1. Tecson Vs.

Comelec

Facts: Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner initiated a petition before the COMELEC to disqualify FPJ and to deny
due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth,
according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his
father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner
asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to
FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate
birth of respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita
Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F.
Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of respondent.

Issue: Whether or Not FPJ is a natural born Filipino citizen.

Held: Yes. It is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen,
which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself
been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent
prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino
citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old,
Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and
that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other
evidence, could have well been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have
benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of
Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935
Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose
fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.

But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he
cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of
Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code.
2. In Re Guardianship of the Minor Roy Reginald Lelina. vs. ADMINISTRATOR OF VETERANS AFFAIRS

Facts:

Severo Viloria was, on October 27, 1948, appointed guardian of the person and estate of the minor Roy Reginald Lelina,
beneficiary of arrears pay, insurance, and other benefits from the U.S Veterans Administration due to the death of his
late father Constancio Lelina, supposedly a member of the U.S. Armed Forces during the war. On March 31, 1950, the
court authorized the guardian to withdraw from the estate of his ward the sum of not to exceed P30 a month for the
boy's support and other expenditures.

On March 20, 1952, the U. S. Veterans Administration filed a motion in the guardianship proceedings, alleging receipt of
certain letters from its central office in Washington, D. C., to the effect that the minor's deceased father had not
guerrilla or other service in the armed forces of the United States, and that consequently, his heir was not entitled to the
payment of gratuitous National Service Life Insurance, and prayed that the guardian be ordered to stop further payment
of monthly allowances to the minor. T

The court found the motion well-founded and granted the same. A few years later, on February 15, 1955, the
Administrator of Veterans Affairs again filed a motion in the same guardianship proceedings for a refund to the U.S.
Veterans Administration of the sum of $2,879.68, the balance of gratuitous insurance benefits allegedly wrongfully paid
to the minor Roy Reginald Lelina, which was still on deposit with the Philippine National Bank, San Fernando, La Union
Branch. Upon opposition of the guardian, who submitted evidence of the service record of the minor's deceased father
duly recognized by both the Philippine and U.S. Armies, the motion for refund was denied. Then on April 27, 1955, the
guardian moved to be allowed to withdraw P4,000 from the minor's estate to meet the minor's needs. This motion was
opposed by the Administrator of Veterans Affairs, arguing that the minors right to National Service Life Insurance
benefits is governed exclusively by the S.S. Code Annotated, which provides (Tit. 38, section 808) that decisions of the
Administrator —shall be final and conclusive on all questions of law or fact and no other official of the United States,
except a judge or judges of the Unite States courts, shall have jurisdiction to review any such decisions;

In the same motion, the Administrator prayed for the setting aside of the court's order denying the refund of the money
in the hands of the minor's guardian, on the ground of "lack of jurisdiction".

Acting on the pending motions of the guardian and the Administrator, the lower court held:and denied Administrator's
position for refund. The Administrator of Veterans Affairs sought reconsideration of the above order, which was denied;
wherefore, it appealed to this Court.

Issue: Whether or not the decision of the administrator is final and conclusive in Ph Courts

Ruling:

No. We are of the opinion that the appeal should be rejected. The provisions of the U.S. Code, invoked by the
appellant, make the decisions of the U.S. Veteran Administrator final and conclusive when made on claims properly
submitted to him for resolution; but they are not applicable to the present case, where the Administrator is not acting
as a judge but as a litigant. There is a great difference between actions against the Administrator (which must be filed
strictly in accordance with the conditions that are imposed by the Veterans' Act, including the exclusive review by
United States courts), and those actions where the veterans' Administrator seeks a remedy from our courts and submits
to their jurisdiction by filing actions therein. Our attention has not been called to any law or treaty that would make the
findings of the Veterans' Administrator, in actions where he is a party, conclusive on our courts. That in effect, would
deprive our tribunals or judicial discretion and render them mere subordinate instrumentalities of the veterans'
Administrator.

In an analogous case, we have ruled:

By filing this action of partition in the court a quo, the Philippine Alien Property Administrator has submitted to its
jurisdiction and put in issue the legality of his vesting order. He can not therefore now dispute this power. (Brownell
vs. Bautista, 50 Off. Gaz., 4772.)

From the time the amounts now sought to be recovered where paid to the appellee guardian, for the ward's benefit,
the latter became their lawful possessor and he can not be deprived thereof on the sole allegation of the Veterans'
Administrator that the money was erroneously paid. The burden lies upon him to satisfy the court that the alleged
mistake was really committed; and the Philippine courts' determination of the question is as binding upon the
Veterans' Administrator as upon any other litigant.

(As to the claim of the guardian in the same proceeding)

Concerning the claim itself, we agree with the court below that it was not properly filed in the guardianship
proceedings, since the latter are solely concerned with the ward's care a custody and the proper administration or
management of his properties. Conflicts regarding ownership or title to the property in the hands of the guardian, in
his capacity as such, should be litigated in a separate proceeding.
3. Aznar vs. Garcia L-16749 G.R. No. L-16749, 31 January 1963

FACTS: Edward E. Christensen, though born in New York, migrated to California, where he resided and
consequently was considered a California citizen. In 1913, he came to the Philippines where he became a
domiciliary until his death. However, during the entire period of his residence in this country he had always
considered himself a citizen of California. In his will executed on March 5, 1951, he instituted an acknowledged
natural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen as his only heir, but left a legacy of sum of money in favor of Helen
Christensen Garcia who was rendered to have been declared acknowledged natural daughter.

Counsel for appellant claims that California law should be applied; that under California law, the matter is
referred back to the law of the domicile; that therefore Philippine law is ultimately applicable; that finally, the
share of Helen must be increased in view of the successional rights of illegitimate children under Philippine
law. On the other hand, counsel for the heir of Christensen contends that inasmuch as it is clear that under
Article 16 of our Civil Code, the national law of the deceased must apply, our courts must immediately apply
the internal law of California on the matter; that under California law there are no compulsory heirs and
consequently a testator could dispose of any property possessed by him in absolute dominion and that finally,
illegitimate children not being entitled to anything and his will remain undisturbed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine law should prevail in administering the estate of Christensen?

RULING: Yes. The court in deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen said in effect that there are two
rules in California on the matter: the internal law which should apply to Californians domiciled in California;
and the conflict rule which should apply to Californians domiciled outside of California. The California conflict
rule says: “If there is no law to the contrary in the place where personal property is situated, is deemed to
follow the person of its owner and is governed by the law of his domicile.” Christensen being domiciled
outside California, the law of his domicile, the Philippines, ought to be followed.

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the
amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the
property and regardless of the country where said property may be found.

There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United States, each
state of the Union having its own private law applicable to its citizens only and in force only within the state.
The “national law” indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted can not, therefore, possibly mean or
apply to any general American law. So it can refer to no other than the private law of the State of California.
4. In re ESTATE OF FERDINAND MARCOS, HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION. Maximo HILAO, No. 92-15526.
Decided June 16, 1994. Defendant is the Estate of Ferdinand Marcos. THIS IS A LONG DIGEST. I APOLOGIZE. I
HAD A HARD TIME huhuhu
FACTS:
During Ferdinand Marcos' tenure as President of the Philippines, up to 10,000 people in the Philippines were
allegedly tortured, summarily executed or disappeared at the hands of military intelligence personnel acting
pursuant to martial law declared by Marcos. Military intelligence allegedly operated under the authority of
Marcos, General Fabian Ver, and Imee Marcos-Manotoc (Ferdinand Marcos' daughter).

Marcos, his family, Ver and others loyal to Marcos fled to Hawaii. A number of lawsuits were filed against
them, claiming that the plaintiffs had been arrested and tortured, or were the families of people arrested,
tortured, and executed between 1971 and 1986.

All actions were dismissed by district courts on the "act of state" defense; we reversed and remanded in an
unpublished decision. Default was entered against Imee Marcos-Manotoc in one of the individual cases
consolidated in this action. She moved to set aside the default and moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Act and immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSA). That, she
was entitled to sovereign immunity because her challenged actions were premised on her authority as a
government agent. The motions were denied. The Estate also argues that Marcos' acts were premised on his
official authority, and thus fall within FSIA.

The plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent the Estate from transferring or secreting any assets
in order to preserve the possibility of collecting a judgment. The Estate had earlier been enjoined from
transferring or secreting assets in an action brought by the Republic of the Philippines against Ferdinand
Marcos. That preliminary injunction had been appealed, and was affirmed.

ISSUE: W/N this action brought for torts committed by military intelligence officials through torture prohibited
by the law of nations, is a cause of action and within the jurisdictional grant of Sec. 1350. Of the U.S

RULING: YES
A. Subject matter jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Act
The Alien Tort Act, 28 US Constitution (U.S.C.) Sec. 1350 provides: The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty
of the United States. In upholding the default judgment against Marcos-Manotoc, we held that a "suit as an
alien for the tort of wrongful death, committed by military intelligence officials through torture prohibited by
the law of nations, is within the jurisdictional grant of Sec. 1350."

 Estate argues that international law does not provide a basis for federal court jurisdiction under Sec. 1350
We also rejected this because the prohibition against official torture carries with it the force of a jus cogens
norm, which enjoys the highest status within international law. "It is well settled that the law of nations is
part of federal common law."

 The Estate argues that we have held that "[i]nternational law principles, do not create substantive rights
or affirmative defenses for litigants in US courts." We stated that “[C]ompliance with international law
does not determine whether the United States may apply the Act to his conduct. Only two restrictions exist
on giving extraterritorial effect to Congress' directives. We require Congress [to] make clear its intent to
give extraterritorial effects to its statutes. And secondly, as a matter of constitutional law, we require that
application of the statute to the acts in question not violate the due process clause of the fifth
amendment.”"[i]nternational law principles, standing on their own, do not create substantive rights."
"[a]lthough Congress is not bound by international law in enacting statutes, out of respect for other nations,
courts should not unnecessarily construe a congressional statute in a way that violates international law."
 The Estate argues that the assertion of federal jurisdiction over an action between aliens regarding
injuries occurring in a foreign nation violates Article III of the Constitution. We held in Estate that there is
"ample indication" that the "Arising Under" Clause was meant to apply to "all cases involving foreigners."

 The Estate nonetheless argues that early decisions regarding the interpretation of section 11 of the First
Judiciary Act (the Diversity Clause), should control the interpretation of section 9 of the Act (the "Arising
Under" Clause). [The] 11th section of the judiciary act can and must receive a construction consistent with
the constitution. It says, it is true, in general terms, that the circuit court shall have cognisance of suits
"where an alien is a party;" but ... the legislative power of conferring jurisdiction on the federal courts, is, in
this respect, confined to suits between citizens and foreigners.
The 'Arising Under' Clause of Art. III provides an appropriate basis for the statutory grant of subject-matter
jurisdiction to actions by foreign plaintiffs under the Act." Congress may confer on the federal courts
jurisdiction over any case or controversy that might call for the application of federal law. [A] suit against a
foreign state under [FSIA] necessarily raises questions of substantive federal law at the very outset, and hence
clearly "arises under" federal law, as that term is used in Art. III.

B. Cause of action under the Alien Tort Act

The Estate argues that the Alien Tort Act is a purely jurisdictional statute which does not provide the
plaintiffs a cause of action and contends that Sec. 1350, like the Sec. 1331 "arising under" jurisdictional
provision, does not grant a cause of action.
Section 1331, "which requires that an action 'arise under' the laws of the United States, section 1350 does not
require that the action 'arise under' the law of nations, but only mandates a 'violation of the law of nations' in
order to create a cause of action."
The court ruled that it is unnecessary that international law provide a specific right to sue. International law
"does not require any particular reaction to violations of law.... "[N]othing more than a violation of the law of
nations is required to invoke section 1350” Actionable violations of international law must be of a norm that is
specific, universal, and obligatory. [T]he right to be free from official torture is fundamental and universal, a
right deserving of the highest stature under international law, a norm of jus cogens.

C. Abatement
The Estate argues that tort claims for personal injuries or wrongful death abate upon the death of either the
plaintiff or the defendant. We held that "The choice of law inquiry is ... primarily concerned with fairness."
Despite the fact that plaintiffs' cause of action arises under the Alien Tort Act, plaintiffs' claims are most closely
analogous to a claim that government officials violated the Eighth Amendment right of freedom from cruel and
unusual punishment. Alternatively, a Sec. 1350 action is closely analogous to a violation of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.
("Claims for tortious conduct of government officials under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1350 may be analogized to domestic
lawsuits brought under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, where plaintiffs must allege both deprivation of a federally
protected right and action 'under color of' state law."). A Sec. 1983 action also survives the death of a party.

In conclusion, the plaintiffs' claims survive the death of Ferdinand Marcos.

ADDITIONAL IN CASE SHE WILL ASK

D. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA"), is the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state
and its agencies or instrumentalities. Subject matter jurisdiction against a foreign state depends on the
existence of one of the exceptions to immunity set forth in FSIA. The existence of subject matter jurisdiction
under FSIA is a question of law reviewed de novo.

However, we have previously rejected the Estate's argument that FSIA immunizes alleged acts of torture and
execution by a foreign official. FSIA does not immunize a foreign official engaged in acts beyond the scope of
his authority: Where the officer's powers are limited by statute, his actions beyond those limitations are
considered individual and not sovereign actions. The officer is not doing the business which the sovereign has
empowered him to do.

We held that upon default, Marcos-Manotoc admitted that she acted on her own authority, not that of the
Republic of the Philippines. Her acts were not taken within any official mandate and were therefore not the
acts of an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state within the meaning of FSIA.

It is only when officials having sovereign authority act in an official capacity that the Act of State Doctrine
applies.The illegal acts of a dictator are not "official acts" unreviewable by federal courts. "if violations of jus
cogens committed outside the United States are to be exceptions to immunity, Congress must make them so."

In this case, the action is against the estate of an individual official who is accused of engaging in activities
outside the scope of his authority. FSIA thus does not apply to this case.