstanding that he is not bound by our
domestic law which mandates a parent to give such support, it is the considered opinion of the court that no prima
faciecase exists against the accused herein, hence, the case should be dismissed.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Cebu City, Philippines, September 1, 2010.26

Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari raising the following issues:

1. Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under Philippine law; and

2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified failure to
support his minor child.27

At the outset, let it be emphasized that We are taking cognizance of the instant petition despite the fact that the same was
directly lodged with the Supreme Court, consistent with the ruling in Republic v. Sunvar Realty Development
Corporation,28 which lays down the instances when a ruling of the trial court may be brought on appeal directly to the
Supreme Court without violating the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, to wit:

x x x Nevertheless, the Rules do not prohibit any of the parties from filing a Rule 45 Petition with this Court, in case only
questions of law are raised or involved. This latter situation was one that petitioners found themselves in when they filed
the instant Petition to raise only questions of law. In Republic v. Malabanan, the Court clarified the three modes of appeal
from decisions of the RTC, to wit: (1) by ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error under Rule 41, whereby judgment was
rendered in a civil or criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction; (2) by a petition for review under
Rule 42, whereby judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; and (3) by a petition for
review on certiorari before the Supreme Court under Rule 45. "The first mode of appeal is taken to the [Court of Appeals]
on questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. The second mode of appeal is brought to the CA on questions of
fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. The third mode of appealis elevated to the Supreme Court only on
questions of law." (Emphasis supplied)

There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented or of the truth or falsehood of the facts being admitted, and the doubt concerns the correct application of law
and jurisprudence on the matter. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of
circumstances.29

Indeed, the issues submitted to us for resolution involve questions of law – the response thereto concerns the correct
application of law and jurisprudence on a given set of facts, i.e.,whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to
support his minor child under Philippine law; and whether or not he can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for
his unjustified failure to do so.

It cannot be negated, moreover, that the instant petition highlights a novel question of law concerning the liability of a
foreign national who allegedly commits acts and omissions punishable under special criminal laws, specifically in relation
to family rights and duties. The inimitability of the factual milieu of the present case, therefore, deserves a definitive ruling
by this Court, which will eventually serve as a guidepost for future cases. Furthermore, dismissing the instant petition and
remanding the same to the CA would only waste the time, effort and resources of the courts. Thus, in the present case,
considerations of efficiency and economy in the administration of justice should prevail over the observance of the
hierarchy of courts.

Now, on the matter of the substantive issues, We find the petition meritorious. Nonetheless, we do not fully agree with
petitioner’s contentions.
To determine whether or not a person is criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262, it is imperative that the legal obligation to
support exists.

Petitioner invokes Article 19530 of the Family Code, which provides the parent’s obligation to support his child. Petitioner
contends that notwithstanding the existence of a divorce decree issued in relation to Article 26 of the Family
Code,31 respondent is not excused from complying with his obligation to support his minor child with petitioner.

On the other hand, respondent contends that there is no sufficient and clear basis presented by petitioner that she, as well
as her minor son, are entitled to financial support.32 Respondent also added that by reason of the Divorce Decree, he is
not obligated topetitioner for any financial support. 33

On this point, we agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely on Article 195 34 of the New Civil Code in demanding
support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since Article 15 35 of the New Civil Code stresses the principle of
nationality. In other words, insofar as Philippine laws are concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family Code on
support, the same only applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies to foreigners such that they are
governed by their national law with respect to family rights and duties. 36

The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and duties. Since the respondent is a
citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-Cebu that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to
Philippinelaw, as to whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so. 37

In the case of Vivo v. Cloribel,38 the Court held that –

Furthermore, being still aliens, they are not in position to invoke the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines, for that
Code cleaves to the principle that family rights and duties are governed by their personal law, i.e.,the laws of the nation to
which they belong even when staying in a foreign country (cf. Civil Code, Article 15). 39

It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son under Article195 of the
Family Code as a consequence of the Divorce Covenant obtained in Holland. This does not, however, mean that
respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son altogether.

In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the
foreign law.40 In the present case, respondent hastily concludes that being a national of the Netherlands, he is governed
by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to support. 41 While respondent pleaded the laws of the
Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same.

It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands does not impose upon the
parents the obligation to support their child (either before, during or after the issuance of a divorce decree), because
Llorente v. Court of Appeals,42 has already enunciated that:

True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to takejudicial notice of
them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.43

In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of processual
presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts
will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal law. 44 Thus, since the law of the
Netherlands as regards the obligation to support has not been properly pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is
presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of parents to support their children and
penalizing the non-compliance therewith.

Moreover, while in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,45 the Court held that a divorce obtained in a foreign land as well as its legal
effects may be recognized in the Philippines in view of the nationality principle on the matter of status of persons, the
Divorce Covenant presented by respondent does not completely show that he is notliable to give support to his son after
the divorce decree was issued. Emphasis is placed on petitioner’s allegation that under the second page of the aforesaid
covenant, respondent’s obligation to support his child is specifically stated, 46 which was not disputed by respondent.

We likewise agree with petitioner that notwithstanding that the national law of respondent states that parents have no
obligation to support their children or that such obligation is not punishable by law, said law would still not find
applicability,in light of the ruling in Bank of America, NT and SA v. American Realty Corporation, 47 to wit:

In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter were properly pleaded and proved in
accordance with Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court and the jurisprudence laid down in Yao Kee, et al. vs. Sy-
Gonzales, said foreign law would still not find applicability.

Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established public policy of the forum, the
said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.
Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order,
public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations
or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle imbedded in our jurisdiction proscribing the
splitting up of a single cause of action.

Section 4, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is pertinent

If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits
in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others. Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its
application would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important
function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles of
Conflict of Laws.48

Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s obligation to support his child nor
penalize the noncompliance therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in the Philippines because it would be of
great injustice to the child to be denied of financial support when the latter is entitled thereto.

We emphasize, however, that as to petitioner herself, respondent is no longer liable to support his former wife, in
consonance with the ruling in San Luis v. San Luis,49 to wit:

As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longerbe considered marriedto the
alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her marital duties and obligations. It held:

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private
respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner
should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The
latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated
against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served. (Emphasis added) 50

Based on the foregoing legal precepts, we find that respondent may be made liable under Section 5(e) and (i) of R.A. No.
9262 for unjustly refusing or failing to give support topetitioner’s son, to wit:

SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The crime of violence against women and their
children is committed through any of the following acts:

xxxx

(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which the woman or her child has the
right to desist from or desist from conduct which the woman or her child has the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict
or restricting the woman's or her child's freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other
harm or threat of physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or child. This shall include, butnot
limited to, the following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the woman's or her child's
movement or conduct:

xxxx

(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally due her or her family, or
deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient financial support; x x x x

(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not limited
to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor childrenof access to the
woman's child/children.51

Under the aforesaid special law, the deprivation or denial of financial support to the child is considered anact of violence
against women and children.

In addition, considering that respondent is currently living in the Philippines, we find strength in petitioner’s claim that the
Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in relation to Article 14 of the New Civil Code, applies to the instant case, which
provides that: "[p]enal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live and sojourn in
Philippine territory, subject to the principle of public international law and to treaty stipulations." On this score, it is
indisputable that the alleged continuing acts of respondent in refusing to support his child with petitioner is committed here
in the Philippines as all of the parties herein are residents of the Province of Cebu City. As such, our courts have territorial
jurisdiction over the offense charged against respondent. It is likewise irrefutable that jurisdiction over the respondent was
acquired upon his arrest.
Finally, we do not agree with respondent’s argument that granting, but not admitting, that there is a legal basis for
charging violation of R.A. No. 9262 in the instant case, the criminal liability has been extinguished on the ground of
prescription of crime52 under Section 24 of R.A. No. 9262, which provides that:

SECTION 24. Prescriptive Period. – Acts falling under Sections 5(a) to 5(f) shall prescribe in twenty (20) years. Acts
falling under Sections 5(g) to 5(I) shall prescribe in ten (10) years.

The act of denying support to a child under Section 5(e)(2) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 is a continuing offense,53 which
started in 1995 but is still ongoing at present. Accordingly, the crime charged in the instant case has clearly not
prescribed.

Given, however, that the issue on whether respondent has provided support to petitioner’s child calls for an examination
of the probative value of the evidence presented, and the truth and falsehood of facts being admitted, we hereby remand
the determination of this issue to the RTC-Cebu which has jurisdiction over the case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated February 19, 2010 and September 1, 2010, respectively, of
the Regional Trial Court of the City of Cebu are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the
same court to conduct further proceedings based on the merits of the case.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a
valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?

Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make a definite ruling on this apparently novel question,
presented as a pure question of law.

In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the Decision1 dated May 15, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of
Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and its Resolution2 dated July 4, 2002 denying the motion for reconsideration.
The court a quo had declared that herein respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated to remarry. The fallo of the
impugned Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code and by reason of the
divorce decree obtained against him by his American wife, the petitioner is given the capacity to remarry under the
Philippine Law.

IT IS SO ORDERED.3

The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows.

On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the
Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V.
Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.

In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered
that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.

Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain
Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel,
California.

Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the
Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein
petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.

In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE4

The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to the instant case because it only
applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper
remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or for legal separation. 5 Furthermore, the OSG argues
there is no law that governs respondent’s situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of judicial
determination.6

For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case but insists that when his naturalized
alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise capacitated by operation of law
pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.7

At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial court actually constituted a petition for
declaratory relief. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides:

RULE 63

DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES

Section 1. Who may file petition—Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose
rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or other governmental regulation may, before
breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of
construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.

...

The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must
be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the
controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination. 8

This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage between two Filipino citizens where one
later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and remarried while in the U.S.A. The interests of the parties
are also adverse, as petitioner representing the State asserts its duty to protect the institution of marriage while
respondent, a private citizen, insists on a declaration of his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for relief, has legal
interest in the controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as when respondent
remarries, litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of his second marriage.

Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code apply to the case of respondent?
Necessarily, we must dwell on how this provision had come about in the first place, and what was the intent of the
legislators in its enactment?

Brief Historical Background

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the
"Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:

All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and
38.

On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed into
law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended,
it now provides:

ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1),
(4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)

On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation presented by the case at hand. It seems to
apply only to cases where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner.
The instant case is one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on,
the wife was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry,
and indeed she remarried an American citizen while residing in the U.S.A.

Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings9 on the Family Code, the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines
(CBCP) registered the following objections to Paragraph 2 of Article 26:

1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose spouses are Filipinos who divorce them abroad. These
spouses who are divorced will not be able to re-marry, while the spouses of foreigners who validly divorce them abroad
can.

2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of divorce even for Filipino citizens. For those whose foreign
spouses validly divorce them abroad will also be considered to be validly divorced here and can re-marry. We propose
that this be deleted and made into law only after more widespread consultation. (Emphasis supplied.)

Legislative Intent

Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26,
according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse.

Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.10 The Van Dorn case
involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly
obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry
under Philippine law.

Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino
citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a foreign citizenship by naturalization?

The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals.11 In Quita, the parties were, as in this
case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became a naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained a
divorce in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized
foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.

Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26
should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino
citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino
spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the
marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute according to
its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should
be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may
therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent. 12

If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married
to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must
be deemed as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.

In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.

In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been
celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid
divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both
present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the "divorced" Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.

We are also unable to sustain the OSG’s theory that the proper remedy of the Filipino spouse is to file either a petition for
annulment or a petition for legal separation. Annulment would be a long and tedious process, and in this particular case,
not even feasible, considering that the marriage of the parties appears to have all the badges of validity. On the other
hand, legal separation would not be a sufficient remedy for it would not sever the marriage tie; hence, the legally
separated Filipino spouse would still remain married to the naturalized alien spouse.

However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted by respondent concerning the divorce
decree and the naturalization of respondent’s wife. It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it
and mere allegation is not evidence.13

Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that his wife was naturalized as an
American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it
must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. 14 Such foreign law must also
be proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be alleged and
proved.15 Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as
specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to
enter into another marriage.

Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as
amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had
acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However, considering that in the present petition there is no
sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we are unable to declare, based on respondent’s bare allegations that his
wife, who was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an American, that
respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made properly upon respondent’s submission
of the aforecited evidence in his favor.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated May 15, 2002,
and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET
ASIDE. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 221029

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner

vs
MARELYN TANEDO MANALO, Respondent

RESOLUTION

peralta, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Rules) seeks to reverse and set aside the
September 18, 2014 Decision1 and October 12, 2015 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
100076. The dispositive portion of the Decision states:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 15 October 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of
Dagupan City, First Judicial Region, Branch 43, in SPEC. PROC. NO. 2012-0005 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Let a copy of this Decision be served on the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila.

SO ORDERED.3

The facts are undisputed.

On January 10, 2012, respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed a petition for cancellation of

Entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan , Metro Manila, by virtueof a judgment of divorce Japanese court.

Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and in substance, Branch 43 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City
set the case for initial hearing on April 25, 2012. The petition and the notice of initial hearing were published once a week
for three consecutive weeks in newspaper of general circulation. During the initial hearing, counsel for Manalo marked the
documentary evidence (consisting of the trial courts Order dated January 25, 2012, affidavit of publication, and issues of
the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February 28 - March 5, 2012, and March 6-12, 2012) for purposes of
compliance with the jurisdictional requirements.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance for petitioner Republic of the Philippines authorizing the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Dagupan to appear on its behalf. Likewise, a Manifestation and Motion was filed
questioning the title and/or caption of the petition considering that based on the allegations therein, the proper action
should be a petition for recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment.

As a result, Manalo moved to admit an Amended Petition, which the court granted. The Amended Petition, which
captioned that if it is also a petition for recognition and enforcement of foreign judgment alleged:

2. That petitioner is previously married in the Philippines to a Japanese national named YOSHINO MINORO as shown by
their Marriage Contract xxx;

3. That recently, a case for divorce was filed by herein [petitioner] in Japan and after die proceedings, a divorce decree
dated December 6, 2011 was rendered by the Japanese Court x x x;

4. That at present, by virtue of the said divorce decree, petitioner and her divorce Japanese husband are no longer living
together and in fact, petitioner and her daughter are living separately from said Japanese former husband;

5. That there is an imperative need to have the entry of marriage in Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila cancelled,
where the petitioner and the former Japanese husband's marriage was previously registered, in order that it would not
appear anymore that petitioner is still married to the said Japanese national who is no longer her husband or is no longer
married to her, she shall not be bothered and disturbed by aid entry of marriage;

6. That this petition is filed principally for the purpose of causing the cancellation of entry of the marriage between the
petitioner and the said Japanese national, pursuant to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, which marriage was
already dissolved by virtue of the aforesaid divorce decree; [and]

7. That petitioner prays, among others, that together with the cancellation of the said entry of her marriage, that she be
allowed to return and use her maiden surname, MANALO.4

Manalo was allowed to testify in advance as she was scheduled to leave for Japan for her employment. Among the
documents that were offered and admitted were:

1. Court Order dated January 25, 2012, finding the petition and its attachments to be sufficient in form and in substance;
2. Affidavit of Publication;

3. Issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February 28 - March 5, 2012, and March 6-12, 2012;

4. Certificate of Marriage between Manalo and her former Japanese husband;

5. Divorce Decree of Japanese court;

6. Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippine Consulate General in Osaka, Japan of the Notification of Divorce;
and

7. Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce.5

The OSG did not present any controverting evidence to rebut the allegations of Manalo.

On October 15, 2012, the trial court denied the petition for lack of merit. In ruling that the divorce obtained by Manalo in
Japan should not be recognized, it opined that, based on Article 15 of the New Civil Code, the Philippine law "does not
afford Filipinos the right to file for a divorce whether they are in the country or living abroad, if they are married to Filipinos
or to foreigners, or if they celebrated their marriage in the Philippines or in another country" and that unless Filipinos "are
naturalized as citizens of another country, Philippine laws shall have control over issues related to Filipinos' family rights
and duties, together with the determination of their condition and legal capacity to enter into contracts and civil relations,
inclusing marriages."6

On appeal, the CA overturned the RTC decision. It held that Article 26 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family
Code) is applicable even if it was Manalo who filed for divorce against her Japanese husband because the decree may
obtained makes the latter no longer married to the former, capacitating him to remarry. Conformably with Navarro, et al. V.
Exec. Secretary Ermita, et al.7 ruling that the meaning of the law should be based on the intent of the lawmakers and in
view of the legislative intent behind Article 26, it would be height of injustice to consider Manalo as still married to the
Japanese national, who, in turn, is no longer married to her. For the appellate court, the fact that it was Manalo who filed
the divorce case is inconsequential. Cited as similar to this case was Van Dorn v. Judge Romilo, Jr. 8 where the mariage
between a foreigner an a Filipino was dissolved filed abroad by the latter.

The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied; hence, this petition.

We deny the petition and partially affirm the CA decision.

Divorce, the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after the marriage, are of two types: (1) absolute divorce
or a vinculo matrimonii, which terminates the marriage, and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro, which suspends it and
leaves the bond in full force.9 In this jurisdiction, the following rules exist:

1. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it.10

2. Consistent with Articles 1511 and 1712 of the New Civil Code, the marital bond between two Filipinos cannot be
dissolved even by an absolute divorce obtained abroad.13

3. An absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided it is consistent with their respective national laws.14

4. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, the former is allowed to contract a subsequent marriage
in case the absolute divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.15

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino signed into law Executive Order (E.O.) No. 209, otherwise known as
the Family Code of the Philippines, which took effect on August 3, 1988. 16 Shortly thereafter , E.O. No. 227 was issued on
July 17, 1987.17 Aside from amending Articles 36 and 39 of the Family Code, a second paragraph was added to Article
26.18 This provision was originally deleted by the Civil Code Revision Committee (Committee),but it was presented and
approved at a Cabinet meeting after Pres. Aquino signed E.O. No. 209.19 As modified, Article 26 now states:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the where country where
they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles
35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him her to remarry under Philippine law.

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a
Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage.20 It authorizes our
courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow
divorce.21 Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a divorce case. 22Under the
principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by the spouse of foreign nationality, but the legal
effects thereof, e.g., on custody, care and support of the children or property relations of the spouses, must still be
determined by our courts.23

According to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Committee, the idea of the amendment is to avoid the absurd
situation of a Filipino as still being married to his or her alien spouse, although the latter is no longer married to the former
because he or she had obtained a divorce abroad that is recognized by his or national law.24 The aim was that it would
solved the problem of many Filipino women who, under the New Civil Code, are still considered married to their alien
husbands even after the latter have already validly divorced them under their (the husbands') national laws and perhaps
have already married again.25

In 2005, this Court concluded that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 applies to a case where, at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them acquired foreign citizenship by naturalization,
initiated a divorce proceeding, and obtained a favorable decree. We held in Republic of the Phils. v. Orbecido III:26

The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals. In Quita, the parties were, as in this
case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became naturalized American citizen n 1954 and obtained a
divorce in the same year. The court therein hinted, by the way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized
foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.

Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26
should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino
citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as foreign citizen and obtains divorce decree. The Filipino spouse
should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage.
To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. x x x

If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married
to the alien spouse who after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be
deemed as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.

In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of marriage, but their citizenship at
the time valid divorced obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.

Now, the Court is tasked to resolve whether, under the same provision, a Filipino citizen has the capacity to remarry under
Philippine law after initiating a divorce proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable judgment against his or her alien
spouse who is capacitated to remarry. Specifically, Manalo pleads for the recognition of enforcement of the divorced
decree rendered by the Japanese court and for the cancellation of the entry of marriage in the local civil registry " in order
that it would not appear anymore that she is still married to the said Japanese national who is no longer her husband or is
no longer married to her; [and], in the event that [she] decides to be remarried, she shall not be bothered and disturbed by
said entry of marriage," and to use her maiden surname.

We rule in the affirmative.

Both Dacasin v. Dacasin28 and Van Dorn29 already recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by
the Filipino spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody and property relation,respectively.

In Dacasin, post-divorce, the former spouses executed an Agreement for the joint custody of their minor daughter. Later
on, the husband who is a US citizen, sued his Filipino wife enforce the Agreement, alleging that it was only the latter who
exercised sole custody of their child. The trial court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, on the ground, among
others, that the divorce decree is binding following the "nationality rule" prevailing in this jurisdiction. The husband moved
to reconsider, arguing that the divorce decree obtained by his former wife is void, but it was denied. In ruling that the trial
court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit bu not to enforce the Agreement, which is void, this Court said:

Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce decree's alleged invalidity - not because the Illinois court lacked jurisdiction or that
the divorced decree violated Illinois law, but because the divorce was obtained by his Filipino spouse - to support the
Agreement's enforceability . The argument that foreigners in this jurisdiction are not bound by foreign divorce decrees is
hardly novel. Van Dron v. Romillo settled the matter by holding that an alien spouse of a Filipino is bound by a divorce
decree obtained abroad. There, we dismissed the alien divorcee's Philippine suit for accounting of alleged post-divorce
conjugal property and rejected his submission that the foreign divorce (obtained by the Filipino spouse) is not valid in this
jurisdiction x x x.30
Van Dorn was decided before the Family Code took into effect. There, a complaint was filed by the ex-husband , who is a
US citizen, against his Filipino wife to render an accounting of a business that was alleged to be a conjugal property and
to be declared with right to manage the same. Van Dorn moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action
was barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings that she initiated, but the trial court denied the motion. On his
part, her ex-husband averred that the divorce decree issued by the Nevada court could not prevail over the prohibitive
laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign court cannot, especially if
the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction . In
dismissing the case filed by the alien spouse, the Court discussed the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their
conjugal property in the Philippines. Thus:

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The decree is
binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her
husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this
jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy.

Is it true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are
covered by the policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorce abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private
respondent from the marriage from standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated
by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794,799:

"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court of competent jurisdiction are to
change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage
tie, when thus severed as stone party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is
unknown to the law. When the law provides in the nature of penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party,
as well as the other, is still absolutely feed from the bond of the former marriage."

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing
to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is estopped by his
own representation before said court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

To maintain, as private respondent does, that under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private
respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner
should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The
latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated
against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served. 31

In addition, the fact that a validity obtained foreign divorce initiated by the Filipino spouse can be recognized and given
legal effects in the Philippines is implied from Our rulings in Fujiki v. Marinay, et al.32 and Medina v. Koike.33

In Fujiki, the Filipino wife, with the help of her husband, who is a Japanese national, was able to obtain a judgment from
Japan's family court. Which declared the marriage between her and her second husband, who is a Japanese national,
void on the ground of bigamy. In resolving the issue of whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to
recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his her spouse and a foreign citizen on the
ground of bigamy, We ruled:

Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to
Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage
between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.

There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage he
contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an
entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest
derives from the substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances) his most intimate
human relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law the moment he contracts marriage.
These property interests in marriage included the right to be supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of the
family" and preserving the property regime of the marriage.

Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution, but a spouse's right in a marriage extends
further to relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations between Husband and Wife") of the Family
Code. x x x34

On the other hand, in Medina, the Filipino wife and her Japanese husband jointly filed for divorce, which was
granted.1âwphi1 Subsequently, she filed a petition before the RTC for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and
declaration of capacity to remarry pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Article 26. The RTC denied the petition on the ground that
the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien spouse recognizing his capacity to obtain a divorce must be
proven in accordance with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. This Court agreed and
ruled that, consistent with Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, et al.35 and Garcia v. Recio,36 the divorce decree and the national law of
the alien spouse must be proven. Instead of dismissing the case, We referred it to the CA for appropriate action including
the reception of evidence to determine and resolve the pertinent factual issues.

There is no compelling reason to deviate from the above-mentioned rulings. When this Court recognized a foreign divorce
decree that was initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody
and property relation, it should not stop short in a likewise acknowledging that one of the usual and necessary
consequences of absolute divorce is the right to remarry. Indeed, there is no longer a mutual obligation to live together
and observe fidelity. When the marriage tie is severed and ceased to exist, the civil status and the domestic relation of the
former spouses change as both of them are freed from the marital bond.

The dissent is of the view that, under the nationality principle, Manalo's personal status is subject to Philippine law, which
prohibits absolute divorce. Hence, the divorce decree which she obtained under Japanese law cannot be given effect, as
she is, without dispute, a national not of Japan, bit of the Philippines. It is said that that a contrary ruling will subvert not
only the intention of the framers of the law, but also that of the Filipino peopl, as expressed in the Constitution. The Court
is, therefore, bound to respect the prohibition until the legislature deems it fit to lift the same.

We beg to differ.

Paragraph 2 of Artilce 26 speaksof "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry." Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only requires that there be a divorce validly obtained
abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding
wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the
respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. The Court is bound by the words of the statute; neither can We put words in
the mouth of lawmakers.37 The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words to have used words advisely
and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or
from the words if a statute there should be departure."38

Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should be interpreted to mean that the divorce proceeding
must be actually initiated by the alien spouse, still, the Court will not follow the letter of the statute when to do so would
depart from the true intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of
the act.39 Law have ends to achieve, and statutes should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and
purposes.40 As held in League of Cities of the Phils. et al. v. COMELEC et. al.:41

The legislative intent is not at all times accurately reflected in the manner in which the resulting law is couched. Thus,
applying a verba legis or strictly literal interpretation of a statute may render it meaningless and lead to inconvience, an
absurd situation or injustice. To obviate this aberration, and bearing in mind the principle that the intent or the spirit of the
law is the law itself, resort should be to the rule that the spirit of the law control its letter.

To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country where it was rendered, is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse. The provision is a corrective measure is free to marry under the laws of his or her
countr.42 Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving the
marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result: the Filipino spouse will
effectively be without a husband or wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in
like circumstances as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject
provision should not make a distinction. In both instance, it is extended as a means to recognize the residual effect of the
foreign divorce decree on a Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by operations of their alien
spouses are severed by operation on the latter's national law.

Conveniently invoking the nationality principle is erroneous. Such principle, found under Article 15 of the City Code, is not
an absolute and unbending rule. In fact, the mer e existence of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is a testament that the State may
provide for an exception thereto. Moreover, blind adherence to the nationality principle must be disallowed if it would
cause unjust discrimination and oppression to certain classes of individuals whose rights are equally protected by law.
The courts have the duty to enforce the laws of divorce as written by the Legislature only if they are constitutional. 43

While the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification and that its decision is accorded
recognition and respect by the court of justice, such classification may be subjected to judicial review. 44 The deference
stops where the classification violates a fundamental right, or prejudices persons accorded special protection by the
Constitution.45 When these violations arise, this Court must discharge its primary role as the vanguard of constitutional
guaranties, and require a stricter and more exacting adherence to constitutional limitations. 46 If a legislative classification
impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect
class strict judicial scrutiny is required since it is presumed unconstitutional, and the burden is upon the government to
prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that it is the least restrictive means to
protect such interest.47

"Fundamental rights" whose infringement leads to strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause are those basic liberties
explicitly or implicitly guaranteed in the Constitution.48 It includes the right to free speech, political expression, press,
assembly, and forth, the right to travel, and the right to vote. 49 On the other hand, what constitutes compelling state
interest is measured by the scale rights and powers arrayed in the Constitution and calibrated by history. 50 It is akin to the
paramount interest of the state for which some individual liberties must give way, such as the promotion of public interest,
public safety or the general welfare.51 It essentially involves a public right or interest that, because of its primacy, overrides
individual rights, and allows the former to take precedence over the latter.52

Although the Family Code was not enacted by the Congress, the same principle applies with respect to the acts of the
President which have the force and effect of law unless declared otherwise by the court. In this case, We find that
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 violates one of the essential requisites 53 of the equal protection clause.54 Particularly, the
limitation of the provision only to a foreign divorce decree initiated by the alien spouse is unreasonable as it is based on
superficial, arbitrary, and whimsical classification.

A Filipino who is married to another Filipino is not similarly situated with a Filipino who is married to a foreign citizen.
There are real, material and substantial differences between them. Ergo, they should not be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and liabilities imposed. Without a doubt, there are political, economic cultural, and religious dissimilarities as
well as varying legal systems and procedures, all too unfamiliar, that a Filipino national who is married to an alien spouse
has to contend with. More importantly, while a divorce decree obtained abroad by a Filipino against another Filipino is null
and void, a divorce decree obtained by an alien against his her Filipino spouse is recognized if made in accordance with
the national law of the foreigner.55

On the contrary, there is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceedings
a Filipino who obtained a divorce decree upon the instance of his or her alien spouse . In the eyes of the Philippine and
foreign laws, both are considered as Filipinos who have the same rights and obligations in a alien land. The
circumstances surrounding them are alike. Were it not for Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both are still married to their foreigner
spouses who are no longer their wives/husbands. Hence, to make a distinction between them based merely on the
superficial difference of whether they initiated the divorce proceedings or not is utterly unfair. Indeed, the treatment gives
undue favor to one and unjustly discriminate against the other.

Further, the differentiation in Paragraph 2 Article 26 is arbitrary. There is inequality in treatment because a foreign divorce
decree that was initiated and obtained by a Filipino citizen against his or her alien spouse would not be recognized even if
based on grounds similar to Articles 35, 36, 37 and 38 of the Family Code.56 In filing for divorce based on these grounds,
the Filipino spouse cannot be accused of invoking foreign law at whim, tantamount to insisting that he or she should be
governed with whatever law he or she chooses. The dissent's comment that Manalo should be "reminded that all is not
lost, for she may still pray for the severance of her martial ties before the RTC in accordance with the mechanism now
existing under the Family Code" is anything but comforting. For the guidance of the bench and the bar, it would have been
better if the dissent discussed in detail what these "mechanism" are and how they specifically apply in Manalo's case as
well as those who are similarly situated. If the dissent refers to a petition for declaration of nullity or annulment of
marriage, the reality is that there is no assurance that our courts will automatically grant the same. Besides, such
proceeding is duplicitous, costly, and protracted. All to the prejudice of our kababayan.

It is argued that the Court's liberal interpretation of Paragraph 2 of Artilce 26 encourages Filipinos to marry foreigners,
opening the floodgate to the indiscriminate practice of Filipinos marrying foreign nationals or initiating divorce proceedings
against their alien spouses.

The supposition is speculative and unfounded.

First, the dissent falls into a hasty generalization as no data whatsoever was sworn to support what he intends to
prove. Second, We adhere to the presumption of good faith in this jurisdiction. Under the rules on evidence, it is
disputable presumed (i.e., satisfactory if uncontradicted and overcome by other evidence) that a person is innocent of
crime or wrong,57 that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns,59 that acquiescence resulted from a belief that the
thing acquiesced in was conformable to the law and fact, 60 that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and
wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage,61 and that the law has been obeyed.62 It is whimsical to easily
attribute any illegal, irregular or immoral conduct on the part of a Filipino just because he or she opted to marry a foreigner
instead of a fellow Filipino. It is presumed that interracial unions are entered into out of genuine love and affection, rather
than prompted by pure lust or profit. Third, We take judicial notice of the fact that Filipinos are relatively more forbearing
and conservative in nature and that they are more often the victims or losing end of mixed marriages. And Fourth, it is not
for Us to prejudge the motive behind Filipino's decision to marry an alien national. In one case, it was said:

Motive for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot dictated on the kind of life that
a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm of their right to privacy and would
raise serious constitutional questions. The right marital privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages in
almost any way they see it fit, to live together or live apart, to have children or no children, to love one another or not, and
so on. Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience, companionship,
money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal requisites, are equally valid. Love, though the ideal
consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by law,
may validly support a marriage.63

The 1987 Constitution expresses that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall
be protected by the State.64 Nevertheless, it was not meant to be a general prohibition on divorce because Commissioner
Jose Luis Martin C. Gascon, in response to a question by Father Joaquin G. Bernas during the deliberations of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, was categorical about this point.65 Their exchange reveal as follows:
MR. RAMA. Mr. Presiding Officer, may I ask that Commissioner Bernas be recognized.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Colayco). Commissioner Bernas is recognized.

FR. BERNAS. Just one question, and I am not sure if it has been categorically answered. I refer specifically to the
proposal of Commissioner Gascon. Is this be understood as a prohibition of a general law on divorce? His intention is to
make this a prohibition so that the legislature cannot pass a divorce law.

MR. GASCON. Mr. Presding Officer, that was not primarily my intention. My intention was primarily to encourage the
social institution of marriage, but not necessarily discourage divorce. But now that the mentioned the issue of divorce, my
personal opinion is to discourage it. Mr. Presiding Officer.

FR. BERNAS. No my question is more categorical. Does this carry the meaning of prohibiting a divorce law?

MR. GASCON. No Mr. Presiding Officer.

FR. BERNAS. Thank you.66

Notably, a law on absolute divorce is not new in our country. Effectivity March 11, 1917, Philippine courts could grant an
absolute divorce in the grounds of adultery on the part of the wife or concubinage on the part of the husband by virtue of
Act No. 2710 of the Philippine Legislature.67 On March 25, 1943, pursuant to the authority conferred upon him by the
Commander-in-Chief fo the Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines and with the approval of the latter, the Chairman
of the Philippine Executive Commission promulgated an E.O. No. 141 ("New Divorce Law"), which repealed Act No. 2710
and provided eleven ground for absolute divorce, such as intentional or unjustified desertion continuously for at least one
year prior to the filing of the action, slander by deed or gross insult by one spouse against the other to such an extent as
to make further living together impracticable, and a spouse's incurable insanity.68 When the Philippines was liberated and
the Commonwealth Government was restored, it ceased to have force and effect and Act No. 2710 again
prevailed.69 From August 30, 1950, upon the effectivity of Republic Act No. 836 or the New Civil Code, an absolute
divorce obatined by Filipino citizens, whether here or abroad, is no longer recognized.70

Through the years, there has been constant clamor from various sectors of the Philippine society to re-institute absolute
divorce. As a matte of fcat, in the currnet 17th Congress, House Bill (H.B.) Nos. 11671 106272 238073 and 602774 were filed
in the House of representatives. In substitution of these bills, H.B. No. 7303 entitled "An Act Instituting Absolute Divorce
and Dissolution of Marriage in the Philippines" or the Absolute Divorce Act of 2018 was submitted by the House
Committee on Population

And Family Relations of February 8, 2018. It was approved on March 19, 2018 on Third Reading - with 134 in favor, 57
against, and 2 absentations. Under the bill, the grounds for a judicial decree of absolute divorce are as follows:

1. The grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code, modified or amended, as follows:

a. Physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the
petitioner;

b. Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious or political affiliation;

c. Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a child of a petitioner, to engage
in prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or inducement;

d. Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six (6) years, even if pardoned;

e. Drug addiction or habitual alchoholism ro chronic gambling of respondent;

f. Homosexuality of the respondent;

g. Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in the Philippines or abroad;

h. Marital infidelity or perversion or having a child with another person other than one's spouse during the
marriage, except when upon the mutual agreement of the spouses, a child is born to them by in vitro or a similar
procedure or when the wife bears a child after being a victim of rape;

i. attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner, a common child or a child of a petitioner; and

j. Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one (1) year.

When the spouses are legally separated by judicial decree for more thath two (2) years, either or both spouses can
petition the proper court for an absolute divorce based on said judicial decree of legal separation.
1. Grounds for annulment of marriage under Article 45 of the Family Code restated as follows:

a. The party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen (18) years of age or over but
below twety-one (21), and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of the parents guradian or personl
having substitute parental authority over the party, in that order, unless after attaining the age of twenty-one (21)
such party freely cohabited with the other and both lived together as husband and wife;

b. either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as
husband and wife;

c. The consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards with full knowledge of the facts
constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other husband and wife;

d. consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence, unless the same having
disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;

e. Either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other and such incapacity
continues or appears to be incurable; and

f. Either part was afflicted with the sexually transmissible infection found to be serious or appears to be incurable.

Provided, That the ground mentioned in b, e and f existed either at the time of the marriage or supervening after the
marriage.

1. When the spouses have been separated in fact for at least five (5) years at the time the petition for absolute divorce is
filed, and the reconciliation is highly improbable;

2. Psychological incapacity of either spouse as provided for in Article 36 of the Family Code, whether or not the incapacity
was present at the time of the celebration of the marriage or later;

3. When one of the spouses undergoes a gender reassignment surgery or transition from one sex to another, the other
spouse is entitled to petition for absolute divorce with the transgender or transsexual as respondent, or vice-versa;

4. Irreconcilable marital differences and conflicts which have resulted in the total breakdown of the marriage beyond
repair, despite earnest and repeated efforts at reconciliation.

To be sure, a good number of Filipinos led by the Roman Catholic Church react adversely to any attempt to enact a law
on absolute divorce, viewing it as contrary to our customs, morals, and traditions that has looked upon marriage and
family as an institution and their nature of permanence,

In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do with religion, it also limits what
religious sects can or cannot do. They can neither cause the government to adopt their particular doctrines as policy for
everyone, nor can they cause the government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms, would cause the State to
adhere to a particular religion and, thus establish a state religion. 76

The Roman Catholic Church can neither impose its beliefs and convictions on the State and the rest of the citizenry nor
can it demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it is sincerely believes that they are good for country. 77While
marriage is considered a sacrament, it has civil and legal consequences which are governed by the Family Code. 78 It is in
this aspect, bereft of any ecclesiastical overtone, that the State has a legitimate right and interest to regulate.

The declared State policy that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is a foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State, should not be read in total isolation but must be harmonized with other constitutional provision.
Aside from strengthening the solidarity of the Filipino family, the State is equally mandated to actively promote its total
development.79 It is also obligated to defend, among others, the right of children to special protection from all forms of
neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development. 80 To Our mind, the State cannot
effectively enforce these obligation s if We limit the application of Paragraph 2 or Article 26 only those foreign divorce
initiated by the alien spouse. It is not amiss to point that the women and children are almost always the helpless victims of
all forms of domestic abuse and violence. In fact, among the notable legislation passed in order to minimize, if not
eradicate, the menace are R.A. No. 9262 ("Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004") R.A. No.
9710 ("The Magna Carta of Women"), R.A. No 10354 ("The Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of
2012") and R.A. No 9208 ("Anti-Trafficking in Person Act of 2003"), as amended by R.A. No. 10364 ("ExpandedAnti-
Trafficking in Persons Act of 2012").Moreover, in protecting and strengthening the Filipino family as a basic autonomous
social institution, the Court must not lose sight of the constitutional mandate to value the dignity of every human person,
guarantee full respect for human rights, and ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men. 81

A prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 would do more harm than good. If We disallow a Filipino citizen who
initiated and obtained a foreign divorce from the coverage of Paragraph 2 Article 26 and still require him or her to first
avail of the existing "mechanisms" under the Family Code, any subsequent relationship that he or she would enter in the
meantime shall be considered as illicit in the eyes of the Philippine law. Worse, any child born out such "extra-marital"
affair has to suffer the stigma of being branded as illegitimate. Surely, these are just but a few of the adverse
consequences, not only to the parent but also to the child, if We are to hold a restrictive interpretation of the subject
provision. The irony is that the principle of inviolability of marriage under Section 2, Article XV of the Constitution is meant
to be tilted in favor of marriage and against unions not formalized by marriage, but without denying State protection and
assistance to live-in arrangements or to families formed according to indigenous customs. 82

This Court should not turn a blind eye to the realities of the present time. With the advancement of communication and
information technology, as well as the improvement of the transportation system that almost instantly connect people from
all over the world, mixed marriages have become not too uncommon. Likewise, it is recognized that not all marriages are
made in heaven and that imperfect humans more often than not create imperfect unions. 83 Living in a flawed world, the
unfortunate reality for some is that the attainment of the individual's full human potential and self fulfillment is not found
and achieved in the context of a marriage. Thus it is hypocritical to safeguard the quantity of existing marriages and, at the
same time, brush aside the truth that some of them are rotten quality.

Going back, we hold that marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be
productive of any good to the society where one is considered released from the marital bond while the other remains
bound to it.84 In reiterating that the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in his or her own country if the
ends of justice are to be served, San Luis v. San Luis85 quoted:

x x x In Alonzo v. Intermediate Applellate Court, the Court stated:

But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results: and likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a
cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions
the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this
is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the
legislature, is to render justice.

Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law and justice are inseparable,
and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied
in a particular case because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their
language. What we do instead is find a balance between the sord and the will, that justice may be done even as the law is
obeyed.

As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it worded, yielding like robots to
the literal command without regard to its cause and consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the
words of law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes agaian, "where these words import a policy that goes beyond them."

xxxx

More that twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual wish to render every one of his
due." That wish continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and the law in ever case brought to it for
decisions. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrant, we interpret the law in a
way that will render justice, presuming that it was the intention if the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed
with justice.86

Indeed, where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or
contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as
far as necessary the letter of the law.87 A statute may therefore, be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its
terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent.88

The foregoing notwithstanding, We cannot yet write finis to this controversy by granting Manalo's petition to recognize and
enforce the divorce decree rendered by the Japanese court and to cancel the entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San
Juan, Metro Manila.

Jurisprudence has set guidelines before the Philippine courts recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of foreign country. Presentation solely of the divorce decree will not
suffice.89 The fact of divorce must still first be proven.90 Before a a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our
courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.91

x x x Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and
admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. The decree purports to be written
act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of foreign country.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official
record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal
custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate
issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and (b)authenticated by the seal of his office. 92
In granting Manalo's petition, the CA noted:

In this case, Petitioner was able to submit before the court a quo the 1) Decision of the Japanese Court allowing the
divorce; 2) the Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippines Consulate General in Osaka, Japan of the Decree of
Divorce; and 3) Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce byu the Petitioner and the Japanese national. Under Rule 132,
Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48 (b) of the Rules of Court, these documents sufficiently prove the
subject Divorce Decree as a fact. Thus, We are constrained to recognize the Japanese Court's judgment decreeing the
divorce.93

If the opposing party fails to properly object, as in this case, the divorce decree is rendered admissible a a written act of
the foreign court.94 As it appears, the existence of the divorce decree was not denied by the OSG; neither was the
jurisdiction of the divorce court impeached nor the validity of its proceedings challenged on the ground of collusion, fraud,
or clear mistake of fact or law, albeit an opportunity to do so.95

Nonetheless, the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved.

x x x The burden of proof lies with the "party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or
defense of an action." In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material defendants have the burden of
proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters. x x x

It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must
alleged and proved. x x x The power of judicial notice must be exercise d with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon
the subject should be resolved in the negative.96

Since the divorce was raised by Manalo, the burden of proving the pertinent Japanese law validating it, as well as her
former husband's capacity to remarry, fall squarely upon her. Japanese laws on persons and family relations are not
among those matters that Filipino judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The September 18, 2014 Decision and October 12, 2015
Resolution if the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV. No. 100076, are AFFIRMED IN PART. The case is REMANDED to the
court of origin for further proceedings and reception of evidence as to the relevant Japanese law on divorce.

SO ORDERED
G.R. No. L-16749 January 31, 1963

IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.

ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the deceased, Executor and Heir-appellees,
vs.
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.

M. R. Sotelo for executor and heir-appellees.

Leopoldo M. Abellera and Jovito Salonga for oppositor-appellant.

LABRADOR, J.:

This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Hon. Vicente N. Cusi, Jr., presiding, in Special
Proceeding No. 622 of said court, dated September 14, 1949, approving among things the final accounts of the executor,
directing the executor to reimburse Maria Lucy Christensen the amount of P3,600 paid by her to Helen Christensen
Garcia as her legacy, and declaring Maria Lucy Christensen entitled to the residue of the property to be enjoyed during
her lifetime, and in case of death without issue, one-half of said residue to be payable to Mrs. Carrie Louise C. Borton,
etc., in accordance with the provisions of the will of the testator Edward E. Christensen. The will was executed in Manila
on March 5, 1951 and contains the following provisions:

3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs. Bernard Daney),
who was born in the Philippines about twenty-eight years ago, and who is now residing at No. 665 Rodger Young
Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.

4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants, and no descendants except my above named daughter,
MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY.

xxx xxx xxx

7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN, now married to Eduardo Garcia, about
eighteen years of age and who, notwithstanding the fact that she was baptized Christensen, is not in any way
related to me, nor has she been at any time adopted by me, and who, from all information I have now resides in
Egpit, Digos, Davao, Philippines, the sum of THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P3,600.00), Philippine
Currency the same to be deposited in trust for the said Maria Helen Christensen with the Davao Branch of the
Philippine National Bank, and paid to her at the rate of One Hundred Pesos (P100.00), Philippine Currency per
month until the principal thereof as well as any interest which may have accrued thereon, is exhausted..

xxx xxx xxx

12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-beloved daughter, the said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN
DANEY (Mrs. Bernard Daney), now residing as aforesaid at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles,
California, U.S.A., all the income from the rest, remainder, and residue of my property and estate, real, personal
and/or mixed, of whatsoever kind or character, and wheresoever situated, of which I may be possessed at my
death and which may have come to me from any source whatsoever, during her lifetime: ....

It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions that the executor in his final account and project of partition ratified
the payment of only P3,600 to Helen Christensen Garcia and proposed that the residue of the estate be transferred to his
daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen.

Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen Christensen Garcia, insofar as it deprives her
(Helen) of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child, she having been declared by Us in G.R. Nos. L-11483-84 an
acknowledged natural child of the deceased Edward E. Christensen. The legal grounds of opposition are (a) that the
distribution should be governed by the laws of the Philippines, and (b) that said order of distribution is contrary thereto
insofar as it denies to Helen Christensen, one of two acknowledged natural children, one-half of the estate in full
ownership. In amplification of the above grounds it was alleged that the law that should govern the estate of the deceased
Christensen should not be the internal law of California alone, but the entire law thereof because several foreign elements
are involved, that the forum is the Philippines and even if the case were decided in California, Section 946 of the
California Civil Code, which requires that the domicile of the decedent should apply, should be applicable. It was also
alleged that Maria Helen Christensen having been declared an acknowledged natural child of the decedent, she is
deemed for all purposes legitimate from the time of her birth.

The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the State of California at
the time of his death, the successional rights and intrinsic validity of the provisions in his will are to be governed by the law
of California, in accordance with which a testator has the right to dispose of his property in the way he desires, because
the right of absolute dominion over his property is sacred and inviolable (In re McDaniel's Estate, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877,
176 P. 2d 952, and In re Kaufman, 117 Cal. 286, 49 Pac. 192, cited in page 179, Record on Appeal). Oppositor Maria
Helen Christensen, through counsel, filed various motions for reconsideration, but these were denied. Hence, this appeal.
The most important assignments of error are as follows:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT THAT HELEN
IS THE ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILD OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN AND, CONSEQUENTLY, IN DEPRIVING
HER OF HER JUST SHARE IN THE INHERITANCE.

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY IGNORING AND/OR FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THE EXISTENCE OF
SEVERAL FACTORS, ELEMENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES CALLING FOR THE APPLICATION OF INTERNAL LAW.

III

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, PARTICULARLY
UNDER THE RENVOI DOCTRINE, THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION OF THE
DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY
THE LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINES.

IV

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE SCHEDULE OF DISTRIBUTION SUBMITTED BY THE
EXECUTOR IS CONTRARY TO THE PHILIPPINE LAWS.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT UNDER THE PHILIPPINE LAWS HELEN CHRISTENSEN
GARCIA IS ENTITLED TO ONE-HALF (1/2) OF THE ESTATE IN FULL OWNERSHIP.

There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the State of California at the
time of his death. But there is also no question that at the time of his death he was domiciled in the Philippines, as witness
the following facts admitted by the executor himself in appellee's brief:

In the proceedings for admission of the will to probate, the facts of record show that the deceased Edward E.
Christensen was born on November 29, 1875 in New York City, N.Y., U.S.A.; his first arrival in the Philippines, as
an appointed school teacher, was on July 1, 1901, on board the U.S. Army Transport "Sheridan" with Port of
Embarkation as the City of San Francisco, in the State of California, U.S.A. He stayed in the Philippines until
1904.

In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to the United States and stayed there for the following nine years
until 1913, during which time he resided in, and was teaching school in Sacramento, California.

Mr. Christensen's next arrival in the Philippines was in July of the year 1913. However, in 1928, he again departed
the Philippines for the United States and came back here the following year, 1929. Some nine years later, in
1938, he again returned to his own country, and came back to the Philippines the following year, 1939.

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this
Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this
stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët

Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen was interned by the Japanese Military Forces in the Philippines
during World War II. Upon liberation, in April 1945, he left for the United States but returned to the Philippines in
December, 1945. Appellees Collective Exhibits "6", CFI Davao, Sp. Proc. 622, as Exhibits "AA", "BB" and "CC-
Daney"; Exhs. "MM", "MM-l", "MM-2-Daney" and p. 473, t.s.n., July 21, 1953.)

In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen returned once more to California shortly after the making of his last will and
testament (now in question herein) which he executed at his lawyers' offices in Manila on March 5, 1951. He died
at the St. Luke's Hospital in the City of Manila on April 30, 1953. (pp. 2-3)

In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the deceased is the Philippines, we are persuaded by the fact that he was
born in New York, migrated to California and resided there for nine years, and since he came to the Philippines in 1913 he
returned to California very rarely and only for short visits (perhaps to relatives), and considering that he appears never to
have owned or acquired a home or properties in that state, which would indicate that he would ultimately abandon the
Philippines and make home in the State of California.
 Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with many shades of meaning from mere temporary presence to the most
permanent abode. Generally, however, it is used to denote something more than mere physical presence.
(Goodrich on Conflict of Laws, p. 29)

As to his citizenship, however, We find that the citizenship that he acquired in California when he resided in Sacramento,
California from 1904 to 1913, was never lost by his stay in the Philippines, for the latter was a territory of the United States
(not a state) until 1946 and the deceased appears to have considered himself as a citizen of California by the fact that
when he executed his will in 1951 he declared that he was a citizen of that State; so that he appears never to have
intended to abandon his California citizenship by acquiring another. This conclusion is in accordance with the following
principle expounded by Goodrich in his Conflict of Laws.

The terms "'residence" and "domicile" might well be taken to mean the same thing, a place of permanent abode.
But domicile, as has been shown, has acquired a technical meaning. Thus one may be domiciled in a place
where he has never been. And he may reside in a place where he has no domicile. The man with two homes,
between which he divides his time, certainly resides in each one, while living in it. But if he went on business
which would require his presence for several weeks or months, he might properly be said to have sufficient
connection with the place to be called a resident. It is clear, however, that, if he treated his settlement as
continuing only for the particular business in hand, not giving up his former "home," he could not be a domiciled
New Yorker. Acquisition of a domicile of choice requires the exercise of intention as well as physical presence.
"Residence simply requires bodily presence of an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily
presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile." Residence, however, is a term used with
many shades of meaning, from the merest temporary presence to the most permanent abode, and it is not safe to
insist that any one use et the only proper one. (Goodrich, p. 29)

The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article 16 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, which is as follows:

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount
of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law
of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country where said property may be found.

The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the meaning of the term "national law"is used
therein.

There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United States, each state of the
Union having its own private law applicable to its citizens only and in force only within the state. The "national law"
indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted can not, therefore, possibly mean or apply to any general American
law. So it can refer to no other than the private law of the State of California.

The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of personal property? The decision of the
court below, sustains the contention of the executor-appellee that under the California Probate Code, a testator may
dispose of his property by will in the form and manner he desires, citing the case of Estate of McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d
877, 176 P. 2d 952. But appellant invokes the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which is as follows:

If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow the person
of its owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile.

The existence of this provision is alleged in appellant's opposition and is not denied. We have checked it in the California
Civil Code and it is there. Appellee, on the other hand, relies on the case cited in the decision and testified to by a witness.
(Only the case of Kaufman is correctly cited.) It is argued on executor's behalf that as the deceased Christensen was a
citizen of the State of California, the internal law thereof, which is that given in the abovecited case, should govern the
determination of the validity of the testamentary provisions of Christensen's will, such law being in force in the State of
California of which Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the other hand, insists that Article 946 should be applicable,
and in accordance therewith and following the doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the validity of the testamentary
provision in question should be referred back to the law of the decedent's domicile, which is the Philippines.

The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been defined by various authors, thus:

The problem has been stated in this way: "When the Conflict of Laws rule of the forum refers a jural matter to a
foreign law for decision, is the reference to the purely internal rules of law of the foreign system; i.e., to the totality
of the foreign law minus its Conflict of Laws rules?"

On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The Michigan court chose to accept the renvoi, that is, applied the
Conflict of Laws rule of Illinois which referred the matter back to Michigan law. But once having determined the
the Conflict of Laws principle is the rule looked to, it is difficult to see why the reference back should not have
been to Michigan Conflict of Laws. This would have resulted in the "endless chain of references" which has so
 often been criticized be legal writers. The opponents of the renvoi would have looked merely to the internal law of
Illinois, thus rejecting the renvoi or the reference back. Yet there seems no compelling logical reason why the
original reference should be the internal law rather than to the Conflict of Laws rule. It is true that such a solution
avoids going on a merry-go-round, but those who have accepted the renvoi theory avoid this inextricabilis
circulas by getting off at the second reference and at that point applying internal law. Perhaps the opponents of
the renvoi are a bit more consistent for they look always to internal law as the rule of reference.

Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the objectors to the renvoi plead that greater uniformity will result
from adoption of their respective views. And still more strange is the fact that the only way to achieve uniformity in
this choice-of-law problem is if in the dispute the two states whose laws form the legal basis of the litigation
disagree as to whether the renvoi should be accepted. If both reject, or both accept the doctrine, the result of the
litigation will vary with the choice of the forum. In the case stated above, had the Michigan court rejected
the renvoi, judgment would have been against the woman; if the suit had been brought in the Illinois courts, and
they too rejected the renvoi, judgment would be for the woman. The same result would happen, though the courts
would switch with respect to which would hold liability, if both courts accepted the renvoi.

The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory in two instances: where the title to land is in question, and where the
validity of a decree of divorce is challenged. In these cases the Conflict of Laws rule of the situs of the land, or the
domicile of the parties in the divorce case, is applied by the forum, but any further reference goes only to the
internal law. Thus, a person's title to land, recognized by the situs, will be recognized by every court; and every
divorce, valid by the domicile of the parties, will be valid everywhere. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 7, pp. 13-
14.)

X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate, domiciled in France, leaving movable property in Massachusetts,
England, and France. The question arises as to how this property is to be distributed among X's next of kin.

Assume (1) that this question arises in a Massachusetts court. There the rule of the conflict of laws as to intestate
succession to movables calls for an application of the law of the deceased's last domicile. Since by hypothesis X's
last domicile was France, the natural thing for the Massachusetts court to do would be to turn to French statute of
distributions, or whatever corresponds thereto in French law, and decree a distribution accordingly. An
examination of French law, however, would show that if a French court were called upon to determine how this
property should be distributed, it would refer the distribution to the national law of the deceased, thus applying the
Massachusetts statute of distributions. So on the surface of things the Massachusetts court has open to it
alternative course of action: (a) either to apply the French law is to intestate succession, or (b) to resolve itself into
a French court and apply the Massachusetts statute of distributions, on the assumption that this is what a French
court would do. If it accepts the so-called renvoidoctrine, it will follow the latter course, thus applying its own law.

This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented which the conflict-of-laws rule of the forum refers to a
foreign law, the conflict-of-laws rule of which, in turn, refers the matter back again to the law of the forum. This is
renvoi in the narrower sense. The German term for this judicial process is 'Ruckverweisung.'" (Harvard Law
Review, Vol. 31, pp. 523-571.)

After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign law is to be resorted to as governing a particular case, the
further question may arise: Are the rules as to the conflict of laws contained in such foreign law also to be
resorted to? This is a question which, while it has been considered by the courts in but a few instances, has been
the subject of frequent discussion by textwriters and essayists; and the doctrine involved has been descriptively
designated by them as the "Renvoyer" to send back, or the "Ruchversweisung", or the "Weiterverweisung", since
an affirmative answer to the question postulated and the operation of the adoption of the foreign law in toto would
in many cases result in returning the main controversy to be decided according to the law of the forum. ... (16
C.J.S. 872.)

Another theory, known as the "doctrine of renvoi", has been advanced. The theory of the doctrine of renvoi is that
the court of the forum, in determining the question before it, must take into account the whole law of the other
jurisdiction, but also its rules as to conflict of laws, and then apply the law to the actual question which the rules of
the other jurisdiction prescribe. This may be the law of the forum. The doctrine of the renvoi has generally been
repudiated by the American authorities. (2 Am. Jur. 296)

The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been defined and the reasons for its application in a country explained by Prof.
Lorenzen in an article in the Yale Law Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-1918, pp. 529-531. The pertinent parts of the article are
quoted herein below:

The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the rules of the conflict of laws are to be understood as
incorporating not only the ordinary or internal law of the foreign state or country, but its rules of the conflict of laws
as well. According to this theory 'the law of a country' means the whole of its law.

xxx xxx xxx

Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the Institute of International Law, at Neuchatel, in 1900, in the form
of the following theses:
 (1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as regards the application of foreign laws.

(2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary exists, the court shall respect:

(a) The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims the right to bind its nationals abroad as regards their
personal statute, and desires that said personal statute shall be determined by the law of the domicile, or
even by the law of the place where the act in question occurred.

(b) The decision of two or more foreign systems of law, provided it be certain that one of them is
necessarily competent, which agree in attributing the determination of a question to the same system of
law.

xxx xxx xxx

If, for example, the English law directs its judge to distribute the personal estate of an Englishman who has died
domiciled in Belgium in accordance with the law of his domicile, he must first inquire whether the law of Belgium
would distribute personal property upon death in accordance with the law of domicile, and if he finds that the
Belgian law would make the distribution in accordance with the law of nationality — that is the English law — he
must accept this reference back to his own law.

We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, while the rule applied in In re
Kaufman, Supra, its internal law. If the law on succession and the conflict of laws rules of California are to be enforced
jointly, each in its own intended and appropriate sphere, the principle cited In re Kaufman should apply to citizens living in
the State, but Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens as are not domiciled in California but in other jurisdictions.
The rule laid down of resorting to the law of the domicile in the determination of matters with foreign element involved is in
accord with the general principle of American law that the domiciliary law should govern in most matters or rights which
follow the person of the owner.

When a man dies leaving personal property in one or more states, and leaves a will directing the manner of
distribution of the property, the law of the state where he was domiciled at the time of his death will be looked to in
deciding legal questions about the will, almost as completely as the law of situs is consulted in questions about
the devise of land. It is logical that, since the domiciliary rules control devolution of the personal estate in case of
intestate succession, the same rules should determine the validity of an attempted testamentary dispostion of the
property. Here, also, it is not that the domiciliary has effect beyond the borders of the domiciliary state. The rules
of the domicile are recognized as controlling by the Conflict of Laws rules at the situs property, and the reason for
the recognition as in the case of intestate succession, is the general convenience of the doctrine. The New York
court has said on the point: 'The general principle that a dispostiton of a personal property, valid at the domicile of
the owner, is valid anywhere, is one of the universal application. It had its origin in that international comity which
was one of the first fruits of civilization, and it this age, when business intercourse and the process of
accumulating property take but little notice of boundary lines, the practical wisdom and justice of the rule is more
apparent than ever. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 164, pp. 442-443.)

Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out as the national law is the internal law
of California. But as above explained the laws of California have prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for
residents therein and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions. Reason demands that We should enforce the
California internal law prescribed for its citizens residing therein, and enforce the conflict of laws rules for the citizens
domiciled abroad. If we must enforce the law of California as in comity we are bound to go, as so declared in Article 16 of
our Civil Code, then we must enforce the law of California in accordance with the express mandate thereof and as above
explained, i.e., apply the internal law for residents therein, and its conflict-of-laws rule for those domiciled abroad.

It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if there is no law to the contrary in the place where the property is
situated" in Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and that the law to
the contrary in the Philippines is the provision in said Article 16 that the national law of the deceased should govern. This
contention can not be sustained. As explained in the various authorities cited above the national law mentioned in Article
16 of our Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the
reference or return of the question to the law of the testator's domicile. The conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946,
Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the
Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile can not and should not refer the case back to California; such
action would leave the issue incapable of determination because the case will then be like a football, tossed back and
forth between the two states, between the country of which the decedent was a citizen and the country of his domicile.
The Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if the
question has to be decided, especially as the application of the internal law of California provides no legitime for children
while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines, makes natural children legally acknowledged
forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.

The Philippine cases (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156; Riera vs. Palmaroli, 40 Phil. 105; Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil.
867; Babcock Templeton vs. Rider Babcock, 52 Phil. 130; and Gibbs vs. Government, 59 Phil. 293.) cited by appellees to
support the decision can not possibly apply in the case at bar, for two important reasons, i.e., the subject in each case
does not appear to be a citizen of a state in the United States but with domicile in the Philippines, and it does not appear
in each case that there exists in the state of which the subject is a citizen, a law similar to or identical with Art. 946 of the
California Civil Code.

We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen of California, is the Philippines, the validity of
the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child, the appellant, should be governed by the Philippine
Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the internal law of California..

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case returned to the lower court with instructions
that the partition be made as the Philippine law on succession provides. Judgment reversed, with costs against appellees.

Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Bengzon, C.J., took no part.
G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967

TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.

PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.

Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors appellants.

Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees E. A. Bellis, et al.
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al.
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila dated
April 30, 1964, approving the project of partition filed by the executor in Civil Case No. 37089 therein.1äwphï1.ñët

The facts of the case are as follows:

Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States." By his first wife, Mary E.
Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in
infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him,
he had three legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three illegitimate
children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.

On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that after all taxes, obligations,
and expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the following order and
manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis,
Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two items have been
satisfied, the remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis,
Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal
shares.1äwphï1.ñët

Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to
probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958.

The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests therein including the amount of
$240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr.,
Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, various amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of their respective
legacies, or a total of P120,000.00, which it released from time to time according as the lower court approved and allowed
the various motions or petitions filed by the latter three requesting partial advances on account of their respective
legacies.

On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its "Executor's Final
Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition" wherein it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of
Mary E. Mallen by the delivery to her of shares of stock amounting to $240,000.00, and the legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr.,
Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis in the amount of P40,000.00 each or a total of P120,000.00. In the project of
partition, the executor — pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will and Testament — divided the
residuary estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the testator's seven legitimate children by his first and second
marriages.

On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions to the project of
partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs
of the deceased.

Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of service of which is evidenced by the registry
receipt submitted on April 27, 1964 by the executor.1

After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent pleadings, the lower court, on April 30, 1964, issued
an order overruling the oppositions and approving the executor's final account, report and administration and project of
partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas
law, which did not provide for legitimes.

Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower court on June 11, 1964, oppositors-
appellants appealed to this Court to raise the issue of which law must apply — Texas law or Philippine law.
In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the doctrine of renvoi, applied by this Court
in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963. Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the decedent is a
national of one country, and a domicile of another. In the present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both a
national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his death.2 So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule
providing that the domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern, the same would not result in a reference back
(renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the situs
theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise,
since the properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as to the conflict of law
rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different from ours.3 Appellants' position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of
renvoi. As stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it in their arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls
under the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code.

Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate or
testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e)
the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. They provide that —

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount
of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law
of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may he the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.

ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.

Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil Code, stating that —

Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order,
public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by
determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. This is not correct. Precisely,
Congress deleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next preceding article" when they
incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing without substantial change
the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been their purpose to make the
second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate succession. As
further indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees that capacity
to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the decedent.

It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our System of legitimes, Congress
has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter
alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.

Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills — one to govern his Texas estate and the other his
Philippine estate — arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such
was the decedent's intention in executing a separate Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for as this Court ruled
in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in
accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in
regard to those matters that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code states said national law should govern.

The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws
of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the
amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to
the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.

Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs against appellants. So ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 124110 April 20, 2001

UNITED AIRLINES, INC., Petitioner

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ANICETO FONTANILLA, in his personal capacity and in behalf of his minor son MYCHAL
ANDREW FONTANILLA, Respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:

On March 1, 1989, private respondent Aniceto Fontanilla purchased from petitioner United Airlines, through the Philippine
Travel Bureau in Manila three (3) "Visit the U.S.A." tickets for himself, his wife and his minor son Mychal for the following
routes:

a. San Francisco to Washinton (15 April 1989);

b. Washington to Chicago (25 April 1989);

c. Chicago to Los Angeles (29 April 1989);

d. Los Angeles to San Francisco (01 may 1989 for petitioner’s wife and 05 May 1989 for petitioner and his son). 1

All flights had been confirmed previously by United Airlines. 2

The Fontanillas proceeded to the United States as planned, where they used the first coupon from San Francisco to
Washington. On April 24, 1989, Aniceto Fontanilla bought two (2) additional coupons each for himself, his wife and his
son from petitioner at its office in Washington Dulles Airport. After paying the penalty for rewriting their tickets, the
Fontanillas were issued tickets with corresponding boarding passes with the words "CHECK-IN REQUIRED," for United
Airlines Flight No. 1108, set to leave from Los Angeles to San Francisco at 10:30 a.m. on May 5, 1989. 3

The cause of the non-boarding of the Fontanillas on United Airlines Flight No. 1108 makes up the bone of contention of
this controversy.1âwphi1.nêt

Private respondents’ version is as follows:

Aniceto Fontanilla and his son Mychal claim that on May 5, 1989, upon their arrival at the los Angeles Airport for their
flight, they proceeded to united Airlines counter where they were attended by an employee wearing a nameplate bearing
the name "LINDA." Linda examined their tickets, punched something into her computer and then told them that boarding
would be in fifteen minutes.4

When the flight was called, the Fontanillas proceeded to the plane. To their surprise, the stewardess at the gate did not
allow them to board the plane, as they had no assigned seat numbers. They were then directed to go back to the "check-
in" counter where Linda subsequently informed them that the flight had been overbooked and asked them to wait. 5

The Fontanillas tried to explain to Linda the special circumstances of their visit. However, Linda told them in arrogant
manner, "So what, I can not do anything about it."6

Subsequently, three other passengers with Caucasian features were graciously allowed to baord, after the Fontanillas
were told that the flight had been overbooked.7

The plane then took off with the Fontanillas’ baggage in tow, leaving them behind. 8

The Fontanillas then complained to Linda, who in turn gave them an ugly stare and rudely uttered, "it’s not my fault. It’s
the fault of the company. Just sit down and wait."9 When Mr. Fontanilla reminded Linda of the inconvenience being
caused to them, she bluntly retorted, "Who do you think you are? You lousy Flips are good for nothing beggars. You
always ask for American aid." After which she remarked "Don’t worry about your baggage. Anyway there is nothing in
there. What are you doing here anyway? I will report you to immigration. You Filipinos should go home." 10 Such rude
statements were made in front of other people in the airport causing the Fontanillas to suffer shame, humiliation and
embarrassment. The chastening situation even caused the younger Fontanilla to break into tears.11

After some time, Linda, without any explanation, offered the Fontanillas $50.00 each. She simply said "Take it or leave
it." This, the Fontanillas declined.12

The Fontanillas then proceeded to the United Airlines customer service counter to plead their case. The male employee at
the counter reacted by shouting that he was ready for it and left without saying anything. 13

The Fontanillas were not booked on the next flight, which departed for San Francisco at 11:00 a.m. It was only at 12:00
noon that they were able to leave Los Angeles on United Airlines Flight No. 803.
Petitioner United Airlines has a different version of what occurred at the Los Angeles Airport on May 5, 1989.

According to United Airlines, the Fontanillas did not initially go to the check-in counter to get their seat assignments for UA
Flight 1108. They instead proceeded to join the queue boarding the aircraft without first securing their seat assignments
as required in their ticket and boarding passes. Having no seat assignments, the stewardess at the door of the plane
instructed them to go to the check-in counter. When the Fontanillas proceeded to the check-in counter, Linda Allen, the
United Airlines Customer Representative at the counter informed them that the flight was overbooked. She booked them
on the next available flight and offered them denied boarding compensation. Allen vehemently denies uttering the
derogatory and racist words attributed to her by the Fontanillas.14

The incident prompted the Fontanillas to file Civil Case No. 89-4268 for damages before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati. After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered dismissing the complaint. The counterclaim is likewise dismissed as
it appears that plaintiffs were not actuated by legal malice when they filed the instant complaint. 15

On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the Fontanillas. The appellate court found that there was an admission
on the part of United Airlines that the Fontanillas did in fact observe the check-in requirement. It ruled further that even
assuming there was a failure to observe the check-in requirement, United Airlines failed to comply with the procedure laid
down in cases where a passenger is denied boarding. The appellate court likewise gave credence to the claim of Aniceto
Fontanilla that the employees of United Airlines were discourteous and arbitrary and, worse, discriminatory. In light of
such treatment, the Fontanillas were entitled to moral damages. The dispositive portion of the decision of the respondent
Court of Appeals dated 29 September 1995, states as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment appealed herefrom is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, and a new judgment is entered ordering defendant-appellee to pay plaintiff-appellant the
following:

a. P200,000.00 as moral damages;

b. P200,000.00 as exemplary damages;
c. P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees;

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.16

Petitioner United Airlines now comes to this Court raising the following assignments of errors;

RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRVAELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE

TRIAL COURT WAS WRONG IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE ALLEGED ADMISSION
THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT OBSERVED THE CHECK-IN REQUIREMENT.

II

RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT PRIVATE

RESPONDENT’S FAILURE TO CHECK-IN WILL NOT DEFEAT HIS CLAIMS BECAUSE
THE DENIED BOARDING RULES WERE NOT COMPLIED WITH.

III

RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT PRIVATE

RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO MORAL DAMAGES OF P200,000.

IV

RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT PRIVATE

RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO EXEMPLARY DAMAGES OF P200,000.

V
 RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT PRIVATE
RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY’S FEES OF P50,000.17

On the first issue raised by the petitioner, the respondent Court of Appeals ruled that when Rule 9, Section 1 of the Rules
of Court,18 there was an implied admission in petitioner’s answer in the allegations in the complaint that private respondent
and his son observed the "check-in requirement at the Los Angeles Airport." Thus:

A perusal of the above pleadings filed before the trial court disclosed that there exist a blatant admission
on the part of the defendant-appellee that the plaintiffs-appellants indeed observed the "check-in"
requirement at the Los Angeles Airport on May 5, 1989. In view of defendant-appellee’s admission of
plaintiffs-appellants’ material averment in the complaint. We find no reason why the trial court should rule
against such admission.19

We disagree with the above conclusion reached by respondent Court of Appeals. Paragraph 7 of private respondents’
complaint states:

7. On May 5, 1989 at 9:45 a.m., plaintiff and his son checked in at defendant’s designated counter at the
airport in Los Angeles for their scheduled flight to San Francisco on defendant’s Flight No. 1108.20

Responding to the above allegations, petitioner averred in paragraph 4 of its answer, thus:

4. Admits the allegation set forth in paragraph 7 of the complaint except to deny that plaintiff and his son
checked in at 9:45 a.m., for lack of knowledge or information at this point in time as to the truth thereof. 21

The rule authorizing an answer that the defendant has no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
truth of an averment giving such answer is asserted is so plainly and necessarily within the defendant’s knowledge that
his averment of ignorance must be palpably untrue.22 Whether or not private respondents checked in at petitioner’s
designated counter at the airport at 9:45 a.m. on May 5, 1989 must necessarily be within petitioner’s knowledge.

While there was no specific denial as to the fact of compliance with the "check-in" requirement by private respondents,
petitioner presented evidence to support its contention that there indeed was no compliance.

Private respondents then are said to have waived the rule on admission. It not only presented evidence to support its
contention that there was compliance with the check-in requirement, it even allowed petitioner to present rebutal
evidence. In the case of Yu Chuck vs. "Kong Li Po," we ruled that:

The object of the rule is to relieve a party of the trouble and expense in proving in the first instance an
alleged fact, the existence or non-existence of which is necessarily within the knowledge of the adverse
party, and of the necessity (to his opponent’s case) of establishing which such adverse party is notified by
his opponent’s pleadings.

The plaintiff may, of course, waive the rule and that is what must be considered to have done (sic) by
introducing evidence as to the execution of the document and failing to object to the defendant’s evidence
in refutation; all this evidence is now competent and the case must be decided thereupon.23

The determination of the other issues raised is dependent on whether or not there was a breach of contract in bad faith on
the part of the petitioner in not allowing the Fontanillas to board United Airlines Flight 1108.

It must be remembered that the general rule in civil cases is that the party having the burden of proof of an essential fact
must produce a preponderance of evidence thereon.24 Although the evidence adduced by the plaintiff is stronger than that
presented by the defendant, a judgment cannot be entered in favor of the former, if his evidence is not sufficient to sustain
his cause of action. The plaintiff must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of the
defendant’s.25 Proceeding from this, and considering the contradictory findings of facts by the Regional Trial Court and the
Court of Appeals, the question before this Court is whether or not private respondents were able to prove with adequate
evidence his allegations of breach of contract in bad faith.

We rule in the negative.

Time and again, the Court has pronounced that appellate courts should not, unless for strong and cogent reasons,
reverse the findings of facts of trial courts. This is so because trial judges are in better position to examine real evidence
and at a vantage point to observe the actuation and the demeanor of the witnesses.26 While not the sole indicator of the
credibility of a witness, it is of such weight that it has been said to be the touchstone of credibility.27
Aniceto Fontanilla’s assertion that upon arrival at the airport at 9:45 a.m., he immediately proceeded to the check-in
counter, and that Linda Allen punched in something into the computer is specious and not supported by the evidence on
record. In support of their allegations, private respondents submitted a copy of the boarding pass. Explicitly printed on the
boarding pass are the words "Check-In Required." Curiously, the said pass did not indicate any seat number. If indeed the
Fontanillas checked in at the designated time as they claimed, why then were they not assigned seat numbers? Absent
any showing that Linda was so motivated, we do not buy into private respondents’ claim that Linda intentionally deceived
him, and made him the laughing stock among the passengers.28Hence, as correctly observed by the trial court:

Plaintiffs fail to realize that their failure to check in, as expressly required in their boarding passes, is they
very reason why they were not given their respective seat numbers, which resulted in their being denied
boarding.29

Neither do we agree with the conclusion reached by the appellate court that private respondents’ failure to comply with the
check-in requirement will not defeat his claim as the denied boarding rules were not complied with. Notably, the appellate
court relied on the Code of Federal Regulation Part on Oversales which states:

250.6 Exceptions to eligibility for denied boarding compensation.

A passenger denied board involuntarily from an oversold flight shall not be eligible for denied board
compensation if:

a. The passenger does not comply with the carrier’s contract of carriage or tariff provisions
regarding ticketing, reconfirmation, check-in, and acceptability for transformation.

The appellate court, however, erred in applying the laws of the United States as, in the case at bar, Philippine law is the
applicable law. Although, the contract of carriage was to be performed in the United States, the tickets were purchased
through petitioner’s agent in Manila. It is true that the tickets were "rewritten" in Washington, D.C. however, such fact did
not change the nature of the original contract of carriage entered into by the parties in Manila.

In the case of Zalanea vs. Court of Appeals,30 this Court applied the doctrine of lex loci contractus. According to the
doctrine, as a general rule, the law of the place where a contract is made or entered into governs with respect to its nature
and validity, obligation and interpretation. This has been said to be the rule even though the place where the contract was
made is different from the place where it is to be performed, and particularly so, if the place of the making and the place of
performance are the same. Hence, the court should apply the law of the place where the airline ticket was issued, when
the passengers are residents and nationals of the forum and the ticket is issued in such State by the defendant airline.

The law of the forum on the subject matter is Economic Regulations No. 7 as amended by Boarding Priority and Denied
Board Compensation of the Civil Aeronautics Board which provides that the check-in requirement be complied with before
a passenger may claim against a carrier for being denied boarding:

Sec. 5. Amount of Denied Boarding Compensation Subject to the exceptions provided hereinafter under
Section 6, carriers shall pay to passengers holding confirmed reserved space and who have presented
themselves at the proper place and time and fully complied with the carrier’s check-in and reconfirmation
procedures and who are acceptable for carriage under the Carrier’s tariff but who have been denied
boarding for lack of space, a compensation at the rate of: xxx

Private respondents’ narration that they were subjected to harsh and derogatory remarks seems incredulous. However,
this Court will not attempt to surmise what really happened, suffice to say, private respondent was not able to prove his
cause of action, for as the trial court correctly observed:

xxx plaintiffs claim to have been discriminated against and insulted in the presence of several people.
Unfortunately, plaintiffs limited their evidence to the testimony of Aniceto Fontanilla, without any
corroboration by the people who saw or heard the discriminatory remarks and insults; while such limited
testimony could possibly be true, it does not enable the Court to reach the conclusion that plaintiffs have,
by a preponderance of evidence, proven that they are entitled to P1,650,000.00 damages from
defendant.31

As to the award of moral and exemplary damages, we find error in the award of such by the Court of Appeals. For the
plaintiff to be entitled to an award of moral damages arising from a breach of contract of carriage, the carrier must have
acted with fraud or bad faith. The appellate court predicated its award on our pronouncement in the case of Zalanea vs.
Court of Appeals, supra, where we stated:

Existing jurisprudence explicitly states that overbooking amounts to bad faith, entitling passengers
concerned to an award of moral damages. In Alitalia Airways vs. Court of Appeals, where passengers
with confirmed booking were refused carriage on the last minute, this Court held that when an airline
issues a ticket to a passenger confirmed on a particular flight, on a certain date, a contract of carriage
 arises, and the passenger has every right to except that he would fly on that flight and on that date. If he
does not, then the carrier opens itself to a suit for breach of contract of carriage. Where an airline had
deliberately overbooked, it took the risk of having to deprive some passengers of their seats in case all of
them would show up for check in. For the indignity and inconvenience of being refused a confirmed seat
on the last minute, said passenger is entitled to moral damages. (Emphasis supplied).

However, the Court’s ruling in said case should be read in consonance with existing laws, particularly, Economic
Regulations No. 7, as amended, of the Civil Aeronautics Board:

Sec. 3. Scope. – This regulation shall apply to every Philippine and foreign air carrier with respect to its
operation of flights or portions of flights originating from or terminating at, or serving a point within the
territory of the Republic of the Philippines insofar as it denies boarding to a passenger on a flight, or
portion of a flight inside or outside the Philippines, for which he holds confirmed reserved space.
Furthermore, this Regulation is designed to cover only honest mistakes on the part of the carriers and
excludes deliberate and willful acts of non-accommodation. Provided, however, that overbooking not
exceeding 10% of the seating capacity of the aircraft shall not be considered as a deliberate and willful
act of non-accommodation.

What this Court considers as bad faith is the willful and deliberate overbooking on the part of the airline carrier. The
above-mentioned law clearly states that when the overbooking does not exceed ten percent (10%), it is not considered as
deliberate and therefore does not amount to bad faith. While there may have been overbooking in this case, private
respondents were not able to prove that the overbooking on United Airlines Flight 1108 exceeded ten percent.

As earlier stated, the Court is of the opinion that the private respondents were not able to prove that they were subjected
to coarse and harsh treatment by the ground crew of united Airlines. Neither were they able to show that there was bad
faith on part of the carrier airline. Hence, the award of moral and exemplary damages by the Court of Appeals is improper.
Corollarily, the award of attorney’s fees is, likewise, denied for lack of any legal and factual basis.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 37044 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City in Civil Case No. 89-4268
dated April 8, 1991 is hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 81262 August 25, 1989

GLOBE MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORP., and HERBERT C. HENDRY, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and RESTITUTO M. TOBIAS, respondents.

Atencia & Arias Law Offices for petitioners.

Romulo C. Felizmena for private respondent.

CORTES, J.:

Private respondent Restituto M. Tobias was employed by petitioner Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation (GLOBE
MACKAY) in a dual capacity as a purchasing agent and administrative assistant to the engineering operations manager.
In 1972, GLOBE MACKAY discovered fictitious purchases and other fraudulent transactions for which it lost several
thousands of pesos.

According to private respondent it was he who actually discovered the anomalies and reported them on November 10,
1972 to his immediate superior Eduardo T. Ferraren and to petitioner Herbert C. Hendry who was then the Executive
Vice-President and General Manager of GLOBE MACKAY.

On November 11, 1972, one day after private respondent Tobias made the report, petitioner Hendry confronted him by
stating that he was the number one suspect, and ordered him to take a one week forced leave, not to communicate with
the office, to leave his table drawers open, and to leave the office keys.

On November 20, 1972, when private respondent Tobias returned to work after the forced leave, petitioner Hendry went
up to him and called him a "crook" and a "swindler." Tobias was then ordered to take a lie detector test. He was also
instructed to submit specimen of his handwriting, signature, and initials for examination by the police investigators to
determine his complicity in the anomalies.

On December 6,1972, the Manila police investigators submitted a laboratory crime report (Exh. "A") clearing private
respondent of participation in the anomalies.

Not satisfied with the police report, petitioners hired a private investigator, retired Col. Jose G. Fernandez, who on
December 10, 1972, submitted a report (Exh. "2") finding Tobias guilty. This report however expressly stated that further
investigation was still to be conducted.

Nevertheless, on December 12, 1972, petitioner Hendry issued a memorandum suspending Tobias from work preparatory
to the filing of criminal charges against him.

On December 19,1972, Lt. Dioscoro V. Tagle, Metro Manila Police Chief Document Examiner, after investigating other
documents pertaining to the alleged anomalous transactions, submitted a second laboratory crime report (Exh. "B")
reiterating his previous finding that the handwritings, signatures, and initials appearing in the checks and other documents
involved in the fraudulent transactions were not those of Tobias. The lie detector tests conducted on Tobias also yielded
negative results.

Notwithstanding the two police reports exculpating Tobias from the anomalies and the fact that the report of the private
investigator, was, by its own terms, not yet complete, petitioners filed with the City Fiscal of Manila a complaint for estafa
through falsification of commercial documents, later amended to just estafa. Subsequently five other criminal complaints
were filed against Tobias, four of which were for estafa through Falsification of commercial document while the fifth was
for of Article 290 of' the Revised Penal Code (Discovering Secrets Through Seizure of Correspondence).lâwphî1.ñèt Two
of these complaints were refiled with the Judge Advocate General's Office, which however, remanded them to the fiscal's
office. All of the six criminal complaints were dismissed by the fiscal. Petitioners appealed four of the fiscal's resolutions
dismissing the criminal complaints with the Secretary of Justice, who, however, affirmed their dismissal.

In the meantime, on January 17, 1973, Tobias received a notice (Exh. "F") from petitioners that his employment has been
terminated effective December 13, 1972. Whereupon, Tobias filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. The labor arbiter
dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the labor arbiter's
decision. However, the Secretary of Labor, acting on petitioners' appeal from the NLRC ruling, reinstated the labor
arbiter's decision. Tobias appealed the Secretary of Labor's order with the Office of the President. During the pendency of
the appeal with said office, petitioners and private respondent Tobias entered into a compromise agreement regarding the
latter's complaint for illegal dismissal.

Unemployed, Tobias sought employment with the Republic Telephone Company (RETELCO). However, petitioner
Hendry, without being asked by RETELCO, wrote a letter to the latter stating that Tobias was dismissed by GLOBE
MACKAY due to dishonesty.
Private respondent Tobias filed a civil case for damages anchored on alleged unlawful, malicious, oppressive, and
abusive acts of petitioners. Petitioner Hendry, claiming illness, did not testify during the hearings. The Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila, Branch IX, through Judge Manuel T. Reyes rendered judgment in favor of private respondent by ordering
petitioners to pay him eighty thousand pesos (P80,000.00) as actual damages, two hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000.00) as moral damages, twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) as exemplary damages, thirty thousand pesos
(P30,000.00) as attorney's fees, and costs. Petitioners appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals. On the other
hand, Tobias appealed as to the amount of damages. However, the Court of Appeals, an a decision dated August 31,
1987 affirmed the RTC decision in toto. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration having been denied, the instant petition for
review on certiorari was filed.

The main issue in this case is whether or not petitioners are liable for damages to private respondent.

Petitioners contend that they could not be made liable for damages in the lawful exercise of their right to dismiss private
respondent.

On the other hand, private respondent contends that because of petitioners' abusive manner in dismissing him as well as
for the inhuman treatment he got from them, the Petitioners must indemnify him for the damage that he had suffered.

One of the more notable innovations of the New Civil Code is the codification of "some basic principles that are to be
observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the stability of the social order." [REPORT ON THE
CODE COMMISSION ON THE PROPOSED CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, p. 39]. The framers of the Code,
seeking to remedy the defect of the old Code which merely stated the effects of the law, but failed to draw out its spirit,
incorporated certain fundamental precepts which were "designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain of
good conscience" and which were also meant to serve as "guides for human conduct [that] should run as golden threads
through society, to the end that law may approach its supreme ideal, which is the sway and dominance of justice" (Id.)
Foremost among these principles is that pronounced in Article 19 which provides:

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards
which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties. These
standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law,
therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in
Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may
nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with
the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the
wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human
relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for
damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper.

Article 20, which pertains to damage arising from a violation of law, provides that:

Art. 20. Every person who contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall
indemnify the latter for the same.

However, in the case at bar, petitioners claim that they did not violate any provision of law since they were merely
exercising their legal right to dismiss private respondent. This does not, however, leave private respondent with no relief
because Article 21 of the Civil Code provides that:

Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

This article, adopted to remedy the "countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless,
even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury" [Id.] should "vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that
untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes" [Id. it p.
40; See also PNB v. CA, G.R. No. L-27155, May 18,1978, 83 SCRA 237, 247].

In determining whether or not the principle of abuse of rights may be invoked, there is no rigid test which can be applied.
While the Court has not hesitated to apply Article 19 whether the legal and factual circumstances called for its application
[See for e.g., Velayo v. Shell Co. of the Phil., Ltd., 100 Phil. 186 (1956); PNB v. CA, supra; Grand Union Supermarket,
Inc. v. Espino, Jr., G.R. No. L-48250, December 28, 1979, 94 SCRA 953; PAL v. CA, G.R. No. L-46558, July 31,1981,106
SCRA 391; United General Industries, Inc, v. Paler G.R. No. L-30205, March 15,1982,112 SCRA 404; Rubio v. CA, G.R.
No. 50911, August 21, 1987, 153 SCRA 183] the question of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been
violated resulting in damages under Article 20 or Article 21 or other applicable provision of law, depends on the
circumstances of each case. And in the instant case, the Court, after examining the record and considering certain
significant circumstances, finds that all petitioners have indeed abused the right that they invoke, causing damage to
private respondent and for which the latter must now be indemnified.
The trial court made a finding that notwithstanding the fact that it was private respondent Tobias who reported the
possible existence of anomalous transactions, petitioner Hendry "showed belligerence and told plaintiff (private
respondent herein) that he was the number one suspect and to take a one week vacation leave, not to communicate with
the office, to leave his table drawers open, and to leave his keys to said defendant (petitioner Hendry)" [RTC Decision, p.
2; Rollo, p. 232]. This, petitioners do not dispute. But regardless of whether or not it was private respondent Tobias who
reported the anomalies to petitioners, the latter's reaction towards the former upon uncovering the anomalies was less
than civil. An employer who harbors suspicions that an employee has committed dishonesty might be justified in taking
the appropriate action such as ordering an investigation and directing the employee to go on a leave. Firmness and the
resolve to uncover the truth would also be expected from such employer. But the high-handed treatment accorded Tobias
by petitioners was certainly uncalled for. And this reprehensible attitude of petitioners was to continue when private
respondent returned to work on November 20, 1972 after his one week forced leave. Upon reporting for work, Tobias was
confronted by Hendry who said. "Tobby, you are the crook and swindler in this company." Considering that the first report
made by the police investigators was submitted only on December 10, 1972 [See Exh. A] the statement made by
petitioner Hendry was baseless. The imputation of guilt without basis and the pattern of harassment during the
investigations of Tobias transgress the standards of human conduct set forth in Article 19 of the Civil Code. The Court has
already ruled that the right of the employer to dismiss an employee should not be confused with the manner in which the
right is exercised and the effects flowing therefrom. If the dismissal is done abusively, then the employer is liable for
damages to the employee [Quisaba v. Sta. Ines-Melale Veneer and Plywood Inc., G.R. No. L-38088, August 30, 1974, 58
SCRA 771; See also Philippine Refining Co., Inc. v. Garcia, G.R. No. L-21871, September 27,1966, 18 SCRA 107] Under
the circumstances of the instant case, the petitioners clearly failed to exercise in a legitimate manner their right to dismiss
Tobias, giving the latter the right to recover damages under Article 19 in relation to Article 21 of the Civil Code.

But petitioners were not content with just dismissing Tobias. Several other tortious acts were committed by petitioners
against Tobias after the latter's termination from work. Towards the latter part of January, 1973, after the filing of the first
of six criminal complaints against Tobias, the latter talked to Hendry to protest the actions taken against him. In response,
Hendry cut short Tobias' protestations by telling him to just confess or else the company would file a hundred more cases
against him until he landed in jail. Hendry added that, "You Filipinos cannot be trusted." The threat unmasked petitioner's
bad faith in the various actions taken against Tobias. On the other hand, the scornful remark about Filipinos as well as
Hendry's earlier statements about Tobias being a "crook" and "swindler" are clear violations of 'Tobias' personal dignity
[See Article 26, Civil Code].

The next tortious act committed by petitioners was the writing of a letter to RETELCO sometime in October 1974, stating
that Tobias had been dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due to dishonesty. Because of the letter, Tobias failed to gain
employment with RETELCO and as a result of which, Tobias remained unemployed for a longer period of time. For this
further damage suffered by Tobias, petitioners must likewise be held liable for damages consistent with Article 2176 of the
Civil Code. Petitioners, however, contend that they have a "moral, if not legal, duty to forewarn other employers of the kind
of employee the plaintiff (private respondent herein) was." [Petition, p. 14; Rollo, p. 15]. Petitioners further claim that "it is
the accepted moral and societal obligation of every man to advise or warn his fellowmen of any threat or danger to the
latter's life, honor or property. And this includes warning one's brethren of the possible dangers involved in dealing with, or
accepting into confidence, a man whose honesty and integrity is suspect" [Id.]. These arguments, rather than justify
petitioners' act, reveal a seeming obsession to prevent Tobias from getting a job, even after almost two years from the
time Tobias was dismissed.

Finally, there is the matter of the filing by petitioners of six criminal complaints against Tobias. Petitioners contend that
there is no case against them for malicious prosecution and that they cannot be "penalized for exercising their right and
prerogative of seeking justice by filing criminal complaints against an employee who was their principal suspect in the
commission of forgeries and in the perpetration of anomalous transactions which defrauded them of substantial sums of
money" [Petition, p. 10, Rollo, p. 11].

While sound principles of justice and public policy dictate that persons shall have free resort to the courts for redress of
wrongs and vindication of their rights [Buenaventura v. Sto. Domingo, 103 Phil. 239 (1958)], the right to institute criminal
prosecutions can not be exercised maliciously and in bad faith [Ventura v. Bernabe, G.R. No. L-26760, April 30, 1971, 38
SCRA 5871.] Hence, in Yutuk V. Manila Electric Co., G.R. No. L-13016, May 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 337, the Court held that
the right to file criminal complaints should not be used as a weapon to force an alleged debtor to pay an indebtedness. To
do so would be a clear perversion of the function of the criminal processes and of the courts of justice. And in Hawpia CA,
G.R. No. L-20047, June 30, 1967. 20 SCRA 536 the Court upheld the judgment against the petitioner for actual and moral
damages and attorney's fees after making a finding that petitioner, with persistence, filed at least six criminal complaints
against respondent, all of which were dismissed.

To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a design to vex and
humiliate a person and that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that the charges were false and
groundless [Manila Gas Corporation v. CA, G.R. No. L-44190, October 30,1980, 100 SCRA 602]. Concededly, the filing of
a suit by itself, does not render a person liable for malicious prosecution [Inhelder Corporation v. CA, G.R. No. 52358,
May 301983122 SCRA 576]. The mere dismissal by the fiscal of the criminal complaint is not a ground for an award of
damages for malicious prosecution if there is no competent evidence to show that the complainant had acted in bad faith
[Sison v. David, G.R. No. L-11268, January 28,1961, 1 SCRA 60].

In the instant case, however, the trial court made a finding that petitioners acted in bad faith in filing the criminal
complaints against Tobias, observing that:
xxx

Defendants (petitioners herein) filed with the Fiscal's Office of Manila a total of six (6) criminal cases, five
(5) of which were for estafa thru falsification of commercial document and one for violation of Art. 290 of
the Revised Penal Code "discovering secrets thru seizure of correspondence," and all were dismissed for
insufficiency or lack of evidence." The dismissal of four (4) of the cases was appealed to the Ministry of
Justice, but said Ministry invariably sustained the dismissal of the cases. As above adverted to, two of
these cases were refiled with the Judge Advocate General's Office of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
to railroad plaintiffs arrest and detention in the military stockade, but this was frustrated by a presidential
decree transferring criminal cases involving civilians to the civil courts.

xxx

To be sure, when despite the two (2) police reports embodying the findings of Lt. Dioscoro Tagle, Chief
Document Examiner of the Manila Police Department, clearing plaintiff of participation or involvement in
the fraudulent transactions complained of, despite the negative results of the lie detector tests which
defendants compelled plaintiff to undergo, and although the police investigation was "still under follow-up
and a supplementary report will be submitted after all the evidence has been gathered," defendants
hastily filed six (6) criminal cases with the city Fiscal's Office of Manila, five (5) for estafa thru falsification
of commercial document and one (1) for violation of Art. 290 of the Revised Penal Code, so much so that
as was to be expected, all six (6) cases were dismissed, with one of the investigating fiscals, Asst. Fiscal
de Guia, commenting in one case that, "Indeed, the haphazard way this case was investigated is evident.
Evident likewise is the flurry and haste in the filing of this case against respondent Tobias," there can be
no mistaking that defendants would not but be motivated by malicious and unlawful intent to harass,
oppress, and cause damage to plaintiff.

xxx

[RTC Decision, pp. 5-6; Rollo, pp. 235-236].

In addition to the observations made by the trial court, the Court finds it significant that the criminal complaints were filed
during the pendency of the illegal dismissal case filed by Tobias against petitioners. This explains the haste in which the
complaints were filed, which the trial court earlier noted. But petitioners, to prove their good faith, point to the fact that only
six complaints were filed against Tobias when they could have allegedly filed one hundred cases, considering the number
of anomalous transactions committed against GLOBE MACKAY. However, petitioners' good faith is belied by the threat
made by Hendry after the filing of the first complaint that one hundred more cases would be filed against Tobias. In effect,
the possible filing of one hundred more cases was made to hang like the sword of Damocles over the head of Tobias. In
fine, considering the haste in which the criminal complaints were filed, the fact that they were filed during the pendency of
the illegal dismissal case against petitioners, the threat made by Hendry, the fact that the cases were filed notwithstanding
the two police reports exculpating Tobias from involvement in the anomalies committed against GLOBE MACKAY,
coupled by the eventual dismissal of all the cases, the Court is led into no other conclusion than that petitioners were
motivated by malicious intent in filing the six criminal complaints against Tobias.

Petitioners next contend that the award of damages was excessive. In the complaint filed against petitioners, Tobias
prayed for the following: one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) as actual damages; fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) as exemplary damages; eight hundred thousand pesos (P800,000.00) as moral damages; fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00) as attorney's fees; and costs. The trial court, after making a computation of the damages incurred by
Tobias [See RTC Decision, pp. 7-8; Rollo, pp. 154-1551, awarded him the following: eighty thousand pesos (P80,000.00)
as actual damages; two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) as moral damages; twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00)
as exemplary damages; thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as attorney's fees; and, costs. It must be underscored that
petitioners have been guilty of committing several actionable tortious acts, i.e., the abusive manner in which they
dismissed Tobias from work including the baseless imputation of guilt and the harassment during the investigations; the
defamatory language heaped on Tobias as well as the scornful remark on Filipinos; the poison letter sent to RETELCO
which resulted in Tobias' loss of possible employment; and, the malicious filing of the criminal complaints. Considering the
extent of the damage wrought on Tobias, the Court finds that, contrary to petitioners' contention, the amount of damages
awarded to Tobias was reasonable under the circumstances.

Yet, petitioners still insist that the award of damages was improper, invoking the principle of damnum absque injuria. It is
argued that "[t]he only probable actual damage that plaintiff (private respondent herein) could have suffered was a direct
result of his having been dismissed from his employment, which was a valid and legal act of the defendants-appellants
(petitioners herein).lâwphî1.ñèt " [Petition, p. 17; Rollo, p. 18].

According to the principle of damnum absque injuria, damage or loss which does not constitute a violation of a legal right
or amount to a legal wrong is not actionable [Escano v. CA, G.R. No. L-47207, September 25, 1980, 100 SCRA 197; See
also Gilchrist v. Cuddy 29 Phil, 542 (1915); The Board of Liquidators v. Kalaw, G.R. No. L-18805, August 14, 1967, 20
SCRA 987]. This principle finds no application in this case. It bears repeating that even granting that petitioners might
have had the right to dismiss Tobias from work, the abusive manner in which that right was exercised amounted to a legal
wrong for which petitioners must now be held liable. Moreover, the damage incurred by Tobias was not only in connection
with the abusive manner in which he was dismissed but was also the result of several other quasi-delictual acts committed
by petitioners.
Petitioners next question the award of moral damages. However, the Court has already ruled in Wassmer v. Velez, G.R.
No. L-20089, December 26, 1964, 12 SCRA 648, 653, that [p]er express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil
Code, moral damages are recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code." Hence, the Court of Appeals
committed no error in awarding moral damages to Tobias.

Lastly, the award of exemplary damages is impugned by petitioners. Although Article 2231 of the Civil Code provides that
"[i]n quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence," the Court,
in Zulueta v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., G.R. No. L- 28589, January 8, 1973, 49 SCRA 1, ruled that if gross
negligence warrants the award of exemplary damages, with more reason is its imposition justified when the act performed
is deliberate, malicious and tainted with bad faith. As in the Zulueta case, the nature of the wrongful acts shown to have
been committed by petitioners against Tobias is sufficient basis for the award of exemplary damages to the latter.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 09055 is
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 156841 June 30, 2005

GF EQUITY, INC., petitioner,

vs.
ARTURO VALENZONA, respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO-MORALES, J.:

On challenge via Petition for Review on Certiorari is the Court of Appeals October 14, 2002 Decision1 reversing that of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila dated June 28, 19972 which dismissed the complaint of herein respondent Arturo
Valenzona (Valenzona) for breach of contract with damages against herein petitioner GF Equity, Inc. (GF Equity).

The factual antecedents of the case are as follows:

GF Equity, represented by its Chief Financial Officer W. Steven Uytengsu (Uytengsu), hired Valenzona as Head Coach of
the Alaska basketball team in the Philippine Basketball Association (PBA) under a Contract of Employment. 3

As head coach, the duties of Valenzona were described in the contract to include the following:

xxx

1. . . . coaching at all practices and games scheduled for the CORPORATION’s TEAM during the scheduled
season of the ASSOCIATION . . ., coaching all exhibition games scheduled by the corporation as approved by the
PBA during and prior to the scheduled season, coaching (if invited to participate) in the ASSOCIATION’s All Star
Game and attending every event conducted in association with the All Star Game, and coaching the play-off
games subsequent to the scheduled season based on the athletic program of the PBA.

xxx

3. The COACH agrees to observe and comply with all requirements of the CORPORATION respecting conduct of
its TEAM and its players, at all times whether on or off the playing floor. The CORPORATION may, from time to
time during the continuance of this contract, establish reasonable rules for the government of its players "at
home" and "on the road"; and such rules shall be part of this contract as fully is (sic) if herein written and shall be
the responsibility of the COACH to implement; x x x

4. The COACH agrees (a) to report at the time and place fixed by the CORPORATION in good physical condition;
(b) to keep himself throughout the entire season in good physical condition; (c) to give his best services, as well
as his loyalty to the CORPORATION, and to serve as basketball coach for the CORPORATION and its
assignees; (d) to be neatly and fully attired in public and always to conduct himself on and off the court according
to the highest standards of honesty, morality, fair play and sportsmanship; (e) not to do anything which is
detrimental to the best interests of the CORPORATION.

xxx

7. The COACH agrees that if so requested by the CORPORATION, he will endorse the CORPORATION’s
products in commercial advertising, promotions and the like. The COACH further agrees to allow the
CORPORATION or the ASSOCIATION to take pictures of the COACH alone or together with others, for still
photographs, motion pictures or television, at such times as the CORPORATION or the ASSOCIATION may
designate, and no matter by whom taken may be used in any manner desired by either of them for publicity or
promotional purposes. (Underscoring supplied).

xxx

Even before the conclusion of the contract, Valenzona had already served GF Equity under a verbal contract by coaching
its team, Hills Brothers, in the 3rd PBA Conference of 1987 where the team was runner-up.

Under the contract, GF Equity would pay Valenzona the sum of Thirty Five Thousand Pesos (₱35,000.00) monthly, net of
taxes, and provide him with a service vehicle and gasoline allowance.

While the employment period agreed upon was for two years commencing on January 1, 1988 and ending on December
31, 1989, the last sentence of paragraph 3 of the contract carried the following condition:

3. x x x If at any time during the contract, the COACH, in the sole opinion of the CORPORATION, fails to exhibit sufficient
skill or competitive ability to coach the team, the CORPORATION may terminate this contract. (Emphasis supplied)
Before affixing his signature on the contract, Valenzona consulted his lawyer who pointed out the one-sidedness of the
above-quoted last sentence of paragraph 3 thereof. The caveat notwithstanding, Valenzona still acceded to the terms of
the contract because he had trust and confidence in Uytengsu who had recommended him to the management of GF
Equity.

During his stint as Alaska’s head coach, the team placed third both in the Open and All-Filipino PBA Conferences in 1988.

Valenzona was later advised by the management of GF Equity by letter of September 26, 1988 of the termination of his
services in this wise:

We regret to inform you that under the contract of employment dated January 1, 1988 we are invoking our rights
specified in paragraph 3.

You will continue to be paid until your outstanding balance which, as of September 25, 1988, is ₱75,868.38 has been fully
paid.

Please return the service vehicle to my office no later than September 30, 1988.4 (Emphasis supplied)

Close to six years after the termination of his services, Valenzona’s counsel, by letter of July 30, 1994,5 demanded from
GF Equity payment of compensation arising from the arbitrary and unilateral termination of his employment. GF Equity,
however, refused the claim.

Valenzona thus filed on September 26, 1994 before the Regional Trial Court of Manila a complaint 6 against GF Equity for
breach of contract with damages, ascribing bad faith, malice and "disregard to fairness and to the rights of the plaintiff" by
unilaterally and arbitrarily pre-terminating the contract without just cause and legal and factual basis. He prayed for the
award of actual damages in the amount of ₱560,000.00 representing his unpaid compensation from September 26, 1988
up to December 31, 1989, at the rate of ₱35,000.00 a month; moral damages in the amount of ₱100,000.00; exemplary
damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00; attorney’s fees in the amount of ₱100,000.00; and costs of suit.

Before the trial court, Valenzona challenged the condition in paragraph 3 of the contract as lacking the element of
mutuality of contract, a clear transgression of Article 1308 of the New Civil Code, and reliance thereon, he contended, did
not warrant his unjustified and arbitrary dismissal.

GF Equity maintained, on the other hand, that it merely exercised its right under the contract to pre-terminate Valenzona’s
employment due to incompetence. And it posited that he was guilty of laches and, in any event, his complaint should have
been instituted before a labor arbiter.

The trial court, upholding the validity of the assailed provision of the contract, dismissed, by decision of June 28,
1997,7 the complaint of Valenzona who, it held, was fully aware of entering into a bad bargain.

The Court of Appeals, before which Valenzona appealed, reversed the trial court’s decision, by decision of October 14,
2002,8 and accordingly ordered GF Equity to pay him damages.

In its decision, the appellate court held that the questioned provision in the contract "merely confers upon GF Equity the
right to fire its coach upon a finding of inefficiency, a valid reason within the ambit of its management prerogatives, subject
to limitations imposed by law, although not expressly stated in the clause"; and
"the rightgranted in the contract can neither be said to be immoral, unlawful, or contrary to public policy." It concluded,
however, that while "the mutuality of the clause" is evident, GF Equity "abused its right by arbitrarily terminating . . .
Valenzona’s employment and opened itself to a charge of bad faith." Hence, finding that Valenzona’s claim for damages is
"obviously . . . based on Art. 19 of the Civil Code" which provides:

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.,

the appellate court awarded Valenzona the following damages, furnishing the justification therefor:

. . . a) Compensatory damages representing his unearned income for 15 months. Actual and compensatory damages are
those recoverable because of a pecuniary loss in business, trade, property, profession, job or occupation. As testified, his
employment contract provided a monthly income of PhP35,000, which he lost from September 26, 1988 up to December
31, 1989 as a consequence of his arbitrary dismissal; b) Moral damages of PhP20,000. The act caused wounded feelings
on the part of the plaintiff. Moral damages is recoverable under Article 2220 and the chapter on Human Relations of the
Civil Code (Articles 1936) when a contract is breached in bad faith; c) Exemplary damages of PhP20,000, by way of
example or correction for the public good; and d) When exemplary damages are awarded, attorney’s fees can also be
given. We deem it just to grant 10% of the actual damages as attorney’s fees. (Underscoring supplied)

Hence, this petition at bar, GF Equity faulting the appellate court in

. . . CONCLUD[ING] WRONGLY FROM ESTABLISHED FACTS IN A MANNER VIOLATIVE OF APPLICABLE LAWS
AND ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE.9

GF Equity argues that the appellate court committed a non-sequitur when it agreed with the findings of fact of the lower
court but reached an opposite conclusion. It avers that the appellate court made itself a guardian of an otherwise
intelligent individual well-versed in tactical maneuvers; that the freedom to enter into contracts is protected by law, and the
courts will not interfere therewith unless the contract is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy or public
order; that there was absolutely no reason for the appellate court to have found bad faith on its part; and that, at all
events, Valenzona is guilty of laches for his unexplained inaction for six years.

Central to the resolution of the instant controversy is the determination of whether the questioned last sentence of
paragraph 3 is violative of the principle of mutuality of contracts.

Mutuality is one of the characteristics of a contract, its validity or performance or compliance of which cannot be left to the
will of only one of the parties.10 This is enshrined in Article 1308 of the New Civil Code, whose underlying principle is
explained in Garcia v. Rita Legarda, Inc.,11 viz:

Article 1308 of the New Civil Code reads as follows:

"The contract must bind both contracting parties; its validity or compliance cannot be left to the will of one of them."

The above legal provision is a virtual reproduction of Article 1256 of the old Civil Code but it was so phrased as to
emphasize the principle that the contract must bind both parties. This, of course is based firstly, on the principle that
obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties and secondly, that there must be
mutuality between the parties based on their essential equality to which is repugnant to have one party bound by
the contract leaving the other free therefrom (8 Manresa 556). Its ultimate purpose is to render void a contract
containing a condition which makes its fulfillment dependent exclusively upon the uncontrolled will of one of the
contracting parties.

x x x (Emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)

The ultimate purpose of the mutuality principle is thus to nullify a contract containing a condition which makes its
fulfillment or pre-termination dependent exclusively upon the uncontrolled will of one of the contracting parties.

Not all contracts though which vest to one party their determination of validity or compliance or the right to terminate the
same are void for being violative of the mutuality principle. Jurisprudence is replete with instances of cases 12where this
Court upheld the legality of contracts which left their fulfillment or implementation to the will of either of the parties. In
these cases, however, there was a finding of the presence of essential equality of the parties to the contracts, thus
preventing the perpetration of injustice on the weaker party.

In the case at bar, the contract incorporates in paragraph 3 the right of GF Equity to pre-terminate the contract — that "if
the coach, in the sole opinion of the corporation, fails to exhibit sufficient skill or competitive ability to coach the team, the
corporation may terminate the contract." The assailed condition clearly transgresses the principle of mutuality of contracts.
It leaves the determination of whether Valenzona failed to exhibit sufficient skill or competitive ability to coach Alaska
team solely to the opinion of GF Equity. Whether Valenzona indeed failed to exhibit the required skill or competitive ability
depended exclusively on the judgment of GF Equity. In other words, GF Equity was given an unbridled prerogative to pre-
terminate the contract irrespective of the soundness, fairness or reasonableness, or even lack of basis of its opinion.

To sustain the validity of the assailed paragraph would open the gate for arbitrary and illegal dismissals, for void
contractual stipulations would be used as justification therefor.

The assailed stipulation being violative of the mutuality principle underlying Article 1308 of the Civil Code, it is null and
void.

The nullity of the stipulation notwithstanding, GF Equity was not precluded from the right to pre-terminate the contract.
The pre-termination must have legal basis, however, if it is to be declared justified.

GF Equity failed, however, to advance any ground to justify the pre-termination. It simply invoked the assailed provision
which is null and void.

While GF Equity’s act of pre-terminating Valenzona’s services cannot be considered willful as it was based on a
stipulation, albeit declared void, it, in doing so, failed to consider the abuse of rights principle enshrined in Art. 19 of the
Civil Code which provides:

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
This provision of law sets standards which must be observed in the exercise of one’s rights as well as in the
performance of its duties, to wit: to act with justice; give every one his due; and observe honesty and good faith.

Since the pre-termination of the contract was anchored on an illegal ground, hence, contrary to law, and GF Equity
negligently failed to provide legal basis for such pre-termination, e.g. that Valenzona breached the contract by failing to
discharge his duties thereunder, GF Equity failed to exercise in a legitimate manner its right to pre-terminate the contract,
thereby abusing the right of Valenzona to thus entitle him to damages under Art. 19 in relation to Article 20 of the Civil
Code the latter of which provides:

Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for
the same.

In De Guzman v. NLRC,13 this Court quoted the following explanation of Tolentino why it is impermissible to abuse our
rights to prejudice others.

The exercise of a right ends when the right disappears, and it disappears when it is abused, especially to the prejudice of
others. The mask of a right without the spirit of justice which gives it life is repugnant to the modern concept of social law.
It cannot be said that a person exercises a right when he unnecessarily prejudices another or offends morals or good
customs. Over and above the specific precepts of positive law are the supreme norms of justice which the law develops
and which are expressed in three principles: honeste vivere,14 alterum non laedere15and jus suum quique tribuere;16 and
he who violates them violates the law. For this reason, it is not permissible to abuse our rights to prejudice others.

The disquisition in Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation v. Court of Appeals 17 is just as relevant as it is illuminating
on the present case. In that case, this Court declared that even granting that the therein petitioners might have had the
right to dismiss the therein respondent from work, the abusive manner in which that right was exercised amounted to a
legal wrong for which the petitioners must be held liable.

One of the more notable innovations of the New Civil Code is the codification of "some basic principles that are to be
observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the stability of the social order." [REPORT ON THE
CODE COMMISSION ON THE PROPOSED CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, p. 39]. The framers of the Code,
seeking to remedy the defect of the old Code which merely stated the effects of the law, but failed to draw out its spirit,
incorporated certain fundamental precepts which were "designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain of
good conscience" and which were also meant to serve as "guides for human conduct [that] should run as golden threads
through society, to the end that law may approach its supreme ideal, which is the sway and dominance of
justice" (Id.) Foremost among these principles is that pronounced in Article 19 which provides:

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards
which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties. These
standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law,
therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in
Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may
nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not
conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby
committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the
government of human relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation.
Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper. 18 Emphasis and underscoring
supplied).

As for GF Equity’s defense of laches on account of Valenzona’s invocation of his right under the contract only after the
lapse of six years, the same fails.

Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which by
exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, thus giving rise to a presumption that the party entitled
to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it. It is not concerned with mere lapse of time; the fact of delay,
standing alone, is insufficient to constitute laches.19

Laches applies in equity, whereas prescription applies at law. Our courts are basically courts of law, not courts of equity.
Laches cannot thus be invoked to evade the enforcement of an existing legal right. Equity, which has been aptly
described as a "justice outside legality," is applied only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law. Aequetas
nunquam contravenit legis. Thus, where the claim was filed within the statutory period of prescription, recovery therefor
cannot be barred by laches. The doctrine of laches should never be applied earlier than the expiration of time limited for
the commencement of actions at law,20 unless, as a general rule, inexcusable delay in asserting a right and acquiescense
in existing conditions are proven.21 GF Equity has not proven, nay alleged, these.

Under Article 114422 of the New Civil Code, an action upon a written contract must be brought within 10 years from the
time the right of action accrues. Since the action filed by Valenzona is an action for breach upon a written contract, his
filing of the case 6 years from the date his cause of action arose was well within the prescriptive period, hence, the
defense of laches would not, under the circumstances, lie.

Consequently, Valenzona is entitled to recover actual damages — his salary which he should have received from the time
his services were terminated up to the time the employment contract expired. 23

As for moral damages which the appellate court awarded, Article 2220 of the New Civil Code allows such award to
breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and
intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity. It contemplates a state of mind
affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill-will.24 Bad faith means a breach of a known duty through some motive of
interest or ill will. It must, however, be substantiated by evidence. Bad faith under the law cannot be presumed, it must be
established by clear and convincing evidence.

As earlier stated, however, the pre-termination of the contract was not willful as GF Equity based it on a provision therein
which is void. Malice or bad faith cannot thus be ascribed to GF Equity.

The unbroken jurisprudence is that in breach of contract cases where a party is not shown to have acted fraudulently or in
bad faith, liability for damages is limited to the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the obligation which
the parties had foreseen or could reasonably have foreseen. The damages, however, do not include moral damages.25

The award by the appellate court of moral damages must thus be set aside. And so must the award of exemplary
damages, absent a showing that GF Equity acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner. 26

The award to Valenzona of attorney’s fees must remain, however, GF Equity having refused to pay the balance of
Valenzona’s salaries to which he was, under the facts and circumstances of the case, entitled under the contract, thus
compelling him to litigate to protect his interest.27

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 14, 2002 is hereby SET ASIDE and another rendered
declaring the assailed provision of the contract NULL AND VOID and ORDERING petitioner, GF Equity, to pay private
respondent, Arturo Valenzona, actual damages in the amount of ₱525,000.00 and attorney’s fees in the amount of
₱60,000.00.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 96126 August 10, 1992

ESTERIA F. GARCIANO, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, EMERITO LABAJO, LUNISITA MARODA, LALIANA DIONES, CANONISA
PANINSORO, DIONISIO ROSAL, REMEDIOS GALUSO, FLORDELUNA PETALCORIN, MELCHIZEDECH LOON,
NORBERTA MARODA and JOSEPH WIERTZ, respondents.

Basilio E. Duaban for petitioner.

Julius Z. Neri for private respondent.

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing the complaint for damages filed by the
petitioner against the private respondents.

The petitioner was hired to teach during the 1981-82 school year in the Immaculate Concepcion Institute in the Island of
Camotes. On January 13, 1982, or before the school year ended, she applied for an indefinite leave of absence because
her daughter was taking her to Austria where her daughter was employed (Exh. B). The application was recommended for
approval by the school principal, Emerito O. Labajo, and approved by the President of the school's Board of Directors
(Exh. B-1).

On June 1, 1982, Emerito Labajo addressed a letter to the petitioner through her husband, Sotero Garciano (for she was
still abroad), informing her of the decision of Fr. Joseph Wiertz, the school's founder, concurred in by the president of the
Parent-Teachers Association and the school faculty, to terminate her services as a member of the teaching staff because
of: (1) the absence of any written contract of employment between her and the school due to her refusal to sign one; and
(2) the difficulty of getting a substitute for her on a temporary basis as no one would accept the position without a written
contract (Exhs. C and 1). Upon her return from Austria in the later part of June, 1982, she received the letter informing her
that her services at the Immaculate Concepcion Institute had been terminated. She made inquiries from the school about
the matter and, on July 7, 1982, the members of the Board of Directors of the school, with the exception of Fr. Joseph
Wiertz, signed a letter notifying her that she was "reinstated to report and do your usual duties as Classroom Teacher . . .
effective July 5, 1982," and that "any letter or notice of termination received by you before this date has no sanction or
authority by the Board of Directors of this Institution, therefore it is declared null and void . . ." (Exhs. D and 2).

On July 9, 1982, the president, vice president, secretary, and three members of the Board of Directors, out of a
membership of nine (9), resigned their positions from the Board "for the reason that the ICI Faculty, has reacted acidly to
the Board's deliberations for the reinstatement of Mrs. Esteria F. Garciano, thereby questioning the integrity of the Board's
decision" (Exh. E).

On September 3, 1982, petitioner filed a complaint for damages in the Regional Trial Court, Cebu, Branch XI, against Fr.
Wiertz, Emerito Labajo, and some members of the faculty of the school for discrimination and unjust and illegal dismissal.

After trial, the lower court rendered a decision on August 30, 1985, ordering the defendants jointly and severally to pay her
P200,000 as moral damages, P50,000 exemplary damages, P32,400 as lost earnings for nine years, and P10,000 as
litigation expenses and attorney's fees.

The defendants (now private respondents) appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 10692), which on August
30, 1990 reversed the trial court's decision thus:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed, the complaint is dismissed, and defendants-
appellants are absolved from any liability to plaintiff-appellee. With costs against plaintiff-appellee. (p.
13, Rollo.)

The plaintiff-appellee (now petitioner) filed a motion for reconsideration which the Court of Appeals denied on October 26,
1990. Hence, this petition for review wherein the lone error assigned by petitioner reads:

Respondent Court of Appeals gravely erred in absolving the private respondents from liability by faulting
the petitioner for her failure to report back to her work. (p. 6, Rollo.)

After a careful perusal of the petition and the respondents' comments, the Court resolved to deny the petition for lack of
merit.

The board of directors of the Immaculate Concepcion Institute, which alone possesses the authority to hire and fire
teachers and other employees of the school, did not dismiss the petitioner. It in fact directed her to report for work. While
the private respondents sent her a letter of termination through her husband, they admittedly had no authority to do so. As
the Court of Appeals aptly observed:

We agree with defendants-appellants, however, that they should not have been held liable to plaintiff-
appellee for damages. Defendants-appellants had no authority to dismiss plaintiff-appellee and the latter
was aware of this. Hence, the letter of termination sent to her through her husband (Exhs. C and 1) by
defendants-appellants had no legal effect whatsoever. It did not effectively prevent her from reporting for
work. What is more, it was subsequently repudiated by the Board of Directors which directed her to report
for work. (Exhs. D and 2) There was, therefore, no reason why she did not continue with her teaching in
the school. No evidence had been presented to show that defendants-appellants prevented her from
reporting for work. The fact that defendants-appellants had "acidly" received the action of the Board of
Directors repudiating their decision to terminate plaintiff-appellee is not proof that defendants-appellants
had effectively and physically prevented plaintiff-appellee from resuming her post. It was nothing more
than a reaction to what defendants-appellants perceived as an affront to their collective prestige. It would
appear, therefore, that plaintiff-appellee voluntarily desisted from her teaching job in the school and has
no right to recover damages from defendants-appellants. (p. 13, Rollo.)

Liability for damages under Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code arises only from unlawful, willful or negligent acts that
are contrary to law, or morals, good customs or public policy.

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall
indemnify the latter for the same.

Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

The Court of Appeals was correct in finding that petitioner's discontinuance from teaching was her own choice. While the
respondents admittedly wanted her service terminated, they actually did nothing to physically prevent her from
reassuming her post, as ordered by the school's Board of Directors. That the school principal and Fr. Wiertz disagreed
with the Board's decision to retain her, and some teachers allegedly threatened to resign en masse, even if true, did not
make them liable to her for damages. They were simply exercising their right of free speech or their right to dissent from
the Board's decision. Their acts were not contrary to law, morals, good customs or public policy. They did not "illegally
dismiss" her for the Board's decision to retain her prevailed. She was ordered to report for work on July 5, 1982, but she
did not comply with that order. Consequently, whatever loss she may have incurred in the form of lost earnings was self-
inflicted. Volenti non fit injuria.

With respect to petitioner's claim for moral damages, the right to recover them under Article 21 is based on equity, and he
who comes to court to demand equity, must come with clean hands. Article 21 should be construed as granting the right
to recover damages to injured persons who are not themselves at fault (Mabutas vs. Calapan Electric Co. [CA] 50 OG
5828, cited in Padilla, Civil Code Annotated, Vol. 1, 1975 Ed., p. 87). Moral damages are recoverable only if the case falls
under Article 2219 in relation to Article 21 (Flordelis vs. Mar, 114 SCRA 41). In the case at bar, petitioners is not without
fault. Firstly, she went on an indefinite leave of absence and failed to report back in time for the regular opening of
classes. Secondly, for reasons known to herself alone, she refused to sign a written contract of employment. Lastly, she
ignored the Board of Directors' order for her to report for duty on July 5, 1982.

The trial court's award of exemplary damages to her was not justified for she is not entitled to moral, temperate or
compensatory damages. (Art. 2234, Civil Code).

In sum, the Court of Appeals correctly set aside the damages awarded by the trial court to the petitioner for they did not
have any legal or factual basis.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 101749 July 10, 1992

CONRADO BUNAG, JR., petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, First Division, and ZENAIDA B. CIRILO, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:

Petitioner appeals for the reversal of the decision 1 of respondent Court of Appeals promulgated on May 17, 1991 in CA-
G.R. CV No. 07054, entitled "Zenaida B. Cirilo vs. Conrado Bunag, Sr. and Conrado Bunag, Jr.," which affirmed in
toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XI at Bacoor, Cavite, and, implicitly, respondent court's resolution of
September 3, 1991 2denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

Respondent court having assiduously discussed the salient antecedents of this case, vis-a-vis the factual findings of the
court below, the evidence of record and the contentions of the parties, it is appropriate that its findings, which we approve
and adopt, be extensively reproduced hereunder:

Based on the evidence on record, the following facts are considered indisputable: On the afternoon of
September 8, 1973, defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. brought plaintiff-appellant to a motel or hotel where
they had sexual intercourse. Later that evening, said defendant-appellant brought plaintiff-appellant to the
house of his grandmother Juana de Leon in Pamplona, Las Piñas, Metro Manila, where they lived
together as husband and wife for 21 days, or until September 29, 1973. On September 10, 1973,
defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. and plaintiff-appellant filed their respective applications for a marriage
license with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Bacoor, Cavite. On October 1, 1973, after leaving
plaintiff-appellant, defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. filed an affidavit withdrawing his application for a
marriage license.

Plaintiff-appellant contends that on the afternoon of September 8, 1973, defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr.,
together with an unidentified male companion, abducted her in the vicinity of the San Juan de Dios
Hospital in Pasay City and brought her to a motel where she was raped. The court a quo, which adopted
her evidence, summarized the same which we paraphrased as follows:

Plaintiff was 26 years old on November 5, 1974 when she testified, single and had
finished a college course in Commerce (t.s.n., p. 4, Nov. 5, 1974). It appears that on
September 8, 1973, at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, while she was walking along
Figueras Street, Pasay City on her way to the San Juan de Dios Canteen to take her
snack, defendant, Conrado Bunag, Jr., came riding in a car driven by a male companion.
Plaintiff and defendant Bunag, Jr. were sweethearts, but two weeks before September 8,
1973, they had a quarrel, and Bunag, Jr. wanted to talk matters over with plaintiff, so that
he invited her to take their merienda at the Aristocrat Restaurant in Manila instead of at
the San Juan de Dios Canteen, to which plaintiff obliged, as she believed in his sincerity
(t.s.n., pp. 8-10, Nov. 5, 1974).

Plaintiff rode in the car and took the front seat beside the driver while Bunag, Jr. seated
himself by her right side. The car travelled north on its way to the Aristocrat Restaurant
but upon reaching San Juan Street in Pasay City, it turned abruptly to the right, to which
plaintiff protested, but which the duo ignored and instead threatened her not to make any
noise as they were ready to die and would bump the car against the post if she persisted.
Frightened and silenced, the car travelled its course thru F.B. Harrison Boulevard until
they reached a motel. Plaintiff was then pulled and dragged from the car against her will,
and amidst her cries and pleas. In spite of her struggle she was no match to the joint
strength of the two male combatants because of her natural weakness being a woman
and her small stature. Eventually, she was brought inside the hotel where the defendant
Bunag, Jr. deflowered her against her will and consent. She could not fight back and
repel the attack because after Bunag, Jr. had forced her to lie down and embraced her,
his companion held her two feet, removed her panty, after which he left. Bunag, Jr.
threatened her that he would ask his companion to come back and hold her feet if she did
not surrender her womanhood to him, thus he succeeded in feasting on her virginity.
Plaintiff described the pains she felt and how blood came out of her private parts after her
vagina was penetrated by the penis of the defendant Bunag, Jr. (t.s.n. pp. 17-24, Nov. 5,
1974).

After that outrage on her virginity, plaintiff asked Bunag, Jr. once more to allow her to go
home but the latter would not consent and stated that he would only let her go after they
were married as he intended to marry her, so much so that she promised not to make
any scandal and to marry him. Thereafter, they took a taxi together after the car that they
used had already gone, and proceeded to the house of Juana de Leon, Bunag, Jr.'s
 grandmother in Pamplona, Las Piñas, Metro Manila where they arrived at 9:30 o'clock in
the evening (t.s.n., p. 26, Nov. 5, 1974). At about ten (10) o'clock that same evening,
defendant Conrado Bunag, Sr., father of Bunag, Jr. arrived and assured plaintiff that the
following day which was a Monday, she and Bunag, Jr. would go to Bacoor, to apply for a
marriage license, which they did. They filed their applications for marriage license
(Exhibits "A" and "C") and after that plaintiff and defendant Bunag, Jr. returned to the
house of Juana de Leon and lived there as husband and wife from September 8, 1973 to
September 29, 1973.

On September 29, 1973 defendant Bunag, Jr. left and never returned, humiliating plaintiff
and compelled her to go back to her parents on October 3, 1973. Plaintiff was ashamed
when she went home and could not sleep and eat because of the deception done against
her by defendants-appellants (t.s.n., p. 35, Nov. 5, 1974).

The testimony of plaintiff was corroborated in toto by her uncle, Vivencio Bansagan who
declared that on September 8, 1973 when plaintiff failed to arrive home at 9:00 o'clock in
the evening, his sister who is the mother of plaintiff asked him to look for her but his
efforts proved futile, and he told his sister that plaintiff might have married (baka nag-
asawa, t.s.n., pp. 5-6, March 18, 1976). However, in the afternoon of the next day
(Sunday), his sister told him that Francisco Cabrera, accompanied by barrio captain
Jacinto Manalili of Ligas, Bacoor, Cavite, informed her that plaintiff and Bunag, Jr. were in
Cabrera's house, so that her sister requested him to go and see the plaintiff, which he
did, and at the house of Mrs. Juana de Leon in Pamplona, Las Piñas, Metro Manila he
met defendant Conrado Bunag, Sr., who told him, "Pare, the children are here already.
Let us settle the matter and have them married."

He conferred with plaintiff who told him that as she had already lost her honor, she would bear her
sufferings as Boy Bunag, Jr. and his father promised they would be married.

Defendants-appellants, on the other hand, deny that defendant-appellant Conrado Bunag, Jr. abducted
and raped plaintiff-appellant on September 8, 1973. On the contrary, plaintiff-appellant and defendant-
appellant Bunag, Jr. eloped on that date because of the opposition of the latter's father to their
relationship.

Defendant-appellants claim that defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. and plaintiff-appellant had earlier made
plans to elope and get married, and this fact was known to their friends, among them, Architect Chito
Rodriguez. The couple made good their plans to elope on the afternoon of September 8, 1973, when
defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr., accompanied by his friend Guillermo Ramos, Jr., met plaintiff-appellant
and her officemate named Lydia in the vicinity of the San Juan de Dios Hospital. The foursome then
proceeded to (the) aforesaid hospital's canteen where they had some snacks. Later, Guillermo Ramos,
Jr. took Lydia to Quirino Avenue where she could get a ride home, thereby leaving the defendant-
appellant Bunag, Jr. and plaintiff-appellant alone. According to defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr., after
Guillermo Ramos, Jr. and Lydia left, he and plaintiff-appellant took a taxi to the Golden Gate and
Flamingo Hotels where they tried to get a room, but these were full. They finally got a room at the Holiday
Hotel, where defendant-appellant registered using his real name and residence certificate number. Three
hours later, the couple check out of the hotel and proceeded to the house of Juana de Leon at Pamplona,
Las Piñas, where they stayed until September 19, 1873. Defendant-appellant claims that bitter
disagreements with the plaintiff-appellant over money and the threats made to his life prompted him to
break off their plan to get married.

During this period, defendant-appellant Bunag, Sr. denied having gone to the house of Juan de Leon and
telling plaintiff-appellant that she would be wed to defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. In fact, he phoned Atty.
Conrado Adreneda, member of the board of directors of Mandala Corporation, defendant-appellant
Bunag, Jr.'s employer, three times between the evening of September 8, 1973 and September 9, 1973
inquiring as to the whereabouts of his son. He came to know about his son's whereabouts when he was
told of the couple's elopement late in the afternoon of September 9, 1973 by his mother Candida
Gawaran. He likewise denied having met relatives and emissaries of plaintiff-appellant and agreeing to
her marriage to his son. 3

A complaint for damages for alleged breach of promise to marry was filed by herein private respondent Zenaida B. Cirilo
against petitioner Conrado Bunag, Jr. and his father, Conrado Bunag, Sr., as Civil Case No. N-2028 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch XIX at Bacoor, Cavite. On August 20, 1983, on a finding, inter alia, that petitioner had forcibly abducted and
raped private respondent, the trial court rendered a decision 4 ordering petitioner Bunag, Jr. to pay private respondent
P80,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, P20,000.00 by way of temperate damages, and
P10,000.00 for and as attorney's fees, as well as the costs of suit. Defendant Conrado Bunag, Sr. was absolved from any
and all liability.

Private respondent appealed that portion of the lower court's decision disculpating Conrado Bunag, Sr. from civil liability in
this case. On the other hand, the Bunags, as defendants-appellants, assigned in their appeal several errors allegedly
committed by trial court, which were summarized by respondent court as follows: (1) in finding that defendant-appellant
Conrado Bunag, Jr. forcibly abducted and raped plaintiff-appellant; (2) in finding that defendants-appellants promised
plaintiff-appellant that she would be wed to defendant-appellant Conrado Bunag, Jr.; and (3) in awarding plaintiff-appellant
damages for the breach of defendants-appellants' promise of marriage. 5

As stated at the outset, on May 17, 1991 respondent Court of Appeals rendered judgment dismissing both appeals and
affirming in toto the decision of the trial court. His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner Bunag, Jr. is
before us on a petition for review, contending that (1) respondent court failed to consider vital exhibits, testimonies and
incidents for petitioner's defense, resulting in the misapprehensions of facts and violative of the law on preparation of
judgment; and (2) it erred in the application of the proper law and jurisprudence by holding that there was forcible
abduction with rape, not just a simple elopement and an agreement to marry, and in the award of excessive damages. 6

Petitioner Bunag, Jr. first contends that both the trial and appellate courts failed to take into consideration the alleged fact
that he and private respondent had agreed to marry, and that there was no case of forcible abduction with rape, but one of
simple elopement and agreement to marry. It is averred that the agreement to marry has been sufficiently proven by the
testimonies of the witnesses for both parties and the exhibits presented in court.

This submission, therefore, clearly hinges on the credibility of the witnesses and evidence presented by the parties and
the weight accorded thereto in the factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals. In effect, what petitioner
would want this Court to do is to evaluate and analyze anew the evidence, both testimonial and documentary, presented
before and calibrated by the trial court, and as further meticulously reviewed and discussed by respondent court.

The issue raised primarily and ineluctably involves questions of fact. We are, therefore, once again constrained to stress
the well-entrenched statutory and jurisprudential mandate that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are, as a rule,
conclusive upon this Court. Only questions of law, distinctly set forth, may be raised in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, subject to clearly settled exceptions in case law.

Our jurisdiction in cases brought to us from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing and revising the errors of law
imputed to the latter, its findings of fact being conclusive. This Court has emphatically declared that it is not its function to
analyze or weigh such evidence all over again, its jurisdiction being limited to reviewing errors of law that might have been
committed by the lower court. Barring, therefore, a showing that the findings complained of are totally devoid of support in
the record, or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of discretion, such findings must stand,
for this Court is not expected or required to examine or contrast the oral and documentary evidence submitted by the
parties. 7 Neither does the instant case reveal any feature falling within, any of the exceptions which under our decisional
rules may warrant a review of the factual findings of the Court of Appeals. On the foregoing considerations and our review
of the records, we sustain the holding of respondent court in favor of private respondent.

Petitioner likewise asserts that since action involves a breach of promise to marry, the trial court erred in awarding
damages.

It is true that in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the time-honored rule that an action for breach of promise to marry has no
standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such
promise. 8 Generally, therefore, a breach of promise to marry per se is not actionable, except where the plaintiff has
actually incurred expenses for the wedding and the necessary incidents thereof.

However, the award of moral damages is allowed in cases specified in or analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of
the Civil Code. Correlatively, under Article 21 of said Code, in relation to paragraph 10 of said Article 2219, any person
who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for moral damages. 9 Article 21 was adopted to remedy the countless gaps in the statutes which
leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury, and is
intended to vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human
foresight to specifically provide for in the statutes. 10

Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, the acts of petitioner in forcibly abducting private respondent and
having carnal knowledge with her against her will, and thereafter promising to marry her in order to escape criminal
liability, only to thereafter renege on such promise after cohabiting with her for twenty-one days, irremissibly constitute
acts contrary to morals and good customs. These are grossly insensate and reprehensible transgressions which
indisputably warrant and abundantly justify the award of moral and exemplary damages, pursuant to Article 21 in relation
to paragraphs 3 and 10, Article 2219, and Article 2229 and 2234 of Civil Code.

Petitioner would, however, belabor the fact that said damages were awarded by the trial court on the basis of a finding
that he is guilty of forcible abduction with rape, despite the prior dismissal of the complaint therefor filed by private
respondent with the Pasay City Fiscal's Office.

Generally, the basis of civil liability from crime is the fundamental postulate of our law that every person criminally liable
for a felony is also civilly liable. In other words, criminal liability will give rise to civil liability ex delicto only if the same
felonious act or omission results in damage or injury to another and is the direct and proximate cause thereof. 11 Hence,
extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability unless the extinction proceeds from a
declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. 12
In the instant case, the dismissal of the complaint for forcible abduction with rape was by mere resolution of the fiscal at
the preliminary investigation stage. There is no declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil case might
arise did not exist. Consequently, the dismissal did not in any way affect the right of herein private respondent to institute
a civil action arising from the offense because such preliminary dismissal of the penal action did not carry with it the
extinction of the civil action.

The reason most often given for this holding is that the two proceedings involved are not between the same parties.
Furthermore, it has long been emphasized, with continuing validity up to now, that there are different rules as to the
competency of witnesses and the quantum of evidence in criminal and civil proceedings. In a criminal action, the State
must prove its case by evidence which shows the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, while in a civil action it is
sufficient for the plaintiff to sustain his cause by preponderance of evidence only. 13 Thus, in Rillon, et al. vs. Rillon, 14 we
stressed that it is not now necessary that a criminal prosecution for rape be first instituted and prosecuted to final
judgment before a civil action based on said offense in favor of the offended woman can likewise be instituted and
prosecuted to final judgment.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit, and the assailed judgment and resolution are hereby
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-16439 July 20, 1961

ANTONIO GELUZ, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and OSCAR LAZO, respondents.

Mariano H. de Joya for petitioner.

A.P. Salvador for respondents.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

This petition for certiorari brings up for review question whether the husband of a woman, who voluntarily procured her
abortion, could recover damages from physician who caused the same.

The litigation was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Manila by respondent Oscar Lazo, the of Nita Villanueva,
against petitioner Antonio Geluz, a physician. Convinced of the merits of the complaint upon the evidence adduced, the
trial court rendered judgment favor of plaintiff Lazo and against defendant Geluz, ordering the latter to pay P3,000.00 as
damages, P700.00 attorney's fees and the costs of the suit. On appeal, Court of Appeals, in a special division of five,
sustained the award by a majority vote of three justices as against two, who rendered a separate dissenting opinion.

The facts are set forth in the majority opinion as follows:

Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant (Antonio Geluz) for the first time in 1948 — through her aunt Paula
Yambot. In 1950 she became pregnant by her present husband before they were legally married. Desiring to
conceal her pregnancy from her parent, and acting on the advice of her aunt, she had herself aborted by the
defendant. After her marriage with the plaintiff, she again became pregnant. As she was then employed in the
Commission on Elections and her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had herself aborted again by the
defendant in October 1953. Less than two years later, she again became pregnant. On February 21, 1955,
accompanied by her sister Purificacion and the latter's daughter Lucida, she again repaired to the defendant's
clinic on Carriedo and P. Gomez streets in Manila, where the three met the defendant and his wife. Nita was
again aborted, of a two-month old foetus, in consideration of the sum of fifty pesos, Philippine currency. The
plaintiff was at this time in the province of Cagayan, campaigning for his election to the provincial board; he did
not know of, nor gave his consent, to the abortion.

It is the third and last abortion that constitutes plaintiff's basis in filing this action and award of damages. Upon application
of the defendant Geluz we granted certiorari.

The Court of Appeals and the trial court predicated the award of damages in the sum of P3,000.06 upon the provisions of
the initial paragraph of Article 2206 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. This we believe to be error, for the said article, in
fixing a minimum award of P3,000.00 for the death of a person, does not cover the case of an unborn foetus that is not
endowed with personality. Under the system of our Civil Code, "la criatura abortiva no alcanza la categoria de persona
natural y en consscuencia es un ser no nacido a la vida del Derecho" (Casso-Cervera, "Diccionario de Derecho Privado",
Vol. 1, p. 49), being incapable of having rights and obligations.

Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured, it is
easy to see that if no action for such damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of the injuries it
received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did
accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone
can take place from on that lacked juridical personality (or juridical capacity as distinguished from capacity to act). It is no
answer to invoke the provisional personality of a conceived child (conceptus pro nato habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil
Code, because that same article expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the condition that the child
should be subsequently born alive: "provided it be born later with the condition specified in the following article". In the
present case, there is no dispute that the child was dead when separated from its mother's womb.

The prevailing American jurisprudence is to the same effect; and it is generally held that recovery can not had for the
death of an unborn child (Stafford vs. Roadway Transit Co., 70 F. Supp. 555; Dietrich vs. Northampton, 52 Am. Rep. 242;
and numerous cases collated in the editorial note, 10 ALR, (2d) 639).

This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at all. But such damages must be those inflicted
directly upon them, as distinguished from the injury or violation of the rights of the deceased, his right to life and physical
integrity. Because the parents can not expect either help, support or services from an unborn child, they would normally
be limited to moral damages for the illegal arrest of the normal development of the spes hominis that was the foetus, i.e.,
on account of distress and anguish attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of their parental expectations (Civ. Code
Art. 2217), as well as to exemplary damages, if the circumstances should warrant them (Art. 2230). But in the case before
us, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals have not found any basis for an award of moral damages, evidently
because the appellee's indifference to the previous abortions of his wife, also caused by the appellant herein, clearly
indicates that he was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes and affections. The lower court expressly
found, and the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals did not contradict it, that the appellee was aware of the second
abortion; and the probabilities are that he was likewise aware of the first. Yet despite the suspicious repetition of the
event, he appeared to have taken no steps to investigate or pinpoint the causes thereof, and secure the punishment of the
responsible practitioner. Even after learning of the third abortion, the appellee does not seem to have taken interest in the
administrative and criminal cases against the appellant. His only concern appears to have been directed at obtaining from
the doctor a large money payment, since he sued for P50,000.00 damages and P3,000.00 attorney's fees, an "indemnity"
claim that, under the circumstances of record, was clearly exaggerated.

The dissenting Justices of the Court of Appeals have aptly remarked that:

It seems to us that the normal reaction of a husband who righteously feels outraged by the abortion which his wife
has deliberately sought at the hands of a physician would be highminded rather than mercenary; and that his
primary concern would be to see to it that the medical profession was purged of an unworthy member rather than
turn his wife's indiscretion to personal profit, and with that idea in mind to press either the administrative or the
criminal cases he had filed, or both, instead of abandoning them in favor of a civil action for damages of which not
only he, but also his wife, would be the beneficiaries.

It is unquestionable that the appellant's act in provoking the abortion of appellee's wife, without medical necessity to
warrant it, was a criminal and morally reprehensible act, that can not be too severely condemned; and the consent of the
woman or that of her husband does not excuse it. But the immorality or illegality of the act does not justify an award of
damage that, under the circumstances on record, have no factual or legal basis.

The decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint ordered dismissed. Without costs.

Let a copy of this decision be furnished to the Department of Justice and the Board of Medical Examiners for their
information and such investigation and action against the appellee Antonio Geluz as the facts may warrant.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and Natividad, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, J., took no part.
De Leon, J., took no part.
G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995

LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS, respondents.

VITUG, J.:

Concededly a highly, if not indeed the most likely, controversial provision introduced by the Family Code is Article 36 (as
amended by E.O. No. 227 dated 17 July 1987), which declares:

Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

The present petition for review on certiorari, at the instance of Leouel Santos ("Leouel"), brings into fore the above
provision which is now invoked by him. Undaunted by the decisions of the court a quo1 and the Court of
Appeal,2 Leouel persists in beseeching its application in his attempt to have his marriage with herein private
respondent, Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos ("Julia"), declared a nullity.

It was in Iloilo City where Leouel, who then held the rank of First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, first met Julia. The
meeting later proved to be an eventful day for Leouel and Julia. On 20 September 1986, the two exchanged vows before
Municipal Trial Court Judge Cornelio G. Lazaro of Iloilo City, followed, shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. Leouel and
Julia lived with the latter's parents at the J. Bedia Compound, La Paz, Iloilo City. On 18 July 1987, Julia gave birth to a
baby boy, and he was christened Leouel Santos, Jr. The ecstasy, however, did not last long. It was bound to happen,
Leouel averred, because of the frequent interference by Julia's parents into the young spouses family affairs.
Occasionally, the couple would also start a "quarrel" over a number of other things, like when and where the couple
should start living independently from Julia's parents or whenever Julia would express resentment on Leouel's spending a
few days with his own parents.

On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of America to work as a nurse despite Leouel's pleas to so dissuade
her. Seven months after her departure, or on 01 January 1989, Julia called up Leouel for the first time by long distance
telephone. She promised to return home upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989. She never did. When Leouel got
a chance to visit the United States, where he underwent a training program under the auspices of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines from 01 April up to 25 August 1990, he desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get in touch with, Julia but
all his efforts were of no avail.

Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel filed with the regional trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch 30,
a complaint for "Voiding of marriage Under Article 36 of the Family Code" (docketed, Civil Case No. 9814). Summons was
served by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in Negros Oriental.

On 31 May 1991, respondent Julia, in her answer (through counsel), opposed the complaint and denied its allegations,
claiming, in main, that it was the petitioner who had, in fact, been irresponsible and incompetent.

A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a decree of nullity of their marriage was ruled out by the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor (in its report to the court).

On 25 October 1991, after pre-trial conferences had repeatedly been set, albeit unsuccessfully, by the court, Julia
ultimately filed a manifestation, stating that she would neither appear nor submit evidence.

On 06 November 1991, the court a quo finally dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.3

Leouel appealed to the Court of Appeal. The latter affirmed the decision of the trial court.4

The petition should be denied not only because of its non-compliance with Circular 28-91, which requires a certification of
non-shopping, but also for its lack of merit.

Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to communicate with him, for more than five
years are circumstances that clearly show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life. In his own
words, Leouel asserts:

. . . (T)here is no leave, there is no affection for (him) because respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos
failed all these years to communicate with the petitioner. A wife who does not care to inform her husband
about her whereabouts for a period of five years, more or less, is psychologically incapacitated.
The family Code did not define the term "psychological incapacity." The deliberations during the sessions of the Family
Code Revision Committee, which has drafted the Code, can, however, provide an insight on the import of the provision.

Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

xxx xxx xxx

Art. 36. . . .

(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in the
sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack
of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.

On subparagraph (7), which as lifted from the Canon Law, Justice (Jose B.L.) Reyes suggested that they
say "wanting in sufficient use," but Justice (Eduardo) Caguioa preferred to say "wanting in the sufficient
use." On the other hand, Justice Reyes proposed that they say "wanting in sufficient reason." Justice
Caguioa, however, pointed out that the idea is that one is not lacking in judgment but that he is lacking in
the exercise of judgment. He added that lack of judgment would make the marriage voidable. Judge
(Alicia Sempio-) Diy remarked that lack of judgment is more serious than insufficient use of judgment and
yet the latter would make the marriage null and void and the former only voidable. Justice Caguioa
suggested that subparagraph (7) be modified to read:

"That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack of
incapacity is made manifest after the celebration."

Justice Caguioa explained that the phrase "was wanting in sufficient use of reason of judgment to
understand the essential nature of marriage" refers to defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent,
which is not the idea in subparagraph (7), but lack of appreciation of one's marital obligations.

Judge Diy raised the question: Since "insanity" is also a psychological or mental incapacity, why is
"insanity" only a ground for annulment and not for declaration or nullity? In reply, Justice Caguioa
explained that in insanity, there is the appearance of consent, which is the reason why it is a ground for
voidable marriages, while subparagraph (7) does not refer to consent but to the very essence of marital
obligations.

Prof. (Araceli) Baviera suggested that, in subparagraph (7), the word "mentally" be deleted, with which
Justice Caguioa concurred. Judge Diy, however, prefers to retain the word "mentally."

Justice Caguioa remarked that subparagraph (7) refers to psychological impotence. Justice (Ricardo)
Puno stated that sometimes a person may be psychologically impotent with one but not with another.
Justice (Leonor Ines-) Luciano said that it is called selective impotency.

Dean (Fortunato) Gupit stated that the confusion lies in the fact that in inserting the Canon Law
annulment in the Family Code, the Committee used a language which describes a ground for voidable
marriages under the Civil Code. Justice Caguioa added that in Canon Law, there are voidable marriages
under the Canon Law, there are no voidable marriages Dean Gupit said that this is precisely the reason
why they should make a distinction.

Justice Puno remarked that in Canon Law, the defects in marriage cannot be cured.

Justice Reyes pointed out that the problem is: Why is "insanity" a ground for void ab initio marriages? In
reply, Justice Caguioa explained that insanity is curable and there are lucid intervals, while psychological
incapacity is not.

On another point, Justice Puno suggested that the phrase "even if such lack or incapacity is made
manifest" be modified to read "even if such lack or incapacity becomes manifest."

Justice Reyes remarked that in insanity, at the time of the marriage, it is not apparent.

Justice Caguioa stated that there are two interpretations of the phrase "psychological or mentally
incapacitated" — in the first one, there is vitiation of consent because one does not know all the
consequences of the marriages, and if he had known these completely, he might not have consented to
the marriage.

xxx xxx xxx

Prof. Bautista stated that he is in favor of making psychological incapacity a ground for voidable
marriages since otherwise it will encourage one who really understood the consequences of marriage to
claim that he did not and to make excuses for invalidating the marriage by acting as if he did not
understand the obligations of marriage. Dean Gupit added that it is a loose way of providing for divorce.

xxx xxx xxx

Justice Caguioa explained that his point is that in the case of incapacity by reason of defects in the
mental faculties, which is less than insanity, there is a defect in consent and, therefore, it is clear that it
should be a ground for voidable marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it is capable of
convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid intervals and there are cases when the insanity is
curable. He emphasized that psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has nothing
to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to marriage.

xxx xxx xxx

On psychological incapacity, Prof. (Flerida Ruth P.) Romero inquired if they do not consider it as going to
the very essence of consent. She asked if they are really removing it from consent. In reply, Justice
Caguioa explained that, ultimately, consent in general is effected but he stressed that his point is that it is
not principally a vitiation of consent since there is a valid consent. He objected to the lumping together of
the validity of the marriage celebration and the obligations attendant to marriage, which are completely
different from each other, because they require a different capacity, which is eighteen years of age, for
marriage but in contract, it is different. Justice Puno, however, felt that psychological incapacity is still a
kind of vice of consent and that it should not be classified as a voidable marriage which is incapable of
convalidation; it should be convalidated but there should be no prescription. In other words, as long as the
defect has not been cured, there is always a right to annul the marriage and if the defect has been really
cured, it should be a defense in the action for annulment so that when the action for annulment is
instituted, the issue can be raised that actually, although one might have been psychologically
incapacitated, at the time the action is brought, it is no longer true that he has no concept of the
consequence of marriage.

Prof. (Esteban) Bautista raised the question: Will not cohabitation be a defense? In response, Justice
Puno stated that even the bearing of children and cohabitation should not be a sign that psychological
incapacity has been cured.

Prof. Romero opined that psychological incapacity is still insanity of a lesser degree. Justice Luciano
suggested that they invite a psychiatrist, who is the expert on this matter. Justice Caguioa, however,
reiterated that psychological incapacity is not a defect in the mind but in the understanding of the
consequences of marriage, and therefore, a psychiatrist will not be a help.

Prof. Bautista stated that, in the same manner that there is a lucid interval in insanity, there are also
momentary periods when there is an understanding of the consequences of marriage. Justice Reyes and
Dean Gupit remarked that the ground of psychological incapacity will not apply if the marriage was
contracted at the time when there is understanding of the consequences of marriage. 5

xxx xxx xxx

Judge Diy proposed that they include physical incapacity to copulate among the grounds for void
marriages. Justice Reyes commented that in some instances the impotence that in some instances the
impotence is only temporary and only with respect to a particular person. Judge Diy stated that they can
specify that it is incurable. Justice Caguioa remarked that the term "incurable" has a different meaning in
law and in medicine. Judge Diy stated that "psychological incapacity" can also be cured. Justice Caguioa,
however, pointed out that "psychological incapacity" is incurable.

Justice Puno observed that under the present draft provision, it is enough to show that at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, one was psychologically incapacitated so that later on if already he can
comply with the essential marital obligations, the marriage is still void ab initio. Justice Caguioa explained
that since in divorce, the psychological incapacity may occur after the marriage, in void marriages, it has
to be at the time of the celebration of marriage. He, however, stressed that the idea in the provision is that
at the time of the celebration of the marriage, one is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations, which incapacity continues and later becomes manifest.

Justice Puno and Judge Diy, however, pointed out that it is possible that after the marriage, one's
psychological incapacity become manifest but later on he is cured. Justice Reyes and Justice Caguioa
opined that the remedy in this case is to allow him to remarry. 6

xxx xxx xxx

Justice Puno formulated the next Article as follows:

 Art. 37. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated, to comply with the essential obligations of marriage shall
likewise be void from the beginning even if such incapacity becomes manifest after its
solemnization.

Justice Caguioa suggested that "even if" be substituted with "although." On the other hand, Prof. Bautista
proposed that the clause "although such incapacity becomes manifest after its solemnization" be deleted
since it may encourage one to create the manifestation of psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa
pointed out that, as in other provisions, they cannot argue on the basis of abuse.

Judge Diy suggested that they also include mental and physical incapacities, which are lesser in degree
than psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa explained that mental and physical incapacities are vices
of consent while psychological incapacity is not a species of vice or consent.

Dean Gupit read what Bishop Cruz said on the matter in the minutes of their February 9, 1984 meeting:

"On the third ground, Bishop Cruz indicated that the phrase "psychological or mental
impotence" is an invention of some churchmen who are moralists but not canonists, that
is why it is considered a weak phrase. He said that the Code of Canon Law would rather
express it as "psychological or mental incapacity to discharge . . ."

Justice Caguioa remarked that they deleted the word "mental" precisely to distinguish it from vice of
consent. He explained that "psychological incapacity" refers to lack of understanding of the essential
obligations of marriage.

Justice Puno reminded the members that, at the last meeting, they have decided not to go into the
classification of "psychological incapacity" because there was a lot of debate on it and that this is
precisely the reason why they classified it as a special case.

At this point, Justice Puno, remarked that, since there having been annulments of marriages arising from
psychological incapacity, Civil Law should not reconcile with Canon Law because it is a new ground even
under Canon Law.

Prof. Romero raised the question: With this common provision in Civil Law and in Canon Law, are they
going to have a provision in the Family Code to the effect that marriages annulled or declared void by the
church on the ground of psychological incapacity is automatically annulled in Civil Law? The other
members replied negatively.

Justice Puno and Prof. Romero inquired if Article 37 should be retroactive or prospective in application.

Justice Diy opined that she was for its retroactivity because it is their answer to the problem of church
annulments of marriages, which are still valid under the Civil Law. On the other hand, Justice Reyes and
Justice Puno were concerned about the avalanche of cases.

Dean Gupit suggested that they put the issue to a vote, which the Committee approved.

The members voted as follows:

(1) Justice Reyes, Justice Puno and Prof. Romero were for prospectivity.

(2) Justice Caguioa, Judge Diy, Dean Gupit, Prof. Bautista and Director Eufemio were for retroactivity.

(3) Prof. Baviera abstained.

Justice Caguioa suggested that they put in the prescriptive period of ten years within which the action for
declaration of nullity of the marriage should be filed in court. The Committee approved the suggestion. 7

It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision Committee in ultimately deciding to adopt the provision with less
specificity than expected, has in fact, so designed the law as to allow some resiliency in its application. Mme. Justice
Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, a member of the Code Committee, has been quoted by Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo in Salita
vs. Hon. Magtolis (G.R. No. 106429, 13 June 1994); thus:8

The Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that the giving of examples
would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the Committee
would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings
of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which,
although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken
from Canon Law.
A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, 9 which reads:

Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:

1. who lack sufficient use of reason;

2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning essentila matrimonial rights and
duties, to be given and accepted mutually;

3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
(Emphasis supplied.)

Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even perhaps all that persuasive for having no juridical or secular effect, the
jurisprudence under Canon Law prevailing at the time of the code's enactment, nevertheless, cannot be dismissed as
impertinent for its value as an aid, at least, to the interpretation or construction of the codal provision.

One author, Ladislas Orsy, S.J., in his treaties, 10 giving an account on how the third paragraph of Canon 1095 has been
framed, states:

The history of the drafting of this canon does not leave any doubt that the legislator intended, indeed, to
broaden the rule. A strict and narrow norm was proposed first:

Those who cannot assume the essential obligations of marriage because of a grave
psycho-sexual anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam psychosexualem) are unable to contract
marriage (cf. SCH/1975, canon 297, a new canon, novus);

then a broader one followed:

. . . because of a grave psychological anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam psychicam) . . . (cf. SCH/1980,
canon 1049);

then the same wording was retained in the text submitted to the pope (cf. SCH/1982, canon 1095, 3);

finally, a new version was promulgated:

because of causes of a psychological nature (ob causas naturae psychiae).

So the progress was from psycho-sexual to psychological anomaly, then the term anomaly was
altogether eliminated. it would be, however, incorrect to draw the conclusion that the cause of the
incapacity need not be some kind of psychological disorder; after all, normal and healthy person should
be able to assume the ordinary obligations of marriage.

Fr. Orsy concedes that the term "psychological incapacity" defies any precise definition since psychological causes can
be of an infinite variety.

In a book, entitled "Canons and Commentaries on Marriage," written by Ignatius Gramunt, Javier Hervada and LeRoy
Wauck, the following explanation appears:

This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of
marriage. Some psychosexual disorders and other disorders of personality can be the psychic cause of
this defect, which is here described in legal terms. This particular type of incapacity consists of a
real inability to render what is due by the contract. This could be compared to the incapacity of a farmer to
enter a binding contract to deliver the crops which he cannot possibly reap; (b) this inability to commit
oneself must refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life and
love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education of offspring; (c) the inability must be
tantamount to a psychological abnormality. The mere difficulty of assuming these obligations, which could
be overcome by normal effort, obviously does not constitute incapacity. The canon contemplates a true
psychological disorder which incapacitates a person from giving what is due (cf. John Paul II, Address to
R. Rota, Feb. 5, 1987). However, if the marriage is to be declared invalid under this incapacity, it must be
proved not only that the person is afflicted by a psychological defect, but that the defect did in fact deprive
the person, at the moment of giving consent, of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and
consequently of the possibility of being bound by these duties.

Justice Sempio-Diy 11 cites with approval the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan
Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch 1), who opines that psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such
that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history
of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must
be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.

It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most importantly, the deliberations of the
Family Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code
has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical
authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's "Void and
Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and their Parallels in Canon Law," quoting from the Diagnostic Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's "Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases").
Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing
precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include
their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly
any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter intensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This pschologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not
evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion
is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity
of the void marriage to be "legitimate."

The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind or
concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage
contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcholism, lesbianism or homosexuality
should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family
Code. These provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances
being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.

Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every circumstance that may have some bearing on
the degree, extent, and other conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined and evaluated so
that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists,
psychologists, and persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable.

Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment. We should continue to be reminded that innate in our society,
then enshrined in our Civil Code, and even now still indelible in Article 1 of the Family Code, is that —

Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and
an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not
subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage
within the limits provided by this Code. (Emphasis supplied.)

Our Constitution is no less emphatic:

Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall
strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development.

Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected
by the State. (Article XV, 1987 Constitution).

The above provisions express so well and so distinctly the basic nucleus of our laws on marriage and the family, and they
are doubt the tenets we still hold on to.

The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come close to the standards required to decree a
nullity of marriage. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation.
Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide all the specific answers to every individual problem.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., is on leave.

G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground (in addition to those enumerated in the Civil
Code) to assail the validity of a marriage, namely, "psychological incapacity." Since the Code's effectivity, our
courts have been swamped with various petitions to declare marriages void based on this ground. Although this
Court had interpreted the meaning of psychological incapacity in the recent case of Santos vs. Court of Appeals,
still many judges and lawyers find difficulty in applying said novel provision in specific cases. In the present
case and in the context of the herein assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, the Solicitor General has labelled
— exaggerated to be sure but nonetheless expressive of his frustration — Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce
procedure in the world." Hence, this Court in addition to resolving the present case, finds the need to lay down
specific guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code.

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the January 25, 1993 Decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858 affirming in toto the May 14, 1991 decision of the Regional Trial Court
of La Trinidad,3 Benguet, which declared the marriage of respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab
initio, on the ground of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code.

The Facts

This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by respondent Roridel O. Molina of a verified petition for
declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the petition alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were
married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church4 in Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was born; that after a year of
marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he preferred to
spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for aid
and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between
them; that sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and since then Roridel had been the
sole breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of which their
relationship was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with her parents
in Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned them; that
Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital obligations and was a
highly immature and habitually quarrel some individual who thought of himself as a king to be served; and that it would be
to the couple's best interest to have their marriage declared null and void in order to free them from what appeared to be
an incompatible marriage from the start.

In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live together as husband
and wife, but contended that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's strange behavior of
insisting on maintaining her group of friends even after their marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her marital
duties such as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run the household and handle their finances.

During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated:

1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at the Church of St. Augustine, Manila;

2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano Molina was born on July 29, 1986;

3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years;

4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;

5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;

6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the petitioner wife.

Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and that of her friends Rosemarie Ventura and Maria
Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of the
Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. She also submitted documents marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-1." Reynaldo
did not present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference.

On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The appeal of petitioner was denied by
the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. Hence, the present recourse.
 The Issue

In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and incorrect interpretation of
the phrase 'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of the Family Code) and made an incorrect application
thereof to the facts of the case," adding that the appealed Decision tended "to establish in effect the most liberal divorce
procedure in the world which is anathema to our culture."

In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court relied 5 heavily on the trial court's findings "that the
marriage between the parties broke up because of their opposing and conflicting personalities." Then, it added it sown
opinion that "the Civil Code Revision Committee (hereinafter referred to as Committee) intended to liberalize the
application of our civil laws on personal and family rights. . . ." It concluded that:

As ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychologically incapacity as a broad range of mental and
behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards the marital union, his or
her personal relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the long haul for the
attainment of the principal objectives of marriage. If said conduct, observed and considered as a whole,
tends to cause the union to self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives of marriage, then there is
enough reason to leave the spouses to their individual fates.

In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no indiscretion in analyzing and deciding the
instant case, as it did, hence, We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and conclusions thus
made.

Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the Court of Appeals.

The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to psychological
incapacity, explaining that such ground "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and
duties, but a defect in their psychological nature which renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities
and duties."

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals6 this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that "psychological
incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . . and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a
former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila, 7Justice Vitug wrote
that "the psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."

On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an
incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some
marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes
psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as
married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (nor
physical) illness.

The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could nor get along with each other.
There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. The expert
testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological incapacity. Dr.
Sison testified:8

COURT

Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based on your findings that it is

better for the Court to annul (sic) the marriage?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q There is no hope for the marriage?

A There is no hope, the man is also living with another woman.

Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are psychologically unfit for each
other but they are psychologically fit with other parties?
 A Yes, Your Honor.

Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions?

A Yes, Your Honor.

The Court has no more questions.

In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits were constitutive of psychological
incapacity existing at the time of marriage celebration. While some effort was made to prove that there was a failure to
fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of "thoughtfulness and gentleness" on Reynaldo's part of being "conservative, homely and
intelligent" on the part of Roridel, such failure of expectation is nor indicative of antecedent psychological incapacity. If at
all, it merely shows love's temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes of the beloved.

During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on the facts of this case vis-a-vis existing law and
jurisprudence. In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family Code and the difficulty experienced by many trial courts
interpreting and applying it, the Court decided to invite two amici curiae, namely, the Most Reverend Oscar V. Cruz, 9 Vicar
Judicial (Presiding Judge) of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, and
Justice Ricardo C. Puno, 10 a member of the Family Code Revision Committee. The Court takes this occasion to thank
these friends of the Court for their informative and interesting discussions during the oral argument on December 3, 1996,
which they followed up with written memoranda.

From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the interpretation and application of
Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both
our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an
entire Article on the Family, 11 recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable,"
thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the
state.

The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes the permanence,
inviolability and solidarity

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological — not physical. although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an
extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given
valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of
the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, 13 nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature explained. Expert evidence may be given qualified psychiatrist and
clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show
that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not
related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to
procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such
non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code
Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which
provides:

The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature. 14

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of
our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decision of
such appellate tribunal. Ideally — subject to our law on evidence — what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be
decreed civilly void.

This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous
religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church — while remaining independent,
separate and apart from each other — shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and
cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
state. No decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly staring therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days
from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the
equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.

In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to grant the petition. Such ruling becomes even
more cogent with the use of the foregoing guidelines.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage of Roridel
Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

Regalado, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concurs in the result.

G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997

CHI MING TSOI, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI, respondents.

TORRES, JR., J.:

Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to steer a marriage in its journey over troubled waters. Laws are
seemingly inadequate. Over time, much reliance has been placed in the works of the unseen hand of Him who created all
things.

Who is to blame when a marriage fails?

This case was originally commenced by a distraught wife against her uncaring husband in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City (Branch 89) which decreed the annulment of the marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Petitioner appealed the decision of the trial court to respondent Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 42758) which affirmed
the Trial Court's decision November 29, 1994 and correspondingly denied the motion for reconsideration in a resolution
dated February 14, 1995.

The statement of the case and of the facts made by the trial court and reproduced by the Court of Appeals1 its decision
are as follows:

From the evidence adduced, the following acts were preponderantly established:

Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant at the Manila Cathedral, . . . Intramuros Manila, as
evidenced by their Marriage Contract. (Exh. "A")

After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at the South Villa, Makati, they went and proceeded
to the house of defendant's mother.

There, they slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first night of their married life.

It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her expectations, that as newlyweds they were supposed to enjoy
making love, or having sexual intercourse, with each other, the defendant just went to bed, slept on one side
thereof, then turned his back and went to sleep . There was no sexual intercourse between them during the first
night. The same thing happened on the second, third and fourth nights.

In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they can enjoy together during their first week as
husband and wife, they went to Baguio City. But, they did so together with her mother, an uncle, his mother and
his nephew. They were all invited by the defendant to join them. [T]hey stayed in Baguio City for four (4) days.
But, during this period, there was no sexual intercourse between them, since the defendant avoided her by taking
a long walk during siesta time or by just sleeping on a rocking chair located at the living room. They slept together
in the same room and on the same bed since May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989. But during this period, there
was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. [S]he claims, that she did not: even see her husband's
private parts nor did he see hers.

Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag, a urologist at the
Chinese General Hospital, on January 20, 1989.

The results of their physical examinations were that she is healthy, normal and still a virgin, while that of her
husband's examination was kept confidential up to this time. While no medicine was prescribed for her, the doctor
prescribed medications for her husband which was also kept confidential. No treatment was given to her. For her
husband, he was asked by the doctor to return but he never did.

The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show his penis. She said,
that she had observed the defendant using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes the cleansing cream of his mother.
And that, according to her, the defendant married her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire or maintain his residency
status here in the country and to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man.

The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband.

On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant that if their marriage shall be annulled by reason of
psychological incapacity, the fault lies with his wife.
 But, he said that he does not want his marriage with his wife annulled for several reasons, viz: (1) that he loves
her very much; (2) that he has no defect on his part and he is physically and psychologically capable; and, (3)
since the relationship is still very young and if there is any differences between the two of them, it can still be
reconciled and that, according to him, if either one of them has some incapabilities, there is no certainty that this
will not be cured. He further claims, that if there is any defect, it can be cured by the intervention of medical
technology or science.

The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there
was no sexual contact between them. But, the reason for this, according to the defendant, was that everytime he
wants to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always avoided him and whenever he caresses her private
parts, she always removed his hands. The defendant claims, that he forced his wife to have sex with him only
once but he did not continue because she was shaking and she did not like it. So he stopped.

There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant , why the plaintiff filed this case against him, and these are:
(1) that she is afraid that she will be forced to return the pieces of jewelry of his mother, and, (2) that her husband,
the defendant, will consummate their marriage.

The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain valid because they are still very young and there is still a
chance to overcome their differences.

The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination. His penis was examined by Dr. Sergio Alteza, Jr., for
the purpose of finding out whether he is impotent . As a result thereof, Dr. Alteza submitted his Doctor's Medical
Report. (Exh. "2"). It is stated there, that there is no evidence of impotency (Exh. "2-B"), and he is capable of
erection. (Exh. "2-C")

The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to masturbate to find out whether or not he has an erection and he
found out that from the original size of two (2) inches, or five (5) centimeters, the penis of the defendant
lengthened by one (1) inch and one centimeter. Dr. Alteza said, that the defendant had only a soft erection which
is why his penis is not in its full length. But, still is capable of further erection, in that with his soft erection, the
defendant is capable of having sexual intercourse with a woman.

In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no collusion between the parties and that the
evidence is not fabricated."2

After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as VOID the marriage entered into by the plaintiff with
the defendant on May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral, Basilica of the Immaculate Conception, Intramuros,
Manila, before the Rt. Rev. Msgr. Melencio de Vera. Without costs. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the
Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City. Let another copy be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Manila.

SO ORDERED.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.

Hence, the instant petition.

Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals erred:

in affirming the conclusions of the lower court that there was no sexual intercourse between the parties without
making any findings of fact.

II

in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have sexual communion with petitioner is a psychological
incapacity inasmuch as proof thereof is totally absent.

III

in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private respondent to have sex with each other
constitutes psychological incapacity of both.

IV
 in affirming the annulment of the marriage between the parties decreed by the lower court without fully satisfying
itself that there was no collusion between them.

We find the petition to be bereft of merit.

Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-89-3141, private respondent has the burden of proving the
allegations in her complaint; that since there was no independent evidence to prove the alleged non-coitus between the
parties, there remains no other basis for the court's conclusion except the admission of petitioner; that public policy should
aid acts intended to validate marriage and should retard acts intended to invalidate them; that the conclusion drawn by the
trial court on the admissions and confessions of the parties in their pleadings and in the course of the trial is misplaced
since it could have been a product of collusion; and that in actions for annulment of marriage, the material facts alleged in
the complaint shall always be proved.3

Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:

Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. — Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the
material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on
such pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation the material facts alleged in the
complaint shall always be proved.

The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment on the pleadings. What said provision seeks to prevent is annulment of
marriage without trial. The assailed decision was not based on such a judgment on the pleadings. When private
respondent testified under oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by oath before the trial court and was
cross-examined by the adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in form of a testimony. After such evidence was
presented, it be came incumbent upon petitioner to present his side. He admitted that since their marriage on May 22,
1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual intercourse between them.

To prevent collusion between the parties is the reason why, as stated by the petitioner, the Civil Code provides that no
judgment annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment (Arts. 88 and
101[par. 2]) and the Rules of Court prohibit such annulment without trial (Sec. 1, Rule 19).

The case has reached this Court because petitioner does not want their marriage to be annulled. This only shows that
there is no collusion between the parties. When petitioner admitted that he and his wife (private respondent) have never
had sexual contact with each other, he must have been only telling the truth. We are reproducing the relevant portion of
the challenged resolution denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, penned with magisterial lucidity by Associate
Justice Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes, viz:

The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed by this Court is not based on a stipulation of facts. The issue of
whether or not the appellant is psychologically incapacitated to discharge a basic marital obligation was resolved
upon a review of both the documentary and testimonial evidence on record. Appellant admitted that he did not
have sexual relations with his wife after almost ten months of cohabitation, and it appears that he is not suffering
from any physical disability. Such abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly
indicative of a serious personality disorder which to the mind of this Court clearly demonstrates an 'utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage' within the meaning of Article 36 of the
Family Code (See Santos vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995). 4

Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the
private respondent to have sex with each other constitutes psychological incapacity of both. He points out as error the
failure of the trial court to make "a categorical finding about the alleged psychological incapacity and an in-depth analysis
of the reasons for such refusal which may not be necessarily due to physchological disorders" because there might have
been other reasons, — i.e., physical disorders, such as aches, pains or other discomforts, — why private respondent
would not want to have sexual intercourse from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989, in a short span of 10 months.

First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the respondent court made a finding on who between petitioner and
private respondent refuses to have sexual contact with the other. The fact remains, however, that there has never been
coitus between them. At any rate, since the action to declare the marriage void may be filed by either party, i.e., even the
psychologically incapacitated, the question of who refuses to have sex with the other becomes immaterial.

Petitioner claims that there is no independent evidence on record to show that any of the parties is suffering from
phychological incapacity. Petitioner also claims that he wanted to have sex with private respondent; that the reason for
private respondent's refusal may not be psychological but physical disorder as stated above.

We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner could have discussed with private respondent or asked her what is ailing
her, and why she balks and avoids him everytime he wanted to have sexual intercourse with her. He never did. At least,
there is nothing in the record to show that he had tried to find out or discover what the problem with his wife could be.
What he presented in evidence is his doctor's Medical Report that there is no evidence of his impotency and he is capable
of erection.5 Since it is petitioner's claim that the reason is not psychological but perhaps physical disorder on the part of
private respondent, it became incumbent upon him to prove such a claim.
 If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage obligations,
and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological
incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of
psychological incapacity.6

Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To procreate children based on the universal
principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage." Constant non- fulfillment of
this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and
protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.

As aptly stated by the respondent court,

An examination of the evidence convinces Us that the husband's plea that the wife did not want carnal intercourse
with him does not inspire belief. Since he was not physically impotent, but he refrained from sexual intercourse
during the entire time (from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989) that he occupied the same bed with his wife, purely
out of symphaty for her feelings, he deserves to be doubted for not having asserted his right seven though she
balked (Tompkins vs. Tompkins, 111 Atl. 599, cited in I Paras, Civil Code, at p. 330). Besides, if it were true that it
is the wife was suffering from incapacity, the fact that defendant did not go to court and seek the declaration of
nullity weakens his claim. This case was instituted by the wife whose normal expectations of her marriage were
frustrated by her husband's inadequacy. Considering the innate modesty of the Filipino woman, it is hard to
believe that she would expose her private life to public scrutiny and fabricate testimony against her husband if it
were not necessary to put her life in order and put to rest her marital status.

We are not impressed by defendant's claim that what the evidence proved is the unwillingness or lack of intention
to perform the sexual act, which is not phychological incapacity, and which can be achieved "through proper
motivation." After almost ten months of cohabitation, the admission that the husband is reluctant or unwilling to
perform the sexual act with his wife whom he professes to love very dearly, and who has not posed any
insurmountable resistance to his alleged approaches, is indicative of a hopeless situation, and of a serious
personality disorder that constitutes psychological incapacity to discharge the basic marital covenants within the
contemplation of the Family Code.7

While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity
(Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the "spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and
not any legal mandate or court order" (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is shared with
another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say "I could not have cared less." This
is so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is sexual
intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of
creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations.

It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private respondent. That is — a shared feeling which
between husband and wife must be experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of
spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process. An expressive interest in each other's feelings at a time it is
needed by the other can go a long way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children but for
two consenting adults who view the relationship with love amor gignit amorem, respect, sacrifice and a continuing
commitment to compromise, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.

This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves trapped in its mire of
unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the studied judgment of respondent
appellate court.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES , the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 29, 1994 is
hereby AFFIRMED in all respects and the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-4904 February 5, 1909

ROSALIA MARTINEZ, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
ANGEL TAN, defendant-appellee.

Domingo Franco, for appellant.

Doroteo Karagdag, for appellee.

WILLARD, J.:

The only question in this case is whether or not the plaintiff and the defendant were married on the 25th day of
September, 1907, before the justice of the peace, Jose Ballori, in the town of Palompon in the Province of Leyte.

There was received in evidence at the trial what is called an expediente de matrimonio civil. It is written in Spanish and
consists, first, of a petition directed to the justice of the peace, dated on the 25th of September, 1907, signed by the
plaintiff and the defendant, in which they state that they have mutually agreed to enter into a contract of marriage before
the justice of the peace, and ask that the justice solemnize the marriage. Following this is a document dated on the same
day, signed by the justice of the peace, by the plaintiff, by the defendant, and by Zacarias Esmero and Pacita Ballori. It
states the presentation of the petition above mentioned; that the persons who signed it where actually present in the office
of the justice on the same day named; that they ratified under oath the contents of the petition, and that they insisted in
what they had there asked for. It also stated that being required to produce witnesses of the marriage, the presented
Zacarias Esmero as a witness for the husband and Pacita Ballori as a witness for the wife. Following this is a certificate of
marriage signed by the justice of the peace and the witnesses Zacarias Esmero and Pacita Ballori, dated the 25th day of
September, 1907, in which it is stated that the plaintiff and the defendant were legally married by the justice of the peace
in the presence of the witnesses on that day.

The court below decided the case in favor of the defendant, holding that the parties were legally married on the day
named. The evidence in support of that decision is: First. The document itself, which the plaintiff admits that she signed.
Second. The evidence of the defendant, who testifies that he and said plaintiff appeared before the justice of the peace at
the time named, together with the witness Zacarias Esmero and Pacita Ballori, and that they all signed the document
above mentioned. Third. The evidence of Zacarias Esmero, one of the above-named witnesses, who testifies that the
plaintiff, the defendant, and Pacita Ballori appeared before the justice at the time named and did sign the document
referred to. Fourth. The evidence of Pacita Ballori, who testified to the same effect. Fifth. The evidence of Jose Santiago,
the bailiff of the court of the justice of the peace, who testified that the plaintiff, the defendant, the two witnesses above-
named, and the justice of the peace were all present in the office of the justice of the peace at the time mentioned.

The only direct evidence in favor of the plaintiff is her own testimony that she never appeared before the justice of the
peace and never was married to the defendant. She admits that she signed the document in question, but says that she
signed it in her own home, without reading it, and at the request of the defendant, who told her that it was a paper
authorizing him to ask the consent of her parents to the marriage.

There is some indirect evidence which the plaintiff claims supports her case, but which we think, when properly
considered, is not entitled to much weight. The plaintiff at the time was visiting, in the town of Palompon, her married
brother and was there for about two weeks. The wife of her brother, Rosario Bayot, testified that the plaintiff never left the
house except in her company. But she admitted on cross-examination that she herself went to school every morning and
that on one occasion the plaintiff had gone to church unaccompanied. The testimony of this witness loses its force when
the testimony of Pacita Ballori is considered. She says that at the request of the defendant on the day named, about 5
o'clock in the afternoon, she went to the store of a Chinese named Veles; that there she met the plaintiff and her mother;
that she asked the mother of the plaintiff to allow the plaintiff to accompany her, the witness, to her own house for the
purpose of examining some dress patterns; that the mother gave her consent and the two rights left the store, but instead
of going to the house of the witness they went directly to the office of the justice of the peace where the ceremony took
place; that after the ceremony had taken place, one came advising them that the mother was approaching, and that they
thereupon hurriedly left the office of the justice and went to the house of Pacita Ballori, where the mother later found them.

The other testimony of the plaintiff relating to certain statements made by the justice of the peace, who died after the
ceremony was performed and before the trial, and certain statements made by Pacita Ballori, is not sufficient to overcome
the positive testimony of the witnesses for the defendant.

The other testimony of Pacita Ballori is severely criticized by counsel for the appellant in his brief. It appears that during
her first examination she was seized with an hysterical attack and practically collapsed at the trial. Her examination was
adjourned to a future day and was completed in her house where she was sick in bed. It is claimed by counsel that her
collapse was due to the fact that she recognized that she testified falsely in stating the office of the justice of the peace
was at the time in the municipal building, when, in fact, it was in a private house. We do not think that the record justifies
the claim of the appellant. The statement as to the location of the office of the justice of the peace was afterwards
corrected by the witness and we are satisfied that she told the facts substantially as they occurred.

There is, moreover, in the case written evidence which satisfies us that the plaintiff was not telling the truth when she said
she did not appear before the justice of the peace. This evidence consists of eight letters, which the defendant claims
were all written by the plaintiff. The plaintiff admits that she wrote letters numbered 2 and 9. The authenticity of the others
was proven. No. 9 is as follows:

ANGEL: Up to this time I did not see my father; but I know that he is very angry and if he be informed that we
have been married civilly, I am sure that he will turn me out of the house.

Do what you may deem convenient, as I don't know what to do.

Should I be able to go to-morrow to Merida, I shall do so, because I can not remain here.

Yours, ROSAL.

Letter No. 6, which bears no date, but which undoubtedly was written on the morning of the 25th of September, is as
follows:

Sr. D. ANGEL, TAN.

ANGEL: It is impossible for me to go to the house of Veles this morning because my sister in law will not let me
go there; if it suits you, I believe that this afternoon, about 5 or 6 o'clock, is the best hour.

Arrange everything, as I shall go there only for the purpose of signing, and have Pacita wait for me at the Chinese
store, because I don't like to go without Pacita.

The house must be one belonging to prudent people, and no one should know anything about it.

Yours, ROSAL.

It will be noticed that this corroborates completely the testimony of Pacita Ballori as to her meeting the plaintiff in the
afternoon at the store of the Chinese, Veles. Letter No. 7 is also undated, but was evidently written after the marriage
before the justice of the peace. It is as follows:

Sr. D. ANGEL, TAN.

ANGEL: If you want to speak to my mother, who is also yours, come here by and by, at about 9 or 10, when you
see that the tide is high because my brother will have to go to the boat for the purpose of loading lumber.

Don't tell her that we have been civilly married, but tell her at first that you are willing to celebrate the marriage at
this time, because I don't like her to know to-day that we have been at the court-house, inasmuch as she told me
this morning that she heard that we would go to the court, and that we must not cause her to be ashamed, and
that if I insist on being married I must do it right.

Tell her also that you have asked me to carry you.

I send you herewith the letter of your brother, in order that you may do what he wishes.

Yours, ROSAL.

Letter No. 8 was also evidently written after the marriage and is in part as follows:

Sr. D. ANGEL TAN.

ANGEL: I believe it is better for you to go to Ormoc on Sunday of the steamer Rosa, for the purpose of asking my
father's permission for our marriage, and in case he fails to give it, then we shall do what we deem proper, and, if
he does not wish us to marry without his permission, you must request his consent.

Tell me who said that my sister in law knows that we are civilly married; my brother ill treatment is a matter of no
importance, as every thing may be carried out, with patience.

It was proven at the trial that the defendant did go to Ormoc on the steamer Rosa as indicated in this letter, and that the
plaintiff was on the same boat. The plaintiff testified, however, that she had no communication with the defendant during
the voyage. The plaintiff and the defendant never lived together as husband and wife, and upon her arrival in Ormoc, after
consulting with her family, she went to Cebu and commenced this action, which was brought for the purpose of procuring
the cancellation of the certificate of marriage and for damages. The evidence strongly preponderates in favor of the
decision of the court below to the effect that the plaintiff appeared before the justice of the peace at the time named.

It is claimed by the plaintiff that what took place before the justice of the peace, even admitting all that the witnesses for
the defendant testified to, did not constitute a legal marriage. General orders, No. 68, section 6, is as follows:
 No particular form from the ceremony of marriage is required, but the parties must declare in the presence of the
person solemnizing the marriage, that they take each other as husband and wife.

Zacarias Esmero, one of the witnesses, testified that upon the occasion in question the justice of the peace said nothing
until after the document was signed and then addressing himself to the plaintiff and the defendant said, "You are married."
The petition signed the plaintiff and defendant contained a positive statement that they had mutually agreed to be married
and they asked the justice of the peace to solemnize the marriage. The document signed by the plaintiff, the defendant,
and the justice of the peace, stated that they ratified under oath, before the justice, the contents of the petition and that
witnesses of the marriage were produced. A mortgage took place as shown by the certificate of the justice of the peace,
signed by both contracting parties, which certificates gives rise to the presumption that the officer authorized the marriage
in due form, the parties before the justice of the peace declaring that they took each other as husband and wife, unless
the contrary is proved, such presumption being corroborated in this case by the admission of the woman to the effect that
she had contracted the marriage certified to in the document signed by her, which admission can only mean the parties
mutually agreed to unite in marriage when they appeared and signed the said document which so states before the justice
of the peace who authorized the same. It was proven that both the plaintiff and the defendant were able to read and write
the Spanish language, and that they knew the contents of the document which they signed; and under the circumstances
in this particular case were satisfied, and so hold, that what took place before the justice of the peace on this occasion
amounted to a legal marriage.

The defendant's original answer was a general denial of the allegations contained in the complaint. Among these
allegations was a statement that the parties had obtain previously the consent of the plaintiff's parents. The defendant
was afterwards allowed to amend his answer so that it was a denial of the allegations of the complaint except that relating
to the condition in regard to the consent of the parents. The plaintiff objected to the allowance of this amendment. After
the trial had commenced the defendant was again allowed to amend his answer so that it should be an admission of
paragraphs 2 and 3 of the complaint, except that part which related to the consent of the parents. It will be seen that this
second amendment destroyed completely the first amendment and the defendants lawyer stated that what he intended to
allege in his first amendment, but by reason of the haste with which the first amendment was drawn he had unintentionally
made it exactly the opposite of what he had intended to state. After argument the court allowed the second amendment.
We are satisfied that in this allowance there was no abuse of discretion and we do not see how the plaintiff was in any
way prejudiced. She proceeded with the trial of the case without asking for a continuance.

The judgment of the court below acquitting the defendant of the complaint is affirmed, with the costs of this instance
against the appellant.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, Johnson, and Carson, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 79284 November 27, 1987

FROILAN C. GANDIONCO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. SENEN C. PEÑARANDA, as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch
18, Cagayan de Oro City, and TERESITA S. GANDIONCO, respondents.

PADILLA, J.:

A special civil action for certiorari, with application for injunction, to annul (1) the Order of the respondent Judge,
dated 10 December 1986, ordering petitioner to pay support pendente lite to private respondent (his wife) and their
child, and (2) the Order of the same respondent Judge, dated 5 August 1987, denying petitioner's motion to
suspend hearings in the action for legal separation filed against him by private respondent as well as his motion to
inhibit respondent Judge from further hearing and trying the case.

On 29 May 1986, private respondent, the legal wife of the petitioner, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Misamis
Oriental, 10th Judicial District, Branch 18, in Cagayan de Oro City, presided over by respondent Judge, a complaint
against petitioner for legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, with a petition for support and payment of
damages. This case was docketed as Civil Case No. 10636. On 13 October 1986, private respondent also filed with
the Municipal Trial Court, General Santos City, a complaint against petitioner for concubinage, which was docketed
on 23 October 1986 as Criminal Case No. 15437111. On 14 November 1986, application for the provisional remedy
of support pendente lite, pending a decision in the action for legal separation, was filed by private respondent in the
civil case for legal separation. The respondent judge, as already stated, on 10 December 1986, ordered The
payment of support pendente lite.

In this recourse, petitioner contends that the civil action for legal separation and the incidents consequent thereto,
such as, application for support pendente lite, should be suspended in view of the criminal case for concubinage
filed against him the private respondent. In support of his contention, petitioner cites Art. III. Sec. 3 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure, which states:

SEC. 3. Other Civil action arising from offenses. — Whenever the offended party shall have
instituted the civil action to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense. as contemplated in the
first Section 1 hereof, the following rules shall be observed:

(a) After a criminal action has been commenced the pending civil action arising from the same
offense shall be suspended, in whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal
proceeding has been rendered. . . .

The civil action for legal separation, grounded as it is on concubinage, it is petitioner's position that such civil action
arises from, or is inextricably tied to the criminal action for concubinage, so that all proceedings related to legal
separation will have to be suspended to await conviction or acquittal for concubinage in the criminal case. Authority
for this position is this Court's decision in the case of Jerusalem vs. Hon. Roberto Zurbano. 1

Petitioner's contention is not correct.

In Jerusalem, the Court's statement to the effect that suspension of an action for legal separation would be proper if
an allegation of concubinage is made therein, relied solely on Sec. 1 of Rule 107 of the then provisions of the Rules
of Court on criminal procedure, to wit:

Sec. 1. Rules governing civil actions arising from offenses.-Except as otherwise provided by law, the
following rules shall he observed:

(a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the
offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party expressly
waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute it separately;

(b) Criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted separately, but after
the criminal action has been commenced the civil action can not be instituted until final judgment has
been rendered in the criminal action;

(c) After a criminal action has been commenced, no civil action arising from the same offense can be
prosecuted and the same shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found until final judgment
in the criminal proceeding has been rendered ... (Emphasis supplied)
The provisions last quoted did not clearly state, as the 1985 Rules do, that the civil action to be suspended, with or
upon the filing of a criminal action, is one which is "to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense". In other
words, in view of the amendment under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, a civil action for legal separation,
based on concubinage, may proceed ahead of, or simultaneously with, a criminal action for concubinage, because
said civil action is not one "to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense" even if both the civil and criminal
actions arise from or are related to the same offense. Such civil action is one intended to obtain the right to live
separately, with the legal consequences thereof, such as, the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains,
custody of offsprings, support, and disqualification from inheriting from the innocent spouse, among others. As
correctly pointed out by the respondent Judge in his Order dated 5 August 1987:

The unreported case of JERUSALEM vs. Hon. Roberto Zurbano, Judge of CFI of Antique, et al., L-
11935, April 24, 1959 (105 Phil. 1277) is not controlling. It applied paragraph C of Sec. 1, of then
Rule 107 of the Rules of Court, which reads:

After a criminal action has been commenced, no civil action arising from the same
offense can be prosecuted and the same shall be suspended, in whatever stage it
may be found, until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered.
(Emphasis supplied)

The governing rule is now Sec. 3, Rule 111, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which refers to "civil actions to
enforce the civil liability arising from the offense" as contemplated in the first paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 111-
which is a civil action "for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged." Sec. 1, Rule 111, (1985) is
specific that it refers to civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged. Whereas, the old
Sec. 1 (c), Rule 107 simply referred to "Civil action arising from the offense."

As earlier noted this action for legal separation is not to recover civil liability, in the main, but is aimed at the conjugal
rights of the spouses and their relations to each other, within the contemplation of Articles 7 to 108, of the Civil
Code."2

Petitioner also argues that his conviction for concubinage will have to be first secured before the action for legal
separation can prosper or succeed, as the basis of the action for legal separation is his alleged offense of
concubinage.

Petitioner's assumption is erroneous.

A decree of legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, may be issued upon proof by preponderance of
evidence in the action for legal separation. 3 No criminal proceeding or conviction is necessary. To this end, the
doctrine in Francisco vs. Tayao 4 has been modified, as that case was decided under Act. No. 2710, when absolute
divorce was then allowed and had for its grounds the same grounds for legal separation under the New Civil Code,
with the requirement, under such former law, that the guilt of defendant spouses had to be established by final
judgment in a criminal action. That requirement has not been reproduced or adopted by the framers of the present
Civil Code, and the omission has been uniformly accepted as a modification of the stringent rule in Francisco v.
Tayao.5

Petitioner's attempt to resist payment of support pendente lite to his wife must also fail, as we find no proof of grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent Judge in ordering the same. Support pendente lite, as a remedy,
can be availed of in an action for legal separation, and granted at the discretion of the judge. 6 If petitioner finds the
amount of support pendente lite ordered as too onerous, he can always file a motion to modify or reduce the same. 7

Petitioner lastly seeks to have the respondent Judge disqualified from hearing the case, as the grant of
supportpendente lite and the denial of the motion to suspend hearings in the case, are taken by the petitioner as a
disregard of applicable laws and existing doctrines, thereby showing the respondent Judge's alleged manifest
partiality to private respondent.

Petitioner's contention is without merit. Divergence of opinions between a judge hearing a case and a party's
counsel, as to applicable laws and jurisprudence, is not a sufficient ground to disqualify the judge from hearing the
case, on the ground of bias and manifest partiality. This is more so, in this case, where we find the judge's
disposition of petitioner's motions to be sound and well-taken.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-30977 January 31, 1972

CARMEN LAPUZ SY, represented by her substitute MACARIO LAPUZ, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
EUFEMIO S. EUFEMIO alias EUFEMIO SY UY, respondent-appellee.

Jose W. Diokno for petitioner-appellant.

D. G. Eufemio for respondent-appellee.

REYES J.B.L., J.:p

Petition, filed after the effectivity of Republic Act 5440, for review by certiorari of an order, dated 29 July 1969, of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Manila, in its Civil Case No. 20387, dismissing said case for legal separation on the ground that the death of the therein plaintiff, Carmen O. Lapuz Sy, which
occurred during the pendency of the case, abated the cause of action as well as the action itself. The dismissal order was issued over the objection of Macario
Lapuz, the heir of the deceased plaintiff (and petitioner herein) who sought to substitute the deceased and to have the case prosecuted to final judgment.

On 18 August 1953, Carmen O. Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio S. Eufemio, alleging,
in the main, that they were married civilly on 21 September 1934 and canonically on 30 September 1934; that they
had lived together as husband and wife continuously until 1943 when her husband abandoned her; that they had no
child; that they acquired properties during their marriage; and that she discovered her husband cohabiting with a
Chinese woman named Go Hiok at 1319 Sisa Street, Manila, on or about March 1949. She prayed for the issuance
of a decree of legal separation, which, among others, would order that the defendant Eufemio S. Eufemio should be
deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits.

In his second amended answer to the petition, herein respondent Eufemio S. Eufemio alleged affirmative and
special defenses, and, along with several other claims involving money and other properties, counter-claimed for the
declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage with Carmen O. Lapuz Sy, on the ground of his prior and subsisting
marriage, celebrated according to Chinese law and customs, with one Go Hiok, alias Ngo Hiok.

Issues having been joined, trial proceeded and the parties adduced their respective evidence. But before the trial
could be completed (the respondent was already scheduled to present surrebuttal evidence on 9 and 18 June
1969), petitioner Carmen O. Lapuz Sy died in a vehicular accident on 31 May 1969. Counsel for petitioner duly
notified the court of her death.

On 9 June 1969, respondent Eufemio moved to dismiss the "petition for legal separation"1 on two (2) grounds,
namely: that the petition for legal separation was filed beyond the one-year period provided for in Article 102 of the
Civil Code; and that the death of Carmen abated the action for legal separation.

On 26 June 1969, counsel for deceased petitioner moved to substitute the deceased Carmen by her father, Macario
Lapuz. Counsel for Eufemio opposed the motion.

On 29 July 1969, the court issued the order under review, dismissing the case.2 In the body of the order, the court
stated that the motion to dismiss and the motion for substitution had to be resolved on the question of whether or not
the plaintiff's cause of action has survived, which the court resolved in the negative. Petitioner's moved to reconsider
but the motion was denied on 15 September 1969.

After first securing an extension of time to file a petition for review of the order of dismissal issued by the juvenile
and domestic relations court, the petitioner filed the present petition on 14 October 1969. The same was given due
course and answer thereto was filed by respondent, who prayed for the affirmance of the said order.3

Although the defendant below, the herein respondent Eufemio S. Eufemio, filed counterclaims, he did not pursue
them after the court below dismissed the case. He acquiesced in the dismissal of said counterclaims by praying for
the affirmance of the order that dismissed not only the petition for legal separation but also his counterclaim to
declare the Eufemio-Lapuz marriage to be null and void ab initio.

But petitioner Carmen O. Lapuz Sy (through her self-assumed substitute — for the lower court did not act on the
motion for substitution) stated the principal issue to be as follows:

When an action for legal separation is converted by the counterclaim into one for a declaration of
nullity of a marriage, does the death of a party abate the proceedings?

The issue as framed by petitioner injects into it a supposed conversion of a legal separation suit to one for
declaration of nullity of a marriage, which is without basis, for even petitioner asserted that "the respondent has
acquiesced to the dismissal of his counterclaim" (Petitioner's Brief, page 22). Not only this. The petition for legal
separation and the counterclaim to declare the nullity of the self same marriage can stand independent and
separate adjudication. They are not inseparable nor was the action for legal separation converted into one for a
declaration of nullity by the counterclaim, for legal separation pre-supposes a valid marriage, while the petition for
nullity has a voidable marriage as a pre-condition.

The first real issue in this case is: Does the death of the plaintiff before final decree, in an action for legal separation,
abate the action? If it does, will abatement also apply if the action involves property rights? .

An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the bed-and-board separation of the spouses (there
being no absolute divorce in this jurisdiction) is purely personal. The Civil Code of the Philippines recognizes this in
its Article 100, by allowing only the innocent spouse (and no one else) to claim legal separation; and in its Article
108, by providing that the spouses can, by their reconciliation, stop or abate the proceedings and even rescind a
decree of legal separation already rendered. Being personal in character, it follows that the death of one party to the
action causes the death of the action itself — actio personalis moritur cum persona.

... When one of the spouses is dead, there is no need for divorce, because the marriage is
dissolved. The heirs cannot even continue the suit, if the death of the spouse takes place during the
course of the suit (Article 244, Section 3). The action is absolutely dead (Cass., July 27, 1871, D. 71.
1. 81; Cass. req., May 8, 1933, D. H. 1933, 332.")4 .

Marriage is a personal relation or status, created under the sanction of law, and an action for divorce
is a proceeding brought for the purpose of effecting a dissolution of that relation. The action is one of
a personal nature. In the absence of a statute to the contrary, the death of one of the parties to such
action abates the action, for the reason that death has settled the question of separation beyond all
controversy and deprived the court of jurisdiction, both over the persons of the parties to the action
and of the subject-matter of the action itself. For this reason the courts are almost unanimous in
holding that the death of either party to a divorce proceeding, before final decree, abates the action.
1 Corpus Juris, 208; Wren v. Moss, 2 Gilman, 72; Danforth v. Danforth, 111 Ill. 236; Matter of
Grandall, 196 N.Y. 127, 89 N.E. 578; 134 Am St. Rep. 830; 17 Ann. Cas. 874; Wilcon v. Wilson, 73
Mich, 620, 41 N.W. 817; Strickland v. Strickland, 80 Ark. 452, 97 S. W. 659; McCurley v. McCurley,
60 Md. 185, 45 Am. Rep. 717; Begbie v. Begbie, 128 Cal. 155, 60 Pac. 667, 49 L.R.A. 141. 5

The same rule is true of causes of action and suits for separation and maintenance (Johnson vs. Bates, Ark. 101
SW 412; 1 Corpus Juris 208).

A review of the resulting changes in property relations between spouses shows that they are solely the effect of the
decree of legal separation; hence, they can not survive the death of the plaintiff if it occurs prior to the decree. On
the point, Article 106 of the Civil Code provides: .

Art. 106. The decree of legal separation shall have the following effects:

(1) The spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other, but the marriage bonds shall not
be severed; .

(2) The conjugal partnership of gains or the absolute conjugal community of property shall be
dissolved and liquidated, but the offending spouse shall have no right to any share of the profits
earned by the partnership or community, without prejudice to the provisions of article 176;

(3) The custody of the minor children shall be awarded to the innocent spouse, unless otherwise
directed by the court in the interest of said minors, for whom said court may appoint a guardian;

(4) The offending spouse shall be disqualified from inheriting from the innocent spouse by intestate
succession. Moreover, provisions in favor of the offending spouse made in the will of the innocent
one shall be revoked by operation of law.

From this article it is apparent that the right to the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains (or of the absolute
community of property), the loss of right by the offending spouse to any share of the profits earned by the
partnership or community, or his disqualification to inherit by intestacy from the innocent spouse as well as the
revocation of testamentary provisions in favor of the offending spouse made by the innocent one, are all rights and
disabilities that, by the very terms of the Civil Code article, are vested exclusively in the persons of the spouses; and
by their nature and intent, such claims and disabilities are difficult to conceive as assignable or transmissible.
Hence, a claim to said rights is not a claim that "is not thereby extinguished" after a party dies, under Section 17,
Rule 3, of the Rules of Court, to warrant continuation of the action through a substitute of the deceased party.
 Sec. 17. Death of party. After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall
order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted
for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be granted...

The same result flows from a consideration of the enumeration of the actions that survive for or against
administrators in Section 1, Rule 87, of the Revised Rules of Court:

SECTION 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought against executor or administrator. No
action upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced
against the executor or administrator; but actions to recover real or personal property, or an interest
therein, from the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to
person or property, real or personal, may be commenced against him.

Neither actions for legal separation or for annulment of marriage can be deemed fairly included in the enumeration..

A further reason why an action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if property rights are
involved, is that these rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source being the decree itself; without
the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality of a decree, these claims are merely
rights in expectation. If death supervenes during the pendency of the action, no decree can be forthcoming, death
producing a more radical and definitive separation; and the expected consequential rights and claims would
necessarily remain unborn.

As to the petition of respondent-appellee Eufemio for a declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage to Carmen
Lapuz, it is apparent that such action became moot and academic upon the death of the latter, and there could be
no further interest in continuing the same after her demise, that automatically dissolved the questioned union. Any
property rights acquired by either party as a result of Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines 6 could be
resolved and determined in a proper action for partition by either the appellee or by the heirs of the appellant.

In fact, even if the bigamous marriage had not been void ab initio but only voidable under Article 83, paragraph 2, of
the Civil Code, because the second marriage had been contracted with the first wife having been an absentee for
seven consecutive years, or when she had been generally believed dead, still the action for annulment became
extinguished as soon as one of the three persons involved had died, as provided in Article 87, paragraph 2, of the
Code, requiring that the action for annulment should be brought during the lifetime of any one of the parties
involved. And furthermore, the liquidation of any conjugal partnership that might have resulted from such voidable
marriage must be carried out "in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse", as expressly
provided in Section 2 of the Revised Rule 73, and not in the annulment proceeding.

ACCORDINGLY, the appealed judgment of the Manila Court of Juvenile and Domestic Relations is hereby affirmed.
No special pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. L-17806 June 29, 1962

ALFONSO ZOBEL, G. H. W. CHURCHILL and J. ANTONIO ARANETA, petitioners-appellants,

vs.
HERMOGENES CONCEPCION, JR. and ANTONIO G. ALINDOGAN, Fiscal and Assistant Fiscal, respectively,
of the City of Manila, respondents-appellees.

Salvador J. Loyares and Ramon T. Garcia for petitioner-appellant Alfonso Zobel. Antonio Ibarra for petitioner-
appellant G. H. W. Churchill.
Francisco T. Papa and Geronimo O. Veneracion, Jr. for petitioner-appellant J. Antonio Araneta.
The City Fiscal of Manila for respondents-appellees.

LABRADOR, J.:

Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Hon. Jesus Y. Perez, presiding, dismissing a petition
for prohibition filed by Alfonso Zobel and others against the Fiscal Hermogenes Concepcion and others of the City of
Manila.

The facts leading to the filing of the action may be briefly stated as follows:

On December 29, 1959, Gavino S. Abaya wrote a letter to petitioner Alfonso Zobel demanding an additional
payment equivalent to about 30% of P517,903, the price agreed upon in the deed of absolute sale of a parcel of
land belonging to the children of the former, executed in favor of the Ayala Securities Corporation, of which
petitioner Zobel is the president. Zobel refused to accede to this demand, so Abaya presented to the National
Bureau of Investigation the charge that petitioner J. Antonio Araneta (who intervened in the sale of the above-
mentioned property) and/or the Ayala Securities Corporation acted as dummy for the Shell Refining Company
(Phils.), Inc., in violation of Commonwealth Act No. 108, otherwise known as the Anti-Dummy Law. On January 13,
1960, the acting director of the NBI, Jose G. Lukban, endorsed the charge to the Anti-Dummy Board which took
cognizance and conducted an investigation of the same. Petitioners, as well as Gavino S. Abaya, testified before
and submitted evidence to the Anti-Dummy Board. While the case was pending decision by the Board, Gavino S.
Abaya addressed a letter to the city fiscal of Manila, charging petitioners with the same violation of Commonwealth
Act No. 108. The charge was docketed in the city fiscal's office as I.S. No. 24331 and assigned to respondent
assistant fiscal Antonio G. Alindogan for investigation. The latter subpoenaed petitioners to appear and testify at the
investigation of the charge on October 24, 1960, which was later postponed to September 15, 1960. Prior to the
investigation scheduled for the latter date, petitioner Zobel filed with respondent Alindogan a motion praying that the
charge filed by Mr. Abaya with the fiscal's office be dismissed because (1) the fiscal's office had no jurisdiction to
investigate the charge since the complainant Gavino S. Abaya did not have the legal personality to file charges
against petitioners for violation of the Anti-Dummy Law, and (2) the fiscal of Manila was not authorized by law to
investigate violations of the Anti-Dummy Law independently of the Anti-Dummy Board. On October 18, 1960,
respondent Alindogan issued a resolution denying petitioners' motion to dismiss and gave notice that he would
proceed with the investigation of the charge of Mr. Abaya on October 20, 1960.

On October 20, 1960, petitioners filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila, a petition for prohibition with
preliminary injunction to prohibit and enjoin respondents from proceeding with the investigation of the alleged
violation of the Anti-Dummy Law. The lower court on the same day denied the petition, and on November 5, 1960,
also denied a motion to reconsider its order of denial. From these two orders petitioners have appealed to this
Court.

On this appeal petitioners-appellants assign the following error:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT FISCALS HAVE THE POWER TO
INVESTIGATE THE COMPLAINT AGAINST PETITIONERS-APPELLANTS FOR ALLEGED VIOLATION OF
COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 108 (ANTI-DUMMY LAW) NOTWITHSTANDING THE PREVIOUS INVESTIGATION
ALREADY CONDUCTED BY THE ANTI-DUMMY BOARD OF THE SAME COMPLAINT.

Republic Act No. 1130, which creates the Anti-Dummy Board, contains the following pertinent provisions:

SECTION 1. There is hereby created in the Department of Justice a board which shall be designated and
known as the Anti-Dummy Board and which shall be vested with and shall exercise the powers and duties
hereinafter specified. . . .

SEC. 2. The main purpose of the Anti-Dummy Board shall be to insure the implementation of all the
provisions of the Constitution, nationalization laws, and other legal provisions which require Philippine
citizenship or citizenship of any other specific country for the exercise or enjoyment of a right, franchise or
privilege, property or business, and further, to coordinate, as far as practicable all government agencies
charged with the enforcement of the said provisions of the Constitution and laws and, in particular,
 Commonwealth Act Numbered One hundred and eight, as amended, commonly known as the Anti-Dummy
Law, . . .

SEC. 3. The Anti-Dummy Board shall have the following duties:

(a) To investigate violations and prosecute all violators of the laws mentioned in section two of this Act,
hereinafter called dummies.

(b) To furnish professional services to informers who wish to avail themselves of section three-A of
Commonwealth Act Numbered One hundred and eight, as inserted therein by Republic Act Numbered One
hundred and thirty-four.

(c) To enter as amicus curiae in all court cases which may have arisen from dummy cases.

(d) To devise ways and means for the carrying out of an educational propaganda against dummies. 1äwphï1.ñët

(e) To devise ways and means for the carrying out of all nationalization legislation.

(f) To organize local subcommittees in the chartered cities and municipalities and a provincial chapter in
every capital of the provinces to help the Board in its campaigns against dummies.

(g) To issue rules and regulations for the government of the Board and that of the subcommittees and
chapters to be established under the provisions hereof; and

(h) To perform such other duties as may enable the Board to carry out the purposes for which it has been
created. 1äwphï1.ñët

SEC. 6. ...

The Anti-Dummy Board may appoint attorneys investigators and other employees as it may deem necessary
and fix their duties and salaries: Provided, That investigators appointed by the Board shall be lawyers,
and/or certified public accountants, the proportion of the number of lawyers and accountants to be at the
discretion of the Board. Each investigator shall receive a salary of at least three thousand six hundred
pesos per annum.

The President, may upon recommendation of the Board, detail one or more assistant provincial fiscals or
assistant attorneys under the Department of Justice, or any other employees in the National, provincial, city
or municipal government, on special duty with the Board. Employees so detailed shall perform such duty as
is required under such detail, and the time so employed shall count as part of their regular official service.

Petitioners-appellants argue before Us that Section 38-B of the Revised Charter of Manila granting authority to the
city fiscal to prosecute all violations of laws and ordinances should be harmonized with the provisions of Republic
Act No. 1130 insofar as anti-dummy cases are concerned, otherwise the city fiscal and the Anti-Dummy Board
would be exercising overlapping authorities over violations of the Anti-Dummy Law; that were the city fiscal allowed
independently to investigate and prosecute violations of anti-dummy laws, the provisions of Republic Act No. 1130
granting the Anti-Dummy Board the right to coordinate all government agencies charged with the enforcement of the
anti-dummy laws, would be violated. Answering the contention of the respondents-appellees that the Revised
Charter of the City of Manila grants them power to prosecute all violations of laws and ordinances, and therefore,
violations of the anti-dummy laws should be included, petitioners-appellants argue that since Republic Act No. 1130
is a special act, its provisions should be interpreted to amend or modify or restrict in a way the general power vested
in the city fiscal insofar as the violations of the anti-dummy laws are concerned.

We find reason and sense in the above arguments of the petitioners-appellants. Under Section 6 of Republic Act
No. 1130, the President may, upon recommendation of the Board detail one or more assistant provincial fiscals or
assistant attorneys in the Department of Justice or any other employee of the national, city or provincial government
on special duty with the Board. If respondents-appellees' contention were correct, that the city Fiscal of Manila can
prosecute violations of the Anti-Dummy Law independently and without coordination with the agencies of the Anti-
Dummy Board, there would be no need for this provision. Were the city fiscal or the provincial fiscals who have the
power or right to prosecute violations of all laws and ordinances allowed to prosecute violations of the Anti-Dummy
Law independently of the Anti-Dummy Board, there would be no order, concert, cooperation, and coordination
between the said agencies of the government. The function of coordination which is entrusted to the Anti-Dummy
Board is evident from all the above-quoted provisions of Republic Act No. 1130. There can be no coordination as
envisioned in the law unless the Anti-Dummy Board be given the power to direct and control the city fiscal in
prosecutions of the violations of the Anti-Dummy Law.
We, therefore, find that the appeal is meritorious and hereby declare that the court below should have granted the
petition for prohibition and issued the writ of preliminary injunction. The orders appealed from are hereby set aside
and the writ of prohibition prayed for issued against the respondents-appellees. So ordered.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Paredes, Barrera and Dizon, JJ., concur.
Regala and Makalintal, JJ., took no part.
G.R. No. L-45870 May 11, 1984

MARGARET MAXEY assisted by Santiago Magbanua; FLORENCE MAXEY assisted by Ofrecinio Santos; and
LUCILLE MAXEY, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE SPOUSES BEATO C. MACAYRA and ALACOPUE
MONDAY, respondents.

Jose B. Guyo for petitioners.

Epifanio Estrellado for private respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This petition for review involves the rights of a woman over properties acquired in 1912 principally through the
efforts of the man she was living with and at a time when the two were not yet legally married.

The facts of the case are briefly stated in the decision of the Court of Appeals as follows:

The record reveals that Melbourne Maxey and Regina Morales (both deceased) lived together as
husband and wife in Banganga, Davao; that out of said union were born six (6) children, among
them are the herein plaintiffs, namely: John or Carlos, Lucille, Margaret, Florence, Fred and George,
all surnamed Maxey; that during the period of their (Melbourne and Regina) cohabitation, or in 1911
and 1912, respectively, the late Melbourne Maxey acquired the parcels of land described under Par.
4 of the com;plaint as evidenced by the documents of sale marked as Exhibits 4-a and 5-1 (same as
Exhibits Facts), Melbourne Maxey, through his attorney-in-fact Julia Pamatluan Maxey, sold in favor
of the defendants-spouses in 1953 the parcels of land under litigation which fact of sale was not
controverted by the perties (Par. 1, /stipulation of Facts); that since thereof, the defendants-spouses
have taken immediate possession thereof continuously up to the present.

Plaintiffs instituted the present case on January 26, 1962, before the Court of First Instance of
Davao, praying for the annulment of the documents of sale covering the subject parcels of land and
to recover possession thereof with damages from the herein defendants-spouses, alleging, among
others, that the aforesaid realties were common properties of their parents, having been acquired
during their lifetime and through their joint effort and capital; and that the sales of the of the said
lands in favor of the defendants-spouses in 1953, after the death of their mother, Regina Morales,
was executed by their father, Melbourne Maxey, without their knowledge and consent; and that they
came to know of the above mentioned sales only in 1961.

On the other hand, defendants-spouses deny the material allegations of the complaint and assert by
way of affirmative defenses that they are the true and lawful owners and possessors of the
properties 'm question having purchased the same in good faith and for value from Melbourne
Maxey during his lifetime in 1953, based upon the reasonable belief that the latter is the me and
exclusive owner of the said parcels of land and that since then, they have been in possession
thereof openly, exclusively and continuously in concept of owners. Defendants - spouses further
counter for damages and attorney's fees and in the alternative, for the value of the improvements
they have introduced in the premises.

Melbourne Maxey and Regina Morales started living together in 1903. Their children claim that their parents were
united in 1903 in a marriage performed "in the military fashion". Both the trial court and the appellate court rejected
this claim of a "military fashion" marriage.

The couple had several children. John Carlos was born in 1903, followed by Lucille, Margaret, Florence, Fred, and
George. Except for the youngest son, all the children were born before the disputed properties were acquired. The
father, Melbourne Maxey, was a member of the 1899 American occupation forces who afterwards held high
positions in the provincial government and in the Philippine public schools system.

As earlier mentioned in the cited statement of facts, the disputed properties were acquired in 1911 and 1912 before
the 1919 church marriage. Regina Morales Maxey died in 1919 sometime after the church wedding. The husband
remarried and in 1953, his second wife Julia Pamatluan Maxey, using a power of attorney, sold the properties to the
respondent spouses, Mr. and Mrs. Beato C. Macayra.

The trial court applied Article 144 of the Civil Code which provides:
 When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their
marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their
work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

The court stated that "when a man and a woman lived together as husband and wife, justice demands that the
woman should be entitled to the share of the property. Certainly she cannot be considered mere adornment or only
for man's comfort and passion." The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

Evidence, testimonial and document considered the Court hereby rendered judgment in favor of the
plaintiffs and against defendant declaring that:

1. Declaring the abovementioned sales as null and void;

2. Ordering defendant-spouses to return the said lands, and to pay for the value of the use of the
same at the rate of P1,000.00 a year from 1953 until delivered, together with interests corresponding
thereto at the legal rate;

3. Ordering defendant-spouses to pay to plaintiff actual damages in the sum of P500.00 and attorney
fees in the sum of P3,000.00.

Defendants counterclaim is hereby ordered dismissed.

The Court of Appeals, however, found the parcels of, land to be exclusive properties of the late Melbourne Maxey. It
set aside the decision of the trial court, decease valid the deeds of sale, and ruled that the appellants are the
absolute owners of the properties in question.

The appellate decision sustained the following arguments of the respondent spouses:

Plaintiffs' evidence is completely devoid of any showing that these properties in question were
acquired through the joint efforts of Melbourne Maxey and Regina Morales. Indeed, if at all, plaintiffs'
evidence tend to establish the fact that Melbourne Maxey by virtue of his positions as Deputy
Governor of Zamboanga (p. 36, t.s.n. de la Victoria) School Supervisor in the East Coast of Davao
(p. 36, t.s.n., Id.) was more than in a position to purchase these properties by his own efforts, his
own earnings and without the help of Regina Morales. On the other hand, we have the declaration of
Juana A. Morales, a widow of 68 years of age when she testified, the sister-in-law of Regina Morales
— Juana A. Morales confirmed the fact that Melbourne Maxey held the positions of teacher,
provincial treasurer, deputy governor, district supervisor and lastly superintendent of schools,
respectively (p. 203, t.s.n., de la Victoria). But more important is her declaration that her sister-in-law
Regina Morales had no property of her own whence she could have derived any income nor was
Regina gainfully employed. (pp. 203-204, t.s.n., Id.) It must be remembered that the showing must
be CLEAR that Regina Morales contributed to the acquisition of these properties. Here the evidence
is not only NOT CLEAR, indeed, there is no evidence at all that Regina Morales contributed to the
acquisition of the properties in question. In the case of Aznar, et al vs. Garcia, et al, supra, the
Supreme Court had before it the common-law wife's own testimony — claiming that the properties in
controversy were the product of their joint industry. Her assertions however, were completely
brushed aside because aside from her claim that she took a hand in the management and/or
acquisition of the same, "there appears no evidence to prove her alleged contribution or participation
in the, acquisition of the properties involved therein." (Id. p. 1069). In the case at bar, besides the
absence of any evidence showing that Regina Morales contributed by her efforts to the acquisition of
these properties in controversy, both plaintiffs and defendants' evidence show that it was through
Melbourne Maxey's efforts alone that these properties were acquired. Indeed, that Regina Morales
had no means at all to have contributed in any manner to all its acquisition.

The petitioners raise the following issues in this petition:

1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE LATE SPOUSES MELBOURNE
MAXEY AND REGINA MORALES WERE MARRIED ONLY IN 1919, BECAUSE THE TRUTH IS
THAT THEY MARRIED AS EARLY AS 1903.

2. THE COURT OF APPEALS, LIKEWISE, ERRED IN DECLARING THE PROPERTIES IN

QUESTION AS THE EXCLUSIVE PROPERTIES OF THE LATE MELBOURNE MAXEY, TO THE
EXCLUSION OF HIS WIFE REGINA MORALES, BECAUSE THE MENTIONED PROPERTIES
WERE ACTUALLY ACQUIRED BY THE JOINT EFFORTS AND INDUSTRY OF BOTH OF THEM
AND THEREFORE, THESE PROPERTIES ARE COMMON PROPERTIES.
 3. THE COURT OF APPEALS FINALLY ERRED IN UNREASONABLY GIVING THE TERM "JOINT
EFFORTS" NOT ONLY A VERY, VERY LIMITED MEANING BUT A CONCEPT WHICH IS
ENTIRELY ABSURD AND UNREALISTIC BECAUSE IN CONSTRUING THE TERM, THE COURT
OF APPEALS HAS REFUSED TO ACCEPT AN INTERPRETATION WHICH IS MOST
CONSISTENT WITH COMMON PRACTICE AND CUSTOMS AS WELL AS IN ACCORD WITH THE
BEST TRADITION OF THE FILIPINO WAY OF LIFE.

The Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeals correctly rejected the argument that Act No. 3613, the Revised
Marriage Law, recognized "military fashion" marriages as legal. Maxey and Morales were legally married at a church
wedding solemnized on February 16, 1919. Since Act No. 3613 was approved on December 4, 1929 and took effect
six months thereafter, it could not have applied to a relationship commenced in 1903 and legitimized in 1919
through a marriage performed according to law. The marriage law in 1903 was General Order No. 70. There is no
provision in General Order No. 68 as amended nor in Act No. 3613 which would recognize as an exception to the
general rule on valid marriages, a so called "Military fashion" ceremony or arrangement.

The Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeals both ruled that Melbourne Maxey and Regina Morales were
married only in 1919. This is a finding of fact which we do not disturb at this stage of the case. There is no showing
that this factual finding is totally devoid of or unsupported by evidentiary basis or that it is inconsistent with the
evidence of record.

The other issue raised in this Petition questions the Court of Appeals' finding that the parcels of land in question
were exclusive properties of the late Melbourne Maxey.

The petitioners argue that even assuming that the marriage of Melbourne Maxey and Regina Morales took place
only in February 17, 1919, still the properties legally and rightfully belonged in equal share to the two because the
acquisition of the said properties was through their joint efforts and industry. The second and third errors mentioned
by the petitioners are grounded on the alleged wrong interpretation given by the Court of Appeals to the phrase
"joint efforts". The petitioners suggest that their mother's efforts in performing her role as mother to them and as wife
to their father were more than sufficient contribution to constitute the parcels of land in question as common
properties acquired through the joint efforts to their parents.

The Court of Appeals, however, was of the opinion that Article 144 of the Civil Code is not applicable to the
properties in question citing the case of Aznar et al. v. Garcia (102 Phil. 1055) on non-retroactivity of codal
provisions where vested rights may be prejudiced or impaired. And, assuming that Article 144 of the Civil Code is
applicable, the Court of Appeals held that the disputed properties were exclusively those of the petitioner's father
because these were not acquired through the joint efforts of their parents. This conclusion stems from the
interpretation given by the Court of Appeals to the phrase "joint efforts" to mean "monetary contribution". According
to the Court

... This view with which this ponente personally wholeheartedly agrees for some time now has been
advocated by sympathizers of equal rights for women, notably in the Commission on the Status of
Women of the United Nations. In our very own country there is strong advocacy for the passage of a
presidential decree providing that "the labors of a spouse in managing the affairs of the household
shall be credited with compensation." Unfortunately, until the happy day when such a proposal shall
have materialized into law, Courts are bound by existing statutes and jurisprudence, which rigidly
interpret the phrase "joint efforts" as monetary contributions of the man and woman living together
without benefit of marriage, and to date, the drudgery of a woman's lifetime dedication to the
management of the household goes unremunerated, and has no monetary value. Thus, in the case
of Aznar vs. Garcia(supra) the Supreme Court held that the man and the woman have an equal
interest in the properties acquired during the union and each would be entitled to participate therein
if said properties were the product of their joint effort. In the same case it was stated that aside` from
the observation of the trial court that the appellee was an illiterate woman, there appears no
evidence to prove appellee's contribution (in terms of pesos and centavos) or participation in the
acquisition of the properties involved; therefore, following the aforecited ruling of the Court,
appellee's claim for one-half (1/2) of the properties cannot be granted.

In so concluding, the respondent Court of Appeals accepted the private respondents' argument that it was unlikely
for the petitioners' mother to have materially contributed in the acquisition of the questioned properties since she
had no property of her own nor was she gainfully engaged in any business or profession from which she could
derive income unlike their father who held the positions of teacher deputy governor, district supervisor, and
superintendent of schools.

We are constrained to adopt a contrary view. Considerations of justice dictate the retroactive application of Article
144 of the Civil Code to the case at bar. Commenting on Article 2252 of the Civil Code which provides that changes
made and new provisions and rules laid down by the Code which may prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights
in accordance with the old legislation shall have no retroactive effect, the Code Commission stated:
 Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. The question of how far the
new Civil Code should be made applicable to past acts and events is attended with the utmost
difficulty. It is easy enough to understand the abstract principle that laws have no retroactive effect
because vested or acquired rights should be respected. But what are vested or acquired rights? The
Commission did not venture to formulate a definition of a vested or acquired right seeing that the
problem is extremely committed.

What constitutes a vested or acquired right well be determined by the courts as each particular issue
is submitted to them, by applying the transitional provisions set forth, and in case of doubt, by
observing Art. 9 governing the silence or obscurity of the law. In this manner, the Commission is
confident that the judiciary with its and high sense of justice will be able to decide in what cases the
old Civil Code would apply and in what cases the new one should be binding This course has been
preferred by the Commission, which did not presume to be able to foresee and adequately provide
for each and every question that may arise. (Report of the Code Commission, pp. 165-166).

Similarly, with respect to Article 2253 which provides inter alia that if a right should be declared for the first tune in
the Code, it shall be effective at once, even though the act or event which gives rise thereto may have been done or
may have occurred under the prior legislation, provided said new right does not prejudice or impair any vested or
acquired right, of the same origin, the Code Commission commented:

... But the second sentence gives a retroactive effect to newly created rights provided they do not
prejudice or impair any vested or acquired right. The retroactive character of the new right is the
result of the exercise of the sovereign power of legislation, when the lawmaking body is persuaded
that the new right is called for by considerations of justice and public policy. But such new right most
not encroach upon a vested right. (Report of the Code Commission, p. 167).

The requirement of non-impairment of vested rights is clear. It is the opinion of the Court of Appeals that vested
rights were prejudiced. We do not think so.

Prior to the effectivity of the present Civil Code on August 30, 1950, the formation of an informal civil partnership
between a man and wife not legally married and their corresponding right to an equal share in properties acquired
through their joint efforts and industry during cohabitation was recognized through decisions of this Court. (Aznar et
al. vs. Garcia, 102 Phil. 1055; Flores vs. Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, 94 Phil. 451; Marata vs. Dionio, L-
24449, December 31, 1925; Lesaca v. Lesaca, 91 Phil. 135.)

With the enactment of the new Civil Code, Article 144 codified the law established through judicial precedents but
with the modification that the property governed by the rules on co-ownership may be acquired by either or both of
them through their work or industry. Even if it is only the man who works, the property acquired during the man and
wife relationship belongs through a fifty-fifty sharing to the two of them.

This new article in the Civil Code recognizes that it would be unjust and abnormal if a woman who is a wife in all
aspects of the relationship except for the requirement of a valid marriage must abandon her home and children,
neglect her traditional household duties, and go out to earn a living or engage in business before the rules on co-
ownership would apply. This article is particularly relevant in this case where the "common-law" relationship was
legitimated through a valid marriage 34 years before the properties were sold.

The provisions of the Civil Code are premised on the traditional and existing, the normal and customary gender
roles of Filipino men and women. No matter how large the income of a working wife compared to that of her
husband, the major, if not the full responsibility of running the household remains with the woman. She is the
administrator of the household. The fact that the two involved in this case were not legally married at the time does
not change the nature of their respective roles. It is the woman who traditionally holds the family purse even if she
does not contribute to filling that purse with funds. As pointed out by Dean Irene R. Cortes of the University of the
Philippines, "in the Filipino family, the wife holds the purse, husbands hand over their pay checks and get an
allowance in return and the wife manages the affairs of the household. . . . And the famous statement attributed to
Governor General Leonard Wood is repeated: In the Philippines, the best man is the woman." (Cortes, "Womens
Rights Under the New Constitution". WOMAN AND THE LAW, U.P. Law Center, p. 10.)

The "real contribution" to the acquisition of property mentioned in Yaptinchay vs. Torres (28 SCRA 489) must
include not only the earnings of a woman from a profession, occupation, or business but also her contribution to the
family's material and spiritual goods through caring for the children, administering the household, husbanding scarce
resources, freeing her husband from household tasks, and otherwise performing the traditional duties of a
housewife.

Should Article 144 of the Civil Code be applied in this case? Our answer is "Yes" because there is no showing that
vested rights would be impaired or prejudiced through its application.
A vested right is defined by this Court as property which has become fixed and established, and is no longer open to
doubt or controversy; an immediately fixed right of present or future enjoyment as distinguished from an expectant
or contingent right (Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. vs. Pineda, 98 Phil. 711; Balbao vs. Farrales, 51 Phil. 498).
This cannot be said of the "exclusive" right of Melbourne Maxey over the properties in question when the present
Civil Code became effective for standing against it was the concurrent right of Regina Morales or her heirs to a
share thereof. The properties were sold in 1953 when the new Civil Code was already in full force and effect.
Neither can this be said of the rights of the private respondents as vendees insofar as one half of the questioned
properties are concerned as this was still open to controversy on account of the legitimate claim of Regina Morales
to a share under the applicable law.

The disputed properties were owned in common by Melbourne Maxey and the estate of his late wife, Regina
Morales, when they were sold. Technically speaking, the petitioners should return one-half of the P1,300.00
purchase price of the land while the private respondents should pay some form of rentals for their use of one-half of
the properties. Equitable considerations, however, lead us to rule out rentals on one hand and return of P650.00 on
the other.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby granted. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
reversed and set aside insofar as one-half of the disputed properties are concerned. The private respondents are
ordered to return one-half of said properties to the heirs of Regina Morales. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-28394 November 26, 1970

PEDRO GAYON, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
SILVESTRE GAYON and GENOVEVA DE GAYON, defendants-appellees.

German M. Lopez for plaintiff-appellant.

Pedro R. Davila for defendants-appellees.

CONCEPCION, C.J.:

Appeal, taken by plaintiff Pedro Gayon, from an order of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo dismissing his complaint
in Civil Case No. 7334 thereof.

The records show that on July 31, 1967, Pedro Gayon filed said complaint against the spouses Silvestre Gayon and
Genoveva de Gayon, alleging substantially that, on October 1, 1952, said spouses executed a deed — copy of
which was attached to the complaint, as Annex "A" — whereby they sold to Pedro Gelera, for the sum of P500.00, a
parcel of unregistered land therein described, and located in the barrio of Cabubugan, municipality of Guimbal,
province of Iloilo, including the improvements thereon, subject to redemption within five (5) years or not later than
October 1, 1957; that said right of redemption had not been exercised by Silvestre Gayon, Genoveva de Gayon, or
any of their heirs or successors, despite the expiration of the period therefor; that said Pedro Gelera and his wife
Estelita Damaso had, by virtue of a deed of sale — copy of which was attached to the complaint, as Annex "B" —
dated March 21, 1961, sold the aforementioned land to plaintiff Pedro Gayon for the sum of P614.00; that plaintiff
had, since 1961, introduced thereon improvements worth P1,000; that he had, moreover, fully paid the taxes on said
property up to 1967; and that Articles 1606 and 1616 of our Civil Code require a judicial decree for the consolidation
of the title in and to a land acquired through a conditional sale, and, accordingly, praying that an order be issued in
plaintiff's favor for the consolidation of ownership in and to the aforementioned property.

In her answer to the complaint, Mrs. Gayon alleged that her husband, Silvestre Gayon, died on January 6, 1954,
long before the institution of this case; that Annex "A" to the complaint is fictitious, for the signature thereon
purporting to be her signature is not hers; that neither she nor her deceased husband had ever executed "any
document of whatever nature in plaintiff's favor"; that the complaint is malicious and had embarrassed her and her
children; that the heirs of Silvestre Gayon had to "employ the services of counsel for a fee of P500.00 and incurred
expenses of at least P200.00"; and that being a brother of the deceased Silvestre Gayon, plaintiff "did not exert
efforts for the amicable settlement of the case" before filing his complaint. She prayed, therefore, that the same be
dismissed and that plaintiff be sentenced to pay damages.

Soon later, she filed a motion to dismiss, reproducing substantially the averments made in her answer and stressing
that, in view of the death of Silvestre Gayon, there is a "necessity of amending the complaint to suit the genuine
facts on record." Presently, or on September 16, 1967, the lower court issued the order appealed from, reading:

Considering the motion to dismiss and it appearing from Exhibit "A" annexed to the complaint that
Silvestre Gayon is the absolute owner of the land in question, and considering the fact that Silvestre
Gayon is now dead and his wife Genoveva de Gayon has nothing to do with the land subject of
plaintiff's complaint, as prayed for, this case is hereby dismissed, without pronouncement as to
costs.1

A reconsideration of this order having been denied, plaintiff interposed the present appeal, which is well taken.

Said order is manifestly erroneous and must be set aside. To begin with, it is not true that Mrs. Gayon "has nothing
to do with the land subject of plaintiff's complaint." As the widow of Silvestre Gayon, she is one of his compulsory
heirs2and has, accordingly, an interest in the property in question. Moreover, her own motion to dismiss indicated
merely "a necessity of amending the complaint," to the end that the other successors in interest of Silvestre Gayon,
instead of the latter, be made parties in this case. In her opposition to the aforesaid motion for reconsideration of the
plaintiff, Mrs. Gayon alleged, inter alia, that the "heirs cannot represent the dead defendant, unless there is a
declaration of heirship." Inasmuch, however, as succession takes place, by operation of law, "from the moment of
the death of the decedent"3 and "(t)he inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person which
are not extinguished by his death,"4 it follows that if his heirs were included as defendants in this case, they would be
sued, not as "representatives" of the decedent, but as owners of an aliquot interest in the property in question, even
if the precise extent of their interest may still be undetermined and they have derived it from the decent. Hence, they
may be sued without a previous declaration of heirship, provided there is no pending special proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the decedent.5
As regards plaintiff's failure to seek a compromise, as an alleged obstacle to the present case, Art. 222 of our Civil
Code provides:

No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it should appear
that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed, subject to
the limitations in article 2035.

It is noteworthy that the impediment arising from this provision applies to suits "filed or maintained between
members of the same family." This phrase, "members of the same family," should, however, be construed in the
light of Art. 217 of the same Code, pursuant to which:

Family relations shall include those:

(1) Between husband and wife;

(2) Between parent and child;

(3) Among other ascendants and their descendants;

(4) Among brothers and sisters.

Mrs. Gayon is plaintiff's sister-in-law, whereas her children are his nephews and/or nieces. Inasmuch as none of
them is included in the enumeration contained in said Art. 217 — which should be construed strictly, it being an
exception to the general rule — and Silvestre Gayon must necessarily be excluded as party in the case at bar, it
follows that the same does not come within the purview of Art. 222, and plaintiff's failure to seek a compromise
before filing the complaint does not bar the same.

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby set aside and the case remanded to the lower court for the
inclusion, as defendant or defendants therein, of the administrator or executor of the estate of Silvestre Gayon, if
any, in lieu of the decedent, or, in the absence of such administrator or executor, of the heirs of the deceased
Silvestre Gayon, and for further proceedings, not inconsistent with this decision, with the costs of this instance
against defendant-appellee, Genoveva de Gayon. It is so ordered.