TILAR VS.

TILAR

FACTS:

On November 4, 2010, Jerrysus filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of respondent's
psychological incapacity based on Article 36 of the Family Code. They were married on June 29, 1996 in a Catholic Church in Poro, Cebu
with Fr. Vicente Igot as the solemnizing officer. He alleged that their marriage went well in the first few months but respondent later
became an extremely jealous, violent person which resulted to frequent quarrels and Jerrysus being threatened and physically harmed.
They eventually separated in 2002 and the respondent is now living with another man in Cebu.

Jerrysus consulted a clinical psychologist and respondent was said to be suffering from "aggressive personality disorder as well as
histrionic personality disorder" which made her psychologically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital obligations. Respondent
failed to file answer despite being served with summons. The RTC dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.

RTC ruled that marriages solemnized and celebrated by the Church are governed by its Canon Law. Although the Family Code provides
for some regulations, the same does not follow that the State is authorized to inquire to its validity, The Constitution is supreme to the
Family Code. Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the Constitution is written in all laws, acts and transactions, hence, the
same must be upheld.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC erred in dismissing the case on the ground that the validity of church marriage is outside of its authority.

RULING:

YES! Section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution provides that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family
and shall be protected by the State.

Our Constitution clearly gives value to the sanctity of marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new
relation, an institution the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Thus, the State is mandated to protect marriage, being
the foundation of the family, which in turn is the foundation of the nation.

Accordingly, Article 1 of the Family Code pertinently provides:

Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences,
and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during
the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.

As marriage is a special contract, their terms and conditions are not merely subject to the stipulations of the contracting parties but are
governed by law. The Family Code provides for the essential 12 as well as formal13requisites for the validity of marriage. The absence of
any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2). A defect in any of the
essential requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly,
criminally and administratively liable.14 No prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is required.

It shall be necessary, however, for the contracting parties to appear personally before the solemnizing officer and declare in the presence
of not less than two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and wife. This declaration shall be contained in the
marriage certificate which shall be signed by the contracting parties and their witnesses and attested by the solemnizing officer. A marriage
license shall be issued by the local civil registrar of the city or municipality where either contracting party habitually resides, except in
marriages where no license is required.15 The rationale for the compulsory character of a marriage license is that it is the authority granted
by the State to the contracting parties, after the proper government official has inquired into their capacity to contract marriage.16

The Family Code also provides on who may solemnize and how marriage may be solemnized, thus:

Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by: xxx

(2) Any priest, rabbi, imam, or minister of any church or religious sect duly authorized by his church or religious sect and registered with
the civil registrar general, acting within the limits of the written authority granted by his church or religious sect and provided that at least
one of the contracting parties belongs to the solemnizing officer's church or religious sect; xxx

Article. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in
the office of the consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted
on the point of death or in remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both of the parties request the solemnizing
officer in writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that
effect.

Thus, the contract of marriage is entered into by complying with the requirements and formalities prescribed by law. The marriage of
petitioner and respondent which was solemnized by a Catholic priest and was held in a church was in accordance with the above-quoted
provisions. Although, marriage is considered a sacrament in the Catholic church, it has civil and legal consequences which are governed
by the Family Code. As petitioner correctly pointed out, the instant petition only seeks to nullify the marriage contract between the parties
as postulated in the Family Code of the Philippines; and the declaration of nullity of the parties' marriage in the religious and ecclesiastical
aspect is another matter.17 Notably, the proceedings for church annulment which is in accordance with the norms of Canon Law is not
binding upon the State as the couple is still considered married to each other in the eyes of the civil law. Thus, the principle of separation
of the church and state finds no application in this case.

As marriage is a lifetime commitment which the parties cannot just dissolve at whim, the Family Code has provided for the grounds for
the termination of marriage. These grounds may be invoked and proved in a petition for annulment of voidable marriage or in a petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage, which can be decided upon only by the court exercising jurisdiction over the matter. Section 19 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 provides:

REPUBLIC VS. ALBIOS

FACTS:

On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married before Judge Ofelia I. Calo of the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Mandaluyong City. On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Fringer. She
alleged that immediately after their marriage, they separated and never lived as husband and wife because they never really had any
intention of entering into a married state or complying with any of their essential marital obligations. She described their marriage as one
made in jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio.

Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his answer. On September 13, 2007, Albios filed a motion to set case for pre-trial and
to admit her pre-trial brief. At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not attend the hearing despite
being duly notified of the schedule. The RTC declared the marriage void ab initio. RTC was of the view that the parties married each other
for convenience only. Giving credence to the testimony of Albios, it stated that she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable
her to acquire American citizenship; that in consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00. She did not pay him the
$2,000.00 because he never processed her petition for citizenship. OSG filed an appeal before the CA, which affirmed the RTC ruling.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a marriage contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00 is void ab initio
on the ground of lack of consent.

RULING:

NO! In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, established the principal test for determining the
presence of marriage fraud in immigration cases. It ruled that a "marriage is a sham if the bride and groom did not intend to establish a
life together at the time they were married." This standard was modified with the passage of the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendment
of 1986 (IMFA), which now requires the couple to instead demonstrate that the marriage was not entered into for the purpose of evading
the immigration laws of the United States. The focus, thus, shifted from determining the intention to establish a life together, to determining
the intention of evading immigration laws.

Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the presence of a solemnizing officer. A "freely
given" consent requires that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense
that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles 45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud,
force, intimidation, and undue influence. Consent must also be conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of intelligently
understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act

Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real consent because it was not vitiated nor
rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the
beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That their consent was freely given
is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they
willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply
with the requirements of an application for citizenship. There was a full and complete understanding of the legal tie that would be... created
between them, since it was that precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.

The court also explained that “There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than what the
Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal requisites
prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or voidable under the grounds provided by law, it shall be declared valid.”

The Constitution declares that marriage, as an in violable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the
State. Thus, it must be safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the contracting parties. We cannot leave the impression that marriage
may easily be entered into when it suits the needs of the parties, and just as easily nullified when no longer needed.”

GO-BANGAYAN VS. BANGAYAN

FACTS:
Benjamin and Sally developed a romantic relationship in 1979. Sally’s father was against the relationship. Sally brought Benjamin to an
office in Santolan, Pasig City where they signed a purported marriage contract. Sally, knowing Benjamin’s marital status, assured him
that the marriage contract would not be registered.

Sally filed criminal actions for bigamy and falsification of public documents against Benjamin, using their simulated marriage contract as
evidence. Benjamin, in turn, filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the
trial court on the ground that his marriage to Sally was bigamous and that it lacked the formal requisites to a valid marriage. Benjamin
also asked the trial court for the partition of the properties he acquired with Sally in accordance with Article 148 of the Family Code, for
his appointment as administrator of the properties during the pendency of the case, and for the declaration of Bernice and Bentley as
illegitimate children. A total of 44 registered properties became the subject of the partition before the trial court. Aside from the seven
properties enumerated by Benjamin in his petition, Sally named 37 properties in her answer.

The trial court ruled that the marriage was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office because it could not
be registered due to Benjamin’s subsisting marriage with Azucena. The trial court ruled that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally
was not bigamous.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the marriage between Benjamin and Sally are void for not having a marriage license
2. Whether Art. 148 should govern Benjamin and Sally’s property relations
3. Whether bigamy was committed by the petitioner.

RULING:

1. YES! We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio and, at the same time,
non-existent. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized without a license, except those covered by Article 34 where
no license is necessary, “shall be void from the beginning.” In this case, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was solemnized
without a license. It was duly established that no marriage license was issued to them and that Marriage License No. N-07568 did not
match the marriage license numbers issued by the local civil registrar of Pasig City for the month of February 1982. The case clearly
falls under Section 3 of Article 35which made their marriage void ab initio. The marriage between Benjamin and Sally was also non-
existent. Applying the general rules on void or inexistent contracts under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts which are absolutely
simulated or fictitious are “inexistent and void from the beginning.” Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining the trial court’s
ruling that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was null and void ab initio and non-existent.

2. YES! The property relations of Benjamin and Sally is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code which states: Art. 148. In cases of
cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution
of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof
to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to
joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.

If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community of conjugal
partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be
forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.

Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage. Thus, only the properties acquired by them through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. Thus, both
the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly excluded the 37 properties being claimed by Sally which were given by Benjamin’s father
to his children as advance inheritance. Sally’s Answer to the petition before the trial court even admitted that “Benjamin’s late father
himself conveyed a number of properties to his children and their respective spouses which included Sally.”

3. NO! On whether or not the parties’ marriage is bigamous under the concept of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the marriage
is not bigamous. It is required that the first or former marriage shall not be null and void. The marriage of the petitioner to Azucena shall
be assumed as the one that is valid, there being no evidence to the contrary and there is no trace of invalidity or irregularity on the face
of their marriage contract. However, if the second marriage was void not because of the existence of the first marriage but for other
causes such as lack of license, the crime of bigamy was not committed. For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent marriage must
have all the essential requisites for validity except for the existence of a prior marriage.In this case, there was really no subsequent
marriage. Benjamin and Sally just signed a purported marriage contract without a marriage license. The supposed marriage was not
recorded with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office. In short, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally did not exist.
They lived together and represented themselves as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage.

NAVARRO VS. DOMAGTOY

FACTS:

Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro filed a complaint on two specific acts committed by respondent Municipal
Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy on the grounds of gross misconduct, inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law.

The first allegation of Navarro to Domagtoy is that the latter solemnized marriage of Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borja on September 27,
1994 despite the knowledge that the groom has a subsisting marriage was merely separated. It was told that the wife of Gaspar left their
conjugal home and has not returned and been heard for almost seven years.
The second allegation of the plaintiff was that the said Judge likewise solemnized marriage of Floriano Dadoy Sumaylo and Gemma G.
del Rosario outside his court’s jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. The judge holds his office and has jurisdiction in the Muni cipal Circuit
Trial Court of Sta Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte but he solemnized the said wedding at his residence in the municipality of Dapa
located 40 to 50 km away.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage solemnized by the Judge Domagtoy were void;

RULING:

YES! The court held that the marriage between Tagadan and Borja was void and bigamous there being a subsisting marriage between
Tagadan and his wife, notwithstanding, the latter was gone for seven years and the spouse had a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was dead, Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding as provided in the Civil Code for the declaration of presumptive death
of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.

However, with regard to the marriage of Sumaylo and Del Rosario, the said marriage was solidified as valid, Albeit, Judge Domagtoy was
not authorized to solemnize the marriage of Sumaylo and Del Rosario as against Article 3 (1) of the Family Code with regard to irregularity
of formal requisites of marriage. In addition, article 4 par 3 of the Family Code of the Philippines states that formal requisites shall not
affect the validity of marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
Hence, Domagtoy was held administratively liable because of the latter’s failure to apply the legal principles applicable in these cases,
the Court find Domagtoy have acted in gross ignorance of the law and because of this he was suspended for a period of six months.