Case No.
16 to May 31st, inclusive of each year, except as provided for in Section 3 of this
People vs. Lim
July 26, 1960 | Montemayor J. | No. L-14432
Topic: D. 2. Administrative rules and regulations
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE: The People of the Philippines
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: Leoncio Lim
SUMMARY: ​This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Samar, where Leoncio Lim was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation
of Section 2, FAO No. 37-1. Lim contends that Section 2 of FAO No. 37-1 is void
because it is not only inconsistent but is contrary to the provisions and spirit of Act
No. 4003 (Fisheries Act). The prohibition prescribed in fisheries act was for any
single period of time not exceeding five years, whereas FAO No. 37-1 fixed no
period, that is to say that it establishes an absolute ban for all time.
Further, Lim contends that FAO No 37-1 is invalid for the reason that it amended the
FAO No. 31 which was not shown to have been approved by the President; it does
not bear and state the date of the president’s approval.
DOCTRINE: ​In case of discrepancy between the basic law and rule issued to
implement it, the basic law prevails, because said rule or regulation cannot go
beyond the terms and provisions of the latter.
The rule is that official duty is presumed to have been regularly performed,
administrative order issued by Department Secretary presumed to have been
approved by the president.
FACTS: ​On March 13, 1954, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
under authority granted him by Sections 3 and 4 of Act No. 4003 (Fisheries Act),
issued Fishery Administrative Order (FAO) No. 37, Section 2 of which reads:
"SEC. 2. Prohibition. It shall be unlawful for all kinds of trawl to operate in
Maqueda and Carigara Bays, including Zumarraga Channel, from December 1st
Administrative Order."
On June 7, 1954, the same Secretary promulgated FAO 37- 1, amending Section 2
of FAO No. 37 above quoted, so as follows:
"SEC. 2. Prohibition.·It shall be unlawful for all kinds of trawl to operate in
Maqueda, Villareal and Carigara Bays, including Zumarraga Channel except as
provided for in Section three of this Fisheries Administrative Order."
Appelante contends:
(1)that Section 2 of FAO No. 37-1 is void because it is not only inconsistent with
but is contrary to the provisions and spirit of Act No. 4003.
(2)that FAO No. 37-1 is discriminatory in that the prohibition is made applicable
only to trawl fishermen and not to other persons engaged in fishing.
(3)FAO No. 37-1 is invalid for the reason that FAO No. 37 which it amended was
not shown to have been approved by the President; at least it does not bear and
state the date of said approval.
ISSUES:
In case of discrepancy between basic law and a rule issued to implement it, which
one will prevail?
Is FAO No. 37-1 invalid?
RATIO:
1. In case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or regulation issued to
implement said law, the basic law prevails, because said rule or regulation cannot
go beyond the terms and provisions of the latter.
2.Under a rule that official duty has been regularly performed, we may well
presume that FAO No. 37 was duly approved by the President as required. FAO
No 37-1 amending it was approved by the president. It is not to be assumed that
an order which is invalid because lack of approval could or should be amended.
The inference is that FAO-37 was valid, and so it was necessary to amend it as it
was done.
Case No. 17
China Banking Corp vs. Court of Appeals,
December 5, 1996 | FRANCISCO, J. |G.R. No. 121158 |
Topic: D. 2. Administrative rules and regulations
FACTS: same with summary
ISSUES: Whether or not Administrative Order no. 3 should govern the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the properties. – NO

PETITIONER: ​China Banking Corporation, et al. RATIO: ​No, Administrative Order No. 3 should not govern the extrajudicial
RESPONDENTS: ​COURT OF APPEALS, HON. PEDRO T. SANTIAGO, SPS. foreclosure of the properties.
SO CHING and CRISTINA SO, and NATIVE WEST INTERNATIONAL
It is an elementary principle in statutory construction that a statue is superior to an
TRADING CORP.
administrative directive and the former cannot be repealed or amended by the
latter. Therefore, Administrative Order No. 3 cannot prevail over Act. No. 3135.
SUMMARY: ​China Banking Corporation entered into two real estate mortgage
contracts covering parcels of land with Native West International Trading
The parties have expressly stipulated in the contracts that the provisions of Act.
Corporation and So Ching and his wife. In return, Native west executed promissory
No. 3135 is the controlling law in case of foreclosure. By invoking the said Act,
notes in favor of China Bank. However, the promissory notes matured and despite
there is no doubt that it must govern the manner in which the sale and redemption
demands from China Bank, the respondents never paid. As a result, China Bank filed
should be effected. The fundamental law in contracts are respected as the law
petitions for the extra-judicial foreclosure of the mortgaged properties before Notary
between the contracting parties.
Public, pursuant to Act No. 3135 – a provision embodied in the contracts. After due
notice and publication, the notary public scheduled the foreclosure sale of the real
Furthermore, Administrative Order No. 3 is a directive for executive judges and
estate properties.
clerks which, under its preliminary paragraph is inline with the responsibility of
an Executive Judge. A petition for foreclosure with the notary public not within
Eight days before the sale, the spouses filed a complaint against China Bank for
its scope as the same is not filed with the court.
failing to comply with the requirements of Administrative Order No. 3 of the
Supreme Court. The CA held that Admin. Circular No. is the governing rule in
extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage, which China Bank failed to follow, with
respect to the publication and notice of the auction sale.

DOCTRINE:​ It is an elementary principle in statutory construction that a statue is

superior to an administrative directive and the former cannot be repealed or amended
by the latter.
Case No. 18
Pelaez vs. Auditor General
Date of Case:December 24, 1965 | Judge:Comcepcion |GR No.L-23825 |
Topic: D. 2. Administrative rules and regulations
PETITIONER:​ Emmanuel Pelaez
RESPONDENTS: ​The Auditor General
SUMMARY:​The President issued Executive Orders creating 33 municipalities
claiming Sec 68 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 as basis. Petitioners
question the validity of such EOs alleging that Sec 68 was repealed by the Barrio
Charter and the 1935 Constitution. Under the Barrio Charter, the president has no
power to create barrios so the petitioners argued that it implies a negation of the
bigger power to create municipalities, each of which consists of several barrios. The
Auditor General insisted that municipalities can be created without creation of
barrios. SC ruled that the EOs are not valid. Section 68 of the Revised Administrative
Code of 1917 constitutes undue delegation of legislative power to the President.
Also, it was been repealed by the 1935 Constitution which only gives the president
the power of general supervision over local government units.
DOCTRINE: ​Whereas the power to fix such common boundary, in order to avoid or
settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities, may partake of an
administrative nature — involving, as it does, the adoption of means and ways to
carry into effect the law creating said municipalities — the authority to create
municipal corporations is essentially ​legislative in nature The power of control is
denied ​by the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local governments are
concerned.
FACTS:
During the period from September 4 to October 29, 1964 the President of the
Philippines, purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code, issued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to
129; creating thirty-three (33) municipalities. On November 10, 1964 petitioner
Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the Philippines and as taxpayer, instituted
the present special civil action, for a writ of prohibition with preliminary
injunction, against the Auditor General, to restrain him, as well as his
representatives and agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds
in implementation of said executive orders and/or any disbursement by said
municipalities.
Pelaez alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that
said Section 68 has been impliedly repealed by Section 3, RA 2370(The Barrio
Charter) and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.The Auditor
General maintains the contrary view and avers that the present action is premature
and that not all proper parties — referring to the officials of the new political
subdivisions in question — have been impleaded. Subsequently, the mayors of
several municipalities adversely affected by the aforementioned executive orders
— because the latter have taken away from the former the barrios composing the
new political subdivisions — intervened in the case.
Hence, since January 1, 1960, when Republic Act No. 2370 became effective,
barrios may "not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed"
except by Act of Congress or of the corresponding provincial board "upon petition
of a majority of the voters in the areas affected" and the "recommendation of the
council of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is
situated."
The main import of the petitioner's argument is that the statutory denial of the
presidential authority to create a new barrio implies a negation of the bigger
power to create municipalities, each of which consists of several barrios
The Auditor General argues that a new municipality can be created without
creating new barrios, such as, by placing old barrios under the jurisdiction of the
new municipality.
ISSUES:​Are Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129 issued by the
President creating thirty-three (33) municipalities valid?
RULING: ​No. Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 constitutes
undue delegation of legislative power to the President. Also, it was been repealed
by the 1935 Constitution which only gives the president the power of general
supervision over local government units.
RATIO: ​Again, ​Section 10 (1) of Article VII of our fundamental law ordains:
The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or
offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be
provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed. ​The ​power of
control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere in the
exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the executive
departments, bureaus, or offices of the national government, as well as to act in
lieu of such officers. This power ​is ​denied ​by the Constitution to the Executive,
insofar as local governments are concerned. With respect to the latter, the
fundamental law permits him to wield no more authority than that of checking
whether said local governments or the officers thereof perform their duties as
provided by statutory enactments. Hence, the President cannot interfere with local
governments, so long as the same or its officers act within the scope of their
authority. He may not enact an ordinance which the municipal council has failed
or refused to pass, even if it had thereby violated a duty imposed thereto by law,
although he may see to it that the corresponding provincial officials take
appropriate disciplinary action therefor.
Then, also, the power of control of the President over executive departments,
bureaus or offices implies ​no more ​than the authority to assume directly the
functions thereof or to interfere in the exercise of discretion by its officials.
Manifestly, ​such c​ ontrol does not include the authority either to abolish an
executive department or bureau, or to create a new one​. ​As a consequence, the
alleged power of the President to create municipal corporations would necessarily
connote the exercise by him of an authority even greater than that of control
which he has over the executive departments, bureaus or offices. In other words,
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not merely fail to comply
with the constitutional mandate above quoted. Instead of giving the President less
power over local governments than that vested in him over the executive
departments, bureaus or offices, it reverses the process and does the ​exact
opposite​, by conferring upon him ​more p​ ower over municipal corporations than
that which he has over said executive departments, bureaus or offices.
In short, even if it did entail an undue delegation of legislative powers, as it
certainly does, said Section 68, as part of the Revised Administrative Code,
approved on March 10, 1917, must be deemed repealed by the subsequent
adoption of the Constitution, in 1935, which is utterly incompatible and
inconsistent with said statutory enactment. (De los Santos vs. Mallare)
CONCURRING OPINION: , J.P., ​J.
The power to create a municipality is legislative in character. American
authorities have therefore favored the view that it cannot be delegated; that what is
delegable is not the power to create municipalities but only the power to
determine the existence of facts under which creation of a municipality will result.
The test is said to lie in whether the statute allows any discretion on the delegate
as to whether the municipal corporation should be created. If so, there is an
attempted delegation of legislative power and the statute is invalid. Now Section
68 no doubt gives the President such discretion, since it says that the President
"may by executive order" exercise the powers therein granted. Under the
prevailing rule in the United States — and Section 68 is of American origin — the
provision in question would be an invalid attempt to delegate purely legislative
powers, contrary to the principle of separation of powers.
The power of ​control over local governments had now been taken away from the
Chief Executive by the Constitution. Accordingly, Congress cannot by law grant
him such power (Hebron v. Reyes). And any such power formerly granted under
the Jones Law thereby became unavoidably inconsistent with the Philippine
Constitution. The power to control is an incident of the power to create or abolish
municipalities. Since as stated, the power to control local governments can no
longer be conferred on or exercised by the President, it follows a fortiori that the
power to create them, all the more cannot be so conferred or exercised.
Since the Constitution repealed Section 68 as far back as 1935, it is academic to
ask whether Republic Act 2370 likewise has provisions in conflict with Section 68
so as to repeal it. Suffice it to state, at any rate, that statutory prohibition on the
President from creating a barrio does not warrant the inference of statutory
prohibition for creating a municipality. For although municipalities consist of
barrios, ​there is nothing in the statute that would preclude creation of new
municipalities out of pre-existing barrios.​It is not contrary to the logic of local
autonomy to be able to create larger political units and unable to create smaller
ones. For as long ago observed in President McKinley's Instructions to the Second
Philippine Commission, greater autonomy is to be imparted to the smaller of the
two political units. The smaller the unit of local government, the lesser is the need
for the national government's intervention in its political affairs. Furthermore, for
practical reasons, local autonomy cannot be given from the top downwards. The
national government, in such a case, could still exercise power over the
supposedly autonomous unit, e.g., municipalities, by exercising it over the smaller
units that comprise them, e.g., the barrios. A realistic program of decentralization
therefore calls for autonomy from the bottom upwards, so that it is not surprising
for Congress to deny the national government some power over barrios without
denying it over municipalities. For this reason, I disagree with the majority view
that because the President could not create a barrio under Republic Act 2370, a
fortiori h​ e cannot create a municipality.
Case No. 19
Cemco Holdings vs. National Life Insurance
August 7, 2007 | Judge: Chico-Nazario |GR No. 171815 |
Topic: D. 2. Administrative rules and regulations
PETITIONER: ​CEMCO HOLDINGS, INC.
RESPONDENTS: ​NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC.
SUMMARY:
Union Cement Corporation (UCC) is a publicly-listed company that has 2
stockholders – UCHC (with shares of 60.51%) and CEMCO (with shares of 17.03%.
In June, PSE Circular for Brokers No 3146-4002 was released stating that the shares
of BCI and ACC (of UCC) to sell their stock to CEMCO making CEMCO own 60%
of the stocks of UCC. Then, National Life Insurance Company of the Philippines
filed a petition against CEMCO that they violated the tender offer rule under Rule 19
of the Implementing Rules of the Securities Regulation Code.
DOCTRINE:
Tender Offer Rule under Rule 19 of the Implementing Rules of the Securities
Regulation Code:
Section 19. Tender Offers. – Any person or group of persons acting in concert who
intends to acquire at least 15% of any class of any equity security of a listed
corporation of any class of any equity security of a corporation with assets of at least
fifty million pesos (50,000,000.00) and having two hundred(200) or more
stockholders at least one hundred shares each or who intends to acquire at least
thirty percent(30%) of such equity over a period of twelve months(12) shall make a
tender offer to stockholders by filling with the Commission a declaration to that
effect; and furnish the issuer, a statement containing such of the information
required in Section 17 of this Code as the Commission may prescribe. Such person
or group of persons shall publish all request or invitations or tender offer or
requesting such tender offers subsequent to the initial solicitation or request shall
contain such information as the Commission may prescribe, and shall be filed with
the Commission and sent to the issuer not alter than the time copies of such materials
are first published or sent or given to security holders.
Tender Offer is defined as a publicly announced intention by a person acting alone or
in concert with other persons to acquire equity securities of a public company and
this is in place to protect minority shareholders against any scheme that dilutes share
value of their investments.
Public Company is defined as a corporation which is listed on an exchange, or a
corporation with assets exceeding 50 million and with 200 or more stockholders(at
least 200 of them holding not less than 100 shares of said company)
FACTS:
Union Cement Corporation (UCC) is a publicly-listed company that has 2
stockholders – UCHC (with shares of 60.51%) and CEMCO (with shares of
17.03%. In June, PSE Circular for Brokers No 3146-4002 was released stating
that the shares of BCI and ACC (of UCC) to sell their stock to CEMCO making
CEMCO own 60% of the stocks of UCC.
With this, PSE inquired to SEC asking if the Tender Offer Rule under Rule 19 of
the Implementing Rules of the Securities Regulation Code is applicable or not to
the purchase by CEMCO of the majority shares of UCC. SEC replied and stated
that said transaction was not covered by the tender rule offer.
In turn, National Life Insurance Company of the Philippines, Inc. who was a
minority stockholder of UCC demanded CEMCO, in form of a letter that CEMCO
should comply with the rule on mandatory tender offer. However, CEMCO
refused.
A share purchase agreement was executed by ACC & BCI on August 5, 2004. By
August 12, the transaction was consummated and closed. However, National Life
Insurance Company of the Philippines filed a complaint with SEC asking to
reverse its resolution and to declare that the purchase agreement between ACC,
BCI & CEMCO void because the mandatory tender offer rule should be applied.
However, CEMCO asserts that the mandatory tender offer rule only applies to
direct acquisitions and it acquired said shares indirectly (through ACC & BCI).

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the SEC has jurisdiction over the case = YES
2. Whether or not the Tender Offer Rule under Rule 19 of the
Implementing Rules of the Securities Regulation Code is not
applicable to the purchase by petitioner of the majority of shares of
UCC. = YES

RATIO:
1. YES, The SEC has jurisdiction over the case because as a regulatory agency,
it has the incidental power to conduct hearings and render decisions fixing the
rights and obligations of the parties. According to the Court of Appeals, by
depriving the SEC of power would render the said agency inutile because it
would become powerless to regulate and implement the law.

2. ​YES. Under Section 19 of RA 8799, the Tender Offer Rule is defined. As

such, the SEC and the Court of Appeals ruled that the indirect
acquisition of 36% of shares by CEMCO through the acquisition of the
non-listed UCHC shares is covered by the mandatory tender offer rule.
The rationale for this rule relates not only to the emergence of the
multifarious needs of a modern or modernizing society and the
establishment of a diverse administrative agencies for addressing and
satisfying those needs but it also relates to accumulation of experience
and growth of specialized capabilities by the administrative agency
charged with implementing a particular statute.

CONCURRING OPINION:
NO SEPARATE OPINIONS--
Case No. 20
Peralta vs. Commission on Elections
Date of Case: March 11, 1978 | Judge: Antonio |GR No.L-47771 |
Topic: E. 1. Presumption of constitutionality
PETITIONER: ​Pedro G. Peralta
RESPONDENTS: ​Hon. Commission on Elections, Hon. National Treasurer, and
Kilusang Bagong Lipunan
SUMMARY:
Peralta, as the petitioner, questions the constitutionality of straight party voting
scheme found in subparagraphs 26-28 of the 1978 Election Code, for it discriminates
against independent candidates and gives certain benefits to candidates with partylist.
As cited in Oughton et al. vs. Black et al., such provision interferes with the freedom
and equality of elections, and authorizes of voting for political parties and not for
men. Petitioner invokes the constitutional mandate that no person shall be denied the
equal protection of the laws (Article IV, Section 1) and the provision that bona fide
candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment or
disrimination. The optional straight party voting provided in the 1978 Election Code
discriminates an independent candidate because by simply writing on the ballot the
name of a political party, the voter would have voted already for all members of the
partylist - a privilege that an independent candidate won’t have.
FACTS: *Same as summary*
ISSUES: ​Whether or not provisions in the Presidential Decree No. 1269 ot The
1978 Election Code is constitutional. Yes the forty-five campaign period is
constitutional and the block-voting scheme in the ballot is permissible.
RATIO:
1. The Court ruled in the argument of Peralta regarding block voting that it
is permissible and constitutional. The freedom of association has been
enshrined in the Constitution to enable individuals to join other
individuals with common objectives and to engage in lawful activities. If
a candidate, while enjoying his freedom to engage in association joins a
partylist and as a result, he enjoys certain privileges, then it is
constitutionally permissible. It does not violate the equal protection
clause of the constitution.

DOCTRINE:
Agpalo Page 67, Peralta vs. COMELEC - ​“Thus, to justify the nullification of a
law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful
and argumentative implication. There is practically unanimity among the courts in
the pronouncement that laws shall not be declared invalid unless the conflict with the
Constitution is clear beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Every statute is presumed valid and an act of the legislature approved by the
President is within the limits of the Constitution.
Case No. 21
Francisco Jr, vs. House of Representatives
November 10, 2003 | Carpio Morales, J. |GR No. 160261
Topic: E. 7. Summary of essential requisites of judicial review
PETITIONER: ​Francisco Jr
RESPONDENTS: ​House of Representatives
SUMMARY:
**see facts**
DOCTRINE:
Requisites for Exercise of Judicial Power: ​The court does not pass upon the
constitutionality of a statute at any time it is requested by any person and for any
purpose. Before the court may resolve the question of constitutionality of a statute,
the following requisites should, as a rule, be present: (1) the existence of an
approriate case; (2) an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the
constitutional question; (3) the plea that the function be exercisd at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon in
order to decide the case​.
FACTS:
On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed with the Office of the
Secretary General of the House of Representatives, a verified impeachment
complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. and seven (7) other
Associate Justices of the Court for violation of the ​Constitution​, betrayal of public
trust and, committing high crimes. The House Committee on Justice subsequently
dismissed said complaint on October 22, 2003 for insufficiency of substance.
The next day, or on October 23, 2003, Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr.,
First District, Tarlac and Felix William B. Fuentebella, Third District,
Camarines Sur, filed another verified impeachment complaint with the Office of
the Secretary General of the House against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.,
alleging underpayment of the COLA of the members and personnel of the
judiciary from the JDF and unlawful disbursement of said fund for various
infrastructure projects and acquisition of service vehicles and other equipment.
Attached to the second impeachment complaint was a Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the members
of the House of Representatives. The complaint was set to be transmitted to the
Senate for appropriate action.
Subsequently, several petitions were filed with this Court by members of the
bar, members of the House of Representatives and private individuals, asserting
their rights, among others, as taxpayers, to stop the illegal spending of public
funds for the impeachment proceedings against the Chief Justice. Petitioners
contended that the filing of second impeachment complaint against the Chief
Justice was barred under Article XI, Sec. 3 (5) of the 1987 ​Constitution which
states that "no impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same
official more than once within a period of one year."
Defending their side, the House of Representatives, respondents, contend that:
● The Court has no jurisdiction to hear, much less prohibit or enjoin the
House of Representatives, which is an independent and co-equal
branch of government under the Constitution, from the performance of
its constitutionally mandated duty to initiate impeachment cases.
● There is lack of jurisdiction of the Court over the issues affecting the
impeachment proceedings and that the sole power, authority and
jurisdiction of the Senate as the impeachment court to try and decide
impeachment cases, as provided in Article XI, Sections 3(1 & 5), 1987
Constitution.
The Supreme Court held that the second impeachment complaint filed against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. was unconstitutional or barred under Article
XI, Sec. 3 (5) of the 1987 ​Constitution​. Petitioners, as taxpayers, had sufficient
standing to file the petitions to prevent disbursement of public funds amounting
to millions of pesos for an illegal act. The petitions were justiciable or ripe for
adjudication because there was an actual controversy involving rights that are
legally demandable. Whether the issues present a political question, the
Supreme Court held that only questions that are truly political questions are
beyond judicial review. The Supreme Court has the exclusive power to resolve
with definitiveness the issues of constitutionality. It is duty bound to take
cognizance of the petitions to exercise the power of judicial review as the
guardian of the ​Constitution​.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the power of judicial review extends to those arising from
impeachment proceedings.
(2) Whether or not the essential pre-requisites for the exercise of the power of
judicial review have been fulfilled.
In discussing these issues, the following may be taken up:
a) locus standi of petitioners
b) ripeness (prematurity; mootness)
c) political question/justiciability
d) House's "exclusive" power to initiate all cases of
impeachment
e) Senate's "sole" power to try and decide all cases of
impeachment
This only shows that the Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of
impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress.
The Constitution confers the courts the power of ​Judicial Review in Section 1,
Article VIII of our present 1987 ​Constitution​:
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court
and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.
However, the court does not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at any time
it is requested by any person and for any purpose. Before the court may resolve
the question of constitutionality of a statute, the following requisites should, as a
rule, be present: (1) the existence of an approriate case; (2) an interest personal
and substantial by the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the plea that the
function be exercisd at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the
constitutional question be passed upon in order to decide the case​.
**NOTE: For a full explanation of the essential requisites for Judicial Review, see
pages 75-87 of “Statutory Construction” by Ruben E. Agpalo, 6th Ed. (2019). It
is a copy of what has been ruled in this case.

g) judicial restraint (Italics in the original)

RATIO:
Although our Constitution vested to the House of Representatives the exclusive
power to initiate impeachment cases, it provides several limitations to the
exercise of such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4), and (5), Article XI
thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing, required vote to
impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of one and the same official.
Case No. 22 Omission of the requirement for publication would offend due process as it deny
Tanada vs. Tuvera the public knowledge of laws.
December 29, 1986 | Cruz, J |No. L-63915 | The term “law” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general
Topic: F. 1. When laws take effect application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to people in general, albeit there
are some that do not apply to them directly.
The Court agreed that the publication must be made in full or it is no publication
PETITIONER: ​Lorenzo M. Tanada, Abraham F. Sarmiento, and MABINI. at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. .
RESPONDENTS: ​Hon. Juan C. Tuvera, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to With regard to the publication in newspapers of general circulation; this kind of
the President, Hon. Joaquin Venus, Melquiades P. De la Cruz, Florendo S. Pablo publication is not the one required by or authorized by the existing law.

SUMMARY: This is a motion for reconsideration for the decision of the case on RULING: ​All laws shall immediately upon their approval, or as soon thereafter
April 24, 1985 where due process was invoked by petitioners in demanding the as possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become effective only
disclosure of a number of presidential decrees which they claimed had not been after fifteen days from their publication, or on another date specified by the
published as required by the law. The court held the necessity of publication for it to legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code.
have binding force and effect.
The petitioners contend that there should be no distinction between laws of general
applicability and those which are not; that publication means complete publication,
and that it should be published in the Official Gazette. In which the Solicitor General
replied that issuance for internal administration need not be published, publication
when necessary must be in full and in the Official Gazette.

DOCTRINE: The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” in Art. 2 of the NCC

refers to the effectivity of laws and not on the requirement of the publication. The
term “laws” refer not only to those of general application, but also to the laws of
local application

ISSUES: ​Whether or not the mandatory publication of the law in the Official
Gazette is a requirement for its effectivity. And;
Whether or to provide the publication elsewhere, aside from the Official
Gazette, as it would be essential for the effectivity of the law.

RATIO: ​The clause ‘unless it is otherwise provided’ refers to the date of the
effectivity not on the requirement of the publication itself, which is necessary.
Case No. 23
Caltex Inc vs. Palomar,
Date of Case: September 29, 1966 | Judge: Castro |GR No. L-19650|
Topic: II. A. 1. Construction defined
PETITIONER: ​Caltex (Philippines) Inc.
RESPONDENTS: ​Enrico Palomar, in his capacity as the Postmaster General
SUMMARY: ​Caltex requested for a clearance to use the mails for publication and
communication purposes of their promotional scheme “Caltex Hooded Pump
Contest”. The Postmaster General denied their request as he claimed that the said
contest is clearly in violation of the Sections in the Revised Administrative Code.
The court ruled in favor of the petitioner, Caltex may be granted declaratory relief
even if Palomar simply applied the provisions of the Postal Law as the prohibitory
provisions of the Postal Law inescapably required an inquiry into the intended
meaning of the words used therein.
DOCTRINE: ​legal hermeneutics noscitur a sociis - t​ he meaning of an unclear or
ambiguous word in a (statute or contract) should be determined by considering the
words with which it is associated in the context.
Construction is the ​art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and
intention of the authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case,
where that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the fact that
the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law.
FACTS:
1. In 1960, Caltex (Philippines) Inc. laid the groundwork for a promotional
scheme calculated to drum up patronage for its oil products. It is named
as “​Caltex Hooded Pump Contest​” which calls participants therein to
estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex
Station will dispense during a specified period. The said contest is open
discriminately to all motor vehicle owners and/or licensed drivers. In
order to participate, no fee or consideration is required to be paid, no
purchase of Caltex products required to be made. The entry forms are to
be made available upon request at each Caltex Station and there is a
sealed can where accomplished entry stubs may be deposited.
2. A three staged winner selection system is envisioned. The station level
called “​Dealer ​Contest​” (the contestant whose estimate is closest to the
actual number of liters dispensed by the hooded pump thereat). The first
prize winner in each station will then be qualified to join in the “​Regional
Contest​” in seven different regions (entry stubs of qualified contestants
will be deposited in a sealed can from which winners of that region will
be drawn). At the national level, the entry stubs of the seven regional first
prize winner will be placed inside a sealed can from which the final
winners will be drawn.
3. Foreseeing the extensive use of mails for publication of the contest and
for transmission of communication relative thereto, Caltex sent a
representative to the postal authorities in order for the contest to be
cleared in advance for the use of such mails, having in view Sections
1954 (a)-(​Absolutely non-mailable matter)​, 1982-(​Fraud Orders) ​&
1983-(​Deprivation of use of money order system and telegraphic transfer
service)​ of the Revised Administrative Code.
4. In formalizing their request for clear usage of mails, a letter was sent to
the Postmaster General, Enrico Palomar, dated October 31, 1960, Caltex
thru counsel, enclosed a copy of the contest rules and endeavored to
justify its position that the contest does not violate the anti-lottery
provisions of the Postal Law.
5. However, Palomar denied the requested clearance of Caltex in view of
the aforementioned sections of the Revised Administrative Code. Caltex
sought for reconsideration but the Postmaster General maintained his
view that the contest involves consideration, or that, if it does not, it is
nevertheless a "gift enterprise" which is equally banned by the Postal
Law, and in his letter of December 10, 1960 not only denied the use of
 the mails for purposes of the proposed contest but as well threatened that well-known principle of ​legal hermeneutics noscitur a sociis [​ the meaning of an
if the contest was conducted, "a fraud order will have to be issued against unclear or ambiguous word in a (statute or contract) should be determined by
it (Caltex) and all its representatives". considering the words with which it is associated in the context.]— ​ which
6. Caltex invoked a judicial intervention by filing a petition of declaratory Opinion 217 aforesaid also relied upon although only insofar as the element of
relief against Palomar, ordering him to allow the petitioner to use the chance is concerned — it is ​only logical that the term under a construction should
mails to bring the contest to the attention of the public and that the be accorded no other meaning than that which is consistent with the nature of the
“​Caltex Hooded Pump Contest”​ is not violative of the Postal Law. word associated therewith​. Hence, if lottery is prohibited only if it involves a
consideration, so also must the term "gift enterprise" be so construed.
ISSUES: ​Whether the proposed promotional scheme called “​Caltex Hooded Significantly, there is not in the law the slightest intent to eliminate that element
Pump Contest”​ is within the coverage of the prohibitive provisions of the Postal of consideration from the "gift enterprise" therein included.
Law inescapably requires an inquiry to the intended meaning of words used In the end, under the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law, gift enterprises and
therein. similar schemes therein contemplated are condemnable only if, like lotteries, they
involve the element of consideration. Finding none in the contest here in question,
RATIO: ​No, the proposed promotional scheme is not within the coverage of the Caltex may not be denied the use of the mails for purposes thereof as it does not
prohibitive provisions of Postal Law. transgress the provisions of the Postal Law.
Caltex, as a business enterprise of some consequence, concededly has the
unquestioned right to exploit every legitimate means, and to avail of all
appropriate media to advertise and stimulate increased patronage for its products.
In contrast, Palomar, as the authority charged with the enforcement of the Postal
Law, admittedly has the power and the duty to suppress transgressions thereof —
particularly thru the issuance of fraud orders, under Sections 1982 and 1983 of the
Revised Administrative Code, against legally non-mailable schemes and by virtue
of his jurisdiction in the premises and construing the pertinent provisions of the
Postal Law, Palomar saw a violation thereof in the proposed scheme and
accordingly declined the request. Hence, a point of difference as to the correct
construction to be given to the applicable statute was thus reached.
Therefore, Caltex may granted declaratory relief, even if Palomar "​simply
applied the clear provisions of the law to a given set of facts as embodied in
the rules of the contest​", for ​Construction​, is the ​art or process of discovering
and expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the law with respect
to its application to a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful,
amongst others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided
for in the law.
Furthermore, in the Postal Law, the term in question is used in association with
the word "lottery". With the meaning of lottery settled, and consonant to the
Case No. 24
Manila Lodge No. 761 vs. Court of Appeals
Date of Case:September 30, 1976 | Judge:Castro |GR No. |L-41001
Topic: II. A. 4. Purpose or object of construction
PETITIONER: Manila Lodge
RESPONDENTS: Court of Appeals
SUMMARY: ​The Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 1360 which authorized
the City of Manila to reclaim a portion of Manila Bay. Subsequently Act No. 1657
amended the former act which states that the City of Manila was authorized to sell or
lease the set aside for hotel site. The City of Manila sells the land to Manila Lodge
No. 761 then the latter sold the land to Tarlac Development Corporation. The City of
Manila filed a petition for re-annotation of its right to repurchased. The TDC then
filed a complaint that the City of Manila was estopped from repurchasing the
property.
DOCTRINE: ​It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that courts must give
effect to the general legislative intent that can be discovered from or is unraveled by
the four corners of the statute, and in order to discover said intent, the whole statute,
and not only a particular provision thereof, should be considered.
FACTS:
On June 26, 1905 the Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 1360 which
authorized the City of Manila to reclaim a portion of Manila Bay. The reclaimed
area was to form part of the Luneta extension. The Act provided that the
reclaimed area "shall be the property of the City of Manila" and that the City of
Manila is authorized to set aside a tract of the reclaimed land formed by the
Luneta extension at the north end for a hotel site, and to lease the same, with the
approval of the Governor General, to a responsible person or corporation for a
term not to exceed 99 years. Subsequently, the Philippine Commission passed on
May 18, 1907 Act No. 1657, amending Act No. 1360, so as to authorize the City
of Manila either to lease or to sell the portion set aside as a hotel site.
ISSUES:​Whether or not the City of Manila is estopped from questioning the
validity of the sale it executed on July 13, 1911 conveying the subject property to
the Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE?
RULING:​No. The Government is never estopped by mistakes or errors on the
part of its agents and estoppel does not apply to a municipal corporation to
validate a contract that is prohibited by law or its against public policy. The sale
of July 13, 1911 executed by the City of Manila to Manila Lodge was certainly a
contract prohibited by law. Estoppel cannot be urged even if the City of Manila
accepted the benefits of such contract of sale and the Manila Lodge No. 761 had
performed its part of the agreement, for to apply the doctrine of estoppel against
the City of Manila in this case would be tantamount to enabling itto do indirectly
what it could not do directly. The sale of the subject property executed by the City
of Manila to the Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE, was void and inexistent for lack
of subject matter. It suffered from an incurable defect that could not be ratified
either by lapse of time or by express ratification. The Manila Lodge No. 761
therefore acquired no right by virtue of the said sale. Hence to consider now the
contract inexistent as it always has been, cannot be an impairment of the
obligations of contracts, for there was in contemplation of law, no contract at all.
The inexistence of said sale can be set up against anyone who asserts a right
arising from it, not only against the first vendee, the Manila Lodge No. 761,
BPOE, but also against all its Successors, including the TDC, which are not
protected by law. The doctrine of bone fide purchaser without notice, being
claimed by the TDC, does not apply where there is a total absence of title in the
vendor, and the good faith of the purchaser TDC cannot create title where none
exists. The restoration or restitution of what has been given is in order.
Case No. 25
People vs. Concepcion
November 29, 1922 | Judge: Malcolm |GR No. 19190 |
Topic: II. A. 4. Purpose or object of construction
PETITIONER: ​THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
RESPONDENTS: ​VENANCIO CONCEPCION
SUMMARY:
Venancio Concepcion was the President of PNB when he authorized an extension of
credit to a co-partnership worth 300k (in which he was a partner, through his wife), it
was eventually paid but still he was charged and found guilty by the Court of First
Instance.
DOCTRINE:
Section 35 of Act No. 2747:
"The National Bank shall not, directly or indirectly, grant loans to any of the
members of the board of directors of the bank nor to agents of the branch banks."
Section 49 of Act No. 2747:
"Any person who shall violate any of the provisions of this Act shall be punished by
a fine not to exceed ten thousand pesos, or by imprisonment not to exceed five years,
or by both such fine and imprisonment."
FACTS:
Venancio Concepcion is the president of Philippine National Bank who
authorized an extension of credit to Puno y Conception, S en C in the amount of
P300,000. The special authorization was essential in view of the memorandum
order of President Concepcion that limits the discretionary power of the local
manager at Aparri to grant loans and discount negotiable documents to P5,000 and
can be increased up to P10,000. This extension of credit however, was paid in full
with interest by July 17, 1919.
Puno y Concepcion, S. en C. was a co-partnership capitalized at P100,000.
Anacleto Concepcion: P5,000; Clara Vda de Concepcion: P5,000; Miguel
Concepcion: P20,000; Clemente Puno: P20,000; Rosario San Agustin & Venancio
Concepcion: P50,000. Also, being the President of Philippine National Bank,
Venancio Concepcion was charged by the Court of First Instance of Cagayan with
a violation of Sec. 35 of Act No. 2747 and was found guilty by the Judge of First
Instance thereby sentenced to imprisonment for 1 year and 6 months and to pay a
fine of P3,000.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Venancio Concepcion be convicted of a violation of Sec.
35 of Act 2747 in relation with Sec. 49 of the same Act when these
portions were repealed by Act. 2938, prior to the filing of information
and rendering of judgement? YES
2. Whether or not granting P300,000 to the co-partnership of Puno y
Concepcion S en C is an indirect loan under Section 35 of Act 2747?
YES
RATIO:
1. In cases of: US v Cuna & Ong Chang Wing and Kwong Fok vs US, this
has been answered. The answer, which will always be in holding states
that where an act of the legislature which penalizes an offense, such
repeal does not have the effect of thereafter depriving the courts of
jurisdiction to try, convict, and sentence offenders charged with
violations of the old law.
2. A loan is defined as the delivery by one party and the receipt by the
other party of a given sum of money, upon an agreement (whether
express or implied) to repay the sum of money loaned, with or
without interest. In this case, it must be noted that the wife of
Venancio Concepcion held ½ of his capital during the partnership.
In the interpretation and construction of statutes, the primary rule is
to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature. If it is
shown that the husband is financially interested in the success/failure
of his wife’s business venture, a loan to a partnership of which the
wife is a director/member, falls within the prohibition of indirect
loan. Thus, a loan to a partnership of which the wife of a director of
a bank is a member, it is an indirect loan to such director.
Case No. 26
Federation of Free Farmers vs. Court of Appeals
Date of Case: September 10, 1981 | Judge: Barredo |GR No. L-41161|
Topic: II. A. 8. Graphical illustration
PETITIONER: ​FEDERATION OF FREE FARMERS, MELQUIADES BETIOS,
CRESENCIANO FERNANDEZ, SANCHO PEREZ and AGATON POSA
RESPONDENTS: ​THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, VICTORIAS
MILLING COMPANY, INC., VICTORIAS MILL DISTRICT PLANTERS'
ASSOCIATION, INC., and ALL SUGARCANE PLANTERS OF SUGARCANE
PLANTATIONS SITUATED IN THE VICTORIAS MILLING DISTRICT, WHO
HAVE AT ONE TIME OR ANOTHER, SINCE JUNE 22, 1952, MILLED THEIR
SUGARCANE IN THE MILL OF VICTORIAS MILLING COMPANY, INC
SUMMARY: ​In CA-G.R. No. 47298-R, decided on August 22, 1975, the Court of
Appeals held that notwithstanding the provisions of Section 9, in relation to Section 1
of the Sugar Act of 1952, Republic Act 809, the laborers of the planters affiliated to
the Victorias Milling District who are members of or represented by the Federation
of Free Farmers, one of herein petitioners, have not been fully paid their share thus
provided by law, corresponding to crop years 1955 to 1974. In these four separate
petitions, the FEDERATION, the PLANTERS, as an association and on behalf of all
planters in the Victoria's district, two individual planters, SANTOS and TIROL, as
well as the CENTRAL (VICTORIAS) are now assailing the said decision. The issues
raised involve the constitutionality of the Sugar Act (RA 809); freedom of the
centrals and the planters to agree on how they would share the proceeds of the milled
sugarcane, regardless of the ratios specified in Section 1, of the Act; non-payment of
laborers' share; and liability for laborers' share, among others. On review, the
Supreme Court held that: a) R.A. 809, as a social legislation founded not only on
police power but more importantly on the social welfare mandates of the
Constitution, is undoubtedly constitutional in all its aspects and relevant to the instant
cases; b) there is nothing in said law that excludes the right of the parties to enter into
new contracts, and in said new contracts, they could provide for a ratio of sharing
different from that stipulated in Section 1 of the Act, provided that any increase in
their share in the proceeds of milling that the PLANTERS would get, 60% thereof
must be paid by them to their respective plantation laborers; and c) in all other
respects, the judgment of the Appellate Court should be affirmed insofar as the
liability of the PLANTERS to their laborers are concerned.
DOCTRINE: ​Sugar Act of 1952 (Republic Act 809)
LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION OF "INCREASE . . . UNDER THIS ACT" IN SECTION
9 THEREOF. — As to the matter of the non-payment by the PLANTERS of the 2.4%
due their laborers, a little clarification may be called for. We feel that the legal
provision mandating such payment may indeed not be readily understood by or
comprehensible to everyone in the same sense it was construed by this Court in
Talisay-Silay and by the Court of Appeals in its subject decision. For, it is undeniable
that Section 9 of Republic Act 809 uses the words "​any increase in participation
granted the planters under this Act.​" (Italics supplied) Read literally, there could be a
little shade of plausibility in the posture of VICTORIAS and PLANTERS that only
any increase as a result of the application of Section 1 of the Act is contemplated in
its Section 9, and ​not increase by virtue of a written milling contract executed after
the effectivity of the Act, ​even if those who do so might constitute the majority of the
planters in the district. But, as We postulate in Talisay-Silay, any increase given to
the planters by any central after the passage of the Act cannot be viewed in any way
than that which has been induced or forced to be done on account of the compulsive
effect of the various related provisions of the Act. Virtually, therefore, any such
increase should be deemed as an "increase . . . under this Act," since it is a result of
its operation.
​ o argument can
CONTRA FACTUM NON VALET ARGUMENTUM - N
withstand the facts
FACTS:
1. Four separate petitions of the respective parties concerned for the review
of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 47298-R, entitled
Federation of Free Farmers, et al. vs. Victorias Milling Co., Inc., et al., of
August 12, 1975.
2. The appellate court held that notwithstanding the provisions of Section 9,
in relation to Section 1 of the Sugar Act of 1952, Republic Act 809,
providing that of any increase in the share of the proceeds of milled
sugarcane and derivatives obtained by the planters from the centrals in
any sugar milling district in the Philippines, 60% of said increase shall
correspond to and should be paid by the planters to their respective
laborers.
3. The laborers of the planters affiliated to the Victorias Milling District
who are members of or represented by the Federation of Free Farmers,
one of herein petitioners, have not been fully paid their share thus
provided by law, corresponding to crop years 1955 to 1974, in spite of
clear evidence in the record showing that the increase of 4% in the share
of the Planters, Victorias Milling District, corresponding to all the years
since the enforcement of the aforementioned Act had already been paid
by petitioner Victorias Milling Co., Inc. to said planters.
4. The Court of Appeals further found that even the shares of the laborers
corresponding to crop years 1952-1955, when by operation of the Act,
the increase was 10%, had not been paid. The appellate court rendered
judgment holding the planters of the district and Victorias Milling Co.,
Inc. jointly and severally liable to the said laborers for all said alleged
unpaid amounts.
5. The Federation maintains that (1) the plantation laborers, its members,
have not only been fully paid the amounts indisputably due them from
crop year 1952-1953 to November 1, 1955, during which period all the
parties are agreed that Section 1 of Republic Act 809 was fully
applicable, but that (2) In 1956, Victorias and the Planters had entered
into an agreement which they had no legal right to enter into the way
they did, (providing for a 64-36 ratio) that is, in a manner that did not
conform with the ratio of sharing between planters and millers specified
in the just mentioned legal provision, (which correspondingly provides
for a 70-30 ratio) the Federation maintaining that after the enactment of
Republic Act 809, all planters and millers in all the sugar milling districts
in the Philippines were deprived of the freedom to stipulate any ratio of
sharing of the proceeds of sugarcane milled by the respective centrals, as
well as their derivatives, in any proportion different from, specially if
less for the planters, than that listed in Section 1 of the Act; and (3)
assuming the Planters and Victorias had the legal right to enter into any
such agreement, that the 60% of the increase given to the Planters under
said agreement has not been paid up to now to the respective laborers of
said Planters.
6. In this connection, the Federation further urges, in this instance, that the
Court of Appeals' decision is correct in holding that under the law on
torts, the Planters and Central are jointly and severally liable for the
payment of the amounts thus due them.
ISSUES: ​Whether RA 809 apply even if the majority of the sugarcane planters
have written milling agreement with the miller or central stipulating a sharing
proportion different from that provided in Section 1 of the Act, such that any
increase of participation granted the planter under said milling agreement will be
divided between the planter and his plantation laborer in the proportion of 60% for
the latter and 40% for the former.
(What is the legislative intent which should be given effect, Sec. 1 or Sec 9?)
RATIO: ​Yes, the existence of milling agreements does not necessarily render
Republic Act 809 inapplicable or inoperative as to the contracting parties but the
Act remains applicable and operative in all cases. Also, t here is nothing in said
law that excludes the right of the parties to enter into new contracts, and in said
new contracts, they could provide for a ratio of sharing different from that
stipulated in Section 1 of the Act, provided that any increase in their share in the
proceeds of milling that the PLANTERS would get, 60% thereof must be paid by
them to their respective plantation laborers.
Thus, the purpose of the legislature is to compel the continuous production of
sugar and to grant the planters’ laborers a share in the increased participation of
the planters in the sugar produce. The literal translation of the said provisions such
that this Act is inapplicable when written milling agreement between the central
and the planters exists will defeat the purpose of RA 809, that is to give laborers a
share for as long as sugar is produced and the planters receive an increased
participation. The legislative intent is to make the Act operative irrespective of
whether there exists a milling agreement between the central and the sugar
planters.

Case No. 27
Association de Agricultores de Talisay - Silay, Inc vs. Talisay-Silay
MillingCo.
Date of Case:February 19, 1979 | Judge: Barredo | GR No.19937 |
Topic: II. A. 8. Graphical illustration
PETITIONER: ​Asociacion de Agricultores de Talisay-Silay, Inc., Trino Montinola,
Fernando Cuneca, Eduardo Ledesma, Emilio Jison, Nilo Lizares, Nicolas Jalandoni,
and Secretary of Labor
RESPONDENTS: ​Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc. and Luzon Surety Co., Inc.;
Philippine National Bank and The Sugar Quota Administrator as defendant-appellant
SUMMARY:
A group of 7 sugarcane planters, represented by the Secretary of Labor, filed a class
suit against the Talisay-Silay Milling Co., to follow and apply RA809 or the Sugar
Act of 1952 in terms of their sharing participation of 60% of the production of
unrefined sugar will be awarded to the laborers., while 40% of it will be awarded to
the millers. The defendants argued that most of the planters or laborers had already
participated in written contracts with millers and centrals prior to the date of
effectivity of RA809. And as provided by RA 809, the Act cannot be applied to
farmers with previous written contracts with millers, unless the share proportion of
the Act’s contract is greater than the sharing proportion of the contract between
planters and millers.
DOCTRINE:
​Graphical illustration of the term “legal intent” and its components, purpose and
meaning, is R.A. No. 809, ot the “Sugar Act of 1952”.
Section 1 of the act provides that “in the absence of written milling agreements
between the majority of planters and millers of sugarcane in any milling district in
the Philippines, the unrefined sugar produced in that district from the milling by the
sugar central of any sugarcane planter or plantation owner, as well as all by-products
and derivatives thereof, shall be divided between them.”
Section 9 of RA No. 809 also provides that “the proceeds of any increase in
participation granted the planters under this Act and above their present share shall
be divided between the planter and his laborers in the plantation”. 60% for the
laborer and 40% for the planter.
In RA809, the intent and purpose of the legislation was to be a social justice and
police power measure to promote the labor conditions in sugar plantations.
Agpalo, pages 109-110: Considering this purpose, the legislative meaning which is
not clearly disclosed in the language of the act, is thus indicated, which is to give the
laborers a share for as long as sugar is produced and the planters receive an increased
participation. The legislative intent is to make the Act operative irrespective of
whether there exists a milling agreement between the central and the sugar planters.
FACTS:
1. The original basic complaint in this case was filed a suit on September
23, 1954 by the Asociacion de Agricultores de Talisay - Silay, Inc, and
six sugarcane planters, collectively referred to as “planters”, against the
defendant Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Iinc, referred to as “control”. Later
on,on December 20, 1956, an amended complaint was filed, and the
Secretary of Labor was added to the plaintiff to represent the laborers,
whereas the Luon Surety Company and Philippine National Bank were
added as defendants.
2. The amended complaint alleged three main causes of action:
a. The plaintiffs complained that under R.A. 809, it is provided
that Section 1. “In the absence of written milling agreements
between the majority of planters and millers of sugarcane in any
milling district in the Philippines, the unrefined sugar produced
in that district from the milling by any sugar central of the
sugar-cane of any sugar-cane planter or plantation owner, as
 well as all by-products and derivatives thereof, shall be divided
between them as follows:” ISSUES: ​Whether or not the RA 809 will still apply, even though majority of the
i. 60% for the planter, and 40% for the central in any millers had written agreements with the millers, as provided in Section 1 of RA
milling district the maximum actual production of 809. ​Yes, RA 809 will still apply.
which is not more than four hundred thousand piculs:
Provided, That the provisions of this section shall not RATIO:
apply to sugar centrals with an actual production of 1. In effectivity of the RA 809, the contracts between the planters and
less than one hundred fifty thousand piculs.” millers in all sugar milling districts that were dated before June 22, 1952,
ii. "62.5% for the planter, and 37.5% for the central in any the date of RA 809’s effectivity, cannot be used to determine whether or
milling district the maximum actual production of not majority of the planters had written contracts in relation to RA 809’s
which exceeds four hundred thousand piculs but does application. If there were indeed written contracts, the rate of the sharing
not exceed six hundred thousand piculs; proportions between the miller and the planter should not be less than the
iii. "65% for the planter, and 35% for the central in any provisions of Section 1 of RA 809.
milling district the maximum actual production of 2. The Court ruled majority of the planters had milling contracts with
which exceeds six hundred thousand piculs but does centrals and millers, but the sharing proportion by Section 1 of RA 809
not exceed nine hundred thousand piculs; should be applied.
iv. "67.5% for the planter, and 32.5% for the central in any 3. The Court also recognized the intent and purpose of RA 809 was to
milling district the maximum actual production of promote labor conditions in sugar plantations, hence, whatever rational
which exceeds nine hundred thousand piculs but does degree of constraint it exerts on freedom of contract and existing
not exceed one million two hundred thousand piculs; contractual obligations is constitutionally permissible.
v. "70% for the planter, and 30% for the central in any
milling district the maximum actual production of
which exceeds one million two hundred thousand
piculs.
**"By actual production is meant the total production of the mill for the
crop year immediately preceding."
3. The planters, represented by the Secretary of Labor, appealed to the court
that it should apply the sharing participation of RA 809 to Talisay- Silay
Milling District. Majority of the planters did not have milling contracts,
entitling them to the sharing participation provisions in RA 809. The
planters also seek to adjudicate in their favor the amounts deposited with
PNB in the account “In Trust for Talisay- Silay Milling Co., Inc.,
Asociacion de Agricultores de Talisay-Silay, Inc., and Department of
Labor.”
Case No. 28
Manila Jockey Club, Inc. vs. Games and Amusement Board
Date of Case: February 29, 1960 | Judge: Barerra, J. |GR No. |
Topic: II. A. 9. Matters inquired into in construing a statute
PETITIONER-APPELLANT: ​Manila Jockey Club, Inc.
RESPONDENTS-APPELLEES: ​Games and Amusements Board, et al.
PETITIONER-INTERVENOR and APPELLANT: ​Philippine Racing Club
SUMMARY: ​This is a petition for declaratory relief filed by petitioner Manila
Jockey Club, Inc., in the Court of FirstInstance Manila praying that judgment be
rendered against respondents Games and Amusements Board (GAB),Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO), and Executive Secretary Fortunato de Leon.
Section 4 Republic Act No. 309, as amended by Republic Act No. 983, by express
terms, specifically reserved 23 Sundays and 16 Saturdays for the Philippine
Anti-Tuberculosis Society, the White Cross, Inc. and the PCSO, and 12 Saturdays to
the President for other charitable, relief, or civic purposes. These days can not be
disposed of by the GAB without authority of law.
When Republic Act No. 1502 increased the sweepstakes draw and races to twelve
but without specifying the days on which they are to be run,​ the board had no
alternative except to make room for additional races from among the only available
racing days unreserved by the law.
DOCTRINE: ​In the interpretation of a legal document, intention of author must not
only be ascertained but it is necessary that such intention has been expressed in such
a way as to give it legal effect and validity.
FACTS:
-RA 1052 increased the number of days for the sweepstakes draw and race to
twelve without specifying on the days on which they are to be run.
-GAB had no alternative except to make room for the additional races, from
among the only available racing days unreserved by any law- the Sundays on
which the private individuals and entities have been permitted to hold their races,
subject to licensing and determination by the GAB.
-Appellant contends that the said increase should be taken from the 12 Saturdays
reserved to the President, for charitable, relief, or civic purposes or should be
assigned to any other day of the week besides Sunday, Saturday, and Legal
holiday. Such contention cannot be sustained, as these days were specifically
reserved according to Section 4 of RA No. 309.
-Appellants also contends that additional races could be run on Sundays, yet if
they are held on a club race day, the GAB should only insert them in the club
races and not give the whole day to the PCSO.
-Several legislative debates were cited by the appellant to give light to the
meaning of the words used in the statute (as it does not say which day they are to
be run). However statements cited by the appellant are generally held inadmissible
for the reason that legislative debates are only expressive of the views and motives
of the individual members and are not safe guides.
ISSUES:​When should the additional sweepstakes draws and race be held?
Whether or not the sweepstakes draw and race be inserted in the club races?
RATIO:
-​At the time of the enactment of Republic Act No. 1502 in June 1956, the long
continuous, and uniform practice was that all sweepstakes draws and races were
held on Sundays and during the whole day. With this, when Congress chose not to
specify in express terms how the additional sweepstakes draws and races would
be held, it is safe to conclude that it did not indent to disturb the prevailing
practice.
-The language of Republic Act No. 1502 in authorizing the increase, clearly
speaks of a regulars sweepstakes draws and races. If the intention of the
Congress were to authorize additional races which could be inserted in club
races, the law would not have included ​regular races.​
-​The court held that it would be confusing and inconvenient to hold sweepstakes
races and club races all on the same day.
RULING: ​The conclusion seems inevitable that the additional sweepstakes draws
and races were intended to be held on a whole day, separate and apart from the
club races.
Case No. 29
Garcia vs. Social Security Commission Legal and Collection
December 17, 2007​: | CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: |​G.R. No. 170735 ​|
Topic: II. A. 10. Where legislative intent is ascertained
PETITIONER: ​IMMACULADA L. GARCIA
RESPONDENTS: ​SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION LEGAL AND
COLLECTION, SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM
SUMMARY:
Petitioner et al. were directors of Impact Corporation. Later, the corporation
encountered financial problems. Workers filed a declaration of strike due to the
inability of the corporation to pay their wages, SSS remittances etc. SSS filed a case
before the respondents for collection of unremitted SSS premium contributions
withheld by the corporation to its employees. Summons were sent to the petitioners
but all turned out to be deceased, except Garcia. SSC found Garcia, as surviving
responsible officer liable to pay the unpaid SSS contributions of their employees
under the SSS Law.
DOCTRINE:
​It is a cardinal rule in statutory construction that in interpreting the meaning and
scope of a term used in the law, a careful review of the ​whole law​ involved, as well
as the intendment of the law, must be made
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Immaculada L. Garcia, et al. were directors of Impact
Corporation. The corporation was engaged in the business of
manufacturing aluminum tube containers and operated two ​factories.
One was a "slug" foundry-factory located in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, while
the other was an Extrusion Plant in Cainta, Metro Manila, which
processed the "slugs" into aluminum collapsible tubes and similar
containers for toothpaste and other related products.
2. In 1978, Impact Corporation started encountering financial problems. By
1980, labor unrest besieged the corporation.
3. Workers filed a declaration of strike due to the inability of corporation to
to pay wages, 13th month pay, and SSS remittances due to cash liquidity
problems.
4. The company is directed to pay all the entitled workers unpaid wages,
unpaid 13th month pay and to remit to the Social Security System loan
amortizations and SSS premiums previously deducted from the wages of
the workers.
5. The SSS filed a case before the Social Security Commission for the
collection of unremitted SSS premium contributions withheld by Impact
Corporation from its employees. The SSS determined the amount sought
to be collected. Summons were sent to the petitioners, but they were all
determined to be deceased, except Garcia.
6. The SSC found Garcia, as responsible officer of said corporation, liable
to pay the SSS the unpaid SSS contributions of their employees.
7. S18,19,22 of SSS Law: it is the obligation of corporation to deduct from
employee’s monthly salaries their shares as premium contributions and
remit the same to the SSS.
8. Petitioner avers that under the aforesaid provision, liability does not
include liability for the unremitted SSS premium contributions.
ISSUES: Whether or not Garcia, as the only surviving director of said
corporation, can be made solely liable for the corporate obligations of the
corporation pertaining to unremitted SSS premium contributions and
penalties therefore. [under the Social Security Law]
RATIO: Yes, Garcia is liable under the SSS law.
The interpretation petitioner would like the Court to adopt finds no support in law
or in jurisprudence. While the CA Decision provided that Section 28(f) refers to
the liabilities pertaining to penalty for the non-remittance of SSS employee
contributions, holding that it is distinct from the amount of the supposed SSS
remittances, petitioner mistakenly concluded that Section 28(f) is applicable only
to penalties and not to the liability of the employer for the unremitted premium
contributions. ​The liability imposed as contemplated under the foregoing Section
28(f) of the Social Security Law does not preclude the liability for the unremitted
amount.

Under Section 22(a), ​every employer is required to deduct and remit such
contributions penalty refers to the 3% penalty that automatically attaches to the
delayed SSS premium contributions. ​The spirit, rather than the letter of a law
determines construction of a provision of law. It is a cardinal rule in statutory
construction that in interpreting the meaning and scope of a term used in the law,
a careful review of the ​whole law involved, as well as the intendment of the law,
must be made. ​Nowhere in the provision or in the Decision can it be inferred that
the persons liable are absolved from paying the unremitted premium
contributions.

In the instant case, petitioner interprets Section 28(f) of the Social Security Law as
applicable only to penalties and not to the liability of the employer for the
unremitted premium contributions. Respondents present a more logical
interpretation that is consistent with the provisions as a whole and with the
legislative intent behind the Social Security Law.

This Court cannot be made to accept an interpretation that would defeat the intent
of the law and its legislators.