ALEJANDRO ESTRADA V. SOLEDAD ESCRITOR remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person's or institution's religion.
on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person's or institution's religion. In the ideal world, the
Topic: Benevolent Neutrality Approach on the Separation of Church and State
FACTS:
Estrada requested the RTC Judge of Las Pinas City to investigate Escritor, court interpreter in said court, for
living with a man not her husband, and having borne a child within this live-in arrangement. Consequently,
respondent was charged with committing "disgraceful and immoral conduct" under Book V, Title I, Chapter VI,
Sec. 46(b)(5) of the Revised Administrative Code.
Escritor testified that she has been a widow since 1999, her husband having died in 1998. She admitted
that she started living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. without the benefit of marriage more than twenty years ago when
her husband was still alive but living with another woman. She also admitted that she and Quilapio have a son.
But as a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovah's Witnesses, respondent asserted that their conjugal
arrangement is in conformity with their religious beliefs and has the approval of her congregation. In fact, after
ten years of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991, a "Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness."
By invoking the religious beliefs, practices and moral standards of her congregation, in asserting that her
conjugal arrangement does not constitute disgraceful and immoral conduct for which she should be held
administratively liable, the Court had to determine the contours of religious freedom under Article III, Section 5
of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Escritor is to be held administratively liable.
HELD:
Yes, Escritor is still administratively liable. The theory of benevolent neutrality or accommodation is premised
on a different view of the "wall of separation," associated with Williams, founder of the Rhode Island colony.
Unlike the Jeffersonian wall that is meant to protect the state from the church, the wall is meant to protect the
church from the state.
Benevolent neutrality recognizes that religion plays an important role in the public life of the United States as
shown by many traditional government practices which, to strict neutrality, pose Establishment Clause questions.
Among these are the inscription of "In God We Trust" on American currency; the recognition of America as "one
nation under God" in the official pledge of allegiance to the flag; the Supreme Court's time-honored practice of
opening oral argument with the invocation "God save the United States and this Honorable Court"; and the
practice of Congress and every state legislature of paying a chaplain, usually of a particular Protestant
denomination, to lead representatives in prayer. These practices clearly show the preference for one theological
viewpoint — the existence of and potential for intervention by a god — over the contrary theological viewpoint
of atheism. Church and government agencies also cooperate in the building of low-cost housing and in other
forms of poor relief, in the treatment of alcoholism and drug addiction, in foreign aid and other government
activities with strong moral dimension.
The benevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect to these governmental actions,
accommodation of religion may be allowed, not to promote the government's favored form of religion, but to
allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. The purpose of accommodations is to
legislature would recognize the religions and their practices and would consider them, when practical, in enacting
laws of general application. But when the legislature fails to do so, religions that are threatened and burdened
may turn to the courts for protection.
Thus, what is sought under the theory of accommodation is not a declaration of unconstitutionality of a
facially neutral law, but an exemption from its application or its "burdensome effect," whether by the legislature
or the courts. Most of the free exercise claims brought to the U.S. Court are for exemption, not invalidation of the
facially neutral law that has a "burdensome" effect.
Having established that benevolent neutrality-accommodation is the framework by which free exercise
cases must be decided, the next question then turned to the test that should be used in ascertaining the limits of
the exercise of religious freedom.
At this point, we must emphasize that the adoption of the benevolent neutrality- accommodation
approach does not mean that the Court ought to grant exemptions every time a free exercise claim comes before
it. Although benevolent neutrality is the lens with which the Court ought to view religion clause cases, the interest
of the state should also be afforded utmost protection. This is precisely the purpose of the test — to draw the line
between mandatory, permissible and forbidden religious exercise.
Be that as it may, the free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental rights in our
Constitution.It is a fundamental right that enjoys a preferred position in the hierarchy of rights — "the most
inalienable and sacred of human rights," in the words of Jefferson. Hence, it is not enough to contend that the
state's interest is important, because our Constitution itself holds the right to religious freedom sacred. The State
must articulate in specific terms the state interest involved in preventing the exemption, which must be
compelling, for only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests can limit the fundamental right to
religious freedom. To rule otherwise would be to emasculate the Free Exercise Clause as a source of right by
itself.
Thus, we find that in this particular case and under these distinct circumstances, respondent Escritor's conjugal
arrangement cannot be penalized as she has made out a case for exemption from the law based on her fundamental
right to freedom of religion. The Court recognizes that state interests must be upheld in order that freedoms —
including religious freedom — may be enjoyed. In the area of religious exercise as a preferred freedom, however,
man stands accountable to an authority higher than the state, and so the state interest sought to be upheld must be
so compelling that its violation will erode the very fabric of the state that will also protect the freedom. In the
absence of a showing that such state interest exists, man must be allowed to subscribe to the Infinite.
SAGUISAG v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OCHOA
Topic: nature of agreements which cover presence of foreign military personnel
FACTS:
· The petitions before SC question the constitutionality of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement
(EDCA) between the PH and the US.
· This is a Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration seeking to reverse the Decision of this Court in
Saguisag et. al., v. Executive Secretary dated 12 January 2016, wherein SC ruled that EDCA was not a treaty.
· Petitioners allege that respondents (the Executive Dept.) committed gadalej when they entered into EDCA
with the U.S. in the form of an executive agreement, claiming that the instrument violated multiple constitutional
provisions.
· Petitioners move that EDCA must be in the form of a treaty in order to comply with the constitutional
restriction under Section 25, Article· XVIII of the 1987 Constitution on foreign military bases, troops, and
facilities.
· Petitioners argue that EDCA’s provisions fall outside the allegedly limited scope of the VFA and MDT
because it provides a wider arrangement than the VFA for military bases, troops, and facilities, and it allows the
establishment of U.S. military bases.
· Respondents argue that petitioners lack standing to bring the suit. To support the legality of their actions,
respondents invoke the 1987 Constitution, treaties, and judicial precedents.
ISSUE:
Whether or not EDCA is a treaty.
HELD:
· NO, it is an executive agreement. EDCA is not constitutionally infirm. As an executive agreement, it
remains consistent with existing laws and treaties that it purports to implement.
· Petitioners claim that the VFA and MDT did not allow EDCA to contain the following provisions:
1. Agreed Locations
2. Rotational presence of personnel
3. U.S. contractors
4. Activities of U.S. contractors
· We ruled in Saguisag, et. al. that the EDCA is not a treaty despite the presence of these provisions. The
very nature of EDCA, its provisions and subject matter, indubitably categorize it as an executive agreement – a
class of agreement that is not covered by the Article XVIII Section 25 restriction
· As culled from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, past Supreme Court Decisions, and
works of noted scholars, executive agreements merely involve arrangements on the implementation of existing
policies, rules, laws, or agreements.
They are concluded
(1) to adjust the details of a treaty;
(2) pursuant to or upon confirmation by an act of the Legislature; or
(3) in the exercise of the President’s independent powers under the Constitution.
· The raison d’etre of executive agreements hinges on prior constitutional or legislative authorizations.
· The special nature of an executive agreement is not just a domestic variation in international agreements.
· International practice has accepted the use of various forms and designations of international agreements,
ranging from the traditional notion of a treaty – which connotes a formal, solemn instrument – to engagements
concluded in modern, simplified forms that no longer necessitate ratification.
· An international agreement may take different forms: treaty, act, protocol, agreement, concordat, compromis
d’arbitrage, convention, covenant, declaration, exchange of notes, statute, pact, charter, agreed minute,
memorandum of agreement, modus vivendi, or some other form.
· Consequently, under international law, the distinction between a treaty and an international agreement or
even an executive agreement is irrelevant for purposes of determining international rights and obligations.
· However, this principle does not mean that the domestic law distinguishing treaties, international
agreements, and executive agreements is relegated to a mere variation in form, or that the constitutional
requirement of Senate concurrence is demoted to an optional constitutional directive. There remain two very
important features that distinguish treaties from executive agreements and translate them into terms of art in the
domestic setting.
· First, executive agreements must remain traceable to an express or implied authorization under the
Constitution, statutes, or treaties. The absence of these precedents puts the validity and effectivity of executive
agreements under serious question for the main function of the Executive is to enforce the Constitution and the
laws enacted by the Legislature, not to defeat or interfere in the performance of these rules. In turn, executive
agreements cannot create new international obligations that are not expressly allowed or reasonably implied in
the law they purport to implement.
· Second, treaties are, by their very nature, considered superior to executive agreements. Treaties are products
of the acts of the Executive and the Senate unlike executive agreements, which are solely executive actions.
Because of legislative participation through the Senate, a treaty is regarded as being on the same level as a statute.
If there is an irreconcilable conflict, a later law or treaty takes precedence over one that is prior. An executive
agreement is treated differently. Executive agreements that are inconsistent with either a law or a treaty are
considered ineffective. Both types of international agreement are nevertheless subject to the supremacy of the
Constitution.
· Subsequently, the Decision goes to great lengths to illustrate the source of EDCA’s validity, in that as an
executive agreement it fell within the parameters of the VFA and MDT, and seamlessly merged with the whole
web of Philippine law. We need not restate the arguments here. It suffices to state that this Court remains
unconvinced that EDCA deserves treaty status under the law.
· We find no reason for EDCA to be declared unconstitutional. It fully conforms to the Philippines’ legal
regime through the MDT and VFA. It also fully conforms to the government’s continued policy to enhance our
military capability in the face of various military and humanitarian issues that may arise.
WHEREFORE, we hereby DISMISS the petitions.
OPOSA v. FACTORAN JR
Topic: Promotion of health (Art. II, Sections 15-16 and Art. XIII, Sections 11-13)
FACTS:
- The controversy begun as Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed before the RTC of Makati City Branch
66.
- The principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded
as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit
corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our
environment and natural resources.
- The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable
Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners.
- The complaint was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of
the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural
resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests."
- The same was filed for themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said
resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court."
- The minors further asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn."
- It is prayed for that judgment be rendered ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons
acting in his behalf to:
(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements (TLAs) in the country;
(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new TLAs. and
(3) granting the plaintiffs such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.
- The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine archipelago of 7,100 islands has a
land area of thirty million (30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and verdant rainforests in which
varied, rare and unique species of flora and fauna may be found.
- These rainforests contain a genetic, biological and chemical pool which is irreplaceable; they are also the
habitat of indigenous Philippine cultures which have existed, endured and flourished since time immemorial.
- Scientific evidence reveals that in order to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology, the country's land
area should be utilized on the basis of a ratio of fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover and forty-six per cent
(46%) for agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial and other uses.
- The distortion and disturbance of this balance as a consequence of deforestation have resulted in a host of
environmental tragedies.
- Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and deforestation are
so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice.
- On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint
based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue raised
by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of
Government.
- In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners maintain that (1) the complaint shows a
clear and unmistakable cause of action, (2) the motion is dilatory and (3) the action presents a justiciable question
as it involves the defendant's abuse of discretion.
- On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss. In the
said order, not only was the defendant's claim — that the complaint states no cause of action against him and that
it raises a political question — sustained, the respondent Judge further ruled that the granting of the relief prayed
for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.
- Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court and asked the Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge
gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action.
Petitioners:
o Contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it contains sufficient allegations
concerning their right to a sound environment, the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the
concept of generational genocide and the concept of man's inalienable right to self-preservation and self-
perpetuation.
o Rely on the respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right
to a healthful environment.
o It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion in granting
Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is available involves a judicial
question.
o Non-impairment clause does not apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts.
o Even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said clause, it is well settled that they may still be revoked
by the State when the public interest so requires.
Respondents:
o Aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the respondent
Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. They see nothing in the complaint but vague and nebulous
allegations concerning an "environmental right" which supposedly entitles the petitioners to the "protection by
the state in its capacity as parens patriae." Such allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid cause of
action.
o They then reiterate the theory that the question of whether logging should be permitted in the country is a
political question which should be properly addressed to the executive or legislative branches of Government.
They therefore assert that the petitioners' resources is not to file an action to court, but to lobby before Congress
for the passage of a bill that would ban logging totally.
o As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot be done by the State
without due process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period of time — usually for
twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same can neither be revised nor cancelled unless the holder has
been found, after due notice and hearing, to have violated the terms of the agreement or other forestry laws and
regulations. Petitioners' proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing
would be violative of the requirements of due process.
Issue/s:
- Whether or not the petitioners have a cause of action to prevent the misappropriation or impairment of
Philippine rainforests and arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued
rape of Mother Earth. (YES)
Ruling:
- The instant Petition is granted, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge is set aside. The petitioners
may therefore amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber
license agreements.
RIGHT TO A BALANCED AND HEALTHFUL ECOLOGY:
- The complaint focuses on the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our
nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law (Section 16, Article II of the 1987
Constitution).
- This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the Section 15 of the same article.
- While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and
State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and
political rights enumerated in the latter.
- Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-
preservation and self-perpetuation the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and
constitutions.
- As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to
exist from the inception of humankind.
- If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of
its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies
by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn
obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else
would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come — generations which stand to inherit
nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.
- The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing
the environment.
- The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the
country's forests.
- Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be irreversiby disrupted.
- Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to health, then
President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, Section 4 of which expressly mandates
that the Department of Environment and Natural Resources "shall be the primary government agency responsible
for the conservation, management, development and proper use of the country's environment and natural
resources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral, resources, including those in reservation and watershed
areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as may be
provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the
present and future generations of Filipinos."
- This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987.
It stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of
the environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of the DENR;
however, it makes particular reference to the fact of the agency's being subject to law and higher authority.
- Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the
bases for policy formulation, and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR.
- On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No. 1152 (Philippine
Environment Code) were issued. As its goal, it speaks of the "responsibilities of each generation as trustee and
guardian of the environment for succeeding generations." The latter statute, on the other hand, gave flesh to the
said policy.
- Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as
clear as the DENR's duty — under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and
the Administrative Code of 1987 — to protect and advance the said right.
- A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or
protect the same gives rise to a cause of action.
MMDA, DENR, DECS, DOH, DA, DPWH, DBM, PHILIPPINE COAST GUARD, PNP MARITIME
GROUP AND DILG v. Concerned Citizens of Manila Bay (GR Nos. 171947-48)
FACTS:
· On 29 January 1999, concerned citizens of Manila Bay (respondents) filed a complaint before the RTC of
Imus, Cavite against several government agencies, among them the petitioners, for the cleanup, rehabilitation and
protection of Manila Bay.
· Respondents alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below the allowable standards
set by Presidential Decree No. 1152 (PD 1152) of the Philippine Environment Code. The continued neglect of
the petitioners in abating the pollution in Manila Bay constitutes a violation of numerous environmental laws.
Thus, respondents pray that petitioners be ordered to clean the Manila Bay and to submit a concrete plan of action
for the purpose.
· The RTC ordered petitioners to clean up and rehabilitate Manila Bay. The dispositive portion reads:
“WHEREFORE, finding merit in the complaint, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the above named
defendant-government agencies, jointly and solidarily, to clean up and rehabilitate Manila Bay and restore its
waters to SB classification to make it fit for swimming, skin-diving and other forms of contact recreation. To
attain this, defendant-agencies, with defendant DENR as the lead agency, are directed, within six (6) months from
receipt hereof, to act and perform their respective duties by devising a consolidated, coordinated and concerted
scheme of action for the rehabilitation and restoration of the bay.
· Before the CA, petitioners contend that the provisions of the Environment Code relate only to the cleaning
of specific pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in general. Also, cleaning of the Manila Bay is not a
ministerial act which can be compelled by mandamus.
· CA affirmed the RTC decision in toto. Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE
1. WON the cleaning or rehabilitation of Manila Bay is a ministerial act of petitioners that can be compelled
by mandamus
2. WON Sections 17 and 20 of PD 1152 relate only to the cleaning of specific pollution incidents and do
not cover cleaning in general
RULING
1. Yes. Petitioners argue that MMDA’s duty to take measures and maintain adequate solid waste and liquid
disposal system necessarily involves policy evaluation and the exercise of judgment on the part of the agency
concerned.
On the other hand, respondents alleges that the statutory command for the petitioners is clear and their duty to
comply with and act according to the clear mandate of the law does not require the exercise of discretion
The petitioners’ obligation to perform their duties as defined by law, on one hand, and how they are to carry out
such duties, on the other, are two different concepts. While the implementation of the MMDAs mandated tasks
may entail a decision-making process, the enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law exacts to
be done is ministerial in nature and may be compelled by mandamus.
The MMDAs duty in the area of solid waste disposal,is set forth not only in the Environment Code (PD 1152)
and the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act (RA 9003), but in its charter as well. This duty of putting up a
proper waste disposal system cannot be characterized as discretionary, for discretion presupposes the power or
right given by law to public functionaries to act officially according to their judgment or conscience. A
discretionary duty is one that allows a person to exercise judgment and choose to perform or not to perform. Any
suggestion that the MMDA has the option whether or not to perform its solid waste disposal-related duties ought
to be dismissed for want of legal basis.
The Petitioners’ enabling laws and issuances are in themselves clear, categorical, and complete as to their
obligations and mandate. The Court need not belabor the issue that their tasks include the cleanup of the Manila
Bay.
2. No. The disputed sections are quoted as follows:
Section 17. Upgrading of Water Quality.Where the quality of water has deteriorated to a degree where its state
will adversely affect its best usage, the government agencies concerned shall take such measures as may be
necessary to upgrade the quality of such water to meet the prescribed water quality standards.
Section 20. Clean-up Operations.It shall be the responsibility of the polluter to contain, remove and clean-up
water pollution incidents at his own expense. In case of his failure to do so, the government agencies concerned
shall undertake containment, removal and clean-up operations and expenses incurred in said operations shall be
charged against the persons and/or entities responsible for such pollution.
Section 16 of the Clean Water Act amended Section 20 of the Environment Code in this wise:
SEC. 16. Cleanup Operations .Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 15 and 26 hereof, any person who
causes pollution in or pollutes water bodies in excess of the applicable and prevailing standards shall be
responsible to contain, remove and clean up any pollution incident at his own expense to the extent that the same
water bodies have been rendered unfit for utilization and beneficial use: Provided, That in the event emergency
cleanup operations are necessary and the polluter fails to immediately undertake the same, the [DENR] in
coordination with other government agencies concerned, shall undertake containment, removal and cleanup
operations. Expenses incurred in said operations shall be reimbursed by the persons found to have caused such
pollution under proper administrative determination x x x. Reimbursements of the cost incurred shall be made to
the Water Quality Management Fund or to such other funds where said disbursements were sourced.
Petitioners contend at every turn that Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code concern themselves only with the
matter of cleaning up in specific pollution incidents, as opposed to cleanup in general. They aver that the twin
provisions would have to be read alongside the succeeding Sec. 62(g) and (h), which defines the terms cleanup
operations and accidental spills, as follows:
g. Clean-up Operations [refer] to activities conducted in removing the pollutants discharged or spilled in water to
restore it to pre-spill condition.
h. Accidental Spills [refer] to spills of oil or other hazardous substances in water that result from accidents such
as collisions and groundings.
To respondents, petitioners parochial view on environmental issues, coupled with their narrow reading of their
respective mandated roles, has contributed to the worsening water quality of the Manila Bay. Assuming,
respondents assert, that petitioners are correct in saying that the cleanup coverage of Sec. 20 of PD 1152 is
constricted by the definition of the phrase cleanup operations embodied in Sec. 62(g), Sec. 17 is not hobbled by
such limiting definition. As pointed out, the phrases cleanup operations and accidental spills do not appear in said
Sec. 17, not even in the chapter where said section is found.
The Court ruled that respondents are correct. For one thing, said Sec. 17 does not in any way state that the
government agencies concerned ought to confine themselves to the containment, removal, and cleaning operations
when a specific pollution incident occurs. On the contrary, Sec. 17 requires them to act even in the absence of a
specific pollution incident, as long as water quality has deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely
affect its best usage. This section, to stress, commands concerned government agencies, when appropriate, to take
such measures as may be necessary to meet the prescribed water quality standards. In fine, the underlying duty to
upgrade the quality of water is not conditional on the occurrence of any pollution incident.
For another, a perusal of Sec. 20 of the Environment Code, as couched, indicates that it is properly applicable to
a specific situation in which the pollution is caused by polluters who fail to clean up the mess they left behind. In
such instance, the concerned government agencies shall undertake the cleanup work for the polluters account.
The cleanup and/or restoration of the Manila Bay is only an aspect and the initial stage of the long-term solution.
The preservation of the water quality of the bay after the rehabilitation process is as important as the cleaning
phase.
It thus behooves the Court to put the heads of the petitioner-department-agencies and the bureaus and offices
under them on continuing notice about, and to enjoin them to perform, their mandates and duties towards cleaning
up the Manila Bay and preserving the quality of its water to the ideal level. Under what other judicial discipline
describes as continuing mandamus. the Court may, under extraordinary circumstances, issue directives with the
end in view of ensuring that its decision would not be set to naught by administrative inaction or indifference.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION
The petition is denied. The RTC decision is affirmed with modifications.
BORACAY FOUNDATION v. PROVINCE OF AKLAN
Topic: Promotion of health (Art. II, Sections 15-16 and Art. XIII, Sections 11-13)
FACTS:
More than a decade ago, Respondent Province of Aklan built the Caticlan Jetty Port and Passenger Terminal at
Barangay Caticlan to be the main gateway to Boracay. It also built the corresponding Cagban Jetty Port and
Passenger Terminal to be the receiving end for tourists in Boracay.
In 2005, Petitioner Boracay Foundation, Inc., a registered, non-stock domestic corporation dedicated to
environment-conscious development of Boracay Island, participated in the Boracay 2010 Summit with
representatives from the national government, LGUs and others from the private sectors. In the Summit, there
was a consensus that government support was lacking, infrastructure was poor, and, the influx of tourists to
Boracay was increasing. Hence, Respondent Province of Aklan conceptualize the expansion of the port facilities
at Barangay Caticlan and submitted an application for the foreshore lease of areas along the shorelines of
Barangay Caticlan.
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Respondent, Province of Aklan, approved and allowed the provincial governor
of Aklan to send a letter to Respondent Philippine Reclamation Authority (respondent PRA) formerly PEA, and
expressing its intent to reclaim the foreshore land.
However, Both the Sangguniang Barangay of Caticlan, and the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Malay
opposed the applications. That the foreshore lease practically covered almost all the coastlines of said barangay,
diminishing its territorial jurisdiction, and depriving right of preference in the utilization of the natural resources,
and that it was for proprietary or business purpose and at the expense of the local government of Malay.
Thereafter, The Provincial Governor submitted an Environmental Performance Report and Monitoring Program
(EPRMP) to DENR-EMB RVI, as an initial step for securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC).
Within the same month of October 2009, respondent Province deliberated on the possible expansion from its
original proposed reclamation area of 2.64 hectares to forty (40) hectares.
On April 27, 2010, DENR-EMB RVI issued to respondent Province of Aklan ECC for Phase 1 of the Reclamation
Project to the extent of 2.64 hectares to be done along the Caticlan side beside the existing jetty port.
On May 17, 2010, respondent Province entered into a MOA with respondent PRA after PRA approved its
application.
Later on June 17, 2010, Province called for "public consultation meeting" and presented the Reclamation
Project and only then detailed the actions that it had already undertaken, particularly: the issuance of the
Caticlan Super Marina Bonds to fund the project expansion; the execution of the MOA with respondent
PRA; the alleged conduct of an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) study for the reclamation project;
and the expansion of the project to forty (40) hectares from 2.64 hectares.
Petitioner Boracay Foundation transmitted its Resolution No. 001, Series of 2010, registering its opposition to the
reclamation project to Respondents Province of Aklan, PRA, DENR-EMB, the National Economic Development
Authority Region VI, the Malay Municipality, and other concerned entities. It allege despite the Malay
Municipalitys denying respondent Provinces request for a favorable endorsement of the foreshore lease, and
strong opposition by Barangay Caticlan and petitioner Boracay Foundation, respondent Province still continued
with the implementation of the Reclamation Project.
On June 1, 2011, Boracay Foundation filed a Petition for Environmental Protection Order/Issuance of the Writ of
Continuing Mandamus and on June 7, 2011, this Court issued a Temporary Environmental Protection Order
(TEPO).
Petitioners argued to the court that:
1) Province of Aklan failed to comply with relevant rules and regulations in the acquisition of an ECC because:
a) its approval of Provinces classification of the project as a mere expansion of the existing jetty port in Caticlan,
instead of classifying it as a new project;
b) Its classification of the reclamation project as a single instead of a co-located project;
c) The lack of prior public consultations and approval of local government agencies; and
d) The lack of comprehensive studies regarding the impact of the reclamation project to the environment.
2) The reclamation of land bordering the strait between Caticlan and Boracay shall adversely affect the frail
ecological balance of the area
Issue:
WON Province of Aklan complied with all the requirements under the pertinent laws and regulations;
Rulling: NO
The EIA report Submitted by Province of Aklan did not cover the impact of the new constructions and building
on the reclaimed land to the surrounding environment. A significant portion of the reclaimed area would be
devoted to the construction of a commercial building, and the area to be utilized for the expansion of the jetty port
consists of a mere 3,000 square meters (sq. m).
The Local Government Code establishes the duties of national government agencies in the maintenance of
ecological balance, and requires them to secure prior public consultation and approval of local government units
for the projects described therein.
Even if the project proponent is the local government of Aklan, it is respondent PRA which authorized the
reclamation, being the exclusive agency of the government to undertake reclamation nationwide. Hence, it was
necessary for respondent Province to go through respondent PRA and to execute a MOA, wherein respondent
PRAs authority to reclaim was delegated to respondent Province.
This project can be classified as a national project that affects the environmental and ecological balance of local
communities, and is covered by the requirements found in the Local Government Code provisions.

Under the Local Government Code, therefore, two requisites must be met before a national project that affects
the environmental and ecological balance of local communities can be implemented: prior consultation with the
affected local communities, and prior approval of the project by the appropriate sanggunian. Absent either of
these mandatory requirements, the projects implementation is illegal.
In this case, respondent Province had already filed its ECC application before it met with the local
government units of Malay and Caticlan.
The lack of prior public consultation and approval is not corrected by the subsequent endorsement of the
reclamation project by the Sangguniang Barangay of Caticlan on February 13, 2012, and the Sangguniang Bayan
of the Municipality of Malay on February 28, 2012, which were both undoubtedly achieved at the urging and
insistence of respondent Province.
It is clear that both petitioner and respondent Province are interested in the promotion of tourism in Boracay and
the protection of the environment, lest they kill the proverbial hen that lays the golden egg. At the beginning of
this decision, we mentioned that there are common goals of national significance that are very apparent from both
the petitioners and the respondents respective pleadings and memoranda.
As shown by the above provisions of our laws and rules, the speedy and smooth resolution of these issues would
benefit all the parties. Thus, respondent Provinces cooperation with respondent DENR-EMB RVI in the Court-
mandated review of the proper classification and environmental impact of the reclamation project is of utmost
importance.
Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tañon Strait v. Secretary Angelo Reyes in his
capacity as Secretary of the Department of Energy, et.al.
FACTS:
On 13 June 2002, the Government of the Philippines, acting through the Department of Energy (DOE) entered
into a Geophysical Survey and Exploration Contract-102 (GSEC-102) with Japan Petroleum Exploration Co.,
Ltd. (JAPEX). The studies included surface geology, sample analysis, and reprocessing of seismic and magnetic
data. Geophysical and satellite surveys as well as oil and gas sampling in Tañon Strait was conducted.
On 12 December 2004, DOE and JAPEX converted GSEC-102 to Service Contract No. 46 (SC-46) for the
exploration, development, and production of petroleum resources in a block covering approximately 2,850 sqm.
offshore the Tañon Strait.
From 9-18 May 2005, JAPEX conducted seismic surveys in and around Tañon Strait, including a multi-channel
sub-bottom profiling covering approximately 751 kms. to determine the area’s underwater composition. During
the 2nd sub-phase of the project, JAPEX committed to drill one exploration well. Since the same was to be drilled
in the marine waters of Aloguisan and Pinamungajan where the Tañon Strait was declared a protected seascape
in 1988, JAPEX agreed to comply with the Environmental Impact Assessment requirements under Presidential
Decree No. 1586 (PD 1586), entitled “Establishing an Environmental Impact Statement System, Including Other
Environmental Management Related Measures and For Other Purposes.”
On 31 January 2007, the Protected Area Management Board (PAMB) of the Tañon Strait issued Resolution No.
2007-01 where it adopted the Initial Environmental Examination commissioned by JAPEX, and favourably
recommended the approval of the latter’s application for an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC).
On 6 March 2007, DENR-EMB Region VII granted an ECC to DOE and JAPEX for the offshore oil and gas
exploration project in Tañon Strait. From 16 November 2007 to 8 February 2008, JAPEX drilled an exploratory
well with a depth of 3,150 meters near Pinamungajan town.
On 17 December 2007, two separate original petitions were filed commonly seeking that the implementation of
SC-46 be enjoined for violation of the 1987 Constitution. The petitioners in G.R. No. 180771 are the “Resident
Marine Mammals” which inhibit the waters in and around the Tañon Strait, joined by “Stewards” Gloria Estenzo
Ramos and Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio as their legal guardians and friends seeking their protection. Also impleaded
as unwilling co-petitioner is former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. In G.R. No. 181527, the petitioners are
the Central Visayas Fisherfolk Development Center (FIDEC), a non-stock, non-profit, non-governmental
organization established for the welfare of the marginal fisherfolk in Region VII and representatives of the
subsistence fisherfolk of the municipalities of Aloguinsan and Pinamungajan, Cebu. Their contentions are:
· A study made after the seismic survey showed that there is a drastic reduce in fish catch by 50-70%
attributable to the destruction of the “payao” or the artificial reef.
· The ECC obtained by the respondents is invalid because there is no public consultations and discussions
prior to its issuance.
· SC-46 is null and void for having violated Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, considering that
there is no general law prescribing the standard or uniform terms, conditions, and requirements for service
contracts involving oil exploration and extraction
· FIDEC alleges that it was barred from entering and fishing within a 7-kilometer radius from the point where
the oilrig was located, an area grated than the 1.5-kilometer radius exclusion zone stated in the Initial
Environmental Examination
The respondents in both petitions are: the late Angelo T. Reyes, DOE Secretary; Jose L. Atienza, DENR
Secretary; Leonardo Sibbaluca, DENR-Region VII Director and Chairman of Tañon Strait PAMB; JAPEX, a
Japanese company; and Supply Oilfield Services, Inc. (SOS) as the alleged Philippine agent of JAPEX. Their
counter-allegations are:
· The “Resident Marine Mammals” and “Stewards” have no legal standing to file the petition.
· SC-46 is constitutional.
· The ECC was legally issued.
· The case is moot and academic since SC-46 is mutually terminated on 21 June 2008.
ISSUES
a. WON Petitioners have a legal standing
b. WON SC-46 is unconstitutional
RULING

1. Yes. In our jurisdiction, locus standi in environmental cases has been given a more liberalized approach.
The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases allow for a “citizen suit,” and permit any Filipino citizen to file
an action before our courts for violation of our environmental laws on the principle that humans are stewards of
nature:
“Section 5. Citizen suit. – Any Filipino citizen in representation of others, including minors or generations
yet unborn, may file an action to enforce rights or obligations under environmental laws. Upon the filing of
a citizen suit, the court shall issue an order which shall contain a brief description of the cause of action and the
reliefs prayed for, requiring all interested parties to manifest their interest to intervene in the case within fifteen
(15) days from notice thereof. The plaintiff may publish the order once in a newspaper of general circulation in
the Philippines or furnish all affected baragngays copies of said order.
Citizen suits filed under R.A. No. 8749 and R.A. No. 9003 shall be governed by their respective provisions.
(Emphasis supplied)”
Although the petition was filed in 2007, years before the effectivity of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases, it has been consistently held that rules of procedure may be retroactively applied to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage and will not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is
adversely affected, inasmuch as there is no vested rights in rules of procedure.
Moreover, even before the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases became effective, the SC had already
taken a permissive position on the issue of locus standi in environmental cases. In Oposa, the SC allowed the suit
to be brought in the name of generations yet unborn “based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility
insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.”
It is also worth noting that the Stewards in the present case are joined as real parties in the Petition and not just in
representation of the named cetacean species.
2. Yes. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides in part:
“The President may enter into agreement with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or
financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and
other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real
contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State shall
promote the development and use of local scientific and technical resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this provision,
within thirty days from its execution.” (Emphases supplied)
The disposition, exploration, development, exploitation, and utilization of indigenous petroleum in the Philippines
are governed by Presidential Decree No. 87 (PD 87) or the Oil Exploration and Development Act of 1972.
Although the Court finds that PD 87 is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of a general law, the absence of the
two other conditions, that the President be a signatory to SC-46, and that the Congress be notified of such contract,
renders it null and void.
SC-46 appears to have been entered into and signed by the DOE through its then Secretary Vicente S. Perez, Jr.
Moreover, public respondents have neither shown nor alleged that Congress was subsequently notified of the
execution of such contract.
Service contracts involving the exploitation, development, and utilization of our natural resources are of
paramount interest to the present and future generations. Hence, safeguards were out in place to insure that the
guidelines set by law are meticulously observed and likewise eradicate the corruption that may easily penetrate
departments and agencies by ensuring that the President has authorized or approved of the service contracts
herself.
Even under the provisions of PD 87, it is required that the Petroleum Board, now the DOE, obtain the President’s
approval for the execution of any contract under said statute.
The SC likewise ruled on the legality of SC-46 vis-à-vis other pertinent laws to serve as a guide for the
Government when executing service contracts.
Under Proclamation No. 2146, the Tañon Strait is an environmentally critical area, having been declared
as a protected area in 1998; therefore, any activity outside the scope of its management plan may only be
implemented pursuant to an ECC secured after undergoing an Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) to
determine the effects of such activity on its ecological system.
Public respondents admitted that JAPEX only started to secure an ECC prior to the 2 nd sub-phase of SC-
46, which required the drilling of the exploration well. This means that no environmental impact evaluation was
done when the seismic surveys were conducted. Unless the seismic surveys are part of the management plan of
the Tañon Strait, such surveys were done in violation of Section 12 of NIPAS Act and Section 4 of Presidential
Decree No. 1586.
While PD 87 may serve as the general law upon which a service contract for petroleum exploration and extraction
may be authorized, the exploitation and utilization of this energy resource in the present case may be allowed
only through a law passed by Congress, since the Tañon Strait is a NIPAS area. Since there is no such law
specifically allowing oil exploration and/or extraction in the Tañon Strait, no energy resource exploitation and
utilization may be done in said protected seascape.
LA BUGAL B’LAAN v. RAMOS
Topic: Promotion of health
FACTS
● On July 25, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order (E.O.) No. 2796
authorizing the DENR Secretary to accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign-owned
corporations or foreign investors for contracts or agreements involving either technical or financial
assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, which, upon appropriate
recommendation of the Secretary, the President may execute with the foreign proponent.
● On March 3, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos approved R.A. No. 7942 to "govern the
exploration, development, utilization and processing of all mineral resources." R.A. No. 7942 defines the
modes of mineral agreements for mining operations, outlines the procedure for their filing and approval,
assignment/transfer and withdrawal, and fixes their terms. Similar provisions govern financial or technical
assistance agreements.
● On April 9, 1995, 30 days following its publication on March 10, 1995 in Malaya and Manila Times,
two newspapers of general circulation, R.A. No. 7942 took effect. Shortly before the effectivity of R.A.
No. 7942, however, or on March 30, 1995, the President entered into an FTAA with Western Mining
Corporation Philippines(WMCP) covering 99,387 hectares of land in South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat,
Davao del Sur and North Cotabato.
○ The FTAA was later transferred to Sagittarius Mines Inc., as well as some shares of WMCP
pertaining to the Tampakan mining project
● On August 15, 1995, then DENR Secretary Victor O. Ramos issued DENR Administrative Order
(DAO) No. 95-23, s. 1995, otherwise known as the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7942.
This was later repealed by DAO No. 96-40, s. 1996 which was adopted on December 20, 1996.
● On January 10, 1997, counsels for petitioners sent a letter to the DENR Secretary demanding that
the DENR stop the implementation of R.A. No. 7942 and DAO No. 96-40, giving the DENR fifteen days
from receipt to act thereon. The DENR, however, has yet to respond or act on petitioners' letter.
● Petitioners claim that the DENR Secretary acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.
They pray that the Court issue an order:
○ (a) Permanently enjoining respondents from acting on any application for Financial or Technical
Assistance Agreements;
○ (b) Declaring the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 or Republic Act No. 7942 as unconstitutional and
null and void;
○ (c) Declaring the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Philippine Mining Act contained in
DENR Administrative Order No. 96-40 and all other similar administrative issuances as unconstitutional
and null and void; and(d) Cancelling the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement issued to Western
Mining Philippines, Inc. as unconstitutional, illegal and null and void.
ISSUES:
1.)What is the proper interpretation of ‘Financial and Technical Agreements’?
2.)Whether or not the FTAA entered into by the Philippine Government and WMCP is void
HELD:
1.) The Supreme Court after going into the Con-Com deliberations interpreted “Financial and Technical
Assistance Agreements” to be service contracts but different from the definition provided by the 1973
Constitution.
The new ones are between foreign corporations acting as contractors on the one hand; and on the other, the
government as principal or "owner" of the works. In the new service contracts, the foreign contractors provide
capital, technology and technical know-how, and managerial expertise in the creation and operation of large-scale
mining/extractive enterprises; and the government, through its agencies (DENR, MGB), actively exercises control
and supervision over the entire operation.
Such service contracts may be entered into only with respect to minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils. The
grant thereof is subject to several safeguards, among which are these requirements:
(1) The service contract shall be crafted in accordance with a general law that will set standard or uniform terms,
conditions and requirements, presumably to attain a certain uniformity in provisions and avoid the possible
insertion of terms disadvantageous to the country.
(2) The President shall be the signatory for the government because, supposedly before an agreement is presented
to the President for signature, it will have been vetted several times over at different levels to ensure that it
conforms to law and can withstand public scrutiny.
(3) Within thirty days of the executed agreement, the President shall report it to Congress to give that branch of
government an opportunity to look over the agreement and interpose timely objections, if any.
Thus, the Supreme Court dismissed the petitioners’ contention that that RA 7942, as well as its Implementing
Rules and Regulations, makes it possible for FTAA contracts to cede full control and management of mining
enterprises over to fully foreign-owned corporations, with the result that the State is allegedly reduced to a passive
regulator dependent on submitted plans and reports, with weak review and audit powers.
There are sufficient guarantees to the compliance of the contractor which vest control supervision to the
government
In RA 7942, such is provided in provisions including: Sec. 8. Sec. 9, Sec. 66, Sec. 35, Sec. 53 and 54, and 59.
DENR Departmental Order-96, the IRR of RA 7942, also provides for such strict requirments, such as:
● Approved mining project feasibility study (Section 53-d, DAO 96-40)
● Approved three-year work program (Section 53-a-4, DAO 96-40)
● Environmental compliance certificate (Section 70, RA 7942)
● Approved environmental protection and enhancement program (Section 69, RA 7942)
● Approval by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan/Bayan/Barangay (Section 70, RA 7942; Section 27,
RA 7160)
● Free and prior informed consent by the indigenous peoples concerned, including payment of
royalties through a Memorandum of Agreement
The foregoing gamut of requirements, regulations, restrictions and limitations imposed upon the FTAA contractor
by the statute and regulations easily overturns petitioners' contention. The setup under RA 7942 and DAO 96-40
hardly relegates the State to the role of a "passive regulator" dependent on submitted plans and reports. On the
contrary, the government agencies concerned are empowered to approve or disapprove -- hence, to influence,
direct and change -- the various work programs and the corresponding minimum expenditure commitments for
each of the exploration, development and utilization phases of the mining enterprise.
In other words, the FTAA contractor is not free to do whatever it pleases and get away with it; on the contrary, it
will have to follow the government line if it wants to stay in the enterprise. Ineluctably then, RA 7942 and DAO
96-40 vest in the government more than a sufficient degree of control and supervision over the conduct of mining
operations.
Baseless are petitioners' sweeping claims that RA 7942 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations make it
possible for FTAA contracts to cede full control and management of mining enterprises over to fully foreign
owned corporations. Equally wobbly is the assertion that the State is reduced to a passive regulator dependent on
submitted plans and reports, with weak review and audit powers and little say in the decision-making of the
enterprise, for which reasons "beneficial ownership" of the mineral resources is allegedly ceded to the foreign
contractor.
As discussed hereinabove, the State's full control and supervision over mining operations are ensured through the
following provisions in RA 7942: Sections 8, 9, 16, 19, 24, 35[(b), (e), (f), (g), (h), (k), (l), (m) and (o)], 40, 57,
66, 69, 70, and Chapters XI and XVII; as well as the following provisions of DAO 96-40: Sections7[(d) and (f)],
35(a-2), 53[(a-4) and (d)], 54, 56[(g), (h), (l), (m) and (n)], 56(2), 60, 66, 144, 168, 171 and 270, and also Chapters
XV, XVI and XXIV.
2.) The FTAA with WMCP is not void. However, certain provisions were struck down.
The assailed provisions of the WMCP FTAA, far from constituting a surrender of control and a grant of beneficial
ownership of mineral resources to the contractor in question, vest the State with control and supervision over
practically all aspects of the operations of the FTAA contractor, including the charging of pre-operating and
operating expenses, and the disposition of mineral products.
There is likewise no relinquishment of control on account of specific provisions of the WMCP FTAA. Clause 8.2
provides a mechanism to prevent the mining operations from grinding to a complete halt as a result of possible
delays of more than 60 days in the government's processing and approval of submitted work programs and
budgets. Clause 8.3 seeks to provide a temporary, stop-gap solution in case a disagreement between the State and
the contractor (over the proposed work program or budget submitted by the contractor) should result in a deadlock
or impasse, to avoid unreasonably long delays in the performance of the works.
The State, despite Clause 8.3, still has control over the contract area, and it may, as sovereign authority, prohibit
work thereon until the dispute is resolved, or it may terminate the FTAA, citing substantial breach thereof. Hence,
the State clearly retains full and effective control.
Clause 8.5, which allows the contractor to make changes to approved work programs and budgets without the
prior approval of the DENR secretary, subject to certain limitations with respect to the variance/s, merely provides
the contractor a certain amount of flexibility to meet unexpected situations, while still guaranteeing that the
approved work programs and budgets are not abandoned altogether. And if the secretary disagrees with the actions
taken by the contractor in this instance, he may also resort to cancellation/termination of the FTAA as the ultimate
sanction
Invalid provisions of the FTAA: 7.9 and 7.8(e)
While Section 7.7 gives the government a 60 percent share in the net mining revenues of WMCP from the
commencement of commercial production, Section 7.9 deprives the government of part or all of the said 60
percent. Under the latter provision, should WMCP's foreign shareholders -- who originally owned 100 percent of
the equity -- sell 60 percent or more of its outstanding capital stock to a Filipino citizen or corporation, the State
loses its right to receive its 60 percent share in net mining revenues under Section 7.7.
Evidently, what Section 7.7 grants to the State is taken away in the next breath by Section 7.9 without any
offsetting compensation to the State. Thus, in reality, the State has no vested right to receive any income from the
FTAA for the exploitation of its mineral resources. Worse, it would seem that what is given to the State in Section
7.7 is by mere tolerance of WMCP's foreign stockholders, who can at any time cut off the government's entire 60
percent share. They can do so by simply selling 60 percent of WMCP's outstanding capital stock to a Philippine
citizen or corporation. Moreover, the proceeds of such sale will of course accrue to the foreign stockholders of
WMCP, not to the State.
The sale of 60 percent of WMCP's outstanding equity to a corporation that is 60 percent Filipino-owned and 40
percent foreign-owned will still trigger the operation of Section 7.9. Effectively, the State will lose its right to
receive all 60 percent of the net mining revenues of WMCP; and foreign stockholders will own beneficially up to
64 percent of WMCP, consisting of the remaining 40 percent foreign equity therein, plus the 24 percent pro-rata
share in the buyer-corporation.84
In fact, the January 23, 2001 sale by WMCP's foreign stockholder of the entire outstanding equity in WMCP to
Sagittarius Mines, Inc. -- a domestic corporation at least 60 percent Filipino owned -- may be deemed to have
automatically triggered the operation of Section 7.9, without need of further action by any party, and removed the
State's right to receive the 60 percent share in net mining revenues.
At bottom, Section 7.9 has the effect of depriving the State of its 60 percent share in the net mining revenues of
WMCP without any offset or compensation whatsoever. It is possible that the inclusion of the offending provision
was initially prompted by the desire to provide some form of incentive for the principal foreign stockholder in
WMCP to eventually reduce its equity position and ultimately divest in favor of Filipino citizens and corporations.
However, as finally structured, Section 7.9 has the deleterious effect of depriving government of the entire 60
percent share in WMCP's net mining revenues, without any form of compensation whatsoever. Such an outcome
is completely unacceptable.
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to GRANT the respondents' and the intervenors' Motions for
Reconsideration; to REVERSE and SET ASIDE this Court's January 27, 2004 Decision; to DISMISS the Petition;
and to issue this new judgment declaring CONSTITUTIONAL (1) Republic Act No. 7942 (the Philippine Mining
Law), (2) its Implementing Rules and Regulations contained in DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 9640 --
insofar as they relate to financial and technical assistance agreements referred to in paragraph 4 of Section 2 of
Article XII of the Constitution; and (3) the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) dated March
30, 1995 executed by the government and Western Mining Corporation Philippines Inc. (WMCP), except Sections
7.8 and 7.9 of the subject FTAA which are hereby INVALIDATED for being contrary to public policy and for
being grossly disadvantageous to the government.
INTERNATIONAL SERVICE FOR THE ACQUISITION OF AGRI-BIOTEC APPLICATIONS, INC v.
GREENPEACE SOUTHEAST ASIA, PH
Topic: General Principles – Promotion of Health – Precautionary Principle
FACTS: (All caps and bold)
The case stemmed from the Petition of Continuing Mandamus and Writ of Kalikasan filed by Greenpeace
Southeast Asia (Greenpeace) and others against International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotec
Applications, Inc (ISA) and others.
Pursuant to the Memorandum of Undertaking entered into by ISA, and UP Foundations of Los Banos and
Mindanao, field trials for “bioengineered eggplants” known as the “BT Talong” was conducted. This BT Talong
contained crystal toxin genes, which produces a certain type of protein that is toxic to target insect pests. From
2007-2009, UPLB conducted a contained experiment on BT Talong. Upon the completion of the experiment, the
National Committee on Biosafety of the Philippines (NCBP) issued a Certificate stating, among others, that all
biosafety measures were complied with. In 2010, after the finding that UPLB’s field test proposal satisfactorily
completed the biosafety risk assessment for field testing, the Bureau of Plant Industries (BPI) issued 2-year
Biosafety Permits for the field testing of BT Talong. Consequently, field testing proceeding in various approved
trial sites.
As mentioned above, Greenpeace filed a petition for continuing mandamus and writ of kalikasan alleging that the
BT Talong field trials violated their constitutional right to health and a balanced ecology, as the BT Talong was
presumed by the regulations to be harmful to human health and environment. Since the scientific evidence as to
the safety of BT Talong remained insufficient or uncertain, the said presumption stands. Because of this
presumption, he precautionary principle should be applied, eventually praying that the field trials be enjoined.
The Writ of Kalikasan was granted in 2012, and the case was remanded to the CA for hearing. During the
pendency of the hearing, the field trials concluded, and the Biosafety Permits expired, prompting ISA to move
that the petition be dismissed on the ground of mootness. However both the CA and the SC still exercised judicial
review, noting that the precautionary principle applies “since the risk of harm from the field trials of BT Talong
remains uncertain and there exist a possibility of serious irreversible harm”. In the December 2015 Decision of
the SC, it was held that:
(a) The case is of exceptional character and paramount public interest is involved
(b) The case is likewis capable of repetition yet evading review.
The Court permanently enjoined the BT Talong field testing.
ISSUE:
Was the application of the Precautionary Principle proper, justifying the review even though the case was mooted
by supervening circumstances? No, the subject of the case did not involve paramount public interest, as no
perceivable benefit to the public may be gained by the issuance of the Writ of Kalikasan.
HELD:
Upon a closer scrutiny of the arguments, the Court reconsiders its ruling and now finds merit in the assertion that
the case should have been dismissed for being moot and academic, and that the aforesaid exceptions to the said
rule should not have been applied.
Jurisprudence in this jurisdiction has set no hard-and-fast rule in determining whether a case involves paramount
public interest in relation to the mootness principle. However, a survey of cases would show that, as a common
guidepost for application, there should be some perceivable benefit to the public which demands the Court to
proceed with the resolution of otherwise moot questions.
The petition for Writ of Kalikasan, were mooted by the undisputed expiration of the Biosafety Permits and the
completion and termination of the BT Talong field trials. These incidents effectively negated the necessity for the
reliefs sought by respondents in their petition for Writ of Kalikasan as there was no longer any field test to enjoin.
As the matter never went beyond the field testing phase, none of the foregoing tasks related to propagation were
pursued or the requirements therefor complied with. Any future threat to the right of herein respondents or the
public in general to a healthful and balanced ecology is therefore more imagined than real.
WHEREFORE, the motions for reconsideration are GRANTED. The Decision dated December 8, 2015 of the
Court, which affirmed with modification the Decision dated May 17, 2013 and the Resolution dated September
20, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00013, is hereby SET ASIDE for the reasons above-
explained. A new one is ENTERED DISMISSING the Petition for Writ of Continuing Mandamus and Writ of
Kalikasan with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) filed by
respondents Greenpeace Southeast Asia (Philippines), Magsasaka at Siyentipiko sa Pagpapaunladng Agrikultura,
and others on the ground of mootness.
IMBONG v. OCHOA
Topic: The Family as a Basic Autonomous Social Institution
FACTS:
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act
of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.
Challengers from various sectors of society are questioning the constitutionality of the said Act. The petitioners
are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law
ISSUE:
Whether or not The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude.
HELD:
Section 23A (2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH procedures even with only the consent of the spouse
undergoing the provision (disregarding spousal content), intrudes into martial privacy and autonomy and goes
against the constitutional safeguards for the family as the basic social institution. Particularly, Section 3, Article
XV of the Constitution mandates the State to defend: (a) the right of spouses to found a family in accordance with
their religious convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood and (b) the right of families or family
associations to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect them. The RH
Law cannot infringe upon this mutual decision-making, and endanger the institutions of marriage and the family.
The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a procedure is already a parent or has had
a miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-family and violates Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution,
which states: “The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency
and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.” In addition, the portion of
Section 23(a)(ii) which reads “in the case of minors, the written consent of parents or legal guardian or, in their
absence, persons exercising parental authority or next-of-kin shall be required only in elective surgical
procedures” is invalid as it denies the right of parental authority in cases where what is involved is “non-surgical
procedures.”
However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to procedures) about family planning services. Parents
are not deprived of parental guidance and control over their minor child in this situation and may assist her in
deciding whether to accept or reject the information received. In addition, an exception may be made in life-
threatening procedures.
In its relationship with its co- equals, the Judiciary recognizes the doctrine of separation of powers which imposes
upon the courts proper restraint, born of the nature of their functions and of their respect for the other branches of
government, in striking down the acts of the Executive or the Legislature as unconstitutional. Verily, the policy
is a harmonious blend of courtesy and caution.
It has also long been observed, however, that in times of social disquietude or political instability, the great
landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In order to address this,
the Constitution impresses upon the Court to respect the acts performed by a co-equal branch done within its
sphere of competence and authority, but at the same time, allows it to cross the line of separation - but only at a
very limited and specific point - to determine whether the acts of the executive and the legislative branches are
null because they were undertaken with grave abuse of discretion. Thus, while the Court may not pass upon
questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of the RH Law, it may do so where an attendant unconstitutionality
or grave abuse of discretion results. The Court must demonstrate its unflinching commitment to protect those
cherished rights and principles embodied in the Constitution. Twin principles of anti-abortion and non-coercion
in the national population program of the government.
ICHONG v. HERNANDEZ
Topic: Enforceability in the Philippines of Final Judgments of Foreign Courts
FACTS:
· The Legislature passed R.A. 1180 (An Act to Regulate the Retail Business). Its purpose was to prevent
persons who are not citizens of the Phil. from having a stranglehold upon the people’s economic life.
o A prohibition against aliens and against associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are
not wholly owned by Filipinos, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade
o Aliens actually engaged in the retail business on May 15, 1954 are allowed to continue their business, unless
their licenses are forfeited in accordance with law, until their death or voluntary retirement. In case of juridical
persons, ten years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration of term.
· Citizens and juridical entities of the United States were exempted from this Act.
o Provision for the forfeiture of licenses to engage in the retail business for violation of the laws on
nationalization, economic control weights and measures and labor and other laws relating to trade, commerce and
industry.
o Provision against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additional
stores or branches of retail business
· Ichong, in his own behalf and behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships affected by the Act,
filed an action to declare it unconstitutional for the following: (reasons)
1. it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives them of their
liberty and property without due process
2. the subject of the Act is not expressed in the title
3. the Act violates international and treaty obligations
4. the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru
hereditary succession
ISSUE:
1. WON the Act deprives the aliens of the equal protection of the laws – NO
2. WON R.A. 1180 is a reasonable exercise of legislative prerogative - YES
HELD:
Concept of Equal Protection Clause
· It does not demand absolute equality among residents; merely acquires that all persons shall be treated
alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced
· Not infringed by legislation which applies only to persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike
to all persons falling within the such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those
who fall within such class and those who do not
The difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable classification in the
exercise of police power.
The rule in general is as follows:
“Aliens are under no special constitutional protection which forbids a classification otherwise justified simply
because the limitation of the class falls along the lines of nationality. That would be requiring a higher degree of
protection for aliens as a class than for similar classes than for similar classes of American citizens. Broadly
speaking, the difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable classification in
the exercise of police power.”
The objectionable characteristics of the exercise of retail trade by the aliens, which are actual and real, are
sufficient grounds for legislative classification of retail traders into nationals and aliens
· Official statistics point out to the ever-increasing dominance and control by alien of the retail trade. It is
this domination and control that is the legislature’s target in the enactment of the Act.
· The mere fact of alienage is the root cause of the distinction between the alien and the national as a trader.
The alien is naturally lacking in that spirit of loyalty and enthusiasm for the Philippines where he temporarily
stays and makes his living. The alien owes no allegiance or loyalty to the State, and the State cannot rely on
him/her in times of crisis or emergency.
· While the citizen holds his life, his person and his property subject to the needs of the country, the alien
may become the potential enemy of the State.
· The alien retailer has shown such utter disregard for his customers and the people on whom he makes his
profit. Through the illegitimate use of pernicious designs and practices, the alien now enjoys a monopolistic
control on the nation’s economy endangering the national security in times of crisis and emergency.
Scope of the Exercise of Police Power and its limitations
· Police power is so far-reaching in scope that it has become almost impossible to limit its sweep
· Derives its existence from the very existence of the State and need not be expressed in defined scope
· Co-extensive with self-preservation and survival, and as such, it is the most positive and active of all
governmental processes, the most essential, insistent, and illimitable
· Field and scope has become boundless just as the field of public interest and public welfare have become
almost all embracing and have transcended human foresight
· LIMITATIONS:
(a) Due process of law
(b) Equal protection clause
R.A NO. 1180 is a reasonable exercise of legislative prerogative
Classification is real and reasonable, all persons of one class are treated alike, and as it cannot be said that the
classification is patently unreasonable and unfounded, it is in duty bound to declare that the legislature acted
within legitimate prerogative
Concept of due process in the exercise of police power was applied in this case
· The police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable
relation must exist between purposes and means. And if distinction has been made, there must be a reasonable
basis for said distinction
· Test of Reasonableness: Appropriateness or adequacy under all circumstances of the means adopted to
carry out its purpose into effect
· The law in question is deemed absolutely necessary to bring about the desired legislative objective – to free
national economy from alien control and dominance
DISPOSITION: Petition DENIED
ROY v. SEC CHAIRPERSON HERBOSA
Topic: Art. XII National Economy and Patrimony
FACTS:
● 9 January 2013, Gamboa became final and executory
● The Supreme Court in the Gamboa decision that the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution refers only to shares of stock entitled to vote in the election of directors, and thus in the present
case only to common shares, and not to the total outstanding capital stock
● 20 May 2013, SEC through Chairperson Herbosa issued SEC-MC No. 8. Section 2 thereof reads:
○ Section 2. All covered corporations shall, at all times, observe the constitutional or statutory
ownership requirement. For purposes of determining compliance therewith, the required percentage of
Filipino ownership shall be applied to BOTH (a) the total number of outstanding shares of stock entitled
to vote in the election of directors; AND (b) the total number of outstanding shares of stock, whether or
not entitled to vote in the election of directors. Corporations covered by special laws which provide
specific citizenship requirements shall comply with the provisions of said law.
● Petitioner, as a lawyer and taxpayer, filed a petition before the SC assailing the validity of Section
2 of SEC-MC No. 8. The said issuance was not in conformity with the Gamboa decision
● Arguments of (intervenors) Gamboa, PLDT:
○ The doctrine of hierarchy of court was not followed by petitioner Roy
○ The petition is premature because it did not exhaust administrative remedies
● Respondents Chairperson Herbosa and the SEC filed a comment, they sought dismissal of the
petition on the following grounds:
○ (1) the petitioners do not possess locus standi to assail the constitutionality of SEC-MC No. 8;
○ (2) a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is not the appropriate and proper remedy to assail the
validity and constitutionality of the SEC-MC No. 8;
○ (3) the direct resort to the Court violates the doctrine of hierarchy of courts;
○ (4) the SEC did not abuse its discretion;
○ (5) on PLDT's compliance with the capital requirement as stated in the Gamboa ruling, the
petitioners' challenge is premature considering that the SEC has not yet issued a definitive ruling thereon.
● Arguments of intervenors PSE are as follows:
○ the Gamboa ruling, "capital" refers only to shares entitled to vote in the election of directors, and
excludes those not so entitled; and the dispositive portion of the decision is the controlling factor that
determines and settles the questions presented in the case. The PSE further argued that adopting a new
interpretation of Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution violates the policy of conclusiveness of
judgment, stare decisis, and the State's obligation to maintain a stable and predictable legal framework
for foreign investors under international treaties; and adopting a new definition of "capital" will prove
disastrous for the Philippine stock market. The Court granted the Motion to Intervene filed by PSE.
ISSUE: Whether or not SEC-MC No. 8 is unconstitutional
HELD:
● SEC-MC No.8 is deemed not unconstitutional
● The Supreme Court applied the full beneficial ownership test and the control test in determining
whether or not the Constitutional requirements and other statutory requirements have been complied
with.
● For the most part of the Gamboa Resolution, the Court, after reviewing SEC and DOJ Opinions as well
as the provisions of the FIA and its predecessor statutes, reiterated that both the Voting Control Test and the
Beneficial Ownership Test must be applied to determine whether a corporation is a "Philippine national" and that
a "Philippine national," as defined in the FIA and all its predecessor statutes, is "a Filipino citizen, or a domestic
corporation "at least sixty percent (60%) of the capital stock outstanding and entitled to vote," is owned by
Filipino citizens. A domestic corporation is a "Philippine national" only if at least 60% of its voting stock is owned
by Filipino citizens." he Court also reiterated that, from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, it is
evident that the term "capital" refers to controlling interest of a corporation,and the framers of the Constitution
intended public utilities to be majority Filipino-owned and controlled.
● Beneficial ownership test:
○ Given that beneficial ownership of the outstanding capital stock of the public utility corporation
has to be determined for purposes of compliance with the 60% Filipino ownership requirement, the
definition in the SRC-IRR can now be applied to resolve only the question of who is the beneficial owner
or who has beneficial ownership of each "specific stock" of the said corporation. Thus, if a "specific
stock" is owned by a Filipino in the books of the corporation, but the stock's voting power or disposing
power belongs to a foreigner, then that "specific stock" will not be deemed as "beneficially owned" by a
Filipino.
● Section 2 of SEC-MC No. 8 clearly incorporates the Voting Control Test or the controlling interest
requirement. In fact, Section 2 goes beyond requiring a 60-40 ratio in favor of Filipino nationals in the
voting stocks; it moreover requires the 60-40 percentage ownership in the total number of outstanding
shares of stock, whether voting or not. The SEC formulated SEC-MC No. 8 to adhere to the Court's
unambiguous pronouncement that "[f]ull beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding cap ital
stock, coupled with 60 percent of the voting rights is required."79 Clearly, SEC-MC No. 8 cannot be said
to have been issued with grave abuse of discretion.
● Ultimately, the key to nationalism is in the individual. Particularly for a public utility corporation or
association, whether stock or non-stock, it starts with the Filipino shareholder or member who, together with other
Filipino shareholders or members wielding 60% voting power, elects the Filipino director who, in turn, together
with other Filipino directors comprising a majority of the board of directors or trustees, appoints and employs the
all-Filipino management team. This is what is envisioned by the Constitution to assure effective control by
Filipinos. If the safeguards, which are already stringent, fail, i.e., a public utility corporation whose voting stocks
are beneficially owned by Filipinos, the majority of its directors are Filipinos, and all its managing officers are
Filipinos, is pro-alien (or worse, dummies), then that is not the fault or failure of the Constitution. It is the
breakdown of nationalism in each of the Filipino shareholders, Filipino directors and Filipino officers of that
corporation. No Constitution, no decision of the Court, no legislation, no matter how ultra-nationalistic they are,
can guarantee nationalism.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court DENIES the Petition and Petition-in-Intervention.
IDEALS, INC. vs. PSALM
Topic: Art. XII National Economy and Patrimony
FALLO: “WHEREFORE, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for injunctive relief/s
is PARTLY GRANTED.
The following DISPOSITIONS are in ORDER:
1. The bidding conducted and the Notice of Award issued by PSALM in favor of the winning bidder,
KOREA WATER RESOURCES CORPORATION (K-WATER), are declared VALID and LEGAL;
2. PSALM is directed to FURNISH the petitioners with copies of all documents and records in its files
pertaining to K-Water;
3. Section 6 (a), Rule 23, IRR of the EPIRA, is hereby declared as merely DIRECTORY, and not an
absolute condition in all cases where NPC-owned hydropower generation facilities are privatized;
4. NPC shall CONTINUE to be the HOLDER of Water Permit No. 6512 issued by the National Water
Resources Board. NPC shall authorize K-Water to utilize the waters in the Angat Dam for hydropower generation,
subject to the NWRB's rules and regulations governing water right and usage. The Asset Purchase Agreement
and Operation & Management Agreement between NPC/PSALM and K-Water are thus amended accordingly.
Except for the requirement of securing a water permit, K-Water remains BOUND by its undertakings and
warranties under the APA and O & M Agreement;
5. NPC shall be a CO-PARTY with K-Water in the Water Protocol Agreement with MWSS and NIA, and
not merely as a conforming authority or agency; and
6. The Status Quo Ante Order issued by this Court on May 24, 2010 is hereby LIFTED and SET ASIDE.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.”
FACTS
Respondent Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation (PSALM) is a GOCC created by virtue
of Republic Act No. 9136, otherwise known as the “Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001” (EPIRA). Said
law mandated PSALM to manage the orderly sale, disposition, and privatization of NPC generation assets, real
estate and other disposable assets, and Independent Power Producer (IPP) contracts with the objective of
liquidating all NPC financial obligations and stranded contract costs in an optimal manner, which liquidation is
to be completed within PSALM’s 25-year term of existence.
In August 2005, PSALM commenced the privatization of the 246-megawatt (MW) Angat Hydro-electric Power
Plant (AHEPP), forming part of the Angat Complex, which includes the Angat Dam, Angat Reservoir and the
outlying watershed area. This is partly owned by respondent Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System
PSALM violated Consti and The utilization of water by a hydroelectric power plant does not
(MWSS). The Angat Dam and AHEPP are utilized for power generation, irrigation, water supply and flood Water Code à K-Water is a constitute appropriation of water from its natural source
control purposes. Because of its multi-functional design, the operation of the Angat Complex involves various foreign corporation considering that the source of water (dam) that enters the intake
government agencies, namely: (1) NPC; (2) National Water Resources Board (NWRB); (3) MWSS; (4)
gate of the power plant is an artificial structure
respondent National Irrigation Administration (NIA); and (5) Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and
NPC gives up its authority to
Astronomical Services Administration (PAG-ASA).
extract or utilize water from the
Angat River
On December 15, 2009, PSALM’s Board of Directors approved the Bidding Procedures for the privatization of
the AHEPP. The two auxiliary units owned by MWSS were excluded from the bid. Pertinent portions of the
Bidding Package include: “The priority of water usage under Philippine Law would have to be observed by the
Buyer/Operator. The Winning Bidder/Buyer shall be requested to enter into an operations and maintenance
agreement with PSALM for the Non-Power Components…the Buyer will be required to enter into the said water Right to water was violated by PSALM is mindful of the State’s duty to protect the public’s right
protocol agreement as a condition to the award of the Asset.” bidding process à State has an to water when it sold the AHEPP. In fact, such concern as taken
obligation to ensure water into consideration by PSALM in devising a privatization scheme
Korea Water Resources Corporation (K-Water) had the winning bid and was consequently given the Notice of security for its people for the AHEPP whereby the water allocation is continuously
Award. regulated by the NWRB and the dam and its spillway gates remain
Angat Dam provides 97% of under the ownership and control of NPC
The present petition was filed by the Initiatives for Dialogue and Empowerment Through Alternative Legal Metro Manila's water -->
Services, Inc. (IDEALS), Freedom from Debt Coalition (FDC), AKBAYAN Citizen’s Action Party PSALM should prioritize
(AKBAYAN) and Alliance of Progressive Labor, seeking to permanently enjoin the sale of the AHEPP to K- domestic use of water over
Water. SC issued Status Quo Ante Order. power generation

MWSS (respondent, but seems to side with P)

ARGUMENTS
PETITIONERS
Right to information violated à
PSALM did not release to the
public critical information
regarding the bidding
PSALM violated CC 498 à
PSALM did not offer the sale of
AHEPP to MWSS, its co-owner,
before selling to an outsider
RESPONDENTS
Conducted the bidding in an open and transparent manner, through
a series of events in accordance with the governing rules on public
bidding --> IDEALS’ request for information about the winning
bidder, as contained in its letter dated May 14, 2010, the same was
already referred to respondent K-Water’s counsel for appropriate
action
MWSS’s contribution in the funds used for the construction of the
AHEPP did not give rise to a regime of co-ownership as the said
funds were merely in exchange for the supply of water that MWSS
would get from the Angat Dam
· MWSS has supervision and control over the Angat Dam given that the Angat Reservoir supplies
approximately 97% of the water requirements of Metro Manila. MWSS has incurred expenses to maintain their
upkeep, improve and upgrade their facilities.
· After the enactment of EPIRA, MWSS had expressed the desire to acquire ownership and control of the
AHEPP so as not to leave the operation of the Angat Reservoir to private discretion that may prejudice the water
allocation to MWSS as dictated by NWRB rules.
1) The AHEPP is in dire danger of being wholly-owned by a Korean corporation which probably merely
considers it as just another business opportunity
ISSUES
1. W/N petitioners’ right to information was violated
2. W/N privatization of the power generation process of AHEPP amounted to a violation of Sec. 2, Art.
XII of the Constitution
3. W/N it violated Water Code provisions on the grant of water rights
HELD
FIRST ISSUE
PSALM advised petitioners that their letter-request was referred to the counsel of K-Water. Such action was
insufficient to comply with the constitutional requirement and inconsistent with the policy under EPIRA to
implement the privatization of NPC assets in an “open and transparent” manner. PSALM’s evasive response to
the request for information was unjustified because all bidders were required to deliver documents such as
company profile, names of authorized officers/representatives, financial and technical experience.
AHEPP is under the jurisdiction of the Department of Energy through NPC. PSALM was authorized to take title
to and possession of, those assets transferred to it. EPIRA mandated that all such assets shall be sold through
public bidding with the exception of Agus and Pulangui complexes in Mindanao, the privatization of which was
left to the discretion of PSALM in consultation with Congress.
The operation and maintenance of a hydroelectric power plant is not among the statutorily granted powers of
MWSS. Since the sale of AHEPP by PSALM merely implements the legislated reforms for the electric power
industry through schemes that aim “to enhance the inflow of private capital and broaden the ownership base of
the power generation, transmission and distribution sectors,” the proposed transfer to MWSS which is another
government entity contravenes that State policy.
SECOND AND THIRD ISSUES
The Water Code limits the grant of water rights only to Filipino citizens and juridical entities duly qualified by
law to exploit and develop water resources, including private corporations with sixty percent of their capital
owned by Filipinos. In the case of Angat River, the NWRB has issued separate water permits to MWSS, NPC
and NIA.
Under the EPIRA, the generation of electric power, a business affected with public interest, was opened to private
sector. Power generation shall not be considered a public utility operation, and hence no franchise is necessary.
Foreign investors are likewise allowed entry into the electric power industry. However, there is no mention of
water rights in the privatization of multi-purpose hydropower facilities.
Operation of a Hydroelectric Power Plant
Hydroelectric energy is produced by the force of falling water. The capacity to produce this energy is dependent
on both the available flow and the height from which it falls. Building up behind a high dam, water accumulates
potential energy. This is transformed into mechanical energy when the water rushes down the sluice and strikes
the rotary blades of turbine. The turbine's rotation spins electromagnets which generate current in stationary coils
of wire. Finally, the current is put through a transformer where the voltage is increased for long distance
transmission over power lines.
Under the Water Code concept of appropriation, a foreign company may not be said to be “appropriating” our
natural resources if it utilizes the waters collected in the dam and converts the same into electricity through
artificial devices. Since the NPC remains in control of the operation of the dam by virtue of water rights granted
to it, there is no legal impediment to foreign-owned companies undertaking the generation of electric power using
waters already appropriated by NPC, the holder of water permit.
There is no provision in the EPIRA itself authorizing the NPC to assign or transfer its water rights in case of
transfer of operation and possession of multi-purpose hydropower facilities. Since only the power plant is to be
sold and privatized, the operation of the non-power components such as the dam and reservoir, including the
maintenance of the surrounding watershed, should remain under the jurisdiction and control of NPC which
continue to be a government corporation. There is therefore no necessity for NPC to transfer its permit over the
water rights to K-Water. Pursuant to its purchase and operation/management contracts with K-Water, NPC may
authorize the latter to use water in the dam to generate electricity.
NPC shall continue to be the holder of the water permit even as the operational control and day-to-day
management of the AHEPP is turned over to K-Water under the terms and conditions of their APA and O & M
Agreement, whereby NPC grants authority to K-Water to utilize the waters diverted or collected in the Angat
Dam for hydropower generation. Further, NPC and K-Water shall faithfully comply with the terms and conditions
of the Memorandum of Agreement on Water Protocol, as well as with such other regulations and issuances of the
NWRB governing water rights and water usage.
Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the Philippines
Topic: Communication and information in Nation-Building
FACTS:
On 8 August 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP), represented by the GRP Peace
Panel and the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (PAPP), and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)
were scheduled to sign the Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the
previous GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
The MOA-AD included, among others, a stipulation that creates the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE), to which
the GRP grants the authority and jurisdiction over the ancestral domain and ancestral lands of the Bangsamoro—
defined as the present geographic area of the ARMM constituted by Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, Tawi-
Tawi, Basilan, and Marawi City, as well as the municipalities of Lanao del Norte which voted for inclusion in the
ARMM in the 2001 plebiscite. The BJE is then granted the power to build, develop, and maintain its own
institutions. The MOA-AD also described the relationship of the GRP and the BJE as “associative,” characterized
by shared authority and responsibility. It further provides that its provisions requiring “amendments to the existing
legal framework” shall take effect upon signing of a Comprehensive Compact.
Before the signing, however, the Province of North Cotabato sought to compel the respondents to disclose and
furnish it with complete and official copies of the MOA-AD, as well as to hold a public consultation thereon,
invoking its right to information on matters of public concern. A subsequent petition sought to have the City of
Zamboanga excluded from the BJE. The Court then issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on 4 August
2008, directing the public respondents and their agents to cease and desist from formally signing the MOA-AD.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the President has the power to pursue reforms that would require new legislation and
constitutional amendments.
2. Whether or not there is a violation of the people’s right to information on matters of public concern
(1987 Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving
public interest (1987 Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 28), including public consultation under RA No. 7160 (Local
Government Code of 1991).
3. Whether or not the GRP Peace Panel and the PAPP committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
4. Whether or not the MOA-AD is constitutional.
5. Whether or not the GRP can invoke executive privilege.

HELD:
1. YES. However, the stipulation in the MOA-AD that virtually guarantees that necessary changes shall be
effected upon the legal framework of the GRP must be struck down as unconstitutional as it is inconsistent with
the limits of the President’s authority to propose constitutional amendments. Because although the President’s
power to conduct peace negotiations is implicitly included in her powers as Chief Executive and Commander-in-
Chief, and, in the course of conducting peace negotiations, may validly consider implementing even those policies
that require changes to the Constitution, she may not unilaterally implement them without the intervention of
Congress, or act in any way as if the assent of that body were assumed as a certainty.
2. YES. At least three pertinent laws animate these constitutional imperatives and justify the exercise of the
people’s right to be consulted on relevant matters relating to the peace agenda:
a. EO No. 3, which enumerates the functions and responsibilities of the PAPP, is replete with mechanics
for continuing consultations on both national and local levels and for a principal forum for consensus-building.
In fact, it is the duty of the PAPP to conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant information, comments, advice,
and recommendations from peace partners and concerned sectors of society;
b. RA No. 7160 (LGC) requires all national offices to conduct consultations before any project or program
critical to the environment and human ecology including those that may call for the eviction of a particular group
of people residing in such locality, is implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that
unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could
pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total
environment;
c. RA No. 8371 (IPRA) provides for clear-cut procedure for the recognition and delineation of ancestral
domain, which entails, among other things, the observance of the free and prior informed consent of the
Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICC/IP).
3. YES. The PAPP committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out the pertinent consultation
process, as mandated by EO No. 3, RA No. 7160, and RA No. 8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD
was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical,
capricious, oppressive, arbitrary, and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and
a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined.
4. NO. It cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions, but the
very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are
unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on
its way to independence. While there is a clause in the MOA-AD stating that the provisions thereof inconsistent
with the present legal framework will not be effective until that framework is amended, the same does not cure
its defect. The inclusion of provisions in the MOA-AD establishing an associative relationship between the BJE
and the Central Government is, itself, a violation of the Memorandum of Instructions From The President
addressed to the government peace panel. Moreover, as the clause is worded, it virtually guarantees that the
necessary amendments to the Constitution and the laws will eventually be put in place. Neither the GRP Peace
Panel nor the President herself is authorized to make such a guarantee. Upholding such an act would amount to
authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only in Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the
people themselves through the process of initiative, for the only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome
of the amendment process is through an undue influence or interference with that process.
5. NO. Respondents effectively waived such defense after it unconditionally disclosed the official copies of the
final draft of the MOA-AD, for judicial compliance and public scrutiny.
Carpio-Morales, J.
The people’s right to information on matters of public concern under Sec. 7, Art. III of the Constitution is in
splendid symmetry with the state policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest
under Sec. 28, Art. II of the Constitution.
The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while the policy of public
disclosure recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands.
The IPRA does not grant the Executive Department or any government agency the power to delineate and
recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or compromise.
An association is formed when two states of unequal power voluntarily establish durable links. In the basic model,
one state, the associate, delegates certain responsibilities to the other, the principal, while maintaining its
international status as a state. Free associations represent a middle ground between integration and independence.
The recognized sources of international law establish that the right to self-determination of a people is normally
fulfilled through internal self-determination—a people’s pursuit of its political, economic, social, and cultural
development within the framework of an existing state. A right to external self-determination (which in this case
potentially takes the form of the assertion of a right to unilateral secession) arises only in the most extreme of
cases and, even then, under carefully defined circumstances.
That the authority of the President to conduct peace negotiations with rebel groups is not explicitly mentioned in
the Constitution does not mean that she has no such authority.
The President has authority, as stated in her oath of office, only to preserve and defend the Constitution. Such
presidential power does not, however, extend to allowing her to change the Constitution, but simply to recommend
proposed amendments or revision. As long as she limits herself to recommending these changes and submits to
the proper procedure for constitutional amendments and revision, her mere recommendation need not be
construed as an unconstitutional act.
Public statements of a state representative may be construed as a unilateral declaration only when the following
conditions are present: the statements were clearly addressed to the international community, the state intended
to be bound to that community by its statements, and that not to give legal effect to those statements would be
detrimental to the security of international intercourse. Plainly, unilateral declarations arise only in peculiar
circumstances.
CALALANG v. WILLIAMS
Topic: Definition of social justice
FACTS:
· Maximo Calalang, as a private citizen and as a taxpayer of Manila, brought before this court this petition
for a writ of prohibition against the respondents, A. D. Williams, as Chairman of the National Traffic
Commission; Vicente Fragante, as Director of Public Works; Sergio Bayan, as Acting Secretary of Public Works
and Communications; Eulogio Rodriguez, as Mayor of Manila; and Juan Dominguez, as Acting Chief of Police
of Manila.
· The NTC, with A.D. Williams, recommended to Vicente Fragante and Sergio Bayan that animal-drawn
vehicles be prohibited from passing along the designated roads at certain times in a resolution on July 17, 1940.
· The next day, NTC chairman recommended the adoption of the measure proposed in the resolution to the
Director of Public Works in pursuance of CA 548, which authorized the Director of Public Works to promulgate
rules and regulations for the use and control of traffic on national roads.
· The case was brought before the SC as a question of constitutionality of CA. 548 raised by Maximo
Calalang, who prayed for the writ of prohibition of said act.
· Calalang, contended that
o CA 548 was unconstitutional because it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.
o the rules and regulations promulgated by respondents pursuant to CA 548
§ constitute an unlawful interference with legitimate business or trade and abridge the right to personal liberty
and freedom of locomotion.
§ infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and
economic security of all the people.
ISSUE:
Whether or not C.A. No. 548 infringes upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice
to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people
HELD:
· “Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization
of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively
secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the
people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent
elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations
of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-
constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored
principle of salus populi est suprema lex. Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the
necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be
equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with
the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons,
and of bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest number."”
· The creation of C.A. No. 548 aimed “to promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads and
streets designated as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of
the Philippines” and to close them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic “whenever the condition of the road
or the traffic thereon makes such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest.”
· CA 548 is constitutional and observes social justice on the principle of salus populi est suprema lex.
· Social justice, as the Supreme Court defined, is the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption
by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society,
through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the
community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally,
through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the principle of salus populi est
suprema lex.
· It must be founded therefore on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among all units of
society, and the protection offered should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in
our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting
the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about “the greatest good to the greatest number.”
In view of the foregoing, the writ of prohibition prayed for is hereby denied, with costs against the petitioner. So
ordered.
CITY OF MANDALUYONG vs. ANTONIO N., FRANCISCO N., THELMA N., EUSEBIO N.,
RODOLFO N., all surnamed AGUILAR
Topic: Aspects of Social Justice; Urban land reform and housing, Art. XIII, Sections 9-10; Choice of site for
public housing
Facts:
On August 4, 1997, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City a complaint for expropriation
against the respondents. Petitioner sought to expropriate three (3) adjoining parcels of land with an aggregate area
of 1,847 square meters registered under Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 59780, 63766 and 63767 in the names
of the respondents, located at Barangay Mauwag, City of Mandaluyong. On a portion of the 3 lots, respondents
constructed residential houses several decades ago which they had since leased out to tenants until the present.
In 1983, the lots were classified by Resolution No. 125 of the Board of the Housing and Urban Development
Coordinating Council as an Area for Priority Development for urban land reform under Proclamation Nos. 1967
and 2284 of then President Marcos; as a result of this classification, the tenants and occupants of the lots offered
to purchase the land from respondents, but the latter refused to sell.
On November 7, 1996, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of petitioner, upon petition of the Kapitbisig, an association
of tenants and occupants of the subject land, adopted Resolution No. 516, Series of 1996 authorizing Mayor
Benjamin Abalos of the City of Mandaluyong to initiate action for the expropriation of the subject lots and
construction of a medium-rise condominium for qualified occupants of the land;
On January 10, 1996, Mayor Abalos sent a letter to respondents offering to purchase the said property at P3,000.00
per square meter. Respondents did not answer the letter. Thus, petitioner prayed for the expropriation of the said
lots and the fixing of just compensation.
In their answer, respondents, except Eusebio N. Aguilar who died in 1995, denied having received a copy of
Mayor Abalos' offer to purchase their lots. They alleged that the expropriation of their land is arbitrary and
capricious, and is not for a public purpose; the subject lots are their only real property and are too small for
expropriation, while petitioner has several properties inventoried for socialized housing; the fair market value of
P3,000.00 per square meter is arbitrary because the zonal valuation set by the Bureau of Internal Revenue is
P7,000.00 per square meter. As counterclaim, respondents prayed for damages of P21 million.
On 5 November 1997, the City filed an Amended Complaint and named as an additional defendant Virginia N.
Aguilar and, at the same time, substituted Eusebio Aguilar with his heirs. The City also excluded from
expropriation TCT N59870 and thereby reduced the area sought to be expropriated from three (3) parcels of land
to two (2) parcels totalling 1,636 square meters.The Amended Complaint was admitted by the trial court.
The trial court dismissed the Amended Complaint after declaring respondents as "small property owners" whose
land is exempt from expropriation under Republic Act No. 7279. The court also found that the expropriation was
not for a public purpose for petitioner's failure to present any evidence that the intended beneficiaries of the
expropriation are landless and homeless residents of Mandaluyong.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. RTC denied the motion. Hence this petition.
Petitioner mainly claims that the size of the lots in litigation does not exempt the same from expropriation in view
of the fact that the said lots have been declared to be within the Area for Priority Development (APD) No. 5 of
Mandaluyong by virtue of Proclamation No. 1967, as amended by Proclamation No. 2284 in relation to
Presidential Decree No. 1517. This declaration allegedly authorizes petitioner to expropriate the property, ipso
facto, regardless of the area of the land.
Issues:
Whether the City has exhausted all means to acquire the land under the hands of private persons, but which is
within the Areas for Priority Development (APD). - No.
Whether or not the respondent who is a small property owner is exempt from expropriation under Section 3 (q)
of R.A. 7279. - Yes.
Held:
City of Mandaluyong failed to exhausted the other modes of acquisition in Section 9 of the law before it decided
to expropriate the subject lots
Presidential Decree (PD) 1517, the Urban Land Reform Act, was issued by then President Marcos in 1978. The
decree adopted as a State policy the liberation of human communities from blight, congestion and hazard, and
promotion of their development and modernization, the optimum use of land as a national resource for public
welfare. Pursuant to this law, Proclamation 1893 was issued in 1979 declaring the entire Metro Manila as Urban
Land Reform Zone for purposes of urban land reform. This was amended in 1980 by Proclamation 1967 and in
1983 by Proclamation 2284 which identified and specified 245 sites in Metro Manila as Areas for Priority
Development and Urban Land Reform Zones.
The acquisition of lands for socialized housing is governed by several provisions in the law. Pursuant to Section
9 of RA 7279, Lands for socialized housing are to be acquired in the following order: (1) government lands; (2)
alienable lands of the public domain; (3) unregistered or abandoned or idle lands; (4) lands within the
declared Areas for Priority Development (APD), Zonal Improvement Program (ZIP) sites, Slum
Improvement and Resettlement (SIR) sites which have not yet been acquired; (5) BLISS sites which have
not yet been acquired; and (6) privately owned lands.
Section 9, however, is not a single provision that can be read separate from the other provisions of the law. It
must be read together with Section 10 of RA 7279. Thus, lands for socialized housing under RA 7279 are to be
acquired in several modes. Among these modes are the following: (1) community mortgage; (2) land swapping,
3) land assembly or consolidation; (4) land banking; (5) donation to the government; (6) joint venture
agreement; (7) negotiated purchase; and (8) expropriation.
The mode of expropriation is subject to two conditions: (a) it shall be resorted to only when the other modes
of acquisition have been exhausted; and (b) parcels of land owned by small property owners are exempt
from such acquisition.
Section 9 of R.A. 7279 speaks of priorities in the acquisition of lands. It enumerates the type of lands to be
acquired and the heirarchy in their acquisition. Section 10 deals with the modes of land acquisition or the process
of acquiring lands for socialized housing. These are two different things. They mean that the type of lands that
may be acquired in the order of priority in Section 9 are to be acquired only in the modes authorized under Section
10. In other words, land that lies within the APD may be acquired only in the modes under, and subject to the
conditions of, Section 10.
Argument of petitioner: City claims that it had faithfully observed the different modes of land acquisition for
socialized housing under RA 7279 and adhered to the priorities in the acquisition for socialized housing under
said law. It, however, did not state with particularity whether it exhausted the other modes of acquisition in Section
9 of the law before it decided to expropriate the subject lots. The law states "expropriation shall be resorted
to when other modes of acquisition have been exhausted." The City alleged only one mode of acquisition,
i.e., by negotiated purchase. The City, through the City Mayor, tried to purchase the lots from the Aguilars
but the latter refused to sell. As to the other modes of acquisition, no mention has been made. Not even
Resolution 516, Series of 1996 of the Sangguniang Panlungsod authorizing the Mayor of Mandaluyong to effect
the expropriation of the subject property states whether the city government tried to acquire the same by
community mortgage, land swapping, land assembly or consolidation, land banking, donation to the government,
or joint venture agreement under Section 9 of the law.
Respondents Aguilars are small property owners, thus exempted from expropriation
Section 9 also exempts from expropriation parcels of land owned by small property owners. Argument of
petitioner: eminent domain not conditioned on size of lands; that only a few can benefit does not diminish its
public use character.
Supreme Court adheres to notion of public use. RA 7279 introduced a limitation on size of land sought to be
expropriated FOR SOCIAL HOUSING for small property owners. RA 7279, Sec 3 (q) – small property owners
are (1) owners of real property whose property consists of residential lands with an area not > 300 sq. m.
in highly urbanized cities and 800 sq. m in other urban areas, (2) do not own real property other than the
same.
The properties of each co-owner did not exceed the 300 sq. m. rule in RA 7279. There was also no evidence to
the contrary that the co-owners owned other real properties. They may live in different housings, but that was no
proof from the petitioner. Respondents presented claims by presenting certifications from offices of the City and
Municipal Assessors in Metro Manila.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED and the orders dated September 17. 1998 and December 29, 1998
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 168, Pasig City in SCA No. 1427 are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
MIRIAM COLLEGE FOUNDATION, INC. v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, et. al.
Topic: Right to Quality Education, Art. XIV, Sec. 1
FACTS:
· Some members of the Mirriam College community described the contents of the school paper and magazine
for the September-October 1994 issue as "obscene," "vulgar," "indecent," "gross," "sexually explicit," "injurious
to young readers," and devoid of all moral values," particularly the fictional story entitled “Kaskas” which told
the experience of a group of young male combo players. The magazine’s Foreword written by Jerome Gomez
entitled “Foreplay” discussed the various reactions readers and the articles written by women and passed on to
the editors boldly tackled sexuality and other experiences.
· In the said issue, various erotic poems were published and following the publication of the paper and
magazine, the members of the editorial board, and Relly Carpio, author of Libog, all students of Miriam College,
were required by Dr. Aleli Sevilla, Chair of the Miriam College Discipline Committee, to answer in writing the
complaints of the Mirriam Community and a concerned Ateneo grade five student for violations of the regulations
in the student handbook considered to be major and minor offenses.
· Instead of answers, the students requested the transfer to the Regional Office of the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) which supposedly had jurisdiction over the case.
· In response to the second letter of Dr. Sevilla, the students reiterated that the Committee had no jurisdiction
over them as they were being disciplined on account of their having written articles and poems in their capacity
as campus journalists thus the applicable law is Republic Act No. 7079 otherwise known as The Campus
Journalism Act and its implementing rules and regulations and the emphasized the partiality of the members of
said Committee who allegedly "had already articulated their position" against them.
· The investigation proceeded ex parte and thereafter, the students were meted sanctions from suspension
to expulsion which prompted the students to file a Petition for Prohibition and Certiorari with Preliminary
Injunction/Restraining Order before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City questioning the jurisdiction of the
Discipline Board of Miriam College over them.
· The RTC denied the prayer for Temporary Restraining Order holding that DECS Order No. 94, S. 1992
dated August 19, 1992 did not exclude school Administrators from exercising jurisdiction over cases of the nature
involved in the instant petition. R.A. 7079 also did not state anything on the matter of jurisdiction. The trial court
ruled that DECS Order No. 94, S. of 1992 merely prescribes for purposes of internal administration which DECS
officer or body shall hear cases arising from R A. 7079 if and when brought to it for resolution. The said order
never mentioned that it has exclusive jurisdiction over cases falling under R.A. 7079.
· Upon motion for reconsideration, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the
expulsion and dismissal of the concerned students but the suspension and withholding of graduation privileges
remained in force and were not covered by the injunction.
· Later, the RTC due to lack of jurisdiction dismissed the petition without prejudice to its institution in the
proper forum.
· All students, except 3, went to the Supreme Court through a petition for certiorari and prohibition of
preliminary injunction/restraining order but it was referred to the Court of Appeals (CA) for disposition.
· The Court of Appeals granted the students’ petition and declared the RTC Orders including the students'
suspension and dismissal, void.
· Hence, the petition by Mirriam College.
ISSUE/S : freedom which has been enshrined in the 1935, 1973 and the present 1987 Constitution.
The relevant issues are:
The power of petitioner to suspend or dismiss respondent students;
The jurisdiction of petitioner over the complaints against the students.
N. B.: The Court did not tackle the alleged obscenity of the publication, the propriety of the penalty imposed or
the manner of the imposition thereof since these were not fully ventilated in the lower courts.
HELD : academic and disciplinary standards laid down by the academic institution.
The Court reversed and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals.
RATIO : The Constitution recognizes the State's power to regulate educational institution however such power to regulate
Academic freedom guaranteed in institutions of higher learning
The Constitution guarantees all institutions of higher learning academic freedom. This institutional academic
freedom includes the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to
attain them free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for
some restraint.
Academic freedom, its coverage
The essential freedoms subsumed in the term "academic freedom" encompasses the freedom to determine for
itself on academic grounds:
(1) Who may teach, (2) What may be taught, (3) How it shall be taught, and (4) Who may be admitted to study.
Right to discipline, a necessity to protect students, faculty and property
The right of the school to discipline its students is embodied in "how it shall be taught" since a school cannot
function in an atmosphere of anarchy. The establishment of an educational institution requires rules and
regulations necessary for the maintenance of an orderly educational program and the creation of an educational
environment conducive to learning. These rules and regulations are equally necessary for the protection of the
students, faculty, and property.
Right to discipline is based on the “what to teach” freedom as well
Teaching the student discipline is necessary in any field of learning. By instilling discipline, the school teaches
discipline which likewise finds basis in the freedom "what to teach."
Right to develop discipline, a constitutional duty
The school has the right and the duty to develop discipline in its students as the Constitution provides that all
educational institutions shall inculcate patriotism and nationalism, foster love of humanity, respect for human
rights, appreciation of the role of national heroes in the historical development of the country, teach the rights and
duties of citizenship, strengthen ethical and spiritual values, develop moral character and personal discipline,
encourage critical and creative thinking, broaden scientific and technological knowledge, and promote vocational
efficiency.
The Court in an earlier case said that discipline was a means for the school to carry out its responsibility to help
its students "grow and develop into mature, responsible, effective and worthy citizens of the community."
Freedom to determine admission carries the right to exclude or expel as well as to impose lesser sanctions,
form part of discipline
The right to discipline includes "who may be admitted to study." The school’s freedom to determine whom to
admit includes the right to determine whom to exclude or expel, as well as upon whom to impose lesser sanctions
such as suspension and the withholding of graduation privileges.
Reinstatement of students found guilty of violating disciplinary rules and authority, undermine school
administration’s authority and impair academic freedom
In an earlier case, the Court upheld the expulsion of students found guilty of hazing holding that the reinstatement
of students who have been investigated and found guilty by the Disciplinary Board in violating disciplinary rules
and standards will undermine the authority of the administration of the school. It will seriously impair academic
Admission to an institution of higher learning, mere privilege rather than a right
The Court reiterated that it has consistently upheld the salutary proposition that admission to an institution of
higher learning is discretionary upon a school, the same being a privilege on the part of the student rather than a
right. While under the Education Act of 1982, students have a right "to freely choose their field of study, subject
to existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to graduation," such right is subject to the established
State’s power to regulate educational institutions does not entail deprivations of their rights
is subject to the requirement of reasonableness. The Constitution allows merely the regulation and supervision of
educational institutions, not the deprivation of their rights.
Students’ right to free speech, though guaranteed is not absolute
The Court has consistently held that students are entitled to peaceable assembly and free speech as they enjoy the
freedom to express their views and communicate their thoughts to those disposed to listen in gatherings.
However, the right of the students to free speech in school premises is not absolute. While the Court upheld the
right of the students to free expression, it did not rule out disciplinary action by the school for conduct by the
student, in class or out of it, which for any reason - whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior - which
materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others.
Reconciliation of the provision under the Campus Journalism Act and the Constitution, imperative
The provision under the Campus Journalism Act providing that a student shall not be expelled or suspended solely
on the basis of articles he or she has written, or on the basis of the performance of his or her duties in the student
publication should not be construed so as to infringe upon the school's right to discipline its students or unduly
restrict the right of the students to free speech.
The Court held that the said provision of the Campus Journalism Act simply meant that the school cannot suspend
or expel a student solely based on the articles he or she has written, except when such article materially disrupts
class work or involve substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others.
Power to investigate is adjunct of its power to suspend or expel thus the school has jurisdiction
The Court held that Mirriam College has the authority to hear and decide the cases filed against its students. The
power of the school to investigate is an adjunct of its power to suspend or expel. It is necessary to the enforcement
of rules and regulations and the maintenance of a safe and orderly educational environment conducive to learning.
That power, like the power to suspend or expel, is an inherent part of the academic freedom of institutions of
higher learning guaranteed by the Constitution.
UNIVERSITY OF SAN AGUSTIN v. CA
Topic: Educational mandate of the State
FACTS:
· Private respondents Ho, Magante, Sancho, So and Cainoy are third year nursing students of the University
of San Agustin (USA) who were refused admission in the summer classes of 1989 and the last two semesters of
school year 1989-1990 on the ground that they failed to obtain grades of not lower than 80% in Nursing 104
(Nursing Practice II with Related Learning Experience).
· A petition for mandamus was filed to command USA to re-admit them.
· USA admitted having barred private respondents from finishing their Nursing course but justified that only
students with grades of at least 80% in any major Nursing subject, including Nursing 104, and two minor subjects,
are allowed enrollment in the following year. Private respondents were duly informed and forewarned of their
below 80% performance rating.
· RTC: Petitioned denied. Mandamus will not lie to compel USA to enroll private respondents because of
their academic deficiencies and that the refusal of USA falls within its right to do so under the academic freedom
clause of the Constitution.
· CA: Reversed the RTC. Private respondents possess no academic deficiency and are not disqualified from
readmission to USA’s College of Nursing. While it is true that they did not obtain a grade of at least 80% in
Nursing 104, they passed and did not fail in said subject and in facts obtained grades of 77% and 78%. It is
irrefutable that 75% is the passing grade in USA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not mandamus will lie to compel USA to enroll private respondents?
HELD:
NO, private respondents failed to show that they possess a clear legal right to be enrolled in USA. Moreover,
assuming that USA has an imperative duty to enroll them, the duty is not merely ministerial; rather, it is a duty
involving the exercise of discretion. The Constitution provides that educational institutions have the discretion or
the academic freedom to deny private respondents admission or re-admission.
· Taking into account the fact that private respondents have already finished their Nursing course at the
Lanting College of Nursing even before the promulgation of the questioned decision, this case has clearly been
overtaken by events and should therefore be dismissed. However, even if the case is moot and academic, a
statement of the governing principle is appropriate in the resolution of dismissal for the guidance not only of the
parries but of others similarly situated.
· Mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, this being its main
objective. It does not lie to require anyone to fulfill contractual obligations or to compel a course of conduct, nor
to control or review the exercise of discretion. Furthermore, the petitioner must have a clear legal right to the
thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act required.
· In the present case, private respondents have failed to satisfy the prime and indispensable requisites of a
mandamus proceeding. There is no showing that they possess a clear legal right to be enrolled in USA. Moreover,
assuming that USA has an imperative duty to enroll them, it does not appear that the duty is merely ministerial;
rather, it is a duty involving the exercise of discretion.
· The Court mentions the following provisions providing for the rights of students:
o Sec. IV, par. 107 of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools states the school, after having
accepted a student for enrollment in a given course may not expel him or refuse to re-enroll him until he completes
his course, except when he is academically deficient or has violated the rules of discipline.
o Sec. 9(2) of BP 232 (Education Act of 1982) provides that students shall have the right to freely choose
their field of study subject to existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to graduation, except in
cases of academic deficiency.
o Art. XIV, Sec. 5(3) of the 1987 Constitution affords a similar right, although limited to citizens. It
provides that every citizen has a right to select a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable, and
equitable admission and academic requirements.
· As to the rights of educational institutions, the Court mentions the following provisions allowing schools
to pursue their academic freedom and in the process have the concomitant right to see to it that this freedom is
not jeopardized:
o Sec. 13(2) of BP 232 provides that schools shall have the right to determine on academic grounds who
shall be admitted to study, who may teach, and what shall be the subjects of the study and research.
o Sec. 5(2), Art. XIV of the 1987 Constitution provides that academic freedom shall be enjoyed by all
institutions of higher learning. Academic freedom has been defined as the right of the school or college to decide
for itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to attain them – free from outside coercion or interference save
possible when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint.
· While it is true that an institution of learning has a contractual obligation to afford its students a fair
opportunity to complete the course they seek to pursue, since a contract creates reciprocal rights and obligations,
the obligation of the school to educate a student would imply a corresponding obligation on the part of the student
to study and obey the rules and regulations of the school.
· The Court recognizes the expertise of educational institutions in the various fields of learning. Thus, they
are afforded ample discretion to formulate reasonable rules and regulations in the admission of students, including
setting of academic standards. Within the parameters thereof, they are competent to determine who are entitled
to admission and re-admission.
· Although private respondents did not flunk in Nursing 104, their performances are still academically
deficient for failure to meet the standards set by USA. Besides, it is worthy to note that they were apprised fully
beforehand about the rules and regulations of USA. They also signed agreements when they applied for admission
to first year at USA.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 23, 1991
and its resolutions dated April 25, 1991 and June 10, 1991 are SET ASIDE. The order of the Regional Trial Court
of Iloilo City dated September 15, 1989 is REINSTATED.

ATENEO v. CAPULONG
Topic: The Educational System, Art. XIV, Sec. 3, Sec. 4
FACTS:
· Aguila Legis, a fraternity in Ateneo Law School, held its initiation rites upon neophytes.
· As a result thereof, one neophyte named Leonardo "Lennie" H. Villa, a first year law student,died of serious
physical injuries.
· Another freshman student by the name of Bienvenido Marquezwas also hospitalized for acute renal failure
occasioned by the serious physical injuries inflictedupon him on the same occasion.
· Dean del Castillo created an investigating committee which was tasked to investigate and submit a report
regarding the circumstances surrounding thedeath of Lennie Villa.
· The respondent students were asked to submit their written statementsbut failed to do so. In the meantime,
they were placed in preventive suspension.
· The investigating committee, after receiving the written statements and hearing the testimonies of several
witness, found a prima facie case against respondent students for violation of Rule 3 of the Law School Catalogue
entitled "Discipline."
· Respondent students were then required to file their written answers to the formal charge.
· Petitioner Dean created a Disciplinary Board to hear the charges against respondent students.
ATENEO BOARD:
· respondent students guilty of violating Rule No. 3 of the Ateneo Law School Rules on Discipline which
prohibits participationin hazing activities. However, in view of the lack of unanimity among the members of the
Board on the penalty of dismissal, the Board left the imposition of the penalty to the University Administration.
· Accordingly, Fr. Bernas imposed the penalty of dismissal on allrespondent students.
Respondent students filed with RTC Makati a TRO since they are currently enrolled.
RESP JUDGE CAPULONG: ordered Ateneo to reverse its decision and reinstate the said students
ISSUE/S:
· WON a school is within its rights in expelling students from its academiccommunity pursuant to its
disciplinary rules and moral standards – YES
· WON respondents students were denied due process – NO
· WON the Ateneo Law School has competence to issue an order dismissing such students pursuant to its
rules. – YES
RULING:
1st Issue: YES.
· As corporate entities, educational institutions of higher learning are inherentlyendowed with the right to
establish their policies, academic and otherwise, unhampered byexternal controls or pressure.
· The SC consistently upheld the salutary propositionthat admission to an institution of higher learning is
discretionary upon a school, the samebeing a privilege on the part of the student rather than a right.
· While under the education Actof 1982, students have a right "to freely choose their field of study, subject
to existing curriculaand to continue their course therein up to graduation," such right is subject, as all rights are,
to the established academic and disciplinary standards laid down by the academic institution.
2nd Issue: NO.
· There was no denial of due process, more particularly procedural due process.
· Dean of the Ateneo Law School, notified and required respondent students to submit their written statement
on the incident.
· Instead of filing a reply, respondent students requested through their counsel, copies of the charges.
· The nature and cause of the accusation were adequately spelled out in petitioners' notices. Present is the
twin elements of notice and hearing.
· Respondent students argue that petitioners are not in a position to file the instant petition under Rule 65
considering that they failed to file a motion for reconsideration first before the trial court, thereby by passing the
latter and the Court of Appeals.
o It is accepted legal doctrine that an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies is when the case
involves a question of law, as in this case, where the issue is whether or not respondent students have been
afforded procedural due process prior to their dismissal from Petitioner University.
· Minimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic institutions, such
as petitioner university herein, thus:
o the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them;
o that they shall have the right to answer the charges against them with the assistance of counsel, if desired:
o they shall be informed of the evidence against them
o they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and
o the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school
authorities to hear and decide the case.
3rd Issue: YES, Ateneo has the competence and the power to dismiss its erring students and therefore it had
validly exercised such power.
· The students do not deserve to claim such a venerable institution such as Ateneo as their own a minute
longer for they may forseeably cast a malevolent influence on students currently enrolled as well as those who
come after them.
· This is academic freedom on the part of the school which includes:
a. freedom to determine who may teach;
b. freedom to determine what may be taught;
c. freedom to determine how it shall be taught;
d. freedom to determine who may be admitted to study.
KNIGHTS OF RIZAL v. DMCI HOMES, INC., et al.
Topic: Arts and Culture, Art. XIV, Sections 14-18
FACTS: In September 2011, DMCI Project Developers, Inc. (DMCI-PDI) acquired a lot near Taft Avenue,
Malate, Manila earmarked for the construction of Torre de Manila. DMCI-PDI secured its Barangay Clearance
to start the construction. A Zoning Permit and a Building Permit was later obtained, allowing to build a 49-storey
with basement and 2 penthouse level condominium on the property.
In July 2012, the City Council of Manila issued Resolution No. 121 enjoining the Office of the Building Official
to temporarily suspend the Building Permit of DMCI-PDI citing that “the Torre de Manila Condominium, based
on their development plans, upon completion, will rise up high above the back of the national monument, to
clearly dwarf the statue of our hero, and with such towering heights, would certainly ruin the line of sight of the
Rizal Shrine from the frontal Roxas Boulevard vantage point.”
The opinion of Manila City Legal Officer Dela Cruz was sought by Building Official Balagot as to whether the
latter is bound to comply with Resolution No. 121. The former stated that there is no legal justification for the
temporary suspension of the Building Permit issued in favor of DMCI-PDI since the construction lies outside the
Luneta Park and is too far to be a repulsive distraction or have an objectionable effect on the artistic and historical
significance of the Rizal Monument. He also pointed out that there is no showing that the area of subject property
has been officially declared as an anthropological or archeological area. Neither has it been categorically
designated by the National Historical Institute as a heritage zone, a cultural property, a historical landmark or
even a national treasure.
Subsequently, both the City of Manila and DMCI-PDI sought the opinion of the National Historical Commission
of the Philippines (NHCP) on the matter. Through letters, NHCP Chairperson Dr. Maria Serena I. Diokno
addressed to DMCI-PDI and NHCP Executive Director III Ludovico D. Badoy addressed to then Manila Mayor
Alfredo S. Lim, that the Torre de Manila project site is outside the boundaries of the Rizal Park and well to the
rear of the Rizal Monument, and thus, cannot possibly obstruct the frontal view of the National Monument.
An online petition against the Torre de Manila project garnered about 7,800 signatures. The City Council of
Manila issued Resolution No. 146, reiterating its directive in Resolution No. 121.
In a letter to Mayor Estrada dated, DMCI-PIDI President Austria sought clarification on the controversy
surrounding its Zoning Permit. He stated that since they were a Zoning Permit, DMCI-PDI continued with the
application for the Building Permit, which was also granted, and did not deem it necessary to go through the
process of appealing to the local zoning board. He expressed DMCI-PDI's willingness to comply with the process
if the City of Manila deemed it necessary.
The Manila Zoning Board of Adjustments and Appeals (MZBAA) issued Zoning Board Resolution No. 06, Series
of 2013, recommending the approval of DMCI-PDI's application.
Manila’s City Council issued Resolution No. 5, Series of 2014, adopting Zoning Board Resolution Nos. 06 and
06-A, which ratifies and confirms all previously issued permits, licenses and approvals issued for Torre de Manila.
KOR: In September 2014, Knights of Rizal, an NGO created under RA No. 646, filed a petition for injunction
seeking a TRO (and later, a writ of preliminary injunction) against the construction of Torre de Manila, arguing
that the subject matter of the present suit is one of transcendental importance, paramount public interest, of
overarching significance to society, or with far-reaching implication involving the desecration of the Rizal
Monument. It further argues that the Rizal Monument, as a National Treasure, is entitled to full protection of the
law and the government must abate any act or activity that endangers the nation’s cultural heritage even against
the wishes of the local government hosting it. Also, it argues that the project is a nuisance per se because "the
despoliation of the sight view of the Rizal Monument is a situation that annoys or offends the senses' of every
Filipino who honors the memory of the National Hero Jose Rizal. It is a present, continuing, worsening and
aggravating status or condition. Being a nuisance per se, it deserves to be abated summarily, even without need
of judicial proceeding. Lastly, it contends that the construction was commenced and continues in bad faith, and
is in violation of the City’s zoning ordinance.
DMCI-PDI: 1. DMCI-PDI argues that the Court has no jurisdiction over the action and that the action should
have been filed with the RTC under the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. It contends that the proper forum should
be the MZBAA and should the KOR fail there, it should appeal to the HLURB. It further argues that since the
Rizal Monument has been declared a National Treasure, the power to issue a cease and desist order is with the
appropriate cultural agency under Section 25, RA No. 10066 or the National Cultural Heritage Act of 2009. An
action for injunction is not the property remedy for the abatement of a nuisance.
2. KOR has no legal right to file the action because it is not a real party in interest since it has not shown that it
suffered an actual or threatened injury as a result of the alleged illegal conduct of the City of Manila. If there is
injury, the same was caused by the private conduct of a private entity and not the City.
3. Torre de Manila is not a nuisance per se. DMCI-PDI obtained all the necessary permits, licenses, clearances
and certificates for the construction of Torre de Manila.
4. DMCI-PDI acted in good faith in constructing Torre de Manila. Bad faith cannot be attributed to DMCI-PDI
since it was within the lawful exercise of its rights. KOR failed to present proof that it did not follow the proper
procedure and zoning restriction of the City. Even if KOR proffered proof, the Court would still be in no position
to declare its acts as illegal since the Court is not a trier of facts.
5. KOR is not entitled to a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction because KOR failed to establish a clear and
unmistakable right to enjoin the construction of Torre de Manila, much less request its demolition. To grant
KOR’s application for injunctive relief would constitute an unjust taking of property without due process of law.
6. An action for injunction is not the proper remedy for abatement of a nuisance. It also assert that the Torre de
Manila is not a nuisance per se as it obtained all the necessary permits, licenses, clearances and certificates for its
construction.
ISSUES:
1. WoN the Court can issue a writ of mandamus against the official of the City of Manila to stop the
construction of Torre de Manila. – No.
2. WoN the Torre de Manila is a nuisance per se. – No.
HELD: 1. WoN the Court can issue a writ of mandamus against the official of the City of Manila to stop the
construction of Torre de Manila. – No.
A. There is no law prohibiting the construction of Torre de Manila.
· What is not expressly or impliedly prohibited by law may be done, except when the act is contrary to
morals, customs and I public order. (Manila Electric Company v. PSC).
· It is the law itself - Articles 1306 and 1409(1) CC, which prescribes that acts not contrary to morals, good
customs, public order, or public policy are allowed if also not contrary to law.
o Here, there is no allegation or proof that the Torre de Manila project is "contrary to morals, customs,
and public order". On the contrary, the City of Manila has determined that DMCI-PDI complied with
the standards set under the pertinent laws and local ordinances to construct its Torre de Manila project.
· Section 47 of Ordinance No. 8119 specifically regulates the “development of historic sites and facilities.”
Section 48 regulates “large commercial signage and/or pylon.”
o There is nothing in both Section that disallows the construction of a building outside the boundaries
of a historic site or facility, where such building may affect the background of a historic site.
o Torre de Manila stands 870 meters outside and to the rear of the Rizal Monument and "cannot
possibly obstruct the front view of the [Rizal] Monument."
o Likewise, Torre de Manila is not in an area that has been declared as an "anthropological or
archeological area" or in an area designated as a heritage zone, cultural property, historical landmark,
or a national treasure by the NHCP.
· The National Cultural Heritage Act of 2009 empowers the National Commission for Culture and the Arts
and other cultural agencies to issue a cease and desist order “when the physical integrity of the national cultural
treasures or important cultural properties [is] found to be in danger of destruction or significant alteration from
its original state.”
o Physical integrity refers to the structure itself - how strong and sound the structure is. The same law
does not mention that another project, not itself a heritage may be the subject of a cease and desist order.
o Thus, it cannot apply to the Torre de Manila project.
B. Mandamus does not lie against the City of Manila.
· Mandamus only issues when there is a clear legal duty imposed upon the office or the officer sought to be
compelled to perform an act, and when the party seeking mandamus has a clear legal right to the performance of
such act.
· As there is nothing in Ordinance 8119 or any law prohibiting the said construction, there is no legal duty
on the part of the City of Manila to consider he standards set under Ordinance No. 8119, which are standards that
can never be applied outside the boundaries of Rizal Park.
o Mandamus will lie only if the officials of the City of Manila have a ministerial duty to consider
these standards to buildings outside of the Rizal Park. There can be no such ministerial duty because
these standards are not applicable to buildings outside of the Rizal Park.
· The exercise of the Court’s extraordinary certiorari power can neither be invoked as it is limited to actual
cases and controversies that necessarily involve a violation of the Constitution or the determination of the
constitutionality or validity of a governmental act or issuance. Specific violation of a statute that does not raise
the issue of constitutionality or validity of the statute.
Ø Dissenting Opinion: The City, by reason of a mistaken or erroneous construction of its own Ordinance, had
failed to consider its duties under [Ordinance No. 8119] when it issued permits in DMCI-PDI's favor.
· Such is disproved by the MBZAA Zoning Resolutions.The power of the Court in mandamus petitions does
not extend "to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way or the retraction or reversal of an
action already taken in the exercise of either."
o Without further proof that the MZBAA acted whimsically, capriciously, or arbitrarily in issuing the
resolution (Fact #8), the Court should respect MZBAA's exercise of discretion.
Ø Dissenting Opinion: City of Manila should reevaluate, through the CPDO, the permits previously issued in
favor of the Torre de Manila project to determine compliance with the standards under Ordinance No. 8119. The
circumstances in this case warrant the pro hac vice conversion of the proceedings in the issuance of the permits
into a "contested case" necessitating notice and hearing with all the parties involved.
· The decision of the Court in this case cannot be pro hac vice because by mandate of the law every decision
of the Court forms part of the legal system of the Philippines. If another case comes up with the same facts as the
present case, that case must be decided in the same way as this case to comply with the constitutional mandate of
equal protection of the law.
· In exceptional cases, the Court has granted a prayer for mandamus to compel action in matters involving
judgment and discretion, only in cases where there has been a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion, manifest
injustice, or palpable excess of authority.
o Here, there can be no determination by this Court that the City of Manila had been negligent or
remiss in its duty under Ordinance No. 8119 considering that this determination will involve questions
of fact.
o Even the KOR could not point to any law that City of Manila had violated and could only point to
declarations of policies by the NHCP and the Venice Charter which do not constitute clear legal bases
for the issuance of a writ of mandamus.
o The Venice Charter is merely a codification of guiding principles for the preservation and restoration
of ancient monuments, sites, and buildings. It is not a treaty and therefore does not become enforceable
as law.
· Though DMCI-PDI's Zoning Permit was granted without going through the process under Ordinance No.
8119, such was rectified when City of Manila ratified the licenses and permits already given to DMCI-PDI.
o Said ratification is a function of the City Council of Manila, an exercise of its discretion and well
within the authority granted it by law and the City's own Ordinance No. 8119.
· The main purpose of zoning is the protection of public safety, health, convenience, and welfare.
o There is no indication that the Torre de Manila project brings any harm, danger, or hazard to the
people in the surrounding areas except that the building allegedly poses an unsightly view on the taking
of photos or the visual appreciation of the Rizal Monument by locals and tourists.
o The approval of MBZAA and subsequent ratification by City Council must be taken as duly
authorized exercise of discretion by the city officials.
C. The KOR is Estopped from questioning the Torre de Manila Construction.
· The KOR itself came up with the idea to build a structure right behind the Rizal Monument that would
dwarf the Rizal Monument. It proposed the building of a 129.25 meter high national theater right behind the
monument in the mid 1950s. KOR also proposed to build a Rizal Center on the park as recently as 2013.

· In contrast, the Torre de Manila is located well outside the Rizal Park, and to the rear of the Rizal Monument
- approximately 870 meters from the Rizal Monument and 3 0 meters from the edge of Rizal Park.
2. WoN the Torre de Manila is a nuisance per se. – No.
· Article 694 NCC defines a nuisance as any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property,
or anything else which: (1) injures or endangers the health or safety of others; (2) annoys or offends the senses;
(3) shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; (4) obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public
highway or street, or any body of water; or (5) hinders or impairs the use of property.
o 2 Kinds of nuisances:
1) nuisance per se - recognized as a nuisance under any and all circumstances, because it
constitutes a direct menace to public health or safety, and, for that reason, may be abated
summarily under the undefined law of necessity.
2) nuisance per accidens - depends upon certain conditions and circumstances, and its existence
being a question of fact, it cannot be abated without due hearing thereon in a tribunal authorized
to decide whether such a thing in law constitutes a nuisance.
· The Torre de Manila is not a nuisance per se. It cannot be considered as a “direct menace to public health
or safety.”
o Not only is a condominium project commonplace in the City of Manila, DMCI-PDI has, according
to the proper government agencies, complied with health and safety standards set by law.
o DMCI-PDI has also been granted the following permits and clearances: 1) Height Clearance Permit
from the Civil Aviation Authority; (2) Development Permit from the HLURB; (3) Zoning Certification
from the HLURB; (4) Cert. of Environmental Compliance Commitment from DENR; (5) Barangay
Clearance (6) Zoning Permit; (7) Building Permit; (8) and Electrical and Mechanical Permit. DMCI-
PDI also obtained the right to build under a variance recommended by the MZBAA and granted by the
City Council of Manila.
· Neither is Torre de Manila a nuisance per accidens as now being claimed by KOR.
o The conditions and circumstances determining a nuisance per accidens must be well established,
not merely alleged. The Court cannot simply accept these conditions and circumstances as established
facts.
o The authority to decide when a nuisance exists is an authority to find facts, to estimate their force,
and to apply rules of law to the case thus made. The Court is no such authority and is not a trier of facts.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: Petition for mandamus is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The TRO issued by the Court
on 16 June 2015 is LIFTED effective immediately.
JOSE A. ANGARA v. ELECTORAL COMMISSION, Perdo Ynsua, Miguel Castillo, and Dionisio Mayor
Topic: Doctrine of Separation of Powers
FACTS:
In the 1935 elections, Jose Angara (Angara) was proclaimed as a member of the National Assembly, winning
over the private respondents. The following are the events that transpired after the election:
· Nov. 15: Angara took his oath of office
· Dec. 3: the National Assembly (NA) passed a resolution confirming the winners of the election without
any protest, and that no other protests may be filed afterwards.
· Dec. 8: Ynsua filed a motion of protest before the Electoral Commission.
· Dec. 9: The Electoral Commission (EC) adopted a resolution fixing December 9 as the last day for the
filing of protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the NA, notwithstanding the
previous confirmation made by the NA.
Angara filed a Motion to Dismiss the protest arguing that by virtue of the NA proclamation, Ynsua can no longer
protest. Ynsua argued back by claiming that there is no legal or constitutional provision barring the presentation
of a protest against the election of a member of the NA after confirmation.
The EC denied this motion to dismiss, which prompted Angara to file a petition before the SC for the issuance of
a writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the EC from taking further cognizance of the protest, as he was
already a member of the NA. He alleged that the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the EC solely
as regards the merits of contested elections, excluding the power to regulate the proceedings for
contesting/protesting (which necessarily includes the fixing of deadlines), which power has been reserved to the
Legislative Department, the NA. Essentially, Angara is of the opinion that the question of which between the NA
and the EC has jurisdiction over his situation falls under the SC’s jurisdiction as it involved the interpretation of
the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Can the SC take cognizance of the Prohibition Petition without interfering or encroaching upon the functions of
the EC? YES, in the system of checks and balances, the SC is the final arbiter, which effectively checks the other
departments in the exercise of its functions.
HELD:
Doctrine of Separation of Powers: The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of
government. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and
is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate
and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other.
Principle of Checks and Balances: The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances
to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. The Constitution provided
a balance between the three so as to prevent one branch of government from being too powerful or weaker than
the other, as they are “co-equal branches”.
For example, the President can veto laws that are passed by Congress (but the Congress can pass the law upon its
return to both houses provided that it reaches a ⅔ vote from each house) and while the President needs the consent
of the Senate in order to be a part of a treaty. The Judiciary through the Supreme Court, is the final arbiter of acts
and laws promulgated by both branches.
Therefore, in cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon
to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral or
constituent units thereof. This moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear implication from section 2
of article VIII of the 1935 Constitution.
PS: In Loazon’s syllabus the doctrine is under the principle of separation of powers, the SC will have to await
the termination of the proceedings before the Electoral Tribunal for it to take congnizance of the case but this
was not in the case itself???
Doctrine of Necessary Implication: Ruling on the merits, the SC held that the EC is a constitutional organ, created
for a specific purpose, namely to determine all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the NA. The express lodging of that power in the EC is an implied denial of the exercise of that power
by the NA. Thus, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive
power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the NA, must be
deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the EC.
The EC was, therefore, acting the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take
cognizance of the protest filed by Ynsua.
We hold, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional
prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua against the election
of the herein petitioner Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935
cannot in any manner toll the time for filing protests against the elections, returns and qualifications of members
of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral
Commission might prescribe… The petition for a writ of prohibition against the Electoral Commission is hereby
denied, with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR. VS. JOINT COMMITTEE OF CONGRESS TO CANVASS THE
VOTES CAST FOR PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT IN THE MAY 10, 2004 ELECTIONS
Topic: Doctrine of Separation of Powers
FACTS:
By the present Petition for Prohibition, Senator Pimentel, Jr. seeks a judgment declaring null and void the
continued existence of the Joint Committee of Congress (Joint Committee) to determine the authenticity and due
execution of the certificates of canvass and preliminarily canvass the votes cast for Presidential and Vice-
Presidential candidates in the May 10, 2004 elections following the adjournment of Congress sine die on June 11,
2004. It corollarily prays for the issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Joint Committee to cease and desist
from conducting any further proceedings pursuant to the Rules of the Joint Public Session of Congress on
Canvassing.
· With the adjournment sine die on June 11, 2004 by the Twelfth Congress of its last regular session, its
term terminated and expired on the said day and the said Twelfth Congress serving the term 2001 to 2004 passed
out of legal existence.
· Henceforth, all pending matters and proceedings terminate upon the expiration of Congress, relying on
legislative procedure, precedent or practice as borne out by the rules of both Houses of Congress.
Given the importance of the constitutional issue raised, SC assumes jurisdiction over the instant petition pursuant
to its power and duty "to determine whether or not there has been a GADALEJ on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government" under Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution and its original jurisdiction
over petitions for prohibition under Section 5 of the same Article.
PETITIONER’S ARGUMENTS:
1. His arguments are buttressed by legislative procedure, precedent or practice [as] borne [out] by the rules of
both Houses of Congress.
2. Citing Section 15[1], Article VI of the Constitution, the existence and proceedings of the Joint Committee of
Congress are invalid, illegal and unconstitutional following the adjournment sine die of both Houses of Congress
of their regular sessions on June 11, 2004.
ISSUE: WON the Joint Committee should cease in completing its tasks assigned following the adjournment sine
die on June 11, 2004 by the Twelfth Congress of its last regular session
RATIO: No, the petition has absolutely no basis under the Constitution and must, therefore, be dismissed.
Petitioner's claim that his arguments are buttressed by "legislative procedure, precedent or practice [as] borne
[out] by the rules of both Houses of Congress" is directly contradicted by Section 42 of Rule XIV of the Rules
adopted by the Senate, of which he is an incumbent member.
· The Senate shall convene in joint session during any voluntary or compulsory recess to canvass the votes
for President and Vice-President not later than thirty days after the day of the elections in accordance with Section
4, Article VII of the Constitution.
The precedents set by the 1992 and 1998 Presidential Elections do not support the move to stop the ongoing
canvassing by the Joint Committee, they citing the observations of former Senate President Jovito Salonga.
1992 Presidential elections: Both Houses of Congress adjourned sine die on May 25, 1992. On June 16, 1992, the
Joint Committee finished tallying the votes for President and Vice-President. Thereafter, on June 22, 1992, the
Eighth Congress convened in joint public session as the National Board of Canvassers, and on even date
proclaimed Fidel V. Ramos and Joseph Ejercito Estrada as President and Vice-President, respectively.
1998 Presidential elections: Both Houses of Congress adjourned sine die on May 25, 1998. The Joint Committee
completed the counting of the votes for President and Vice-President on May 27, 1998.[3]cralaw The Tenth
Congress then convened in joint public session on May 29, 1998 as the National Board of Canvassers and
proclaimed Joseph Ejercito Estrada as President and Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President and Vice-President,
respectively.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE EXISTENCE AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE
Contrary to petitioner's argument, however, the term of the present Twelfth Congress did not terminate and expire
upon the adjournment sine die of the regular session of both Houses on June 11, 2004.
Section 15, Article VI of the Constitution cited by petitioner does not pertain to the term of Congress, but to its
regular annual legislative sessions and the mandatory 30-day recess before the opening of its next regular session
(subject to the power of the President to call a special session at any time).
Section 4 of Article VIII Constitution:
"The term of office of the Senators shall be six years and shall commence, unless otherwise provided by law, at
noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election."
Section 7, Article VIII, Constitution:
"The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless
otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election."
Consequently, there being no law to the contrary, until June 30, 2004, the present Twelfth Congress to which the
present legislators belong cannot be said to have passed out of legal existence.
The legislative functions of the Twelfth Congress may have come to a close upon the final adjournment of its
regular sessions on June 11, 2004, but this does not affect its non-legislative functions, such as that of being the
National Board of Canvassers.
In fact, the joint public session of both Houses of Congress convened by express directive of Section 4, Article
VII of the Constitution to canvass the votes for and to proclaim the newly elected President and Vice-President
has not, and cannot, adjourn sine die until it has accomplished its constitutionally mandated tasks. For only when
a board of canvassers has completed its functions is it rendered functus officio. Its membership may change, but
it retains its authority as a board until it has accomplished its purposes.
Since the Twelfth Congress has not yet completed its non-legislative duty to canvass the votes and proclaim the
duly elected President and Vice-President, its existence as the National Board of Canvassers, as well as that of
the Joint Committee to which it referred the preliminary tasks of authenticating and canvassing the certificates of
canvass, has not become functus officio.
In sum, despite the adjournment sine die of Congress, there is no legal impediment to the Joint Committee
completing the tasks assigned to it and transmitting its report for the approval of the joint public session of both
Houses of Congress, which may reconvene without need of call by the President to a special session.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby DISMISSED.
[1] Sec. 15. The Congress shall convene once every year on the fourth Monday of July for its regular session,
unless a different date is fixed by law, and shall continue to be in session for such number of days as it may
determine until thirty days before the opening of its next regular session, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and
legal holidays. The President may call a special session at any time.
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee vs. Majaducon (G.R. No. 136760)
Topic: Doctrine of Separation of Powers
Facts:
The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee conducted an inquiry into the alleged mismanagement of the funds and
investment of the Armed Forces Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS). During the public
hearings by the Blue Ribbon Committee, it appeared that the AFP-RSBS purchased a lot from Atty. Nilo J.
Flaviano worth P10,500 per square meter. However, the deed of sale filed with the Register of Deeds indicated
that the purchase price of the lot was only P3,000 per square meter. The Committee caused the service of a
subpoena to Atty. Flaviano, directing him to appear and testify before it. Respondent refused to appear and filed
a petition for prohibition and preliminary injunction with prayer for temporary restraining order with the RTC of
General Santos City. The trial court issued a TRO directing the committee to cease and desist from proceeding
with the inquiry. The Committee filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and failure to state
a valid cause of action. The Trial Court denied the motion to dismiss. Hence, this petition for certiorari alleging
that Judge Majaducon committed grave abuse of discretion and acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Judge Jose Majaducon committed grave abuse of discretion when he dismissed the
petition for prohibition and issued the writ of preliminary injunction.
Ruling:
The assailed resolution of respondent Judge Majaducon was issued without legal basis. The principle of separation
of powers essentially means that legislation belongs to Congress, execution to the Executive, and settlement of
legal controversies to the Judiciary. Each is prevented from invading the domain of the others. When the Senate
Blue Ribbon Committee served subpoena on respondent Flaviano to appear and testify before it in connection
with its investigation of the alleged misuse and mismanagement of the AFP-RSBS funds, it did so pursuant to its
authority to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. This is clearly provided in Article 6, Section 21 of the 1987
Constitution:
The Senate of the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected
by such inquiries shall be respected.
Hence, the RTC of General Santos City, or any court for that matter, had no authority to prohibit the Committee
from requiring respondent t appear and testify before it.
Also, the ruling in Bengzon vs. Blue Ribbon Committee cited by the respondent does not apply in this case. The
factual circumstances therein are different from those in the case at bar. In Bengzon, no intended legislation was
involved and the subject matter of the inquiry was more within the province of the courts rather than the
legislature. On the other hand, there was in this case a clear legislative purpose, and this is to look into the reported
misuse and mismanagement of the AFP-RSBS funds, with the intention of enacting appropriate legislation to
protect the rights and interests of the officers and members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

DATU ANDAL AMPATUAN JR. vs. SEC. LEILA DE LIMA
G.R. No. 197291 April 3, 2013
Topic: Doctrine of Separation of Powers
FACTS:
In the joint resolution issued on February 5, 2010, the Panel of Prosecutors charged 196 individuals with multiple
murder in relation to the Maguindanao massacre. One Kenny Dalandag, was admitted into the Witness Protection
Program of the DOJ and was later on listed as one of the prosecution witness. On October 14, 2010, petitioner,
through counsel request the inclusion of Dalandag in the information for murder considering that Dalandag had
already confessed his participation in the massacre through his two sworn declarations. Petitioner reiterated the
request twice more on October 22, 201019 and November 2, 2010 but Secretary De Lima denied petitioner’s
request.
Accordingly, on December 7, 2010, petitioner brought a petition for mandamus in the RTC in Manila seeking to
compel respondents to charge Dalandag as another accused in the various murder cases undergoing trial in the
QC RTC. The RTC in Manila set a pre-trial conference and issued a pre-trial order. The respondents questioned
the propriety of the conduct of a trial in a proceeding for mandamus. Petitioner opposed. Petitioner also filed a
motion for the production of documents, which the RTC in Manila granted.
On June 27, 2011,33 the RTC of Manila issued the assailed order in Civil Case No. 10-124777 dismissing the
petition for mandamus. Hence, this appeal by petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents may be compelled by writ of mandamus to charge Dalandag as an
accused for multiple murder in relation to the Maguindanao massacre despite his admission to the Witness
Protection Program of the DOJ.
HELD: NO. Respondent Secretary of Justice may be compelled to act on the letter-request of petitioner, but may
not be compelled to act in a certain way, i.e., to grant or deny such letter-request. Considering that respondent
Secretary of Justice already denied the letter-request, mandamus was no longer available as petitioner's recourse.
The prosecution of crimes pertains to the Executive Department of the Government whose principal power and
responsibility are to see to it that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of the power to execute
our laws is the right to prosecute their violators. The right to prosecute vests the public prosecutors with a wide
range of discretion – the discretion of what and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a smorgasbord
of factors that are best appreciated by the public prosecutors.
The public prosecutors are solely responsible for the determination of the amount of evidence sufficient to
establish probable cause to justify the filing of appropriate criminal charges against a respondent. Theirs is also
the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not criminal cases should be filed in court.
Consistent with the principle of separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution, the Court deems it a sound
judicial policy not to interfere in the conduct of preliminary investigations, and to allow the Executive
Department, through the Department of Justice, exclusively to determine what constitutes sufficient evidence to
establish probable cause for the prosecution of supposed offenders. By way of exception, however, judicial review
may be allowed where it is clearly established that the public prosecutor committed grave abuse of discretion,
that is, when he has exercised his discretion "in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by reason
of passion or personal hostility, patent and gross enough as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law."
The records herein are bereft of any showing that the Panel of Prosecutors committed grave abuse of discretion
in identifying the 196 individuals to be indicted for the Maguindanao massacre. It is notable in this regard that
petitioner does not assail the joint resolution recommending such number of individuals to be charged with
multiple murder, but only seeks to have Dalandag be also investigated and charged as one of the accused based
because of his own admissions in his sworn declarations. However, his exclusion as an accused from the
informations did not at all amount to grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Panel of Prosecutors whose
procedure in excluding Dalandag as an accused was far from arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic. Section
2, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, which requires that "the complaint or information shall be xxx against all
persons who appear to be responsible for the offense involved," albeit a mandatory provision, may be subject of
some exceptions, one of which is when a participant in the commission of a crime becomes a state witness.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; AFFIRMS the final order issued on June
27, 2011 in Civil Case No. 10-124777 by the Regional Trial Court in Manila; and ORDERS petitioner to pay the
costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
DEMETRIA v ALBA
Topic: How principle is violated: interference to and assumption of another branch’s functions

FACTS:
Petitioners, who are members of the National Assembly as citizens and taxpayers, filed a petition questioning the
constitutionality of Sec 44 of PD 1177 (Budget Reform Decree of 1977) on the grounds that: (a) it infringes the
law by authorizing the illegal transfer of public moneys, (b) it failed to specify the objectives and purposes for
which the proposed transfer of funds are to be made and (c) it allows the President to override the safeguards,
form and procedure and approving appropriations, and is a continuous threat of excess of authority and
jurisdiction, thus it amounts to an undue delegation of legislative powers to the executive.
The Solicitor General questioned the legal standing of the petitioners and argued that the provision under
consideration was enacted pursuant to Section 16[5], Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution. He further contended
that prohibition will not lie from one branch of the government to a coordinate branch to enjoin the performance
of duties within the latter's sphere of responsibility. He also filed a rejoinder to dismiss the petition on the ground
that the abrogation of Section 16(5) of Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution by the Freedom Constitution, which
states that “No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the President, may by law
be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in
other items of their respective appropriations.”, allegedly rendered the petition moot and academic.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Executive Branch exceeds the scope of its constitutional authority by the act of approving
appropriations in accordance to Sec 44 of PD 1177
HELD: Yes, the Executive Branch exceeds the scope of its constitutional authority by the act of approving
appropriations in accordance to Sec 44 of PD 1177.
The conflict between paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 and Section 16[5], Article VIII
of the 1973 Constitution is readily perceivable from a mere cursory reading thereof. Said paragraph 1 of Section
44 provides:
“The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the different departments, bureaus,
offices and agencies of the Executive Department, which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any
program, project or activity of any department, bureau, or office included in the General Appropriations Act or
approved after its enactment.”
Section 16[5], Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution provides:
“No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the President, the Prime Minister,
the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional commissions may by law be
authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in
other items of their respective appropriations.”
The prohibition to transfer an appropriation for one item to another was explicit and categorical under the 1973
Constitution. Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177 unduly over extends the privilege granted under said
Section 16[5]. It empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau, office
or agency of the Executive Department to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau or office
included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without regard as to whether or not
the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item. It does not only completely disregard the standards set
in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond
the tenor thereof.
Moreover, where the legislature or the executive branch is acting within the limits of its authority, the judiciary
cannot and ought not to interfere with the former. But where the legislature or the executive acts beyond the scope
of its constitutional powers, it becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare what the other branches of the
government had assumed to do as void. Respondents are not acting within their sphere of responsibility and are
hence, enjoined form acting under the unconstitutional provision in question.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is granted. Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 is
hereby declared null and void for being unconstitutional.
MACALINTAL vs COMELEC
Topic: Illustrations of Application of the Principle of Blending of Powers
FACTS:
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Romulo B. Macalintal, a member of the
Philippine Bar, seeking a declaration that certain provisions of Republic Act No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee
Voting Act of 2003) suffer from constitutional infirmity. Claiming that he has actual and material legal interest
in the subject matter of this case in seeing to it that public funds are properly and lawfully used and appropriated,
petitioner filed the instant petition as a taxpayer and as a lawyer. The Court upholds the right of the petitioner to
file the present petition.
R.A. No. 9189, entitled, An Act Providing for A System of Overseas Absentee Voting by Qualified Citizens of
the Philippines Abroad, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes, appropriates funds under Section
29 thereof which provides that a supplemental budget on the General Appropriations Act of the year of its
enactment into law shall provide for the necessary amount to carry out its provisions.
The need to consider the constitutional issues raised before the Court is further buttressed by the fact that it is
now more than fifteen years since the ratification of the 1987 Constitution requiring Congress to provide a system
for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad
ISSUE: WON Sections 19 and 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189, violates the independence of the COMELEC granted
under Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution? [YES]
RULING:
Petitioner maintains that the creation of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee with the power to review,
revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the COMELEC, R.A. No.
9189 intrudes into the independence of the COMELEC which, as a constitutional body, is not under the control
of either the executive or legislative departments of government; that only the COMELEC itself can promulgate
rules and regulations which may be changed or revised only by the majority of its members; and that should the
rules promulgated by the COMELEC violate any law, it is the Court that has the power to review the same via
the petition of any interested party, including the legislators.
Like the petitioner, respondent COMELEC anchors its claim of unconstitutionality of said Sections upon Section
1, Article IX-A of the Constitution providing for the independence of the constitutional commissions such as the
COMELEC. It is only on this question that respondent COMELEC submitted its Comment. It agrees with the
petitioner that Sections 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 are unconstitutional. Like the petitioner, respondent
COMELEC anchors its claim of unconstitutionality of said Sections upon Section 1, Article IX-A of the
Constitution providing for the independence of the constitutional commissions such as the COMELEC.
The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee (JCOC), created under RA 9189 and is charge of the IRR, violates
the Constitution. JCOC composing of members of both houses is a purely legislative body. As stated in the
Constitution, the COMELEC, being an independent Constitutional Commission, has the power to formulate,
regulate and implement rules and regulations, stated in Art IX-A of the Constitution. The Constitution does not
state, or even imply, the power of the Congress to enforce and administer election laws with the COMELEC.
Laws mentioned:
1. SEC. 19. Authority of the Commission to Promulgate Rules. The Commission shall issue the necessary
rules and regulations to effectively implement the provisions of this Act within sixty (60) days from the effectivity
of this Act. The Implementing Rules and Regulations shall be submitted to the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee created by virtue of this Act for prior approval.
2. SEC. 25. Joint Congressional Oversight Committee. A Joint Congressional Oversight Committee is
hereby created, composed of the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Constitutional Amendments, Revision of
Codes and Laws, and seven (7) other Senators designated by the Senate President, and the Chairman of the House
Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, and seven (7) other Members of the House of Representatives
designated by the Speaker of the House of Representatives: Provided, That, of the seven (7) members to be
designated by each House of Congress, four (4) should come from the majority and the remaining three (3) from
the minority.
The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee shall have the power to monitor and evaluate the implementation
of this Act. It shall review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated
by the Commission.
The Court has no general powers of supervision over COMELEC which is an independent body except those
specifically granted by the Constitution, that is, to review its decisions, orders and rulings. In the same vein, it is
not correct to hold that because of its recognized extensive legislative power to enact election laws, Congress may
intrude into the independence of the COMELEC by exercising supervisory powers over its rule-making authority.
Composed of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee (JCOC) is a purely legislative body. There is no question that the authority of Congress to monitor
and evaluate the implementation of R.A. No. 9189 is geared towards possible amendments or revision of the law
itself and thus, may be performed in aid of its legislation.
The Court has no general powers of supervision over COMELEC which is an independent body except those
specifically granted by the Constitution, that is, to review its decisions, orders and rulings. In the same vein, it is
not correct to hold that because of its recognized extensive legislative power to enact election laws, Congress may
intrude into the independence of the COMELEC by exercising supervisory powers over its rule-making authority.
WHEREFORE, the petition is partly GRANTED. The following portions of R.A. No. 9189 are declared VOID
for being UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Concurring & Dissenting Opinion
PUNO, J.
· Concurs on issue 2 & 3
· Dissents on issue 1
Congressional Oversight:
· Embraces all activities undertaken by Congress to enhance its understanding of and influence over the
implementation of legislation it has enacted; concerns post-enactment measures
· Monitor compliance, determine if agencies properly administered, eliminate dishonesty, assess executive
conformity with public interest
· Intrinsic in grant of legislative power and integral to checks and balances
o Scrutiny – determine efficiency; may request information and reports; based primarily on power of
appropriation
§ Ex. budget hearings, question hour, confirmation
o Congressional investigation – intense digging of facts; compel information needed to discharge legislative
functions
§ Must be in aid of legislation, conducted following rules of procedure, persons appearing afforded constitutional
rights
o Legislative supervision – informed awareness of a committee regarding executive operations; allows scrutiny
the exercise of delegated law-making authority
§ Ex. veto power
· Sec 19/25 constitute undue restrictions on the constitutional power of the COMELEC to promulgate rules
and regulations – Congress can veto under the oversight committee
· Majority sustains that the petitioner as it holds that “by vesting itself with powers to approve, review, amend
and revise the IRR for the Overseas Voting Act of 2003, Congress went beyond the scope of its constitutional
authority. Congress trampled upon the constitutional mandate of independence of the COMELEC.
· The focus is on the exact place of the power of congressional oversight in our constitutional canvass. This
will involve exposition of two principles basic to our constitutional democracy: separation of powers and checks
and balances.
· Separation of Powers – prevents the concentration of legislative, executive, and judicial powers to a single
branch of government by deftly allocating their exercise to the three branches of government.
o “The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through
express provision but by actual division in our Constitution.” (Laurel)
· Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of the matters within its jurisdiction, and is
supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separately
and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The
constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings
of the various departments of the government
· There is more truism and actuality in interdependence than in independence and separation of powers.
· It is beyond debate that the Principle of Separation of Powers:
o Allows the “blending” of some of the executive, legislative, or judicial powers in one body;
o Does not prevent one branch of government from inquiring into the affairs of the other branches to maintain
the balance of power;
o but ensures that there is no encroachment on matters within the exclusive jurisdiction of the other branches.
· Supreme Court checks the exercise of power of the other branches of government through judicial review.
It is the final arbiter of disputes involving the proper allocation and exercise of the different powers under the
Constitution.
· Judicial Supremacy
o The Constitution is a definition of the powers of the government. The Constitution itself has provided for the
instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional
boundary, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate
an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to
determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual
controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantee to them.
· The power of judicial review is, however, limited to “actual cases and controversies to be exercised after
full opportunity of arguments by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional questions raised or the very
lis mota presented” but this was redefined in the 1987 Constitution which expanded the jurisdiction of this Court
to include the dermination of “grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government.”
· COMELEC is a constitutional body exclusively charged with the enforcement and administration of “all
laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall, and is
invested with the power to decide all questions affecting elections save those involving the right to vote.
· COMELEC was purposely constituted as a body separate from the executive, legislative, and judiciary
branches of government given its important role in preserving the sanctity of the right of suffrage.
· The 1973 Constitution broadened the power of the COMELEC by making it the sole judge of all election
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the national legislature and elective
provincial and city officials. Thus, the COMELEC was given judicial power aside from its traditional
administrative and executive functions. The trend towards strengthening the COMELEC continued with the 1987
Constitution.
· The decisions of COMELEC are reviewable only by petition for certiorari on grounds of grave abuse of
discretion.
· The COMELEC is, however subject to congressional scrutiny especially during budget hearing. But
congress cannot abolish COMELEC as it’s a mere creature of the legislature; it owes its origin from the
Constitution.
· Congress has no power to call the commissioners of the COMELEC to a question hour but COMELEC is
mandated to “submit to the President and the Congress comprehensive report on the conduct of each election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall.” This provision allows the Congress to review and assess the
effectivity of election laws and if necessary, enact new laws or amend existing statuses.
· Be that as it may… legislative veto power or congressional oversight power over the authority of COMELEC
to issue rules and regulations in order to enforce election laws is unconstitutional.
· The COMELEC occupies a distinct place in our scheme of government. As the constitutional body charged
with the administration of our election laws, it is endowed with independence in the exercise of some of its powers
and the discharge of its responsibilities. The power to promulgate rules and regulations in order to administer
laws belong to this category of powers as this has been vested exclusively by the 1987 Constitution to the
COMELEC. It cannot be trenched upon by Congress in the exercise of its oversight function.
“I join the majority in holding that the section 17.1 of Rep. Act No. 9189 is unconstitutional for it allows Congress
to negate exclusive power of the COMELEC to administer and enforce election laws and regulations granted by
the Constitution itself.
Granting the petition will not invalidate the entire Rep. Act No. 9819. Decision (sic)
IN VIEW OF THE FORGOING, I dissent from the majority’s ruling upholding the constitutionality of section
5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189, which allows an immigrant or a permanent resident of a foreign country to vote for
President, Vice-President, Senators and Party-List after executing the required affidavit. I concur, however, with
the majority’s ruling upholding the constitutionality of section
18.5 of Rep. Act No. 9189 with respect to the authority given to the COMELEC to proclaim the winning
candidates for Senators and Party-List representatives but not as to the power to canvass the votes for President
and Vice-President. I also concur with the majority with respect to the unconstitutionality of sections 17.1, 19 and
25 of Rep. Act No. 9189 subjecting the implementation of voting by mail, and the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of Rep. Act No. 9189 to be promulgated by COMELEC, to prior review and approval by Congress.
I so vote.
ALEJANDRINO v. QUEZON
Topic: Illustrations of Application of the Principle of Blending of Powers
OSMENA v PENDATUN
Topic: The interference of the Supreme Court when dealing with the members of the Senate
FACTS:
On July 14, 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr., submitted to this Court a verified petition for "declaratory
relief, certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction" against Congressman Salapida K. Pendatun and
fourteen other congressmen in their capacity as members of the Special Committee created by House Resolution
No. 59. He asked for annulment of such Resolution on the ground of infringenment of his parliamentary
immunity; he also asked, principally, that said members of the special committee be enjoined from proceeding in
accordance with it, particularly the portion authorizing them to require him to substantiate his charges against the
President with the admonition that if he failed to do so, he must show cause why the House should not punish
him.
In support of his request, Congressman Osmeña alleged; first, the Resolution violated his constitutional absolute
parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in the House; second, his words constituted no actionable conduct;
and third, after his allegedly objectionable speech and words, the House took up other business, and Rule XVII,
sec. 7 of the Rules of House provides that if other business has intervened after the member had uttered obnoxious
words in debate, he shall not be held to answer therefor nor be subject to censure by the House.
Although some members of the court expressed doubts of petitioner's cause of action and the Court's jurisdiction,
the majority decided to hear the matter further, and required respondents to answer, without issuing any
preliminary injunction. Evidently aware of such circumstance with its implications, and pressed for time in view
of the imminent adjournment of the legislative session, the special committee continued to perform its talk, and
after giving Congressman Osmeña a chance to defend himself, submitted its reports on July 18, 1960, finding
said congressman guilty of serious disorderly behaviour; and acting on such report, the House approved on the
same day—before closing its session—House Resolution No. 175, declaring him guilty as recommended, and
suspending him from office for fifteen months.
Thereafter, on July 19, 1960, the respondents (with the exception of Congressmen De Pio, Abeleda, San Andres
Ziga, Fernandez and Balatao)1 filed their answer, challenged the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the petition,
defended the power of Congress to discipline its members with suspension, upheld a House Resolution No. 175
and then invited attention to the fact that Congress having ended its session on July 18, 1960, the Committee—
whose members are the sole respondents—had thereby ceased to exist.
There is no question that Congressman Osmeña, in a privilege speech delivered before the House, made the
serious imputations of bribery against the President which are quoted in Resolution No. 59 and that he refused to
produce before the House Committee created for the purpose, evidence to substantiate such imputations. There is
also no question that for having made the imputations and for failing to produce evidence in support thereof, he
was, by resolution of the House, suspended from office for a period of fifteen months for serious disorderly
behaviour.
As previously stated, Osmeña contended in his petition that: (1) the Constitution gave him complete parliamentary
immunity, and so, for words spoken in the House, he ought not to be questioned; (20 that his speech constituted
no disorderly behaviour for which he could be punished; and (3) supposing he could be questioned and discipline
therefor, the House had lost the power to do so because it had taken up other business before approving House
Resolution No. 59. Now, he takes the additional position (4) that the House has no power, under the Constitution,
to suspend one of its members.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC can interfere with the senate for disorderly behavior
HELD: “NO, the Supreme Court cannot interfere with the decision of the senate of what is disorderly behaviour
the House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behaviour, not only because the Constitution has conferred
jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the House
knows best but which can not be depicted in black and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts.
For one thing, if this Court assumed the power to determine whether Osmeña conduct constituted disorderly
behaviour, it would thereby have assumed appellate jurisdiction, which the Constitution never intended to confer
upon a coordinate branch of the Government. The theory of separation of powers fastidiously observed by this
Court, demands in such situation a prudent refusal to interfere. Each department, it has been said, had exclusive
cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere. (Angara vs. Electoral
Commission, 63 Phil., 139.)
In Clifford vs. French, There is no provision authority courts to control, direct, supervise, or forbid the exercise
by either house of the power to expel a member. These powers are functions of the legislative department and
therefore, in the exercise of the power this committed to it, the senate is supreme. An attempt by this court to
direct or control the legislature, or either house thereof, in the exercise of the power, would be an attempt to
exercise legislative functions, which it is expressly forbidden to do.
Our refusal to intervene might impress some readers as subconscious hesitation due to discovery of impermissible
course of action in the legislative chamber. Nothing of that sort: we merely refuse to disregard the allocation of
constitutional functions which it is our special duty to maintain. Indeed, in the interest of comity, we feel bound
to state that in a conscientious survey of governing principles and/or episodic illustrations, we found the House
of Representatives of the United States taking the position upon at least two occasions, that personal attacks upon
the Chief Executive constitute unparliamentary conduct or breach of orders. 8 And in several instances, it took
action against offenders, even after other business had been considered.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition has to be, and is hereby dismissed. So ordered.
NOTE:
However, under Sec. 1, Art. VIII of the 1987 Constitution, the Supreme Court may inquire whether or not the
decision to expel a member of Doctrine of Necessary Implication.
The Doctrine of necessary implication provides that the exercise of the power may be justified in the absence
of an express conferment because the grant of express power carried with it all other powers that may be
reasonably inferred from it.
Font: Helvetica Neue, Justified
JESUS C. GARCIA vs. THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON
Topic: Delegation of Powers
FACTS:
PETITIONER
· Jesus Garcia is the husband of Rosalie Jaype-Garcia and the father of their minor children.
· A series of Temporary Protection Orders were issued against Jesus Garcia, ordering him, among other
things, to remove all his personal belongings in the conjugal dwelling and leave the premises, to stay away from
Rosalie and their children, to not harass them in any way and to provide financial support.
· He filed oppositions to the renewal of the TPO. However, when it was renewed on September 26, 2006, he
no longer submitted the required comment to the motion for renewal of the TPO arguing that it would be an
exercise in futility.
· He then filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with a prayer for injunction and TRO challenging the
constitutionality of RA 9262 for being violative of the equal protection clause and due process clause, and the
validity of the modified TPO for being an unwanted product of an invalid law.
· CA dismissed his petition for failure to raise the constitutional issue in his pleadings before the RTC and
that the challenge to the validity of RA 9262 via petition for prohibition constituted a collateral attack on said
law.
· Jesus Garcia then filed this petition before the SC, assailing the constitutionality of RA 9262 for
a. making a gender-based classification, providing remedies only to women&children and not to men thus
violating the equal protection clause. He claims the even the title of the law, "An Act Defining Violence Against
Women and Their Children" is already discriminatory since it means violence by men against women. The law
also does not include violence committed by women against children and other women. He adds that gender alone
is not enough basis to deprive the husband of the remedies under it because its purpose is to curb and punish
spousal violence.
b. Violating the due process clause since he has practically no opportunity to respond and that he was
stripped of his property and family without an inkling of what happened.
c. by criminalizing run-of-the-mill arguments, instead of encouraging mediation and counseling, the law has
done violence to the avowed policy of the State to "protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution."
FACTS: RESPONDENT
· Jesus Garcia had allegedly inflicted acts of violence against his wife Rosalie Jaype-Garcia and his daughter,
Jo-ann.
· He was controlling , forbade Rosalie to pray and deliberately isolated her from her friends. When she took
up law, he trivialized her ambitions and asked her to just stay at home.
· Jesus Garcia admitted having an affair with a bank manager (godmother to one of their kids) and boasted
about their sexual relations to the household help.
· His infidelity was the subject of their numerous arguments, some resulting in physical harm to Rosalie; one
quarrel of theirs, Jesus grabbed Rosalie on both arms and shook her, leaving bruises and hematoma.
· Jesus Garcia also beat up their daughter, Jo-ann, who saw his text messages to said bank manager and who
told Rosalie about it.
· All these drove respondent Rosalie Garcia to despair causing her to attempt suicide on December 17, 2005
by slitting her wrist. Instead of taking her to the hospital, Jesus Garcia left the house and never visited her in all
the 7 days she was confined in the hospital.
· He even told his mother-in-law that Rosalie Garcia should just accept his extramarital affair since he is not
cohabiting with his paramour and has not sired a child with her.
· Rosalie Garcia was determined to separate from Jesus Garcia but she was afraid he would take away their
children and deprive her of financial support. He warned her that if she pursued legal battle, she would not get a
single centavo from him.
· After she confronted him of his affair, he forbade her to hold office in the family businesses of which they
are both stockholders, depriving her of access to full information about their businesses.
a. Note that Rosalie gets only P20k/month as salary from one corporation only while Jesus receives
P60k/month from said corporation and also enjoys unlimited cash advances and other benefits from the
corporations.
· Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC for the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order against Jesus
Garcia pursuant to RA 9262. RTC found reasonable ground to believe there was imminent danger of violence
against respondent and her children and issued a series of Temporary Protection Orders (TPO) against Jesus
Garcia.
ISSUE/HELD: Whether VAWC is unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause? No.

MAIN ISSUE: Whether or not RA. 9262 allows undue delegation of judicial power, thus being
unconstitutional
RATIO: R.A. 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws.
Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The oft-repeated disquisition in the early case of Victoriano v.
Elizalde Rope Workers' Union is instructive:
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in
law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation
or practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid
because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes
without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of
constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means
that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences;
that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions
only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. This Court has held that the
standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or
rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.
Measured against the foregoing jurisprudential yardstick, we find that R.A. 9262 is based on a valid classification
as shall hereinafter be discussed and, as such, did not violate the equal protection clause by favoring women over
men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the State extends its protection.
Unequal power relationship between men and women
The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are more likely than men to be
victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice against women all make for real differences
justifying the classification under the law.
Art. II, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution mandates the State to recognize the role of women in nation building
and to ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men. To this end, the Philippines has
participated in the global movement to address violence against women and children. Senate has ratified the
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the Convention
on the Rights of the Child and its two protocols. Congress also enacted RA 9262 (VAWC) in line with this State
policy.
According to the Philippine Commission on Women, violence against women (VAW) is deemed to be closely
linked with the unequal power relationship between women and men otherwise known as "gender-based
violence". Societal norms and traditions dictate people to think men are the leaders, pursuers, providers, and take
on dominant roles in society while women are nurturers, men's companions and supporters, and take on
subordinate roles in society. This perception leads to men gaining more power over women. With power comes
the need to control to retain that power. And VAW is a form of men's expression of controlling women to retain
power.
MAIN ISSUE: No undue delegation of judicial power to barangay officials.
Petitioner contends that protection orders involve the exercise of judicial power which, under the Constitution, is
placed upon the "Supreme Court and such other lower courts as may be established by law" and, thus, protests
the delegation of power to barangay officials to issue protection orders.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.112
On the other hand, executive power "is generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is
the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance.
The Barangay Protection Order issued by the Punong Barangay or, in his unavailability, by any available
Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator to desist from (a) causing physical harm to the woman or her
child; and (2) threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm. Such function of the Punong Barangay
is, thus, purely executive in nature, in pursuance of his duty under the Local Government Code to “enforce all
laws and ordinances,” and to “maintain public order in the barangay”
We have held that "(t)he mere fact that an officer is required by law to inquire into the existence of certain facts
and to apply the law thereto in order to determine what his official conduct shall be and the fact that these acts
may affect private rights do not constitute an exercise of judicial powers."115
In the same manner as the public prosecutor ascertains through a preliminary inquiry or proceeding "whether
there is reasonable ground to believe that an offense has been committed and the accused is probably guilty
thereof," the Punong Barangay must determine reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence
against the woman and her children exists or is about to recur that would necessitate the issuance of a BPO. The
preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor is, concededly, an executive, not a judicial, function. The
same holds true with the issuance of a BPO.
We need not even belabor the issue raised by petitioner that since barangay officials and other law enforcement
agencies are required to extend assistance to victims of violence and abuse, it would be very unlikely that they
would remain objective and impartial, and that the chances of acquittal are nil. As already stated, assistance by
barangay officials and other law enforcement agencies is consistent with their duty to enforce the law and to
maintain peace and order.
PHCAP v. Sec. Duque III,
Topic: Delegation of power
Facts:
E.O. No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon Aquino on October 28, 1986 by virtue of the legislative
powers granted to the president under the Freedom Constitution. One of the preambular clauses of the Milk Code
states that the law seeks to give effect to Article 11 of the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk
Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981.
 From 1982 to 2006, the WHA adopted several Resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be supported,
promoted and protected, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for
breastmilk substitutes.
In 1990, the Philippines ratified the International Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article 24 of said
instrument provides that State Parties should take appropriate measures to diminish infant and child mortality,
and ensure that all segments of society, specially parents and children, are informed of the advantages of
breastfeeding.
On May 15, 2006, the DOH issued herein assailed RIRR which was to take effect on July 7, 2006.
However, on June 28, 2006, petitioner, representing its members that are manufacturers of breastmilk substitutes,
filed the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a TRO or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction.
Petitioner’s Argue: The RIRR goes beyond the provisions of the Milk Code, thereby amending and expanding
the coverage of said law.
1. That the RIRR impose unreasonable requirements for advertising and promotion;
2. It impose an absolute ban on such activities for breastmilk substitutes intended for infants from 0-24 months
old or beyond,
3. It forbids the use of health and nutritional claims.
4. It impose additional labeling requirements not found in the Milk Code
The DOH Administrative order is violative of the WHA obligation in implementing the ICMBS under which the
state has an obligation to aid in marketing breast milk substitutes in line with protecting and promoting the rights
of children.
Respondent’s Defense:
1. International instruments are deemed part of the law of the land and therefore the DOH may implement
them through the RIRR. The RIRR does not violate the state obligation under the WHA because the ICMBS was
not ratified by senate, hence there is no state obligation arising from it.
2. The DOH is authorized to control the content of any information on breastmilk vis-à-visbreastmilk
substitutes, supplement and related products as stated under Sections 5,8, and 10 of the Milk Code.
Issue: WON the advertising and labeling requirements under the RIRR are valid
Held: NO
When it comes to information regarding nutrition of infants and young children, however, the Milk Code
specifically delegated to the Ministry of Health (hereinafter referred to as DOH) the power to ensure that there is
adequate, consistent and objective information on breastfeeding and use of breastmilk substitutes, supplements
and related products; and the power to control such information.
Further, DOH is authorized by the Milk Code to control the content of any information on breastmilk vis-à-vis
breastmilk substitutes.
The DOH is also authorized to control the purpose of the information and to whom such information may be
disseminated under Sections 6 through 9 of the Milk Code54 to ensure that the information that would reach
pregnant women, mothers of infants, and health professionals and workers in the health care system is restricted
to scientific and factual matters and shall not imply or create a belief that bottle-feeding is equivalent or superior
to breastfeeding.
It bears emphasis, however, that the DOH's power under the Milk Code to control information regarding
breastmilk vis-a-vis breastmilk substitutes is not absolute as the power to control does not encompass the
power to absolutely prohibit the advertising, marketing, and promotion of breastmilk substitutes.
It is in this context that the Court now examines the assailed provisions of the RIRR regarding labeling and
advertising.
Sections 1355 on "total effect" and 2656 of Rule VII of the RIRR contain some labeling requirements,
specifically: a) that there be a statement that there is no substitute to breastmilk; and b) that there be a statement
that powdered infant formula may contain pathogenic microorganisms and must be prepared and used
appropriately. Section 1657 of the RIRR prohibits all health and nutrition claims for products within the scope of
the Milk Code, such as claims of increased emotional and intellectual abilities of the infant and young child.
These requirements and limitations are consistent with the provisions of Section 8 of the Milk Code expressly
forbid information that would imply or create a belief that there is any milk product equivalent to breastmilk or
which is humanized or maternalized, as such information would be inconsistent with the superiority of
breastfeeding.
It may be argued that Section 8 of the Milk Code refers only to information given to health workers regarding
breastmilk substitutes, not to containers and labels thereof. However, such restrictive application of Section 8(b)
will result in the absurd situation in which milk companies and distributors are forbidden to claim to health
workers that their products are substitutes or equivalents of breastmilk, and yet be allowed to display on the
containers and labels of their products the exact opposite message. That askewed interpretation of the Milk Code
is precisely what Section 5(a) thereof seeks to avoid by mandating that all information regarding breastmilk vis-
a-vis breastmilk substitutes be consistent, at the same time giving the government control over planning,
provision, design, and dissemination of information on infant feeding.
Thus, Section 26(c) of the RIRR which requires containers and labels to state that the product offered is not a
substitute for breastmilk, is a reasonable means of enforcing Section 8 of the Milk Code.
Section 26(f)61 of the RIRR is an equally reasonable labeling requirement.
The label of a product contains information about said product intended for the buyers thereof. The buyers of
breastmilk substitutes are mothers of infants, and Section 26 of the RIRR merely adds a fair warning about the
likelihood of pathogenic microorganisms being present in infant formula and other related products when these
are prepared and used inappropriately.
The authority of DOH to control information regarding breastmilk vis-a-vis breastmilk substitutes and
supplements and related products cannot be questioned. It is its intervention into the area of advertising,
promotion, and marketing that is being assailed by petitioner.

The DOH, through its co-respondents, evidently arrogated to itself not only the regulatory authority given to the
IAC but also imposed absolute prohibition on advertising, promotion, and marketing.
Yet, oddly enough, Section 12 of the RIRR reiterated the requirement of the Milk Code in Section 6 thereof for
prior approval by IAC of all advertising, marketing and promotional materials prior to dissemination.
Thus, the DOH has the significant responsibility to translate into operational terms the standards set forth in
Sections 5, 8, and 10 of the Milk Code, by which the IAC shall screen advertising, promotional, or other marketing
materials.
Such standards bind the IAC in formulating its rules and regulations on advertising, promotion, and marketing.
Through that single provision, the DOH exercises control over the information content of advertising, promotional
and marketing materials on breastmilk vis-a-vis breastmilk substitutes, supplements and other related products. It
also sets a viable standard against which the IAC may screen such materials before they are made public.
In Equi-Asia Placement, Inc. vs. Department of Foreign Affairs, the Court held:
x x x [T]his Court had, in the past, accepted as sufficient standards the following: "public interest," "justice and
equity," "public convenience and welfare," and "simplicity, economy and welfare."
In this case, correct information as to infant feeding and nutrition is infused with public interest and welfare.
ABAKADA v. SEC. PURISIMA
Topic: Delegation of Powers
People v. Maceren
Topic: Delegation of power
FACTS
● Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin Reyes, Nazario Aquino and Carlito del Rosario
were charged by a Constabulary investigator in the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna with having
violated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1
● The accused were found to have performed “electro fishing” in the water of Sta. Cruz, by using
electricity from the machine of their bangka to fish and kill aquatic animals which come into contact with
its scope
● Upon motion of the accused, the municipal court quashed the complaint. The prosecution
appealed. The Court of First Instance of Laguna affirmed the order of dismissal
● CFI ruled that that electro fishing cannot be penalize because electric currentd is not an obnoxious
or poisonous substance as contemplated in section I I of the Fisheries Law and that it is not a substance
at all but a form of energy conducted or transmitted by substances. The lower court further held that,
since the law does not clearly prohibit electro fishing, the executive and judicial departments cannot
consider it unlawful
○ Section 11 of the Fisheries Law prohibits "the use of any obnoxious or poisonous substance" in
fishing
○ Section 76 of the same law punishes any person who uses an obnoxious or poisonous substance
in fishing with a fine of not more than five hundred pesos nor more than five thousand, and by
imprisonment for not less than six months nor more than five years.
○ The Fisheries Law does not expressly punish electro fishing
● Later, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, upon the recommendation of the
Commissioner of Fisheries, promulgated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84 prohibiting electro fishing
in all Philippine waters
● The Secretary later upon the recommendation of the Fisheries Commission, issued Fisheries
Administrative Order No. 84-1, amending section 2 of Administrative Order No. 84, by restricting the
ban against electro fishing to fresh water fisheries
○ The Supreme Court treated the appeal as one that is an appeal to the SC and not the CFI, as The
Court of First Instance and the prosecution (p. 11 of brief) assumed that electro fishing is punishable
under section 83 of the Fisheries Law (not under section 76 thereof), which provides that any other
violation of that law "or of any rules and regulations promulgated thereunder shall subject the offender
to a fine of not more than two hundred pesos (P200), or in t for not more than six months, or both, in
the discretion of the court."
○ That assumption is incorrect because 3 of the aforequoted Administrative Order No. 84 imposes
a fm of not exceeding P500 on a person engaged in electro fishing, which amount the 83. It seems that
the Department of Fisheries prescribed their own penalty for swift fishing which penalty is less than the
severe penalty imposed in section 76 and which is not Identified to the at penalty imposed in section 83.
○ Had Administrative Order No. 84 adopted the fighter penalty prescribed in on 83, then the crime
of electro fishing would be within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the inferior court
ISSUE: Whether the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources exceeded its authority in issuing Fisheries
Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1
HELD: Yes. The Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is not banned
under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are
powerless to penalize it. In other words, Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1, in penalizing electro
fishing, are devoid of any legal basis.
● Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that effect could
have been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law
○ That law punishes (1) the use of obnoxious or poisonous substance, or explosive in fishing; (2)
unlawful fishing in deepsea fisheries; (3) unlawful taking of marine molusca, (4) illegal taking of sponges;
(5) failure of licensed fishermen to report the kind and quantity of fish caught, and (6) other violations
● Nowhere in that law is electro fishing specifically punished. Administrative Order No. 84, in
punishing electro fishing, does not contemplate that such an offense fails within the category of "other
violations" because, as already shown, the penalty for electro fishing is the penalty next lower to the
penalty for fishing with the use of obnoxious or poisonous substances, fixed in section 76, and is not the
same as the penalty for "other violations" of the law and regulations fixed in section 83 of the Fisheries
Law
● At present, there is no more doubt that electro fishing is punishable under the Fisheries Law and
that it cannot be penalized merely by executive revolution because Presidential Decree No. 704, which is a
revision and consolidation of all laws and decrees affecting fishing and fisheries and which was promulgated on
May 16, 1975 , expressly punishes electro fishing in fresh water and salt water areas The inclusion in that decree
of provisions defining and penalizing electro fishing is a clear recognition of the deficiency or silence on that
point of the old Fisheries Law. It is an admission that a mere executive regulation is not legally adequate to
penalize electro fishing.
● An examination of the rule-making power of executive officials and administrative agencies and,
in particular, of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources under the Fisheries Law sustains the
view that he exceeded his authority in penalizing electro fishing by means of an administrative order
● Administrative agent are clothed with rule-making powers because the lawmaking body finds it
impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate and provide for the multifarious and complex situations
that may be encountered in enforcing the law. All that is required is that the regulation should be
germane to the defects and purposes of the law and that it should conform to the standards that the
law prescribes
● The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to
carry into effect the law as it his been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding
the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the
statute cannot be sanctioned
● In case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or regulation issued to implement said
law, the basic law prevails because said rule or regulation cannot go beyond the terms and provisions
of the basic law
WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision of June 9, 1970 is set aside for lack of appellate jurisdiction and the
order of dismissal rendered by the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna in Criminal Case No. 5429 is affirmed.
Costs de oficio.
– Prospero PICHAY v. OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY et al.
Topic: Delegation of Powers
FACTS:
In 2001, PGMA issued E.O. 12 creating the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) and vesting it with
the power to investigate or hear administrative cases or complaints for possible graft and corruption, among
others, against presidential appointees and to submit its report and recommendations to the President.
Cut to 2010, PNoy issued E.O. 13 abolishing the PAGC and transferring its functions to the Office of the Deputy
Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (ODESLA) more particularly to its newly-established Investigative and
Adjudicatory Division (IAD)
In 2011, Purisima filed before the IAD a complaint for grave misconduct against Pichay, Jr., then the Chairman
of the Board of Trustees (BoT) of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), as well as the incumbent
members of the LWUA BoT, in the purchase of shares of stock of Express Savings Bank, Inc. Pichay et al then
received an Order, signed by the then ExecSec Ochoa, requiring them to submit their written explanations.
Instead of complying with the Order, Pichay filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the SC, seeking,
among others to declare E.O. 13 as unconstitutional for usurping the powers of the Legislature – of Congress – to
create a public office and to delegate quasi-judicial powers to administrative agencies.
ISSUE:
Did the abolishing of the PAGC, an executive office, and the subsequent transfer of its functions to another
executive office (IAD) under E.O. 13 usurp upon the Congress’ power to create public office? No, E.O. 13 is
constitutional. The power of the President to reorganize executive offices is a prerogative under his
“continuing authority” to do so under the Administrative Code.
HELD:
The Administrative Code of 1987, vests in the President the continuing authority to reorganize the offices under
him in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency.
Section 31 thereof enumerates instances of when the President may reorganize offices, to wit:
(1) Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper, including the immediate
Offices, the Presidential Special Assistants/Advisers System and the Common Staff Support System, by
abolishing, consolidating, or merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another;
(2) Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other Department or Agency as well
as transfer functions to the Office of the President from other Departments and Agencies; and
(3) Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other Department or Agency as well as
transfer agencies to the Office of the President from other departments or agencies.
Under (1) the President can reorganize the Office of the President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging
units, or by transferring functions from one unit to another. In contrast, under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292,
the President's power to reorganize offices outside the Office of the President Proper but still within the Office of
the President is limited to merely transferring functions or agencies from the Office of the President to
Departments or Agencies, and vice versa.
The distinction between the allowable organizational actions under Section 31 (1) on the one hand and Section
31 (2) and (3) on the other is crucial not only as it affects employees' tenurial security but also insofar as it touches
upon the validity of the reorganization, that is, whether the executive actions undertaken fall within the limitations
prescribed under the Admin Code.
When the PAGC was created under E.O. 12, it was composed of a Chairman and two (2) Commissioners who
held the ranks of Presidential Assistant II and I, respectively, and was placed directly “under the Office of the
President.”
On the other hand, the ODESLA, to which the functions of the PAGC have now been transferred, is an office
within the Office of the President Proper. Since both of these offices belong to the Office of the President Proper,
the reorganization by way of abolishing the PAGC and transferring its functions to the ODESLA is allowable
under Section 31 (1) of E.O. 292.
The abolition of the PAGC did not require the creation of a new, additional and distinct office as the duties and
functions that pertained to the defunct anti-graft body were simply transferred to the ODESLA, which is an
existing office within the Office of the President Proper.
The reorganization required no more than a mere alteration of the administrative structure of the ODESLA
through the establishment of a third division the Investigative and Adjudicatory Division through which ODESLA
could take on the additional functions it has been tasked to discharge under E.O. 13.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
BANDA v. ERMITA
Topic: How law-making power is delegated: suppletory rule-making (filling in details to ensure enforcement of
the law) and contingent rule-making (ascertaining the facts to bring the law into operation)
FACTS:
Pursuant to Executive Order No. 378, government agencies and instrumentalities are allowed to source their
printing services from the private sector through competitive bidding, subject to the condition that the services
offered by the private supplier be of superior... quality and lower in cost compared to what was offered by the
National Printing Office (NPO). Executive Order No. 378 also limited NPO's appropriation in the General
Appropriations Act to its income.
Petitioners maintain that former President Aquino's Executive Order No. 285 is a legislative enactment, as the
same was issued while President Aquino still had legislative powers under the Freedom Constitution; thus, only
Congress through legislation can validly amend Executive Order No. 285.
Petitioners maintain that the issuance of Executive Order No. 378 would lead to the eventual abolition of the NPO
and would violate the security of tenure of NPO employees. Petitioners avow that the reorganization of the NPO
under Executive Order No. 378 is tainted with bad faith
ISSUE:
Whether or not it is beyond the executive powers of President Arroyo to amend or repeal Executive Order No.
285 issued by former President Aquino when the latter still exercised legislative powers.
HELD:
NO. It is a well-settled principle in jurisprudence that the President has the power to reorganize the offices and
agencies in the executive department in line with the President's constitutionally granted power of control over
executive offices and by virtue of previous delegation of the legislative power to reorganize executive offices
under existing statutes.
The NPO remains the main printing arm of the government for all kinds of government forms and publications
but in the interest of greater economy and encouraging efficiency and profitability, it must now compete with the
private sector for certain government printing jobs. Republic Act No. 7645, Executive Order No. 191 2003
General Appropriations Act, the aforequoted provisions in the appropriations law recognize the power of the
President to reorganize even executive offices already funded by the said appropriations act, including the power
to implement structural, functional, and operational adjustments in the executive bureaucracy and, in so doing,
modify or realign appropriations of funds as may be necessary under such reorganization.
The power of the President to reorganize agencies under the executive department by executive or administrative
order is constitutionally and statutorily recognized.
In all, Executive Order No. 378, which purports to institute necessary reforms in government in order to improve
and upgrade efficiency in the delivery of public services by redefining the functions of the NPO and limiting its
funding to its own income and to transform it into a... self-reliant agency able to compete with the private sector,
is well within the prerogative of President Arroyo under her continuing delegated legislative power to reorganize
her own office... the presidential power to reorganize agencies and offices in the executive branch of government
is subject to the condition that such reorganization is carried out in good faith.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order and/or a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction is hereby DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS v. SEC. REYES
Topic: Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency
FACTS:
· Petitioners are toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean species, which inhabit the
waters in and around the Tañon Strait.
· On December 21, 2004, DOE and Japan Petroleum Exploration, Co., Ltd. (JAPEX) formally converted
GSEC-102 into SERVICE CONTRACT-46 for the exploration, development, and production of petroleum
resources in a block covering approximately 2,850 square kilometers offshore the Tañon Strait.
· JAPEX committed to drill one exploration well during the second sub-phase of the project. Since the well
was to be drilled in the marine waters of Aloguinsan and Pinamungajan, where the Tañon Strait was declared
a protected seascape in 1988
o JAPEX agreed to comply with the Environmental Impact Assessment requirements pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 1586, entitled "Establishing An Environmental Impact Statement System, Including
Other Environmental Management Related Measures And For Other Purposes."
· Protected Area Management Board of Tanon Strait favorably recommended the approval of JAPEX’s
application of ECC.
o DENR granted an ECC to JAPEX for the offshore oil and gas exploration project in Tañon Strait.
o Months later, JAPEX began to drill an exploratory well, with a depth of 3,150 meters
· Petitioner applied to SC to enjoin the implementation of SC-46, which allowed the exploration, development,
and exploitation of petroleum resources within Tañon Strait, a narrow passage of water situated between the
islands of Negros and Cebu, for violation of the 1987 constitution.
· Petitioner’s argument:
o a study made after the seismic survey showed that the fish catch was reduced drastically by 50 to 70 percent
o They attribute this "reduced fish catch" to the destruction of the ''payao," also known as the "fish aggregating
device" or "artificial reef."
o the ECC obtained by private respondent JAPEX is invalid because public consultations and discussions
with the affected stakeholders, a pre-requisite to the issuance of the ECC, were not held prior to the ECC's
issuance.
o Insist that SC-46 is null and void for having violated Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
ISSUE: WON the Service Contract 46 violates the 1987 Constituion? YES
HELD:
SC 46 is in violation of the 1987 Consitution - YES
· In La Bugal, we held that the deletion of the words "service contracts" in the 1987 Constitution did not
amount to a ban on them per se.
· In brief, they were going to permit service contracts with foreign corporations as contractors, but
with safety measures to prevent abuses, as an exception to the general norm established in the first paragraph
of Section 2 of Article XII. This provision reserves or limits to Filipino citizens – and corporations at least 60
percent of which is owned by such citizens -- the exploration, development and utilization of natural resources
· In summarizing the matters discussed in the ConCom, we established that paragraph 4, with the safeguards
in place, is the exception to paragraph 1, Section 2 of Article XII. The following are the safeguards this Court
enumerated in La Bugal:
o Such service contracts may be entered into only with respect to minerals, petroleum and other mineral
oils. The grant thereof is subject to several safeguards, among which are these requirements:
(1) The service contract shall be crafted in accordance with a general law that will set standard or uniform terms,
conditions and requirements, presumably to attain a certain uniformity in provisions and avoid the possible
insertion of terms disadvantageous to the country.
(2) The President shall be the signatory for the government because, supposedly before an agreement is
presented to the President for signature, it will have been vetted several times over at different levels to ensure
that it conforms to law and can withstand public scrutiny.
(3) Within thirty days of the executed agreement, the President shall report it to Congress to give that branch of
government an opportunity to look over the agreement and interpose timely objections, if any
· Court finds that SC-46 is indeed null and void for noncompliance with the requirements of the 1987
Constitution.
o Presidential Decree No. 87 is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of a general law, the absence of the two
other conditions, that the President be a signatory to SC-46, and that Congress be notified of such contract,
renders it null and void.
· While the requirements in executing service contracts in paragraph 4, Section 2 of Article XII of the 1987
Constitution seem like mere formalities, they, in reality, take on a much bigger role. As we have explained in La
Bugal, they are the safeguards put in place by the framers of the Constitution to "eliminate or minimize
the abuses prevalent during the martial law regime."
o not just mere formalities, which will only render a contract unenforceable but not void, if not complied with.
They are requirements placed, not just in an ordinary statute, but in the fundamental law, the non-observance
of which will nullify the contract.
· our Constitution requires that the President himself be the signatory of service agreements with foreign-
owned corporations involving the exploration, development, and utilization of our minerals, petroleum, and other
mineral oils.
o the public respondents have failed to show that the President had any participation in SC-46.
o Even under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 87, it is required that the Petroleum Board, now the DOE,
obtain the President's approval for the execution of any contract under said statute
SC 46 vis-à-vis other laws VIOLATIVE
· former President Fidel V. Ramos declared the Tañon Strait as a protected seascape in 1998 by virtue of
Proclamation No. 1234
· During former President Joseph E. Estrada's time, he also constituted the Tañon Strait Commission via
Executive Order No. 76 to ensure the optimum and sustained use of the resources in that area without threatening
its marine life.
· Congress enacted the NIPAS Act to secure the perpetual existence of all native plants and animals through
the establishment of a comprehensive system of integrated protected areas.
· The Tañon Strait, pursuant to Proclamation No. 1234, was set aside and declared a protected area under
the category of Protected Seascape.
· requirement that an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) be made prior to undertaking any activity
outside the scope of the management plan. Unless an ECC under the EIA system is obtained, no activity
inconsistent with the goals of the NIPAS Act shall be implemented
· Under Proclamation No. 2146, the Tañon Strait is an environmentally critical area, having been declared
as a protected area in 1998; therefore, any activity outside the scope of its management plan may only be
implemented pursuant to an ECC secured after undergoing an EIA to determine the effects of such activity on its
ecological system.
· The public respondents themselves admitted that JAPEX only started to secure an ECC prior to the second
subphase of SC-46, which required the drilling of an oil exploration well. This means that when the seismic
surveys were done in the Tañon Strait, no such environmental impact evaluation was done. Unless seismic
surveys are part of the management plan of the Tañon Strait, such surveys were done in violation of Section 12
of the NIPAS Act and Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1586