RECAP
already been instituted, the latter shall be suspended in
RULE 111:Prosecution of Civil Action
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. — (a)
When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall
be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to
institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the
criminal action.
The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil
action shall be made before the prosecution starts presenting
its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended
party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against
the accused by way of moral, nominal, temperate, or
exemplary damages without specifying the amount thereof in
the complaint or information, the filing fees thereof shall
constitute a first lien on the judgment awarding such
damages.
Where the amount of damages, other than actual, is specified
in the complaint or information, the corresponding filing fees
shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in
court.
Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, no filing fees
shall be required for actual damages.
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be
filed by the accused in the criminal case, but any cause of
action which could have been the subject thereof may be
litigated in a separate civil action. (1a)
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action.
No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be
allowed.
Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the
offended party shall pay in full the filing fees based on the
amount of the check involved, which shall be considered as
the actual damages claimed. Where the complaint or
information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal,
temperate or exemplary damages, the offended party shall
pay additional filing fees based on the amounts alleged
therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but any of these
damages are subsequently awarded by the court, the filing
fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute a first lien
on the judgment.
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial
thereof has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated with
the criminal action upon application with the court trying the
latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both
actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule
governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions. (cir.
57-97)
Section 2. When separate civil action is suspended. — After
the criminal action has been commenced, the separate civil
action arising therefrom cannot be instituted until final
judgment has been entered in the criminal action.
If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has
whatever stage it may be found before judgment on the
merits. The suspension shall last until final judgment is
rendered in the criminal action. Nevertheless, before
judgment on the merits is rendered in the civil action, the
same may, upon motion of the offended party, be
consolidated with the criminal action in the court trying the
criminal action. In case of consolidation, the evidence already
adduced in the civil action shall be deemed automatically
reproduced in the criminal action without prejudice to the
right of the prosecution to cross-examine the witnesses
presented by the offended party in the criminal case and of
the parties to present additional evidence. The consolidated
criminal and civil actions shall be tried and decided jointly.
During the pendency of the criminal action, the running of the
period of prescription of the civil action which cannot be
instituted separately or whose proceeding has been
suspended shall be tolled. (n)
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it
extinction of the civil action. However, the civil action based
on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in
a final judgment in the criminal action that the act or
omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.
(2a)
Section 3. When civil action may proceeded independently.
— In the cases provided for in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action
may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed
independently of the criminal action and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the
offended party recover damages twice for the same act or
omission charged in the criminal action. (3a)
Section 4. Effect of death on civil actions. — The death of the
accused after arraignment and during the pendency of the
criminal action shall extinguish the civil liability arising from
the delict. However, the independent civil action instituted
under section 3 of this Rule or which thereafter is instituted to
enforce liability arising from other sources of obligation may
be continued against the estate or legal representative of the
accused after proper substitution or against said estate, as
the case may be. The heirs of the accused may be substituted
for the deceased without requiring the appointment of an
executor or administrator and the court may appoint a
guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or
representatives to appear and be substituted within a period
of thirty (30) days from notice.
A final judgment entered in favor of the offended party shall
be enforced in the manner especially provided in these rules
for prosecuting claims against the estate of the deceased.
If the accused dies before arraignment, the case shall be
dismissed without prejudice to any civil action the offended
party may file against the estate of the deceased. (n)
Section 5. Judgment in civil action not a bar. — A final
judgment rendered in a civil action absolving the defendant
from civil liability is not a bar to a criminal action against the
defendant for the same act or omission subject of the civil
action. (4a)
Section 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. — A
petition for suspension of the criminal action based upon the
pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be
filed in the office of the prosecutor or the court conducting the
preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been
filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in
the same criminal action at any time before the prosecution
rests. (6a)
Section 7. Elements of prejudicial question. — The elements
of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil
action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the
issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the
resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed. (5a)
Article 1191. The power to rescind obligations is implied in
reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors should not comply
with what is incumbent upon him.
The injured party may choose between the fulfillment and the
rescission of the obligation, with the payment of damages in
either case. He may also seek rescission, even after he has
chosen fulfillment, if the latter should become impossible.
The court shall decree the rescission claimed, unless there be
just cause authorizing the fixing of a period.
This is understood to be without prejudice to the rights of
third persons who have acquired the thing, in accordance with
articles 1385 and 1388 and the Mortgage Law.
Reciprocal Obligation
Created or established at the same time, out of the same
cause and which results in the mutual relationship of creditor
and debtor between the parties.
Article 1169. Those obliged to deliver or to do something
incur in delay from the time the obligee judicially or
extrajudicially demands from them the fulfillment of their
obligation.
However, the demand by the creditor shall not be necessary
in order that delay may exist:
(1) When the obligation or the law expressly so
declare; or
(2) When from the nature and the circumstances of
the obligation it appears that the designation of the
time when the thing is to be delivered or the service
is to be rendered was a controlling motive for the
establishment of the contract; or
(3) When demand would be useless, as when the
obligor has rendered it beyond his power to perform.
In reciprocal obligations, neither party incurs in delay if the
other does not comply or is not ready to comply in a proper
manner with what is incumbent upon him. From the moment
one of the parties fulfills his obligation, delay by the other
begins.
General Rule: NO DEMAND NO DELAY
When is there a breach of Obligation?
Voluntary if the debtor or obligor in the performance of his
obligation is guilty of default (mora), or fraud (dolo), or
negligence (culpa), or in any manner contravenes the tenor
thereof. Liable for damages.
Involuntary if he is unable to comply with his obligation
because of an event which cannot be foreseen, or which,
though foreseen, was inevitable. Not liable for damages.
Macasaet & Associates Inc vs COA
Held: The use of the terms "actual construction cost",
gradating into "final actual project cost" is not without
significance. The real intendment of the parties, as shown by
paragraph 5, Article V, of their Contract was to base the
ultimate balance of petitioner's professional fees not on
"actual construction cost" alone but on the final actual project
cost; not on "construction cost" alone but on "project cost."
By so providing, the Contract allowed for flexibility based on
actuality and as a matter of equity for the contracting
parties. For evidently, the final actual project cost would not
necessarily tally with the actual construction cost initially
computed. The "final actual project cost" covers the totality
of all costs as actually and finally determined, and logically
includes the escalation cost of the contract price.
It matters not that the price escalation awarded to the
construction company did not entail additional work for
petitioner. As a matter of fact, neither did it for the main
contractor. The increased cost of materials was not the doing
of either contracting party.
That an escalation clause was not specifically provided for in
the Contract is of no moment either for it may be considered
as already "built-in" and understood from the very terms
"actual construction cost," and eventually "final actual project
cost."
Article VI of the Contract, supra has no bearing on the
present controversy either. It speaks of any major change in
the planning and engineering aspects necessitating the award
and payment of additional compensation. Admittedly, there
was no additional work by petitioner, which required
additional compensation. Rather, petitioner's claim is for
payment of the balance of its professional fees based on the
"final actual project cost" and not for additional compensation
based on Article VI.
The terminologies in the contract being clear, leaving no
doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, their
literal meaning control (Article 1370, Civil Code). The price
escalation cost must be deemed included in the final actual
project cost and petitioner held entitled to the payment of its
additional professional fees. Obligations arising from contract
have the force of law between the contracting parties and
should be complied with in good faith (Article 1159, Civil
Code).
WHEREFORE, the ruling of respondent Commission on Audit
is hereby SET ASIDE and respondent Philippine Tourism
Authority is hereby ordered to pay petitioner the additional
amount of P219,302.47 to complete the payment of its
professional fee under their Contract for Project Design and
Management Services.
Agcaoili vs GSIS
Facts: In this case, appellant GSIS approved an application
of the appellee Agcaoli for the purchase of a house and lot in
the GSIS Housing Project at Nangka, Marikina, subject to the
condition that the latter should forthwith occupy the house, a
condition that Agcaoli tried to fulfill but could not because the
house was absolutely uninhabitable. However, Agcaoli ask a
homeless friend, a certain Villanueva, to stay in the premises
as some sort of watchman, pending completion of the
construction of the house.
Agcaoli after paying the first installment and other fees,
having thereafter refused to make further payment of other
stipulated installments until GSIS had made the house
habitable; and appellant having refused to do so, opting
instead to cancel the award and demanded the vacation by
Agcaoli of the premises; and the latter having sued the GSIS
in the Court of First Instance of Manila for
performance with damages and having obtained a favorable
judgment, the cases was appealed by the GSIS.
Issue: Whether or not Agcaoli is entitled for
performance with damages.
Held: Appeal of GSIS must fail.
There was then a perfected contract of sale between the
parties; there had been a meeting of minds upon the
purchase by Agcaoli of a determinate house and lot from
GSIS at a definite price which is payable in amortizations and
from that moment the parties acquired the
reciprocally demand performance. It was, to be sure, the duty
of the GSIS, as seller, to deliver the thing soled in acondition
suitable for its enjoyment by the buyer, in other words to
deliver the house subject of the contract in a reasonably
livable state. This it failed to do.
Since GSIS failed to fulfill its obligation, and was not willing to
put the house in a habitable state, it cannot invoke Agcaoli’s
suspension of payment as cause to cancel the contract
between them. In recipient obligation, neither party incur in
delay of the other does not comply or is not ready to comply
in a proper manner with what is incumbent upon him. Nor
may the GSIS succeed in justifying its cancellation of the
award by the claim tha Agcaoli had not complied with the
condition of occupying the house within three (3) days. The
record shows that Agcaoli did try to fulfill the condition.
Finally appellant having caused the ambiguity as the exact
prestation of the agreement, the question of interpretation
arising therefrom, should be resolved against it.
What is Negligence?
Negligence or culpa- signifies an act or omission which is
voluntary in character by virtue of which another person
suffers damage or injury due to a failure to observe the
diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and
which must correspond with the circumstances of persons,
time, and place.
Bacolod –Murcia Milling Co Inc vs CA
Facts: Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc.(BMMC) is the owner
and operator of the sugar central in Bacolod.
Alonso Gatuslao (Gatuslao) is a registered plantor of the Bacolod-
Muria Mill District.
BMMC and Gatuslao executed an “Extension and Modification of
Milling Contract.
From crop year 1957-1958 up to crop year 1967-1968, Gatuslao
has been milling all the sugarcane grown and produced with the
Mill of BMMC.
From crop year 1920-21 to crop year 1967-68, the canes of
planters adhered to the mill of BMMC were transported from the
plantation to the mill by means of cane cars and through railway
specific system operated by BMMC.
BMMC has been hauling planter Gatuslao’s sugar cane to its mill or
factory continuously until crop year 1967 – 1968.
specific
The milling contract between BMMC and owners of the hacienda
Helvetica expired at the end of the 1964-1965 crop year.
The portion of the railway traversing the hacienda Helvetica was
closed as per decision of the court.
The use of the railroad tracks(traversing hacienda Helvetica) was
temporarily allowed due to the intervention of the President of the
Philippines, which is until 1967-1978 milling season only.
right to
Gatuslao loaded their cut cranes on trucks provided by the
Bacolod-Murcia Agricultural Cooperative Marketing Association,
Inc. (B-MACMA) during 1968-1969 crop year.
BMMC had not been able to use its cane cars and railway system
for the cargo crop year 1968-1989.
Issue/s:
1. Whether or not the termination of petitioner’s right of way
over the hacienda Helvetica caused by the expiration of its
amended milling contracts with the landowners of the land in
question is fortuitous event or force majeure which will
exempt petitioner BMMC from fulfillment of its contractual
obligation.
2. Whether or not BMMC was able to provide adequate and
efficient transportation facilities of the canes of Gatuslao and
the other planters milling with BMMC during the crop year
1968-69.
Ruling:
1. No. The terms of the milling contracts were clear and
undoubtedly there was no reason for BMMC to expect
otherwise. The closure of any portion of the railroad track, not
necessarily in the hacienda Helvetica but in any of the
properties whose owners decided not to renew their milling
contracts with the Central upon their expiration, was
foreseeable and inevitable.
Despite its awareness that the conventional contract of lease
would expire in crop year 1964-1965 and that refusal on the
part of any one of the landowners to renew their milling
contracts and the corresponding use of the right of way on
their lands would render impossible compliance of its
commitments, BMMC took a calculated risk that all the
landowners would renew their contracts.
 The closure of the railway lines was not an act of God nor it
constitute force majeure. It was due to the termination of the
contractual relationships of the parties, for which BMMC is
charged with knowledge. Owners of the hacienda Helvetica
notified BMMC as far back as August 1965 of its intention not
to allow the passage of the railway system thru its land after
the aforesaid crop year. Adequate measures should have
been adopted by BMMC to forestall such paralyzations but the
records show none.
2. No, BMMC failed to provide adequate transportation facilities
to Gatuslao and other adherent parties.
The inadequacies of the reparto or trailer allotment as well as
the state of unpreparedness on the part of BMMC to meet the
problem posed by the closure of the railway lines.
It was established that after Gatuslao had cut his sugarcanes
for hauling, no trailers arrived and when two trailers finally
arrived on October 1968 after several unheeded requests,
they were left on the national highway about one kilometer
away from the loading station, the means of transportation
provided by BMMC is very inadequate to answer the needs of
Gatuslao.
Philcomsat v. Globe Telecom429 SCRA 153,
Facts: Globe Telecom, Inc. (Globe) is engaged in the coordination
of the provision of various communication facilities for the military
bases of the United States of America (US) in the Clark Air Base
and Subic Naval Base.
Saud communication facilities were installed and configured for
the exclusive use of the US Defense Communications Agency
(USDCA).
Globe contracted Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation
(Philcomsat) for the provision of the communication facilities.
Philcomsat and Globe entered into an agreement whereby
Philcomsat obliged itself to establish, operate and provide an IBS
Standard B earth station (earth station) for the exclusive use of
the USDCA. Globe promised to pay Philcomsat monthly rentals for
each leased circuit involved.
Philcomsat installed and established the earth station and the
USDCA made use of the same.
Senate passed and adopted its resolution, expressing its decision
not to concur in the ratification of the Treaty of Friendship,
Cooperation and Security and its Supplementary Agreements that
was supposed to extend the term of the use by the US of Subic
Naval Base, among others.
PH government sent a Note Verbale to the US government
through the US Embassy, notifying it of the Philippine termination
of the RP-US Military Base Agreement. The withdrawal of all US
military forces from Subic Naval Base should be completed by
December 31. 1992.
Globe notified Philcomsat of its intention to discontinue the use of
the earth station.
Philcomsat demand payment of rentals for the balance of lease
term, despite the non-use of earth station.
Issue/s:
1. Whether the termination of the RP-US Military Base
Agreement, the non-ratification of the Treaty of Friendship,
Cooperation and Security, and the consequent withdrawal of
US military forces and personnel from Cubi Point constitute
force majeure which would exempt Globe from complying
with its obligation to pay rentals under its Agreement with
Philcomsat.
2. Whether Globe is liable to pay rentals under the Agreement
for the month of December 1992.
3. Whether Philcomsat is entitled to attorney’s fees and
exemplary damages.
Ruling:
1. Yes. Philcomsat and Globe had no control over the non-
renewal of the term of the RP-US Military Base Agreement
when the same expired in 1991, because the prerogative to
ratify the treaty extending the life thereof belonged to the
Senate. Neither did the parties have control over the
subsequent withdrawal of the US military forces and
personnel from Cubi Point in December 1992.
As a consequence of the termination of the RP-US Military
Base Agreement the continued stay of all US Military forces
and personnel from Subic Naval Base would no longer be
allowed, hence, plaintiff would no longer be in any position to
render service it was obligated under the Agreement.
Events made impossible the continuation of the Agreement
until the end of its five-year term without fault on the part of
either party. Such fortuitous events rendered Globe exempt
from payment of rentals for the remainder of the term of the
Agreement.
Philcomsat would like to charge globe rentals for the balance
of the lease term without being any corresponding
telecommunications service subject of the lease. It will be
grossly unfair and iniquitous to hold globe liable for lease
charges for a service that was not and could not have been
rendered due to an act of the government which was clearly
beyond globes control.
2. Yes. The US military forces and personnel completely
withdrew from Cubi Point only on December 31, 1992. Thus,
until that date, USDCA had control over the earth station and
had the option of using the same. Furthermore, Philcomsat
could not have removed or rendered ineffective said
communication facility until after December 31, 1992 because
Cubi Point was accessible only to US naval personnel up to
that time.
3. No. The award of attorney’s fees is the exemption rather than
the rule. In cases where both parties have legitimate claims
against each other and no party actually prevailed, such as in
the present case where the claims of both parties were
sustained in part, an award of attorney’s fees would not be
warranted.
Exemplary damages may be awarded in cases involving
contracts, if the erring party acted in wanton, fraudulent,
reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner. It was not shown
that Globe acted wantonly or oppressively in not heeding
 Philcomsats demands for payment of rentals. Globe had valid
grounds for refusing to comply with its contractual obligations
after 1992.
Luzon Stevedoring vs Republic
Facts: Barge owned by Luzon Stevedoring Corporation(defendant,
LSC for brevity) was being towed down the Pasig river by tugboats
belonging to the same corporation.`The barge rammed against
one of the wooden piles of the Nagtahan Bailey Bridge, smashing
the posts and causing the bright to list. The river, at that time,
was swollen and the current swift, on account of the heavy
downpour of Manila and the surrounding provinces. Republic of
the Philippines (PH) sued LSC for actual and consequential
damages caused by its employees.
Issue: Whether or not the collision of LSC’s barge with the
supports or piers of the Nagtahan bridge was in law caused by
fortuitous event or force majeure.
Held: No. Considering that the Nagtahan bridge was an
immovable and stationary object and uncontrovertibly provided
with adequate openings for the passage of water craft, including
barges like of NSC’s, it is undeniable that the unusual event that
the barge, exclusively controlled by appellant, rammed the bridge
supports raises a presumption of negligence on the part of
appellant or its employees manning the barge or the tugs that
towed it. For in the ordinary course of events, such a thing does
not happen if proper case is used. Res ipsa loquitur.
NLS stresses the precautions (due diligence) taken by it: (1) that
it assigned two of its most powerful tugboats to tow down river its
barge, and (2) that it assigned to the task the more competent
and experienced among its patrons, (3) had the towlines, engines
and equipment double-checked and inspected; (4) that it
instructed its patrons to take extra precautions. These very
precautions, completely destroy the NLS’defense.
Caso fortuito or force majeure by definition, are extraordinary
events not foreseeable or avoidable, events that could not be
foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable.” It is,
therefore, not enough that the event should not have been
foreseen or anticipated, as is commonly believed, but it must be
one impossible to foresee or to avoid. The more difficulty to
foresee the happening is not impossibility to foresee the same.
The very measures adopted by NSC prove that the possibility of
danger was not only foreseeable, but actually foreseen, and was
not caso fortuito.
LSC, knowing and appreciating the perils posed by the swollen
steam and its swift current, voluntarily entered into a situation
involving obvious danger; it therefore assured the risk, and cannot
shed responsibility merely because the precautions it adopted
turned out to be insufficient.
What is Fortuitous Event?
Fortuitous event (caso fortuito) may be defined as an event could
not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, was inevitable.
Absolutely independent of human intervention; act of God.
FORCE MAJEURE - an event caused by the legitimate or
illegitimate acts of persons other than the obligor; there is human
intervention.
 Conditions which exempt obligor from liability (Essential
Characteristics)
1. event is independent of the will of obligor
2. it must either be unforeseeable or unavoidable
3. occurrence must render it impossible for the debtor
to fulfill the obligation in a normal matter
4. the obligor is free of participation in injury to
creditor.
REQUISITES OF FORTUITOUS EVENT:
1. Independent of the human will (or at least of the
obligor’s)
2. Unforeseen or unavoidable
3. Of such character as to render it impossible for
the obligor to comply with his obligation in a
normal manner
4. Obligor – free from any
participation/aggravation of the injury to the
obligee (no negligence or imprudence)
EXEPTIONS:
1. When it is expressly stipulated that he shall be liable
even if non-performance of the obligation is due to
fortuitous events;
2. When the nature of the obligation requires the
assumption of risk;
3. When the obligor is in delay;
4. When the obligor has promised the same thing to
two or more persons who do not have the same
interest;
5. When the possessor is in bad faith and the thing lost
or deteriorated due to fortuitous event;
6. When the obligor contributed to the loss of the thing.
1161. Civil obligations arising from criminal offenses
shall be governed by the penal laws, subject to the
provisions of Article 2177, and of the pertinent
provisions of Chapter 2, Preliminary in Human
Relations, and of Title 18 of this book, regulating
damages.
Governing rules:
1. Pertinent provisions of the RPC and other penal laws
subject to Art 2177 Civil Code
[Art 100, RPC – Every person criminally liable for a felony is
also civilly liable]
2. Chapter 2, Preliminary title, on Human Relations (
Civil Code )
3. Title 18 of Book IV of the Civil Code – on damages
 Every person criminally liable for a felony is also
criminally liable (art. 100, RPC)
CRIMINAL LIABILITY INCLUDES:
(a) RESTITUTION – restoration of property
previously taken away; the thing itself shall
be restored, even though it be found in the
possession of a third person who has
acquired it by lawful means, saving to the
latter his action against the proper person
who may be liable to him.
(b) REPARATION OF THE DAMAGE CAUSED –
court determines the amount of damage:
price of a thing, sentimental value, etc.
(c) INDEMNIFICATION FOR CONSEQUENTIAL
DAMAGES – includes damages suffered by
the family of the injured party or by a third
person by reason of the crime.
Effect of acquittal in criminal case: sustained injuries. These cases involve actions ex
contractu against the owners of PRBL filed by the son
a. when acquittal is due to reasonable doubt – no civil and the heirs of the mother. Lower Court dismissed the
liability actions, holding that the accident was a fortuitous
b. when acquittal is due to exempting circumstances – there
event.
is civil liability
c. when there is preponderance of evidence – there is civil
liability ISSUE:

Whether or not the carrier is liable for the

1162. Obligations derived from quasi-delicts shall be manufacturing defect of the steering knuckle, and
governed by the provisions of chapter 2, title 17 of this whether the evidence discloses that in regard thereto
book, and by special laws. the carrier exercised the diligence required by law (Art.
1755, new Civil Code)
QUASI-DELICT (culpa aquiliana) – an act or omission by a
person which causes damage to another giving rise to an HELD: Yes.
obligation to pay for the damage done, there being fault or
negligence but there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between parties.
While the carrier is not an insurer of the safety of the
passengers, the manufacturer of the defective
REQUISITES: appliance is considered in law the agent of the carrier,
and the good repute of the manufacturer will not
a. omission relieve the carrier from liability. The rationale of the
b. negligence carrier’s liability is the fact that the passengers has no
c. damage cause to the plaintiff privity with the manufacturer of the defective
d. direct relation of omission, being the cause, and equipment; hence, he has no remedy against him,
the damage, being the effect while the carrier has. We find that the defect could be
e. no pre-existing contractual relations between
detected. The periodical, usual inspection of the
parties
steering knuckle did not measure up to the “utmost
Fault or Negligence – consists in the omission of that diligence
which is required by the nature of the obligation and diligence of a very cautious person” as “far as human
corresponds with the circumstances of the person, time, and care and foresight can provide” and therefore the
of the place. knuckle’s failure cannot be considered a fortuitous
event that exempts the carrier from responsibility.
BASIS DELICTS QUASI-DELICTS

1. INTENT Criminal / Negligence

malicious

2. INTEREST Affects PUBLIC Affects PRIVATE

interest interest

3. LIABILITY Criminal and Civil liability

civil liabilities

4. PURPOSE Purpose – Indemnification

punishment

5.COMPROMISE Cannot be Can be compromised

compromised

6. GUILT Proved beyond Preponderance of

reasonable evidence
doubt

RULE 16: Motion to Dismiss

Section 1. (j) That a condition precedent for filing the

claim has not been complied with.

NECESITO vs. PARAS, G.R. No. L-10605, June 30,

1958)

FACTS: A mother and her son boarded a passenger

auto-truck of the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines. While
entering a wooden bridge, its front wheels swerved to
the right, the driver lost control and the truck fell into
a breast-deep creek. The mother drowned and the son